G.R. No. 129910 September 5, 2006 The International Corporate Bank, Inc., Petitioner, Court of Appeals and Philippine National Bank, Respondents
G.R. No. 129910 September 5, 2006 The International Corporate Bank, Inc., Petitioner, Court of Appeals and Philippine National Bank, Respondents
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 9 August 1994 Amended Decision2 and the 16
July 1997 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25209.
The case originated from an action for collection of sum of money filed on 16 March 1982 by the
International Corporate Bank, Inc.4 ("petitioner") against the Philippine National Bank ("respondent").
The case was raffled to the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, Branch 6. The complaint
was amended on 19 March 1982. The case was eventually re-raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 52 ("trial court").
The Ministry of Education and Culture issued 15 checks5 drawn against respondent which petitioner
accepted for deposit on various dates. The checks are as follows:
The checks were deposited on the following dates for the following accounts:
After 24 hours from submission of the checks to respondent for clearing, petitioner paid the value of
the checks and allowed the withdrawals of the deposits. However, on 14 October 1981, respondent
returned all the checks to petitioner without clearing them on the ground that they were materially
altered. Thus, petitioner instituted an action for collection of sums of money against respondent to
recover the value of the checks.
The trial court ruled that respondent is expected to use reasonable business practices in accepting
and paying the checks presented to it. Thus, respondent cannot be faulted for the delay in clearing
the checks considering the ingenuity in which the alterations were effected. The trial court observed
that there was no attempt from petitioner to verify the status of the checks before petitioner paid the
value of the checks or allowed withdrawal of the deposits. According to the trial court, petitioner, as
collecting bank, could have inquired by telephone from respondent, as drawee bank, about the
status of the checks before paying their value. Since the immediate cause of petitioner’s loss was
the lack of caution of its personnel, the trial court held that petitioner is not entitled to recover the
value of the checks from respondent.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing both the complaint and the
counterclaim. Costs shall, however be assessed against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner appealed the trial court’s Decision before the Court of Appeals.
In its 10 October 1991 Decision,8 the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Decision. Applying
Section 4(c) of Central Bank Circular No. 580, series of 1977,9 the Court of Appeals held that checks
that have been materially altered shall be returned within 24 hours after discovery of the alteration.
However, the Court of Appeals ruled that even if the drawee bank returns a check with material
alterations after discovery of the alteration, the return would not relieve the drawee bank from any
liability for its failure to return the checks within the 24-hour clearing period. The Court of Appeals
explained:
Does this mean that, as long as the drawee bank returns a check with material alteration
within 24 hour[s] after discovery of such alteration, such return would have the effect of
relieving the bank of any liability whatsoever despite its failure to return the check within the
24- hour clearing house rule?
Obviously, such bank cannot be held liable for its failure to return the check in question not
later than the next regular clearing. However, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that it
could still be held liable if it fails to exercise due diligence in verifying the alterations made. In
other words, such bank would still be expected, nay required, to make the proper verification
before the 24-hour regular clearing period lapses, or in cases where such lapses may be
deemed inevitable, that the required verification should be made within a reasonable time.
The implication of the rule that a check shall be returned within the 24-hour clearing period is
that if the collecting bank paid the check before the end of the aforesaid 24-hour clearing
period, it would be responsible therefor such that if the said check is dishonored and
returned within the 24-hour clearing period, the drawee bank cannot be held liable. Would
such an implication apply in the case of materially altered checks returned within 24 hours
after discovery? This Court finds nothing in the letter of the above-cited C.B. Circular that
would justify a negative answer. Nonetheless, the drawee bank could still be held liable in
certain instances. Even if the return of the check/s in question is done within 24 hours after
discovery, if it can be shown that the drawee bank had been patently negligent in the
performance of its verification function, this Court finds no reason why the said bank should
be relieved of liability.
Although banking practice has it that the presumption of clearance is conclusive when it
comes to the application of the 24-hour clearing period, the same principle may not be
applied to the 24-hour period vis-a-vis material alterations in the sense that the drawee bank
which returns materially altered checks within 24 hours after discovery would be conclusively
relieved of any liability thereon. This is because there could well be various intervening
events or factors that could affect the rights and obligations of the parties in cases such as
the instant one including patent negligence on the part of the drawee bank resulting in an
unreasonable delay in detecting the alterations. While it is true that the pertinent proviso in
C.B. Circular No. 580 allows the drawee bank to return the altered check within the period
"provided by law for filing a legal action", this does not mean that this would entitle or allow
the drawee bank to be grossly negligent and, inspite thereof, avail itself of the maximum
period allowed by the above-cited Circular. The discovery must be made within a reasonable
time taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case. In other words, the
aforementioned C.B. Circular does not provide the drawee bank the license to be grossly
negligent on the one hand nor does it preclude the collecting bank from raising available
defenses even if the check is properly returned within the 24-hour period after discovery of
the material alteration.10
The Court of Appeals rejected the trial court’s opinion that petitioner could have verified the status of
the checks by telephone call since such imposition is not required under Central Bank rules. The
dispositive portion of the 10 October 1991 Decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the
defendant-appellee Philippine National Bank is declared liable for the value of the fifteen
checks specified and enumerated in the decision of the trial court (page 3) in the amount
of P1,447,920.00
SO ORDERED.11
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the 10 October 1991 Decision. In its 9 August 1994
Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and affirmed the Decision of the trial court
dismissing the complaint.
