Professional Documents
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Paternity and Filiation
Paternity and Filiation
be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the
Angeles vs. Maglaya contrary. If it is proved that the were till living together at the time of his death,
Facts: it is presumed that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is
Petitioner is the wife of the deceased while the respondent is the child of the shown that she is capable of providing for herself.
deceased in his first wife. Respondent seeks administration of the estate of the Ø Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits as it was established that she
deceased but opposed by the surviving wife (2nd wife) alleging that the is his legitimate child. Records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the
respondent is an illegitimate child of the deceased. spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it. Rosanna was the legitimate
wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she
Issue: failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still
Whether or not the respondent is illegitimate precluding her to become the dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately. NOTE:
administratrix. Legitimacy cannot be extended to other siblings.
FACTS: The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must
Ø Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the SSS died. be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills
Ø Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of the will in
death benefits on indicating in her claim that Pablo was survived by his minor China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no
child, Jeylnn proof on these points.
Ø Her claim for monthly pension was settled.
Ø SSS received a sworn from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court
Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses
family abode approximately more than 6 years before, and lived with another to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not
man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred that purport to probate the will.
Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna.
Ø The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary. The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to
Ø CA reversed the SSC deicision and favored the respondents. probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view
thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been
ISSUE: done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and
W/N Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the
from the death of Pablo authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of
HELD: Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the
Ø It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children probate of allowance of a will and therefore, the will referred to therein cannot
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.
Ø Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears
the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from ARBOLARIO vs. CA 129163
the Civil Registry showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records
also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and the FACTS:
marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore The petitioners claim that they are the legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters
evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage. of the deceased, hence they are qualified to inherit from the latter. However,
Ø Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband the birth dates of the petitioner were earlier than the death of the original wife
or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo of their father.
challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime.
Ø The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth ISSUE:
certificate bearing Pablo’s signature, which was verified from his specimen
signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a Whether or not the petitioners are legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of
competent evidence of paternity. the deceased.
Ø For Rosanna, to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must establish 2
qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is RULING:
dependent upon the member for support.
No, they are not. The petitioners were born before 1951. Therefore, in the Rodriguez his common-law wife. Plaintiffs allege that they alone have the right
absence of any fact that would show that conjugal union of Juan Arbolario and to the surname ―Valencia.‖
Catalina Baloyo had been judicially annulled before 1951, or before Juan
Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, it would only be reasonable to Issues: WON the illegitimate children could use the surname Valencia
conclude that the foregoing union which resulted in the birth of the [Arbolarios]
was extra-marital. And consequently, Voltaire Arbolario, et al., are illegitimate Held: Yes
children of Juan Arbolario.
Ratio: This cannot happen since if plaintiffs were correct then they could stop
As held by the appellate court, without proof that Catalina died in 1903, her numerous inhabitants from using the surname Valencia as well. Moreover, Pio
marriage to Juan is presumed to have continued. Even where there is actual Valencia has acquiesced to this as well. Finally, there is no law granting the
severance of the filial companionship between spouses, their marriage subsists, exclusive ownership over a surname.
and either spouse’s cohabitation with any third party cannot be presumed to be
between “husband and wife.” Briones vs Miguel
Facts:
In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused
the death of their unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective
bargaining agreement, then filed death benefits claim from his employer, the Review of CA decision awarding custody of minor child to mother (custody
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation which denied the claim. til child reaches age 10 then he is to choose w/c parent he wants to stay
Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both parties agreed to with) w/ visitation rights to the ℗Father, Joey D. Briones.
have Atty. Allan Montaño act as the arbitrator. Montaño ruled that Hortillano is
entitled to his claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Montaño. Mar 5, 02‘ ℗ files for Habeas Corpus claiming the child was visited by яs
Maricel and Francisca Miguel relatives of the mother of the child, я Loreta
On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because Miguel, under the pretext of taking the child to SM, then they did not
under the CBA, death benefits are awarded if an employee’s legitimate return.
dependent has died; but that in this case, no “death” has occurred because the
fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no juridical ℗ claims that he extensively looked for the child but failed so he was
personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code compelled to file for habeas corpus.
which provides a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that
the fetus was not born hence it is not a legitimate dependent as contemplated Я mother Loreta alleges that the child was not taken as he was fetched by
by the CBA nor did it suffer death as contemplated under civil laws. her w/ the ℗ consent.
ISSUES: Я and ℗ met in Japan and had a relationship together w/c bore the child
Michael Kevin
1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent?
Pineda (relationship eventually soured accd‘g to я Loreta because of ℗
2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die? illicit relationship w/ another woman, я now married to Japanese national).
2. No. Death is defined as “cessation of life”. Certainly, a child in the womb has Held:
life. There is no need to discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired
juridical personality – that is not the issue here. But nevertheless, life should not Yes, the child being born outside of a legitimate marriage
be equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly is considered illegitimate since his illegitimacy is not cured by his
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not parent‘s later marriage. As such he is covered by Art 176 of the family
explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. code that mentions among other things that a mother shall have
In this case, Hortillano’s fetus had had life inside the womb as evidenced by the
fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage. Thus, ―parental authority‖ over the illegitimate child, regardless of
death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an employee is entitled to whether the father acknowledges paternity over the child.
death benefit claims as provided for in their CBA. Acknowledgment of paternity is only a means of compelling support
for the child not entitling custody. Moreover the Family Code does
Moore vs Republic not distinguish b/w the natural and spurious nature of the
illegitimate child as they are treated in the same category.
