Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR

PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
COMMAND, respondents.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere,
as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to
direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for
the protection of the people.

Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer,
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP)
sues in its capacity as an association whose members are all members of the IBP.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,
AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility
and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty
to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints,
considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-
ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court
order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988,
Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was
gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing
to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning
shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had
gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-
up without a court order or search warrant.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket
authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in
violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not
killed, had been harassed.

Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se
illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their
routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right
against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.

In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for
People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual
petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to
bring the action, as real parties in interest.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular
case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved. 5

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and
searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without
more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his
right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and
seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case. 6

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which
is parked on the public fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light
therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas)
may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit
of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize
the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take
judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement,
so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA
"sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming
rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in
media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum
up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted,
the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at
the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were
temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police
and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional
Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 86941. March 3, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TEODORO BASAY @

"DORO" and JAIME RAMIREZ @ "NEBOY", accused. JAIME RAMIREZ @
"NEBOY", accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND

TO COUNSEL AND TO BE INFORMED OF SUCH RIGHTS; WAIVER THEREOF;
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; DEFINED; PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS TO BE
EMPLOYED. — ". . . " . . . The landmark opinion of Miranda vs. Arizona, decided in
1966, as noted above, the source of this constitutional provision, emphasized that
statements made during the period of custodial interrogation to be admissible require a
clear intelligent waiver of constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to
questioning that he has a right to remain silent, that any utterance may be used against
him, and that he has the right to the presence of a counsel, either retained or appointed. In
the language of Chief Justice Warren: 'Our holding will be spelled out with some
specificity in the pages which follow, but briefly stated, it is this: the prosecution may not
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the
procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to
inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does not make (sic)
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however,
he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with
an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is
alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may
not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned.'"

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED BY PEACE OFFICERS WHEN

MAKING ARREST AND WHEN CONDUCTING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. —
In Morales vs. Enrile, in the light of the said Section 20, prescribed the procedure to be
followed by peace officers when making an arrest and when conducting a custodial
investigation. Thus: "7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone
he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence
of counsel engaged by the reason arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by
the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid
down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence."

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PHRASE "RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF SUCH RIGHTS"

EXPLAINED; CASE AT BAR. — In People vs. Nicandro, this Court declared that one's
right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." Thus, is not enough for the interrogator
to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution; the former
must also explain the effects of such provision in practical terms — e.g., what the person
under interrogation may or may not do - and in a language the subject fairly understands.
The right "to be informed" carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the
subject's understanding of what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to
be attained, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the
education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person
undergoing investigation. In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the
subject is informed of such right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same
and should be told that he could ask for counsel if he so desired or that one could be
provided him at his request. If he decides not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of
one to be provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such
waiver, to be valid and effective, must still be made with the assistance of counsel. That
counsel must be a lawyer. . . . the kind of "advice" proffered by the unidentified
interrogator belongs to that stereotyped class — a long question by the investigator
informing the appellant of his right followed by a monosyllabic answer — which this
Court has condemned for being unsatisfactory. The investigator gave his advice
perfunctorily or in a pro-forma manner, obviously to pay mere lip service to the
prescribed norms. As this Court observed in People vs. Newman, this stereotyped
"advice": " . . . has assumed the nature of a 'legal form' or model. Its tired, punctilious,
fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing."

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIMARY OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL STRESSED IN 1987

CONSTITUTION. — "SEC 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him." The adjectives competent and independent, which qualify the kind of counsel an
accused is entitled to during investigation, were not found in the previous Constitution.
Their incorporation in the 1987 Constitution was thus meant to stress the primacy of this
right to counsel.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES; IN CASE AT

BAR, CONDITION OF WITNESS AT TIME SHE SUPPOSEDLY GAVE STATEMENT
RENDERED EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION IMPOSSIBLE. — We harbor very
serious doubts about the alleged statement given by Bombie Toting to Sgt. Tabanao and
Jaime Saguban identifying the appellant and Teodoro Basay as the perpetrators of the
heinous crime. In the first place, the trial court itself ruled that Bombie was not a
competent witness. We agree with such a conclusion, not necessarily because she was
only six (6) years old, but because her condition at the time she supposedly gave her
statement made it impossible for her to have communicated effectively. She suffered the
following injuries: "Infected hack wound from the right anterior lumbar area transecting
mid abdomen, inguinal area left to the medial thigh left through and through, with
necrotic transected muscle." She was taken from the crime scene only on 6 March 1986,
or two (2) days after the commission of the crime, and died in the hospital on 7 March
1986. The doctor who first attended to her when she arrived at the Provincial Hospital, a
certain Dr. Sy, was not presented as a witness. On the other hand, the doctor who attended
to her before she died, Dr. Edgar Cantalao, testified that when he last saw Bombie alive,
she could not talk.

6. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; WHEN SUFFICIENT FOR

CONVICTION; CASE AT BAR. — While it may be true that the appellant ran away
when he first saw the armed law officers, he did so merely out of fear of them. This act
should not be considered as the flight which is indicative of guilt. The appellant had not
left his house or barangay since 4 March 1986, the day the crime was committed. If he
were indeed one of the perpetrators and had the intention to flee in order to avoid arrest,
he should have vanished sooner and should not have remained in his house. Besides, if
indeed his running away could be construed as flight, it could only be considered as
circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would still be insufficient for a conviction. Under
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in order that circumstantial evidence may
sustain a conviction, there must, inter alia, be more than one (1) circumstance. No other
circumstance was established in this case.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J p:

Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with Multiple Murder with Arson in a
criminal complaint 1 filed on 24 March 1986 with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Pamplona-Amlan-San Jose in the Province of Negros Oriental for having
allegedly killed the spouses Zosimo and Beatrice Toting and their six-year old daughter,
Bombie, and for having burned the said spouses' house to conceal the crime; as a
consequence of such fire, the spouses' other daughter, Manolita, was burned to death.
On 31 March 1986, the MCTC issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused; no bail was
recommended. 2 It appears, however, that the accused had earlier been apprehended on 6
March 1986 by elements of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Civilian Home Defense
Forces (CHDF) and were detained at the Pamplona municipal jail.

On 15 April 1986, the accused filed a Waiver of Preliminary Investigation 3 which

prompted the MCTC, the following day, to order the clerk of court to forward the records
of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. 4

Meanwhile, on 14 August 1986, the Integrated National Police (INP) Station Commander
of Pamplona amended the complaint by including therein the name of another victim,
Manolo Toting, who suffered second and third degree burns because of the burning of the
house. 5

On 11 December 1986, the Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental an Information for Multiple
Murder and Frustrated Murder with Arson 6 against the accused. The accusatory portion
of the Information reads:

xxx xxx xxx

"That on or about March 4, 1986, at sitio Tigbao, Barangay Banawe, Pamplona, Negros
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and acting in common accord,
with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, stab and hack with the use of a bolo and sickle,
with which the accused were then respectively armed and provided, one ZOSIMO
TOTING, SR., thereby inflicting upon the victim hack wound, neck posterior area 5"
long, 3" depth, hack wounds, left upper back 3" long, 4" depth, stab wound, thru and thru,
lower abdomen, 4" width , exit lower back 1" width, 90% 2nd and 3rd degree burns of
the body, and which wounds caused the death of said Zosimo Toting, Sr., immediately
thereafter; one BEATRICE TOTING, thereby inflicting upon the victim hacking (sic)
wound, neck posterior area, 5" long, 6" depth, incised wound, epigastric area 11" long, 4"
depth, exposing vital organs, lower abdomen, 11" long, 4" depth exposing intestines, 90%
2nd and 3rd degree burns of the body, and which wounds caused the death of said
Beatrice Toting immediately thereafter; one BOMBIE TOTING, thereby inflicting upon
the victim infected hack wound from the right anterior lumbar area transecting mid-
abdomen, inguial area left to the medial thigh left, through and through, with necrotic
transected muscle, and which wounds caused the death of said Bombie Toting shortly
thereafter; and in order to cover-up the heinous crime committed, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and acting in common accord, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set to fire the house of the aforesaid victim
(sic) spouses Zosimo Toting, Sr. and Beatrice Toting, thereby razing it to the ground, and
as a consequence thereto MANOLITA TOTING suffered Third degree burns, all burn
(sic) body, head, extremities or 100% burns, and which wounds caused the death of said
Manolita Toting immediately thereafter and also causing injuries to MANOLO TOTING,
to wit: 20% 2nd and 3rd degree burns on the upper extremity bilateral, posterior shoulder,
left and back, and which wounds would have caused the death of victim Manolo Toting,
thus performing all the overt acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, the timely medical assistance extended
to said Manolo Toting which prevented his death.

Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Articles 6, 48 and 50 of the Revised Penal Code."

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7411 and was raffled off to Branch 40 of the
said court.

After both accused entered a not guilty plea during their arraignment on 23 February
1987, 7 trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented Dr. Edgardo Barredo,
MCTC Judge Teopisto Calumpang, Jaime Saguban, Sgt. Reynaldo Tabanao, Dr. Edgar
Gantalao and Dr. Lucio Togonon as its witnesses for the evidence in chief, and Judge
Calumpang and Elpedio Catacutan in rebuttal; for its surrebuttal, Pfc. Urbano Cavallida
was presented. On the other hand, the accused testified for the defense together with
witnesses Joven Lopez and Maxima Basay. Accused Ramirez took the witness stand
again in surrebuttal.

On 15 December 1988, the trial court promulgated its Decision, dated 14 December
1988, acquitting accused Teodoro Basay but convicting accused Jaime Ramirez. 8 Its
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Multiple Murder, Frustrated Murder With Arson against
the accused Teodoro Basay, this Court hereby finds said accused Teodoro Basay NOT
GUILTY and orders his immediate release from detention.

The prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of Multiple Murder, Frustrated Murder With Arson against accused Jaime Ramirez
(sic), this Court finds him GUILTY to (sic) said crime and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the sum of
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos as his civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED." 9

The evidence for the prosecution upon which the decision is based is summarized in
detail in the trial court's decision and is further condensed in the Appellee's Brief 10 as
follows:

"On March 6, 1986, Zosimo Toting Jr. reported to the Nabalabag Philippine Constabulary
Patrol at Pamplona, Negros Oriental, that his parents had been killed and their house at
Tigbaw, [Pamplona] Negros Oriental, burned. This prompted PC Sgt. Reynaldo Tabanao,
Sgt. Nestorio Rubia, Jaime Saguban and three members of the Civilian Home Defense
Force to go to Tigbaw, [Pamplona] Negros Oriental, to investigate the incident (TSN,
January 20, 1988, p. 5).

Upon arriving at Tigbaw, they found a burned house and several dead bodies. The trial
court identified the four (4) fatalities and their injuries as follows:

(1) Zosimo Toting, Sr., with hack wound neck, posterior area, . . . hack wound, left upper
back . . . stab wound, through and through, lower abdomen, . . . 90% second and third
degree burns of the body;

(2) Beatrice Toting, hack wound, neck posterior are . . . incised wound, epigastric area . . .
exposing vital organs, lower abdomen . . . exist (sic) lower back, 90% second and third
degree burns of the body;

(3) Bombie Toting, inflicted hack wound from the anterior lumbar area transecting mid-
abdomen, inguial area left to the medial thigh left, through and through, with necrotic
transected muscle;

(4) Manolita Toting, third degree burns, all burned body, head, extrimities (sic) or 100%
burns;

Manolo Toting did not die but suffered 20% second and third degree burns on the upper
extremity bilateral, posterior shoulder, left and back (Records, p. 213).

Zosimo Toting, Sr, Beatrice Toting, Manolita Toting and Manolo Toting were found near
the vicinity of the burned house. About forty (40) meters away, the investigating officers
found six year old Bombie Toting suffering from serious hack wounds (TSN, January 20,
1988, p. 18). The young girl said that she had been in this condition for one and a half
days already.

Bombie Toting related to Sgt. Tabanao that on March 4, 1986 at 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, appellant and Teodoro Basay killed her parents and burned their house (TSN,
January 20, 1988, p. 18, Records, p. 9).

On the same day the investigating officers went to the appellant's house. They saw
appellant fixing the roof of his house and when appellant saw them, he went down and
tried to ran (sic) away (TSN, January, 20, 1988, p. 22). Appellant was turned over to the
Pamplona Police Station (TSN, January 20, 1988, p. 25).

Bombie Toting was brought to the hospital but due to the gravity of her injuries she died
on March 7, 1986 at 1:40 P.M. (Records, p. 12, Exhibit I).

Appellant was brought into the chamber of Judge Teopisto Calumpang, the municipal
circuit trial judge of Pamplona, Amlan, and San Jose, on March 14, 1986. He was
accompanied by Mr. Elpedio Catacutan who acted as appellant's counsel (TSN, June 6,
1988, p. 6). They brought with them an affidavit previously typed by a police
investigating officer. The Judge then made the court interpreter translate the allegations of
the sworn statement into the local dialect for appellant (TSN, June 6, 1988). Thereafter, in
the presence of the Judge, appellant and Mr. Catacutan signed the affidavit. (TSN,
January 20, 1988, p. 14). Appellant and counsel also signed the vernacular translation of
Exhibit F (Records, p . 12)."

Upon the other hand, the evidence for accused Jaime Ramirez is substantially
summarized in the Appellant's Brief 11 in this wise:

"Evidence for the Defense:

xxx xxx xxx

Accused Jaime Ramirez testified that he was cooking food for the pig when the armed
uniformed men arrested him on March 5, 1986 and was brought (sic) to the Nabalabag
PC Detachment where he was maltreated. Later, he was brought to Municipal (sic) Jail
where he stayed for one month and 23 days.

Queried on the 'Joint Waiver', this witness said he did not read it because he did not know
how to read. When it was read to him, he did not understand it because it was read in
English. Elpedio Catacutan was not his lawyer and he did not know him (TSN, March 5,
pp. 3, 5-6, 9-10).

On cross-examination, this witness said he reached Grade II and knows how to write his
name. He was alone at the time he was arrested. He was arrested ahead of Teodoro Basay
and those who arrested him where (sic) not the same persons who arrested Teodoro
Basay.