In reversing itself, the Court of Appeals held that its 10 October 1991 Decision failed to appreciate
that the rule on the return of altered checks within 24 hours from the discovery of the alteration had
been duly passed by the Central Bank and accepted by the members of the banking system. Until
the rule is repealed or amended, the rule has to be applied.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Amended Decision. In its 16 July 1997 Resolution,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
The Issues
2. Whether respondent was negligent in failing to recognize within a reasonable period the
altered checks and in not returning the checks within the period; and
3. Whether the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent was out of time thus making
the 10 October 1991 Decision final and executory.12
The Ruling of This Court
Respondent asserts that the petition should be dismissed outright since petitioner availed of a wrong
mode of appeal. Respondent cites Ybañez v. Court of Appeals13 where the Court ruled that "a
petition cannot be subsumed simultaneously under Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and
neither may petitioners delegate upon the court the task of determining under which rule the petition
should fall."
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive.14 However, this Court may set aside technicality for justifiable reasons. The petition
before the Court is clearly meritorious. Further, the petition was filed on time both under Rules 45
and 65.15 Hence, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice,16 we will treat the petition as having been filed under Rule 45.
Sections 124 and 125 of Act No. 2031, otherwise known as the Negotiable Instruments Law,
provide:
SEC. 124. Alteration of instrument; effect of. ― Where a negotiable instrument is materially
altered without the assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as against a party
who has himself made, authorized, or assented to the alteration and subsequent indorsers.
But when an instrument has been materially altered and is in the hands of a holder in due
course, not a party to the alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to its original
tenor.
SEC. 125. What constitutes a material alteration. ― Any alteration which changes:
or which adds a place of payment where no place of payment is specified, or any other
change or addition which alters the effect of the instrument in any respect, is a material
alteration.
The question on whether an alteration of the serial number of a check is a material alteration under
the Negotiable Instruments Law is already a settled matter. In Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Appeals, this Court ruled that the alteration on the serial number of a check is not a material
alteration. Thus:
An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument. It means an
unauthorized change in an instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of
a party or an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an incomplete
instrument relating to the obligation of a party. In other words, a material alteration is one
which changes the items which are required to be stated under Section 1 of the Negotiable
Instrument[s] Law.
(b) Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money;
In his book entitled "Pandect of Commercial Law and Jurisprudence," Justice Jose C. Vitug
opines that "an innocent alteration (generally, changes on items other than those required to
be stated under Sec. 1, N.I.L.) and spoliation (alterations done by a stranger) will not avoid
the instrument, but the holder may enforce it only according to its original tenor.
xxxx
The case at the bench is unique in the sense that what was altered is the serial number of
the check in question, an item which, it can readily be observed, is not an essential requisite
for negotiability under Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The aforementioned
alteration did not change the relations between the parties. The name of the drawer and the
drawee were not altered. The intended payee was the same. The sum of money due to the
payee remained the same. x x x
xxxx
The check’s serial number is not the sole indication of its origin. As succinctly found by the
Court of Appeals, the name of the government agency which issued the subject check was
prominently printed therein. The check’s issuer was therefore sufficiently identified, rendering
the referral to the serial number redundant and inconsequential. x x x
xxxx
Petitioner, thus cannot refuse to accept the check in question on the ground that the serial
number was altered, the same being an immaterial or innocent one.17
Likewise, in the present case the alterations of the serial numbers do not constitute material
alterations on the checks.
Incidentally, we agree with the petitioner’s observation that the check in the PNB case appears to
belong to the same batch of checks as in the present case. The check in the PNB case was also
issued by the Ministry of Education and Culture. It was also drawn against PNB, respondent in this
case. The serial number of the check in the PNB case is 7-3666-223-3 and it was issued on 7
August 1981.
Respondent filed its motion for reconsideration of the 10 October 1991 Decision on 6 November
1991. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration states that it received a copy of the 10 October 1991
Decision on 22 October 1991.18 Thus, it appears that the motion for reconsideration was filed on
time. However, the Registry Return Receipt shows that counsel for respondent or his agent received
a copy of the 10 October 1991 Decision on 16 October 1991,19 not on 22 October 1991 as
respondent claimed. Hence, the Court of Appeals is correct when it noted that the motion for
reconsideration was filed late. Despite its late filing, the Court of Appeals resolved to admit the
motion for reconsideration "in the interest of substantial justice."20
There are instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the interest of justice. However, in this
case, respondent did not proffer any explanation for the late filing of the motion for reconsideration.
Instead, there was a deliberate attempt to deceive the Court of Appeals by claiming that the copy of
the 10 October 1991 Decision was received on 22 October 1991 instead of on 16 October 1991. We
find no justification for the posture taken by the Court of Appeals in admitting the motion for
reconsideration. Thus, the late filing of the motion for reconsideration rendered the 10 October 1991
Decision final and executory.
The Court will not rule on the proper application of Central Bank Circular No. 580 in this case. Since
there were no material alterations on the checks, respondent as drawee bank has no right to
dishonor them and return them to petitioner, the collecting bank.21 Thus, respondent is liable to
petitioner for the value of the checks, with legal interest from the time of filing of the complaint on 16
March 1982 until full payment.22 Further, considering that respondent’s motion for reconsideration
was filed late, the 10 October 1991 Decision, which held respondent liable for the value of the
checks amounting to P1,447,920, had become final and executory.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 9 August 1994 Amended Decision and the 16 July 1997
Resolution of the Court of Appeals. We rule that respondent Philippine National Bank is liable to
petitioner International Corporate Bank, Inc. for the value of the checks amounting to P1,447,920,
with legal interest from 16 March 1982 until full payment. Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.