THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR.

, as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and
STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the
Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the
Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a
domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of
6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in
the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots
registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos,
Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale
to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private
respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of
evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the
parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of
land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented
by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint —
petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and
Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was
filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to
dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by
entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated
the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign
immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative,
the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations
regarding selling a lot to a private entity
RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a
foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio,
has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since
1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international
relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held
and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of
another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it
is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be
categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but
claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute
said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use
of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal
Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or
personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of
its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15,
1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof
are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell
Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because
the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it
for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and
are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the
premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a
person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his
own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign
Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to
persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity
of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of
the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine
government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants
Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private
Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government
decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in
Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.

LLANTINO V. CO LIONG CHONG (1990)

Facts:

Co Liong Chong entered a contract with Llantino Sps for a lease of land
for a period of 60 years. Note that Co Liong Chong was naturalized as a
Filipino citizen (changed name to Juan Molina). Llantino sps wanted to
recover the property from Co Liong Chong.
Issue:

WON the lease contract is Invalid because at the time of its execution, he
was a Chinese?

Held:

NO. It was VALID. Lease contracts with Aliens allowed since an alien's stay
in RP is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease
contract which is not prohibited by the constitution -the lease contract is
valid as long as there are no circumstances attendant to its execution which
are used to circumvent the constitutional prohibition such as an option to
buy the contract or a lease for more than 50 years. An exception to this
exception is when the alien subsequently acquires Philippine Citizenship.

Holy See vs Rosario

G.R. No. 101949

238 SCRA 524

December 1, 1994

Petitioner: The Holy See

Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge

of

RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A,
registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D
under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was
donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents
the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy,
for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights
to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the
two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict
the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc.
insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that
respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned.
With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000
earnest money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale,
specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr.
Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on
sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that
petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a
business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign
immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987
Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted
by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition
and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating
to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic
missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local
jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or
embassy in this Court.

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner

has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business,
surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal
of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for
the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of
concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a
donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but
for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the
Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent
disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character
as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely
cannot evict the squatters living in said property.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the

complaints were dismissed accordingly.

G.R. No. 88694

BIDIN, J.:
This petition assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV
No. 14948 entitled "Eugenio S. Baltao, plaintiff-appellee vs. Albenson
Enterprises Corporation, et al, defendants-appellants", which modified the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVIII in Civil
Case No. Q-40920 and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent, among
others, the sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages and attorney's fees in the
amount of P50,000.00.

The facts are not disputed.

In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson

Enterprises Corporation (Albenson for short) delivered to Guaranteed
Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila, the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment
thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 136361
in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L.
Woodworks (Rollo, p. 148).

When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason
"Account Closed." Thereafter, petitioner Albenson, through counsel, traced
the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered that the president of
Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio
S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry of
Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business,
was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon
verification with the drawee bank, Pacific Banking Corporation, Albenson was
advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one
"Eugenio Baltao".

After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson, through counsel, made

an extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao,
president of Guaranteed, to replace and/or make good the dishonored check.
Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or
that the signature appearing thereon is his. He further alleged that
Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have transacted
business with Albenson.

On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
of Rizal a complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted to support said charges was an affidavit of
petitioner Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of Albenson. In said affidavit,
the above-mentioned circumstances were stated.

It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son

Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business establishment, E. L.
Woodworks, on the ground floor of Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street,
Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very same business address of Guaranteed.

On September 5, 1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an

information against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given
Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the
latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have waived his right.

Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him,

immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for
reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he had been given an
opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation conducted by Fiscal
Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings with Albenson or Benjamin
Mendiona, consequently, the check for which he has been accused of having
issued without funds was not issued by him and the signature in said check
was not his.

On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the
finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. He also
instructed the Trial Fiscal to move for dismissal of the information filed
against Eugenio S. Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signature in PBC
Check No. 136361 is not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao. He also found
that there is no showing in the records of the preliminary investigation that
Eugenio S. Baltao actually received notice of the said investigation. Fiscal
Castro then castigated Fiscal Sumaway for failing to exercise care and
prudence in the performance of his duties, thereby causing injustice to
respondent who was not properly notified of the complaint against him and
of the requirement to submit his counter evidence.

Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for
allegedly issuing a check which bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages against
herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin
Mendiona, its employee.

In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the
account of 'E.L. Woodworks,' not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff
used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had
ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. x x x. The possibility is that it
was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son of plaintiff who had a
business on the ground floor of Baltao Building located on V. Mapa Street,
that the defendants may have been dealing with. x x x" (Rollo, pp. 41-42).

The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against

defendants ordering the latter to pay plaintiff jointly and severally:

1. actual or compensatory damages of P133,350.00;

2. moral damages of P1,000,000.00 (1 million pesos);

3. exemplary damages of P200,000.00;

4. attorney's fees of P100,000.00;

5. costs.

"Defendants' counterclaim against plaintiff and claim for damages against

Mercantile Insurance Co. on the bond for the issuance of the writ of
attachment at the instance of plaintiff are hereby dismissed for lack of
merit." (Rollo, pp. 38-39)
On appeal, respondent court modified the trial court's decision as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by reducing the

moral damages awarded therein from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 and
the attorney's fees from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00, said decision being
hereby affirmed in all its other aspects. With costs against appellants."
(Rollo, pp. 50-51)
Dissatisfied with the above ruling, petitioners Albenson Enterprises Corp.,
Jesse Yap, and Benjamin Mendiona filed the instant Petition, alleging that
the appellate court erred in:

"1. Concluding that private respondent's cause of action is not one based on
malicious prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the Civil
Code notwithstanding the fact that the basis of a civil action for malicious
prosecution is Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 or Article 2176 of the Civil
Code x x x.

"2. Concluding that 'hitting at and in effect maligning (private respondent)

with an unjust criminal case was, without more, a plain case of abuse of
rights by misdirection and 'was therefore, actionable by itself,' and which
'became inordinately blatant and grossly aggravated when x x x (private
respondent) was deprived of his basic right to notice and a fair hearing in
the so-called preliminary investigation x x x'

"3. Concluding that petitioner's 'actuations in this case were coldly

deliberate and calculated', no evidence having been adduced to support such
a sweeping statement.

"4. Holding the petitioner corporation, petitioner Yap and petitioner

Mendiona jointly and severally liable without sufficient basis in law and in
fact.

"5. Awarding respondents-

5.1. P133,350.00 as actual or compensatory damages, even in the absence

of sufficient evidence to show that such was actually suffered.

5.2. P500,000.00 as moral damages considering that the evidence in this

connection merely involved private respondent's alleged celebrated status as
a businessman, there being no showing that the act complained of adversely
affected private respondent's reputation or that it resulted to material loss.

5.3. P200,000.00 as exemplary damages despite the fact that petitioners

were duly advised by counsel of their legal recourse.

5.4. P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, no evidence having been adduced to

justify such an award" (Rollo, pp. 4-6).
Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for
malicious prosecution. Citing the case of Madera vs. Lopez (102 SCRA 700
[1981]), they assert that the absence of malice on their part absolves them
from any liability for malicious prosecution. Private respondent, on the other
hand, anchored his complaint for Damages on Articles 19, 20, and 21 [*] of
the Civil Code.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of

abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in
the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes
the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each
provision is different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As
the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this article
(Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil
wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much more supple
and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to
conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by
the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines
72).

There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question
of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting
in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law,
depends on the circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1)
There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the
general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for their own sanction (Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who,
whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty,
causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered
thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the
following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is
done with intent to injure.

Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes
injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages.

There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act
must be intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may
be done either "willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well as the
respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three (3) articles
together, and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages in the
civil complaint filed against petitioners, thus:

"With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21) in focus, there
is not much difficulty in ascertaining the means by which appellants' first
assigned error should be resolved, given the admitted fact that when there
was an attempt to collect the amount of P2,575.00, the defendants were
explicity warned that plaintiff Eugenio S. Baltao is not the Eugenio Baltao
defendants had been dealing with (supra, p. 5). When the defendants
nevertheless insisted and persisted in filing a case -- a criminal case no less
-- against plaintiff, said defendants ran afoul of the legal provisions (Articles
19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code) cited by the lower court and heretofore
quoted (supra)."

Defendants, not having been paid the amount of P2,575.00, certainly had
the right to complain. But that right is limited by certain constraints. Beyond
that limit is the area of excess, of abuse of rights." (Rollo, pp. 44-45).

Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not
independently of each one, could be validly made the bases for an award of
damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under the
circumstances, We see no cogent reason for such an award of damages to
be made in favor of private respondent.

Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated

principle of abuse of right. What prompted petitioners to file the case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their
failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which
they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners
had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and yielded the
following results: from the records of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, it was discovered that the President of Guaranteed (the
recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one "Eugenio S. Baltao"; an
inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed that E.L.
Woodworks, against whose account the check was drawn, was registered in
the name of one "Eugenio Baltao"; verification with the drawee bank, the
Pacific Banking Corporation, revealed that the signature appearing on the
check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".

In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote private
respondent demanding that he make good the amount of the check. Counsel
for private respondent wrote back and denied, among others, that private
respondent ever transacted business with Albenson Enterprises Corporation;
that he ever issued the check in question. Private respondent's counsel even
went further: he made a warning to defendants to check the veracity of their
claim. It is pivotal to note at this juncture that in this same letter, if indeed
private respondent wanted to clear himself from the baseless accusation
made against his person, he should have made mention of the fact that
there are three (3) persons with the same name, i.e.: Eugenio Baltao Sr.,
Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr. (private respondent), and Eugenio Baltao III (private
respondent's son, who as it turned out later, was the issuer of the check).
He, however, failed to do this. The last two Baltaos were doing business in
the same building - Baltao Building - located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila. The mild steel plates were ordered in the name of Guaranteed
of which respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is the president and delivered to
Guaranteed at Baltao building. Thus, petitioners had every reason to believe
that the Eugenio Baltao who issued the bouncing check is respondent
Eugenio S. Baltao when their counsel wrote respondent to make good the
amount of the check and upon refusal, filed the complaint for violation of BP
Blg. 22.

Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken

identity at first hand. Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and
thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was
propituous by filing an action for damages. The Court will not countenance
this devious scheme.

The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter
refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand
was a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners to find the best possible
means by which they could collect the sum of money due them. A person
who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to
compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to
make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a
wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be
awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the
action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the
law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Rubio
vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).

In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild steel
plates were ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building and
as part payment thereof, the bouncing check was issued by one Eugenio
Baltao. Neither had private respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are
two Eugenio Baltaos conducting business in the same building - he and his
son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which received the
goods in payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by
respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the
complaint before the provincial fiscal.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the

prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that
his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable
for malicious prosecution. (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100
SCRA 602 [1980]). Still, private respondent argues that liability under
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code is so encompassing that it likewise
includes liability for damages for malicious prosecution under Article 2219
(8). True, a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed
under the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33,
35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order that such a case can prosper, however,
the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the
prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the
prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2)
That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3)
The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court of
Appeals, 199 SCRA 58, [1991]).

Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is
later on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the
principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. As earlier stated, a
complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if
the three (3) elements aforecited are shown to exist. In the case at bar, the
second and third elements were not shown to exist. It is well-settled that
one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one
has acted with probable cause. "Probable cause is the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. In other words, a suit
will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without
probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great
discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of
suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried"
(Que vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]).

The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the

absence of malice. In the instant case, it is evident that petitioners were not
motivated by malicious intent or by sinister design to unduly harass private
respondent, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect their rights when
they filed the criminal complaint against private respondent.

"To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the

prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting
a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly
and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages" (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of
petitioners to vex or humiliate private respondent by instituting the criminal
case against him. While petitioners may have been negligent to some extent
in determining the liability of private respondent for the dishonored check,
the same is not so gross or reckless as to amount to bad faith warranting an
award of damages.

The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken

identity. It is possible that with a more assiduous investigation, petitioners
would have eventually discovered that private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao
is not the "Eugenio Baltao" responsible for the dishonored check. However,
the record shows that petitioners did exert considerable effort in order to
determine the liability of private respondent. Their investigation pointed to
private respondent as the "Eugenio Baltao" who issued and signed the
dishonored check as the president of the debtor-corporation Guaranteed
Enterprises. Their error in proceeding against the wrong individual was
obviously in the nature of an innocent mistake, and cannot be characterized
as having been committed in bad faith. This error could have been
discovered if respondent had submitted his counter-affidavit before
investigating fiscal Sumaway and was immediately rectified by Provincial
Fiscal Mauro Castro upon discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation
resulting in the dismissal of the complaint.

Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act
wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right
is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may
even exercise it erroneously. And an adverse decision does not ipso
facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Garcia vs.
Gonzales, 183 SCRA 72 [1990]).

Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the

action was filed in good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising
his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electric Company
vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).

Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or compensatory

damages, the records show that the same was based solely on his
allegations without proof to substantiate the same. He did not present proof
of the cost of the medical treatment which he claimed to have undergone as
a result of the nervous breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof of
the actual loss to his business caused by the unjust litigation against him. In
determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation,
conjectures or guesswork as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss,
the award of actual damages becomes erroneous (Guilatco vs. City of
Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 [1989]).

Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of

pecuniary loss -- in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation -
- and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and
unsubstantiated, no damages will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141
SCRA 488 [1986]). For these reasons, it was gravely erroneous for
respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual damages in favor of
private respondent in the absence of proof thereof.

Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton,

fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive manner, neither may exemplary
damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corporation vs.
Reyes, 145 SCRA 488 [1986]).
As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same is the
exception rather than the general rule. Needless to say, the award of
attorney's fees must be disallowed where the award of exemplary damages
is eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 186
SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, in view of the fact that there was no malicious
prosecution against private respondent, attorney's fees cannot be awarded
him on that ground.

In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners acted

maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case against private
respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith
committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages (Escritor,
Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 577 [1987]). No damages
can be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the principle of abuse
of rights, or for malicious prosecution. The questioned judgment in the
instant case attests to the propensity of trial judges to award damages
without basis. Lower courts are hereby cautioned anew against awarding
unconscionable sums as damages without bases therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of

Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.
SO ORDERED.

Wild Valley v CA
Facts:
Philippine Roxas (owned by Phil. Pres. Lines), vessel, arrived in Venezuela to
load iron ore. When vessel was ready to leave the port, Mr. Vasquez (official
pilot of Venezuela) was designated to navigate the vessel through the
Orinoco River.

The master of the vessel, Captain Colon, was at the bridge with the pilot
when the vessel left the port. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel
was underway.

The vessel experienced some vibrations but the pilot assured that they were
just a result of the shallowness of the vessel. The vessel again experienced
vibrations which led to the vessel being run aground in the Orinoco River,
obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.

As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon (vessel owned by Wildvalley

Shipping) was unable to sail out that day. For this reason, Wild Valley
commenced an action for damages.

Issue:
1. Whether or not fault can be attributed to the master(captain) of Philippine
Roxas for the grounding of said vessel.

2. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies.

Held:
1. No. It's the pilot's fault!

There being no contractual obligation, the master was only required to give
ordinary diligence in accordance with Article 1173 of the New Civil Code. In
the case, the master exercised due diligence when the vessel sailed only
after the main engine, machine rise and other auxiliaries were checked and
found to be in good running condition and when the master left a competent
officer - the pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco River.

Philippine rules on pilotage enunciate the duties and responsibilities of a

master of a vessel and its pilot. The law is explicit in saying that the master
remains the overall commander of the vessel even when there is a pilot on
board. He remains in control despite the presence of a pilot who is
temporarily in charge of the vessel. It is NOT required of him to be on bridge
while the vessel is being navigated by a pilot.

Furthermore, the Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel

necessitated the engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable
of every shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. Admitting his
limited knowledge of the River, Captain Colon deemed it best to rely on the
knowledge and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel safely.

The pilot should have been aware of the portions which are shallow and
which are not. His failure to determine the depth of the river and his decision
to plod on his set course, in all probability, caused damage to the vessel.
Thus, he is negligent and liable for the grounding.

2. NO. The elements of res ipsa loquitor are:

-accident was of such character as to warrant inference that it would not
have happened except for defendant's negligence
-accident must have been caused by an agency/instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of
-accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured.

There was a temporary shift of control over the ship from the master to the
pilot on a compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, requisites 1 and 2 (negligence
and control) are not present in the following situation.

257 Phil. 476

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

These petitions ask for re-examination of this Court's precedent - setting
decision in Vir-
Jen Shipping and Marine Services Inc. v. NationalLabor Relations Commissio
n, et al. (125 SCRA 577 [1983]). On constitutional, statutory, and factual
grounds, we find no reason to disturb the doctrine in Vir-Jen Shipping and to
turn back the clock of progress for sea-based overseas workers. The
experience gained in the past few years shows that, following said doctrine,
we should neither deny nor diminish the enjoyment by Filipino seamen of
the same rights and freedoms taken for granted by other workingmen here
and abroad.
The cases at bar involve a group of Filipino seamen who were declared by
the defunct National Seamen Board (NSB) guilty of breaching their
employment contracts with the private respondent because they demanded,
upon the intervention and assistance of a third party, the International
Transport Worker's Federation (ITF), the payment of wages over and above
their contracted rates without the approval of the NSB. The petitioners were
ordered to reimburse the total amount of US $91,348.44 or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency representing the said over-payments and to be
suspended from the NSB registry for a period of three years. The National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of the NSB.
In a corollary development, the private respondent, for failure of the
petitioners to return the overpayments made to them upon demand by the
former, filed estafa charges against some of the petitioners. The criminal
cases were eventually consolidated in the sala of then respondent Judge
Alfredo Benipayo. Hence, these consolidated petitions, G.R. No. 64781-99
and G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53, which respectively pray for the
nullification of the decisions of the NLRC and the NSB, and the dismissal of
the criminal cases against the petitioners.
The facts are found in the questioned decision of the NSB in G.R. No. 64781-
99.
"From the records of this case it appears that the facts established and/or
admitted by the parties are the following: that on different dates in 1977
and 1978 respondents entered into separate contracts of employment (Exhs.
"B" to "B-17", inclusive) with complainant (private respondent) to work
aboard vessels owned/operated/manned by the latter for a period of 12
calendar months and with different rating/position, salary, overtime pay and
allowance, hereinbelow specified: x x x; that aforesaid employment
contracts were verified and approved by this Board; that on different dates
in April 1978 respondents (petitioners) joined the M/V 'GRACE RIVER'; that
on or about October 30, 1978 aforesaid vessel, with the respondents on
board, arrived at the port of Vancouver, Canada; that at this port
respondent received additional wages under rates prescribed by the
International Transport Worker's Federation (ITF) in the total amount of
US$98,261.70; that the respondents received the amounts appearing
opposite their names, to wit: xxx; that aforesaid amounts were over and
above the rates of pay of respondents as appearing in their employment
contracts approved by this Board; that on November 10, 1978, aforesaid
vessel, with respondent on board, left Vancouver, Canada for Yokohama,
Japan; that on December 14, 1978, while aforesaid vessel, was at Yura,
Japan, they were made to disembark. (pp. 64-66, Rollo)
Furthermore, according to the petitioners, while the vessel was docked at
Nagoya, Japan, a certain Atty. Oscar Torres of the NSB Legal Department
boarded the vessel and called a meeting of the seamen including the
petitioners, telling them that for their own good and safety they
should sign an agreement prepared by him on board the vessel and that if
they do, the cases filed against them with NSB on November 17, 1978 would
be dismissed. Thus, the petitioners signed the "Agreement" dated
December 5, 1978. (Annex C of Petition) However, when they were later
furnished xerox copies of what they had signed, they noticed that the line
"which amount(s) was/were received and held by CREWMEMBERS in trust
for SHIPOWNERS" was inserted therein, thereby making it appear that the
amounts given to the petitioners representing the increase in their wages
based on ITF rates were only received by them in trust for the private
respondent.
When the vessel reached Manila, the private respondent demanded from the
petitioners the "overpayments" made to them in Canada. As the petitioners
refused to give back the said amounts, charges were filed against some of
them with the NSB and the Professional Regulations
Commission. Estafa charges were also filed before different branches of the
then Court of First Instance of Manila which, as earlier stated, were
subsequently consolidated in the sala of the respondent Judge
Alfredo Benipayo and which eventually led to G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-
53.
In G.R. Nos. 64781-99, the petitioners claimed before the NSB that contrary
to the private respondent's allegations, they did not commit any illegal act
nor stage a strike while they were on board the vessel; that the "Special
Agreement" entered into in Vancouver to pay their salary differentials is
valid, having been executed after peaceful negotiations. Petitioners further
argued that the amounts they received were in accordance with the
provision of law, citing among others, Section 18, Rule VI, Book I of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code which provides that
"the basic minimum salary of seamen shall not be less than the prevailing
minimum rates established by the International Labor Organization
(ILO) or those prevailing in the country whose flag the employing vessel
carries, whichever is higher xxx"; and that the "Agreement" executed in
Nagoya, Japan had been forced upon them and that intercalations were
made to make it appear that they were merely trustees of the amounts they
received in Vancouver.
On the other hand, the private respondent alleged that the petitioners
breached their employment contracts when they, acting in concert and with
the active participations of the ITF while the vessel was in Vancouver, staged
an illegal strike and by means of threats, coercion and intimidation
compelled the owners of the vessel to pay to them various
sums totalling US$104,244.35; that the respondent entered into the "Special
Agreement" to pay the petitioners' wage differentials because it was under
duress as the vessel would not be allowed to leave Vancouver unless the
said agreement was signed, and to prevent the shipowner from incurring
further delay in the shipment of goods; and that in view of petitioners'
breach of contract, the latter's names must be removed from
the NSB's Registry and that they should be ordered to return the amounts
they received over and above their contracted rates.
The respondent NSB ruled that the petitioners were guilty of breach of
contract because despite subsisting and valid NSB-approved employment
contracts, the petitioners sought the assistance of a third party (ITF) to
demand from the private respondent wages in accordance with the ITF
rates, which rates are over and above their rates of pay as appearing in their
NSB-approved contracts. As bases for this conclusion, the NSB stated:
"1) The fact that respondents sought the aid of a third party (ITF) and
demanded for wages and overtime pay based on ITF rates is shown in the
entries of their respective Pay-Off Clearance Slips which were marked as
their Exhs. "1" to "18", and we quote 'DEMANDED ITF WAGES, OVERTIME,
DIFFERENTIALS APRIL TO OCTOBER 1978'. Respondent Suzara admitted
that the entries in his Pay-Off Clearance Slip (Exh. "1" are correct (TSN., p.
16, Dec. 6, 1979). Moreover, it is the policy (reiterated very often) by the
ITF that it does not interfere in the affairs of the crewmembers and masters
and/or owners of a vessel unless its assistance is sought by the
crewmembers themselves. Under this pronounced policy of the ITF, it is
reasonable to assume that the representatives of the ITF
in Vancouver, Canada assisted and intervened by reason of the assistance
sought by the latter.

"2) The fact that the ITF assisted and intervened for and in behalf of the
respondents in the latter's demand for higher wages could be gleaned from
the answer of the respondents when they admitted that the ITF acted in
their behalf in the negotiations for increase of wages. Morover, respondent
Cesar Dimaandal admitted that the ITF differential pay was computed by the
ITF representative (TSN. p. 7, dec. 12, 1979)

"3) The fact that complainant and the owner/operator of the vessel were
compelled to sign the Special Agreement (Exh. "20") and to pay ITF
differentials to respondents in order not to delay the departure of the vessel
and to prevent further losses is shown in the 'Agreement' (Exhs. "R-21")
xxx>") pp. 69-70, Rollo)

The NSB further said:

"While the Board recognizes the rights of the respondents to demand for
higher wages, provided the means are peaceful and legal, it could not,
however, sanction the same if the means employed are violent and
illegal. In the case at bar, the means employed are violent and illegal for
in demanding higher wages the respondents sought the aid of a third party
and in turn the latter intervened in their behalf and prohibited the vessel
from sailing unless the owner and/or operator of the vessel acceded to
respondents' demand for higher wages. To avoid suffering further
incalculable losses, the owner and/or operator of the vessel had no
alternative but to pay respondents' wages in accordance with the ITF
scale. The Board condemns the act of a party who enters into a contract
and with the use of force/or intimidation causes the other party to modify
said contract. If the respondents believe that they have a valid ground to
demand from the complainant a revision of the terms of their contracts, the
same should have been done in accordance with law and not thru illegal
means. (at p. 72, Rollo).

