Professional Documents
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Handbook
Handbook
Seth Abrutyn
Editor
Handbook of
Contemporary
Sociological Theory
Handbooks of Sociology and Social
Research
Series Editor
John DeLamater, University of Wisconsin, MADISON, Wisconsin, USA
Each of these Handbooks survey the field in a critical manner, evaluating
theoretical models in light of the best available empirical evidence.
Distinctively sociological approaches are highlighted by means of explicit
comparison to perspectives characterizing related disciplines such as psy-
chology, psychiatry, and anthropology. These seminal works seek to record
where the field has been, to identify its current location, and to plot its course
for the future. If you are interested in submitting a proposal for this series,
please contact the series editor, John DeLamater: [email protected].
Handbook of
Contemporary
Sociological Theory
Editor
Seth Abrutyn
Department of Sociology
The University of Memphis
Memphis, Tennessee, USA
ISSN 1389-6903
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research
ISBN 978-3-319-32248-3 ISBN 978-3-319-32250-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6
vii
viii Foreword
much like methods textbooks or manual for statistical modeling. But, in fact,
theorizing is a creative activity of having insights into the nature and opera-
tion of some fundamental social process; formalizing the theory is “mop up
work” of trying to find a way to state the relationships among the forces in
play in a parsimonious way. Formalization, itself, is not theorizing; having
insights in the forces driving the social universe is theorizing. So, while there
is a little formal theorizing in this handbook, it is filled with insights into how
the social universe operates. Others can build upon these ideas, and once they
are well developed, it becomes possible to express them more formally—but,
again, that is not what is most important. Ideas over formats and formaliza-
tion are what will drive sociological theorizing; and this handbook is filled
with such ideas.
Finally, I have a dream—most likely never to be realized but a dream
nonetheless—that Handbooks of Sociological Theory will someday in the
near future never be necessary because our discipline’s introductory text-
books would, like those in physics, outline most of the basic principles. Gone
would be discussion of our classical figures, cartoons, boxes full of color and
not much else, diagrams for the sake of graphics, and all of the fluff that is
now in a sociology textbook. Physics textbooks have adopted much of this
look, but it is not fluff in the manner of sociology textbooks. It is a sincere
effort to communicate basic principles, and this is what sociology books of
the future should look like. Biology textbooks also have that “four color
look” (and expense) but if one reads them closely, this “look” focuses on
explaining on generic biological processes. In my dream, there would be no
theory handbooks; rather, handbooks in sociology would be about the rapidly
accumulating knowledge in subfields where empirical research, theoretically
informed, could be assembled for a quick review. And such handbooks might
be needed every year because a field where data is collected to assess theories
advance rapidly. In some ways, the very need for a Handbook of Sociological
Theory like this one in 2016 tells us that we still have ways to go in separating
theory as a goal of science as opposed to social theory that debunks science;
that tells us once again the stories of St. Marx, St. Weber, St. Durkheim, and
other canonized figures in whose shadows we still stand; that drags in old
philosophical debates; and that expresses relativistic, constructivist, and
sophistic views about sociology.
The chapters in this book give me some hope that we can avoid a fate
dominated by critics. And so, let us dedicate this Handbook of Sociological
Theory and the others that will be necessary in the near future to obviating, in
the future, the need for such Handbooks of Sociological Theory. We should
look and work for a day when there would be such wide consensus about
explanations of how the social universe operates that our introductory text-
books would tell much of the basic theoretical story. Perhaps sociology would
have fewer interested students, but they would be students with theoretical
knowledge that would be useful in making the social world a better place for
all.
I would like to first extend a warm thank you to each of the contributors to
this volume. You all made the challenge of managing an editorship such as
this much easier, and the handbook is a testament to your expertise and the
care you put into your respective chapters. In addition, I would like to thank
Jonathan Turner, my grad school advisor, good friend, and confidant, for
opening doors and giving constant encouragement, advice, and support.
Additionally, Jon, Steve Brint, Sandy Maryanski, Chris Chase-Dunn, Jan
Stets, and Peter Burke were all instrumental in shaping my eclectic taste in
theory, as well as shaping the theorist I have become, and thus have much to
do with the vision of this handbook. I also have to thank my collaborator and
close colleague, Anna S. Mueller, for tolerating (and encouraging) my forays
into the theoretical ether; my graduate theory seminar students who have
allowed me to use the class as a laboratory for my ideas; the sociology depart-
ment at Memphis for being supportive and excellent colleagues; and, finally,
my graduate assistant, Taylor M. Binnix, who was instrumental in helping
format and proof these chapters. Finally, my wife, Danielle Morad
Abrutyn, and son Asa Jonas, deserve a huge thank you: they have done noth-
ing but, inspire me, and encourage and support all of my academic endeavors,
including this handbook.
xi
Contents
1 Introduction ................................................................................... 1
Seth Abrutyn
xiii
xiv Contents
xvii
xviii Contributors
discipline’s paradoxical reverence and simultane- action, as well as debate and conflict more fruit-
ous distaste for theorists, the crystallized ful. To be sure, I celebrate eclectic and diverse
discipline-wide pedagogy, and the residuals from theoretical traditions; I was drawn to graduate
past practices and beliefs have erected artificial work by a master’s level theory course in which
barriers that deter people from embracing theory we had freedom over our coursework. Marcuse
at the level that might best serve sociology and its was the first seductive theorist for me. Yet, I have
contribution to knowledge, policy, and everyday also come to recognize the need for a coherent
experience. These barriers are, at least, weak- language and, as I have seen from the reaction of
ened, by the chapters presented herein. Indeed, students exhausted from being presented one
many of the authors are not self-identified theo- vision of social reality after another from one
rists, but their command over bodies of knowl- class to the next, a relatively coherent view of the
edge reveal that theory remains the central social universe. It’s not that we know everything,
backbone of the sociological imagination. but we know quite a bit and it is time theorists
Before elucidating the challenges and oppor- and sociologists stopped acting as though we do
tunities present, some definitional work is in not. We know, as Collins (1975) noted four
order. To begin, I believe sociology is a science decades ago, a lot about stratification and organi-
and, as such, is rooted in theories that guide zation; we know a lot about power across levels
research problems, make sense of data, are tested of social reality, as well as status, identity, and
using the scientific method (regardless of the spe- roles. Having a firm theoretical grounding does
cific analytic strategy), and provide ways of talk- not deter from novel, creative methods; from
ing, thinking, understanding, and, ultimately, studying understudied populations; from discov-
explaining the world. I realize that there are many ering new principles, or modifying old ones.
types and kinds of theories, and while I see no Rather, it provides a community of scholars the
need to stake out firm ground that propositional, foundation for pursuing these very endeavors
formal analytic theorizing or modeling is the only because it provides us with a firmer understand-
kind of theorizing, I do believe that not every- ing of the gaps in knowledge, of the fuzzy areas
thing a scholar calls theory is theory; critical that have been less attended to, and, ultimately, a
theory, for instance, is not really theory in the road map for pursuing social research.