He first saw Elpedio Catacutan in the Pamplona Municipal Hall when Elpedio was going
upstairs. When he signed Exhibit "F", Catacutan was in front of him. They did not
converse with each others (sic). He did not engage Catacutan to assist him, nor solicit his
services. He does know (sic) any one who solicited Catacutan's services for him. He did
not ask the Judge (Calumpang) that a lawyer be designated to help him in connection
with the affidavit. The Pamplona Judge did not offer to give him a lawyer to assist him in
the execution of the affidavit (TSN, October 4, 1988, p.4)." 12

Jaime Ramirez is a farmer and at the time he testified on 8 March 1988, was nineteen
(19) years old and single. 13 The prosecution did not rebut his claim that he had only
finished Grade II and that he does not know how to read. He, however, understands the
Cebuano dialect. 14

The Exhibit "F" referred to above is the Sworn Statement, 15 in English, of accused
Jaime Ramirez taken in the Pamplona police station on 7 March 1986 and subscribed and
sworn to only on 14 March 1986 before Judge Teopisto L. Calumpang of the MCTC of
Pamplona-Amlan-San Jose. The trial court described this document as the Extra-Judicial
Confession 16 of Ramirez.
The Joint Waiver (Exhibit "G") mentioned the testimony of Jaime Ramirez is in the
Cebuano dialect and was signed by accused Basay and Ramirez on 7 March 1986. Both
accused state therein that for their safety and security, they voluntarily decided to be
detained and that they killed the spouses Zosimo Toting and Betty Toting and thereafter
burned the spouses' house; this fire resulted in the death of one and the hospitalization of
two Toting children. 17

The trial court disregarded this Joint Waiver insofar as it tended to incriminate the
accused "because when they signed said Joint Waiver, they were not represented by
counsel;" thus, the same was prepared in violation of "Section 12, Article 3 of the Bill of
Rights of the 1987 Constitution." 18 There being no other evidence against Basay, the
trial court acquitted him. However, it admitted in evidence the so-called extra-judicial
confession of Jaime Ramirez, considered as part of the res gestae the alleged statement
given by Bombie Toting to PC Sgt. Reynaldo Tabanao and Jaime Saguban identifying
Ramirez and Basay as the perpetrators of the crime and considered as flight — which is
indicative of guilt — Ramirez's running away when he saw the law enforcers on 6 March
1986. It further ruled that the latter signed the extra-judicial confession voluntarily and in
the presence of Elpedio Catacutan, the COMELEC registrar of Pamplona — "a barister
(sic) who appeared as counsel for accused Jaime Ramirez;" hence it is admissible against
the latter. 19

On the other hand, the trial court did not admit the statement of Bombie Toting as a dying
declaration but merely as part of the res gestae because the prosecution failed to prove
two (2) of the requisites for the admissibility of a dying declaration, viz., that the
statement was given under consciousness of an impending death and that Bombie Toting
is a competent witness. 20

Accused Jaime Ramirez neither filed a notice of appeal nor orally manifested his
intention to appeal. However, on 31 January 1983, the trial court handed down an order
directing the clerk of court to transmit to this Court the entire records of the case because
in view of the penalty imposed — life imprisonment — "such Decision is subject for
automatic review by the Supreme Court." 21 This of course is erroneous as, pursuant to
Section 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, the automatic review of a criminal case is
applicable only where the penalty of death has been imposed which, nevertheless, is now
banned under Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

In the interest of justice, however, We accepted the appeal in the Resolution of 8 May
1989. 22

In his Appellant's Brief, 23 Jaime Ramirez, hereinafter referred to as the Appellant,

imputes upon the trial court the commission of this lone error:

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY AS

CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF EXHIBIT "F" (AFFIDAVIT) WHICH WAS
EXECUTED IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND ON THE
BASIS OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND ON THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT."
Appellant contends that his so-called extra-judicial confession, Exhibit "F", was executed
in blatant disregard of his constitutional right to counsel and to remain silent during
custodial investigation. It is therefore inadmissible in evidence. 24 Without the said
confession, the only piece of evidence which seems to point to his guilt is the alleged
statement of Bombie Toting. Appellant asserts, however, that the said statement was "very
doubtful and . . . no reasonable mind would conclude that she was candidly truthful;"
hence, her statement, besides being hearsay as it came from a person who was not
presented in court to testify, should not have been taken at "face value against any of the
accused, much less against the appellant." 25 Besides, the appellant asserts that the same
statement was not used against his co-accused Basay who was, unlike him, acquitted by
the trial court. As to his having run away upon seeing the armed law enforcers, appellant
claims that he did so out of fear as the latter were armed. 26

On the other hand, it is maintained by the People, in the Appellee's Brief 27 submitted by
the Office of the Solicitor General, that the appellant executed the extra-judicial
confession voluntarily and without duress; in signing such confession, he was
accompanied by a certain Mr. Catacutan, a non-lawyer, inside the chambers of Judge
Calumpang — "an environment . . . other than vindictive and oppressive which the courts
desired to guard against in Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436." 28 As to Bombie's
statement, it is claimed that the same should be considered as a dying declaration.

We find merit in the appeal.

1. Jaime Ramirez's sworn statement or extra-judicial confession was prepared on 7 March

1986 at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning in the Pamplona police station. Pertinent
portions thereof read as follows:

"PRELIMINARY — MR. JAIME RAMIREZ, you are now under investigation in

connection with the death of the couple and the burning of their house, ZOSIMO
TOTING and BEATRICE TOTING alias BETTY TOTING on March 4, 1986 at about
7:00 o'clock in the evening at sitio Togbao, Barangay Banawe, Pamplona, Negros
Oriental. You are also informed that under our new constitution you have the right to
remain silent and not to answer questions which will incriminate you and to have a
counsel of your own choice to assist you in this investigation, do (sic) you aware of this?

ANSWER — Yes.

Q — You are also informed that whatever statement you may offer in this investigation it
(sic) might be used as evidence in your favor or against you in the future, do (sic) you
aware of this this (sic)?

A — Yes.

Q — After you have informed (sic) of your rights are you willing to proceed with this
investigation of yours even if you have no counsel of your own choice that will assist you
in this investigation?
A — Yes. I don't need any counsel in this investigation because I will just tell the truth.

1. Question — If so, please state your name, age and other personal circumstances?

Answer — Jaime Ramirez y Tano, 19 years old, single, Filipino, farmer and a resident of
sitio Palale, Barangay San Isidro, Pamplona, Negros Oriental.

xxx xxx xxx

11. Q — What more can you say?

A — No more. I proved that my statement is correct I signed this 7 March 1986 (sic), at
Pamplona, Negros Oriental.

(Sgd.) JAIME T. RAMIREZ

(TYP) JAIME T. RAMIREZ

Affiant

NOTE: ASSISTED BY:

(Sgd.) ELPEDIO B. CATACUTAN

(TYP) ELPEDIO B. CATACUTAN

Counsel of the accused

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 14th day of March 1986, at Pamplona,
Negros Oriental, Philippines.

(Sgd.) TEOPISTO L. CALUMPANG

(TYP) TEOPISTO L. GALUMPANG

Mun Trial Circuit Judge

CERTIFICATION

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have personally examined the affiant and that I am satisfied
that he voluntarily executed and understood his affidavit.

(Sgd.) TEOPISTO L. CALUMPANG

(TYP) TEOPISTO L. CALUMPANG

Mun Trial Circuit Judge" 29

We do not hesitate to rule that this purported extra-judicial confession belonging to

appellant Jaime Ramirez and obtained during custodial interrogation was taken in blatant
disregard of his right to counsel, to remain silent and to be informed of such rights,
guaranteed by Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution — the governing law at
that time. Said section reads:

"SECTION 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."

The source of this provision is Miranda vs. Arizona, 30 in connection therewith, this
Court stated in People vs. Caguioa 31 that:

" . . . The landmark opinion of Miranda vs. Arizona, decided in 1966, as noted above, the
source of this constitutional provision, emphasized that statements made during the
period of custodial interrogation to be admissible require a clear intelligent waiver of
constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to questioning that he has a right to
remain silent, that any utterance may be used against him, and that he has the right to the
presence of a counsel, either retained or appointed. In the language of Chief Justice
Warren: 'Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow,
but briefly stated, it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be
employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does not make (sic) may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner
and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking,
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The
mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on
his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries
until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.'"
(citations omitted).
Then, in Morales vs. Enrile, 32 in the light of the said Section 20, prescribed the
procedure to be followed by peace officers when making an arrest and when conducting a
custodial investigation. Thus:

"7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He
shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
reason arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence."

This was reiterated in People vs. Galit. 33

In People vs. Nicandro, 34 this Court declared that one's right to be informed of the right
to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle." Thus, is not enough for the interrogator to merely repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution; the former must also explain the effects
of such provision in practical terms — e.g., what the person under interrogation may or
may not do - and in a language the subject fairly understands. The right "to be informed"
carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates effective communication which results in the subject's understanding of
what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of
explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence and
other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. In further
ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of such right; he
should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he could ask
for counsel if he so desired or that one could be provided him at his request. 35 If he
decides not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and,
therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective,
must still be made with the assistance of counsel. 36 That counsel must be a lawyer. 37

The foregoing pronouncements are now synthesized in paragraphs 1 and 3, Section 12,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

"SECTION 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him."

The adjectives competent and independent, which qualify the kind of counsel an accused
is entitled to during investigation, were not found in the previous Constitution. Their
incorporation in the 1987 Constitution was thus meant to stress the primacy of this right
to counsel.

A close scrutiny of the questioned extra-judicial confession in the case at bar reveals all
possible violations of the appellant's right to remain silent, to counsel and to be informed
of such rights, and of the safeguards prescribed by this Court for the holding of custodial
interrogations.

(a) The interrogation was the conducted and the confession was written in English a
language the appellant, a farmer in a remote barangay of Pamplona, cannot speak and
does not understand; he only finished Grade II. There is no evidence to show that the
interrogator, who was not even presented as a witness and remains unidentified,
translated the questions and the answers into a dialect known and fairly understood by the
appellant.

(b) Appellant was not told that he could retain a counsel of choice and that if he cannot
afford to do so, he could be provided with one.

(c) He did not sign any waiver of his right to remain silent and to counsel.

(d) He was not assisted by any counsel during the investigation. Instead, a certain Elpedio
Catacutan, who claimed to have appeared for him as a "friend-counsel," 38 was present
only at the time that appellant was brought to the office of Judge Catacutan for the
preparation of the jurat. It was precisely for this reason that the following notations were
inserted above the jurat of the so-called extra-judicial confession:

"NOTE: ASSISTED BY:

(Sgd.) ELPEDIO B. CATACUTAN

(TYP) ELPEDIO B. CATACUTAN"

In reality, Catacutan signed not as counsel, but only as a witness. Thus:

"Q Do you recall having signed as a witness of an affidavit of one Jaime (sic) T. Ramirez
which affidavit is now marked as Exhibit "F"?
A Yes.

Q Can you tell the court where did you sign that Exhibit "F"?

A I signed this affidavit in the office of the Municipal Judge of Pamplona." 39

Moreover, it is to be observed that the appellant does not even know the said Elpedio
Catacutan. 40

(e) Assuming arguendo that Elpedio Catacutan may have been summoned to act as
appellant's counsel, he was, nevertheless, not present during the custodial interrogation
which, by the way, was conducted exactly a week before he appeared —or more
correctly, was made to appear — before Judge Calumpang. His presence before the latter
did not change the situation. As this Court stated in People vs. Burgos, 41 the securing of
counsel to help the accused when the latter subscribed under oath to his statement at the
Fiscal's Office was too late and had no palliative effect; it did not cure the absence of
counsel at the time of the custodial investigation when the extra-judicial statement was
being taken.

(f) Furthermore, Elpedio Calumpang is not a lawyer; according to the trial court, he is "a
barister (sic)." In fact, he candidly admitted that he is not a lawyer but that he obtained a
law degree from the Siliman University in 1959. Unfortunately, however, he failed in
three Bar Examinations. 42

(g) There is no showing that the so-called extra-judicial confession, which is in English,
was correctly explained and translated to the appellant by Judge Calumpang. Although
the latter claimed in his testimony on direct examination that he translated the same in the
local dialect to the appellant before the latter affixed his signature thereto, 43 Elpedio
Catacutan categorically declared that it was the interpreter, one Pedro Rodriguez, who
translated it to the appellant. Thus:

"Q Who is the interpreter who made the translation?

A Pedro Rodriguez.

Q Were you there when the translation was made?

A Sure.

Q So it was not the Judge who made the translation, is that what you mean?

A The translation was course (sic) through the interpreter." 44

(h) Finally, the kind of "advice" proffered by the unidentified interrogator belongs to that
stereotyped class — a long question by the investigator informing the appellant of his
right followed by a monosyllabic answer — which this Court has condemned for being
unsatisfactory. 45 The investigator gave his advice perfunctorily or in a pro-forma
manner, obviously to pay mere lip service to the prescribed norms. As this Court
observed in People vs. Newman, 46 this stereotyped "advice":

" . . . has assumed the nature of a 'legal form' or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and
artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing."

Consequently, Exhibit "F", which is indisputably an uncounselled confession or

admission, is inadmissible in evidence. The trial court, therefore, committed a fatal error
in admitting it.