Although the respondent NSB found that the petitioners were entitled to the
payment of earned wages and overtime pay/allowance from November 1,
1978 to December 14, 1978, it nevertheless ruled that the computation
should be based on the rates of pay as appearing in the petitioners' NSB-
approved contracts. It ordered that the amounts to which the petitioners
are entitled under the said computation should be deducted from the
amounts that the petitioners must return to the private respondent.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the NSB's findings. Hence, the petition in G.R.
Nos. 64781-99.
Meanwhile, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53 moved to
quash the criminal cases of estafa filed against them on the ground that the
alleged crimes were committed, if at all, in Vancouver, Canada and,
therefore, Philippine courts have no jurisdiction. The respondent judge
denied the motion. Hence, the second petition.
The principal issue in these consolidated petitions is whether or not the
petitioners are entitled to the amounts they received from the private
respondent representing additional wages as determined in the special
agreement. If they are, then the decision of the NLRC and NSB must be
reversed. Similarly, the criminal cases of estafa must be dismissed because
it follows as a consequence that the amounts received by the petitioners
belong to them and not to the private respondent.
In arriving at the questioned decision, the NSB ruled that the petitioners are
not entitled to the wage differentials as determined by the ITF because the
means employed by them in obtaining the same were violent and illegal and
because in demanding higher wages the petitioners sought the aid of a third
party, which, in turn, intervened in their behalf and prohibited the vessel
from sailing unless the owner and/or operator of the vessel acceded to
respondents' demand for higher wages. And as proof of this conclusion, the
NSB cited the following: (a) the entries in the petitioners Pay Off Clearance
Slip which contained the phrase "DEMANDED ITF WAGES xxx"; (b) the
alleged policy of the ITF in not interfering with crewmembers of a vessel
unless its intervention is sought by the crewmembers themselves; (c) the
petitioners' admission that ITF acted in their behalf; and (d) the fact that the
private respondent was compelled to sign the special agreement at
Vancouver, Canada.
There is nothing in the public and private respondents' pleadings, to support
the allegations that the petitioners used force and violence to secure the
special agreement signed in Vancouver, British Columbia. There
was no need for any form of intimidation coming from the Filipino seamen
because the Canadian Brotherhood of Railways and Transport Workers
(CBRT), a strong Canadian labor union, backed by an international labor
federation was actually doing all the influencing not only on the ship-owners
and employers but also against third world seamen themselves who, by
receiving lower wages and cheaper accommodations, were threatening the
employment and livelihood of seamen from developed nations.
The bases used by the respondent NSB to support its decision do not prove
that the petitioners initiated a conspiracy with the ITF ordeliberately sought
its assistance in order to receive higher wages. They only prove that when
ITF acted in petitioners' behalf for an increase in wages, the latter
manifested their support. This would be a logical and natural reaction for
any worker in whose benefit the ITF or any other labor group had
intervened. The petitioners admit that while they expressed their conformity
to and their sentiments for higher wages by means of placards, they,
nevertheless, continued working and going about their usual chores. In
other words, all they did was to exercise their freedom of speech in a most
peaceful way. The ITF people, in turn, did not employ any violent means to
force the private respondent to accede to their demands. Instead, they
simply applied effective pressure when they intimated the possibility of
interdiction should the shipowner fail to heed the call for an upward
adjustment of the rates of the Filipino seamen. Interdiction is nothing more
than a refusal of ITF members to render service for the ship, such as to load
or unload its cargo, to provision it or to perform such other chores ordinarily
incident to the docking of the ship at a certain port. It was the fear of ITF
interdiction, not any action taken by the seamen on board the vessel which
led the shipowners to yield.
The NSB's conclusion that it is ITF's policy not to intervene with the plight of
crewmembers of a vessel unless its intervention was sought is without
basis. This Court is cognizant of the fact that during the period covered by
the labor
controversies in Wallen PhilippinesShipping, Inc. v. Minister of Labor (102
SCRA 835 [1981]; Vir-
Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC (supra) and these
consolidated petitions, the ITF was militant worldwide especially in Canada,
Australia, Scandinavia, and various European countries, interdicting foreign
vessels and demanding wage increases for third world seamen. There was
no need for Filipino or other seamen to seek ITF intervention. The ITF was
waiting on its own volition in all Canadian ports, not particularly for the
petitioners' vessel but for all ships similarly situated. As earlier stated, the
ITF was not really acting for the petitioners out of pure altruism. The ITF
was merely protecting the interests of its own members. The petitioners
happened to be pawns in a higher and broader struggle between the ITF on
one hand and shipowners and third world seamen, on the other. To subject
our seamen to criminal prosecution and punishment for having been caught
in such a struggle is out of the question.
As stated in Vir-Jen Shipping (supra):
"The seamen had done no act which under Philippine law or any other
civilized law would be termed illegal, oppressive, or malicious. Whatever
pressure existed, it was mild compared to accepted and valid modes of labor
activity." (at page 591)

Given these factual situations, therefore, we cannot affirm the NSB

and NLRC's findings that there was violence, physical or otherwise employed
by the petitioners in demanding for additional wages. The fact that the
petitioners placed placards on the gangway of their ship to show support
for ITF's demands for wage differentials for their own benefit and the
resulting ITF's threatened interdiction do not constitute violence. The
petitioners were exercising their freedom of speech and expressing
sentiments in their hearts when they placed the placard "We Want ITF
Rates." Under the facts and circumstances of these petitions, we see no
reason to deprive the seamen of their right to freedom of expression
guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution and the fundamental law of
Canada where they happened to exercise it.
As we have ruled
in Wallem Phil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor, et al. supra:
"'Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified
because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their
demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the
Labor Code. This contention is now well-taken. The records fail to establish
clearly the commission of any threat. But even if there had been such a
threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but
natural for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for
petitioner, who refused to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to
honor and respect the same. They were only acting in the exercise of their
rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of expression is contrary to law
and public policy. xxxx.'" (at page 843)

We likewise, find the public respondents' conclusions that the acts of the
petitioners in demanding and receiving wages over and above the
rates appearing in their NSB-approved contracts is in effect an alteration of
their valid and subsisting contracts because the same were not obtained
through mutual consent and without the prior approval of the NSB
to be without basis, not only because the private respondent's consent
to pay additional wages was not vitiated by any violence or intimidation on
the part of the petitioners but because the said NSB-approved form
contracts are not unalterable contracts that can have no room for
improvement during their effectivity or which ban anyamendments during
their term.
For one thing, the employer can always improve the working conditions
without violating any law or stipulation.
We stated in the Vir-Jen case (supra) that:
"The form contracts approved by the National Seamen Board are designed to
protect Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners who can take care of
themselves. The standard forms embody the basic minimums which must
be incorporated as parts of the employment contract. (Section 15, Rules V,
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code). They are not
collective bargaining agreements or immutable contracts which the parties
cannot improve upon or modify in the course of the agreed period of
time. To state, therefore, that the affected seamen cannot petition their
employer for higher salaries during the 12 months duration of the contract
runs counter to established principles of labor legislation. The National
Labor Relations Commission, as the appellate tribunal from the decisions of
the National Seamen Board, correctly ruled that the seamen did not violate
their contracts to warrant their dismissal." (at page 589)

It is impractical for the NSB to require the petitioners, caught in the

middle of a labor struggle between the ITF and owners of ocean going
vessels halfway around the world in Vancouver, British Columbia to first
secure the approval of the NSB in Manila before signing an agreement which
the employer was willing to sign. It is also totally unrealistic to expect the
petitioners while in Canada to exhibit the will and strength to oppose
the ITF's demand for an increase in their wages, assuming they were so
minded.
An examination of Annex C of the petition, the agreement signed in Japan by
the crewmembers of the M/V Grace River and a certain M. Tabei,
representative of the Japanese shipowner, lends credence to the petitioners'
claim that the clause "which amount(s) was received and held by
CREWMEMBERS in trust for SHIPOWNER" was an intercalation added after
the execution of the agreement. The clause appears too closely typed below
the names of the 19 crewmen and their wages with no similar intervening
space as that which appears between all the paragraphs and the triple space
which appears between the list of crewmembers and their wages on one
hand and the paragraph above which introduces the list, on the other. The
verb "were" was also inserted above the verb "was" to make the clause
grammatically correct but the insertion of "were" is already on the same line
as "Antonio Miranda and 5,221.06" where it clearly does not belong. There
is no other space where the word "were" could be intercalated. (See Rollo,
page 80).
At any rate, the proposition that the petitioners should have pretended to
accept the increased wages while in Vancouver but returned them to
the shipowner when they reached its country, Japan, has already been
answered earlier by the Court:
"Filipino seamen are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen from
any other country in the world. Otherwise, there would not be so many of
them in the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea on this globe. It is
competence and reliability, not cheap labor that makes our seamen so
greatly in demand. Filipino seamen have never demanded the same high
salaries as seamen from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and
other developed nations. But certainly they are entitled to government
protection when they ask for fair and decent treatment by their employer
and when they exercise the right to petition for improved terms of
employment, especially when they feel that these are sub-standard or are
capable of improvement according to internationally accepted rules. In the
domestic scene, there are marginal employers who prepare two sets of
payrolls for their employees - one in keeping with minimum wages and the
other recording the sub-standard wages that the employees really
receive. The reliable employers, however, not only meet the minimums
required by fair labor standards legislation but even go away above the
minimums while earning reasonable profits and prospering. The same is
true of international employment. There is no reason why this Court and the
Ministry of Labor and Employment or its agencies and commissions should
come out with pronouncements based on the standards and practices of
unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners, who claim they cannot survive
without resorting to tricky and deceptive schemes, instead of Government
maintaining labor law and jurisprudence according to the practices of
honorable, competent, and law-abiding employers, domestic or foreign."
(Vir-Jen Shipping, supra, pp. 587-588)

It is noteworthy to emphasize that while the International Labor

Organization (ILO) set the minimum basic wage of able seamen at
US$187.00 as early as October 1976, it was only in 1979 that the
respondent NSB issued Memo Circular No. 45, enjoining all shipping
companies to adopt the said minimum basic wage. It was correct for the
respondent NSB to state in its decision that when the petitioners entered
into separate contracts between 1977-1978, the monthly minimum basic
wage for able seamen ordered by NSB was still fixed at
US$130,00. However, it is not the fault of the petitioners that the NSB not
only violated the Labor Code which created it and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code but also seeks to punish the seamen for a
shortcoming of NSB itself.
Article 21(c) of the Labor Code, when it created the NSB, mandated the
Board to "(O)btain the best possible terms and conditions of employment for
seamen."
Section 15, Rule V of Book I of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code provides:
"Sec. 15. Model contract of employment. - The NSB shall devise a model
contract of employment which shall embody all the requirements of
pertinent labor and social legislations and the prevailing standards set by
applicable International Labor Organization Conventions. The model
contract shall set the minimum standards of the terms and conditions to
govern the employment of Filipinos on board vessels engaged in overseas
trade. All employers of Filipinos shall adopt the model contract inconnection
with the hiring and engagement of the services of Filipino seafarers, and in
no case shall a shipboard employment contract be allowed where the same
provides for benefits less than those enumerated in the model employment
contract, or in any way conflicts with any other provisions embodied in the
model contract."

Section 18 of Rule VI of the same Rules and Regulations provides:

"Sec. 18. Basic minimum salary of able-seamen. - The basic minimum
salary of seamen shall be not less than the prevailing minimum rates
established by the International Labor Organization or those prevailing in the
country whose flag the employing vessel carries, whichever is
higher. However, this provision shall not apply if any shipping company
pays its crew members salaries above the minimum herein provided.

Section 8, Rule X, Book I of the Omnibus Rules provides:

"Section 8. Use of standard format of service agreement. - The Board shall
adopt a standard format of service agreement in accordance with pertinent
labor and social legislation and prevailing standards set by applicable
International Labor Organization Conventions. The standard format shall set
the minimum standard of the terms and conditions to govern the
employment of Filipino seafarers but in no case shall a shipboard
employment contract (sic), or in any way conflict with any other provision
embodied in the standard format."

It took three years for the NSB to implement requirements which, under the
law, they were obliged to follow and execute immediately. During those
three years, the incident in Vancouver happened. The terms and conditions
agreed upon in Vancouver were well within ILO rates even if they were
above NSB standards at the time.
The sanctions applied by NSB and affirmed by NLRC are moreover not in
keeping with the basic premise that this Court stressed in the Vir-
Jen Shipping case (supra) that the Ministry now the Department of Labor
and Employment and all its agencies exist primarily for the workingman's
interest and the nation's as a whole.
Implicit in these petitions and the only reason for the NSB to take the side of
foreign shipowners against Filipino seamen is the "killing the goose which
lays the golden eggs" argument. We reiterate the ruling of the Court in Vir-
Jen Shipping (supra)
"There are various arguments raised by the petitioners but the common
thread running through all of them is the contention, if not the dismal
prophecy, that if the respondent seamen are sustained by this Court, we
would in effect 'kill the hen that lays the golden egg.' In other words,
Filipino seamen, admittedly among the best in the world, should remain
satisfied with relatively lower if not the lowest, international rates of
compensation, should not agitate for higher wages while their contracts of
employment are subsisting, should accept as sacred, iron clad, and
immutable the side contracts which require them to falsely pretend to be
members of international labor federations, pretend to receive higher
salaries at certain foreign ports only to return the increased pay once the
ship leaves that port, should stifle not only their right to ask for improved
terms of employment but their freedom of speech and expression, and
should suffer instant termination of employment at the slightest sign of
dissatisfaction with no protection from their Government and their
courts. Otherwise, the petitioners contend that Filipinos would no longer be
accepted as seamen, those employed would lose their jobs, and the still
unemployed would be left hopeless.

"This is not the first time and it will not be the last where the threat of
unemployment and loss of jobs would be used to argue against the interests
of labor; where efforts by workingmen to better their terms of employment
would be characterized as prejudicing the interests of labor as a whole."

xxx xxx xxx

"Unionism, employers' liability acts, minimum wages, workmen's

compensation, social security and collective bargaining to name a few were
all initially opposed by employers and even well meaning leaders of
government and society as 'killing the hen or goose which lays the golden
eggs.'The claims of workingmen were described as outrageously injurious
not only to the employer but more so to the employees themselves before
these claims or demands were established by law and jurisprudence as
'rights' and before these were proved beneficial to management, labor, and
the nation as a whole beyond reasonable doubt.

"The case before us does not represent any major advance in the rights of
labor and the workingmen. The private respondents merely sought rights
already established. No matter how much the petitioner-employer tries to
present itself as speaking for the entire industry, there is no evidence that it
is typical of employers hiring Filipino seamen or that it can speak for them.

"The contention that manning industries in the Philippines would not survive
if the instant case is not decided in favor of the petitioner is not supported
by evidence. The Wallen case was decided on February 20, 1981. There
have been no severe repercussions, no drying up of employment
opportunities for seamen, and none of the dire consequences repeatedly
emphasized by the petitioner. Why should Vir-Jen be an exception?

"The wages of seamen engaged in international shipping are shouldered by

the foreign principal. The local manning office is an agent whose primary
function is recruitment and who usually gets a lump sum from
the shipowner to defray the salaries of the crew. The hiring of seamen and
the determination of their compensation is subject to the interplay of various
market factors and one key factor is how much in terms of profits the local
manning office and the foreign shipowner may realize after the costs of the
voyage are met. And costs include salaries of officers and crew members."
(at pp. 585-586)

The Wallem Shipping case, was decided in 1981. Vir-Jen Shipping was
decided in 1983. It is now 1989. There has been no drying up
ofemployment opportunities for Filipino seamen. Not only have their wages
improved thus leading ITF to be placid and quiet all these years insofar as
Filipinos are concerned but the hiring of Philippine seamen is at its highest
level ever.
Reporting its activities for the year 1988, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) stated that there will be an increase in
demand for seamen based overseas in 1989 boosting the number to as high
as 105,000. This will represent a 9.5 percent increase from the 1988
aggregate. (Business World, News Briefs, January 11, 1989 at page 2)
According to the POEA, seabased workers numbering 95,913 in 1988
exceeded by a wide margin of 28.15 percent the year end total in 1987. The
report shows that sea-based workers posted bigger monthly increments
compared to those of land-based workers. (The Business Star, Indicators,
January 11, 1988 atpage 2)
Augmenting this optimistic report of POEA Administrator Tomas Achacoso is
the statement of Secretary of Labor Franklin M. Drilon that the Philippines
has a big jump over other crewing nations because of the Filipinos' abilities
compared with any European or western crewing country. Drilon added that
cruise shipping is also a growing market for Filipino seafarers because of
their flexibility in handling odd jobs and their expertise in handling
almost all types of ships, including luxury liners. (Manila
Bulletin, More Filipino SeamenExpected Deployment, December 27, 1988 at
page 29). Parenthetically, the minimum monthly salary of able
bodied seamen set by the ILO and adhered to by the Philippines is now
$276.00 (id.) more than double the $130.00 sought to be enforced by the
public respondents in these petitions.
The experience from 1981 to the present vindicates the finding in Vir-
Jen Shipping that a decision in favor of the seamen would not necessarily
mean severe repercussions, drying up of employment opportunities for
seamen, and other dire consequences predicted by manning agencies and
recruiters in the Philippines.
From the foregoing, we find that the NSB and NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion in finding the petitioners guilty of using intimidation and illegal
means in breaching their contracts of employment and punishing them for
these alleged offenses. Consequently, the criminal prosecutions for estafa in
G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53 should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The decisions of the
National Seamen Board and National Labor Relations Commission in G.R.
Nos. 64781-99 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered
holding the petitioners not guilty of the offenses for which they were
charged. The petitioners' suspension from the National Seamen Board's
Registry for three (3) years is LIFTED. The private respondent is ordered to
pay the petitioners their earned but unpaid wages and overtime
pay/allowance from November 1, 1978 to December 14, 1978 according to
the rates in the Special Agreement that the parties entered into in
Vancouver, Canada.
The criminal cases for estafa, subject matter of G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-
53, are ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
257 Phil. 334

CRUZ, J.:
The facts of this case are not disputed. Even the legal issues are simple and
are soon resolved.
Joseph B. Atienza was engaged by Philimare Shipping and Equipment
Supply, as agent for Trans Ocean Liner Pte. Ltd. of Germany, based in
Singapore, to work as Third Mate on board the MV Tibati for the stipulated
compensation of US$850.00 a month from January 20, 1981 to January 20,
1982.[1] The Crew Agreement signed by the parties on January 3, 1981,
provided for insurance benefits "as per NSB Standard Format" and was
validated and approved by the National Seamen Board on January 14,
1981.[2]
On May 12, 1981, Atienza died as a result of an accident which befell him
while working on the vessel in Bombay, India.[3] In due time, his father, the
herein petitioner, filed a claim for death benefits computed at the rate of 36
months times the seaman's monthly salary plus ten per cent thereof in
accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Law of Singapore, for a total
of $30,600.00. The private respondents, while admitting liability, contended
that this was limited to only P40,000.00 under Section D(1) of the NSB
Standard Format.
On November 6, 1984, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
sustained the private respondent and held that the applicable law was
Philippine law.[4] On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the National Labor
Relations Commission except that it increased the award to
P75,000.00 pursuant to NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Series of 1981.[5]
In the petition before us, we are asked to reverse the public respondent on
the ground that Singaporean law should have been applied in line with our
ruling in Norse Management Co. v. National Seamen Board,[6] where
the foreign law was held controlling because it provided for greater benefits
for the claimant. For their part, the private respondents question the
application of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Series of 1981, which they
say became effective after the seaman's death.[7]
On the first issue, our ruling is that Norse is not applicable to the
present petition. The reason is that in that case, it was specifically
stipulated by the parties in the Crew Agreement that "compensation shall be
paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the
Workmen's Compensation Act of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance
Law of the registry of the vessel, whichever is greater."[8] That was why the
higher benefits prescribed by the foreign law were awarded. By contrast, no
such stipulation appears in the Crew Agreement now
under consideration. Instead, it is clearly stated therein that the insurance
benefits shall be "as per NSB Standard Format," in the event "of death of the
seaman during the term of his contract, over and above the benefits for
which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine law."[9]
The petitioner argues that the Standard Format prescribed only the
minimum benefits and does not preclude the parties from stipulating for
higher compensation. That may be true enough. But the point is that the
parties in this case did not provide for such higher benefits as the parties did
in the Norse case. There was no stipulation in the Crew Agreement
of January 3, 1981, that the employee would be entitled to
whichever greater insurance benefits were offered by either Philippine law or
the foreign law; on the contrary, it was plainly provided that insurance
benefits would be determined according to the NSB Standard Format then in
force. The consequence is that the petitioner cannot now claim a higher
award than the compensation prescribed in the said format.
As we said in Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. NLRC:[10]
We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling in this
case. The contract provides that the beneficiaries of the seaman are entitled
to P20,000.00 'over and above the benefits' for which the
Philippine Government is liable under Philippine Law.

Hongkong law on workmens' compensation is not the applicable law. The

case of Norse Management Co. v. National Seaman Board, G.R. No. 54204,
September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 486 cannot be a precedent because
it was expressly stipulated in the employment contract in that case that the
workmen's compensation payable to the employee should be in accordance
with Philippine Law or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the country where
the vessel is registered "whichever is greater."

The next issue involves the effectivity of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71,
which appears to have been retroactively applied by the NLRC in increasing
the compensation from P40,000.00. The amended award was based by the
POEA on NSB Memorandum Circular No. 46, which became effective in
1979.[11] The NLRC, apparently laboring under the belief that Memorandum
Circular No. 71 was already effective at the time of the seaman's death
on May 12, 1981, increased the death benefits to
P75,000.00 as provided thereunder. The fact, though, is that the new rule
became effective only in December 1981, as certified by the POEA
itself,[12] or seven months after Atienza'sfatal accident.
On the petitioner's claim that the award should be adjusted in view of the
decrease in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, it suffices to cite
the following relevant ruling of the Court in Sta. Rita and Well Run Maritime
SA Ltd. v. NLRC:[13]
Regarding the third contention of the petitioners, the records show that
when Sta. Rita died on September 14, 1981, NSB Memorandum Circular No.
46 (Series of 1979) was the applicable law. Pursuant to this circular, in case
of a seaman's death during the terms of his contract, the company shall pay
his beneficiaries the amount of P30,000.00. On November 18, 1981 or more
than one month after Sta. Rita's death the administrative regulations were
amended to increase death compensation for seamen to P50,000.00,
effective December 1, 1981.

Considering that the applicable law governing death compensation for

seamen at the time of Sta. Rita's death was Memorandum Circular No. 46,
Series of 1979, the petitioner's liability should be limited to
P30,000.00. Moreover, if manning agents or shipping corporations secure
employer's insurance to cover their liabilities for death, total disability and
sickness of officers andratings on board foreign going vessels, the extent of
the coverage is based on the applicable law at the time. It would be unjust
to compel them to pay benefits based on a law not yet in effect at the time
the contingency occurs.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC dated 15 July 1985 is SET ASIDE
and that of the POEA is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
252 Phil. 845

GANCAYCO, J.:
On November 2, 1982, a "crew agreement" was entered into by private
respondent Nerry D. Balatongan and Philimare Shipping and Equipment
Supply (hereinafter called Philimare) whereby the latter employed the
former as able seaman on Board its vessel "Santa Cruz" (renamed "Turtle
Bay") with a monthly salary of US$300,00. Said agreement was processed
and approved by the National Seaman's Board (NSB) on November 3,
1982.[1]

While on board said vessel the said parties entered into a supplementary
contract of employment on December 6, 1982[2] which provides among
others:

The employer shall be obliged to insure the employee during his

"1. engagement against death or permanent invalidity caused by accident
on board up to:

US $40,000 - for death caused by accident

US $50,000 - for permanent total disability caused by accident."[3]

On October 6, 1983 Balatongan met an accident in the Suez Canal, Egypt as
a result of which he was hospitalized at the Suez Canal Authority
Hospital. Later, he was repatriated to the Philippines and was hospitalized at
the Makati Medical Center from October 23, 1983 to March 27, 1984. On
August 19, 1985 the medical certificate was issued describing his disability
as "permanent in nature."

Balatongan demanded payment for his claim for total disability insurance in
the amount of US $50,000.00 as provided for in the contract of employment
but his claim was denied for having been submitted to the insurers beyond
the designated period for doing so.

Thus, Balatongan filed on June 21, 1985 a complaint against Philimare and
Seagull Maritime Corporation (hereinafter called Seagull) in the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for non-payment of his claim
for permanent total disability insurance with damages and attorney's fees.

After the parties submitted their respective position papers with the
corresponding documentary evidence, the officer-in-charge of the Workers
Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA rendered a decision on May
2, 1986, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby ordered to pay
complainant the amount of US$50,000.00 representing permanent total
disability insurance and attorney's fees at 10% of the award. Payment
should be made in this Office within ten (10) days from receipt hereof at the
prevailing rate of exchange. This Office cannot however rule on damages,
having no jurisdiction on the matter.

SO ORDERED."[4]
Seagull and Philimare appealed said decision to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) on June 4, 1986. Pending resolution of their appeal
because of the alleged transfer of the agency of Seagull to Southeast Asia
Shipping Corporation, Seagull filed on April 28, 1987 a Motion For
Substitution/Inclusion of Party Respondent which was opposed by
Balatongan.[5] This was followed by an ex-parte motion for leave to file third
party complaint on June 4, 1987 by Seagull. A decision was promulgated on
December 7, 1987 denying both motions and dismissing the appeal for lack
of merit.[6] A motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied for lack
of merit in a resolution dated February 26, 1988.[7]

Hence, Seagull and Philimare filed this petition for certiorari with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order based on the following
grounds:

1. Respondent POEA erred in applying the Supplemental Contract;

Respondents POEA and NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in

2. holding that the Supplemental Contract was signed on board MV Santa
Cruz by and between private respondent and your petitioner; and

Respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in not giving due
3. course to your petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint
as well as their Motion for Inclusion/Substitution of respondents.[8]
On March 21, 1988, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from enforcing the questioned decision and resolution of public
respondents.

Petitioners argue that prior to private respondent's departure he executed a

crew agreement on November 2, 1982 which was duly approved by the
POEA; that the supplementary contract of employment that was entered into
on board the vessel "Turtle Bay" which provides for a US $50,000.00
insurance benefit in case of permanent disability was neither approved nor
verified by respondent POEA; and that the same violates Article 34(i) of the
Labor Code, as amended, which provides as follows:

"Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual,

entity, licensee, or holder of authority:

xxx xxx xxx

to substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the

Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the
(i)
parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without
the approval of the Department of Labor."
Petitioners also call attention to Article VIII, paragraph 2 of the
Supplementary Contract which provides as follows:

"2. Notwithstanding his claim against the insurers the employee hereby
expressly waives all claims of his own or his heirs for compensation of
damages due to death or permanent invalidity which he suffered during his
engagement against the employers x x x unless his death or permanent
invalidity has been caused by willful act of any of the above-named persons.
"[9]

Petitioners stress that while public respondents upheld the applicability of

said supplementary contract insofar as it increased the benefits to private
respondent, public respondents considered the provision on the waiver
against all claims by private respondent to be contrary to public policy.

In its questioned decision dated December 7, 1987, the respondent NLRC

made the following disquisition:

"The focal issue for determination is the validity and enforceability of the
second contract of employment entered into by and between complainant
and respondents on board the vessel where the former had served as a
member of its complement despite the absence of NSB verification or
approval. With respect to the findings of facts in the appealed decision, We
consider the same as duly supported by substantial evidence and the
admissions of the parties in their pleadings.
Much stress and emphasis are made by the respondents in their appeal that
this claim has no legal basis or footing inasmuch as the second contract of
employment containing a total disability insurance benefit of US$50,000.00,
much more than that embodied in the first contract of employment which
was approved by the defunct NSB, was not verified or approved by the
latter. Accordingly, the respondents posit the argument that subject claim
may not prosper pursuant to the provisions of Art. 34(i) of the Labor Code,
as amended, which provides that it shall be unlawful for any individual,
entity, licensee, or holder of authority (T)o substitute or alter employment
contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of
actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of
expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor.