sense that it cannot be tested, but rather offers
normative comparisons between parts of the real
world and an idealized world that may or may not 1.2 Three Challenges
be possible or desirable. Hence, theories require
some degree of abstraction, or conceptual dis- Many of the classic statements on theory and its
tance from their subject; they must be operation- challenges have focused on the political, provin-
alizable, though how we operationalize them cial, and ideological dilemmas preventing our
may not always be readily apparent; they must be discipline from coalescing and from theory
used to either understand or, even better, explain becoming a site of some basic agreement. Having
a phenomenon, process, or other sociological spent 5 years in academia as a professor, I am
object of study; and, finally, theories that tran- prepared to chalk these up to constants and deal
scend time and space are often superior to those with the environment as constructed. Hence,
that do not, which calls attention to sociology’s there are pragmatic challenges that I believe can
continued need for historical and comparative be more easily overcome without treading too
work. deeply into the ideological or political battles
Finally, theory and theories should be cumula- (perhaps that is naïve). In a perfect world, of
tive, which means that sociologists should be course, sociologists would be a community or a
working together, not just on the specific case or society—the American Sociological Society, as it
substantive problem that brings notoriety, but on was once called—and not an association; for
the common endeavor of building a language and Weber (1978:40–1), the former is based on “a
conceptual world that makes cooperation, inter- subjective feeling of the parties…that they belong
1 Introduction 3
together,” whereas the former “rests on rationally It is arbitrary either way, and invites arbitrary
motivated adjustment of interests.” But, perhaps decision making that elevates one flavor of the
we are more like the actors in a Bourdieuian field period over another: this month it will be DuBois,
than in a Marxian primitive communist society: and then next month it will be Sorokin. But,
tenure requirements, individual professional while we spend time looking for the founders of
goals, elite networks and schools, ego, and the this or that, for inclusivity, for some unmined
growing scarcity of valued resources flowing to, theorist who we can write five or six papers
within, and out from higher education lead to the about, we are not resolving the pedagogical prob-
objectification of sociological relationships. lem and, ultimately, how we socialize students
Ironically, however, sociological theory explains into what theory is. I cannot tell you how many
what has happened: between Collins’ (1998) law times I have taught Durkheim or Marx and
of small numbers, and, concomitantly, Spencer’s because they do not formalize their propositions
(1874–1896) law of differentiation, Durkheim’s and their works are sprawling, students lose the
(1893) law of specialization, and the pressure for connection between theory and research. There is
effective integrative mechanisms, the state of not enough time to walk a student through
sociology can be easily explained. But, I digress. Durkheim’s suicide, and the evolution of the
In the following three section, I consider three sociology of suicide throughout the course of the
interrelated challenges: the time crunch; the slav- twentieth and twenty-first century! Not if I need
ish adherence principle; and the conceptual to also lecture on Marx, Weber, DuBois,
crunch. Martineau, Simmel, Mead, Cooley, and Spencer;
and, what about Comte, Park, Sumner, Wirth,
Thomas, Znaniecki? Or, if you want to go really
1.2.1 The Time Crunch deep, what about Tarde, Le Bon, Sorokin, de
Tocqueville, ad infinitum?
Elsewhere, I have commented on what I deem the In some ways, this is a function of path depen-
‘time crunch’ (Abrutyn 2013; Carter 2013). In dency: textbooks have been written for several
short, sociological theory as currently taught and decades now based on these two classes. These
conceptualized, sedimented in textbook after textbooks are involved in an arms race focused
textbook, and contested as well is facing its own mainly on presentation and form, but also the con-
internal temporal pressures. Two hundred fifty tent matter; the former two, however, constrain
years of theorists and theory can no longer be the latter. The one creative space an author has in
adequately taught in two courses (Classic/ updating their classical textbook is the “discov-
Contemporary), or worse, in a single blended ery” of some long lost theorist or, better, social/
course. The desire to add more and more minor- moral philosopher that other textbook authors
ity theorists to the classical canon, for example, have neglected. As if sociology students didn’t
further presses against the constraints of time, have to learn enough names, now they must tangle
while the unending march of time adds new soci- with Nietzsche and Ibn Khaldun. One could just
ological theorists, forces us to make choices as easy go back to Plato or Pliny the Elder, or bet-
about old theorists and their viability, makes it ter yet, the unnamed author(s) of the Epic of
difficult to know “all” theory, and raises implicit Gilgamesh to find recurring ideas that found their
unanswered questions about what the heck we way into sociological theory! To be sure, there is
are even teaching! If there is any challenge that value in noting the intellectual heritage of a theo-
should be signaling we are doing this all wrong, rist, as Coser’s (1977) classic text did with
this is it. Durkheim, and Comte/Saint Simon/Diderot/
In 1960, classical/contemporary classes made Condorcet, but there is also a point where the
sense: pre-Parsons fit the former and Parsons and principles of the theorist are lost in the vagaries of
beyond fit the latter. Today, what constitutes con- the philosophical statements of so and so. Who
temporary? Post 1970? 1990? 2000s and beyond? cares? And, more importantly, how is this theory?
What constitutes classical? Pre-1960? Pre-1980? Indeed, if Durkheim’s theoretical statements are
4 S. Abrutyn
only understandable within the context of his section, and come to rely on textbooks—which
intellectual milieu, then they are not worth teach- are already designed for the lowest common
ing in a science of society; if they transcend time denominator—for quick reviews, refreshers, or
and space, or at least some principles transcend rehashing. The consequence is what I call the
time and space, then perhaps we should get on slavish adherence principle, or the tendency for
with the business of teaching those statements and sociologists in their work and in their reviews of
leaving the rest out? The conflict, for instance, others work to believe that: “if [insert your favor-
between town and country that underscores ite theorist here] wrote “X,” then any attempt to
Marx’s discussion of the inherent problems in the update, revise, reinterpret, or synthesize “X” is a
division of labor and the uneven distribution of violation of all that is holy. This axiom is espe-
economic power can be found in Ibn Khaldun, but cially true of the classics, which are jealously
not surprisingly, also in several Mesopotamian guarded by folks who identify as Marxists or as
texts that were written from an urban perspective, Durkheimians. However, it remains true of
though still highlight the logic of this divide. So, Bourdieuians and Foucaltians, and the like. There
where do we stop? Because, there are several eth- are numerous flaws that this axiom rests on. First,
nographies on non-literate philosophers (Radin nearly every theorist—though not all—that is
1927 [1955]) that are also worth mining if we are worshipped, is worshipped precisely because
indeed interested in going backwards. their body of work is sprawling, filled with con-
In other ways, this is more an indictment of tradictions, and vague in definition. Like the
the discipline’s inability to create even the most Bible, one can find their favorite quotes for “hab-
modest scopes around theory or theorizing. itus” and write an article or a book about this con-
Perhaps it is radical to suggest that theories and ceptualization. (If this first flaw sounds like a
not theorists be taught. From here, it is a short violation of the principle, then the reader is aware
step to saying theory is about scientific research, of the biggest weakness with slavish adherence).
and not cult of the personality or deep exegesis of Second, there is a larger set of sociologists
one’s favorite theorist. The methods people who read Durkheim’s Division of Labor or
employ are less important than the rigor sur- Suicide, or the German Ideology, or whatever,
rounding the methods. It is not theory, for 10, 15, or 20 years ago. Time rarely permits us to
instance, to debate whether a method achieves re-read the classics or much theory once we
what it sets out to achieve; it is theory that guides become professors, because we are busy keeping
the selection of methods as well as their creation. up with the field we work in and the latest
It is an entirely different task to debate the merits research. Consequently, our understanding of a
of this method or that. Regardless of where one theory or a concept is crystallized in our graduate
falls ideologically, we can agree on one thing: the school or early professorial days, and the essence
time crunch is real and needs fixing. It is unten- often becomes obscured by our specialized focus
able to imagine another decade of theorizing and or by the inevitable decay of memory. Yet, many
few changes to how we conceptualize the peda- remain insistent that theorist X said theory A or
gogical dissemination of theory. defined concept B, regardless of its factuality, but
insistent on the fact that their interpretation, cor-
rect or incorrect, is fact and, thus, the theory
1.2.2 The Slavish Adherence cannot be altered. Finally, many sociologists
Principle remember the co-opted version of a theory.