2. We harbor very serious doubts about the alleged statement given by Bombie Toting to
Sgt. Tabanao and Jaime Saguban identifying the appellant and Teodoro Basay as the
perpetrators of the heinous crime. In the first place, the trial court itself ruled that Bombie
was not a competent witness. We agree with such a conclusion, not necessarily because
she was only six (6) years old, but because her condition at the time she supposedly gave
her statement made it impossible for her to have communicated effectively. She suffered
the following injuries:

"Infected hack wound from the right anterior lumbar area transecting mid abdomen,
inguinal area left to the medial thigh left through and through, with necrotic transected
muscle." 47

She was taken from the crime scene only on 6 March 1986, or two (2) days after the
commission of the crime, and died in the hospital on 7 March 1986. The doctor who first
attended to her when she arrived at the Provincial Hospital, a certain Dr. Sy, was not
presented as a witness. On the other hand, the doctor who attended to her before she died,
Dr. Edgar Cantalao, testified that when he last saw Bombie alive, she could not talk. 48 It
was this inability to talk which led the trial court to express its doubts on the veracity of
the latter's supposed statement:

" . . . Although persons of tender age are prone to tell the truth, however, the Court must
be cautious in appreciating said testimony where the person had a serious wound and had
not eaten for one day and one night. There is no evidence to show that Bombie Toting
told the doctor as to who were the perpetrators of the crime; neither did she tell her own
brother, Zosimo Toting, Jr. that it was the accused, Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez
who killed her parents and her brother and sisters and burned their house. . . . The Court
cannot understand why P.C. Sgt. Tabano did not ask Bombie Toting questions concerning
the commission of the crime by the accused. Neither did the P.C. or (sic) the police take
any statement from her on her way to the hospital or at the hospital. Surprisingly, Bombie
Toting did not even tell her own brother, Zosimo Toting, Jr. that it was the accused who
committed the crime. Had the statement of Bombie Toting been made to the doctor or to
the barangay captain or to any reputable member of the community where the incident
happened, the Court will have to put weight and consider her statement as a dying
declaration. Our experience has shown that persons in authority are prone to fabricate or
misrepresent the facts to serve their own purpose. Innocent people had been charged in
Court simply by the false statements of peace officers. The Court therefore has to be
cautious when these peace officers testify in Court." 49

In the second place, as a result of the foregoing observations, the trial court completely
disregarded Bombie Toting's so-called statement as against Teodoro Basay. We therefore
see neither rhyme nor reason for the trial court's admission of the same as against the
appellant.

3. While it may be true that the appellant ran away when he first saw the armed law
officers, he did so merely out of fear of them. This act should not be considered as the
flight which is indicative of guilt. The appellant had not left his house or barangay since 4
March 1986, the day the crime was committed. If he were indeed one of the perpetrators
and had the intention to flee in order to avoid arrest, he should have vanished sooner and
should not have remained in his house. Besides, if indeed his running away could be
construed as flight, it could only be considered as circumstantial evidence. Such evidence
would still be insufficient for a conviction. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court, in order that circumstantial evidence may sustain a conviction, there must, inter
alia, be more than one (1) circumstance. No other circumstance was established in this
case.

Hence, the appellant's guilt was not established with moral certainty. He should be
acquitted.

We cannot, however, close this case without making some observations about the legal
conclusions of the trial court anent the crimes committed and the penalty imposed. The
facts indisputably establish that Zosimo Toting, Sr., Beatrice Toting and Bombie Toting
were stabbed and hacked before their house was burned. Zosimo and Beatrice died
immediately while Bombie lived for a few days. As a matter of fact, the thesis of the
prosecution is that the house was burned to conceal the stabbing and hacking. As a result
of this fire, Manolita Toting and Manolo Toting suffered burns which caused the death of
the former; the latter, however, survived due to timely medical attention. Four (4) crimes
were therefore committed, viz.: three (3) separate murders under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code 50 for the deaths of Zosimo, Beatrice and Bombie, and arson as
punished under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613 51 for the death of Manolita and the injuries
sustained by Manolo as a consequence of the burning of the house. The aforementioned
Section 5 reads:

"SECTION 5. Where Death Results from Arson. — If by reason of or on the occasion of

the arson death results, the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to death shall be imposed."

Also, the information that was filed is clearly duplicitous and thus vulnerable to a motion
to quash under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. No such motion having been
filed, appellant is deemed to have waived the defect.
Finally, We have time and again said that life imprisonment is not a penalty provided for
in the Revised Penal Code and is not the same as reclusion perpetua. 52 Unfortunately,
the trial court still disregarded this pronouncement. It is hoped that it will not happen
again.

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision in Criminal Case No. 7411 of Branch 40 of the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental is REVERSED and appellant JAIME RAMIREZ
alias "NEBOY" is hereby ACQUITTED with costs de oficio. His immediate release from
detention is hereby ordered.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,

JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR.,
BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T.
GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA,
FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA
J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO,
CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE &
NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS

JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and
PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME
ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules
for his life on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled
mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus
rose even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules'
increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that
Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was
touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air,
beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.

Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch
even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.

The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the
elemental forces of life and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the
sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.

"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the
distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan.
Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly
urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.

Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to
"insure the well-being and economic security of all the people," 1 especially the less
privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the
State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private
property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was
also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program
aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil." 3
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also
adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights,
containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common
people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an
agrarian reform program:

SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share
of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line
with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later
by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to
provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-
farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.

The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust
for agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O.
No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and
providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the
manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential
Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and
E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took
over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including
extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result,
after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino
signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent
with its provisions. 4

The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal
questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures
mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The
different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and will first
be explained hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777

Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and
229, and R.A. No. 6657.

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned
by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four
tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full
owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter
alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated
E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of
the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners.
Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a
valid appropriation.

In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the
same may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines.
They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay 5 andManotok v. National Food
Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is
payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also
deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal
protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the
agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is
imposed on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be
the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and
so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem
because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld
in the earlier cases ofChavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice
and Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council. 9 The
determination of just compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the
formula prescribed under the questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does
not foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the
challenge to the order is premature because no valuation of their property has as yet been
made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are also not proper parties
because the lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum retention limit of 7
hectares.

Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not
provide for retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class
suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain
that the determination of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final
ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of
P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the
validity of the imposition of martial law.

In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No.
6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it
suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.

A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz,
owner of a 1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the
implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had
reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10,
1989, he adopted the allegations in the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned
enactments have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79310

The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization
composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation
of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.

The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President.
Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress
was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition
period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was
properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for
violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal
protection.

They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:

Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the

Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS
(P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the
assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received
through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources as
government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special
fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this
Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to
cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be
appropriated at this time.

Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such
payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6,
thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner
in an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's
declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to
certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes
that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct
payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the
landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC.

The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to
make a careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the
sugar areas that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the
sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they
are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection
has been violated.

A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of
Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual
sugar planters all over the country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for
intervention was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and
riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the Court.

NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform
Program and that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the
amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229
provide for an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum
rather than the maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated
initial amount has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.

Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain,
and the violation of the fundamental right to own property.

The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the
expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation
of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own
valuation he is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land,
in violation of the uniformity rule.

In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the
necessity for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation
and submits that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the
feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not
indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.

On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to
show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment
also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and
scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the
petition for prohibition would be premature.

The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the
payment of public money without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that
only money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the
earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an
initial amount, is actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply
means that additional amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.

On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own
behalf, assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments
already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because:

(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;

(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;

(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and

(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not
originate from the House of Representatives.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in
violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his
landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer
were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease
rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small
landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of
the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that
on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987,
he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228
and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they
directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.

The petitioner now argues that:

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.

(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987
Constitution.

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before
Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of
separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory
Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper
exercise of the police power.

The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due
process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under
Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him
just compensation for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:

Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972
shall be considered as advance payment for the land.

is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the
inclusion of even small landowners in the program along with other landowners with
lands consisting of seven hectares or more is undemocratic.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the
motion for reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved.
As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were
enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution which reads:

The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first
Congress is convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated
on October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the
land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be
considered amortization payments.

In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed
was resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be
useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the
validity of the public respondent's acts.

G.R. No. 78742

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners
of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or
intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but
are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected
or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-
farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and
regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right
of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court
for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI
474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of
more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family.
And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July
10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying
Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978,
(Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated
December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention
by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing
for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage
of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure
to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners
are now barred from invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this
case notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines.
Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done,
involves the exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ
of mandamus. This is especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a
separate department of the government.

In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to
them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover,
assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are
nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the
ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera.10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the
additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential
decree.

Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three
departments of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to
annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable
to the fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of
judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The
doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the
nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down
the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a
blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was
done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or
both, to insure that the Constitution would not be breached.

In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of
the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their
session en banc.11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume
jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites
of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision
of the case itself. 12

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us,
we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them
has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the
definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and
so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.

In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino
although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with
the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled
that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."
We have since then applied this exception in many other cases. 15

The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.

In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted
with constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law
or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion,
its only criterion will be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to
probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations
are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as
intimidation.

For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate
to "make the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the
acts of these departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as expressed
in the Constitution.

It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that —

... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16

The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must
categorically resolve. And so we shall.

II

We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more
serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in these
petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under
martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to
modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.

The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the
Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from
her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because
E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these
measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they
continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid
by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the
dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of
legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her
when and as long as she possessed it.

Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact
substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they
shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its
provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50
billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have
been incorporated by reference in the CARP Law. 18

That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not
conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution.
Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide
for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is
one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds
from the treasury. 19 The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of
the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.

It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and
Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24,
this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of
Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures,
had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was
then solely vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both
houses of Congress.

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII,
Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such
limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial
provisions. This section declares:
Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or
retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall
vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of
the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15)
years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm;
Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27
shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That
original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as
they continue to cultivate said homestead.

The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall
have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is
settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred
from the title. 20

The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance,
by whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from
President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the
petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27
because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was
issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time.

But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to
comply with the requirement for publication as this Court held in Tanada v.
Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of
the Civil Code, they could not have any force and effect if they were among those
enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the
Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)

Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of
mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a
specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject
to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that
mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to
control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require
action only but not specific action.

Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable
delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts
will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the
duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely
discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an
inferior court, public official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to
decide a particular question to the great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court
should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction
mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require
that jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22

And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to
the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23

III

There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent
domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the
same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24for example, where a law
required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange
for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was
eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public
use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public
morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.

In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of
the police power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking." The regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might
cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface.
This was resisted by a coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its
mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and
waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained without
compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that
there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:

Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power
deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment
by the State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed
to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The
restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so
restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make
any use of it. The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes
with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious —
as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions — the restriction will
have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.

Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police
power and the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of
the former like the power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a
police purpose has long been accepted. 26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J.
Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the police
power) makes the following significant remarks:

Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent
domain powers on different planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as
encompassing public acquisition of private property for improvements that would be
available for public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand, they
assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the
Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning.
So long as suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some
legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure need have afforded no compensation
whatever. With the progressive growth of government's involvement in land use, the
distance between the two powers has contracted considerably. Today government often
employs eminent domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police
power-- a trend expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v.
Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to match that of
the police power's standard of "public purpose." 27

The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted
areas in the District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of
eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:

If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be
beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the
way.

Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the
exercise of eminent domain is clear.

For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978,
the U.S Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under
which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a
multi-story office building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic
landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police
power. The problem, however, was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of
the right to use the airspace above it although other landowners in the area could do so
over their respective properties. While insisting that there was here no taking, the Court
nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal
which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair
compensation," as he called it, was explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:

In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was
authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing
to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark — the rights which would
have been exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance atop
the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately
relaxed, theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by
constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence more profitable
buildings on the transferee sites. 30

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of

compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out
such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may
own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power
of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.

Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the
several measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses.

The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no
retention limits are prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that
although they excited many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in
Congress, the retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being
questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come
to the other claimed violations of due process in connection with our examination of the
adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of expropriation.

The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of
the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No.
6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the
complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an
objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular
class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to
the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other
in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. 31 To be
valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the
class. 32 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here
challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who
will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused
to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police
power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put
otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular
class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform
have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has
been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to
achieve the constitutional goal.

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the
individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be
a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping
with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is
no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need,
subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's
rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under Article
III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who
would deny him that right.

That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article
III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection
of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.

This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.

IV

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms
also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed
upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the
price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will
come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public
interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the
welfare of the people is the supreme law.

But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute
(as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction
that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in
the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle.
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2)
just compensation.

Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the
State should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform
instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private
agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural
lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of
all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands
in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive
departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that
discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.

A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments

when they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice
Concepcion in the case of Tañada v. Cuenco: 36

The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.

It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the
enlargement of judicial power, which now includes the authority of the courts "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." 37 Even so, this should not be construed as a license for us to reverse the
other departments simply because their views may not coincide with ours.

The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the
CARP the redistribution of private landholdings (even as the distribution of public
agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land
Act and other cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority,
which we may assert only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but
illegal. We do not find it to be so.

In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company,38 it was held:

Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St.
Mary's river between the American bank and the international line, as well as all of the
upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its entire length, was "necessary for the
purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters connected therewith," that
determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States
under that Act, and there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .

As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the
Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the
reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the
prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No.
131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the
State adopt the necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of
all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively
the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be
binding on us.

The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more
thoughtful examination.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the
measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. 40 The word "just" is used to intensify
the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41

It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a
mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an
actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their
property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the
just compensation mandated by the Constitution.

As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when

the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2)
the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant
or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for
public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon
its taking possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge,
the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation
may be employed in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law
provides that:

Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or
no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
qualified beneficiaries.

Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is
claimed is entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives.
Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection
or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land-

... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested
parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15)
days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is
deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days
after it is submitted for decision.

To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of

justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA
v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos
providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the
assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the
owner, whichever was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held
through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile
in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.

Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the
power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable
decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be
useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is
seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before
the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings
would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose
between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always
limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence
in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the
judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.

xxx

In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether
the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation
as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just
compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint
commissioners for such purpose.

This time, we answer in the affirmative.

xxx

It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation
in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of
justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to
absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and
con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and
just determination have been judiciously evaluated.

A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the
arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable.
Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested
parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of
the property. But more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the
DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested
party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:

Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties
concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality
the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as
easily resolved.

This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:

SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the
LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other
pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land.

The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the
landowner:

(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:

(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned —
Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.

(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty
percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.

(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the
balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.

(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred

shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by
the PARC;

(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;

(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:

(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the
face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance until the tenth
(10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion,
whether in full or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;

(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner, his
successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face value, for any of the
following:

(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets under
the Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by government financial
institutions in the same province or region where the lands for which the bonds were paid
are situated;

(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or

shares of stock owned by the government in private corporations;

(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons, or
for performance bonds;

(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds of
the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small and medium-
scale industry, in the same province or region as the land for which the bonds are paid;

(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use of these
bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding
balance of the financial instruments; Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the
percentages mentioned above;

(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in
government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;

(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government
hospitals; and

(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.