Did the POEA committee a reversible error when it considered the second
contract of employment as valid sans any verification or approval thereof by
the NSB? Our answer to this query is in the negative. Apparently, the
intention of the law when Art. 34 of the Labor Code was enacted is to
provide for the prohibited and unlawful practices relative to recruitment and
placement. As shown in the 'Explanatory Note' of Parliamentary Bill No.
4531, pertaining to Art. 34 (supra), thus:

Many of the provisions are already existing and were simply restated. Some
however were restated with modifications and new ones were introduced to
reflect what in the past have been noted to be pernicious practices which
tend to place workers at a disadvantage.
it is indubitably clear that the purpose of having overseas contracts of
employment approved by the NSB (POEA) is whether or not such contracts
conform to the minimum terms and conditions prescribed by the NSB
(POEA). In other words, the law did not at all prohibit any alteration which
provided for increases in wages or other benefits voluntarily granted by the
employer. Precisely, under Section 2, Rule I, Book V of the Rules and
Regulations of the POEA, '(t)he standard format of employment contracts
shall set the minimum standards of the terms and conditions of
employment. All employers and principals shall adopt the model contract in
connection with the hiring of workers without prejudice to their adopting
other terms and conditions of employment over and above the minimum
standards of the Administration.' Where, as here, it is admitted that the
second contract although not verified or approved by the NSB (POEA)
granted more benefits by way of total disability insurance to the
complainant, the respondents may not be allowed to disavow their own
voluntary acts by insisting that such beneficial contract in favor of the
seaman is null and void." (Emphasis supplied.)[10]

We agree.

The supplementary contract of employment was entered into between

petitioner and private respondent to modify the original contract of
employment. The reason why the law requires that the POEA should
approve and verify a contract under Article 34(i) of the Labor Code is to
insure that the employee shall not thereby be placed in a disadvantageous
position and that the same are within the minimum standards of the terms
and conditions of such employment contract set by the POEA. This is why a
standard format for employment contracts has been adopted by the
Department of Labor. However, there is no prohibition against stipulating in
a contract more benefits to the employee than those required by law. Thus,
in this case wherein a "supplementary contract" was entered into affording
greater benefits to the employee than the previous one, and although the
same was not submitted for the approval of the POEA, the public
respondents properly considered said contract to be valid and
enforceable. Indeed, said pronouncement of public respondents have the
effect of an approval of said contract. Moreover, as said contract was
voluntarily entered into by the parties the same is binding between
them.[11] Not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or
public order, its validity must be sustained.[12] By the same token, the court
sustains the ruling of public respondents that the provision in the
supplementary contract whereby private respondent waives any claim
against petitioners for damages arising from death or permanent disability is
against public policy, oppressive and inimical to the rights of private
respondent. The said provision defeats and is inconsistent with the duty of
petitioners to insure private respondent against said contingencies as clearly
stipulated in the said contract.

Petitioners however argue that they could not have entered into said
supplementary contract of employment as Philimare was a mere manning
agent in the Philippines of the shipping company managed by Navales
Shipping Management and Marine Consultant (PTE) Ltd., its
principal. Petitioners assert that the said supplementary contract was
entered into by private respondent with their principal, Navales Shipping
Management and Marine Consultant (Pte) Ltd. on board the vessel Turtle
Bay so petitioners cannot be held responsible thereunder.

This Court is not a trier of facts and the findings of the public respondents
are conclusive in this proceeding. Public respondents found that petitioner
Philimare and private respondent entered into said supplementary contract
of employment on December 6, 1982. Assuming for the sake of argument
that it was petitioners' principal which entered into said contract with private
respondent, nevertheless petitioner, as its manning agent in the Philippines,
is jointly responsible with its principal thereunder.[13]

There is no question that under the said supplementary contract of

employment, it is the duty of the employer, petitioners herein, to insure the
employee, during his engagement, against death and permanent invalidity
caused by accident on board up to $50,000.00. Consequently, it is also its
concomitant obligation to see to it that the claim against the insurance
company is duly filed by private respondent or in his behalf, and within the
time provided for by the terms of the insurance contract.

In this case, the private respondent met the accident on October 6,

1983. Since then, he was hospitalized at the Suez Canal Authority Hospital
and thereafter he was repatriated to the Philippines wherein he was also
hospitalized from October 22, 1983 to March 27, 1984. It was only on
August 19, 1985 that he was issued a medical certificate describing his
disability to be permanent in nature. It was not possible for private
respondent to file a claim for permanent disability with the insurance
company within the one-year period from the time of the injury, as his
disability was ascertained to be permanent only thereafter. Petitioners did
not exert any effort to assist private respondent to recover payment of his
claim from the insurance company. They did not even care to dispute the
finding of the insurer that the claim was not filed on time.[14] Petitioners
must, therefore, be held responsible for its omission, if not negligence, by
requiring them to pay the claim of private respondent.

The Court finds that the respondent NLRC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners' motion for leave to file third-party
complaint and substitution or inclusion of party respondents. Such motion is
largely addressed to the discretion of the said Commission. Inasmuch as the
alleged transfer of interest took placed only after the POEA had rendered its
decision, the denial of the motion so as to avoid further delay in the
settlement of the claim of private respondent was well-taken. At any rate,
petitioners may pursue their claim against their alleged successor-in-interest
in a separate suit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 21, 1988 is
hereby LIFTED. No costs. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and
KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.

Facts:
The petitioner challenge the decision of Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration POEA on the principal ground that the POEA had no
jurisdiction over the case of Vitaliano Saco as he was not an overseas
worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was
killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for
damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of
the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint
was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and
should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA
nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers
of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the
employees of the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its
international flights, are not considered overseas workers.
Moreover, the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No.
2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation.

Issues:
Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 has violated the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power.

Discussions:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power:

1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative

authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
Rulings:
No. There was no principles violated. The authority to issue the said
regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. …
“The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise
of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law
cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment
of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general
are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate
legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by “filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor
Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
350 Phil. 813

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the January 25, 1995 decision
of the Court of Appeals[1] and its resolution of March 22, 1995 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The appellate court upheld orders
of Branch 68 (Pasig) of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss in the original action filed
against petitioner by private respondent.
The facts are not in dispute.[2]
Petitioner Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. is a foreign corporation represented in
the Philippines by its agent, Magsaysay Agencies. It entered into a contract
of carriage through Meister Transport, Inc., an international freight
forwarder, with private respondent Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing
Corporation to transport goods of the latter from Manila to Le Havre,
France. Petitioner undertook to deliver the goods to France 28 days from
initial loading. On July 24, 1991, petitioner's vessel loaded private
respondent's container van for carriage at the said port of origin.
However, in Kaoshiung, Taiwan the goods were not transshipped
immediately, with the result that the shipment arrived in Le Havre only on
November 14, 1991. The consignee allegedly paid only half the value of the
said goods on the ground that they did not arrive in France until the "off
season" in that country. The remaining half was allegedly charged to the
account of private respondent which in turn demanded payment from
petitioner through its agent.
As petitioner denied private respondent's claim, the latter filed a case in the
Regional Trial Court on April 14, 1992. In the original complaint, private
respondent impleaded as defendants Meister Transport, Inc. and
Magsaysay Agencies, Inc., the latter as agent of petitioner Mitsui O.S.K.
Lines Ltd. On May 20, 1993, it amended its complaint by impleading
petitioner as defendant in lieu of its agent. The parties to the case thus
became private respondent as plaintiff, on one side, and Meister Transport
Inc. and petitioner Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. as represented by Magsaysay
Agencies, Inc., as defendants on the other.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the claim against it had
prescribed under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
The Regional Trial Court, as aforesaid, denied petitioner's motion as well as
its subsequent motion for reconsideration. On petition for certiorari, the
Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's orders. Hence this petition
containing one assignment of error:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
AMENDED COMPLAINT IS (sic) NOT PRESCRIBED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 3(6) OF THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT.
The issue raised by the instant petition is whether private respondent's
action is for "loss or damage" to goods shipped, within the meaning of §3(6)
of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).
Section 3 provides:
(6) Unless notice of loss or damage and the general nature of such loss or
damage be given in writing to the carrier or his agent at the port of
discharge or at the time of the removal of the goods into the custody of the
person entitled to delivery thereof under the contract of carriage, such
removal shall be prima facie evidence of the delivery by the carrier of the
goods as described in the bill of lading. If the loss or damage is not
apparent, the notice must be given within three days of the delivery.
Said notice of loss or damage may be endorsed upon the receipt for the
goods given by the person taking delivery thereof.
The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the goods has at the
time of their receipt been the subject of joint survey or inspection.
In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in
respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after
delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered: Provided, that, if a notice of loss or damage, either apparent or
concealed, is not given as provided for in this section, that fact shall not
affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within one year after
the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered.
In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage, the carrier and the
receiver shall give all reasonable facilities to each other for inspecting and
tallying the goods.
In Ang v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., the question was whether an
action for the value of goods which had been delivered to a party other than
the consignee is for "loss or damage" within the meaning of §3(6) of the
COGSA. It was held that there was no loss because the goods had simply
been misdelivered. "Loss" refers to the deterioration or disappearance of
goods.[3]
As defined in the Civil Code and as applied to Section 3(6), paragraph 4 of
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, "loss" contemplates merely a situation
where no delivery at all was made by the shipper of the goods because the
same had perished, gone out of commerce, or disappeared in such a way
that their existence is unknown or they cannot be recovered.[4]
Conformably with this concept of what constitutes "loss" or "damage," this
Court held in another case[5] that the deterioration of goods due to delay in
their transportation constitutes "loss" or "damage" within the meaning of
§3(6), so that as suit was not brought within one year the action was barred:
Whatever damage or injury is suffered by the goods while in transit would
result in loss or damage to either the shipper or the consignee. As long as it
is claimed, therefore, as it is done here, that the losses or damages suffered
by the shipper or consignee were due to the arrival of the goods in damaged
or deteriorated condition, the action is still basically one for damage to the
goods, and must be filed within the period of one year from delivery or
receipt, under the above-quoted provision of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act.[6]
But the Court allowed that
There would be some merit in appellant's insistence that the damages
suffered by him as a result of the delay in the shipment of his cargo are not
covered by the prescriptive provision of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
above referred to, if such damages were due, not to the deterioration and
decay of the goods while in transit, but to other causes independent of the
condition of the cargo upon arrival, like a drop in their market value. . . .[7]
The rationale behind limiting the said definitions to such parameters is not
hard to find or fathom. As this Court held in Ang:
Said one-year period of limitation is designed to meet the exigencies of
maritime hazards. In a case where the goods shipped were neither lost nor
damaged in transit but were, on the contrary, delivered in port to someone
who claimed to be entitled thereto, the situation is different, and the special
need for the short period of limitation in cases of loss or damage caused by
maritime perils does not obtain.[8]
In the case at bar, there is neither deterioration nor disappearance nor
destruction of goods caused by the carrier's breach of contract. Whatever
reduction there may have been in the value of the goods is not due to their
deterioration or disappearance because they had been damaged in transit.
Petitioner contends:
Although we agree that there are places in the section (Article III) in which
the phrase need have no broader meaning than loss or physical damage to
the goods, we disagree with the conclusion that it must so be limited
wherever it is used. We take it that the phrase has a uniform meaning, not
merely in Section 3, but throughout the Act; and there are a number of
places in which the restricted interpretation suggested would be
inappropriate. For example Section 4(2) [Article IV(2) (sic) exempts
exempts (sic) the carrier, the ship (sic), from liability "loss or
damage" (sic) resulting from certain courses beyond their control.[9]
Indeed, what is in issue in this petition is not the liability of petitioner for
its handling of goods as provided by §3(6) of the COGSA, but its liability
under its contract of carriage with private respondent as covered by laws of
more general application.
Precisely, the question before the trial court is not the particular sense of
"damages" as it refers to the physical loss or damage of a shipper's goods as
specifically covered by §3(6) of COGSA but petitioner's potential liability for
the damages it has caused in the general sense and, as such, the matter is
governed by the Civil Code, the Code of Commerce and COGSA, for the
breach of its contract of carriage with private respondent.
We conclude by holding that as the suit below is not for "loss or damage" to
goods contemplated in §3(6), the question of prescription of action is
governed not by the COGSA but by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code which
provides for a prescriptive period of ten years.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST: People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729

Case Title: People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:

The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal that urges the revocation of
a demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila presented by the defendant. The
defendant, accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of
the city. In the said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of
the said crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters.

Held:

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus the Philippine courts
have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court said that having the opium smoked
within our territorial waters even though aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public
order because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the
demurrer is revoked and the Court ordered further proceedings.
Case Title: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:

On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named Stanford
commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel
from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper
suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others
to have died while in transit.

This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it said that the
court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships
not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships involved.

Issue:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while
inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

Held:
Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the entrance of Manila
Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply. A crime
committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is within the jurisdiction
of the courts of the Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the time the ship was within
the territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when the ship settled
from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas,

In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of two
hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

416 Phil. 365

MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of
the Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar
cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated
February 27, 2001.

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by

the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels
of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel
oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87. was sailing off the coast of
Mindoro near Silonay Island.

The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-

on, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was
suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully
armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns,
and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel.
Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to paint
over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear
portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the
vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at
San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the
while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was
undergoing repairs.

PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the
disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the
assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However,
search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9, 1991,
the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area
presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The
pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991,
arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at
sea.

On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored
about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another
vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the
crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi
Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi
Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both
vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30,1991.

On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and
completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."

On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the

vessel remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were
released in three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident
to government authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991,
otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from the
shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to Imus,
Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in
proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by
accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought
to different places in Metro Manila.

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the
crew, called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report
the incident. The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for
investigation. The incident was also reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn
statements regarding the incident.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:

a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates
were present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days
of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the
NBI headquarters in Manila.

b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at

Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the
mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.

c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested

at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.

On October 24 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation

of Presidential Decree No. 532 (piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed
against accused-appellants, as follows:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I.

LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG
SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation
of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:

That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991,
both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then
manning a motor launch and armed with high powered guns, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize while
in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum
products, together with the complement and crew members, employing
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct
the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and
thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the
aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in
Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial thereupon ensued.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some

inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991,
maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the
transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them
claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to
the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a
red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian
Torralba on board, approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from
the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the work
was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with
additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They agreed
even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked,
cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They
denied having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to
Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were
paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that
the balance would be remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt
nor contracts of employment signed by the parties.

Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that

he was at home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the
younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.

Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced

evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as
Chief Officer, and later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel,
working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi
Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in
the business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and
petroleum to domestic and international markets. It owned four vessels,
one of which was "Navi Pride."

On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio
Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to
the Mercantile Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore
government as the radio telephone operator on board the vessel "Ching
Ma."

The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a
Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the
amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-
half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph
Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on
board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.

The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991.
Hiong, upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to
supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the
contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain
the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00
Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the
surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called
"M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the
transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port
authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to
procure a port clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew
list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted
and did not pass through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely
reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.

On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The
brokers then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee"
and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao
met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned
out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask for the full
name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.

Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in
the "Navi Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the
survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto
Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao.
Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong
reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.

Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil

purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same
procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told
that that there were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by the
company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was
completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.

On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had

four vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was
asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore.
Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco,
who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as
contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the
port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in
Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A
person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be
Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving.
Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.

After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants

of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio
Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in
Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San
Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the
penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death. However,
considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose the
death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, ]r.,
and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong
San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of
PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and
Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer
return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and
severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of
P11,240,000.00 Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of
6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All
the accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to
the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the
accused can no longer return the said cargo to said corporation, all the
accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex
Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87,
Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After
the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be
deported to Singapore.

All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the
National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the
pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and
comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila and
the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)

The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-
appellants may be summarized as follows:

Roger P. Tulin Virgilio Loyola Andres C. Infante Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco

Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert

that the trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken
during the time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-
lawyer, thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural
due process.

In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his
appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the
proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr.
Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr.
Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.

Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco

uniformly contend that during the custodial investigation, they were
subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign statements without being
given the opportunity to read the contents of the same; were denied
assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of
their constitutional rights,

Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that
the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the
crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by
the crew who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew,
so these accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged
pirates.

Cheong San Hiong

In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect
obliterated the crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in
declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts
attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel
was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court
erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing
him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done
or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the
Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and
sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual conclusions without
evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the
evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as
an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was
charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus
violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.

Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants
do not prove any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of
qualified piracy. He further argues that he had not in any way participated
in the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the crime of
qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo
were pirated.

As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the
information with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at
bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters
or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have
been committed within its territory.

We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.

The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are
the legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented
accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and
implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation?;
(3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of
qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime
committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant
Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and
when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside
Philippine waters and territory?

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20",
Record) was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and
Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the
evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such
waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by
the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of
a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by
Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-
appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the
subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed
the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in
open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59). It is true that an accused
person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and
by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the
technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may
be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right
recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the
same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be
allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the
court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of
counsel." By analogy , but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by
law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of
accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the
appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show
that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was
a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial,
considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made
and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar.
Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a
valid waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553
[1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).

However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial
investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means

which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17

hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture
or similar practices, and their families.

Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U. S. 436 [1966])

which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect
that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may
waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more stringent
requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of
counsel.

Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called

confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very
basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar.
Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit
from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S.
388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is
shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based
on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be
used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251
SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial
confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to
counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom
shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.

However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there

is sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty.
We agree with the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio
Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
.and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the crime
charged. In the words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of
the Court of Appeals -

...The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and

members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and
pointed to the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the
"M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon,
off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said vessel,
with its cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of
Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of
Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which
the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for
the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30,
1991...

x x x

x x x

x x x

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao"
were on board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2,
1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no
scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the
vessel could and did see and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact,
immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of
the National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa,
Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit"
(Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as some of the
pirates.

x x x

x x x

x x x

Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3)
Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in
the evening of March 2 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed
to its, destination, which turned out to be off the port of Singapore.

(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense
of denial is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony.
Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by
the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation
in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296
[1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr.
narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by three complete
strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian
Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were
conversing with one another along the seashore at Apkaya, Balibago,
Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then
anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as
cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time without even saying
goodbye to their families, without even knowing their destination or the
details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long
voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with
human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that
Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave
the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely
unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113,
Rollo)."

Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on

May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he
was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is
fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when
uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997])
considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove.
Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at
about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to
have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he
was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates
aforestated.

It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a

testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an
untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of witnesses
and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth
(People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).

We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy

exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal
Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know
the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when conspirators
are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to
one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a
common criminal design.

We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused- appellants
Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack
and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the members of the
crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring
them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel
with money for their fare and food provisions on their way home. These
acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need
not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"
since he performed his task in view of an objective common to all other
accused- appellants.

Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one

another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of
Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin
Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother
in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six or seven
kilometers away from each other. Their families are close. Accused-
appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents
were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-
appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity
.Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking
case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off
Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was
convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at large.

As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be

convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in
Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because
Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994) which amended Article
122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential
Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been
rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish
piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to
reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of
Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree
No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement
or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to
offenders who are neither members of the complement or passengers of the
vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:

Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. -The penalty
of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high
seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement
nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its
equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Underscoring supplied.)

Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 January 1, 1994), reads:

Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine
waters. -The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any
person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a
vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall
seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or
personal belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Underscoring ours)

On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:

SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - The following shall mean and be understood,

as follows:

d. Piracy. -Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of
the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal
belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things, committed by any person. including a passenger or member of
the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as
piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided (underscoring supplied).

To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its

amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by
any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon
its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent
provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine
waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in
1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine
waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any
person is covered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on
piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction
between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no
need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to
widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the
citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of
nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree
No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by
the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article
122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed
outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack
on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates)
and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive
vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-
loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-
appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532
requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed
in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its
cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal
Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law.
The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged,
not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a
special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in
Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied
with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and
prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761
[1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the
same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v.
Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).

However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's

constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an
accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he
was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said
law?

The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:

(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and

seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio
Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its
cargo; ( c) and that his act was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of
"M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that
accused-appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided
or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition of the
stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides:

SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or

highway robbery brigandage. -Any person who knowingly and in any
manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as
giving them information about the movement of police or other peace
officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by such
pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any
person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway
robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the
principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in
this Section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.

The ruling of the trial court is Within well-settle jurisprudence that if there
is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an
accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]).
Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the commission of the
crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v.
Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr.,125 SCRA 792
[1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).

Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of

Presidential Decree No 532 which presumes that any person who does any
of the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly, unless
the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had
failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or
aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates
and derived benefit therefrom.

The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in

disposing of the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T
Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked
cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He
even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products,
connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General
Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through,
undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied the pirates with
food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn,
June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).

We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and

Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-
appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of
their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had
accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port
Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place
and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution in Singapore.
Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi
Pride" could not have been effected.

We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in

detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods
summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy
Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to
rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of
the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the
name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi
Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH",
Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10
o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the
purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to
unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel
from "M/T Galilee" with' Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a.
Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity
Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred
to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was
not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificate"
above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid
$150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio
Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General
Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in
the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to falsely
appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas
during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000
metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same
irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused-
appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised the
transfer from his end.

Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders

of his superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source
of the cargo.

First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the

source and nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from
"M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner,
he should have avoided any participation in the cargo transfer given the
very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to
show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any
contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never bothered to ask for
and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee";
he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met
for the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the
transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night
which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first
time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money
without any receipt issued therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was
a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted
that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than
US$l,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that
time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value.
Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity.
Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time
and money for transportation -only to sell at the aforestated price if it were
legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to the act of falsifying records,
clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo
that his firm was acquiring was purloined.

Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely

following the orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in
performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if such
order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the
subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code,
Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua
Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of
international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-
operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said
order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities,
falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts.
During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was
convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These
circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the
implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could
have refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer
of the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he
must now suffer the consequences of his actions.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the

evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial
court in toto.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and DEVELOPMENT

INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-49407 19 August 1988

Facts:

National Development Company (NDC) appointed Maritime Company of the Philippines (MCP) as its
agent to manage and operate its vessel, ‘Dona Nati’, for and in behalf of its account. In 1964, while en
route to Japan from San Francisco, Dona Nati collided with a Japanese vessel, ‘SS Yasushima Maru’,
causing its cargo to be damaged and lost. The private respondent, as insurer to the consigners, paid
almost Php400,000.00 for said lost and damaged cargo. Hence, the private respondent instituted an
action to recover from NDC.

Issue:

Which laws govern the loss and destruction of goods due to collision of vessels outside Philippine waters?

Ruling:

In a previously decided case, it was held that the law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration
pursuant to Article 1753 of the Civil Code. It is immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign
waters, such as Ise Bay, Japan.

It appears, however, that collision falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil Code, hence,
we apply Articles 826 to 839, Book Three of the Code of Commerce, which deal exclusively with collision
of vessels.

Transportation Case Digest: Everett

Streamship Corp. V. CA (1998)
G.R. No. 122494 October 8, 1998
Lessons Applicable: Contracting Parties (Transportation)

FACTS:

 Hernandez Trading Co., Inc. (Hernandez) imported 3 crates of bus spare parts
(MARCO C/No. 12, MARCO C/No. 13 and MARCO C/No. 14), from Maruman
Trading Company, Ltd. (Maruman), a foreign corporation based in Japan.
 The crates (covered by Bill of Lading No. NGO53MN) were shipped on board
“ADELFAEVERETTE,” a vessel owned by Everett Orient Lines
 Upon arrival at the port of Manila, it was discovered that the crate marked
MARCO C/No. 14 was missing
 Hernandez made a formal claim for Y1,552,500.00, as shown in an Invoice No.
MTM-941, dated November 14, 1991
 Everett Streamship Corp. offered to pay only Y100,000.00 the maximum
amount stipulated under Clause 18 of the covering bill of lading
 Hernandez rejected the offer and thereafter instituted a suit for collection
 Trial Court: in favor of Hernandez
 CA: Affirmed but deleted the award of attorney’s fees
ISSUE:

1. W/N the limited liability clause in the Bill of Lading is valid

2. W/N Hernandez as consignee, who is not a signatory to the bill of lading is bound
by the stipulations thereof
HELD:

1. YES.

 A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the common carrier’s liability for loss or destruction of a
cargo to a certain sum, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is sanctioned by law,
particularly Articles 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code which provide:

ART. 1749. A stipulation that the common carrier’s liability is limited to the value of the goods
appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.

ART. 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and
has been freely and fairly agreed upon.

 Maruman Trading, had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was higher
than the limited liability of the carrier. Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher
valuation, it had itself to blame for not complying with the stipulations.
 The trial court’s ratiocination that private respondent could not have “fairly and freely” agreed to the
limited liability clause in the bill of lading because the said conditions were printed in small letters
does not make the bill of lading invalid.
 contracts of adhesion are valid and binding
 Greater vigilance, however, is required of the courts when dealing with contracts
of adhesion in that the said contracts must be carefully scrutinized “in order to
shield the unwary (or weaker party) from deceptive schemes contained in
ready-made covenant
 Article 24 of the Civil Code which mandates that “(i)n all contractual, property or
other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his
moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other
handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection
 Maruman Trading, we assume, has been extensively engaged in the trading
business. It can not be said to be ignorant of the business transactions it
entered into involving the shipment of its goods to its customers. The shipper
 could not have known, or should know the stipulations in the bill of lading and
there it should have declared a higher valuation of the goods
shipped. Moreover, Maruman Trading has not been heard to complain that it
has been deceived or rushed into agreeing to ship the cargo in petitioner’s
vessel. In fact, it was not even impleaded in this case.
2. YES.

 the right of a party in the same situation as Hernandez, to recover for loss of a
shipment consigned to him under a bill of lading drawn up only by and between
the shipper and the carrier, springs from either a relation of agency that may
exist between him and the shipper or consignor, or his status as stranger in
whose favor some stipulation is made in said contract, and who becomes a party
thereto when he demands fulfillment of that stipulation, in this case the delivery
of the goods or cargo shipped
 When Hernandez formally claimed reimbursement for the missing goods from
Everett and subsequently filed a case against the it based on the very same bill
of lading, it accepted the provisions of the contract and thereby made itself a
party thereto, or at least has come to court to enforce it.