Merton’s (1938) famous paper on anomie drew
Besides these pedagogical problems, the size and his conceptualization from one section of
density of theoretical knowledge available Durkheim’s (1897 [1951]) Suicide. Since then,
ensures that few sociologists have the time to many have employed explicitly or implicitly the
read it all, and that most become versed in more Mertonian structural functional conception of
than a small subsection of an already small sub- anomie in testing Durkheim’s hypotheses. Thus,
1 Introduction 5
the concept is rarely defined precisely, is often why it tends to continue to look that way (e.g.,
rooted in someone else’s interpretation,1 and, Bourdieu’s structured structures and structuring
unfortunately, becomes arbitrary in analysis. For structures). Nevertheless, Durkheim has the
instance, a recent paper by Hoffman and Bearman label. How then do we fit in the rest of his career
(2015) treats the definition and operationalization post 1893? How do we make sense of the shift
of anomie as taken for granted, barely reviewing towards emotions in The Rules, throughout
the debates surrounding its meaning, ignoring Suicide, and in full force in The Elementary
Durkheim’s own words, all while making impor- Forms? Even the most cursory read of these
tant empirical claims about anomie vis-à-vis the works would force the reader to question just
consequences of media exposure; claims that, if how functionalist he is; especially compared to,
true, would call into question guidelines media say, Parsons or Merton. In fact, he gradually
outlets use in reporting celebrity suicides. became a social psychologist who, despite reject-
Slavish adherence also kills the sociological ing all of his rival Tarde’s ideas, came to embrace
imagination. It hermetically seals sociological ideas like emotional contagion and group iden-
theory, and erects provincial boundaries that tity, and small scale interaction rituals.
make sense, to some degree, for folks protecting A second example can be culled from Suicide,
their hard fought positions in the discipline, sub- which I have already begun referring to above.
field, or substantive area. The number of reviews Nearly all sociology of suicide over the last 100
I have received that continue to adhere to years has, understandably, been Durkheimian
Durkheim’s fourfold typology, golden equilib- (Stack 2000; Wray et al. 2011). Except, it hasn’t
rium of integration/regulation, and macro-level really been. As noted above, it generally adheres
orientation is truly confounding. (Yet, it does slavishly to the common interpretations of
make some sense when we consider the time Durkheim: there are four types of suicide, two of
crunch discussion above: there simply isn’t which (egoism/anomic) are present in modernity,
enough time to digest all the different theories two of which (altruism/fatalism) are relics of tra-
and theorists available). Without beating a dead ditional, ascriptive societies. Therefore, we
horse, let’s look a little closer at Durkheim and should only study the former two, because the
how some of his works are portrayed slavishly by others ones cannot possibly be located in moder-
the discipline. nity. In terms of altruism, until recently (Abrutyn
First, there is the frame we bracket his work and Mueller 2015), a review found only one
in: Durkheim is usually presented to undergradu- empirical article (Leenaars 2004). One must
ates and graduate students alike as a structural reply to the slavish adherents: how can a theory
functionalist. To be sure, in the opening salvos of be generalizable when two of its main concepts
the Division of Labor, he speaks like an organi- are denied applicability by its founder, and when
cist, and yes he believed the social body to be they remain understudied? Of course, Durkheim
greater than its parts. And, we can admit that he could not have cared that much about at least one
was constantly seeking to understand what mech- of the two “traditional” forms of suicide, fatal-
anisms functioned to generate solidarity. But, is ism, as it was hastily analyzed in a single para-
functionalism really a bad word? Marxists also graph, in a single footnote (1897 [1951]:276),
assert functional theories, as they try to elucidate never to be discussed by Durkheim again. How
the mechanisms that sustain economic power can we even slavishly adhere to a fourfold model
relations. In fact, it is hard to not be a functional- when its progenitor was not fully committed to
ist as a theorist, because part of theorizing is the model?!
pointing out how the social universe looks and The larger point is such: what is gained by not
isolating the principles of suicide or rituals, and
1 moving on from Durkheim’s sociocultural
In this case, Merton, who had a very different idea than
Durkheim did (Hilbert 1989), but in other cases, it is one’s milieu? Again, if the principles cannot be
mentor’s interpretation. extracted from the nineteenth century, then the
6 S. Abrutyn
theory is not worth keeping and then why are we rests less on empirical grounds that verify or cast
teaching Durkheim besides the fact that he estab- doubt on the concept’s effects on behavior and
lished the discipline? Clearly, his work has some- attitudes, and more on parochial positions, advi-
thing timeless that inspires contemporary sor or department preferences, and the pursuit of
sociologists. Thus, we do not need to debate who sociological fame. A perfectly useful and empiri-
belongs in the canon and who does not; we need cal valid concept is denied its value on non-
to extract the ideas, and move them forward with scientific grounds. The same problems plague
the various methodological tools we have. seminal concepts like anomie and class, to name
However, we cannot move on until we arrive at a two.
point where “power,” “anomie,” or the basic It remains frustrating that sociology has
dynamics of organizations or stratification are avoided some type of common socialization
presented as sociological knowledge. beyond everyone knowing Durkheim, Weber, and
Marx! The fact that this is the baseline for becom-
ing a sociologist speaks directly to a constellation
1.2.3 The Conceptual Crunch of problems surrounding theory itself. And, while
I am not trying to advance a political position, I
The conceptual crunch refers to a set of interre- am merely speaking a social fact: communities
lated dilemmas surrounding theory. First, because that do not share a common language, have a
of the size of theory and the way we teach it, hard time sharing a modicum of common reality.
many scholars invent neologisms for concepts or Moreover, it supports the (false) idea that sociol-
processes already extant. Sometimes it is because ogy does not have any laws or scientific value to
the scholar, such as Bourdieu and habitus, solving problems. Indeed, the chapters of this
believes extant concepts are inadequate; these book demonstrate, throughout, common threads
maneuvers are not the best for clarity and shared that tie sociology together as a discipline and
theoretical language, but they are at least defen- community of scholars. These threads are some-
sible. But, often new concepts are the hallmark of times made explicit, but other times implicit. The
young professors trying to create their own the- reader is invited to consider the way the social
ory for professional reasons. Second, some con- world can be envisioned. In the following sec-
cepts are rejected, not on their empirical or tion, I lay out the organization of the book and,
theoretical validity and utility, but for ideological briefly, the content of each of the three major sec-
or political reasons—could one imagine a physi- tions; each section, ultimately, presenting a
cist deciding to call “atoms” something else slightly different pedagogical strategy for teach-
because he or she did not like the term concept or ing a course in sociological theory.
