AISPORNA V CA (DIGEST)

DECEMBER 10, 2017 BY THELOWLYLAWSTUDENT

Aisporna v Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-39419

12 April 1982

TOPIC: Statutory Construction, Doctrine of Associated Words (Noscitur a Sociis)

FACTS:

Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the Insurance Commission as agent to Perla
Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12- month Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla with beneficiary to Ana
M. Isidro for P50,000. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy.

Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was issued with her active participation,
which is not allowed because she did not possess a certificate of authority to act as agent from the office of the
Insurance Commission.

Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, and that the policy was
merely a renewal and was issued because her husband was not around when Isidro called by telephone. Instead,
appellant left a note on top of her husband’s desk.

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court’s decisions was affirmed by respondent
appellate court, finding petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Sec 189 of the insurance act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act
without reference to the second paragraph of the same section.

RULING:
The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused is acquitted of the crime charged.

A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent,
sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate
of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who an insurance agent is
within the intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its
violation.

The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word
“agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second
paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189.

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained
from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning
of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give
effect to all its provisions whenever possible. More importantly the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a
Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or
with which it is associated.
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent
mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first
paragraph of the aforesaid section.

In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with
Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the
accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the
crime must be alleged and proved.

The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
People v. Manantan

GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)

Facts:

In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo
Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted
by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant.
Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant’s plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the
ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of
Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54
of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against
the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.

Issue:

Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code

Held:

Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim ‘casus omisus’ can operate and apply only if and when the omission
has been clearly established. The application of the rule of ‘casus omisus’ does not proceed from the mere fact that a case
is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted
from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term
'judge' includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the
peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of
the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as
previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic
and broader term ‘judge’, including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the
courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace. The Supreme Court set
aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the merits.
 Civil Code Article 13:

When the law speaks of years, months or nights, it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each; months of 30
days; days of 24 hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

Lynetter Garvida Petitioner

Vs.
Floencio Sales Jr., COMELEC, Election Officer Dionisio Rios & Provincial Supervisor Noli Pipo Respondents

Facts: On March 16, 1996, Lynette Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. However, her application was denied by the Board of Election
Tellers since she exceeded the age limit. She then filed a “Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataan Member and Voter”
with the Municipal Trial Court which was granted by the said court. Then, on April 23, 1996, Garvida filed her certificate
of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province
of Ilocos Norte. On the same date, Election Officer Dionisio Rios, per advise of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo,
disapproved petitioner’s certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner then appealed to COMELEC Regional
Director Filemon Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. Earlier and without
knowledge of COMELEC officials, private respondent and petitioner’s rival Florencio Sales Jr. filed with the COMELEC en
banc a “Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” via facsimile and registered mail on April 29,
1996. And, on May 2, 1996 respondent Riso issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and
giving hr 24 hours why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. Also on the same date, the COMELEC en
banc issued an order directing the Board Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of
petitioner in the event she won in the election. This is why on May 6, 1996, Election Day, Garvida was not proclaimed the
winner. She was only proclaimed on June 2, 1996. Said proclamation was “without prejudice to any further action by the
Commission on Elections or any other interested parties.

I ssues: Whether or not COMELEC erred in the cancellation of her candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded
the age limit.
Whether or not COMELEC en banc acted within its jurisdiction in cancelling her certificate of candidacy.

Ruling: Petition dismissed. Lynette Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for
candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan. The general rule is that an elective official of the
SAngguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 years old on the day of his election. The only exception is when the
official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency.
G.R No. 148408
July 14, 2006
Concepcion Parayno vs. Jose Jovellanos

FACTS:

Respondent Parayno was an owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents
of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another
location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of
Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advice, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or
transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline station. Resolution 50 stipulated the alleged violations of the gasoline station
in question. Petitioner sought for reconsideration, which was then denied. She then filed a special civil action for
prohibition and mandamus in the RTC, contending that her gasoline station was not covered by Section 44 of the Official
Zoning Code of Calasiao, which prohibits gasoline service stations which are within 100meters away from any public or
private school, public library, playground, church, and hospital based on the straight line method measured from the
nearest side of the building nearest the lot if there are no intervening buildings to the nearest pump of the gasoline station.
Petitioner contended that hers was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling station" governed by Section 21
thereof. Moreover, the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in a previous case filed by the
same respondent Jovellanos against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) should bar the grounds invoked by respondent
municipality in Resolution No. 50. The RTC ruled against petitioner by applying the virtue of ejusdem generis, saying that
a “gasoline filling station” fell within the ambit of Section 44. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was, again, only
denied by the RTC. The same fate was met by the petition in the CA. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s gasoline filling station could be likened to that of a gasoline service station as provided
for in Section 44 of the Official zoning Code by virtue of Ejusdem Generis.