Lazaro Rayray vs Chae Kyung

Lee
Article 45
Rayray married Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before the marriage, Lee was able to secure
a marriage license which is a requirement in Korea prior to marrying. They lived together
until 1955. Rayray however later found out that Lee had previously lived with 2 Americans
and a Korean. Lee answered by saying that it is not unusual in Korea for a woman to have
more than one partner and that it is legally permissive for them to do so and that there is no
legal impediment to her marriage with Rayray. Eventually they pursued their separate
ways. Rayray later filed before lower court of Manila for an action to annul his marriage with
Lee because Lee’s whereabouts cannot be determined and that his consent in marrying
Lee would have not been for the marriage had he known prior that Lee had been living with
other men. His action for annulment had been duly published and summons were made
known to Lee but due to her absence Rayray moved to have Lee be declared in default.
The lower court denied Rayray’s action stating that since the marriage was celebrated in
Korea the court cannot take cognizance of the case and that the facts presented by Rayray
is not sufficient to debunk his marriage with Lee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rayray’s marriage with Lee is null and void.
HELD: The lower court erred in ruling that Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over the
case. As far as marriage status is concerned, the nationality principle is controlling NOT lex
loci celebracionis. The lower court is however correct in ruling that Rayray’s evidence is not
sufficient to render his marriage with Lee null and void. Rayray said that the police
clearance secured by Lee is meant to allow her to marry after her subsequent
cohabitation/s with the other men – which is considered bigamous in Philippine law. The SC
ruled that the police clearance is wanting for it lacks the signature of the person who
prepared it and there is no competent document to establish the identity of the same. Also,
through Rayray himself, Lee averred that it is ok in Korea for a person who cohabited with
other men before to marry another man. This is an indication that Lee herself is aware that if
 it were a previous marriage that is concerned then that could be a legal impediment to any
subsequent marriage. Rayray cannot be given credence in claiming that his consent could
have been otherwise altered had he known all these facts prior to the marriage because he
would lie to every opportunity given him by the Court so as to suit his case.

WONG WOO YIU V VIVO

26 FEB

G.R. No. L-21076 | March 31, 1965 | J. BAUTISTA ANGELO

Doctrine:
Laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.

Facts:
1. The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be legally married to
Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant, which was later on
affirmed by the Board of Commissioners.
2. However, the same Board, composed of a new set of members, reversed BSI No. 3 and ordered
petitioner to be excluded from the country.
3. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but the same was denied for lack of merit. She then filed the
instant petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction (considered as certiorari) before the
Manila CFI.
4. After the respondents filed their answer and the parties submitted a written stipulation of facts, the
court a quo declared valid the original decision and restrained respondents from excluding petitioner
from the country. Respondents interposed the present appeal.
5. It appears from the BSI proceeding that petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961
for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang, China
on January 15, 1929; that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that the
new set of Board of Commissioners found that petitioner’s claim was without basis, it appearing that
in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first visited
China in 1935 and married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that she
married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he
went to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941, although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first
went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the
same affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four years old so
that computed from his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912.

Issue:
W/N petitioner presented sufficient proof to support fact of her marriage and can thus be admitted
as non-quota immigrant in the country?

Held:
No. A lot of discrepancies were found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband
in the investigations conducted by the immigration authorities. Also, the only basis in support of
petitioner’s claim that she is Blas’ wife is a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of
substantial proof of husband-wife relationship.
Article 15 of our new Civil Code also provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known
that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be
solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a
priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and
Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to
Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our
country.
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced in Section 19
of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of the
Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the
Philippines. But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative
to the law of marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply the general rule that in the
absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.

Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein, and
a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner’s marriage, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.

Decision appealed from reversed.

G.R. No. L-29132 May 29, 1970

THE SPOUSES, JOSE YAP JOAQUIN and LAM SOK KAM, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. EMILIO L. GALANG, THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

Hector S. Crisostomo and Elena S. Lim for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro
and Solicitor Ceferino S. Gaddi for respondent-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal to the Court of Appeals but certified to the Supreme Court as a case involving questions
purely of law. This appeal was interposed against a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
in its Civil Case No. 39025, denying a petition for prohibition against the herein respondent-appellee,
Commissioner of Immigration, for ordering the deportation of herein petitioner-appellant Lam Sok
Kam.

The case was submitted for decision before the trial court upon a stipulation of facts. In resume,
these facts are as follows:

On 21 January 1958, petitioner-appellant Lam Sok Kam, a Portuguese woman, filed with the
Philippine consulate general in Hongkong a non-immigrant application for passport visa for the
Philippines, "for the purpose of visiting a friend" and "to remain in the Philippines for a period of 30
days," according to her application. She also therein stated that she was married to one Tan Pio, a
resident of Macau.

She arrived in the Philippines on 19 April 1958 and was admitted as a temporary visitor for a limited
stay up to 18 May 1958. On 7 May 1958, she petitioned for, and was granted, an extension of her
temporary stay up to 17 November 1958. On 17 October 1958, however, she married one Jose Yap
Joaquin, a Filipino citizen, in a wedding solemnized by the Justice of the Peace of Siniloan, Laguna.
Four (4) days after the marriage, she applied for the cancellation of her alien registry on the ground
of having acquired Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to Joaquin. Her application was
granted in an order, dated 21 October 1958, by Associate Commissioner of Immigration Francisco
de la Rosa, and she was issued an identification certificate recognizing her as a citizen of the
Philippines.

Upon further investigation, however, Immigration Commissioner Emilio L. Galang discovered that
Lam Sok Kam was not a divorcee, as she had stated in her marriage contract with Joaquin, because
the document of divorce by mutual consent that she had presented was defective and irregular on its
face and, therefore, she had no right to contract another marriage. The Commissioner sought the
opinion of the consul of Portugal on the force and validity of a "Divorcio Por Muto Consentimento"
and its effect upon the marriage of Lam Sok Kam to Tan Pio, and the consul replied that he
considered the document not valid for the lack of the signature of Lam Sok Kam; the document was
supposedly executed in Macau on 19 July 1958, when Lam Sok Kam was already in the Philippines.
Neither had the consul issued to petitioner any certificate of legal capacity to marry, required by
Article 66 of the Civil Code. Thereupon, respondent-appellee Commissioner revoked, on 15 January
1959, the previous order of 21 October 1958 of Associate Commissioner de la Rosa, and ordered
her to leave the country within five (5) days. The Commissioner further denied her request for stay of
execution of the order, pending action by the President of the Philippines on her request for
additional extension of her stay. The Commissioner, likewise, forfeited her bond for having changed
her residence without giving notice and obtaining a previous written consent of the Bureau of
Immigration.

On 21 January 1959, petitioners-appellants filed a petition for prohibition against the Commissioner
of Immigration to prohibit him from enforcing his deportation order.

In the meanwhile, two (2) daughters, Lita and Cita, had been born, on 20 January 1960 and 26
March 1961, respectively, to the petitioners-appellants.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered its decision, subject of the present appeal,
denying the petition for prohibition.

The power of the Commissioner of Immigration to determine the validity of a marriage for the
purpose of deporting aliens was upheld in Brito, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 106 Phil.
417, in the following language:

The pivotal issue is whether or not the respondent Commissioner of Immigration has
the power to determine the validity of the marriage contracted by the petitioners for
the purpose of arresting and deporting Tan Soo alias So Wa. There is no question
that the power to deport is limited to aliens, that the citizenship of the respondent in
deportation proceedings is determinative of the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of
Immigration, and that the power to deport carries that of determining the
respondent's nationality. But if the question of nationality is dependent upon the
validity of the respondent's marriage, may the Commissioner of Immigration pass
judgment thereon?

The lower court rules against appellant Commissioner of Immigration. The latter,
however, drew a distinction between a voidable marriage and one which is void ab
initio. He argues that in the first case the court may be correct, but in the second,
where the marriage is void ab initio, the Commissioner of Immigration may pass
upon the validity of said marriage ... no judicial decree being necessary to establish
its nullity.

It is true that in relation to the marriage of petitioners no assumption can arise or

should be made from the mere discovery of a marriage contract between Olegario
Brito and Narcisa Maya executed in 1943, without proof that the first wife was still
alive or that said first marriage was otherwise subsisting in 1954. As a matter of fact,
it is to be supposed that the marriage between the herein petitioners in 1954 is valid
altho this is only a prima facie presumption which may be overcome by evidence that
it was contracted during the lifetime of Narcisa Maya and before the first marriage of
Olegario Brito was annulled or dissolved. In any event, these considerations going
into the validity of the marriage of petitioners are not an obstacle to the preliminary
proceedings to be conducted in this particular case by the appellant Commissioner of
Immigration pursuant to Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act, as amended,
to determine whether or not a prima facie case exists against appellee Tan Soo alias
So Wa to warrant her deportation.

Though the decision in the aforecited case was subsequently set aside, the ground therefor was on
new relevant evidence (See Brito, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-16829, 30 June 1965,
14 SCRA 539) which did not reject or alter the ruling or opinion aforequoted upholding the power of
the Commissioner to determine the validity of a marriage, in the exercise of his jurisdiction to deport
aliens, where such marriage is claimed as a ground for non-alienage or citizenship.

But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the divorce from her first husband and her second
marriage were both valid, petitioner Lam Sok Kam is plainly deportable because her marriage to
Joaquin did not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of the
extended period of her temporary stay, which was on 17 November 1958, because her marriage did
not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen (Ly Giok Ha, et al. vs. Galang, L-10760, 17 May 1957, 101
Phil. 459; Morano vs. Vivo,
L-22196, 30 June 1967, 20 SCRA 568; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Go Tieng, et al., L-22581,
21 May 1969, 28 SCRA 237).
Petitioners oppose consideration of the foregoing issue on the ground of its being raised for the first
time on appeal. The opposition is unacceptable; petitioners themselves raised the issue in their
fourth assignment of error (Brief, 32) by citing Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
providing that:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.

Besides, the circumstances shown by the record before us are convincing that the marriage was not
entered into in good faith but only for the purpose of evading Lam Sok Kam's promise to leave the
country upon expiration of her temporary stay. Her case is identical to that dealt with in De Austria
vs. Conchu, L-20716, 22 June 1965, 14 SCRA 336, wherein this Court held the temporary visitor to
be deportable, notwithstanding her marriage to a natural-born Filipino citizen some forty days before
expiration of her permit to remain in the Islands. Such devious maneuvers to circumvent our
immigration laws and confront the authorities with a "fait accompli" must be firmly discouraged if the
country is not to be flooded by illegal entrants, abetted by unthinking citizens devoid of regard for the
country's higher interest.

That Lam Sok Kam now has children by her second husband, and that her deportation would tear
her apart from them, is not a ground that would bar exclusion. In Vivo vs. Cloribel, L-25411, 26
October 1968, 25 SCRA 616, this Court held:

It is contended that two-year old respondent Uy Tian Siong cannot, under Article 363
of the Civil Code, be separated from his mother _ _ _ _ _ _; and that to make said
wife depart from the Philippines is destructive of family solidarity (Articles 218-221).
These arguments are beside the point. Said laws govern the relations _ _ _ _ _
between private persons, not the relations between visiting aliens and the sovereign
host-country _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against the
petitioners-appellants.

.R. No. L-11622 January 28, 1961

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-11668 January 28, 1961.

DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, petitioner,

vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate left by the deceased
Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws applicable thereto. Walter G. Stevenson (born in the Philippines
on August 9, 1874 of British parents and married in the City of Manila on January 23, 1909 to
Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another British subject) died on February 22, 1951 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved and established their permanent residence since
May 10, 1945. In his will executed in San Francisco on May 22, 1947, and which was duly probated
in the Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951, Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as his
sole heiress to the following real and personal properties acquired by the spouses while residing in
the Philippines, described and preliminary assessed as follows:

Gross Estate
Real Property — 2 parcels of land in
Baguio, covered by T.C.T. Nos. 378 and P43,500.00
 379
Personal Property
(1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao Estate
at P10.00 each 1,770.00
(2) 210,000 shares of stock of Mindanao
Mother Lode Mines, Inc. at P0.38 per
share 79,800.00
(3) Cash credit with Canacao Estate Inc. 4,870.88
(4) Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India,
Australia & China 851.97
Total Gross Assets P130,792.85

On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was duly
admitted to probate by our court and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the
estate, who on July 11, 1951, filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the
reservation of having the properties declared therein finally appraised at their values six months after
the death of Stevenson. Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator in order to
secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax due on the 210,000
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to dispose in
the United States. Acting upon said return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the valuation
of the personal properties declared therein, but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land
located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value in the amount of P52.200.00, instead of
P43,500.00. After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses
in the amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the
Collector assessed the state the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance
tax, or a total of P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid by the estate on June 6, 1952.

On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and inheritance tax
return in pursuance f his reservation made at the time of filing of the preliminary return and for the
purpose of availing of the right granted by section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

In this amended return the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc. was reduced from 0.38 per share, as originally declared, to P0.20 per share, or from a
total valuation of P79,800.00 to P42,000.00. This change in price per share of stock was based by
the ancillary administrator on the market notation of the stock obtaining at the San Francisco
California) Stock Exchange six months from the death of Stevenson, that is, As of August 22, 1931.
In addition, the ancillary administrator made claim for the following deductions:

Funeral expenses ($1,04326) P2,086.52

Judicial Expenses:
(a) Administrator's Fee P1,204.34
(b) Attorney's Fee 6.000.00
(c) Judicial and Administration
expenses as of August 9, 1952 1,400.05
8,604.39
Real Estate Tax for 1951 on Baguio
real properties (O.R. No. B-1
686836) 652.50
Claims against the estate:
($5,000.00) P10,000.00 P10,000.00
Plus: 4% int. p.a. from Feb. 2 to 22,
1951 22.47 10,022.47
Sub-Total P21,365.88

In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and
interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.
On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and inheritance
tax return (Exh. "M-N"). This return declared the same assets of the estate stated in the amended
return of September 22, 1952, except that it contained new claims for additional exemption and
deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the amount of P4,000.00 from the gross estate of the decedent as
provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary
administrator averred was allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals in case No. 71 entitled "Housman
vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and (2) exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance
taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the
reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. In this last return, the
estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for
inheritance tax and that, as a consequence, it had overpaid the government. The refund of the
amount of P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was accordingly requested by the estate. The Collector
denied the claim. For this reason, action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondents, as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of said amount.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case was forwarded to the Court of Tax Appeals which court,
after hearing, rendered decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

In fine, we are of the opinion and so hold that: (a) the one-half (½) share of the surviving
spouse in the conjugal partnership property as diminished by the obligations properly
chargeable to such property should be deducted from the net estate of the deceased Walter
G. Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C of the National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the
intangible personal property belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is exempt from
inheritance tax, pursuant to the provision of section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code in relation to the California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to
an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax; (c) for purposes of estate
and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the spouses should be valued at
P52,200.00, and 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. should
be appraised at P0.38 per share; and (d) the estate shall be entitled to a deduction of
P2,000.00 for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8,604.39.

From this decision, both parties appealed.

The Collector of Internal Revenue, hereinafter called petitioner assigned four errors allegedly
committed by the trial court, while the assignees, Douglas and Bettina Fisher hereinafter called
respondents, made six assignments of error. Together, the assigned errors raise the following main
issues for resolution by this Court:

(1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-half (½) of the net
estate should be deducted therefrom as the share of tile surviving spouse in accordance with our law
on conjugal partnership and in relation to section 89 (c) of the National Internal revenue Code;

(2) Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso embodied in Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code granting exemption from the payment of estate and inheritance
taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.;

(3) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00 allowed by Section 861, U.S.
Internal Revenue Code in relation to section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code;

(4) Whether or not the real estate properties of the decedent located in Baguio City and the 210,000
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., were correctly appraised by the lower
court;

(5) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the following deductions: P8,604.39 for judicial and
administration expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral expenses; P652.50 for real estate taxes; and
P10,0,22.47 representing the amount of indebtedness allegedly incurred by the decedent during his
lifetime; and

(6) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the payment of interest on the amount it claims to have
overpaid the government and to be refundable to it.

In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a well-known doctrine in our civil law that in the
absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the
system of conjugal partnership as to the properties acquired during their marriage. The application of
this doctrine to the instant case is being disputed, however, by petitioner Collector of Internal
Revenue, who contends that pursuant to Article 124 of the New Civil Code, the property relation of
the spouses Stevensons ought not to be determined by the Philippine law, but by the national law of
the decedent husband, in this case, the law of England. It is alleged by petitioner that English laws
do not recognize legal partnership between spouses, and that what obtains in that jurisdiction is
another regime of property relation, wherein all properties acquired during the marriage pertain and
belong Exclusively to the husband. In further support of his stand, petitioner cites Article 16 of the
New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the old) to the effect that in testate and intestate proceedings, the amount
of successional rights, among others, is to be determined by the national law of the decedent.

In this connection, let it be noted that since the mariage of the Stevensons in the Philippines took
place in 1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of the old Civil Code and not Article 124 of the New
Civil Code which became effective only in 1950. It is true that both articles adhere to the so-called
nationality theory of determining the property relation of spouses where one of them is a foreigner
and they have made no prior agreement as to the administration disposition, and ownership of their
conjugal properties. In such a case, the national law of the husband becomes the dominant law in
determining the property relation of the spouses. There is, however, a difference between the two
articles in that Article 1241 of the new Civil Code expressly provides that it shall be applicable
regardless of whether the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or abroad while Article 13252 of
the old Civil Code is limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land.

It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed marriages between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. In the instant case, both spouses are foreigners who married in the
Philippines. Manresa,3 in his Commentaries, has this to say on this point:

La regla establecida en el art. 1.315, se refiere a las capitulaciones otorgadas en Espana y

entre espanoles. El 1.325, a las celebradas en el extranjero cuando alguno de los conyuges
es espanol. En cuanto a la regla procedente cuando dos extranjeros se casan en Espana, o
dos espanoles en el extranjero hay que atender en el primer caso a la legislacion de pais a
que aquellos pertenezean, y en el segundo, a las reglas generales consignadas en los
articulos 9 y 10 de nuestro Codigo. (Emphasis supplied.)

If we adopt the view of Manresa, the law determinative of the property relation of the Stevensons,
married in 1909, would be the English law even if the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines,
both of them being foreigners. But, as correctly observed by the Tax Court, the pertinent English law
that allegedly vests in the decedent husband full ownership of the properties acquired during the
marriage has not been proven by petitioner. Except for a mere allegation in his answer, which is not
sufficient, the record is bereft of any evidence as to what English law says on the matter. In the
absence of proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in indulging in what Wharton calls "processual
presumption," in presuming that the law of England on this matter is the same as our law.4

Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New Civil Code (art. 10, old Civil
Code) to bolster his stand. A reading of Article 10 of the old Civil Code, which incidentally is the one
applicable, shows that it does not encompass or contemplate to govern the question of property
relation between spouses. Said article distinctly speaks of amount of successional rights and this
term, in speaks in our opinion, properly refers to the extent or amount of property that each heir is
legally entitled to inherit from the estate available for distribution. It needs to be pointed out that
the property relation of spouses, as distinguished from their successional rights, is governed
differently by the specific and express provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of our new Civil Code (Title III,
Chapter I of the old Civil Code.) We, therefore, find that the lower court correctly deducted the half of
the conjugal property in determining the hereditary estate left by the deceased Stevenson.

On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court in the exempting the
respondents from paying inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, in relation to Section 13851 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, on the ground that:
(1) the said proviso of the California Revenue and Taxation Code has not been duly proven by the
respondents; (2) the reciprocity exemptions granted by section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code can only be availed of by residents of foreign countries and not of residents of a state in the
United States; and (3) there is no "total" reciprocity between the Philippines and the state of
California in that while the former exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes on
intangible personal properties, the latter only exempts the payment of inheritance tax..
To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel for herein respondents,
testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue
and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent
California law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited article 4,
section 13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derring's
California Code, a publication of the Bancroft-Whitney Company inc. And as part of his testimony, a
full quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by the respondents.

It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them.5 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.6

Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving foreign laws before our
tribunals. However, although we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with
said rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a
reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will
convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to
prove the existence of a foreign law." In that case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law
of San Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated
that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on the part of
the Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as proved by respondents' witness.

We now take up the question of reciprocity in exemption from transfer or death taxes, between the
State of California and the Philippines.F

Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent part, provides:

... And, provided, further, That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of
intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a
foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer of tax or death tax of
any character in respect of intangible personal property of citizens of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent
was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death
taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country." (Emphasis supplied).

On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law, insofar as pertinent, reads:.

"SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions. Intangible personal property is exempt

from the tax imposed by this part if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a
territory or another State of the United States or of a foreign state or country which then
imposed a legacy, succession, or death tax in respect to intangible personal property of its
own residents, but either:.

(a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any character in respect to
intangible personal property of residents of this State, or

(b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible personal property of a non-
resident was exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character if the
Territory or other State of the United States or foreign state or country in which the
nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption in respect to intangible personal property of
residents of the Territory or State of the United States or foreign state or country of residence
of the decedent." (Id.)

It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the reciprocity must be total, that is, with respect to
transfer or death taxes of any and every character, in the case of the Philippine law, and to legacy,
succession, or death taxes of any and every character, in the case of the California law. Therefore, if
any of the two states collects or imposes and does not exempt any transfer, death, legacy, or
succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work. This is the underlying principle of the
reciprocity clauses in both laws.

In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with properties therein,
there are imposed upon his estate and its settlement, both an estate and an inheritance tax. Under
the laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. On the other hand, the Federal Internal
Revenue Code imposes an estate tax on non-residents not citizens of the United States,7 but does
not provide for any exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Applying these laws in the manner the
Court of Tax Appeals did in the instant case, we will have a situation where a Californian, who is
non-resident in the Philippines but has intangible personal properties here, will the subject to the
payment of an estate tax, although exempt from the payment of the inheritance tax. This being the
case, will a Filipino, non-resident of California, but with intangible personal properties there, be
entitled to the exemption clause of the California law, since the Californian has not been exempted
from every character of legacy, succession, or death tax because he is, under our law, under
obligation to pay an estate tax? Upon the other hand, if we exempt the Californian from paying the
estate tax, we do not thereby entitle a Filipino to be exempt from a similar estate tax in California
because under the Federal Law, which is equally enforceable in California he is bound to pay the
same, there being no reciprocity recognized in respect thereto. In both instances, the Filipino citizen
is always at a disadvantage. We do not believe that our legislature has intended such an unfair
situation to the detriment of our own government and people. We, therefore, find and declare that
the lower court erred in exempting the estate in question from payment of the inheritance tax.

We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Lara (G.R. Nos. L-
9456 & L-9481, prom. January 6, 1958, 54 O.G. 2881) exempting the estate of the deceased Hugo
H. Miller from payment of the inheritance tax imposed by the Collector of Internal Revenue. It will be
noted, however, that the issue of reciprocity between the pertinent provisions of our tax law and that
of the State of California was not there squarely raised, and the ruling therein cannot control the
determination of the case at bar. Be that as it may, we now declare that in view of the express
provisions of both the Philippine and California laws that the exemption would apply only if the law of
the other grants an exemption from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character, there
could not be partial reciprocity. It would have to be total or none at all.

With respect to the question of deduction or reduction in the amount of P4,000.00 based on the U.S.
Federal Estate Tax Law which is also being claimed by respondents, we uphold and adhere to our
ruling in the Lara case (supra) that the amount of $2,000.00 allowed under the Federal Estate Tax
Law is in the nature of a deduction and not of an exemption regarding which reciprocity cannot be
claimed under the provision of Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code. Nor is reciprocity
authorized under the Federal Law. .

On the issue of the correctness of the appraisal of the two parcels of land situated in Baguio City, it
is contended that their assessed values, as appearing in the tax rolls 6 months after the death of
Stevenson, ought to have been considered by petitioner as their fair market value, pursuant to
section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It should be pointed out, however, that in
accordance with said proviso the properties are required to be appraised at their fair market value
and the assessed value thereof shall be considered as the fair market value only when evidence to
the contrary has not been shown. After all review of the record, we are satisfied that such evidence
exists to justify the valuation made by petitioner which was sustained by the tax court, for as the tax
court aptly observed:

"The two parcels of land containing 36,264 square meters were valued by the administrator
of the estate in the Estate and Inheritance tax returns filed by him at P43,500.00 which is the
assessed value of said properties. On the other hand, defendant appraised the same at
P52,200.00. It is of common knowledge, and this Court can take judicial notice of it, that
assessments for real estate taxation purposes are very much lower than the true and fair
market value of the properties at a given time and place. In fact one year after decedent's
death or in 1952 the said properties were sold for a price of P72,000.00 and there is no
showing that special or extraordinary circumstances caused the sudden increase from the
price of P43,500.00, if we were to accept this value as a fair and reasonable one as of 1951.
Even more, the counsel for plaintiffs himself admitted in open court that he was willing to
purchase the said properties at P2.00 per square meter. In the light of these facts we believe
and therefore hold that the valuation of P52,200.00 of the real estate in Baguio made by
defendant is fair, reasonable and justified in the premises." (Decision, p. 19).

In respect to the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc.,
(a domestic corporation), respondents contend that their value should be fixed on the basis of the
market quotation obtaining at the San Francisco (California) Stock Exchange, on the theory that the
certificates of stocks were then held in that place and registered with the said stock exchange. We
cannot agree with respondents' argument. The situs of the shares of stock, for purposes of taxation,
being located here in the Philippines, as respondents themselves concede and considering that they
are sought to be taxed in this jurisdiction, consistent with the exercise of our government's taxing
authority, their fair market value should be taxed on the basis of the price prevailing in our country.