felt they had a “better” metaphor? Third, many of
our most cherished concepts have resisted defini-
tion, yet continue to be used as if they do have 1.3 An Overview
some semblance of shared meaning—e.g., insti-
tution (see Chap. 11) or self (see Chap. 17). The first handbook of theory is a testament to the
One of the casualties of the crunch are good, sheer diversity and eclectic nature of sociological
clear concepts. Take role for instance: a concept theory (Turner 2001). Nearly two decades old,
that stood for the generalized behavioral reper- most of the perspectives remain used today in
toires and expectation-sets that people meeting various subfields across the discipline. Thus, my
certain criteria could occupy is rarely referred to vision for this companion, stand-alone volume,
in contemporary parlance. For some it is too was under two distinct pressures: to be unique
functionalist, being connected to Parsons and from the former volume and, as opposed to hav-
Merton; for others, it isn’t cultural enough or ing authors simply review the theoretical terrain,
lacks agency; and for others, it is too determinis- offer something penetrating and more advanced
tic and structural. Yet, the arguments against role than is often assumed of handbooks. To resolve
1 Introduction 7
the first pressure, my emphasis from the onset 1893, 1915 [1995])—or, what mechanisms bring/
was on commonalities and convergence. The first hold individuals and groups together, regulation
handbook is notable in its encyclopedic form, (Marx 1845–6 [1972]; Weber 1978)—or, what
whereas I wanted this handbook to present the mechanisms allow individuals and groups to con-
instructor, the student, and the academic with a trol and coordinate the behavior of other individ-
way or set of ways for organizing the social uni- uals and groups, and legitimation (Weber 1920
verse and the practice of sociology. To that effect, [2002], 1946)—or, how is shared meaning con-
the reader is presented with three major delinea- structed and maintained. In terms of the
tions: (1) questions that have been explicit and Handbook, the first section is devoted to these
implicit to sociological theorizing since Comte three questions (Chaps. 2, 3, 4, and 5) and a
(and before), but which look and feel different in fourth question that is implicit in classical sociol-
contemporary sociology today (Chaps. 2, 3, 4, 5, ogy, but has become a central question since at
and 6); (2) a vision of the social universe con- least the 1970s as the cultural anthropologies of
structed by the various levels of social reality folks like Geertz (1972), Douglas (1970), and
sociologists focus on (Chaps. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, Turner (1974) became increasingly relevant to
13, 14, 15, 16, and 17); and, finally, a set of sub- challenging the rather flat cultural version of
stantive phenomena, distinct to be sure, but inter- Parsonsian (1951) sociology.
related in their deep inextricable link to the Thus, Chaps. 2 and 3 focus on integration and
classics (many of which have been long forgot- regulation, respectively. Both draw from the tra-
ten) and for their tendency towards the cutting ditional well of references, but chart more holis-
edges of sociology (Chaps. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, tic, unique views on the problem. In Chap. 2,
24, 25, and 26). Turner posits a general theory of integration,
The second contribution of the handbook was drawing from structuralism, social psychology,
truly out of my hands, and was the responsibility evolutionary biology, and the sociology of emo-
of the author(s) of each chapter. To that effect, I tions. Integration, or the lack there of, has long
am greatly indebted to each author for accepting been cited as a source of various social prob-
the challenge of balancing a review-like expecta- lems—e.g., Durkheim’s Suicide; an argument
tion with breaking new ground. Several of the that has received plenty of empirical support
chapters present radically unique perspectives, (Umberson and Montez 2010; Thoits 2011). In
while others synthesize often disparate, far-flung Turner’s framework, gone are the old functional-
traditions; however, all of them offer fresh, ist tropes, replaced by many of the important
authoritative statements about the social world. advances in neuroscience and social psychology.
What was most rewarding for me was that the This chapter is followed by Yingyao and Pollilo’s
authors, in several cases, accidentally weaved (Chap. 3) treatment of regulation. A sophisticated
threads from other chapters throughout their review of the winding threads of Marxian and
own, helping make the volume coherent, consis- Weberian theory unfolds into a fascinating con-
tent, and convergent. Below, I briefly consider sideration of organizational power as the central
each section and the vision behind it, as well as site of coordination and control in modernity.
the realization made possible by the Hence, while the authors consider the macro- and
contributors. micro-level dynamics, it is at the meso-level that
the true force of power, in modernity, is unleashed,
along with the contradictions between distributive
1.3.1 Classic Questions power (domination) and social or collective
power.
The late-great Israeli sociologist, Shmuel Chapters 4 and 5 turn our attention to the
Eisenstadt (1985, 1987) argued that the entire problem of legitimation, first in action and then in
sociological practice was anchored in three basic interaction. In Glaeser’s discussion of action,
questions or problems: integration (Durkheim new theoretical ground is staked out on a very old
8 S. Abrutyn
topic: what is social action? The problem of many dynamics at the micro-level, such as rituals
meaning emerges in the work of Marx, Durkheim, and emotions (Chap. 20; also, Collins 2004;
and most explicitly in Weber as they contend Lawler et al. 2009) and exchange (Chap. 18; also,
with the “ghost,” or perhaps specter, of the great Cook et al. 2006), continue to look hard at inte-
utilitarian tradition of Smith and Bentham, but gration as a process (as well as the consequences
Glaeser’s work extends far beyond these old for too much or too little). Likewise, regulation
debates, offering a processual, comprehensive (and, more often, power) remain central to socio-
action theory. Tavory’s examination of interac- logical research (Reed 2013), as does the ques-
tion is no less inspired: while careful to hew tion of action (Swidler 1986; Emirbayer and
closely to the road mapped out by symbolic inter- Mische 1998; Vaisey 2009), interaction and
actionists, Tavory’s Chap. 5 moves into newer meaning making (Chap. 19; also, Stryker 2008;
horizons, pushing for more processual notions of Burke and Stets 2009), and, of course, cultural
interaction and self. Confronting critiques from processes (Lizardo 2006; Pugh 2009; Abrutyn
different sources, Tavory considers the most and Mueller 2015).
recent push for inter-situational analyses.