The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is
unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept
just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment
allowed. In support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:

The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property
expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said
property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of
the expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)

In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:

It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property
at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less,
than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is
the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity.
The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of
condemned property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a
person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to
sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such property. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived,
the weight of authority is also to the effect that just compensation for property
expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus —

The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot
compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or require the
condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money at the
time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. When the power
of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding
upon both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded
as a reliable and constant standard of compensation. 48

"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in

money, which must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not
within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment future obligations,
bonds, or other valuable advantage. 49(Emphasis supplied.)

It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been
paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional
excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where
only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from
its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.

What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of
whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their
owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular
community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from
all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its
purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to
the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice
of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this
program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more
fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And,
finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained
this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands
that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least
to their deliverance.

Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we
estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the
amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our
present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.

We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they
called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this
assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also
intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a
less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware
of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be
enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed
among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such
manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of
the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire
amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose that
what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27,
which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with
which they presumably agreed in principle.

The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical
agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just
compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being
contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the
demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to
determine how payment should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required
from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as "progressive compensation" and
"State-subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no special
definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the
Commission. 50

On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the
assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on
the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the
magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.

With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just
compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not
violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a
cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to
the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to
see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of
our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation
of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's
hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and
dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the
Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.

Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be
made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other
things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of
the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the
smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner
will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in
bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial
instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other
modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not
unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or
assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just
compensation.

Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and
small, not a little inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided.
Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know
they are of the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their
indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our
pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail.

The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does
not seem to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been
superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as
embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of
failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the
provincial or city assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the
just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section
17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.

The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even
before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-
accepted principle of eminent domain.

The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the
owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence
on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.
Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the
condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the
condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent
Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51

... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time
of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually
made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title
to property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been
made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838,
in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned
property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the
State" albeit "not to the appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the
Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee
did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the authority to
enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further
said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on and use
the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the
authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without
his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."

Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:

If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively
examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction
is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and
irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid ... . (Emphasis
supplied.)

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October
21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting
of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually
issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized
farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just
compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of
the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after
proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just
compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its
Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after
October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just
compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
Until then, title also remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.

Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily
transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.

It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D.
No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No.
6657. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that
"the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be
allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original
homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at
the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead."

In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the
appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved.
Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need
not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to
be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not
covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of
their petition.

Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the
petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the
Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No.
6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.

The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the
subject of bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and
ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect;
indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper
instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start
somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but
grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The
CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice Holmes's
words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture
forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although
we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the
farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul
to the soil.

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian
reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may
now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from the
exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and
helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils
will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the
staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair,
now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last can
he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild
in it the music and the dream."

WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full
payment of compensation to their respective owners.

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and
recognized.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27
shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein
prescribed.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No.
1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO,
City Treasurer of Manila,respondents.

Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent
City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.

LABRADOR, J.:

I. The case and issue, in general

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality
of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment
poses questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also
poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law
purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant,
and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from
the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress
attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and national
security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete
and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing
dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed
economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the
enactment?

II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition
against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above
prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are
allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance
with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for
ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical
persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United
States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for
violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other
laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment
or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail
business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their
assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a
provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought
this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin
the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality
of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of
the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates
international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions
of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to
entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII
and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the
Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act
has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are
infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of
the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

a. The police power. —

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but
petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before
proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be
well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in
the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees
of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and
how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the province
and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These
consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts
of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the
State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-
extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active
of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it
so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations
have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power
has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have
become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as
we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly
changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of
police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or
welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of
the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these
are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

b. Limitations on police power. —

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following
provisions of our Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III,
Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and
freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in
their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)

c. The, equal protection clause. —

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed
or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

d. The due process clause. —

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare
involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or
reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of
the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we
ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and
the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said,
the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic
society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny.
Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the
State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of
law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given
the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —

Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the
courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the
constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the
policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity,
adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the
police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve
public interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty
and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the
legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or
palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts
are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom
of the law.

V. Economic problems sought to be remedied

With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the
issue involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates,
there would be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power.
But it goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein.
The problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common, trade or
occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has always been open to
residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.

a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all
that they produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and
families begin to live in communities producing more than what they consume and
needing an infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into
existence. As villages develop into big communities and specialization in production
begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of
living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and
proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite
variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of
consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru
which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the communities
comprising the nation.

There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the
community. He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and
the various little gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his
customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices
needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew
them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the
owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a supermarket is
so much a part of day-to-day existence.

b. The alien retailer's trait. —

The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers
of population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages).
Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities
and big centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings
of community life appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing
their agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many
communities the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade,
industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of
ill-bred and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not,
and he forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be
harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —

There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about
the controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy.
Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents
mostly through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only
predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as
lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods
and articles. And were it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco,
the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal foods and products would easily
become full and complete.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one
breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is
charged that the law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed
nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable
factors in the retail business make control virtually impossible. The first argument which
brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion
within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass
upon and decide.

The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black
and white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien
domination and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with
fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail
trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing
dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade, as witness the following tables:

Assets Gross Sales

Per cent Per cent

Year and Retailers No.-
Pesos Distributio Pesos Distributio
Nationality Establishments
n n

1941
:

Filipino ......... 106,671 200,323,13 55.82 174,181,92 51.74

. 8 4

Chinese ......... 15,356 118,348,69 32.98 148,813,23 44.21

.. 2 9
 Others ........... 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05
.

1947
:

Filipino ......... 111,107 208,658,94 65.05 279,583,33 57.03

. 6 3

Chinese ......... 13,774 106,156,21 33.56 205,701,13 41.96

.. 8 4

Others ........... 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01

1948 (Census)
:

Filipino ......... 113,631 213,342,26 67.30 467,161,66 60.51

. 4 7

Chinese ......... 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,22 38.20

. 7

Others .......... 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29

1949
:

Filipino ......... 113,659 213,451,60 60.89 462,532,90 53.47

. 2 1

Chinese ......... 16,248 125,223,33 35.72 392,414,87 45.36

. 6 5

Others .......... 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17

1951
:

Filipino ......... 119,352 224,053,62 61.09 466,058,05 53.07

 0 2

Chinese ......... 17,429 134,325,30 36.60 404,481,38 46.06

. 3 4

Others .......... 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 87

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Item Gross
Year and Retailer's
Assets Sales
Nationality
(Pesos) (Pesos)

1941:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 1,633

Chinese .............................................. 7,707 9,691

Others ............................................... 24,415 8,281

1947:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 2,516

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 14,934

Others .............................................. 24,749 13,919

1948: (Census)
 Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,111

Chinese ............................................. 7,707 24,398

Others .............................................. 24,916 23,686

1949:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,069

Chinese .............................................. 7,707 24,152

Others .............................................. 24,807 20,737

1951:

Filipino ............................................. 1,877 3,905

Chinese ............................................. 7,707 33,207

Others ............................................... 24,824 22,033

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of
Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on
Filipino establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily
small..

The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos
have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical
gap through their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times
those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply
superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and
gains much more. The same official report, pointing out to the known predominance of
foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely
engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment
is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital,
credit, price and supply.

d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —

It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist,
that is the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never
have been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this
alien dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring
among other things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires
the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago;
and the events since then have not been either pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the
University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the
Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general
preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought
under their control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco,
Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the
constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in connection with the
nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:

But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the
country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence
alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big
enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but
of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such
conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of
the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus
. . . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation
not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic
subjugation by alien interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th
ed., p. 476.)

Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from
alien control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is
Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino
Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second
National Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes,
and fears, alien predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially
pointed out not only to control but to alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien
domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all
the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in
the predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly
endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and
thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and
concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of
goods or articles to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or
articles they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the
national economy and of the complete subservience of national economy and of the
consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike
can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of
daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer does
not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits
for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article,
eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers
or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom
of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.

We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of
alien domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by
aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly
overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling
on the part of the public that alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a
pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our
purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of essential
commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits
to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience
and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to
establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous
hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially
on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9,
Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price
control convictions; that they have secret combinations among themselves to control
prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand; that they have connived
to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in
unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to
have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated
import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of
lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials
with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the
Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by
the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which
impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come
in the future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of
population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other
calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing
goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that
dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers
of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely
upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person
and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the
potential enemy of the State.

f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the
disputed law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the
expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized
representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been
saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of
the public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of
police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the
supreme welfare of its citizens.

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation

a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses
solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the
mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the
national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his
adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of
gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral,
but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where
he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and
consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of
their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien
go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of
the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and
the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the
legislation, radical as it may seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a
genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to
general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that
would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in
this country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to
continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out
above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter
disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of
the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do
not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual,
positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify
the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are
certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in the retail
trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or
ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.

b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —

The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens,
which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail
traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's
classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power.
Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons
of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted
within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of
equal protection established by the Constitution.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications
among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The
legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In
addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs.
Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined
the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:

. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the
wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without
any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the
classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry
the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially
arbitrary."

c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification
has already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in
the United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the
validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition
therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations
formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to
aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection
clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate
purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands
from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and
all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the
limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the
Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law
clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with
approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9
Wheat., I, as follows:

"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example,
acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance,
is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which
is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping
of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a
monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American
shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It
is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect has
been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American
privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from
fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial
marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system
is projected."

The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification

otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class
than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking,
the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the

licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless
he is, or has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held
valid, for the following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of
those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the
community, and the court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield
vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among
them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the result of race
hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the
belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as
to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire social
fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S.
392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance
of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to
aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does
not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to
a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and
that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be
allowed for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice
of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E.
129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P.
30 (Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as having
tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police
power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also
sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs.
Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to
have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the
prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard,
card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs.
Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting
the licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the
court's findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect
the morals, the health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish
and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance
of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because
the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and because there is no public
interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was no
adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the
outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices
dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural
resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a
state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male
persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found that there was no
reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of
an employee.

d. Authorities contra explained. —

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United
States hold that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for
classification. But in this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either
arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism
and hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared
invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any
language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for
the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other
system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud,
because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct
its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public
benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would
deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold
consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid,
but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the
discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that
the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine,
1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void,
because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to
which the classification was proposed.

The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have
said, aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the
customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster
the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and
allegiance which the national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of
the aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis
and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle,
297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the distinction between the
alien and the national, thus:

. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without
the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it
is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our
fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign
born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental
environment and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different
regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are
they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of
the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that
obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without
plausible reason for making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations
against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .

VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.

a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has
been stated by the highest authority in the United States that:

. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or,
when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination
to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940,
950, 957.)

Another authority states the principle thus:

. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the
scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the
restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are
unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the
persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not
be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)

In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:

. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . .

Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test
of constitutionality:

In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police
power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first
questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient
foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary,
oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health,
safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.

b. Petitioner's argument considered. —

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those
privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free
men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the
legislature to prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests
on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is
engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest
creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without
ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has
found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused
by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now
enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on
the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and
ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from
the retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and
pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus
correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to
bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien
control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights
and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the
appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its
purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely
reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that
accompanied the bill, which later was enacted into law:

This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the
persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no
allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and
who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our
destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other
people.

In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons

who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks
to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power
that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national
security it respects existing rights.

The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic

independence is none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if
the people are subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not
of their own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign
economic control and domination, is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature
may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can
infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate
aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative

action. —

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional
restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from
economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of
the Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact
legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and
liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they
adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in question is within the
scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization
of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate
for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the
National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and
American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of
the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the
Petitioner.)

It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of

the Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the
patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the
Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in
Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of
the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the
nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution. Can it
be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the
provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested
in the approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been
recreant to its duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of
the nationals with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy
commensurate with the demands of public interest and national survival. As the
repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face
the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien
domination of retail trade poses to national economy.

d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how
reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right
and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the
rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations
of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain
offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that
the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in
the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside,
the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that
the Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general
matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of
an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity,
and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not
annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the
test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not
unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the
law, some of which are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of
aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will increase because of the
elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate
replacement is problematical; that there may be general breakdown; that there would be
repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed against the
supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do
not import invalidity.

VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the
title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is
to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The
constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI,
which reads:

No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to
appraise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or
its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory
consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of
duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first
glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the
two main purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either
prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term
regulation.

Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in
page 41 of Answer.)

Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the
Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors,
etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an actprohibiting the sale of such liquors to
minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly
included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308,
quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of
restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated.
While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute
reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in
connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves
suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said
that the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in
question adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit".
Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which
may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title
changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been many
provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made the Act
invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle
governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be
adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the
Act.

One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in
its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions,
and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and
study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the
legislators have been appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and
the prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law,
and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a
campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for
declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.

IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations

Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation
thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations
Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their
subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the
Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is
the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be
inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and
Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the
world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China
of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty
guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against
because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are
granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail
trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always
subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258,
Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of
the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

X. Conclusion

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to
remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance
and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and
control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State,
thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future;
that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in
operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department
of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced
in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed
conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any
other conventional agreement.

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could
have been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time
should have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time
comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls
within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due
process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the
harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power
and jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1573 March 29, 1948

KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS, petitioner-

appellant,
vs.
GOTAMCO SAW MILL, respondent-appellee.

Severino P. Izon for petitioner.

Romeo Perfecto for respondent.

HILADO, J.:

In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the "Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa
Pilipinas" prays, for the reasons therein set forth, that we reverse and vacate the orders of
the Court of Industrial Relations dated September 23, 1946 (Annex A) and March 28,
1947 (Annex B) and its resolution of July 11, 1947 (Annex C).