Upon the other hand, we find merit in respondents' other contention that the said shares of stock
commanded a lesser value at the Manila Stock Exchange six months after the death of Stevenson.
Through Atty. Allison Gibbs, respondents have shown that at that time a share of said stock was bid
for at only P.325 (p. 103, t.s.n.). Significantly, the testimony of Atty. Gibbs in this respect has never
been questioned nor refuted by petitioner either before this court or in the court below. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, we are, therefore, constrained to reverse the Tax Court on this
point and to hold that the value of a share in the said mining company on August 22, 1951 in the
Philippine market was P.325 as claimed by respondents..

It should be noted that the petitioner and the Tax Court valued each share of stock of P.38 on the
basis of the declaration made by the estate in its preliminary return. Patently, this should not have
been the case, in view of the fact that the ancillary administrator had reserved and availed of his
legal right to have the properties of the estate declared at their fair market value as of six months
from the time the decedent died..

On the fifth issue, we shall consider the various deductions, from the allowance or disallowance of
which by the Tax Court, both petitioner and respondents have appealed..

Petitioner, in this regard, contends that no evidence of record exists to support the allowance of the
sum of P8,604.39 for the following expenses:.

1) Administrator's fee P1,204.34

2) Attorney's fee 6,000.00
3) Judicial and Administrative expenses 2,052.55
Total Deductions P8,604.39

An examination of the record discloses, however, that the foregoing items were considered
deductible by the Tax Court on the basis of their approval by the probate court to which said
expenses, we may presume, had also been presented for consideration. It is to be supposed that the
probate court would not have approved said items were they not supported by evidence presented
by the estate. In allowing the items in question, the Tax Court had before it the pertinent order of the
probate court which was submitted in evidence by respondents. (Exh. "AA-2", p. 100, record). As the
Tax Court said, it found no basis for departing from the findings of the probate court, as it must have
been satisfied that those expenses were actually incurred. Under the circumstances, we see no
ground to reverse this finding of fact which, under Republic Act of California National Association,
which it would appear, that while still living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained we are not inclined to
pass upon the claim of respondents in respect to the additional amount of P86.52 for funeral
expenses which was disapproved by the court a quo for lack of evidence.

In connection with the deduction of P652.50 representing the amount of realty taxes paid in 1951 on
the decedent's two parcels of land in Baguio City, which respondents claim was disallowed by the
Tax Court, we find that this claim has in fact been allowed. What happened here, which a careful
review of the record will reveal, was that the Tax Court, in itemizing the liabilities of the estate, viz:

1) Administrator's fee P1,204.34

2) Attorney's fee 6,000.00
3) Judicial and Administration expenses as of August
9, 1952 2,052.55
Total P9,256.89

added the P652.50 for realty taxes as a liability of the estate, to the P1,400.05 for judicial and
administration expenses approved by the court, making a total of P2,052.55, exactly the same figure
which was arrived at by the Tax Court for judicial and administration expenses. Hence, the
difference between the total of P9,256.98 allowed by the Tax Court as deductions, and the
P8,604.39 as found by the probate court, which is P652.50, the same amount allowed for realty
taxes. An evident oversight has involuntarily been made in omitting the P2,000.00 for funeral
expenses in the final computation. This amount has been expressly allowed by the lower court and
there is no reason why it should not be. .
We come now to the other claim of respondents that pursuant to section 89(b) (1) in relation to
section 89(a) (1) (E) and section 89(d), National Internal Revenue Code, the amount of P10,022.47
should have been allowed the estate as a deduction, because it represented an indebtedness of the
decedent incurred during his lifetime. In support thereof, they offered in evidence a duly certified
claim, presented to the probate court in California by the Bank of California National Association,
which it would appear, that while still living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained a loan of $5,000.00
secured by pledge on 140,000 of his shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc.
(Exhs. "Q-Q4", pp. 53-59, record). The Tax Court disallowed this item on the ground that the local
probate court had not approved the same as a valid claim against the estate and because it
constituted an indebtedness in respect to intangible personal property which the Tax Court held to
be exempt from inheritance tax.

For two reasons, we uphold the action of the lower court in disallowing the deduction.

Firstly, we believe that the approval of the Philippine probate court of this particular indebtedness of
the decedent is necessary. This is so although the same, it is averred has been already admitted
and approved by the corresponding probate court in California, situs of the principal or domiciliary
administration. It is true that we have here in the Philippines only an ancillary administration in this
case, but, it has been held, the distinction between domiciliary or principal administration and
ancillary administration serves only to distinguish one administration from the other, for the two
proceedings are separate and independent.8 The reason for the ancillary administration is that, a
grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore, have any effect beyond the limits of the country in
which it was granted. Hence, we have the requirement that before a will duly probated outside of the
Philippines can have effect here, it must first be proved and allowed before our courts, in much the
same manner as wills originally presented for allowance therein.9 And the estate shall be
administered under letters testamentary, or letters of administration granted by the court, and
disposed of according to the will as probated, after payment of just debts and expenses of
administration.10 In other words, there is a regular administration under the control of the court,
where claims must be presented and approved, and expenses of administration allowed before
deductions from the estate can be authorized. Otherwise, we would have the actuations of our own
probate court, in the settlement and distribution of the estate situated here, subject to the
proceedings before the foreign court over which our courts have no control. We do not believe such
a procedure is countenanced or contemplated in the Rules of Court.

Another reason for the disallowance of this indebtedness as a deduction, springs from the provisions
of Section 89, letter (d), number (1), of the National Internal Revenue Code which reads:

(d) Miscellaneous provisions — (1) No deductions shall be allowed in the case of a non-
resident not a citizen of the Philippines unless the executor, administrator or anyone of the
heirs, as the case may be, includes in the return required to be filed under section ninety-
three the value at the time of his death of that part of the gross estate of the non-resident not
situated in the Philippines."

In the case at bar, no such statement of the gross estate of the non-resident Stevenson not situated
in the Philippines appears in the three returns submitted to the court or to the office of the petitioner
Collector of Internal Revenue. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the revenue officer to
determine how much of the indebtedness may be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to (b), number
(1) of the same section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code which provides:

(b) Deductions allowed to non-resident estates. — In the case of a non-resident not a citizen
of the Philippines, by deducting from the value of that part of his gross estate which at the
time of his death is situated in the Philippines —

(1) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. — That proportion of the deductions
specified in paragraph (1) of subjection (a) of this section11 which the value of such part
bears the value of his entire gross estate wherever situated;"

In other words, the allowable deduction is only to the extent of the portion of the indebtedness which
is equivalent to the proportion that the estate in the Philippines bears to the total estate wherever
situated. Stated differently, if the properties in the Philippines constitute but 1/5 of the entire assets
wherever situated, then only 1/5 of the indebtedness may be deducted. But since, as heretofore
adverted to, there is no statement of the value of the estate situated outside the Philippines, no part
of the indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to Section 89, letter (d), number (1) of
the Internal Revenue Code.
For the reasons thus stated, we affirm the ruling of the lower court disallowing the deduction of the
alleged indebtedness in the sum of P10,022.47.

In recapitulation, we hold and declare that:

(a) only the one-half (1/2) share of the decedent Stevenson in the conjugal partnership
property constitutes his hereditary estate subject to the estate and inheritance taxes;

(b) the intangible personal property is not exempt from inheritance tax, there existing no
complete total reciprocity as required in section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
nor is the decedent's estate entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the
estate tax;

(c) for the purpose of the estate and inheritance taxes, the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. are to be appraised at P0.325 per share; and

(d) the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses should be deducted in the determination of the net
asset of the deceased Stevenson.

In all other respects, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed.

Respondent's claim for interest on the amount allegedly overpaid, if any actually results after a
recomputation on the basis of this decision is hereby denied in line with our recent decision
in Collector of Internal Revenue v. St. Paul's Hospital (G.R. No. L-12127, May 29, 1959) wherein we
held that, "in the absence of a statutory provision clearly or expressly directing or authorizing such
payment, and none has been cited by respondents, the National Government cannot be required to
pay interest."

WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated, the judgment of the lower court is
hereby affirmed in all other respects not inconsistent herewith. No costs. So ordered.

PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al

G.R. No. 103493
June 19, 1997
FACTS: Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners
Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment Corp
(PHILSEC), secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc.,
through its president, private respondent Daic, assumed Ducat’s obligation
under an Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with
Vendor’s Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA)
a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan
to ATHONA as initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be
paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488,
Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC
and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc.
all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.

As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount
covered by the note became due and demandable. Accordingly, private
respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in
the United States for payment of the balance and for damages for breach of
contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting
the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the
Agreement.
While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a
complaint “For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary
Attachment” against private respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint
reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in the
Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private
respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent
more than its true value.

Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1)
litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens,
and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.

The trial court granted Ducat’s MTD, stating that “the evidentiary
requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum
of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international
law of forum non conveniens,” even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in
the U.S. case.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying
the principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens.

The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic
on the ground of litis pendentia.

ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S.
court?
HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati
NO
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in
several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is
because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes
prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, §50 provides:

Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal

of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as
follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive

upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity
to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata
or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial
court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even
furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence
presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then
being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such
that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata.

Second. Nor is the trial court’s refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable
under the principle of forum non conveniens:

First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not
include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on
this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly
considered a matter of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after “vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances” require the court’s
desistance.

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio

CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian
family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha
on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3,
1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to
prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and
recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is
absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former
presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as
evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it
will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive
or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus
free him on the ground of bigamy.

Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy Chun Yen, petitioners,
versus Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, Rodolfo Sy, and
Honorable Court of Appeals, respondents.
No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

Facts:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth
P300,000.00 more or less.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition alleging among others that:

a) They are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego;

b) To their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate;
c) They do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to
him; and
d) They nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratriz of the
intestate estate of the deceased.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who
alleged that:

a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat who he married on January 19, 1931 in China;
b) The other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased Yao Kee; and
c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to
become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.

Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China;
that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was
for elders to agree upon the bethrotal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother
was the one who contracted or entered into an agreement with the parents of her
husband; that she and her husband have been living in Fookien, China before he went to
the Philippines; that in China, the custom is that there is a go-between, a sort of
marriage broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of
the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son-in-law, then they agree on a
date as an engagement day; that on the wedding day, the document would be signed by
the parents of both parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the
Philippines; that the parties do not sign the document themselves; and that she and Sy
Kiat were married for 46 years already and the document was left in China and she
doubt if that document can still be found now.

The testimony of Gan Ching, the younger brother of Yao Kee, that he attended the
marriage of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by
the Chinese government, a document signed by the parents and elders of the parties
being sufficient. Statements were made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified that a) Sy
Kiat was married to Yao Kee according to a Chinese custom.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China is valid.

Held:

The law requires that a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules
of evidence. A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other
fact.

Article 71 of the Civil Code states that: “All marriages performed outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous or
incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.

The testimonies of Yao Kee and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China’s law
or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more
importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject
matter. The marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and
proved as any other fact.

As petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the
laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only of
acknowledged natural children.

G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979

RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON, BERNARDO DE LEON,
ARLENE DE LEON and IRMA L. VELOSO, respondents.

Ernesto T. Zshornack, Jr. for petitioner.

Jose W. Diokno Law Office private respondents the Leons.

Arturo E. Balbastro for privates respondent Veloso.

TEEHANKEE, J.: 1äwph ï1.ñët

The Court dismisses the petition which seeks to overrule respondent judge's orders declaring that
petitioner has failed to establish by competent evidence his alleged status as an adopted child of the
deceased Lazatin spouses and prays for judgment of this Court "declaring as established the fact of
(his) adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such."
Respondent judge correctly ruled that he could not allow petitioner (who had filed a motion to
intervene in the proceedings to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin and to
settle her estate as her adopted son, after having earlier filed a motion to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her pre-deceased husband as his admitted illegitimate [not natural] son), over the
opposition of private respondents, to introduce evidence that he had "enjoyed ... the status of an
adopted child of the without his first producing competent and documentary that there had been
judicial proceedings for his by the said spouses which resulted in the final judgment of a competent
court decreeing his adoption.

On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin diamond intestate in Pasay City, survived by his wife,
Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon, married to
respondent Bernardo de Leon, and respondent Irma Lazatin, married to Francisco Veloso.

One month after Mariano's death, his widow, Margarita de Asis, commenced an intestate proceeding
before the Court of First Instance of Pasay, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P. Mariano, Oscar,
Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr. Lazatin with one
Helen Munoz, intervened. Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another
admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.

Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow, Margarita de Asis, also died, leaving a &
holographic will executed on May 29, 1970, providing, among others, for a legacy of cash, jewelry,
and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo,
a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato
Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.

During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the People's Bank and Trust
Company, Roxas Boulevard branch, which either she or respondent Nora L. de Leon could open.
Five days after Margarita's death, respondent Nora L. de Leon, accompanied by her husband,
respondent Bernardo de Leon, opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares
of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry
belonging to her and to her mother. Respondent Nora L. de Leon claims that she opened the safety
deposit box in good faith, believing that it was held jointly by her and her deceased mother. Her sole
reason for opening the box was to get her stock certificates and other small items deposited therein.
When she was to close the deposit box, the bank personnel informed her that she needed an
authority from the court to do so, in view of her mother's death and so, she removed everything from
the box.

On June 3, 1974, private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis,
before docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P of respondent Court, Days after having learned that
respondent Nora L. de Leon had opened this safety deposit box, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara,
filed a motion in the probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to
that submitted for probate and demanding its production. He likewise prayed for the opening of the
safety deposit box. Respondent Nora L. de Leon admitted that she opened the box but there was no
will or any document resembling a will therein.
Upon the order of the probate court, presided over by Judge Arsenio B. Alcantara, the safety deposit
box was opened on November 6, 1974, at which time it was found to be empty, because prior
thereto respondent Nora L. de Leon had already removed its contents.

On November 22, 1974, or seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner intervened
for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc.
No. 2326- P), as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.

Under the same date of November 22, 1974, petitioner's son, Ramon, filed a petition in the estate
proceedings of Margarita de Asis to examine private respondents on the contents of the safety
deposit box, Whereupon, on January 31, 1975, the probate court ordered respondent Nora L. de
Leon to deliver the properties taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of Court. Subsequently,
however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano Lazatin, and 2341-P, Margarita de Asis)
were transferred to the sala of respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr.

On May 29, 1975, Judge Campos issued an order requiring counsel for respondents Nora L. de
Leon and Bernardo de Leon to produce all those papers and items removed from the safety deposit
box and to deliver the same to the custody of the court within one week. Within the period ordered,
respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with the Clerk of Court, not the items themselves, but two
keys to a new safety deposit box which could only be opened upon order of the court.

On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene
in the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, as an adopted child, on the basis of an
affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, the
petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was
later modified on August 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin
and his wife Margarita de Asis.

On September 29, 1975, Judge Campos found respondent' Nora L. de Leon guilty of contempt of
court for not complying with the orders of January 31, 1975 and May 29, 1975, requiring her to
produce and deliver to the court an the papers and items removed from the safety deposit box. Her
former counsel was also found guilty of contempt, sentenced to pay a fine of P00.00 and suspended
from appearing in the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano M. Lazatin, and Sp. Proc. No.
2341-P, Margarita de Asis), on her testimony that she, Nora L. de Leon, acted upon his advice.

Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of Margarita
de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of adoption in his,
favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over private respondents' objections, that he had
recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by them until their death;
formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was compelled to change his surname to "Sta.
Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife; that
at first, he and his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita, but a few
months later, they transferred to the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased
spouses, where they continuously resided up to the present. Photographs were also intended to be
presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of
petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy; document
showing that petitioners real name is "Renato Lazatin." 1

Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents' objections to the admission of
petitioner's evidence, but on November 14, 1975, when petitioner could not present evidence on the
issue of his alleged legal adoption, respondent court discontinued the hearing and gave the parties
time to file memoranda on the question of the admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced
by petitioner.

On March 4, 1976, respondent court barred the introduction of petitioner's evidence because: têñ.£îhqwâ£

All the evidence submitted by Renato and Ramon Sta. Clara through their counsel do
not prove or have no tendency to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding
where the adoption of the parties above named were taken up by any court. Neither
do the evidence tend to establish the presence of any record of a proceeding in court
where the adoption of the above named persons was held. The evidence, however,
tends to prove a status of a recognized natural child which, however, is not the legal
basis for which Renato and Ramon seek to intervene in this proceedings. In view
thereof, and taking into consideration the evidence heretofore presented by the
 petitioners, any further introduction of similar evidence, documentary or oral, would
not prove or tend to prove the fact of their adoption but rather of a recognized natural
child.

Petitioner then filed on March 16, 1976, in both cases, a motion to declare as established the fact of
adoption in view of respondent Nora L. de Leon's refusal to comply with the orders of respondent
court to deposit the items she had removed from the safety deposit box of Margarita de Asis. As
authority therefor, petitioner invokes the sanction of Rule 29, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, since
according to him, the order of the court for the production of the items in the safety deposit box can
be considered as an order for production and inspection of documents under Rule 27.

Private respondents opposed the motion, and on March 26, 1976, respondent court denied
petitioner's motion. On April 26, 1976, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with respondent court
the items she had removed from the safety deposit box. An inventory was conducted by respondent
court, with notice to the parties, and the items surrendered consisted only of pieces of jewelry and
stock certificates.

On June 3,1976, respondent court, ruling on petitioners motion for definite resolution on his previous
n declare as established the fact of adoption, issued the f order: têñ.£îhqw â£

As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is his Petition to establish his status as an
adopted child, The Court has ruled that he has failed to establish such status. The
any motion for reconsideration unless based on some documentary proof.

Hence, the petition at bar.

We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and jurisprudence.

1. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem 2 which creates between two persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 3 Only an adoption made through
the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid
in this jurisdiction. 4 It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. 5 To establish the
relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an
absolute nullity. 6 The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the
person claiming its existence. The destruction by fire of a public building in which the adoption
papers would have been filed if existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the
destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be presumed. On the contrary, the absence
of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence. 7 Where, under
the provisions of the statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court
constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established. 8

2. Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to any proof of judicial adoption.
We can not pluck from his chain of evidence any link to the real existence of a court decree of
adoption in his favor. Petitioner's proofs do not show or tend to show that at one time or another a
specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late
spouses an order approving his adoption as a child of the latter. No judicial records of such adoption
or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented. Petitioner merely proceeds from a
nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and 1932. By what
particular court was the adoption decreed or by whom was the petition heard, petitioner does not
even manifest, much less show. There are no witnesses cited to that adoption proceeding or to the
adoption decree. Apparently on the assumption that the adoption was commenced in Manila,
petitioner's counsel secured a certification from the Court of first Instance of Manila which, however,
negatively reported "(T)hat among the salvaged records now available in this Office, there has not
been found, after a diligent search, any record regarding the adoption of Mr. Renato Lazatin alias
Renato Sta. Clara allegedly filed sometime in the years 1928 to 1931 by the spouses Dr. Mariano M.
Lazatin and Margarita de Asis Lazatin." The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila "(T)hat
our pre-war records relative to decisions of the Court of First Instance were either destroyed or
burned during the Liberation of the City of Manila," does not furnish any legal basis for a
presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner. This is because there was no proof that petitioner was
really adopted in Manila or that an adoption petition was filed in the Court of first Instance of Manila
by the deceased spouses, where, after hearing, a judgment of approval was rendered by said court.
Moreover, if there was really such adoption, petitioner could have conveniently secured a copy of the
newpaper publication of the adoption as required under Section 4, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court
(formerly Section 4, Rule 100) or a certification of the publishing house to that effect. Petitioner's
failure on this point is anotherer strong indication of the non-existence of the one who gave the
written consent of the non-existence of the adoption paper. We also observed to the adoption
(Section 3, Rule 99, Rules of Court), whether the parents or orphanage, does not appear on this
point is not so difficult and such proof must be presented if only to prove the real existence of the
adoption. And of course, if the war, the clear right and duty of petitioner was to duly reconstitute the
records as provided by law.

3. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be
substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been
treated as a child to establish such adoption. 9 Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made
in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the
fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he
attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption.10 Nor does the fact that the
deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an
adopted child, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily
establish adoption of the child. 11 Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and
declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of
adoption. The thrust of petitioner's evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted
illegitimate child, not an adopted child which status of an admitted illegitimate child was — the very
basis of his petitioner for intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as above
stated. (Supra, at page 3 hereof)

We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted
on the principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth. 12 Pedigree
testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because greater
evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. 13 But, in proving an
adoption, there is a better proof available and it should be produced. The whereabouts of the child's
family and circulation of the jurisdiction in which they resided and investigation in those courts where
adoption are usually granted would surely produce an adoption order, if indeed there was an
order. 14 Besides, since the point in favor of receiving hearsay evidence upon matters of family
history or pedigree is its reliability, it has been set forth as a condition upon which such evidence is
received that it emanate from a source within the family. Pursuant to this view, before a declaration
of a deceased person can be admitted to prove pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship of the
declarant, by either of blood or affinity to the family in question, or a branch thereof, must ordinarily
be established by competent evidence. 15 Section 33 of Rule 130 states: "The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other
than such actor declaration ..."

4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were
actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent
must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows:
Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in the
discretion of the court. 16 The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an
alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the
particular case.17 As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the former existence of the
adoption paper and its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it
has first beer. established that such adoption paper really existed and was lost. This is
indispensable. 18 Petitioner's supposed adoption was only testified to by him and is allegedly to be
testified to a brother of the deceased Mariano M. Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the
deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption was really made, the records thereof
should have existed and the same presented at the hearing or subsequent thereto or a reasonable
explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be the case, adduced. 19

Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child does not justify
the conclusion that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses nor does it
constitute admissible proof of adoption.

We cannot entertain the plea of petitioner that the sanction of Rule 29 should be applied to consider
as established the fact of his adoption due to the refusal of respondent Nora L. de Leon to produce
the document of adoption, because first, the fact or real existence of petitioner's adoption had not
been established; second, there is no proof that such document of adoption is in the possession of
respondent Nora L. de Leon; third, the motu proprio order of the court for Nora de Leon to produce
the items retrieved from the safety deposit box cannot be treated as a mode of discovery of
production and inspection of documents under Rule 27; and fourth, the items deposited in the safety
deposit box have already been surrendered by respondent Nora L. de Leon on April 26; 1976 and no
document of adoption in favor of petitioner was listed as found in the safety deposit box.

5. As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly
intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P as an adopted
child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite
that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has
a claim against the estate like a creditor. 20 A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor.
by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done in strict accord with the statue. Until this is
done, no rights are acquired by the child and neither the supposed adopting parent or adopted child
could be bound thereby. 21 The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming
such relationship. He must prove compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the jurisdiction
where the adoption occurred. 22 A fortiori if no hereditary interest in the estate can be gained by a
claimant who failed to submit proof thereof, whether the will is probated or not, intervention should
be denied as it would merely result in unnecessary complication. 23 To succeed, a child must be
ligitimate, legitimated, adopted, acknowledged illegitimate natural child or natural child by legal
fiction or recognized spurious child. 24

In the face of the verified pleadings of record (constituting judicial admissions) which show that
petitioner sought to intervene on November 22, 1974 in the estate proceedings of his alleged
adoptive father Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P) as an admitted illegitimate (not
natural) child, 25 while his intervention on August 20, 1975 in the estate of Margarita de Asis, widow
of the deceased Dr. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P) was as her adopted child on the basis of the
affidavit of a brother of the deceased Dr. Lazatin, Benjamin Lazatin, executed August 19, 1975
(which affidavit modified a first affidavit executed on May 31, 1975, which failed to estate by
"oversight" petitioner, but stated that affiant knew petitioner to be "an illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin
who later "legally adopted (him) as a son before the Court of First Instance of Manila sometime
between the years 1928 and 1921") and prescinding from the question of whether a natural or
spurious child may be legally adopted by the putative father, we hold that no grave abuse of
discretion nor error of law as committed by respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders of
March 4, 1976, March 26, 1976 and June 3, 1976 denying petitioner's petition "to declare as
established in this proceeding the fact of adoption" and denying "any motion for reconsideration
unless based on some documentary proof." The Court finds no basis to grant the affirmative relief
sought in this proceeding by petitioner for a rendition of judgment "declaring as established the fact
of your petitioner's adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in their
estates as such in accordance with the applicable law on succession as to his inheritance."

Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 16, 1976 a temporary restraining order;
which as amended on July 21, 1976, restrained respondent judge "from proceeding with the hearing
scheduled on June 17, 1976 at 8:30 a.m., requiring the submission of evidence to establish heirship
in Special Proceedings No. 2326-P entitled 'Intestate Estate of the Late Mariano M. Lazatin' and
Special Proceedings No. 2341-P, entitled 'Testate Estate of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de
Lazatin,' and from proceeding with the probate of the alleged holographic will of the deceased Doñ;a
Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin scheduled on June 29, 1976, August 10 and 12, 1976 and on any
other dates." With the Court's determination of the issues as herein set forth, there is no longer any
need for restraining the proceedings below and the said restraining order shall be immediately lifted.

On January 24, 1977, the Court upon petitioner's motion resolved to conditionally allow respondent
judge "to take the deposition of petitioner's witnesses to perpetuate their testimonies pursuant to
Rule 134, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, subject to the Court's ruling in due course on the
admissibility of such testimonies." The Court thereby permitted in effect the advance testimonies of
petitioner's witnesses, principally among them Rafael Lazatin and Esteban L. Lazatin, both brothers
of the deceased Dr. Mariano L. Lazatin and as stated in petitioner's motion of January 11, 1977: têñ.£îhqw â£

Substantially, the testimony of the above-named witnesses will be on the fact that
they had been informed by the deceased spouses, Mariano and Margarita Lazatin
that your petitioner was their [Mariano's and Margarita's] judicially adopted son and
to elicit further from them the fact that your petitioner enjoys the reputation of being
their judicially adopted son in the Lazatin family.

The Court's resolution allowing the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses was but in
application of the Court's long standing admonition to trial courts is reaffirmed in Lamagan vs. De la
Cruz, 26, "to be liberal in accepting proferred evidence since even if they were to refuse to accept the
evidence, the affected party will nevertheless be allowed to spread the excluded evidence on the
record, for review on appeal." The Court therein once again stressed the established rule that "it is
beyond question that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of
evidence during the course of the trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of
separate appeal or review on certiorari, but are to be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal
properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case," 27 and that a
party's recourse when proferred evidence is rejected by the trial court is to make a offer stating on
the record what a party or witness would have testified to were his testimony not excluded, as well
as to attach to the record any rejected exhibits.

At the continuation of the proceedings below for declaration of heirship and for probate of the alleged
holographic the deceased Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin, pet who has failed to establish his
status as an alleged ;m child of Margarita de Asis (unless, as reserved to him by the court below, he
can show some documentary proof),and whose intervention in the estate of the deceased Dr.
Mariano Lazatin is as an admitted illegitimate child, win have to decide whether he will pursue his
first theory of having the of such admitted illegitimate child of said deceased. Whatever be his theory
and his course of action and whether or not he may be duly snowed to intervene in the proceedings
below as such alleged admitted illegitimate child, his recourse in the event of an adverse ruling
against him is to make a formal offer of proof and of his excluded evidence, oral and documentary,
and seek a reversal on an appeal in due course.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed and the questioned orders denying petitioner's petition
below "to declare as established in this proceeding the fact of [his] adoption" are hereby affirmed.
The temporary restraining order issued on June 16, 1976 and amended on July 21, 1976 is ordered
lifted, effective immediately. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)

FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ children
without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposed this stating that Art. 338 of the
Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by his father refers only to a child who
has not been acknowledged as natural child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may be
adopted by his natural father or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the
natural child for it will go against Art. 335.

ISSUE:
W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or mother.

HELD:
The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If the intention were to
allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338 would be of no useful purpose. The rights
of an acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimated child. Contending that
this is unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights. The trend
when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. The law does not
prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a natural child is
equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the words of the law,
they should be allowed adoption.

JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA vs. LEONCIO V.

AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila,
respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-24006, November 25, 1967

FACTS:
Prior to October 21, 1958, proceedings for adoption were started before the
CFI- Madrid, Spain by Maria Garnier Garreau, then 84 years of age, adopting
Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez Marcaida, 55 years, a citizen of the
Philippines. Both were residents of Madrid, Spain. The court granted the
application for adoption and gave the necessary judicial authority, once the
judgment becomes final, to execute the corresponding adoption document.
On November 29, 1958, the notarial document of adoption — which embodies
the court order of adoption — whereunder Maria Garnier Garreau formally
adopted petitioner, was executed before Notary Public Braulio Velasco
Carrasquedo of Madrid. In that document, Maria Gernier Garreau instituted
petitioner, amongst other conditions as here unica y universal heredera de
todos sus bienes, derechos y acciones, presentes y futuros.
In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion (deed of adoption) was,
on December 10, 1953, authenticated by Emilio S. Martinez, Philippine Vice
Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who issued the corresponding certificate
of authentication.
The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila. The Registrar refused to register it on the ground that under
Philippine law, adoption can only be had through judicial proceeding. And
since the notarial document of adoption is not a judicial proceeding, it is not
entitled to registration. Petitioner went to CFI- Manila on mandamus. The
lower court dismissed said petition and decided that what is registrable is only
adoption obtained through a judgment rendered by a Philippine court.
Solicitor General argues that petitioner’s case does not come within the
purview of Article 409 of the Civil Code, which states that:
“In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other judicial orders
mentioned in the preceding article it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court
which issued the decree to ascertain whether the same has been registered,
and if this has not been done, to send a copy of said decree to the civil registry
of the city or municipality where the court is functioning”, and Section 11 of
Act 3753, which reads:
“Duties of clerks of court to register certain decisions. — In cases of
legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, naturalization, and change of given
or family name, or both, upon the decree of the court becoming final, it shall
be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain
whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to have
said decree recorded in the office of the civil registrar of the municipality
where the court is functioning.:”

ISSUE:
WON the order of adoption issued by the CFI- Madrid can be registered in the
Philippines.

RULING:
Yes. The cited provisions refer to adoptions effected in the Philippines.Article
409 of the Civil Code and Section 10 of the Registry Law speak of adoption
which shall be registered in the municipality or city where the court issuing
the adoption decree is functioning.
We perceive that Article 409 and Section 10 aforesaid were incorporated into
the statute books merely to give effect to our law which required judicial
proceedings for adoption. Limitation of registration of adoptions to those
granted by Philippine courts is a misconception which a broader view allows
us now to correct. For, if registration is to be narrowed down to local
adoptions, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out such
limitation. We cannot carve out a prohibition where the law does not so state.
Excessive rigidity serves no purpose. And, by Articles 407 and 408 of our Civil
Code, the disputed document of adoption is registrable.
No suggestion there is in the record that prejudice to State and adoptee, or any
other person for that matter, would ensue from the adoption here involved.
The validity thereof is not under attack. At any rate, whatever may be the
effect of adoption, the rights of the State and adoptee and other persons
interested are fully safeguarded by Article 15 of our Civil Code which, in terms
explicit, provides that: “Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines even though living abroad.”
Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign adoption.
This rests on the principle that the status of adoption, created by the law of a
State having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in another
state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when created by its
own law. It is quite obvious then that the status of adoption, once created
under the proper foreign law, will be recognized in this country, except where
public policy or the interests of its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and
demand the substitution of the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in Article 15 of our
Civil Code just quoted, is that the exercise of incidents to foreign adoption
“remains subject to local law.”
We hold that an adoption created under the law of a foreign country is entitled
to registration in the corresponding civil register of the Philippines. It is to be
understood, however, that the effects of such adoption shall be governed by
the laws of this country.
The lower court’s decision is hereby reversed; and the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila is hereby directed to register the deed of adoption (Escritura de
Adopcion) by Maria Garnier Garreau in favor of petitioner Josefina de Dios
Ramirez Marcaida.

G.R. No. L-11467 March 15, 1916

NG HIAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellant.

Williams, Ferrier and SyCip for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 26th of
November, 1915, by the presentation of a petition for the writ of habeas corpus.

From an examination of the record the following facts appear to be proved beyond question:

First. That on or about the 30th of October, 1915 on the steamship Tian there arrived at the port of
Manila, a woman, Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco, together with two children, Ng Tio a female of the age of
9 years, and Ng Hian a boy of 16 years of age (the petitioner herein);

Second. That Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco had been born in the Philippine Islands, of a Filipina mother
and a Chinese father;
Third. That Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco was married to a Chinaman by the name of (Filipino name) Juan
Uy Tue, (Chinese name) Ng Chion Tue:

Fourth. That Juan Uy Tue (Ng Chion Tue), before his marriage with Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco, had
been married to a Chinese woman with whom he had some children, the petitioner herein and also
one called Ng Guan. It appears that Ng Guan was residing in the Philippine Islands at the time of the
presentation of the present petition;

Fifth. That the Chinese wife of Juan Uy Tue died while the petitioner herein, Ng Hian, was a very
small child;

Sixth. That the said Juan Uy Tue, after the death of his Chinese wife, was legally married to the said
Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco;

Seventh. That the said little girl, Ng Tio, of 9 years of age was the daughter of the brother of the said
Juan Uy Tue, born of a Chinese father and mother; that the father of the little girl had given her to
the said Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco;

Eight. That Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco, being the stepmother of the said Ng Hian, adopted him and was
bringing him to the Philippine Islands to study.

After the close of the investigation before the board of special inquiry, during which examination the
foregoing facts were presented, the said board refused the right of each of said children to enter the
Philippine Islands.

Later, on the 17th of November, 1915, a rehearing was granted for the purpose of examining other
witnesses upon the question of the right of said two children, Ng Tio and Ng Hian, to enter the
Philippine Islands. At the close of the second hearing the board of special inquiry admitted Ng Tio,
but denied the right of Ng Hian to enter the Philippine Islands. From that decision an appeal was
taken to the Collector of Customs and by him affirmed on the 23d of November, 1915. The petition
for the writ of habeas corpus in the present case was presented on the 26th of November, 1915.

The petition and answer and the record made in the department of customs were presented to the
Court of First Instance. The court, after an examination of the record, reached the conclusion that
the petition (Ng Hian) was entitled to enter the Philippine Islands. From that decision the Collector of
Customs appealed to this court. The question which the Attorney-General presents is whether or not
the minor children of a deceased resident Chinese merchant have a right to enter the territory of the
Philippine Islands. That question has been answered by this court in numerous decisions in the
negative. (Lee Jua vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 24; Tan Lin Jo vs. Collector of Customs,
32 Phil. Rep., 78; Cang Kai Guan vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 102; Yat Tian Un (Sun) vs.
Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 487; De Eng Hoa vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep.,
490; Ex parte Chan Fooi, 217 Fed. Rep., 308.)

It is true that the petitioner, Ng Hian, had never been in the Philippine Islands before. It is also true
that the said Marcosa S. Dy Jingco was his stepmother. She swore positively that she had adopted
him. That fact is not denied of record. Until the fact is denied we must accept it. There is nothing in
the record which shows or tends to show that she had not adopted him in good faith. The question
whether or not Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco could bring Ng Hian into the territory of the Philippine Islands
as her adopted son has been discussed by the Federal Courts of the United States. In the case
of Ex parte Fong Yim (134 Fed. Rep., 938), the court held that:

A Chinese merchant domiciled in the United States has the right to bring into this country
with his wife minor children legally adopted by him in China, where it is shown that the
adoption was bona fide, and that the children have lived as members of his family and have
been supported by him for several years.

The court further said:

Of course, the question whether the adoption is a genuine one is a question of fact, open to
investigation . . . . The evidence shows that the practice of adopting children in China is very
common, that it takes place substantially without legal formalities, but that the rights and
obligations of children adopted and recognized as such are similar to those of natural
children. Under these circumstances I can see no difference between the legal status of
 adopted children and of natural children. The Supreme Court (of the United States) having
decided that a Chinese merchant domiciled in this country has the right to bring into it his
natural children, I think that the same decision is authority for the proposition that he has the
right to introduce his adopted children.

Upon the theory, therefore, that Ng Hian had been adopted by his stepmother, and upon the theory
that she has a right to enter territory of the United States, without objection, we are of the opinion
and so hold that Ng Hian has a right to enter the territory of the Philippine Islands as her adopted
son. Therefore the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

HERBERT CANG VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 11:30 PM

G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998

FACTS:

Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's extramarital affairs, which the trial
court approved the petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole
custody of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.

The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert contest the adoption,
but the petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the
FC requires the written consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the parent
who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children.
Herbert elevated the case to the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground
that Herbert has abandoned them.

RULING:

Yes.

Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the
adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly
intemperate or has not abandoned the child.

Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the decree of adoption to be
valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."

In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent
which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means
"neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their
children."

In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his
natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court find pieces of documentary
evidence that he maintained regular communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and
send them packages catered to their whims.

Republic vs Claude A. Miller and Jumrus E.

Miller
G.R. No. 125932. April 21, 1999

Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC,
Angeles City a verified petition to adopt Michael Magno Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision
of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed
affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of
the petition on the basis of its evaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting
the petition for adoption.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by
aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child when the petition for adoption was filed
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.

Held:
Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the
time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent
enactment of a new law disqualifying him.

The enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents
who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the
petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose
existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. Vested
rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption
from new obligations created after the right has vested.

As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in
governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes
of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once
it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although
denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law
prevailing before the Family Code.

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and
give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.

Santos, et al. vs. Aranzanso, et al., No. L-23828, February 28, 1966_digested
Posted by Pius Morados on March 27, 2012

(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Consent, Abandonment and Collateral Attack)

Facts: A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old, was filed by Simplicio Santos
and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila. It was alleged that both parents of the minors have long been unheard from
and could not be found in spite of diligent efforts to locate them; that since the war said minors have been
abandoned; and that for years since their infancy, said children have been continuously been in petitioners’ care and
custody. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. After due
publication and hearing, the adoption court granted the petition for the adoption.
Subsequently – eight years later – Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos filed a petition for the settlement of
the intestate estate of the former, stating among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina
Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate.

Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition for appointment
of administrator, asserting among others that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos is void ab initio for want of
the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them.

Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the deceased and mother of Paulina opposed also the
petition of Simplicio and adopted the pleadings filed by Aranzanso.

The Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to make a collateral attack against the adoption decree
on the ground of failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption
void ab initio.

Issue: WON a decree of adoption could be assailed collaterally in a settlement proceeding.

Held: No. Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was abandoned, consent by the guardian
ad litem suffices.
Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports “any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means neglect or refusal
to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children.”

Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to
be established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon
its order. Hence, the CA erred in reviewing under a collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the
parents of the adopted children had abandoned them.

ELLIS V. REPUBLIC (1963)

[ G. R. No. L-16922, April 30, 1963 ]
IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE.
MARVIN G. ELLIS AND GLORIA C. ELLIS, PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.
FACTS:
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Francisco, California, is 28 years of age. On
September 8, 1949, he married Gloria C. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens
of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan Maternity
Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary
Villa&mdashan institution for unwed mothers and their babies—stating that she (the mother)
could not take care of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's) family.

Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the
hearing of the petition on. January 14, I960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in
the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States
Air Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga, where both lived at that time. They had been in the
Philippines before, or, to be exact, in 1953.

ISSUE:
Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt
Baby Rose.
RULING:
No.
Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that:
"The following cannot adopt:
*******

"(4) Non-resident aliens;"

*******
This legal provision is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we may
sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners herein, the
law leaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms, which unqualifiedly deny to petitioners
the power to adopt anybody in the Philippines.

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may
entertain, unless it has jurisdiction, not only over tho subject matter of the case and over the
parties, but, also, over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status
of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have
jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the
status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.
Inasmuch s petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines,—and, hence, non-resident
aliens—we cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over their status, under either the nationality
theory or the domiciliary theory. ln any event, whether the above-quoted provision of said Art.
335 is predicated upon lack of jurisdiction over the, res, or merely affects the cause of action, we
have no authority to grant the relief prayed for by petitioners it.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, in her capacity as Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 62,
Angeles City and SPOUSES SAMUEL ROBERT DYE, JR. and ROSALINA D.
DYE, respondents.

G.R. No. 95551. March 20, 1997

Facts:

The spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13
and 12 years old, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the
United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in
Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American.

Issue:

Whether or not the spouses Dye may legally adopt Maricel and Alvin Due

Held:
No. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under
Article 184 of the Family Code. The law here does not provide for an alien who is
married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt.

Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint adoption by
husband and wife under Article 185 of the Family Code.

Republic vs. Hernandez, GR No. 117209, February 9, 1996_digested

Posted by Pius Morados on March 27, 2012

(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Change of Name)

Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the
prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson
y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the
joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these
petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in
substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct
sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the
adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus
granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a
substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be
instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name
predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of
suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no
prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but
related causes of action in a single petition.

Issue: WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a
petition for adoption.
Held: No.
Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to
use the surname of the adopters;

The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of
the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and
necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact,
even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was
originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a
license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely
upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an
adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this
case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change
in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is
indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its
role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR BERTHA ANN RIVERA.

ROBERT H. CATHEY and HELEN O. CATHEY, petitioners and appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.

L. F. Lansangan for petitioners and appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor and appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

On January 26, 1963, the spouses Robert H. Cathey and Helen O. Cathey petitioned the Court of
Juvenile and Domestic Relations for the adoption of the minor Bertha Ann Rivera. Among other
things their petition alleged that petitioners are both of legal age and residents of Manila; that Robert
Cathey is an American citizen, residing in the Philippines since 1945 and Helen Cathey is a Filipino
citizen residing here since birth; that they had the care and custody of the child Bertha Ann Rivera
three days after her birth on January 19, 1963; that Bertha is the natural child of Violeta O. Rivera
who has given her written consent to the adoption; that a copy of said consent is attached as Annex
A to the petition; that the child's natural father is unknown; that petitioners have no children and are
qualified to adopt.

Subsequently, upon orders of the Court, the petition was amended to further allege that petitioners
are permanent residents living at 1331 Carola St., Sampaloc, Manila, and to attach thereto the
child's birth certificate.

After petitioners had presented their evidence, without opposition from the Solicitor General, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, on August 5, 1963, rendered a decision that denied the
petition, for two reasons: (1) It was not convinced that genuine efforts were exerted to present
Violeta O. Rivera before the Court, for inspite of her refusal to testify, other remedies could have
been availed of under the Rules of Court to obtain her testimony; (2) As an alien, Robert Cathey is
not qualified to adopt.

Petitioner appealed therefrom to Us, thereby raising questions purely of law.

Article 340 of the New Civil Code on consent to adoption provides that the written consent of the
following shall be necessary: "(1) the person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over; (2) the
parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted."

Section 3 of Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court (now Sec. 3 of Rule 99) likewise provides:

SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.—There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the
adoption signed by the child, if over fourteen years of age and not incompetent and by each
of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not
abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian or
guardian adlitem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's
home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum,
home, or society, or by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been
recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required.
From these provisions, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, the requirement as to consent has
been met, for both our substantive and procedural laws do not further require the testimony of the
consenting parent before the court aside from the requisite written consent attached to the petition.

And contrary to the court's opinion that genuine efforts were not exerted to bring the mother to testify
before it, the evidence before Us shows that petitioners, after their own efforts had failed (Tsn of May
8, 1963, pp. 14, 29), sought the help of the Chief of Police of Angeles, Pampanga to locate the
mother. Patrolman Mariano Carbungco the investigator assigned to locate the mother, finally found
her in Pauline's Cavern where she worked as a night club hostess. She refuse to reveal her
residence and to testify in court, but she re-affirmed the fact that she has given her written consent
to the adoption. Patrolman Carbungo executed an affidavit (Exhibit F) where such facts were
attested to. Subsequently, she could not be found anymore.

While it would have been ideal, to remove all possible doubts, for the mother to have presented in
court, the primary consideration — the welfare of the child — should not be prejudiced by the
absence of it in view of the circumstances showing that the petitioners did all they could and all that
reasonably could have been expected from them. Even the Solicitor General, concerned about the
child's welfare, filed a brief praying for the adoption to be granted, reasoning that the mother's act of
leaving the baby to the Catheys three days after her birth constituted abandonment which under
Sec. 3, Rule 100 (now Sec. 3, Rule 99) even dispenses with the need for consent. This, the Solicitor
General believes, coupled with the affidavit of consent (Exhibit B) reaffirmed by her to Pat.
Carbungco also, show that she too, a mother, with the interests of her child at heart, favors her
adoption.

Anent the alienage of petitioner Robert H. Cathey, not all aliens are disqualified to adopt. Article 335
of the New Civil Code provides:

ART. 335. The following cannot adopt:

xxx xxx xxx

(4) Non-resident aliens;

(5) Resident aliens with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken
diplomatic relations;

As this Court pointed out through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Uggi Therkelsen v. Republic, L-21951,
November 27, 1964: "the present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being
adopters aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who are residents but the Republic of the
Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their government. Outside of these two cases,
alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting under our laws."

Petitioner, Robert H. Cathey though an American citizen, is a resident alien entitled to remain in the
Philippines, as his Immigrant Certificate of Residence (Exhibit D) shows. He is legally married to
Helen Olalia and presently is the administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Construction office at Clark
Air Base with an annual compensation of $6,295.00 and has P25,000 worth of personal properties in
the Philippines. As petitioners spouses have no child of their own, they wish to adopt Bertha Ann
Rivera and thus make her their heir. The welfare of the child being the paramount consideration
under the law (Art. 363, New Civil Code), the child now sought to be adopted being virtually
unwanted by her own mother, who, by the way, has seven other children to feed (Tsn of May 2,
1963, p. 11), We see no reason why the adoption should not be granted. 1awphîl.nèt

Domingo vs CA
Domingo vs. CA

226 SCRA 572

FACTS:

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously
married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter
filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-
month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been
disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because
their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and
superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the
purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties
acquired during the marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.

HELD:

The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it
is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or
her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being
charged with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply
be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence,
the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime
of property relations governing them.

You are here: Home ∼ 2013 ∼ August ∼ Case Digest: Carino v. Carino

CASE DIGEST: CARINO V. CARINO

Published by paul on August 12, 2013 | Leave a response

SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first
with Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and
with Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten
year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent
for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received
a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao,
contending that the marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab initio because their
marriage was solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court ruled in
favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack
of marriage license.

Ruling:

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and
Carino was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and
the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In
the case at bar, the marriage does not fall within any of those exceptionsand a marriage
license therefore was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is certified by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the presumed validity of
the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot stand.
The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of
nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The marriages
are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. The decision of
the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Tenchavez vs Escano
TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano

CITATION: 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:

27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got
married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer
before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of
the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their
match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San
Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to
renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating
the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her
parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for
the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and
issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her
marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada
and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint
against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her
husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

HELD:

Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on
foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the
Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce
in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough
grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and
Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to
recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the
desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount
of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his
wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Van Dorn vs Romillo

Van Dorn vs. Romillo

139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was
married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2
children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with
Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s
business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein
that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator
of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada
is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before
the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to
be served.

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA

DANDAN, respondents
December 22, 1998

Facts:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
May 18, 1941. No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner
obtained a final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16,
1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning
the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina
Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of ArturoDandan and the surviving
children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the
marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972,
that the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since
it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court
of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Issues:

1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?

2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the
decedent?

Held:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner
herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their
respective hereditary shares.

Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous
marriage considered void ab inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her
not a surviving spouse.

The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera

CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The
petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC
Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982
and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though
they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale,
private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
[G.R. No. L-6897. November 29, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Claim for Attorney’s Fees. CLARO M. RECTO, claimant-Appellee, vs. ESPERANZA P.
DE HARDEN and FRED M. HARDEN, Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal taken by Esperanza P. de Harden and Fred M. Harden from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, the pertinent part of which is of the following tenor: . chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“The contingent fee to which the claimant is entitled under paragraph 3 of the contract, Exhibit JJJ or 20,
is 20% of P1,920,554.85 or the sum of P384,110.97.
“WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the recommendation of the Commissioner with the above-
stated modification, and finds that Attorney Claro M. Recto is entitled to the sum of THREE HUNDRED
EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND TEN PESOS AND NINETY-SEVEN CENTAVOS
(P384,110.97), representing 20% of Esperanza P. de Harden’s share in the conjugal properties owned by
her and her husband, Fred M. Harden, as contingent fee stipulated in paragraph 3 of the Contract of
Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ or 20, and the said Esperanza P. de Harden is hereby ordered to pay the
said amount above-stated.” It appears that sometime in July, 1941, Appellant, Mrs. Harden,
and Appellee, Claro M. Recto, executed the following: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“CONTRACT OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

“That I, ESPERANZA PEREZ DE HARDEN, of age, married to Fred M. Harden, and temporarily residing in
the Philippines, with address at 534 Sales Street, Manila, have engaged the services of Attorney Claro M.
Recto to appear and act as my counsel in the action which I will file against my husband, Fred M.
Harden, for the purpose of securing an increase in the amount of support being received by me from the
conjugal partnership of myself and said Fred M. Harden, and for the purpose likewise of protecting and
preserving my rights in the properties of the said conjugal partnership, in contemplation of the divorce
suit which I intent to file against him in the competent Court of California and of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership between us, this contract of services to be under the following conditions: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“1. That in lieu of retainer fee, which under the circumstances I am not in a position to pay, I hereby
agree to pay Attorney Claro M. Recto, such payment to be made monthly, during the pendency of the
litigation and until the termination of the same, twenty-five (25%) per cent of the total increase in
allowance or pension which may be awarded to me by the court over and above the amount of
P1,500.00 which I now receive monthly from Defendant Fred M. Harden out of the funds of the conjugal
partnership; Provided, that should the case be terminated or an amicable settlement thereof be
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arrived at by the parties before the expiration of two years from the date of the filing of the complaint, I
shall continue to pay the said twenty-five (25%) per cent up to the end of said period.
“2. That the aforesaid monthly payments shall be in addition to whatever amount may be adjudged by
the court against the Defendant Fred M. Harden or against the conjugal partnership by way of litis
expense, that is, attorney’s fees chargeable as expenses of litigation.
“3. That as full and complete satisfaction of the fees of Attorney Claro M. Recto in connection with the
case above referred to, and said case being for the purposes aforestated, that is, to secure an increase in
the amount of support I now receive as well as to protect and preserve my rights and interest in the
properties of the conjugal partnership, in contemplation of divorce and of the liquidation of said
partnership, I hereby agree to pay said Attorney Claro M. Recto twenty (20%) per cent of the value of
the share and participation which I may receive in the funds and properties of the said conjugal
partnership of myself and Defendant Fred M. Harden, as a result of the liquidation thereof either by
death, divorce, judicial separation, compromise or by any means or method by virtue of which said
partnership is or may be liquidated.
“4. All expenses in connection with the litigation are to be for my account, but the same may be
advanced by Attorney Claro M. Recto, to be reimbursed to him either from the money which I receive by
way of support or from the funds of the conjugal partnership.
“5. It is hereby understood that this contract includes the services of Attorney Claro M. Recto in
connection with the securing of the liquidation of the properties and assets of the conjugal partnership
of myself and Fred M. Harden, upon dissolution of said partnership or for any other cause mentioned in
Paragraph (3) hereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed these presents in the City _____ of Manila, Philippines this
_______ day of July, 1941.
s/ Esperanza P. de Harden
t/ ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN
ACCEPTED: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

s/ Claro M. Recto
t/ CLARO M. RECTO”
In compliance therewith, on July 12, 1941, the Appellee, as counsel for Mrs. Harden, commenced Civil
Case No. 59634 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled “Esperanza P. de Harden vs. Fred M.
Harden and Jose Salumbides.” In the complaint therein filed, it was prayed, among other things: (a) chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

that Mrs. Harden be given the exclusive administration of the business and all properties of the conjugal
partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden; (b) that, in the event of denial of this prayer, the Defendants be chan roble svirtualawlibrary

ordered to inform her “of everything pertaining to the administration of said business and properties”,
as well as to render accounts thereof and to permit her to examine the books and records pertinent
thereto; (c) that Mr. Harden be ordered to account to Mrs. Harden, and to return to this jurisdiction,
chan roble svirtualawlibrary

the sum of P449,015.44 allegedly withdrawn by him from the Philippines or sent by him to Hongkong on
April 1, 1941; (d) that Defendant Salumbides be ordered to account for all moneys, amounting to
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P285,000.00, belonging to the business and assets of said conjugal partnership and deposited by him in
a safety box, either in his name, or in that of Antonio Wilson, from January 23 to December 23, 1940; chan