Finally, in Chap. 6, Lizardo’s work challenges
the reader, and the discipline: (1) is culture really 1.3.2 Levels of Social Reality
something the classical theorists like Weber and
Durkheim thought of, or is it a Parsonian creation Fresh out of graduate school, the first two theory
and (2) what is the future for the concept and courses I taught tried to build a coherent socio-
assorted constellation of elements orbiting it in logical world for the students by way of starting
sociology? Lizardo presents a careful analysis of at the macro-level and working down to the orga-
the classics, in particular Durkheim and Weber, nizational level. Then, the class shifted to the
and elucidates how “culture” is largely alien to micro-level and built back up, ending with theo-
their work, and is really added post hoc by ries of groups and organizational life. Nearly
Parsons. Lizardo does not leave us with a defini- impossible to do in a 14-week class, this peda-
tive answer to the second question, though his gogical strategy did get positive reviews: most
essay cogently argues that Durkheim, and even specifically, students expressed happiness that a
Bourdieu, presents sociologists with examples of coherent social world emerged over the course of
how to theorize without the culture concept, and the class as opposed to the eclecticism of sub-
thus provocatively implies, perhaps, culture is stantive courses that move from one level to the
less useful a concept than modern sociology next, one theory to the next, and with little com-
often assumes. mitment to a “this is how sociologists generally
In short, this section offers a new pedagogical see the world” type of orientation. The advantage
direction for theory courses: organizing weeks to this method is clear. Each level or the different
and readings by major theoretical dilemmas. phenomena at each level, are embedded and thus
Integration, for instance, remains as relevant to have equivalencies to those higher-order levels
theorizing and empirical research today as it did pressing against them; however, each level
for Comte or Durkheim. The first cluster of read- reveals distinct, emergent properties and dynam-
ings, then, could be centered on the problem of ics that force us to study each one as distinct and
integration, fleshing out the various ways it is as linked to the above and below. Second, while
studied across levels of social reality. Processes the levels themselves deserve analysis, the
and research at the meso-level look at social capi- interlinkages between them are of equal impor-
tal (Portes 1998, 2014), organizational segmenta- tance. How encounters and corporate units inter-
tion (Hannan and Freeman 1977), isomorphism act, for instance, matters because it is in the flow
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983), and embedded between the two that microdynamics produce,
fields (Chap. 9; also, Fligstein and McAdam reproduce, and alter the meso-level and, con-
2012) are all interested in integration; likewise, versely, it is the meso-level that constrains and
1 Introduction 9
facilitate the production and reproduction of eventually reached: emotional forces generated
encounters. Perhaps not radical, it remains impor- in palpable, recurring interaction continually
tant to develop common ways of talking about remade the group while temporarily charging the
what sociologists study that matters to creating a batteries of those participants and, even, those in
society and not an association of sociologists. the audience. The juxtaposition of the two chap-
Ultimately, this approach allows students to ters, and the authors’ awareness of each other,
see the diversity of sociological research, and presents a unique chance to see how two opposed
come to understand both the reasons why some positions (top-down and bottom-up) often reach
scholars are drawn to historical research and oth- similar conclusions about the social world.
ers qualitative ethnographies, as well as how both Macrosociology, which was once the center of
strategies require some semblance of a social the sociological world, is presented from the
world filled within nested or embedded levels. It point of view of a theorist whose career has
is true, we don’t often talk about the social world increasingly sought to integrate neuroscience
this way, and there are always radical positions into sociology, and it thus sensitive to the macro-
on both sides (micro and macro) asserting the micro links. Lawler and his colleagues, for their
non-existence of the other, but, the goal of theory part, begin within the exchange tradition which
is to provide the student with different tools to has structural assumptions built in, and thus the
deal with different research problems. Providing macro already looms over their theorizing. In the
a set of vantage points is as important as the for- end, the reader comes to realize that both
mal and substantive aspects of the theories approaches can complement each other, rather
themselves. than be dichotomous positions.
The next set of sections is devoted to this sort The alternatives, as I see them, are found in
of pedagogic approach, beginning with a subsec- field theory and in the network/relational
tion on macro-micro linkages (Chaps. 7, 8, 9, and approach that is both a methodological and theo-
10) and followed by a subsection that considers retical perspective. To be sure, fields are meso-
the major social units across each level of social level units of analysis, as are networks, and could
reality (Chaps. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17). just as well be placed in the following subsection,
yet there is some logic behind seeing them as
1.3.2.1 Rethinking alternatives to more traditional macro-micro
the Macro-Micro Link solutions. They both turn away from the overly
The first subsection takes up a question that had abstract macro accounts, preferring either real
gained prominence in the 1980s: how can we link nodal connections or embedded arenas filled with
the seemingly wide chasm between the lived, real groups competing against each other. That is,
everyday experience and the invisible social neither gives primacy to the individual or the
structure that so fascinated the young Durkheim. über macro sphere that acts as an environment for
In this section, the reader is presented with four collective action. Instead, they have a sort of
chapters—two that explicitly deal with the prob- Simmelian approach focused on the relation-
lem (the first starting from the top-down (Chap. ships—exchange-based, competitive, or conflict-
7) and the second from the bottom-up (Chap. 8)), oriented—and the structure of these relationships.
and two that offer alternative ways of dealing Where they perhaps differ most, is in their natural
with the presumed chasm (Chaps. 9 and 10). affinities with other subfields—and, thus, the
In charting a link from the macro to the micro, theoretical traditions they are most comfortable
Turner (2010a, b, 2011) argues that emotions are, borrowing from to explain the social world. On
ultimately, the thread that runs through the entire the one hand, network theory easily borrows
system; a point cogently made by Lawler, Thye, from social psychology, either from the exchange
and Joon in their exposition of the links flowing traditions (Coleman 1988; Cook et al. 2006) or
up from the micro to the macro; and, importantly, from identity-based concepts (Pescosolido 2006;
the conclusion that Durkheim (1915 [1995]) Thoits 2011). On the other hand, field theory is
10 S. Abrutyn
far more comfortable with culture and structure My own take on institutions draws from clas-
intermingling (Bourdieu 1992, 1993) then net- sical sociologists and anthropologists who talked
work theory is (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). about the world as divided into major social
One final note, Fligstein and McAdam’s spheres like religion, law, or kinship. Chapter 11
(2012) strategic action fields has been, in my per- presents these types of discussions in a fresh
spective, a major advance in field theory in that light, drawing on ecological and evolutionary
they consciously sought to expand traditional theory to explore how macro-structural and cul-
field analyses by adding social movements the- tural spheres shape the everyday reality we all
ory. Theorizing is a process of building upon encounter. Conversely, in Chap. 12, Guenther
existing literatures; rather than reinventing the and her colleagues take on the macro-level
wheel, it is the essence of extending, synthesiz- dynamics of stratification. Exploring a range of
ing, and making robust (Turner 2010a, b; Abrutyn empirical and theoretical studies, this chapter
and Mueller 2015). Network theory is perhaps presents the tools that sociologists use to explore
ready for that type of revolutionary theorizing. inequalities within nations, comparatively across
Cultural sociologies have already begun to inter- nations, and between clusters of nations.
act (Lizardo 2006), and my work with Mueller Chapters 13 and 14 provide close examina-
(Abrutyn and Mueller 2014; Mueller and Abrutyn tions of two key corporate units: communities
2015) has advocated for expanding the social and organizations. Communities have always
psychological “vocabulary” of network applica- been essential to theory; de Tocqueville,
tions to include emotions. Both areas seem to me Töennies, Durkheim, and then later the Chicago
exciting sites of opportunities and challenges, school’s urban ecology and a significant propor-
and have already made major inroads in offering tion of sociological ethnographies. Irwin presents
new strategies of seeing the macro-micro link. a sophisticated review and theoretical exposition
Hence, in a theory course that begins with this of what community is, and the potential it has for
question, the actual art of theorizing instead of theorizing about social organization and action.