HELD:
The Court held that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between a gasoline service
station and a gasoline filling station as found in Section 21 and Section 42 of the said ordinance. It was made clear that
the two terms were intended to be distinguished from the other, which the respondent further admitted. Respondent
municipality cannot invoke the principle of Ejusdem generis which means "of the same kind, class or nature” but rather
should apply the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius which means that the express mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of others.
With the distinction clearly provided, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service station" under Section 44
necessarily included "gasoline filling station" under Section 21.

The Court also held that the HLURB decision in the previous case filed against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) by
respondent Jovellanos had effectively barred the issues in Resolution No. 50 based on the principle of res judicata or the
rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. With the similarity of the
identity of interest of the case at bar and that of the previous case already decided by HLURB, the litigation should already
end since the concerns had already been resolved. The Court stated that an individual should not be vexed twice for the
same cause.
Lidasan vs COMELEC GR No L-28089 25 Ocotber 1967
Facts: Republic Act 4790, being disputed, reorganized the barrios in different municipalities of Province of Lanao del Sur.
It came to light later that 2 barrios in the statute are within the boundaries of other municipalities and that other 10
barrios are parts and parcel of another municipality, all in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. As the
statute stood, 12 barrios are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries
of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute
be suspended until “clarified by correcting legislation.” Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own
interpretation, declared that the statute “should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.”This triggered the petition for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached
portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. Petitioner requested that Republic Act 4790 be
declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec’s resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes, be
nullified.Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement that “[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

Decision: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. Constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power.
First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the
bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of
the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be “expressed in the title” of the bill.
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during
its deliberations the entire text of the bill.

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve
the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill,
and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to
inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and
the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry
as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one
is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

Since the petitioner is a qualified voter from the affected barrio, he has every right to become a suitor to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
CASE DIGEST: CALTEX V PALOMAR

Caltex vs Palomar

G.R. No. L-19650

29 September 1966

Facts:

In the year 1960, Caltex conceived a promotional scheme and called it "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest". It calls for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex Station will dispense during a
specified period. For the priviledge to participate, no fees or consideration, nor purchase of Caltex products were
required.

Forseeing the extensive use of mails relative to the contest, representations were made by Caltex with the postal
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advanced for mailing. The acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme
falls within the purview of sections 1954, 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code and declined to grant the
requested clearance.

Issues:

W/N construction should be employed in this case and W/N the contest violates the provisions of the Postal Law

Held:

Yes. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used in
a certain law. As defined in Black's Law Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the author's of the law with respect to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. In the present case, the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably require an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words therein.
This is as much as question of construction or interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair
exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies that the law is seeking to
prevent.

Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prize by chance. The three essential elements of a lottery are:
(1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. Gift enterprise is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods
are sold for their market value but by way of inducement, each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize. Gratuitous
distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute lottery. In the present case, the element of consideration is
not observed. No payment or purchase of a merchandise was required for the priviledge to participate.
Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446
(December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have
no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall”
therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a
rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would
be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
CASE DIGEST : Centeno Vs VIllalon

G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994 MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS : In the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng
Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin
Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of
Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit
from the Department of Social Welfare and Development As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles,
an information was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602 On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment finding
accused Vicente Yco and petitioner Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine of
P200.00

ISSUE : WON charitable purposes can be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose

HELD : Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since religious
activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions. However, "religious purpose" is not interchangeable with
the expression "charitable purpose Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude
solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal
legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused It does not follow, therefore from the
constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It has
been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the
"free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more
religion. Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and
does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though
the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free
exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise