Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
DECISION
PERALTA * J : p
For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Review led by petitioner Marietta N.
Barrido questioning the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated November 16, 2006,
and its Resolution 2 dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235. The CA a rmed the
Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 53, dated July 21,
2004, in Civil Case No. 03-12123, which ordered the partition of the subject property.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner
Marietta N. Barrido, they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City,
consisting of a house and lot, covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361.
On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the
property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29,
2003, Nonato led a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of a rmative defense, that the subject property had already
been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the
dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being
an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying Article
129 of the Family Code. It ruled in this wise: EISCaD
(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount
advanced by them in payment of the debts and obligation of TCT No. T-140361
with Philippine National Bank;
(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph
Leo Nonato pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED. 5
Upon appeal, the CA a rmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006. It held that
since the property's assessed value was only P8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC's
jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its decision still correctly ordered the
equitable partition of the property. Barrido led a Motion for Reconsideration, which was,
however, denied for lack of merit.
Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review. She assigned
the following errors in the CA Decision:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
MTCC HAD JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE.
II.
III.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to
the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no
illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under
a void marriage or without the bene t of marriage. 12 It is clear, therefore, that for Article
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2)
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the
bene t of marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all these elements are present. 13 The
term "capacitated" in the rst paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage. 14 Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have
existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other as
husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 15
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household. 16 Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family
and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by
one who has no salary or income or work or industry. 17
In the analogous case of Valdez, 18 it was likewise averred that the trial court failed
to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a
situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity
on the part of either or both parties in the contract of marriage. The Court held that the
court a quo did not commit a reversible error in utilizing Article 147 of the Family Code and
in ruling that the former spouses own the family home and all their common property in
equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
that they owned in common, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code should
aptly prevail. 19 The rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid
and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages. 20
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during
the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Barrido, however, claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested
on their children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still
being registered in the names of the former spouses, said document of sale does not bear
a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a
document remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public document, 21
making it inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated. 22 Unfortunately, Barrido
failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of
Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in
common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on
co-ownership. TSHIDa
** Designated Acting Member, in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special
Order No. 1816 dated October 3, 2014.
1. Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, with Associate Justices Agustin S. Dizon
and Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla; concurring; rollo, pp. 21-32.
2. Id. at 39-40.
5. Id. at 24.
6. Id. at 14.
7. Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 258-A Phil. 336, 340 (1989).
11. Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure
shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal
partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and
obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset
thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the
acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of
which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal
assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for
the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration
of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to
fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the
partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse
with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the
age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of said children.
12. Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City , 328 Phil. 1289, 1296 (1996).
13. Mercado-Fehr v. Fehr, 460 Phil. 445, 457 (2003).
14. Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, supra note 12.
15. Mercado-Fehr v. Fehr, supra note 13.
16. Id.
17. Agapay v. Palang, 342 Phil. 302, 311 (1997).
18. Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, supra note 12.
19. Id.
20. Id.