the process of learning theorists could make for Irwin’s inspired writing challenges sociology to
an exciting and engaging classroom. embrace a concept that has been repeatedly
deemed moribund, but which continues to show
1.3.2.2 From Top to Bottom resilience. In Chap. 14, Powell and Brandtner
The second subsection explore the three major offer a wholly original synthesis of the organiza-
levels of analysis, and the principles units of tion literature, presenting a new pathway for inte-
social reality we study at each level. At the grating advances in other disciplines.
macro-level, we find institutional spheres (Chap. Organizations, then, become both things and
11) and stratification systems (Chap. 12); at the forces for Powell and Brandtner; sites in which
meso, communities (Chap. 13), organizations informal groups and selves are produced and
(Chap. 14), and categoric units (Chap. 15); and, reproduced daily, and forces of change in com-
at the micro, small groups (Chap. 16) and the self munities and institutional spheres. What makes
(Chap. 17). While each chapter focuses on the these two chapters so important—as well as
specific phenomenon of interest, they each work Chaps. 9 (fields) and 10 (networks)—is that the
to contextualize the phenomenon within the meso-level is the site in which the everyday meets
higher and lower levels of social reality. the abstract, invisible forces that facilitate and
Furthermore, each chapter takes serious the way constrain reality. Threads of integration,
sociologists try to study the unit of analysis, regulation, legitimation, and culture abound, as
exploring how theory and research work together do the questions of macro-micro linkages. These
as opposed to the traditional pedagogy of teach- same questions continue to be relevant in Chap.
ing theory and methods as a separate set of ideas 15, where Webster and Walker consider the other
and skills. side of the meso-level: categoric units (e.g., sex,
1 Introduction 11
race, age) and inequality. A sprawling and erudite 1.3.3 Theorizing the Social World
review, is followed by a close consideration of
the empirical foundations of a cluster of theoreti- The final section of the book takes a third
cal traditions that consider how certain status approach to the sociological endeavor that breaks
characteristics affect the functioning of various sociology into different thematic areas—two of
types of groups that we all find ourselves in; how which are presented herein. To be sure, many of
these characteristics come to have that effect; and the chapters of the Handbook could fit into this
how that shapes the experiences of people across space, but these chapters (and their substance)
categories. Like its companion chapters, Webster tend to be less abstract than those in the first clus-
and Walker’s chapter presents important ideas ter (Chaps. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) and, in many cases,
that explicitly spillover into Chap. 16 (small cut across various levels of analysis instead of
groups) and Chap. 18 (microsociologies), but being rooted in one or the other.
which also touch on numerous other chapters
including that of regulation (Chap. 3) and the self 1.3.3.1 Constraints on the Lived
(Chap. 17). Experience
Finally, the micro-level is represented by a This section considers many of the questions
chapter on groups and one on the self. In the lat- raised in Chaps. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, but does not
ter, Cast and Stets ambitiously present a synthetic interrogate them explicitly or as the focus of the
look at the self both as a micro-level phenome- chapter. Instead, they present the reader with the
non, and a thing embedded in various other levels varieties of social forces constraining the way we
of social reality. To talk about the self, as even experience the reality in which we are embedded.
Mead clearly emphasized, the larger environ- Picking up where Chaps. 17 on the self, as well as
ments must be considered too; though, we often 15 on small groups and 16 on categoric units left
lose sight of the other levels of reality. Cast and off, the first chapter of this section (Chap. 18) fur-
Stets push us to consider the many layers that the ther explores the microdynamics of social life. In
self interacts with to become our anchor in the this chapter, Carter pushes sociologists to revisit
social world. In Chap. 16, Benard and Mize pres- the once porous borders between social and psy-
ent a fresh, comprehensive take on small groups. chological social psychology, pulling theoretical
Once the center of the sociological world (Bales strands that supplement insights drawn from vari-
and Slater 1955; Berger 1958), small groups have ous areas of contemporary microsociology that
become peripheralized despite their continued take attribution and evaluation as the central
importance to understanding the social world and mechanism or process from which theoretical
empirical research (Berger et al. 1998; Benard explanations emerge. Chapter 19 offers a fresh
2012; Fine 2012). Indeed, it is in small groups take on the field of ethnomethodology. Often
that vast majority of our lives are spent, as they marginalized in contemporary sociology, or per-
mediate our experiences in organizations and haps forgotten in some ways, this chapter reminds
communities, institutions and stratification sys- the reader of the roots beyond Garfinkel’s ground-
tems. Thus, the self is our personal anchor to the breaking work, but quickly turns towards the per-
social world while small groups are the social spective and method’s footprint in contemporary
anchor to the larger universe. Integration, regula- research. Like the chapters on communities and
tion, and legitimation cannot be understood with- small groups, this chapter reminds sociologists
out considering the anchors that are most visible that this area is not frozen, and instead of teaching
and known to each person, and thus, these chap- ethnomethodology as “Garfinkel’s theory” or in
ters tie the entire section together, and in many breaching experiments, Turowetz and his col-
ways, serve as a fulcrum to the next major section leagues press us to consider the active research
in which we offer a third strategy to teaching that continues to provide insights into the con-
sociological theory. struction of meaning and action.
12 S. Abrutyn
Finally, complementing both of these chapters 2012). McCaffree pivots quickly from the roots
is an exposition on the sociology of emotions of the sociology of morality to both consider the
(Chap. 20). What distinguishes Weed and Smith- many angles sociologists exploit to examine
Lovin’s chapter from most discussions of emo- morality, but also offers a compelling new theo-
tions is its careful division and clear elucidation retical take on how we can go about studying
of the three dominant strands of emotions in morality social scientifically. Finally, in Chap.
social psychology today: the performative- 23, Robinson offers a much needed essay on
dramaturgical strand built on Goffman and, most intersectionality. Not simply content with the
prominently, Hochschild’s seminal text; the sym- conventional ways intersectionality is taught and
bolic interactionist tradition (Kemper 1978; cf. mobilized in research, this chapter pushes new
Shott 1979) that has found its expression across a ground, trying to add new items to the agenda in
variety of theoretically-driven research programs the study of inequality, stratification, and various
like Affect Control Theory, Identity Control subfields like race and gender. Like the previous
Theory, and Status Expectations States Theory; chapters on memory and morality, this chapter
and, the interaction ritual tradition (Collins 2004; sits on the frontiers of where sociology has been
Summers-Effler 2004). Finding the points of con- moving, and brings an essential perspective to
vergence, this chapter collapses many of the how lived experience is constrained by those in
unnecessary distinctions across these different structurally and culturally disadvantaged
perspectives, promoting the commonalities that positions.
link the study of emotions. In short, a pathway
for a more integrative study of emotions is 1.3.3.2 Modes of Change
posited. The last three chapters of the Handbook fittingly
The next cluster of chapters follows in the explore one of the most important and compel-
theme of exterior constraints on the lived experi- ling aspects of sociology: change. Here, three
ence. In Chap. 21, Simko explores a very old idea important modes of change, found across all of
that has somehow been forgotten, ironically, or the classical sociologists, also present the fron-
simply undertheorized: collective memory. tiers of sociological research, cross-cutting most
Drawing from Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of the chapters above, and bringing insights from
and, especially, his forgotten student Halbwachs other disciplines. First, Machalek and Martin
(1992), this chapter urges readers to consider begin this section by delineating the diverse and
how the past is a social creation; how it becomes ever-growing area of evolutionary sociology.
exterior and constraining in monuments and Once a mainstay of sociological theory—found
other physical spaces, temporal differentiation, in Comte, Marx, Spencer, Durkheim, and even
sedimented interaction and ritual, and so on. Weber—evolutionary theory has undergone a
Memory is the cutting edge, as it draws the renaissance in the last two decades or so.