(e) that the transfer, in the name of Salumbides, of certain shares of stock, allegedly belonging to the
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conjugal partnership, be rescinded and said Defendant ordered to transfer said shares of stock in the
name of Mrs. Harden or in that of Mr. and Mrs. Harden, should Mr. Harden be allowed to continue as
administrator of said partnership; ( f ) that the transfer, made by Mr. Harden and/or chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

by Defendant Salumbides, as his attorney-in-fact, of 36,000 shares of stock of the Angelo Mining
Company, to some residents of Hongkong, be rescinded and said shares returned to the assets of the
conjugal partnership and placed in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Harden; (g) that the monthly allowance chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

of Mrs. Harden be increased from P1,500 to P15,000; (h) that, pending final decision, Mr. Harden be chan roble svirtualawlibrary

ordered to increase the allowance or pension of Mrs. Harden and their daughter Sarah Elizabeth to
P10,000 a month; and (i) that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

the Defendants from disposing of the assets of the conjugal partnership in fraud of Mrs. Harden.
By an order dated July 12, 1941, the court authorized the issuance of said writ, upon the filing of the
corresponding bond. It appears that, pursuant to an agreement submitted by both parties, and with a
view to avoiding unnecessary embarrassment, restraint or inconvenience in the financial operations of
the business enterprises affected by said writ of preliminary injunction, the same was amended by an
order dated July 19, 1941, in the sense that.
“ without prejudicing in any way the rights of the parties in this case, a separate bank account be
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established in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, of Manila, and all transactions in
connection with the aforesaid businesses passed through that account by Mr. Harden or his duly
authorized representative, who at present is Mr. Salumbides, without the necessity of securing a
particular order from this Court on each occasion; that the present funds in the Philippine National chan roblesvirtualawli brary

Bank in the name of Plaza Lunch and Fred M. Harden be utilized for the purpose of starting said special
bank account in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China; that all income from the aforesaid chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

businesses be deposited in this special bank account and no checks be drawn upon the same, except to
pay the necessary overhead and running expenses including purchases of tobacco, merchandise, etc.,
required for the proper operation of said businesses; that a new set of books be opened by Mr. chan roble svirtualawlibrary

Harden or his duly authorized representative covering all business transactions passed through said
special bank account and the same be opened for inspection by the Plaintiff’s duly authorized
representative.
“The order of injunction of July 12, 1941, is modified only to the above extent, and in all other respects
is maintained.”
Subsequently, the Philippines was invaded by the Japanese and placed under military occupation. Then
came the liberation, in the course of which the records of this case were destroyed. On October 23,
1946, said records were reconstituted at the instance of Appellee herein. Thereafter, the proceedings
were resumed and, in due course, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered, on or about October
31, 1949, a decision the dispositive part of which we quote: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

“In view of the foregoing considerations, this court finds and so holds that —
“(a) Fred M. Harden abandoned his domicile of origin in New Jersey and established a domicile of
choice in Manila, Philippines, since 1901;
“(b) The matrimonial domicile of Fred M. Harden and Esperanza P. de Harden was established in
Manila, Philippines, from the date of their marriage on December 14, 1917;
“(c) Since they did not execute any antenuptial contract before their marriage, all the properties, real or
personal, acquired by either or both of them on and after December 14, 1917, up to the present, over
and above the sum of P20,000.00 representing Fred M. Harden’s capital, are hereby declared conjugal
properties;
“(d) The total amount of P1,944,794.37 representing deposits in safety deposit boxes in the name of
Jose Salumbides, the selling price of the house in Los Angeles, California, and the pre-war and post-war
remittances abroad of Fred M. Harden, from which has already been deducted the sum of P160,000.00
covering payments for deficiency Federal income taxes and attorney’s fees, both in the tax case and the
present one, is hereby declared chargeable to the share of Defendant Harden and deductible from
whatever participation he may still have in the said conjugal partnership upon the liquidation thereof,
upon his failure to return and deposit them in the name of the Plaza Lunch with the Manila branch of
the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China up to the time this decision shall become final;
“(e) A conjugal lien be annotated in the original and owner’s duplicate of Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 24393, 52436 and 54911 of the Register of Deeds of Manila and in Original Certificate of Title No.
2292 of Quezon Province, and on all the certificates of shares belonging to said conjugal partnership, as
well as in the corresponding books of the companies or corporations issuing them, whereby it will be
made to appear that any subsequent alienation or encumbrance of said properties by Fred M. Harden
alone or his representative without the consent of his wife will be deemed fraudulent and subject to
revocation or cancellation for being in fraud and prejudicial to the right of Esperanza P. de Harden;
“( f ) Within a period of fifteen (15) days after this decision shall have become final, Fred M. Harden and
Esperanza P. de Harden are hereby ordered to execute a document to be approved by this court
creating and express active trust upon the remaining cash assets and income of the conjugal partnership
in the Philippines, whereby the Philippine Trust Company, with offices in Manila, will act as trustee,
subject to the right of Fred M. Harden to receive therefrom the sum of P2,500,00 a month by way of
allowance and an equal amount for the Plaintiff as separate support and maintenance;
“(g) Within thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become final, Fred M. Harden shall inform
the Plaintiff of all the properties and businesses of the conjugal partnership, be they in the Philippines or
abroad, and render a true and complete accounting of the earnings and profits thereof;
“(h) The Plaintiff is entitled to litis expensae in the amount of P175,000.00 for services rendered by her
counsel up to the rendition of this judgment, which Fred M. Harden or the herein receiver is ordered to
pay within a period of fifteen (15) days after this decision has become final; and chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

“(i) The writ of preliminary injunction of July 12, 1941, is hereby declared permanent and the order of
receivership of November 20, 1946, is hereby maintained, but said auxiliary remedies will be
automatically lifted upon the conclusion of the annotation of the conjugal lien and the execution of the
deed of trust above mentioned. Without costs.
“IT IS SO ORDERED.”
The Defendants appealed from said decision to this Court, where the case was docketed as case No. L-
3687. While the appeal was thus pending before us, herein Appellee filed a manifestation and a motion,
both dated February 20, 1952. In said “manifestation”, Appellee stated that Mrs. Harden had instructed
him, by letter, to “discontinue all proceedings relative to” said case, “vacate all orders and judgments
rendered therein, and abandon and nullify all her claims to the conjugal partnership existing between
her and Mr. Harden”, in accordance with several instruments dated January 29, 1952, and executed
without the knowledge, advise and consent of said Appellee, as counsel for Mrs. Harden, whereby: (1) chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Mr. and Mrs. Harden had purportedly agreed to settle their differences in consideration of the sum of
$5,000 paid by Mr. Harden to Mrs. Harden, and a monthly pension of P500 to be paid by him to her; chan

(2) Mr. Harden had created a trust fund of $20,000 from which said monthly pension of $500 would
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be taken; and (3) Mr. and Mrs. Harden had mutually released and forever discharged each other from
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all actions, debts, duties, accounts, demands and claims to the conjugal partnership, in consideration of
the sum of $1. It was further asserted, in Appellee’s “manifestation”, that the purpose of the said
instruments, executed by Mr. and Mrs. Harden, was to defeat the claim of the former for attorney’s
fees, for which reason, he prayed, in his aforementioned motion, that
“a) Pending the resolution of this motion, the receiver appointed herein be authorized to continue
holding the properties above mentioned in his custody in order not to defeat the undersigned’s inchoate
lien on them;
“b) A day set aside to receive the evidence of the undersigned and those of the Plaintiff and
the Defendant Fred M. Harden, in order to determine the amount of fees due to the undersigned, by the
appointment of a referee or commissioner for the reception of such
“c) After due hearing, the undersigned be declared entitled to the sum of P400,000.00 as his fees for
services rendered in behalf of the Plaintiff in this case, under paragraph 3 of the contract, Annex ‘A’, and
to that end a charging lien therefore be established upon the properties above-mentioned;
“d) And the receiver be ordered to pay to the undersigned the full amount of the fees to which the
latter is found to be entitled.”
Counsel for the Defendants-Appellants, in turn, moved for the dismissal of the case, to
which Appellee objected. Acting upon the issues raised in such motion for dismissal and in Appellee’s
motion to establish and enforce his charging lien, as counsel for Mrs. Harden, this Court issued on July
22, 1952, a resolution the pertinent part of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“It will be seen from the above that the Defendants-Appellants pray for the complete dismissal of the
above entitled case without prejudice to the annotation of the contingent claim of Attorney Claro M.
Recto on the property under receivership, other than the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining
Company which belong to Fred M. Harden. On the other hand, Attorney Claro M. Recto agrees to the
lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, the orders of contempt and commitment, and all other
interlocutory orders which were issued in the course of this case, with the exception of the receivership,
but objects to the dismissal of the case on the ground that, since receivership is merely an auxiliary
remedy, the present case should be allowed to remain pending for the purpose of maintaining the
receivership to safeguard his right to collect the fees that may be due him.
“Attorney Claro M. Recto prays that a commissioner or referee be immediately appointed by this Court
to receive evidence in support of his allegations as to his attorney’s lien and its enforcement. Counsel for
the Defendants-Appellants does not object to this proceeding provided that the restrictions set forth by
him be observed. However, this Court does not have the proper facilities for receiving evidence in order
to determine the amount of the fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto, and it is deemed advisable
that this matter be determined by the Court of First Instance. This is specially so considering the
opposition to the claim of Attorney Claro M. Recto filed by Attorney J. W. Ferrier, Sr. in behalf of
Esperanza P. de Harden.
“In view of the foregoing, the above entitled case is hereby remanded to the court of origin in order to
determine the amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto in his motion dated February 20,
1952.
“It is understood that, after said fees had been finally determined and paid, this case will be completely
dismissed as prayed for by the Defendants-Appellants, without prejudice to considering the claim of the
receiver for compensation as stated in his urgent motion dated July 2, 1952. “Pending the determination
of the amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto, the writ of preliminary injunction, the orders
of contempt and commitment, and all interlocutory orders which were issued in the course of this case,
are hereby lifted and vacated, and with regard to the receivership, the same is hereby dissolved, only
with respect to the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Company. As to the rest of the properties, the
receivership shall be maintained.”
In compliance with said resolution, the records of this case were remanded to the lower court, which, on
September 2, 1952, designated a commissioner to receive evidence on the amount of the fees
collectible by herein Appellee and to report thereon. After due hearing, said commissioner submitted,
on February 6, 1953, a report of about one hundred (100) pages of the printed record on appeal, setting
forth, in detail, the evidence introduced by both parties, and his findings of fact, with the following
conclusion and recommendation: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Taking into consideration the value of the properties involved in this litigation, the length of time in
which claimant had handled the same for Esperanza Harden, the volume and quality of the work
performed, the complicated legal questions involved, the responsibility assumed by the claimant as
counsel, his reputation in the bar, the difficulties encountered by him while handling the same in which
he had to work hard every inch of the way because of the stiff oppositions filed by adverse counsel, the
diligence he employed not only in the preservation of the records in his possession during the days of
enemy occupation but also in the protection of the interests of Esperanza Harden, his successful
handling of said case and those cases growing out of it which reached the Supreme Court, and the extra
services he rendered in her behalf in the tax and other court cases, the undersigned Commissioner
concludes that claimant is entitled to the full amount of 20% of Esperanza Harden’s share of the
conjugal properties, as provided in paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ.
“WHEREFORE, the undersigned Commissioner respectfully recommends that Atty. Claro M. Recto be
paid the equivalent amount of 20% of Esperanza P. de Harden’s share of the conjugal properties or the
sum of P369,410.04 as his contingent fee for services rendered in her behalf.”
After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered a decision dated April 30, 1953, adopting
substantially said report of the commissioner, but increasing the contingent fee of Appellee herein from
P369,410.04, the sum recommended in the report, to P384,110.97. Hence, this appeal taken by Mr. and
Mrs. Harden.
The first question for determination therein is the validity of the above-quoted contract of services,
which the Appellants assail as void, mainly, upon the ground: (1) that Mrs. Harden cannot bind the chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

conjugal partnership without her husband’s consent; (2) that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the chan roble svirtualawlibrary

Philippines in effect prohibits contingent fees; (3) that the contract in question has for its purpose to
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

secure a decree of divorce, allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines; and (4) that the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and oppressive.
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute does not seek to bind the
conjugal partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound herself — or assumed the
personal obligation — to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% of her share in said partnership. The
contract neither gives, nor purports to give, to the Appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real, in
and to her aforesaid share. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable. Moreover, it has already been held
that contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons
(No. 13) of Professional Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is,
likewise, the rule in the United States (Legal Ethics by Henry S. Drinker, p. 176).
“ in the United States, the great weight of authority recognizes the validity of contracts for contingent
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fees, provided such contracts are not in contravention of public policy, and it is only when the attorney
has taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client that such a claim is condemned.” (See 5 Am.
Jur. 359 et seq.; Ballentine, Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 276.)
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Needless to say, there is absolutely nothing in the records before us to show that Appellee herein had, in
any manner, taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client Mrs. Harden.
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract between them, or by the
intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote the
procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal
partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States. What is
more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the United States, their status and
the dissolution thereof are governed — pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in
force in the Philippines at the time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines — by the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In short, the
contract of services, between Mrs. Harden and herein Appellee, is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity must
come with clean hands (Bastida, et al., vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil., 195; 30 C.J. S. 475), chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
and Appellants have not done so, for the circumstances surrounding the case show, to our satisfaction,
that their aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between
husband and wife, were made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of
herein Appellee, under his above-quoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden. Indeed, having secured
a judgment in her favor, acknowledging her rights to the assets of the conjugal partnership, which
turned out to be worth almost P4,000,000 in addition to litis expensae in the sum of P175,000, it is
inconceivable that Mrs. Harden would have waived such rights, as well as the benefits of all orders and
judgments in her favor, in consideration of the paltry sum of $5,000 allegedly paid to her by Mr. Harden
and the additional sum of $20,000 to be paid by him in installments, at the rate of $500 a month. In fact,
no explanation has been given for this most unusual avowed settlement between Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
One cannot even consider the possibility of a reconciliation between the spouses, the same being
inconsistent with the monetary consideration for said alleged settlement. What is more, the records
show that the relations between said spouses — which were bad indeed, not only in July, 1941, when
Mrs. Harden engaged the services of the Appellee, but, even, before, for Mr. and Mrs. Harden were
separated since 1938 — had worsened considerably thereafter, as evidence by an action for divorce
filed by Mr. Harden in New Jersey, in July 1948, upon the ground of repeated acts of infidelity allegedly
committed by Mrs. Harden in 1940 and 1941.
Again, it appears that Appellee had rendered, under the contract in question, the following services, for
the benefit of Mrs. Harden:chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

1. He succeeded in defeating Defendants’ motion for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary
injunction, issued by the Court on July 12, 1941, and amended on July 19, 1941.
2. On November 12, 1946, Appellee moved for the appointment of a receiver, upon the ground that,
despite said writ of preliminary injunction, the Defendants had been disposing of the properties of the
conjugal partnership for the purpose of defrauding Mrs. Harden. After due hearing, the court, by an
order dated November 20, 1946, directed the appointment of Abelardo Perez as receiver of said
properties, upon the filing of a P10,000 bond. Defendants asked, on February 13, 1947, that the
receivership be suspended, or else, that they be allowed to file a bond for the discharge of the
receivership. Appellee replied objecting thereto, unless the Defendantsposted a P4,000,000 bond.
Subsequently or on March 5, 1947, the Defendants sought a reconsideration of the order of November
20, 1946, and the discharge of the receiver. By an order dated March 21, 1947, the Court authorized
said discharged upon the filing, by the Defendants, of a bond in the sum of P500,000, provided that Mr.
Harden “should bring back all the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Co., in his name to the
Philippines for deposit with the Clerk of Court, or with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China,
at Manila cralaw

“3. On motion of the Appellee dated March 4, 1947, the Court, by an order dated April 5, 1947, directed
Mr. Harden to remit to Mrs. Harden the sum of $2,500, to be charged against her litis expensae. Upon
similar motion, filed by Appellee on or about April 26, 1947, the Court ordered Mr. Harden, on May 13,
1947, to furnish Mrs. Harden the sum of $5,000, under the same conditions.
4. On June 21, 1947, the Defendants instituted Civil Case No. G. R. No. L-1499 of this Court, entitled
“Fred M. Harden and Jose Salumbides vs. Emilio Peña, Abelardo Perez and Esperanza P. Harden” for the
purpose of annulling and setting aside, by writ of certiorari, the aforementioned orders of the lower
court dated July 12, 1941, November 20, 1946, and April 5 and May 13, 1947, and to restrain, in the
meantime, the enforcement thereof. After appropriate proceedings, in the course of
which Appellee appeared as counsel for Mrs. Harden, and like counsel for the Petitionerstherein, filed
several lengthy, detailed pleadings and memoranda, decision was rendered on November 21, 1950,
denying the writ of certiorari prayed for.
5. On or about September 9, 1947, Appellee filed a motion alleging that despite the writ of preliminary
injunction above mentioned, the Defendants had, fraudulently and without judicial consent, remitted
abroad several sums of money aggregating P1,000,608.66, and praying that Mr. Harden be ordered to
return this sum to the Philippines, within a stated period, said sum to be deposited with the account of
the Plaza Lunch at the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. Mr. Harden
objected to said motion. Appellee filed a rejoinder, to which Mr. Harden replied. Appellee filed a
rejoinder to the rejoinder. On October 7, 1947, the Court granted Appellee’s motion. Mr. Harden sought
a reconsideration, which was opposed by the Appellee on October 27, 1947, and denied by an order
dated November 13, 1947. Mr. Harden moved, on November 18, 1947, for the suspension of this order,
which was immediately objected to by the Appellee and then denied by the Court.
6. Inasmuch as said order of November 13, 1947 had not been complied with, Appellee filed on
November 27, 1947, a motion praying that Mr. Harden be declared in contempt of court and punished
accordingly. Meanwhile, or on November 24, 1947, Mr. Harden had instituted case G. R. No. L-1816 of
this Court against Hon. Emilio Peña, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Mrs. Harden.
In the petition therein filed, Mr. Harden applied for a writ of certiorari annulling said orders of Judge
Peña of October 7 and November 13, 1947, and prayed that, pending disposition of the case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining the Respondentstherein from enforcing said orders,
particularly through contempt proceedings. Hence, the lower court deferred action on the
aforementioned motion of November 27, 1947. After due hearing, this Court, in a resolution dated
February 12, 1948, refused to issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. Subsequently, or on
November 21, 1950, decision was rendered denying the petition for a writ of certiorari.
7. Soon after the issuance of our resolution in said case G. R. No. 1816, dated February 12, 1948, or to
be exact on March 27, 1948, the lower court issued an order directing Mr. Harden to comply, within five
(5) days from notice, with the order of October 7, 1947. On April 6, 1948, Appellee filed with the lower
court the corresponding formal charges against Mr. Harden for contempt of court. After due hearing,
Mr. Harden was, by an order of April 28, 1948, found guilty as charged and ordered confined “until he
complies with the aforementioned orders” of October 7, 1947 and March 27, 1948. On motion of Mr.
Harden, said order of April 28, 1948 was suspended until May 4, 1948, on which date he was arrested
and placed in confinement at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinglupa, Rizal. On July 10, 1948, he filed
with this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons, (G. R. No. L-2349,
entitled “Fred M. Harden vs. The Director of Prisons”), which, in due course was denied in a decision
promulgated on October 22, 1948.
8. During the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese, the Appellee made representations
with the Japanese Government to prevent the commandeering of a business establishment belonging to
Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Moreover, he succeeded in persuading the Japanese to refrain from interning
Mrs. Harden and her daughter and to allow her to withdraw, from the former’s deposit in a local bank,
from P200 to P250 a month, for their subsistence. He, likewise, lent her money to meet her needs and
spent the sum of P55,000 in the preservation of the records and papers pertaining to the business and
other properties of the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
9. Appellee assisted, also, the receiver, as his counsel and, in such capacity, took all steps essential for
the proper discharge of the duties of the former. Among other things, Appellee sought and obtained
judicial authority for some important acts of administration of, and disposition by, the receiver. He
(Appellee) secured judicial intervention for the protection and preservation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership, including orders for the delivery of certificates of stock, the return thereof and/or its
deposit with the clerk of court. He, likewise, represented the receiver in seeking war damage payments.
10. In civil case No. 6222 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled “Francisco Dalupan vs. Fred
M. Harden” for the recovery of P113,837.17, it was decided, through Appellee’s intervention, that the
conjugal assets would bear the payment of P22,767.43 only, the balance to be chargeable exclusively
against Mr. Harden’s share of the conjugal partnership.
11. Appellee instituted civil case No. 6940 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled “Abelardo
Perez vs. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and Fred M. Harden”, for the recovery of
P1,000,608.66 and the return of stock certificates of the Balatoc Mining Co., which had been sent
abroad.
12. He (Appellee) represented Mrs. Harden in connection with a million-peso federal tax case against
Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
13. Appellee successfully blocked Mr. Harden’s attempts to withdraw: (1) $53,000 and forward the
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

same to the Collector of Internal Revenue of Los Angeles, California; (2) $50,000.00, allegedly to
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

defray expenses in resisting a new tax assessment against him in the United States; and (3) P65,000 chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

for his expenses.

Then too, the conjugal partnership had varried and extensive business interests and its assets were
worth almost P4,000,000. The pleadings, motions, oppositions, rejoinders, and memoranda filed, and
the evidence introduced, in the aforementioned cases — in which Appellee was pitted against one of the
most experienced and able members of the Philippine Bar — were numerous, extensive and exhaustive.
For instance, the record on appeal in one of those cases, namely, G. R. No. L-3687, consisted of 966
pages.
In short, considering the character of the services rendered by the Appellee, the nature and importance
of the issues in said litigations, the amount of labor, time (1941 to 1952) and trouble involved therein,
the skill displayed in connection with said cases, the value of the property affected by the controversy,
the professional character and standing of the Appellee, the risks assumed and the results obtained, we
are of the opinion, and so hold, that the contract of services in question is neither harsh nor oppressive
or inequitable.
Under their second assignment of error, Appellants maintain that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“The lower court erred in failing to find as a fact borne out by the evidence that the legal services of
Attorney Claro M. Recto to Mrs. Esperanza P. de Harden, payment, for which is sought by him in this
case, have already been paid by his immediate execution pending appeal of the decision in Civil Case No.
CFI-R-59634 (SC-G.R. No. L- 3687), wherein he collected the sum of P176,000.00 for all such legal
services.”
Said decision, however, states clearly that the aforementioned sum of P175,000 represents litis
expensae, and the contract between the Appellee and Mrs. Harden explicitly declares that said litis
expensae shall be “in addition to” Appellee’s share of 25% of the increase in the allowance of Mrs.
Harden and his attorney’s fees of 20% of her share in the conjugal partnership. The second assignment
of error is, therefore, devoid of merit.
Appellants, further contend, that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

3. The lower court erred in holding that the inchoate share of the wife, Esperanza P. de Harden, in the
undissolved and unliquidated conjugal partnership properties of the Harden spouses, is capable of
certain valuation before such dissolution and liquidation, and summarily assessing the value of Mrs.
Harden’s share in such conjugal properties without proper evidence.
4. “The lower court erred in awarding 20% of such inchoate share to Attorney Claro M. Recto from Mrs.
Harden’s interests in the Harden conjugal properties, summarily assessing such 20% inchoate share as of
a value of P384,110.97, and ordering the payment of said sum to Attorney Recto in pursuance of the
provisions of paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services.”
Appellants’ arguments in support thereof may be summarized as follows: The contract of services in chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

question provides that Appellee’s contingent fees shall be 20% of the share of Mrs. Harden in the
conjugal partnership. Pursuant to law, the share of Mrs. Harden shall be determined upon the
liquidation of said partnership, which has not taken place, as yet. What is more, it cannot be effected
until the dissolution of the marriage relation between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Inasmuch as this relation
subsists, it follows that the amount of attorney’s fees due to Appellee herein should not have been
determined in the decision appealed from.
This line of argument overlooks the fact that said contract of services was made, principally, in
contemplation of a suit for divorce that, according to Mrs. Harden, she intended to file before a
competent court in California, “and of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership between” her and Mr.
Harden. Had she filed said action for divorce and secured a decree of divorce, said conjugal partnership
would have been dissolved and then liquidated, and the share of Mrs. Harden therein would have been
fixed. However, this cannot take place, either now, or in the foreseeable future, owing to the
aforementioned agreements between Mr. and Mrs. Harden, which were made for the evident purpose
of defeating Appellee’s claim for attorney’s fees. In other words, the occurrence, within the time
contemplated by the parties — bearing in mind the nature of, and the circumstances under which they
entered into, said contract of services — of the event upon which the amount of said fees depended,
was rendered impossible by Mrs. Harden. Hence, whether such event be regarded as a condition or as a
period, she may not insist upon its occurrence, prior to the enforcement of the rights of the
herein Appellee, for “the condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its
fulfillment” (Art. 1186, Civil Code) and “the debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period”
when he “violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period.” (Art.
1198, Civil Code.)
It should be noted, also, that the compensation agreed upon for Appellee’s services, consists of three (3)
parts, namely: (a) 25% of the increase in the allowance of Mrs. Harden; (b) litis expensae; and (c)
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

20% of her share in the conjugal partnership. The first part was dealt with in the first paragraph of their
contract of services. The second and third parts were the object of the second and third paragraphs,
respectively. The first paragraph limited the rights of Appelleethereunder to two (2) years, in the event
of termination of the case or amicable settlement thereof within two (2) years from the filing of the
complaint. No such limitation appears in the second and third paragraphs of said contract. Hence, the
same were intended by the parties to be fully operative under any and all conditions.
It may not be amiss to add that the value of the properties involved has been assessed, not summarily,
but after due notice and full dress hearing, in the course of which both parties introduced testimonial
and documentary evidence. Appellants presented Exhibits 1 to 58, whereas those of the Appellee were
so numerous that, having begun with Exhibit A, his last piece of documentary evidence was marked
Exhibit 26 Y’s. The transcript of the hearing, which lasted ten (10) days, covers over 220 pages.
The other assignments of error made by Appellants herein are mere corollaries of those already
disposed of, and, hence, no further discussion thereof is necessary.
In conclusion, it appears that the assets of the conjugal partnership between Mr. and Mrs. Harden are
reasonably valued at P3,841,109.70. One-half (1/2) thereof, representing the share of Mrs. Harden, is
therefore, worth P1,920,554.85. Twenty percentum (20%) of this sum is P384,110.97, which is the
contingent fee due to the Appellee, apart from the litis expensae already paid to him. Inasmuch as
the Appellee has collected, also, the sum of P80,000.00, on account of said contingent fees, there results
in his favor a balance of P304,110.97.
Subject to this qualification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, therefore, with costs against
the Appellants. SO ORDERED.
Paula Llorente vs Court of Appeals

November 5, 2010

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345 SCRA 592 – Civil Law – Application of Laws – Foreign Laws – Nationality Principle – Effects
of Foreign Divorce

Succession – Last Will and Testament of an Alien

In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula
Llorente got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American citizen.