Naldoza vs Republic – change of surname of the minor legitimate children on Furthermore absent any compelling reason for depriving я Loreta
account of the father’s activities such bigamous relationships, swindling, among custody over the child (such
others. The court denied the petition.
Heirs of Loreto Maramag v. Maramag
Republic vs CA, 300 SCRA 138
FACTS: Petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag
Heirs of Basbas vs Basbas (Loreto), while respondents were Loretos illegitimate family. Loreto designated
respondents as beneficiaries in his life insurance policies from Insular Life and
Uy vs Chua, GR No. 183965 Great Pacific Life (Grepalife).
Osmenia de Valencia vs Rodriguez Petitioners insituted in the RTC a petition for revocation and/or reduction of
Facts: insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious, with prayer for a
Plaintiffs say that they are the legitimate children of the defendant Pio Valencia temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. They
in the latter‘s lawful wedlock with plaintiff Catalina Osmena. Defendants on the claim that Eva de Guzman Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a
other hand are the illegitimate children of defendant Pio Valencia with Emilia suspect in the killing of the latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive any
proceeds from his insurance policies; the illegitimate children of Loreto were ISSUE:
entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of
proceeds released to them were inofficious and should be reduced; and minor Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity.
petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied
first. RULING:
Yes.
Petitioners allege that the designation of a beneficiary is an act of liberality or a Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate
donation and, therefore, subject to the provisions of Articles 752[8] and 772[9] child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized
of the Civil Code. him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private
handwritten instrument.
The trial court held that the petitioners cannot invoke the law on donations or
the rules on testamentary succession in order to defeat the right of herein Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature
defendants to collect the insurance indemnity. The beneficiary in a contract of by the putative father in the private handwritten instrument.
insurance is not the donee spoken in the law of donation. The rules on
testamentary succession cannot apply here, for the insurance indemnity does The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
not partake of a donation. acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
It also stated that the proceeds to the Life Insurance Policy belongs exclusively to
the defendant as his individual and separate property, and not to the estate of 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
the person whose life was insured. submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
The RTC disqualifed Loreto’s concubine, Eva, from being a benficiary pursuant to
Art. 2012: Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be
who cannot make any donation to him, but stated that the insurance contract shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is
will still remain valid, but the indemnity must go to the legal heirs and not to the merely corroborative of such other evidence.
concubine, for evidently, what is prohibited under Art. 2012 is the naming of the
improper beneficiary. Manungas vs Loreto
ISSUE: Are the members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the Gotardo vs Buling
insurance for the concubine? Facts: Charles Gotardo and Divina Buling became a couple in in the last week of
January 1993. They started intimate sexual relations sometime in September
HELD: No. Sec. 53 of the Ins that the Insurance Code states: proceeds shall be 1993. By August 1994 Divina found out she was pregnant. The couple made
applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for plans to marry but later on Charles backed out of the wedding plan. Divina filed
whose benefit it is made, unless otherwise specified in the policy. a complaint for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry.
This was later on amicably settled.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the
insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 1995. Charles failed to show up and
insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy.The exception to support the child. Divina sent him a demand letter on July 1995 demanding
this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit recognition and support. When Charles did not answer, she filed her complaint
third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite. Charles denied the
stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim imputed paternity.
from the insurer.
“RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife filiation. It found the respondent’s testimony inconsistent on the question of
and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. when she had her first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e., “September 1993”
in her direct testimony while “last week of January 1993” during her cross-
The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she had
such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the refused the petitioner’s initial marriage proposal. It ordered the respondent to
illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loretos insurance policies remains valid. return the amount of support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P
Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of 10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.”
illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds
must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, “CA departed from the RTC’s appreciation of the respondent’s testimony,
to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding
designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by of the questions of the petitioner’s counsel. It noted that the petitioner and the
law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the
the benefit of the estate of the insured. respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August
1994; and that the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had previous
Dela Cruz vs Gracia relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently
set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son
FACTS: Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting a P 2,000.00 monthly child
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document support.”
attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled
"Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father, and Issue: WON CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC appreciation of
“because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to the respondent’s testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to
his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.” prove paternity.
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of Decision: SC affirmed CA.
name against Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was
the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not The burden of proof in paternity cases is on the person alleging. Divina
contain any express recognition of paternity. established prima facie case against Charles through her testimony,
corroborated by Charles uncle (dorm owner), that she’s only been involved with
one man at the time of conception. Charles did not deny his sexual relations
with her, only that it occurred at a later date.
“One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws. We have held that such other proof of one’s filiation may be a
“baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has
been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by
silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.””
“In Herrera v. Alba, we stressed that there are four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie
case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child.35 We explained that a prima facie
case exists if a woman declares — supported by corroborative proof — that she
had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of
evidence shifts to the putative father. We explained further that the two
affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of
sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or
(2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of
conception.”
Grande vs Antonio