In the order of September 23, 1946, it is recited that the laborers in the main case (case
No. 31-V of the Court of Industrial Relations) declared a strike on September 10, 1946,
"which suspended all the work in the respondent company"; that on September 19, 1946
(presumably after the case had been brought to the Court of Industrial Relations) said
court informed the parties that the continuation of the strike would necessarily prejudice
both parties, and that a temporary solution, satisfactory to both parties, must be found to
put an end to it, at the same time, urging both parties to be reasonable in their attitude
towards each other; that ample opportunity was given to both parties to iron out their
differences until September 21, 1946, when the court continued the conference at which,
among other things, the leader of the laborers informed the court that, although said
laborers were not exactly satisfied with the arrangement, in order to cooperate with the
court and with the parties so that the laborers could return to work and the company
resume its operation, they had no objection to accepting a temporary settlement of P3.50
without meal, as against the proposal of the company of P2.00 without meal; that after a
series of conferences held on September 23, 1946, the date of the order now under
consideration, the labor leader decided to accept a temporary arrangement of the wage
problem as proposed by management, that is, P2.00 over-all increase without meal to all
striking laborers; that Francisco Cruz, President of the Union, manifested that he would
have a hard time convincing the laborers, but in view of their desire to preserve that
harmony which used to exist between the parties, they were going to accede to this
proposition, provided that the management would permit the laborers to bring with them
home, if available, small pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood; that the negotiations
culminated in an agreement by which the laborers would return to their work on Tuesday,
September 24, 1946, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the respondent company would
resume its operation on said date under the following conditions:

(1) That all the laborers and workingmen will receive an over-all increase of P2.00 daily,
without meal, over the wages received by them before the strike;

(2) That the management will permit the laborers to bring with them home, if available,
small pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood; and

(3) That the foregoing increase and privilege will take effect upon the return of the
workingmen to work until the final determination of the present controversy.

The same order then proceeds as follows:

Finding the above temporary agreement between the parties to be reasonable and
advantageous to both, the court approves the same and orders the striking laborers of the
respondent company to return to their work on Tuesday, September 24, 1946 at 7:00
o'clock in the morning, and the respondent company to resume its operation and admit
the striking laborers. The respondent company is enjoined not to lay-off, suspend or
dismiss any laborer affiliated with the petitioning union, nor suspend the operation of the
temporary agreement, and the labor union is enjoined not to stage a walk-out or strike
during the pendency of the hearing.

From the order of March 27, 1947, it appears that on January 7, 1947, the respondent
Gotamco Saw Mill filed with the Court of Industrial relations an urgent motion asking
that the petitioning union be held for contempt of court for having staged a strike during
the pendency of the main case "in violation of the order of this court dated September 23,
1946"; that on January 9, 1947, petitioner filed an answer with a counter-petition
alleging, among other things, that a representative of petitioner conferred with respondent
regarding certain discriminations obtaining in the respondent's saw mill, but instead of
entertaining their grievances said respondent in a haughty and arbitrary manner ordered
the stoppage of the work and consequently the workers did then and there stop working;
and in the counter-petition said petitioner asked the respondent be held for contempt for
having employed four new Chinese laborers during the pendency of the hearing of the
main case, without express authority of the court and in violation of section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended. It is also recited in the said order of March 28,
1947, that on that same date, January 9, 1947, respondent filed with the court another
urgent motion for contempt against the petitioning union for picketing on the premises of
the respondent's saw mill and for grave threats which prevented the remaining laborers
from working.

Upon request of both parties, the court required the presentation of evidence pertinent to
the incidents thus raised. Thereafter, the said order of March 28, 1947, was entered, and
the court stated therein the three questions to be determined as follows: first, if there was
a violation by the petitioning union of the order of said court of September 23, 1946,
which would warrant the commencement of contempt proceedings; second, whether the
facts and circumstances attending the picketing constitute contempt of court; third,
whether there was a violation by the respondent of section 19 of the Commonwealth Act
No. 103, as amended, in taking four Chinese laborers pending the hearing and without
express authority of the court; and fourth, whether the dismissal of Maximino Millan was
with or without just cause.

The court, passing upon these questions, found and held:

(1) That there was a violation of the order of the court dated September 23, 1946, by the
petitioning union and thereby ordered Atty. Pastor T. Reyes, special agent of the court, to
take such action as may be warranted in the premises against the person or persons
responsible therefor for contempt:

(2) That the question of picketing being closely and intimately related to the strike which
had been found illegal, did not need to be passed upon, it being imbibed by question No.
1;

(3) That there being no strong and clear proof on the question of respondent having
violated section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, respondent was thereby
exonerated from any liability in connection with the alleged employment of four
Chinamen;

(4) That Maximino Millan being of troublesome nature and unworthy to work among his
fellow laborers, his petition for reinstatement contained in demand No. 5 of the main case
was thereby denied.

The above cited resolution of July 11, 1947, was entered by the Court of Industrial
Relations, sitting in banc, and denied reconsideration of its order of March 28, 1947, as
requested by the petitioning union's contention is recited that the provisions of section 19
of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, upon which order of September 23, 1946,
was based, had not been complied with; in other words, that the said order was not issued
in conformity with the requisites of said section, because, it was said, before its issuance
there had been no proper hearing and there was and there was no express finding by the
court that public interest required the return of the striking workers. The further
contention is therein recited that, granting that the order of September 23, 1946, was
issued in conformity with said section 19, said provision is unconstitutional for being in
violation of the organic proscription of involuntary servitude. Passing upon these
contentions, the Court of Industrial Relations said:

The order of September 23, 1946, was issued in conformity with the provisions of section
19. Said order was proposed and issued on the basis of the agreement entered into by the
parties after the preliminary hearings and conferences. While it is true that the order of
the Court now in question did not make any express finding as to whether public interest
required the return of the striking workers, it is undeniable, however, that until the
numerous incidents arising therefrom since the certification of the dispute promptly, need
not be stated in the said order because it is a fact which is borne out by the entire record
of the case. If the petitioner was aggrieved by the terms of the order, it could have
objected right then and there and could have appealed said order within the period
prescribed by law, and nor to wait after it had become final, definite, and conclusive. The
record shows that the petitioner in its answer answer and counter-petition for contempt
based its complaint upon section 19 (incidental Case No. 31-V [4]). It is, indeed, strange
that after taking advantage of this order and enjoyed (enjoying) the benefits thereunder,
the petitioner now comes to impugn and challenge the validity. The second motion for
reconsideration is the sad instance where the petitioner attacks the validity of an order
under which it once took shelter.

The court believes that section 19 is constitutional. To start with, this section is presumed
to be constitutional. Several laws promulgated which apparently infringe the human
rights of individuals were "subjected to regulation by the State basically in the exercise of
its paramount police power". The provisions of Act No. 103 were inspired by the
constitutional injunction making it the concern of the State to promote social justice to
insure the well being and economic security of all the people. In order to attain this
object, section 19 was promulgated which grants to labor what it grants to capital and
denies to labor what it denies to capital. Section 19 complements the power of the Court
to settle industrial disputes and renders effective such powers which are conferred upon it
by the different provisions of the Court's organic law, more particularly, sections 1 and 4,
and "other plenary powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to settle all questions
matters, controversies or disputes arising between, and/or affecting employers and
employees", "to prevent non-pacific methods in the determination of industrial or
agricultural disputes" (International HardWood and Venser Co. vs The Pangil Federation
of Laborers, G.R. No. 47178, cited in the case of Mindanao Bus Co. vs. Mindanao Bus
Co. Employees' Association, 40 Off. Gaz., 115). Section 4 has been upheld in the case
aforecited. It appearing that the power of this Court to execute its orders under section 19
is also the same power it possesses under section 4 of the same act, it inferentially follows
that section 19 is likewise valid. (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor
Union, G.R. No. 47796.)

In Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine Labor Union, supra, this Court
said:

In the first place, the ultimate effect of petitioner's theory is to concede to the Court of
Industrial Relations the power to decide a case under section 19 but deny it, the power to
execute its decision thereon. The absurdity of this proposition, is too evident to require
argument. In the second place considering that the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations under section 19 is merely incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously
acquired under section 4 of the law, if follows that the power to execute its orders under
section 19 is also the same power that it possesses under section 4. (40 Off. Gaz., [14th
Supp.], No. 23, p. 178.)

Among the powers thus conferred is that to punish a violation of an order such as those
now under consideration as for contempt of court.

We agree with the Court of Industrial Relations that section 19 of Commonwealth Act
No. 103 is constitutional. It does not offend against the constitutional inhibition
prescribing involuntary servitude. An employee entering into a contract of employment
said law went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those prescribed in
said section 19, among which is the "implied condition that when any dispute between
the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the
Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of
this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not
strike or walk out of his employment when so joined by the court after hearing and when
public interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to
it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest
so requires or when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled ...".
(Emphasis supplied.) The voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of
employment — he has a free choice between entering into it or not — with such an
implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing. The
resolution of July 11, 1947, states that the order of September 23, 1946, was issued after a
series of preliminary hearings or conferences, and we are satisfied that these were
"hearings" within the meaning of the above mentioned section 19 of the law. The record
certainly reveals that what was done during and what resulted from said preliminary
hearings or conferences were reported to the court at a formal hearing. As to public
interest requiring that the court enjoin the strike or walk out, or the return of striking
laborers, aside from the legal presumption that the Court of Industrial Relations complied
with the provisions of the law in this respect, we think that, considering the universally
known fact, of which this Court takes judicial notice, that as a result of the destructions
wrought by the late war, the economic and social rehabilitation of the country urgently
demands the reconstruction work will inevitably tend to paralyze, impede or slow down
the country's program of rehabilitation which, for obvious and natural reasons, the
government is striving to accelerate as much as is humanly possible.
Besides, the order of the court was for the striking workers to return to their work. And
that order was made after hearing, and, moreover, section 19 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, in providing for an order of the court fro the return of striking workers, authorizes
such order, among other cases, "when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly
decided or settled". The provision says: "... and if he has already done so (struck or
walked out),that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be
issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in
its opinion, be promptly decided or settled, (emphasis supplied). In other words the order
to return, if the dispute can be promptly decided or settled, may be issued "only after
hearing when public interest so requires", but if in the court's opinion the dispute can not
be promptly decided or settled, then it is also authorized after hearing to issue the order:
we construe the provision to mean that the very impossibility of prompt decision or
settlement of the dispute confers upon the court the power to issue the order for the
reason that the public has an interest in preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the
wheels of industry. And, as well stated by the court's resolution of July 11, 1947, this
impossibility of prompt decision or settlement was a fact which was borne out by the
entire record of the case and did not need express statement in the order.

Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the findings of fact made by the Court of
Industrial Relations (Commonwealth Act No. 103, section 15, as amended by
Commonwealth Act 559, section 2; Rule 44, Rules of Court; National Labor Union vs.
Phil. Match Co., 40 Off. Gaz. 8th Supp. p. 134, Bardwell Brothers vs. Phil. Labor Union,
39 Off. Gaz. 1032; Pasumil Workers' Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off.
Gaz. 6th Supp., p. 71).

However, Mr. Justice Briones thinks that we should expressly reserve our opinion on the
constitutionality of the above statutory and reglementary provisions should it, in the
future, become necessary to decide it.

For all theses considerations, the orders and resolution of the Court of Industrial
Relations assailed by the instant petition are hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioner-appellant. So ordered.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 121519. October 30, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE TY and

CARMEN TY, accused-appellants.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Vicente Ty AND Carmen Ty were charged with the crime of kidnapping and failure
to return a minor in an information filed by 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor of Kalookan
City Rosauro J. Silverio, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the month of April 1989, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the
owners, proprietors, managers and administrators of Sir John Clinic and as such said
accused had the custody of Arabella Somblong, a minor, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another and with deliberate intent to deprive the parents of the child
of her custody, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to restore the
custody of said Arabella Sombong to her parents by giving said custody of subject minor
to another person without the knowledge and consent of her parents.

Contrary to Law.[1]

Both accused were arrested, and then arraigned on October 27, 1992 when they
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
After trial, on May 31, 1995, a decision was rendered by
the Regional Trial Courtof Kalookan City, Branch 123, the decretal portion of which
disposes as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused Spouses Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping a minor and failure to return the
same as defined and penalized by Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences them to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The accused are hereby
ordered to pay the private complainant the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages
caused by anxiety, by her being emotionally drained coupled by the fact that up to this
date she could not determine the whereabouts of her child Arabella Sombong.

SO ORDERED.[2]

