Compania de Naveira Nedelka Sa V Tradex Internacional Sa
Compania de Naveira Nedelka Sa V Tradex Internacional Sa
1
Clause 21.
III. Arguments by the Owners
Applying this test it is apparent that notice of readiness can be given even though there are
some further preliminaries to be done, or routine matters to be carried on, or formalities
observed. If those things are not such as to give any reason to suppose that they will cause
any delay.
In the present case there were pests in the hold such as to make the ship unready to receive
cargo. Fumigation was not a mere preliminary, nor a routine matter, nor a formality at all. It
was an essential step which had to be taken before any cargo could be received at all. Until
the vessel had been fumigated, notice of readiness could not be given3.
Judge opinied that “the presence of pests in the hold invalidated the notice of readiness. I
think the decision of Mocatta J. was right and I would dismiss this appeal.”
2
Atkin L.J. in Aktiebolaget Nordiska Lloyd v. J. Brownlie & Co. (Hull) Ltd. (1925) 30 Com.Cas. 307, 315.
3
Groves, Maclean and Co. v. Volkart Brothers (1884) 1 T.L.R. 92.
B. CAIRNS L.J.
“Those measures have to be taken, as the clause lays down, before notice of readiness is
tendered. There can be no doubt, having regard to the context, "clean, dry, without smell,"
that the words "in every way suitable to receive grain" include freedom from infestation.
There is no room for any argument that the measures to be taken were simple and
comparatively cheap and could be carried out before a berth was available. The parties have
agreed to these measures as a condition precedent to the service of the notice of readiness,
and that is an end of the matter.
C. ROSKILL L.J.
The arbitrators appeared to have allowed themselves to be influenced by their view that there
was a breach of contract on the part of the charterers in failing timeously to inspect the holds.
With respect, that view is misconceived, as is that part of their part of their award which, in
the alternative, gives damages to the owners for such breach. Mr. Mustill found himself
compelled to abandon that part of the award. I fear that the arbitrators allowed their view that
the charterers were at fault in this respect to colour their whole award.
Mr. Mustill's final point was that clause 6 was akin to a clause which provided for time lost
waiting for berth to count as lay time. I reject this contention as a matter of the construction
of the clause.
I have ventured to add to what Lord Denning M.R. and Cairns L.J. have said because we are
here dealing with a question of principle our answer to which (one hopes) will help to avoid
further disputes of this kind.
I agree entirely with Mocatta J.'s judgment4 and would dismiss the appeal
4
[1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 384