In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered that Paula was already
living illicitly with Ceferino Llorente (brother of Lorenzo). Ceferino and Paula even had a son.
Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary support. Eventually,
Lorenzo and Paula agreed in writing Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula if the latter agrees to
waive all monetary support from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the United States.

In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula was represented by an
American counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce became final.

Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno. They had three
children.

In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate to Alicia and their
children (nothing for Paula). In 1983, he went to court for the will’s probate and to have Alicia as the
administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo
died. Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate.

The trial court ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce he obtained
abroad is void. The trial court ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a Filipino hence divorce is not applicable
to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

ISSUES: Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be recognized.

HELD: Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American citizen in 1943.
Hence, when he obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen. Article 15 of
the Civil Code provides:

Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws relating to family rights, duties, or status are
no longer applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must be respected. The
rule is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to determine the effects
of the divorce as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.

Anent the issue on Lorenzo’s last will and testament, it must be respected. He is an alien and is not
covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was submitted to our courts for probate,
then the case was remanded to the lower court where the foreign law must be alleged in order to
prove the validity of the will.

G.R. No. L-3693 July 29, 1950

MARGARET QUERUBIN, recurrente-apelante,

vs.
SILVESTRE QUERUBIN, recurrido-apelado.

Manuel A. Argel en representacion del recurrente y apelante.

Maximino V. Bello en representacion del recurrido y apelado.

PABLO, J.:

Silvestre Querubin es de Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, de padres filipinos. En 1926 se marcho a los Estados
Unidos con el objeto de estudiar pero con el proposito de volver despues a su pais natal. Obtuvo el
titulo de "Master of Arts and Sciences" en la "University of Southern California," institucion
domiciliada en los Angeles, California, en donde el recurrido empezo a vivir desde 1934.

En 20 de octubre de 1943, Silvestre Querubin contrajo matrimonio con la recurrente, Margaret

Querubin, en Albuquerque, New Mexico. Como fruto de este matrimonio nacio Querubina Querubin,
quien, al tiempo de la vista de la causa en el Juzgado de primera instancia de Ilocos Sur, tenia
cuatro años de edad poco mas o menos.

La recurrente entablo en 1948 una demanda de divorcio contra el recurrido, fundada en "crueldad
mental." En 7 de febrero de 1948 el divorcio fue concedido al marido en virtud de una
contrademanda presentada por el y fundada en la infidelidad de su esposa. En 5 de abril de 1949, y
a peticion del demandado y contrademandante, (recurrido enesta actuacion de habeas corpus) el
Juzgado superior de Los Angeles dicto una orden interlocutoria disponiendo lo siguiente:

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the interlocutory judgment of divorce
hereinbefore entered on February 27, 1948, in Book 1891, page 319, be and the same is
hereby modified in the following particulars in connection with the custody of the minor child
of the parties only:

(1) The care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties, Querubina Querubin, is
hereby awarded to defendant and cross-complainants;

(2) Said child is to be maintained in a neutral home, subject to the right of reasonable
visitation on the part of both parties to this action;

(3) Each party shall have the right to take said child away from said neutral home but plaintiff
and cross-defendant is restrained from taking said child to her place of residence;

(4) Each party is restrained from molesting the other, or in any way interfering with the
other's right of reasonable visitation of said child;

(5) Each party is restrained from removing the child from the State of California without first
securing the permission of the court; said parties are further restrained from keeping the
child out of the County of Los Angeles for more than one day without first securing the
consent of the court.

El recurrido salio de San Francisco en 7 de noviembre de 1949, arribando a Manila en 25 del mismo
mes. En 27 de susodicho mes llego a Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, donde vive actualmente, llevandose
consigo a la niña Querubina, a quien trajo a Filipinas porque, en su calidad de padre, queria evitar
que llegase a conocimiento de ella la conducta indecorosa de su propia madre. El recurrido queria
que su hija fuera educada en un ambiente de elevada moralidad.

A peticion de la recurrente Margaret, el Juzgado superior de los Angeles, California, en 30 de

noviembre de 1949 modifico su orden de 5 de abril de 1949, disponiendo lo siguiente:
 Under interlocutory decree of March 7, 1949, the child, a girl now 3 1/2 years old, was
granted to deft husband, but the child was to be kept in a neutral home; both parties were
given reasonable visitation and both were restrained from removing the child out of the state.
Deft has taken the child with him to the Philippine Islands. At time of trial custody was
apparently denied pft because she was then living with another man. She is now married to
this man and they have a well equipped home. Ptf appears to be a devoted mother. She has
one child, the issue of her present marriage, and is also caring for a child that was
abandoned by certain friends of hers. Ptf's husband is regularly and permanently employed.
Witnesses testified in behalf of the ptf in reference to her motherly qualities and the condition
of her home. She visited the child in question sufficiently when the child was in the neutral
home and brought her toys and other articles. Service of the order to show cause was made
on deft's attorneys of record.

The interlocutory decree is modified so as to provide that custody of the child shall be
awarded to ptf and deft shall have the right of reasonable visitation. Deft shall pay ptf for the
support of the child $30 each month on the 1st day thereof, commencing Jan. 1950.

En el dia de la vista de esta causa de habeas corpus en Ilocos Sur, el recurrido declaro que nunca
intento cambiar su ciudadania; que cuando vino al pais tenia unos P2,000 de ahorro; que tres
semanas despues de su arribo recibio oferta para enseñar con sueldo P250 mensual en el colegio
establecido por el Dr. Sobrepeña en Villasis, Pangasinan; que nunca se le ha privado de patria
potestad por sentencia judicial, ni declarado ausente de Filipinas, ni sujeto a interdiccion civil. Segun
el juzgado a quo, el recurrido es de irreprochable conducta.

En 10 de febrero de 1950 la recurrente Margaret Querubin, por medio de su abogado, presento en

el Juzgado de primera instancia de Ilocos Sur una solicitud de habeas corpus reclamando la
custodia de su hija Querubina, alegando como fundamento el decreto interlocutorio del juzgado de
California que concedio a ella dicha custodia. Despues de la vista correspondiente, el Juzgado a
quo, en 28 de febrero de 1950 denego la solicitud. La recurrente acude en apelacion ante este
Tribunal.

La recurrente sostiene que bajo el articulo 48 de la Regla 39, el decreto Exhibit A-1 del Juzgado de
los Angeles, California, debe cumplirse en Filipinas. Su parte dispositiva dice textualmente:

The interlocutory decree is modified so as to the provide that custody of the child shall be
awarded to ptf and deft shall have the right to reasonable visitation. Deft shall pay ptf for the
support of the child $30 each month on the 1st day thereof, commencing Jan. 1950.

Un decreto interlocutorio sobre la custodia de un menor no es una decision final. Por su naturaleza
no es firme. Esta sujeto a cambios como cambian las circunstancias. En el primer decreto se dio al
padre la custodia de la menor. A peticion del padre, se dicto el decreto de 5 de abril prohibiendo a la
madre que llavase a la menos a su casa porque estaba otra vez en relaciones adulterinas con otro
hombre. Cuando ya no estaba el recurrido en Los Angeles, porque ya habian venido a Filipinas, se
enmendo la ultima orden y se dispuso que la custodia estuviese encomendada a la recurrente,
pagando a ella el recurrido $30 al mes para la manutencion de la menor. La pension no es fija y se
aumenta o disminuye como aumentan o disminuyen las necesidades del pensionista o como exijan
las condiciones economicasdel que la da.

Porque el decreto interlocutorio, Exhibit A-1, no constituye decision final, no cabe pedir su
cumplimiento en Filipinas. En los mismos Estados Unidos no puede pedirse el cumplimiento de una
orden interlocutoria en el juzgado de otro estado.

The rule is of common knowledge that the definitive judgment of a court of another state
between the same parties on the same cause of action, on the merits of the case is
conclusive, but it must be a definitive judgment on the merits only. Where the judgment is
merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by the court which rendered it did not
settle and adjudge finally the rights of the parties." (National Park Bank vs.Old Colony Trust
Co., 186 N.Y.S., 717.)

As already stated the Minnesota decree, to the extent that it is final and not subject to
modification, is entitled to the protection of the full faith and credit clause of the federal
Constitution and must be enforced in this state. If, however, a part of the Minnesota decree
in not final, but is subject to modification by the court which rendered it, then neither the
United States Constitution nor the principle of comity compels the courts of this state to
 enforce that part of the decree; for no court other than the one granting the original decree
could undertake to administer relief without bringing about a conflict of authority.
(Levine vs. Levine, 187 Pac., 609.)

A judgment rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction in one state, is conclusive on

the merits in the courts of every other state, when made the basis of an action and the merits
cannot be reinvestigated. Our own Supreme Court so holds. Cook vs. Thornhill, 13 Tex. 293,
65 Am. Dec. 63. But before such a judgment rendered in one state is entitled to acceptance,
in the courts of another state, as conclusive on the merits, it must be a final judgment and not
merely an interlocutory decree. Freeman on Judgment, Sec. 575; Baugh vs.Baugh, 4 Bibb (7
Ky.) 556; Brinkley vs. Brinkley, 50 N.Y. 184, 10 Am. Rep. 460; Griggs, vs. Becker, 87 Wis.
313, 58 N.W. 396. (Walker vs. Garland et al., 235 S.W., 1078.)

En general, un decreto de divorcio encomendando la custodia de un hijo del matrimonio a uno de

los conyuges se respeta por los juzgados de otros estados "at the time and under the circumstances
of its rendition but that such a decree has no controlling effects in another state as to facts or
conditions arising subsequently to the date of the decree; and the courts of the latter state may, in
proper proceedings, award the custody otherwise upon proof of matters subsequent to the decree
which justify the change in the interest of the child." (20 A.L.R., 815.)

En el caso presente las circunstancias han cambiado. Querubina ya no esta en los Angeles sino en
Caoayan, Ilocos Sur. Esta bajo el cuidado de su padre. Hay una distancia enorme desde Los
Angeles y el presente domicilio de la menor y el costo del pasaje hasta aquella ciudad seria muy
elevado, y aun es posible que este fuera del alcance de la recurrente. No hay pruebas de que ella
esta en condiciones de pagar los gastos de viaje de la menor y del que la acompañe. Ella no es un
paquete de cigarrillos que se puede enviar por correo a Los Angeles.

No consta que las circunstancias que se daban en noviembre de 1949 en Los Angeles, prevalecian
en el mismo estado hasta el momento en que se vio la causa en el Juzgado de primera instancia de
Ilocos Sur. Tampoco hay pruebas de que la recurrente dispone de suficientes fondos para costear el
viaje de la niña Querubina desde Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, hasta Los Angeles, California, y para
responder de su alimentacion, cuidado y educacion, y constando en autos que el padre, mas que
nadie, esta interesado en el cuidado y educacion de su hija, y que tiene ahorros de mas de P2,000
depositados en un banco, creemos que el Juzgado a quo no erro al denegar la solicitud.

El Juzgado no podia, sin prueba satisfactoria, disponer sin remordimiento de conciencia la entrega
de la niña al abogado de la recurrente: es su obligacion velar por la seguridad y bienestar de ella.
No se trata solo de resolver el derecho preferente del padre y de la madre en la custodia. La vital y
trascendental cuestion del porvenir de la niña es superior a toda consideracion. El Estado vela por
sus ciudadanos. El articulo 171 del Codigo Civil dispone que "Los Tribunales podran privar a los
padres de la patria potestad, o suspender el ejercicio de esta, si trataren a sus hijos con dureza
excesiva, o si les dieren ordenes, consejos o ejemplos corrutores." En Cortes contra Castillo y otra
(41 Jur. Fil., 495), este Tribunal declaro que no erro el Juzgado de primera instancia al nombrar a la
abuela, como tutora de dos menores, en vez de su madre que fue condenada por adulterio.

El articulo 154 del Codigo Civil dispone que "El padre, y en su defecto la madre, tienen potestad
sobre sus hijos legitimos no emancipados." Con todo, si se hace indebido ejercicio de esta facultad,
los tribunales, como ya hemos dicho, pueden privarie de ella y encomendar el cuidadano del menor
a otras instituciones, como dispone el articulo 6 de la Regla 100, que es reproduccion del articulo
771 de la Ley No. 190. En el asunto de Lozano contra Martinez y De Vega (36 Jur. Fil., 1040), en
que el primero, en un recurso de habeas corpus, reclamaba contra su esposa la custodia de su hijo
menor de 10 años, este Tribunal, en apelacion, declaro que el juzgado a quo no abuso de la
discrecion conferida a el por el articulo 771 del Codigo de procedimiento civil al denegar la solicitud.
Esta interpretacion del articulo en cuanto al debido ejercicio de la discrecion de un Juzgado de
primera instancia ha sido reafirmada en el asunto de Pelayo contra Lavin (40 Jur. Fil., 529).

En la solicitud presentada, no hay siquiera alegacion de que el juzgado a quo haya abusado de su
discrecion. Este Tribunal no debe revocar su actuacion.

En la vista de la causa en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Ilocos Sur, el recurrido declaro que
habia traido su hija a Filipinas porque queria evitar que ella tuviera conocimiento de la conducta
impropia y de la infidelidad cometida por la madre, impidiendo que la viese convivir con el hombre
que habia ofendido a su padre. El recurrido dijo que queria que su hija se criase en un ambiente de
elevada moral, y que no se sancionara indirectamente la infidelidad de la esposa. Bajo la Ley de
Divorcio No. 2710, el conyuge culpable no tiene derecho a la custodia de los hijos menores. La
legislacion vigente, las buenas costumbres y los interesesdel orden publico aconsejan que la niña
debe estar fuera del cuidado de una madre que ha violado el juramento de fidelidad a su marido.
Creemos que este Tribunal no debe hacer cumplir un decreto dictado por un tribunal extranjero, que
contraviene nuestras leyes y los sanos principios de moralidad que informan nuestra estructura
social sobre relaciones familiares.

En el asunto de Manuela Barretto Gonzales contra Augusto Gonzales (58 Jur. Fil., 72), se pidio por
la demandante que el divorcio obtenido por el demandado en Reno, Nevada, en 28 de noviembre
de 1927, fuera confirmado y ratificado por el Juzgado de primera instancia de Manila. Este juzgado
dicto sentencia a tenor de la peticion. Teniendo en cuenta el articulo 9 del Codigo civil que dispone
que "Las leyes relativas a los derechos y deberes de familia, o al estado, condicion y capacidad
legal de las personas, obligan a los espanoles (filipinos) aunque residan en pais extranjero" y el
articulo 11 del mismo codigo que dice en parte qye ". . . las leyes prohibitivas concernientes a las
personas, sus actos o sus bienes, y las que tienen por objeto el orden publico y las buenas
costumbres, no quedaran sin efecto por leyes o sentencias dictadas, ni por disposiciones o
convenciones acordades en pais extranjero," este Tribunal, en apelacion, declaro: "Los litigantes,
mediante convenio mutuo, no pueden obligar a los tribunales a que aprueben sus propios actos, ni
que permitan que las relaciones personales de los ciudadanos de estas Islas queden afectadas por
decretos de paises extranjeros en una forma que nuestro Gobierno cree que es contraria al orden
publico y a la recta moral," y revoco la decision del juzgado inferior.

Las sentencias de tribunales extranjeros no pueden properse en vigor en Filipinas si son contrarias
a la leyes, costumbres y orden publico. Si dichas decisiones, por la simple teoria de reciprocidad,
cortesia judicial y urbanidad internacional son base suficiente para que nuestros tribunales decidan
a tenor de las mismas, entonces nuestros juzgados estarian en la pobre tesitura de tener que dictar
sentencias contrarias a nuestras leyes, costumbres y orden publico. Esto es absurdo.

En Ingenohl contra Olsen & Co. (47 Jur. Fil., 199), se discutio el alcanse de la cortesia internacional.
El articulo 311 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil que es hoy el articulo 48, Regla 39, fue la base de
la accion presentada por Ingenohl. Pidio en su demanda que el Juzgado de primera instancia de
Manila dictase sentencia de acuerdo con la dictada por el Tribunal Supremo de Hongkong. Despues
de la vista correspondiente, el juzgado dicto sentencia a favor del demandante con intereses legales
y costas. En apelacion, se alego que el juzgado inferior erro al no declarar que la decision y
sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de Hongkong se dicto y registro como resultado de un error
manifiesto de hecho y de derecho. Este Tribunal declaro que "Es principio bien sentado que, a falta
de un tratado o ley, y en virtud de la cortesia y del derecho internacional, una sentencia dictada por
un tribunal de jurisdiccion competente de un pais extranjero, en el que las partes han comparecido y
discutido un asunto en el fondo, sera reconocido y puesta en vigor en cualquier otro pais
extranjero." Pero teniendo en cuenta el articulo 311 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil que dispone
que "la sentencia puede ser rechazada mediante prueba de falta de competencia, o de haber sido
dictada sin la previa notificacion a la parte, o que hubo connivencia, fraude o error manifiesto de
derecho o de hecho," concluyo: "En virtud de esa Ley cuando una persona trata de hacer cumplir
una sentencia extranjera, el demandado tiene derecho a ejercitar cualquier defensa de esas, y si se
llegara a demostrar que existe propiamente alguna de ellas, destruira los efectos de la sentencia."
Revoco la decision del juzgado inferior y declaro y fallo que "la sentencia dictada por el Tribunal de
Hongkong, contra la demandada, constituyo un error manifesto de hecho y de derecho, y, por tal
razon, no debe exigirse su cumplimiento en las Islas Filipinas."

Si se concede la solicitud, la menor estaria bajo el cuidadode su madre que fued declarada
judicialmente culpable de infidelidad conyugal; viviria bajo un techo juntamente con el hombre que
deshonro a su madre y ofendio a su padre; jugaria y creceria con el fruto del amor adulterino de su
madre; llegaria a la pubertad con la idea de que una mujer que fue infiel a su marido tiene derecho a
custodiar a su hija. En semejante medio ambiente no puede criarse a una niña de una manera
adecuada: si llegara a saber durante su adolescencia que su padre ha sido traicionado por su
madre con el hombre con quien vive, esa niña viviria bajo una impresion de inferioridad moral de
incalculables consecuencias, y por ello nunca seria feliz; y si, bajo la influencia de su madre, llegara
a creer que la infidelidad de una esposa es solo un incidente tan pasajero como cambiar de tocado,
la niña iria por el camino de la perdicion. Y la educacion moral que puede darle su padrasto
dificilmente puede ser mejor.

Si se deniega la solicitud, la niña viviria con su padre con el beneficio de un cuidado paternal
exclusivo, y no con la dividida atencion de una madre que tiene que atender a su esposo, a sus dos
hijas y a una tercera niña, la protegida. Para el bienestar de la menor Querubina, que es lo que mas
importa en el caso presente, su custodia por el padre debe considerarse preferente.

En los mismos Estados Unidos, el punto cardinal que tienen en cuenta los juzgados, no es la
reclamacion de las partes o la fuerza del decreto interlocutorio, sino el bienestar del menor.

A consideration of all the facts and circumstances leads to the conclusion that comity does
not require the courts of this state, regardless of the well-being of the child, to lend their aid
to the enforcement of the Iowa decree by returning Winifred to the custody of her
grandmother. A child is not a chattel to which title and the right of possession may be
secured by the decree of any court. If the decree had been rendered by a domestic court of
competent jurisdiction, it would not have conclusively established the right to the custody of
the child. In a contest between rival claimants, this court would have been free,
notwithstanding the decree, to award the custody solely with an eye to the child's welfare.
(State ex rel. Aldridge vs. Aldridge, 204 N.W. 324.)

On habeas corpus by the mother to obtain possession from the father of two children aged
four and six years, whose custody she alleged had been awarded her in divorce proceedings
in another state, it appeared that the mother was without property, and had no means of
support save her personal earnings of $15 per month, was in poor health, and lived with her
mother, in immoral surroundings, and that the father was an industrious and sober man,
earnings $100 per month. Held, that the welfare of the children was the only thing to be
considered, and a judgment awarding their custody to the mother should be reversed.
(Kentzler vs. Kentzler, 28 Pac., 370.)

La recurrente, como ultimo recurso, invoca la comity of nations. La reciprocidad, la cortesia entre
naciones no es absoluta. Rige cuando hay tratado y hay igualdad de legislacion. Se adopta la
doctrina de reciprocidad cuando el tribunal extranjero tiene jurisdiccion para conocer de la causa,
las partes han comparecido y discutido el asunto en el fondo. Algunas veces se concede como
privilegio pero no como estricto derecho. La cortesia pedida no ha sido reconocida por este Tribunal
cuando declaro que los derechos y deberes de familia, estado, condicion y capacidad legal de las
personas se rigen por las leyes de Filipinas y no por las de America
(Gonzales contra Gonzales, supra) y no dio validez a la decision del Tribunal Supremo de
Hongkong porque era erronea en sus conclusiones de hecho y de derecho (Ingenohl contra Olsen y
Co., supra).

La reciprocidad entre los estados de la Union Americana no es absoluta. No es regla

inquebrantable. Los varios casos citados mas arriba lo demuestran. He ahi otro caso:

On the question of comity, this court said in the habeas corpus case of In re Stockman, 71
Mich. 180, 38 N.W. 876:

"Comity cannot be considered in a case like this, when the future welfare of the child is the
vital question in the case. The good of the child is superior to all other considerations. It is
the polar star to guide to the conclusion in all cases of infants, whether the question is raised
upon a writ of habeas corpus or in a court of chancery." (Ex parte Leu, 215 N.W., 384.)

Case Digest: Roehr v. Rodriguez

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA
GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003

QUISUMBING, J.:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14,
1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to
Wolfgang.

Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been
promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.

Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between her and
Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of
support and custody of their children.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for reconsideration.

Ruling: Yes.

A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as in the case at
bar.

The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment even after the same
has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable,
as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired
after the judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest
of justice or when supervening events warrant it.

2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards
child custody and support.

Ruling: Yes.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody
to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court
(now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the
German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmen’s participation in the proceedings in
the German court, the records remain unclear.

Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the children.

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76, Dec.08, 1999

FACTS: Lucita and Marcio met in Philippine Christian University in Dasmarinas when lucita was Marcio’s
teacher for two consecutive semesters. Lucita was 5 years older than Marcio. They later on became
sweethearts and eventually got married. They also had a child. Lucita supported the family as her
husband continued studying, supported by his parents. The first few years of their marriage went okay.
But this eventually changed. Marcio had an extra-marital relation with another student who was also
married. When Lucita discovered this, he asked Lucio to end it. He promised to but did not fulfill it and left
their conjugal home and child. After some time, he returned to Lucita and she accepted him. However, his
attitude worsened when he got employed to Reynold Philippines, Inc. He engaged in extreme
promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea
and infected petitioner. Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent
hit their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their
children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed
before the RTC a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity. RTC and CA denied the petition. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: W/N Marcio is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations

HELD: The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must
exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment,
gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
Certainly, petitioner-appellant’s declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husband’s
character was on the “borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky,” could not
constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Tuason v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 116607, 10 April 1996

FACTS:

On June 1972, respondent Victoria Lopez Tuazon married petitioner Emilio Tuazon. Due to the
series of physical abuse against the respondent, the petitioner use of prohibited drugs, cohabitating
with three women, leaving the conjugal home and giving minimal child support, abuse of conjugal
property use and incurring of bank debts without the respondent consent, respondent filed a petition
for annulment of marriage in 1989 on the ground of psychological incapacity and prayed for powers
of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.

Petitioner filed his Opposition in April 1990 and was scheduled to present his evidence. Counsel for
petitioner moved for a postponement, however, petitioner failed to appear. The trial court rendered
judgment declaring the nullity of marriage and awarding the custody of common children to
respondent. No appeal was taken.

Thereafter, respondent filed Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties which was opposed by petitioner. Petitioner filed a
Petitioner from Relief of Judgment on the held decision. The trial court denied the petition which was
affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in the absence of petitioner in the hearing, the court should have ordered a
prosecuting officer to intervene.

RULING:

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases
where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available
to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial
court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive
the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.

Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code which
provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should
intervene for the state because the law looks with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of
annulment of marriages by default. He contends that when he failed to appear at the scheduled
hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and
inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance.

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment.

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family
Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner
filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent.
He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining
the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was
characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under
these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure
lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the
trial court.