The accused now interposes this appeal alleging the ensuing assignment of errors,
viz:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS
DELIBERATELY FAILED TO RESTORE THE CHILD TO HER MOTHER,
AND CONVICTING THEM UNDER ART. 270 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, AND SENTENCING THEM TO RECLUSION PERPETUA;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED, IF ANY, IS THAT DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER
ART. 227 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
 III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY PURSUANT TO PRECEDENT IN PEOPLE vs. GUTIERREZ,
197 SCRA 569; and
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COMPLAINANT THE SUM
OF P100,000.00 BY WAY OF MORAL DAMAGES.[3]
The relevant antecedents surrounding the case are as follows:
On November 18, 1987, complainant Johanna Sombong brought her sick daughter
Arabella, then only seven (7) months old, for treatment to the Sir John Medical and
Maternity Clinic located at No. 121 First Avenue, Grace Park, KalookanCity which was
owned and operated by the accused-appellants. Arabella was diagnosed to be suffering
bronchitis and diarrhea, thus complainant was advised to confine the child at the clinic for
speedy recovery. About three (3) days later, Arabella was well and was ready to be
discharged but complainant was not around to take her home. A week later, complainant
came back but did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount
of P300.00. Complainant likewise confided to accused-appellant Dr. Carmen Ty that no
one would take care of the child at home as she was working. She then inquired about the
rate of the nursery and upon being told that the same was P50.00 per day, she decided to
leave her child to the care of the clinic nursery. Consequently, Arabella was transferred
from the ward to the nursery.[4]
Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and accumulate. It was at this time that
accused-appellant Dr. Ty suggested to the complainant that she hire a yaya for P400.00
instead of the daily nursery fee of P50.00. Complainant agreed, hence, a yaya was
hired. Arabella was then again transferred from the nursery to the extension of the clinic
which served as residence for the hospital staff.[5]
From then on, nothing was heard of the complainant. She neither visited her child
nor called to inquire about her whereabouts. Her estranged husband came to the clinic
once but did not get the child. Efforts to get in touch with the complainant were
unsuccessful as she left no address or telephone number where she can be reached.This
development prompted Dr. Ty to notify the barangay captain of the childs abandonment.
[6]
Eventually, the hospital staff took turns in taking care of Arabella.[7]
Sometime in 1989, two (2) years after Arabella was abandoned by complainant, Dr.
Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the clinic, suggested during a hospital staff conference that
Arabella be entrusted to a guardian who could give the child the love and affection,
personal attention and caring she badly needed as she was thin and sickly.The suggestion
was favorably considered, hence, Dr. Mallonga gave the child to her aunt, Lilibeth Neri.[8]
In 1992, complainant came back to claim the daughter she abandoned some five (5)
years back.
When her pleas allegedly went unanswered, she filed a petition for habeas
corpusagainst accused-appellants with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Said
petition was however denied due course and was summarily dismissed without prejudice
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the alleged detention having been perpetrated
in Kalookan City.
Thereafter, the instant criminal case was filed against accused-appellants.
Complainant likewise filed an administrative case for dishonorable conduct against
accused-appellant Dr. Carmen Ty before the Board of Medicine of the Professional
Regulation Commission. This case was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute.
On October 13, 1992, complainant filed a petition for habeas corpus with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, this time against the alleged guardians of her
daughter, namely, Marietta Neri Alviar and Lilibeth Neri. On January 15, 1993, the trial
court rendered a decision granting the petition and ordering the guardians to immediately
deliver the person of Cristina Grace Neri to the complainant, the court having found
Cristina to be the complainants child. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, said
decision was reversed on the ground that the guardians were not unlawfully withholding
from the complainant the rightful custody of Cristina after finding that Cristina and
complainants daughter are not one and the same person. On January 31, 1996, this Court
in Sombong v. Court of Appeals[9] affirmed the Court of Appeals decision.
In this appeal, accused-appellants would want us to take a second look and resolve
the issue of whether or not they are guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a
minor. Accused-appellants of course contend that they are not guilty and the Solicitor
General agrees. In its Manifestations and Motion in lieu of Appellees Brief, the Office of
the Solicitor General recommends their acquittal.
We agree.
As we have mentioned above, this Court in Sombong v. Court of Appeals[10]affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial courts ruling that complainant has
rightful custody over the child, Cristina Grace Neri, the latter not being identical with
complainants daughter, Arabella. The Court discoursed, thusly:

Petitioner does not have the right of custody over the minor Cristina because, by the
evidence disclosed before the court a quo, Cristina has not been shown to be petitioners
daughter, Arabella. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not warrant the
conclusion that Arabella is the same person as Cristina.

xxx

In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and
separate existence of petitioners child, Arabella, from that of private respondents foster
child, Cristina.

We note, among others, that Dr. Trono, who is petitioners own witness, testified in court
that, together with Arabella, there were several babies left in the clinic and so she could
not be certain whether it was Arabella or some their baby that was given to private
respondents.Petitioners own evidence shows that, after the confinement of Arabella in the
clinic in 1987, she saw her daughter again only in 1989 when she visited the clinic. This
corroborates the testimony of petitioners own witness, Dra. Ty, that Arabella was
physically confined in the clinic from November, 1987 to April, 1989. This testimony
tallies with her assertion in her counter-affidavit to the effect that Arabella was in the
custody of the hospital until April, 1989.All this, when juxtaposed with the unwavering
declaration of private respondents that they obtained custody of Cristina in April, 1988
and had her baptized at the Good Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988, leads to the
conclusions that Cristina is not Arabella.

Significantly, Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, herself a mother and the ponente of the
herein assailed decision, set the case for hearing on August 30, 1993 primarily for the
purpose of observing petitioners demeanor towards the minor Cristina. She made the
following personalbut relevant manifestation:

The undersigned ponente as a mother herself of four children, wanted to see how
petitioner as an alleged mother of a missing child supposedly in the person of Cristina
Neri would react on seeing again her long lost child. The petitioner appeared in the
scheduled hearing of this case late, and she walked inside the courtroom looking for a
seat without even stopping at her alleged daughters seat; without even casting a glance on
said child, and without even that tearful embrace which characterizes the reunion of a
loving mother with her missing dear child. Throughout the proceedings, the undersigned
ponente noticed no signs of endearment and affection expected of a mother who had been
deprived of the embrace of her little child for many years. The conclusion or finding of
undersigned ponente as a mother, herself, that petitioner-appellee is not the mother of
Cristina Neri has been given support by aforestated observation xxx.

xxx

Since we hold that petitioner has not been established by evidence to be entitled to the
custody of the minor Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be said that
private respondents are unlawfully withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over
Cristina. At this juncture, we need not inquire into the validity of the mode by which
private respondents acquired custodial rights over the minor, Cristina.

xxx
Under the facts and ruling in Sombong, as well as the evidence adduced in this case
accused-appellants must perforce be acquitted of the crime charged, there being no reason
to hold them liable for failing to return one Cristina Grace Neri, a child not conclusively
shown and established to be complainants daugther, Arabella.
The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we were to consider Cristina Grace Neri and
Arabella Sombong as one and the same person, still, the instant criminal case against the
accused-appellants must fall.
Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of
the Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender
has been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to
restore said minor to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the
offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not
the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather
the deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his
parents or guardians.[11] Said failure or refusal, however, must not only be deliberate but
must also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the
aid of the courts in order to obtain custody. [12] The key word therefore of this element is
deliberate and Blacks Law Dictionary defines deliberate as:

Deliberate, adj. Well advised; carefully considered; not sudden or rash; circumspect;
slow in determining. Willful rather than merely intentional. Formed, arrived at, or
determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations, as a
deliberate judgment or plan.Carried on coolly and steadily, especially according to a
preconceived design; given to weighing facts and arguments with a view to a choice or
decision; careful in considering the consequences of a step; slow in action; unhurried;
characterized by reflection; dispassionate; not rash. People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880,
156 P. 2d 7, 17, 18.

By the use of this word, in describing a crime, the idea is conveyed that the
perpetrator weighs the motives for the act and its consequences, the nature of the crime,
or other things connected with his intentions, with a view to a decision thereon; that he
carefully considers all these, and that the act is not suddenly committed. It implies that
the perpetrator must be capable of the exercise of such mental powers as are called into
use by deliberation and the consideration and weighing of motives and consequences.[13]
Similarly, the word deliberate is defined in Corpus Juris Secundum as:

DELIBERATE.

As a Verb

The word is derived from two Latin words which mean literally concerning and to weigh,
it implies the possession of a mind capable of conceiving a purpose to act, and the
exercise of such mental powers as are called into use by the consideration and weighing
of the motives and the consequences of the act; and has been defined as meaning to
consider, reflect, take counsel, or to weigh the arguments for and against a proposed
course of action; to consider and examine the reasons for and against, consider maturely,
ponder, reflect upon, or weigh in the mind; to reflect, with a view to make a choice; to
weigh the motives for an act and its consequences, with a view to a decision thereon.

As an Adjective

The word, used adjectively, implies action after thought and reflection, and relates to the
end proposed; indicates a purpose formed in a mind capable of conceiving a purpose; and
is based upon an intention accompanied by such circumstances as evidence a mind fully
conscious of its own purpose and design. It has been defined as meaning carefully
considered; circumspect; entered upon after deliberation and with fixed purpose, formed
after careful consideration, and fully or carefully considering the nature or consequences
of an act or measure; maturely reflected; not sudden or rash, carefully considering the
probable consequences of a step; premeditated; slow in determining; weighing facts and
arguments with a view to a choice of decision; well-advised.

Under some circumstances, it has been held synonymous with, or equivalent to,
intentional, premeditated, and willful.

Under other circumstances, however, it has been compared with, or distinguished from,
premeditated, sudden, and willful.[14]

Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply something more
than mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or
intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the
part of the accused-appellants to restore the custody of the complainants child to
her. When the accused-appellant learned that complainant wanted her daughter back after
five (5) long years of apparent wanton neglect, they tried their best to help herein
complainant find the child as the latter was no longer under the clinics care. Accused-
appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address of Arabellas guardians but as soon as she
obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga who was already working abroad, she personally went
to the guardians residence and informed them that herein complainant wanted her
daughter back. Dr. Ty testified as follows:
Q: Now, since you said a while ago that when you placed the child under the (sic)
guardianship, you are (sic) aware that the natural mother will get back the child,
why did you not return the minor to the natural mother?
A: During that time mam, the resident physician who will (sic) discharged the baby
was not present because she was abroad.
Q: But then madam witness, are you aware where the child was and to whom it was
given?
A: The exact address was not given to me, mam, before the resident physician left
for abroad so, I asked the PAO to give me one month to have (sic) a long
distance call to this doctor and asked her for the whereabout(s) of the child.
Q: And where you granted the thirty-day period by the Officer of the PAO?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: What happened if any during that thirty-day period?
A: I was able to talk to Fe Mallonga in Bahrain and she told me the exact address of
the guardian, mam.
Q: Were (sic) you informed (of) the exact address of the guardian, did you informed
(sic) the PAO?
A: Yes, mam.
 ATTY. WARD:
Q: Then, what happened next, madam witness?
A: I was the one who went to the address to be sure that the child was really there,
mam.
Q: And did you see the child?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: What did you do with the child?
A: I just tell (sic) the child. Ay and laki mo na pala. I just told the child like that and
Ive (sic) talked also to the guardian during that time, mam.
Q: And what did you tell the guardian?
A: I told the guardian that the rightful mother was claiming for the child and that we
should talked (sic) with each other at the PAO for the decision, mam.
Q: Did the guardian bring the child to the PAOs Office (sic)?
A: No mam, she did not appear.
Q: Why?
A: They told me first that they are (sic) going to contact a lawyer but for (sic) several
days, she did not respond anymore, mam.[15]
When the guardians refused to return the child, accused-appellant Dr. Ty sought the
assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which conducted a conference
among the parties but since a case was yet to be filed, the custody of the minor remained
with the guardians. This fact is evident from the following testimony, thus:
Q: You testified on cross-examination that you located the whereabouts of the child
sometime later, what steps did you take up (sic) after you found the child?
A: I explained to the guardian that the verbal agreement between the supposed to be
guardianship was only a plain guardianship and not as an adoption, sir.
Q: You said you went to the NBI after you found the child, why did you go to the
NBI?
A: Because the guardian are (sic) not willing to surrender the child to the PAOs
Office (sic). that is why I asked their help, sir.[16]
xxx
Q: Now, when you informed the present custodian that the natural mother is now
claiming the child, why were you not able to get the minor?
A: I was not able to get the minor so I asked the help of the NBI to have the child
surrender (sic), mam.
ATTY. WARD:
 Q: And what happened when you get (sic) the assistance of the NBI?
A: They were the ones who asked the guardian to surrender the child, mam.
Q: You stated a while ago that there was no written agreement between you or your
hospital and the guardian of the minor, is that correct?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: For what reason if you know, why (did) the guardian did (sic) not follow you or
obey you when you want (sic) to get back the child?
A: I dont know of any reason, mam.[17]
The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in finding the child
clearly negate the finding that there was a deliberate refusal or failure on their part to
restore the child to her mother. Evidence is simply wanting in this regard.
It is worthy to note that accused-appellants conduct from the moment the child was
left in the clinics care up to the time the child was given up for guardianship was
motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire to help the child and a high regard for
her welfare and well-being.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant VICENTE TY and
CARMEN TY are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and are ordered to be
released immediately unless they are being detained for other lawful causes. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23253 March 28, 1969

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR BETTY CHUA SY ALIAS "GRACE

CABANGBANG" FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
PACITA CHUA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MR. & MRS. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG ET AL., respondents-appellees.

Francisco R. Sotto and Associates for petitioner-appellant.

Teofilo F. Manalo for respondents-appellees Mr. & Mrs. Cabangbang.
Enrico R. Castro for respondent-appellee Victor T. Villareal.
CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal direct to this Court from the decision of May 21, 1964 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal dismissing Pacita Chua's petition for habeas corpus directed
against Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife Flora Cabangbang.

Pacita Chua, when still in the prime of youth, supported herself by working in
nightclubs as a hostess. And sexual liaison she had with man after man without benefit of
marriage. She first lived with a certain Chua Ben in 1950 by whom she had a child who
died in infancy. She afterwards cohabited with Sy Sia Lay by whom she had two children
named Robert and Betty Chua Sy. The latter child was born on December 15, 1957.
Shortly after the birth of Betty, Pacita Chua and Sy Sia Lay separated. Finding no one to
fall back on after their separation, Pacita Chua lingered in and around nightclubs and
gambling joints, until she met Victor Tan Villareal. In due time she became the latter's
mistress. In 1960 another child, a girl, was born to her. In 1961 when this last child was
still an infant, she and Villareal separated. Without means to support the said child, Pacita
Chua gave her away to a comadre in Cebu.

Sometime in May 1958 Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife, a childless couple,
acquired the custody of the child Betty who was then barely four months old. They have
since brought her up as their own. They had her christened as Grace Cabangbang on
September 12, 1958. 1

There is some testimonial conflict on how the Cabangbang spouses acquired custody of
the girl Betty (or Grace), Pacita Chua avers that in October 1958, while she and Villareal
were still living together, the latter surreptitiously took the child away and gave her to the
Cabangbangs, allegedly in recompense for favors received. She supposedly came to know
of the whereabouts of her daughter, only in 1960 when the girl, who was then about three
years old, was brought to her by Villareal, who shortly thereafter returned the child to the
Cabangbangs allegedly thru threats intimidation, fraud and deceit. The Cabangbang
spouses assert in rebuttal that Mrs. Cabangbang found the child, wrapped in a bundle, at
the gate of their residence; that she reared her as her own and grew very fond of her; and
that nobody ever molested them until the child was 5-½ years of age.lâwphi1.ñet

At all events, it is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbang
spouses by Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Pacita Chua.

By letter dated June 6, 1963 addressed to the Cabangbang spouses, with copy furnished
to Villareal, Pacita Chua thru counsel demanded the surrender to her of the custody of the
child. Failing to secure such custody, Pacita Chua (hereinafter referred to as the
petitioner) filed on June 14, 1963 a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, praying that the court grant her custody of and recognize her parental
authority over the girl. Named respondents in the petition were Villareal and the spouses
Cabangbang.
 On June 15, 1963 a writ was issued commanding the provincial sheriff of Rizal or any
of his deputies to produce the body of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang before the
court a quo on June 17, 1963, at 8:30 a.m. However, for reasons not stated in the record,
the child was not produced before the lower court as ordered.

On June 21, 1963 Villareal filed his answer to the petition. The Cabangbangs filed their
answer the next day.

After due trial, the lower court on May 21, 1964 promulgated its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court has come to the conclusion that it will be
for the welfare of the child Betty Chua Sy also known as Grace Cabangbang to be under
the custody of respondents Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang. Petition dismissed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

In this appeal now before us, the petitioner tenders for resolution two issues of law
which, by her own formulation, read as follows: "The lower court erred when it awarded
the custody of petitioner's daughter Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang, who is less than
seven (7) years old, in favor of respondents Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang, and [2]
illegally deprived petitioner of parental authority over her daughter."

We resolve both issues against the petitioner.

I.

Stated succinctly, the petitioner's thesis is that pursuant to the mandate contained in
article 363 of the Civil Code she cannot be separated from her child who was less, seven
years of age, and that she cannot be deprived of her parental authority over the child
because not one of the grounds for the termination, loss, suspension or deprivation of
parental authority provided in article 332 of the same Code obtains in this case.

Whether the petitioner can be legally separated from her child, Betty Chua Sy or Grace
Cabangbang, is an issue that is now moot and academic. Having been born on December
15, 1957, the child is now 11 years of age. Consequently, the second paragraph of art. 363
of the Civil Code, which prohibits the separation of a child under seven years of age from
her mother, "unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure," has no
immediate relevance. The petitioner correctly argues, however, that the reasons relied
upon by the lower court — i.e., "petitioner is not exactly an upright woman" and "it will
be for the welfare of the child" — are not strictly speaking, proper grounds in law to
deprive a mother of her inherent right to parental authority over her child. It must be
conceded that minor children — be they legitimate, recognized natural, adopted, natural
by legal fiction or illegitimate, other than natural as specified in art. 269 of the Civil Code
— are by law under the parental authority of both the father and the mother, or either the
father or the mother, as the case may be. But we take the view that on the basis of the
aforecited seemingly unpersuasive factual premises, the petitioner can be deprived of her
parental authority. For while in one breath art. 313 of the Civil Code lays down the rule
that "Parental authority cannot be renounced or transferred, except in cases of
guardianship or adoption approved by the courts, or emancipation by concession," it
indicates in the next that "The courts may, in cases specified by law deprive parents of
their [parental] authority." And there are indeed valid reasons, as will presently be
expounded, for depriving the petitioner of parental authority over the minor Betty Chua
Sy or Grace Cabangbang.

It is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbangs by Villareal
with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner. In support of this finding, it cited the
facts that the petitioner did not at all — not ever — report to the authorities the alleged
disappearance of her daughter, and had not taken any step to see the child when she
allegedly discovered that she was in the custody of the Cabangbangs. It discounted the
petitioner's claim that she did not make any move to recover the child because the
Cabangbangs are powerful and influential. The petitioner is bound by the foregoing
findings of fact. Having taken her appeal directly to this Court, she is deemed to have
waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the trial court. 2

Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia:

The courts may deprive the parents of their authority or suspend the exercise of the
same if they should treat their children with excessive harshness or should give them
corrupting orders, counsels, or examples, or should make them beg or abandon them.
(emphasis supplied)

Abandonment is therefore one of the grounds for depriving parents of parental authority
over their children.

Was the petitioner's acquiescence to the giving by Villareal of her child to the
Cabangbangs tantamount to abandonment of the child? To our mind, mere acquiescence
— without more — is not sufficient to constitute abandonment. But the record yields a
host of circumstances which, in their totality, unmistakably betray the petitioner's settled
purpose and intention to completely forego all parental response possibilities and forever
relinquish all parental claim in respect to the child.

She surrendered the custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until
1963, or after the lapse of a period of five long years, before she brought action to recover
custody. Her claim that she did not take any step to recover her child because the
Cabangbangs were powerful and influential, does not deserve any modicum of credence.
A mother who really loves her child would go to any extent to be reunited with her. The
natural and normal reaction of the petitioner — once informed, as she alleged, and her
child was in the custody of the Cabangbangs — should have been to move heaven and
earth, to use a worn-out but still respectable cliche, in order to recover her. Yet she lifted
not a finger.
 It is a matter of record — being the gist of her own unadulterated testimony under oath
— that she wants the child back so that Sy Sia Lay, the alleged father, would resume
providing the petitioner the support which he peremptorily withheld and ceased to give
when she gave the child away. A woman scorned, she desires to recover the child as a
means of embarrassing Villareal who retrieved the jeep he gave her and altogether
stopped living with and supporting her. But the record likewise reveals that at the pre-trial
conducted by the court a quo, she expressed her willingness that the child remain with the
Cabangbangs provided the latter would in exchange give her a jeep and some money.

The petitioner's inconsistent demands in the course of the proceedings below, reveal that
her motives do not flow from the wellsprings of a loving mother's heart. Upon the
contrary, they are unmistakably selfish — nay, mercenary. She needs the child as a
leverage to obtain concessions — financial and otherwise — either from the alleged
father or the Cabangbangs. If she gets the child back, support for her would be
forthcoming so she thinks — from the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay. On the other hand, if
the Cabangbangs would keep the child, she would agree provided they gave her a jeep
and some money.

Indeed, the petitioner's attitude, to our mind, does nothing but confirm her intention to
abandon the child — from the very outset when she allowed Villareal to give her away to
the Cabangbangs. It must be noted that the abandonment took place when the child,
barely four months old, was at the most fragile stage of life and needed the utmost care
and solicitude of her mother. And for five long years thereafter she did not once move to
recover the child. She continuously shunned the natural and legal obligations which she
owed to the child; completely withheld her presence, her love, her care, and the
opportunity to display maternal affection; and totally denied her support and
maintenance. Her silence and inaction have been prolonged to such a point that her
abandonment of the child and her total relinquishment of parental claim over her, can and
should be inferred as a matter of law. 3

Note that this was not the only instance when she gave away a child of her own flesh
and blood. She gave up her youngest child, named Betty Tan Villareal, to her comadre in
Cebu because she could not support it.

Of incalculable significance is the fact that nowhere in the course of the petitioner's
lengthy testimony did she ever express a genuine desire to recover her child Betty Chua
Sy or Grace Cabangbang — or, for that matter, her other child Betty Tan Villareal —
because she loves her, cares for her, and wants to smother her with motherly affection.
Far from it. She wants Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang back so that the alleged
father would resume giving her (the petitioner) support. She wants her back to humiliate
and embarrass the respondent Villareal who, with her knowledge and consent, gave the
child to the Cabangbangs. But — "most unkindest cut of all"! — she nevertheless
signified her readiness to give up the child, in exchange for a jeep and some money.

We therefore affirm the lower court's decision, not on the grounds cited by it, but upon a
ground which the court overlooked — i.e., abandonment by the petitioner of her child. 4
 Contrast the petitioner's attitude with that of the respondents Cabangbang — especially
the respondent Flora Cabangbang who, from the moment the child was given to them,
took care of her as if she were her own flesh and blood, had her baptized, and when she
reached school age enrolled her in a reputable exclusive school, for girls.

Ironically enough, the real heart-rending tragedy in this case would consist not in taking
the child away from the Cabangbangs but in returning her to the custody of the petitioner.

For, by her own admission, the petitioner has no regular source of income, and it is
doubtful, to say the very least, that she can provide the child with the barest necessities of
life, let alone send her to school. There is no insurance at all that the alleged father, Sy Sia
Lay — an unknown quantity, as far as the record goes — would resume giving the
petitioner support once she and the child are reunited. What would then prevent the
petitioner from again doing that which she did before, i.e., give her away? These are of
course conjectures, but when the welfare of a helpless child is at stake, it is the bounden
duty of courts — which they cannot shirk — to respect, enforce, and give meaning and
substance to a child's natural and legal right to live and grow in the proper physical,
moral and intellectual environment. 5

This is not to say that with the Cabangbang spouses, a bright and secure future is
guaranteed for her. For life is beset at every turn with snares and pitfalls. But the record
indubitably pictures the Cabangbang spouses as a childless couple of consequence in the
community, who have given her their name and are rearing her as their very own child,
and with whom there is every reason to hope she will have a fair chance of normal
growth and development into respectable womanhood.

Verily, to surrender the girl to the petitioner would be to assume — quite incorrectly —
that only mothers are capable of parental love and affection. Upon the contrary, this case
precisely underscores the homiletic admonition that parental love is not universal and
immutable like a law of natural science.

II.

The petitioner assails as illegal and without basis the award of the custody of Grace
Cabangbang or Betty Chua Sy to the Cabangbang spouses upon the grounds, first, that
the couple are not related by consanguinity or affinity to the child, and second, because
the answer of the spouses contains no prayer for the custody of the child.

The absence of any kinship between the child and the Cabangbangs alone cannot serve
to bar the lower court from awarding her custody to them. Indeed, the law provides that
in certain cases the custody of a child may be awarded even to strangers, as against either
the father or the mother or against both. Thus, in proceedings involving a child whose
parents are separated — either legally or de facto — and where it appears that both
parents are improper persons to whom to entrust the care, custody and control of the
child, "the court may either designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the child, or
his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take charge of such
child, or commit it to and suitable asylum, children's home, or benevolent society." 6

Parenthetically, sections 6 and 7 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court belie the petitioner's
contention that the first sentence of art. 363 of the Civil Code, which states that

In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount.....

applies only when the litigation involving a child is between the father and the mother.
That the policy enunciated, in the abovequoted legal provision is of general application, is
evident from the use of the, adjective all — meaning, the whole extent or quantity of, the
entire number of, every one of. 7 It is, therefore, error to argue that if the suit involving a
child's custody is between a parent and a stranger, the law must necessarily award such
custody to the parent. Sec 7, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, precisely contemplates,
among others, a suit between a parent and a stranger who, in the words of the provision,
is "some reputable resident of the province." And under the authority of the said rule, the
court — if it is for the best interest of the child — may take the child away from its
parents and commit it to, inter alia, a benevolent person.

The petitioner's contention that the answer of the spouses Cabangbang contains no
prayer for the retention by them of the custody of the child, is equally devoid of merit.
The several moves taken by them are clear and definitive enough. First, they asked for
her custody pendente lite. Second, they sought the dismissal of the petition below for lack
of merit. Finally, they added a general prayer for other reliefs just and equitable in the
premises. Surely the above reliefs prayed for are clearly indicative of the Cabangbangs'
genuine desire to retain the custody of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.

III.

Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The petitioner has not
proven that she is entitled to the rightful custody of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.
Upon the contrary, by wantonly and completely shunting aside her legal and moral
obligations toward her child, she must be deemed as having forfeited all legitimate legal
and moral claim to her custody. The lower court acted correctly in dismissing her petition.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-67880 September 15, 1989

FELIX ESMALIN, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (3rd Division) and CARE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Pedro A. Lopez for petitioner.

Eugene A. Tan for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:

Before Us is a petition for review by certiorari 1 of the decision 2 of the National Labor
Relations Commission, Third Division, declaring the petitioner's dismissal from private
respondent, CARE Philippines, justified.

As gathered from the records, the facts of this case are as follows:

The petitioner, Felix Esmalin has been employed by CARE Philippines for almost six (6)
years, three (3) years of which as warehouseman of the company, assigned at Transcon
Warehouse in Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila. Among his duties and responsibilities were: to
expedite dispatch of all CARE supplied commodities through monitoring delivery orders;
to dispatch and correct bag count; to coordinate with the shipping clerk on all details
concerning arriving shipments, and to make a report on all arrivals at TRANSCON. As
found by the NLRC, Esmalin was occupying a position of trust. 3

The private respondent, CARE Philippines, is a non-profit organization whose primary

purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts or reliefs, rehabilitation and
reconstruction materials and other needed commodities, by individuals and organizations
outside of the Philippines, to individuals and organizations in the Philippines, designated
by the donors. 4

In a series of thefts involving a total of 17,731 bags of relief goods consisting of soy
fortified flour (SFF) and corn soya milk (CSM) belonging to the U.S. government and
stored at the TRANSCON Bodega of respondent Company, the alleged participation of
Esmalin, CARE OIC of said bodega, was summarized by the Tanodbayan, as follows:

Felix Esmalin was the CARE OIC of TRANSCON Bodega. He cooperated with John
Dupree in retesting in MIT laboratory and in taking samples even not at random until the
original test result of being unfit for human and unfit for animal was changed to "unfit for
human but fit for animal." Thereafter, Letter Orders were made by John Dupree but only
to be applied to CSM and SFF deposited in TRANSCON, Sta. Mesa bodega. However,
he caused withdrawal in favor of Oliver C. Reyes one truck of good order milk CSM
from Pasig Warehouse and brought them to Binan. As OIC Warehouseman, he should see
to it that in every delivery of relief goods to ASF, BAI, Alabang he must at the return of
every trip, take back a copy of the DCR and from there he could easily detect where the
goods were brought and who received them. But he did not comply with that duty, and
his unjustified failure facilitated the diversion, a conduct emphasizing cooperation in the
execution of his role in the conspiracy.

Esmalin reported at first a small quantity of damaged SFF and CSM; however, with the
loterance (sic) of Orlando Cabrega, who is the USAID Program Specialist and godfather
of Efren C. Reyes in marriage, and without the benefit of inspection, check or
reclassification, he jacked up the number of damaged CSM and SFF and reported/
advised same as due for donation in order not to contaminate the good order relief goods
coming from "SS Thomas Nelson."

Such act manifest (sic) intent for gain to cooperate with the scheme to divert good order
relief goods in big quantities and Cabrega played the leading role in that
respect. 5 (Emphasis supplied.)

The report on the loss of company commodities as wen as the involvement of Esmalin
therein was transmitted by the Criminal Investigation Services (CIS), Armed Forces of
the Philippines, on March 9, 1981 to the Tanodbayan 6which in turn found a prima
facie case against the suspects including Esmalin.

On April 29, 1981, a clearance application for the preventive suspension of Esmalin,
leading to his termination from employment was filed by CARE PHILIPPINES on the
ground that the continued presence of the former poses a serious or imminent danger to
the property of the latter. Thus, on the same day petitioner received from private
respondent, a letter signed by its director, Mr. Henry R. Richards, the pertinent portion of
which reads:

This is to inform you that today we are filing with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
an application for clearance to place you under preventive suspension.

Considering that there is an ongoing investigation being conducted by the Criminal

Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary involving anomalies in the
movement of CARE food commodities; because these investigations have resulted in
strong reasonable suspicion that you are party to these anomalies considering that as
warehouseman you occupy a sensitive position in relation to the subject of this
investigation, CARE is constrained to place you under preventive suspension pending
final termination of the CIS Investigation.

You are therefore relieved of your duties and responsibilities as warehouseman effective
immediately. 7
The reason for the clearance application to suspend and terminate Esmalin was loss of
trust and confidence. 8

On May 4, 1981, petitioner Esmalin opposed the clearance applied for by private
respondents to place him under preventive suspension, stating that he is not a threat to the
life and property of his employers and co-employees; nor is he a threat to the normal
operations of the company, considering that his job is ministerial and that the on-going
investigation conducted on the reported anomalies has no bearing upon him.

In an Order dated October 22, 1981, the Ministry of Labor, through Director Francisco
Estrella denied the clearance for preventive suspension sought by CARE Philippines and
ordered the latter to immediately reinstate Esmalin to his former position with full back
wages less his salary for two (2) months during which period he was considered to be
under disciplinary suspension. 9

Private respondent appealed 10 the Order of Director Estrella to the Ministry of Labor on
December 14, 1981. The appeal was dismissed for lack of merit 11 on May 24, 1982.

Not satisfied, CARE Philippines filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to the
Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Execution 12 dated June 16, 1982. On September
23, 1982, Deputy Minister of Labor, Vicente Leogardo, Jr., issued an Order 13 setting
aside the Order of May 24, 1982 and remanding the case to the National Labor Relations
Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch for compulsory arbitration.

The Labor Arbiter conducted a hearing and the parties agreed to submit their respective
position papers and documentary evidence, after which the case was deemed submitted
for decision. On April 8, 1983, Labor Arbiter, Manuel B. Lorenzo, rendered a
decision 14 in favor of petitioner, the pertinent portion of which reads:

In the case at bar, there is no showing that complainant had cooperated and conspired
with the several accused charged before the Tanodbayan and consequently with the
Sandiganbayan. True to the incorruptible saying 'that the innocent is as bold as a lion
while the wicked teeth even no one pursueth. (sic) The complainant had shown his
boldness by pursuing relentlessly his bid for justice because it was very clear that
complainant, Felix Esmalin is not involved in the irregularities.

In view of the foregoing, this Office cannot close his (sic) eyes from the glaring evidence
of the complainant's innocence, hence, we hold that request for clearance to terminate is
DENIED and respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate the complainant, Felix Esmalin
immediately with full backwages and other benefits attached to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and privileges.

SO ORDERED.

CARE Philippines appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). On February 14, 1984, the NLRC promulgated its
decision 15 setting aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declaring the dismissal of
petitioner, Felix Esmalin, justified. The ratiocination of the NLRC is stated in its decision,
the pertinent portion of which reads:

We find complainant's dismissal proper. It cannot be denied that Esmalin was occupying
a position of trust in respondent company. As warehouseman, he had access to the
property of his employer. The latter therefore had every reason to expect from him at all
times utmost fidelity and diligence in dealing with its property. So that, with the finding
by the CIS and the Tanodbayan that Esmalin was involved in a series of thefts of
company property, and his subsequent indictment therefor, one cannot say that there was
no justifiable cause for the company's loss of trust and confidence in complainant. In the
instant case, the complainant, occupying a position of trust, has been charged in the
Sandiganbayan on two counts for theft of company property worth hundreds of thousands
of pesos, and the evidence against him appears to be strong. His guilt beyond reasonable
doubt or innocence that may be found later by the Sandiganbayan cannot be the
determinative gauge in the final adjudication of the instant case. It is enough that
sufficient substantial evidence has been established, as this Commission has found, that
complainant violated the trust and confidence reposed in him by his employers, that a
justified dismissal can be pronounced. We cannot, therefore, in conscience compel the
respondent company to take him back for We cannot guarantee his good behavior in the
future.

Felix Esmalin filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision, but it was
denied. Hence the instant petition for review by certiorari ** wherein petitioner sets forth
the following issues:

1. Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that
petitioner's dismissal was justified;

2. Whether or not public respondent decided a question of substance in a way not in

accordance with law and applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;

3. Whether or not petitioner was denied "due process of law" when he was arbitrarily
relieved of his employment on April 29, 1981. 16

all of which may be synthesized into one single issue, that is, whether or not Esmalin's
dismissal is justified.

Before going into the merits of this case, an important point to consider is the finality of
the assailed order of the Director of Labor dated October 22, 1981 which was the subject
of review by the National Labor Relations Commission whose decision is now before this
Court.

The records show that despite reconsideration of the Order of Deputy Minister of Labor
Vicente Leogardo, Jr. dated May 24, 1982 which affirmed the Order of the Director,
National Capital Region dated October 22, 1981 and dismissed respondent's appeal
relative thereto, the findings of the Office of the Minister on the untimeliness of the filing
of the appeal memorandum are still as follows: [1] that the Order of the Regional Director
appealed from was received and signed by counsel of record on October 31, 1981 and by
respondent itself on November 5, 1981; [2] that from November 5, 1981, respondent was
given ten (10) working days within which to appeal the said Order; [3] that before the
expiration of said period, respondent filed an urgent motion for extension of time to file
appeal memorandum on November 16, 1981 praying for 15 days from November 18.
1981 within which to file an appeal memorandum and another extension from December
4, 1981 to December 13, 1981; and [4] that since December 13, 1981 falls on Sunday,
respondent's appeal memorandum was filed on December 14, 1981, which allegedly is
within the reglementary period. 17

It is well established that a motion for reconsideration and/or an appeal from a decision,
award or order of the Labor Arbiter must be filed within ten (10) working days from
receipt of such decision, award or order, pursuant to the Labor Code. 18 In implementation
thereof, Section 6, Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the NLRC provides: "No extension
of period. No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an
appeal shall be entertained." Hence, the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations
Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation, that the subject
Order of the Director of Labor appealed to the Deputy Minister of Labor has already
become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal. 19 Accordingly, the
decision of the National Labor Relations is null and void for lack of jurisdiction and for
the same reason, not within the jurisdiction of this Court to review.

However, even on the merits, a careful review of the records failed to yield a cogent
reason to disturb the assailed Order of Director Estrella dated October 22, 1981.

The bone of contention in this case is the alleged participation of Esmalin, as conspirator
in the theft of a large number of relief goods belonging to the U.S. and intended for
delivery to Alabang Stock Farm, Bureau of Animal Industry, Alabang, Rizal, which were
in fact diverted and delivered to Biñan, Laguna.

CARE submits that as warehouseman, Esmalin has full knowledge of the irregularity and
the fact that the incident took place, only shows that he connived with the other indictees
and expected profit from the transaction if disposed, which in fact was so disposed.
CARE also pointed out that Esmalin was physically present as warehouseman-
representative when the goods subject of the CIS investigation were taken out of the
Transcon Bodega, yet he allowed goods of excellent condition to be mixed with alleged
damaged commodities. 20

On the other hand, Esmalin taking exception to aforesaid charges, maintained that the
PC-CIS investigation itself clearly shows that withdrawals from the Transcon bodega
were covered with the letter-orders from the American officers of CARE and gate passes
prepared by Transcon warehouseman/supervisors. He insists that said withdrawals were
witnessed by CARE and Transcon officers. In fact, there were three (3) letter-orders
submitted covering the delivery of the disputed goods and 35 gate passes thereof. For this
reason, he contends that if there was any "switching of food commodities" it was not of
his own making. According to him, it was a co-employee Mrs. Adelina Caday who, upon
instruction by a superior, prepared the authorization and D-3 and were the same
documents presented to lain for his signature.

Briefly stated, the Regional Director's findings and conclusions read:

Based on the foregoing set of facts, we find that Esmalin's involvement in the irregularity
cited as ground for dismissal has not been clearly and satisfactorily established. Even the
report of the CIS on the incident happened through the presentation and flow of papers
and documents. Esmalin had only ministerial participation in them. These papers, which
are usually letter- orders and gate passes are not prepared by Esmalin; certainly, he is not
to account for the impropriety of its contents, nor can stop the flow of goods. He
therefore, had no direct hand in the switching much more in the flow of CARE
commodities. Therefore, as the participation of Esmalin in the irregularity is not
sufficiently established, the clearance application, perforce cannot be sustained. However,
for affixing his signature on a document which he should have studied carefully and
which he did not, he should be meted some kind of penalty. His suspension for two (2)
months appears to be appropriate. 21

In fact, even after compulsory arbitration in the National Labor Relations Commission,
Regional Arbitration Branch, the findings in favor of Esmalin remained unaltered. Labor
Arbiter Manuel B. Lorenzo gave stress on the glaring evidence of the petitioner's
innocence and arrived at the same conclusion, to deny the request for clearance to
terminate and grant full back wages and other benefits to Esmalin. More importantly, in a
resolution dated August 17, 1984, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, acquitted Esmalin
of the accusations filed against him. 22

In addition, in a letter dated April 29, 1981, and signed by Director Henry R. Richards of
CARE Philippines, informing petitioner Esmalin that he shall be placed under preventive
suspension pending the final termination of the CIS investigation, CARE alleged that it
conducted its own investigation as early as July 1980, one (1) year before petitioner was
placed under preventive suspension. But on February 24, 1981 or sixty-four (64) days
before petitioner's suspension, the same Director Richards sent Esmalin a
memorandum 23 increasing his salary to P1,285.00 per month effective January 1, 1981,
in recognition of his continued good work and efforts in behalf of CARE.

If indeed, petitioner was under formal investigation with regard to his alleged
participation in the anomaly, then the action of CARE Philippines in giving petitioner a
merit increase is undoubtedly inconsistent with the said investigation.

Undisputedly, CARE Philippines did not conduct its own investigation on the petitioner
but relied only on the CIS investigation which is in contravention of the ruling set forth in
the case of De Leon vs. NLRC, 100 SCRA 691 [1980], wherein this Court held:
The act of respondents in dismissing petitioner without first conducting a formal
investigation is arbitrary and unwarranted. The right of an employer to dismiss an
employee differs from and should not be confused with the manner in which such right is
exercised. It must not be oppressive and abusive since it affects one's person and
property.

While it is true that suspension is different from dismissal and that it is only in cases of
dismissal wherein a formal investigation and a prior clearance from the Ministry of Labor
is required, it can be discerned from the records of the case as well as from the actions
taken by CARE Philippines, that indeed they sought not only the suspension of petitioner
Esmalin but also his dismissal.

This can be gleaned from the memorandum submitted to us by private respondent, which
mentioned "an application for Clearance for the termination of the employment of the
petitioner with the Ministry of Labor." 24 Furthermore, although the letter dated April 29,
1981 speaks of "preventive suspension," its tenor clearly indicates dismissal. The
pertinent portion of the same reads:

You are therefore relieved of your duties and responsibilities as Warehouseman effective
immediately.

Please arrange with the Accounting Office for a proper computation of any amounts due
you from CARE by way of unpaid salaries as of this date, and for a proper turnover of
records and documents in your custody, including your CARE Identification card.

In addition, said letter refers to an enclosure which is the "Clearance to Dismiss

Employee." 25

Thus, the letter preventively suspending petitioner is in reality a dismissal, considering

that on the same day, private respondent filed with the Ministry of Labor an application
for clearance to dismiss the petitioner.

The Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines or P.D.
442 26 then enforced, *** clearly states that no employer may dismiss an employee
without a prior clearance secured from the Ministry of Labor. A dismissal without said
clearance shall be conclusively presumed a termination without a just cause.

According to the case of Bachiller vs. NLRC, 98 SCRA 393 [1980]:

Dismissal of an employee without requisite prior clearance from the Ministry of Labor is
equivalent to arbitrary dismissal.

Verily, it is the prerogative of management to employ the services of a person and

likewise to discharge him. But this is not without limitations and restrictions. The
dismissal of an employee must be done with just cause and without abuse of discretion. It
must NOT be done in an arbitrary and despotic manner. To hold otherwise would render
nugatory the security of tenure clause enshrined in the Constitution.

The right to labor is a constitutional as well as a statutory light. Every man has a natural
right to the fruits of his own industry. A man who has been employed to undertake certain
labor and has put into it his time and effort is entitled to be protected. "The right of a
person to his labor is deemed to be property within the meaning of constitutional
guarantees. That is his means of livelihood. He cannot be deprived of his labor or work
without due process of law. 27

Dismissal of an employee must be done without abuse of discretion. The right of an

employer to freely select or discharge his employees is regulated by the State, because the
preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, more vital than the
preservation of corporate profit. The protection to labor and social justice provisions of
the Constitution and the labor laws and rules and regulations are interpreted in favor of
the exercise of labor rights. 28

From the records of the case, it can be discerned that reinstatement is no longer viable in
view of the strained relations between petitioner-employee and private respondent-
employer. This is very evident from the vehement and consistent stand of CARE
Philippines in refusing to accept back petitioner Esmalin. Instead, petitioner should be
awarded separation pay as an alternative for reinstatement.

In the case of City Trust Corporation vs. NLRC, 157 SCRA 87 [1988], WE said:

However, in this case, there is no doubt that the relationship of employer to employee is
so strained and ruptured as to preclude a harmonious working relationship should
reinstatement of private respondent be decreed. Instead, private respondent should be
afforded the right to separation pay so that he can be spared the agony of having to work
anew with petitioner under an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism and the petitioner
does not have to endure the continued services of private respondent in whom it has lost
confidence.

This principle was formulated in Balaquezon EWTU v. Zamora (97 SCRA 5) and
subsequently reiterated in Asiaworld Publishing Inc. v. Ople (152 SCRA 219, G.R. No.
56398, July 23, 1987) and Bautista vs. Inciong, (158 SCRA 665 [1988]), wherein it was
stated that: "a monetary award is to be paid to the employee as an alternative to
reinstatement which can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time or
because of the realities of the situation."

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside,
and the decision of the Director of Labor is hereby affirmed with the modification that in
lieu of reinstatement, petitioner shall be given separation pay equivalent to one-half
month pay for every year of service. No costs.

SO ORDERED.