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Complainant Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
Complainant Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
SYLLABUS
DECISION
NARVASA , C .J : p
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of
E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari
M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in
Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned rm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a
letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the
company. He wrote:
". . . I am formally and o cially withdrawing from and notifying you of my
intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your
company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of
your company's branch o ce here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that
my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of con dence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void
ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and
unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to
my rights and interests."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be
the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21,
1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited,
he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from
his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M.
Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget O ce, and to the Chief, Finance
Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began
negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage, and . . . the
refund of . . . (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi
led with this Court a veri ed complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended
a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words,
"Free Postage — PD 26 ." 1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds
through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"
The Court referred the case to the O ce of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation. 1 4
The rst accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her
honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized
acts . . . prejudicial to . . . (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had
fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse
of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with
Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without . . . (his) authority and against . . . (his) will," and "concealed the
real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely
acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded
feelings and untold nancial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of
P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 1 5
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public O cials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
utmost responsibility in the public service. 1 6 Section 4 of the Code commands that "
(p)ublic o cials and employees . . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . . refrain
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
public safety and public interest." 1 7 More than once has this Court emphasized that "the
conduct and behavior of every o cial and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the
respect of the public for the judiciary." 1 8
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or
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public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed —
however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action
against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without
malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." 19 Righteous
indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an o cer of a Court, Alawi is
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers.
As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word
should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from
these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly
held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion
to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full- edged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has
been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law,"
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly
similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the
record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
o cer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
a. Annexes B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya's Comment dated June 5, 1996.
b. Annexes F and G, Id.
c. Annex C-2, Id.
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1. Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14; copies of the letter were also furnished
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, the Finance Management and Budget
Office and the Financial Division of the Supreme Court.
2. Resolution dated March 25, 1996.
3. Dated April 19, 1996.
4. Rollo at p. 23.
5. Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice that NOTICES (or
communications informing) of Resolutions adopted by the Court En Banc or any of its
three (3) Divisions are sent to the parties by and over the signature of the corresponding
Clerk or Court or his Assistant, the Court's Resolutions being incorporated verbatim in
said notices.
6. Dated April 22, 1996.
7. Rollo at p. 28.
8. Id. at p. 60.
9. Id. at p. 32.
10. Id. at p. 34.
11. Id. at p. 35, et seq.
12. Id. at p. 35.
13. Id.
14. See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996; Rollo at p. 61 et seq.