Durkheimian sense of integration into dialogue Neuroscience, cognitive science, archaeology,
with the Weberian notion of regulation and legiti- history, and anthropology have found their way
mation: that is, memory is both a force of cohe- into these theories, as have the most up-to-date
sion and shared meaning, as well as something findings in genetics and evolutionary biology.
individuals and groups strive to control for those Evolutionary sociology runs along several differ-
very same reasons. In Chap. 22, we turn towards, ent tracks: general theories that reflect the clas-
again, an older area of sociology that had lost sics, but are far more cautious in their construction;
favor for several decades because of Parsons gene-culture interaction; neuroscience and the
“flat” treatment: the sociology of morality. evolution of the brain; group-level selection; and
Recent years has seen an explosion of research neo-Darwinian theorizing.
on morality (Hitlin and Vaisey 2013), ranging In Chaps. 25 and 26, we present the reader
from cultural-cognitive studies (Vaisey 2009) to with two complimentary chapters: the first on
social psychological inquiries (Stets and Carter collective behavior and the second on social
1 Introduction 13
movements. In the latter, Moss and Snow deftly a common umbrella that does not dissuade
delineate the massive body of literature on social creativity, the pursuit of understudied problems,
movements, offering original insights into the or the continued development of theory. Rather, a
dynamics of social movements. In the former, society or community instead of an association is
Van Ness and Summers-Effler revisit another more likely to cooperate in an effort to push soci-
subfield that was once central to sociological ology into the twenty-first century and make our
inquiry, but which has fallen out of favor to some discipline one that is consulted when politicians,
degree. Of course, the study of social movements economic leaders, community organizers, and
was historically embedded in the study of collec- the like have problems they need help solving.
tive behavior, but since the 1960s, social move-
ments have become a distinct and vibrant area in
its own right. Hence, like the juxtaposition of
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Part I
Classical Questions Contemporalized
Integrating and Disintegrating
Dynamics in Human Societies 2
Jonathan H. Turner
2.1 Approaching the Analysis organization and the potential of these mecha-
of Integration in Societies nisms to stave off, or to accelerate, the inevitable
disintegration of all patterns of social organiza-
The concept of integration has long been both an tion. And so, whether integration is achieved by
implicit and explicit concern of all sociological open markets or high levels of coercion and strat-
theorists. Yet, despite this provenance, integra- ification, it is nonetheless integration by the
tion is a topic that has been subject to criticism above definition. The point of this chapter is to
because evaluative considerations of what is outline the various forms that integration takes
“good” or “pathological” in a society. For exam- and the degree to which particular forms generate
ple, Marxists see the modes of integration of a pressures for continued integration or for disinte-
societal formations as filled with contradictions gration. In the long run, disintegration is the fate
and basically as a “necessary evil” in an histori- of societies and their constituent sociocultural
cal process leading to a “better” form of integra- formations; the issue then is what modes of inte-
tion as these contradictions lead to conflict and gration stave off for how long the inevitable
reform. Early functionalists such as Auguste entropy inherent in the social universe. For theo-
Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim and, rizing about human societies to be complete, it
more recently, Talcott Parsons have tended to becomes essential to understand both the nega-
analyze social structures in terms of meeting tive entropic and entropic forces working on
functional needs for integration, thereby convert- human societies.
ing existing structural and cultural arrangements As I will argue, integration and disintegration
into implicit statements that the status quo is operate at all three fundamental levels of human
“functional” for a society. Such analyses deliber- social organization: (1) the micro universe of
ately or inadvertently moralize what should be a interaction in face-to-face encounters, (2) the
more neutral conception of integration. For my meso world of [a] corporate units (groups, orga-
purposes here, I see integration as simply the nizations, and communities) revealing divisions
modes and mechanisms by which social units and of labor and [b] categoric units built from social
the social activities in and between them are distinctions based upon criteria such as ethnicity,
coordinated into coherent patterns of social religion, gender, and age that become that bases
for moral evaluations of members of subpopula-
J.H. Turner (*) tions in a society, and (3) the macro systems of
Department of Sociology, University of California, (a) institutional domains and (b) stratification
Santa Barbara, CA, USA systems as these become the pillars of (c) societal
e-mail: [email protected]
and (d) inter-societal systems. Integration is sim- formations, thus assuring the operation of verti-
ply the way in which micro, meso, and macro cal integrative process across levels of social
social formations are laced together, but this pro- organization. As with the micro-level interaction
cess is complicated by the fact that integration rituals, horizontal integrative processes operate
operates not only between levels of social organi- among also meso-level units. Corporate units dif-
zation but within each of these three levels. Thus, ferentially distribute resources to persons, which
there are complex causal relations among the partially determines their categoric unit member-
micro, meso, and macro bases of integration and, ships—at a minimum their social class.
as will become evident, disintegration as well Conversely, members of categoric units are
(Turner 2010a). All of the processes by which located in positions within the divisions of labor
such connections are generated and sustained of corporate units. And the dynamics revolving
constitute the subject matter of integration as a around these horizontal connections within the
fundamental force in the social universe, while meso level are important to integration not only
the operation of these forces are also the explana- at this level but also at both the micro and macro
tion for the disintegrative potential in all socio- levels. Macro structures and cultures are built
cultural formations. from meso-level structures, while the corporate
Another way to view integration is as con- and categoric units of the meso-level constrain
nections among the “parts” of the social uni- what transpires in micro encounters. Reciprocally,
verse; and the outline below of the three levels dynamics of encounters affect the dynamics of
of social reality suggests what these part are: integration at the meso level and, at times, even
individual persons, encounters of individuals in the macro level of social organization.
face-to-face interaction, corporate units (groups, The arrows moving within and across levels of
organizations, and communities) organizing social organization portrayed in Fig. 2.1 are
encounters, categoric units of persons denoted intended to denote these paths of connection and
as distinctive and evaluated in terms of their potential disconnection; and while the processes
perceived distinctiveness that constrain what are complicated, a general theory of integration
transpires in encounters, institutional domains and disintegration can, it is hoped, make under-
built up from corporate units, stratification sys- standing of these connections much simpler than
tems built around categoric-unit distinctions, it may seem at first glance. How and where do we
and societies as well as inter-societal systems get started? I think the best place to start is at the
arising from institutional domains and systems macro level, particularly the societal level of
of stratification. social organization; from there we can move up
To conceptualize integration and also disinte- and down the levels of the figure and begin to fill
gration at the same time, it is necessary to recog- in the picture of dynamic processes of integration
nize that these parts are connected horizontally and disintegration in human societies.
within each level of social reality and vertically
across the micro, meso, and macro levels of the
social universe and that disintegration occurs 2.2 The Macrodynamics
when these horizontal and vertical linkages break of Integration
down. For example, at the micro level, when per-
sons enter encounters, horizontal processes As outlined above, the macro-level universe is
revolving around interaction rituals (Collins composed of inter-societal systems and societies
2004; Turner 2002) and other interpersonal that are built from institutional domains and strati-
dynamics operate to integrate chains of interac- fication systems which, in turn, are built respec-
tion over time and space. At the same time, tively from meso-level corporate and categoric
encounters are embedded in corporate and cate- units (Turner 2010a). The dynamics of integration
goric units at the meso level and; in turn, these at the macro level of social reality can best be
meso-level units are embedded in macro-level understood by the nature of sociocultural
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 21
formations that organize corporate units and cate- (6) categoric-unit status belief and normative sys-
goric units into institutional domains and stratifi- tems, and (7) expectation states in micro-level
cation systems. There are well-studied structural encounters. Let me begin with an outline of the
mechanisms by which the macro level of social structural mechanisms of integration.
reality is generated and sustained, including
(Turner 2010a): (1) segmentation, (2) differentia-
tion, (3) interdependencies, (4) segregation, (5) 2.2.1 Structural Mechanisms
domination and stratification, and (6) intersec- of Integration
tions. While culture is always part of these social
structural mechanisms, there are still distinctive 2.2.1.1 Segmentation
cultural mechanisms revolving around 2010 Emile Durkheim ([1893] 1963) originally con-
(Turner 2010a, b): (1) values, (2) generalized sym- ceptualized the process of segmentation as
bolic media, (3) ideologies, (4) meta-ideologies, “mechanism solidarity” (in juxtaposition to
(5) corporate-unit belief and normative systems, “organic solidarity)—a distinctions that he had
22 J.H. Turner
dropped from his sociology by 1896 in favor of of cultural and structural equivalence. Thus, even
discovering the dynamics of integration common as institutional sectors differentiate, the corporate
to both simple and complex societies (Durkheim units within these sectors converge in their struc-
[1912] 1984). Segmentation is the process of pro- ture and culture, thereby integrating the sector
ducing and reproducing similar corporate units, while, at the same time, having sufficient simi-
revealing (a) high levels of structural (regular) larities to corporate units in at least some other
equivalence in the network structures of these institutional domains and sectors in these
corporate units (Freeman et al. 1989) and (b) domains to promote some structural and cultural
high levels of cultural equivalence in that indi- equivalences across larger swaths of the macro
viduals are guided by the same sets of cultural realm. And so, even as high levels of differentia-
codes—values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, tion among corporate units are used to build
beliefs, norms, and expectation states. Under diverse institutional domains—e.g., economy,
these conditions, individuals at locations in simi- polity, education, science, religions, etc.—the
lar corporate units experience the social universe continuing segmentation of generic types of cor-
in equivalent ways, and thus develop common porate units within and between institutional
orientations because they stand in the same rela- domains operates as a powerful integrative force.
tionships to all other positions in the corporate Segmentation does, however, eventually gen-
unit and its culture. When human societies first erate disintegrative pressures because there are
began to grow, segmentation was the principle limitations in how far structural and cultural
mechanisms of integration, as new hunter-gather equivalences can link together large numbers of
bands and, later, new community structures were diverse corporate units and individuals in these
spun off of the old, with each new structure units. If only segmentation is possible, a society
revealing the same basic network forms and sys- and inter-societal system cannot become very
tems of culture. large because segmentation cannot integrate
Segmentation always continues to operate as large and diverse (by categoric unit member-
an integrative mechanisms even as societies dif- ships) populations, without the addition of new
ferentiate new kinds of corporate and categoric integrative mechanisms.
units. For example, Weber’s ([1922] 1968: 956–
1004) famous typology on “bureaucracy” is, in 2.2.1.2 Differentiation
essence, an argument about segmentation. Even As Herbert Spencer ([1874–96] 1898) phrased
bureaucratic structures that evolve in different the matter, growth in the social mass –whether in
institutional domains evidence some equivalence organic or super-organic bodies—will eventually
in their structure and culture. Businesses, schools, require a more complex skeleton to support the
churches, government agencies, science organi- larger mass. That is, structural and cultural dif-
zations, sports teams, and so on are, at a funda- ferentiation is a function of the size and rate of
mental level, very similar structurally, revealing growth of populations organized into societies
some cultural equivalences promoting integra- and inter-societal systems. Differentiation
tion, even as persons engage in very different involves the creation of new types of corporate
kinds of institutional activities. The result is that units, revealing divisions of labor, organized to
individuals diversely situated in seemingly dif- purse diverse goals within and between institu-
ferent structures experience a common structural tional domains. While, as emphasized above,
and cultural environment, such as relations of some degree of segmentation is retained during
authority and similar norms for impersonality, differentiation, the process of differentiation still
goal directness, and efficiency. Moreover, seg- divides up labor and functions so that larger-scale
mentation also operates to distinguish axes of dif- tasks can be performed to sustain a population. If
ferentiation so that those corporate units in the a population grows but cannot differentiate new
same institutional domain all reveal higher levels types of corporate units to build out diverse insti-
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 23
tutional domains to solve adaptive problems, a money supplies, formation of credit, and differen-
society will disintegrate for a lack of ability to tiation of markets for exchanges of equities and
produce, reproduce, and regulate its members. other systems for amassing capital used in
Differentiation, however, generates new types exchange distribution. And, these mechanism all
of integrative problems of how to manage and increase the volume, velocity, and scope of
coordinate relations among differentiated corpo- exchanges, while at the same time increasing the
rate units and between corporate units and cate- disintegrative potential in markets and, indeed, all
goric units. And these integrative problems can economic exchanges (Braudel 1977; Collins
be aggravated by conflicts of interests, hardening 1990; Turner 1995, 2010a).
boundaries and divergent cultures of corporate
units with sectors of an institutional domain or In addition to these more economic exchanges,
among domains, and increases in inequalities the expansion of markets and market infrastruc-
among class and other categoric units. Thus, dif- tures generate quasi markets, thereby increasing
ferentiation very rapidly generates new integra- the number of social relationships in societies
tive problems that, in turn, generate selection revealing a market-like quality (Simmel [1907]
pressures for new mechanisms forging interde- 1979; Turner 1995, 2010a). Quasi markets are, in
pendencies among differentiated units. some ways, a form of loose segmentation because
they mimic the basic structure of market
2.2.1.3 Interdependencies exchanges but are not generally explicitly eco-
Interdependencies among corporate units reveal nomic. For example, memberships in voluntary
a number of distinctive forms, including (Turner corporate units—clubs, churches, sports teams,
2010a): (a) exchange, (b) embedding and inclu- etc.—take on an exchange character, with the
sion, (c) overlap, and (d) mobility. Each of these corporate unit “marketing” it resources to poten-
is examined below. tial members and with members joining the cor-
porate unit for non-economic resources, such as
Exchanges Corporate units form many levels and religiosity, fun, companionship and love, loyalty,
types of exchange relations with each other and commitments, and philanthropy, aesthethics,
with incumbents in their respective divisions of competition, prestige, etc. (Hechter 1987).
labor. At the macro level, exchanges cannot Money may become part of this exchange if dues,
become extensive without markets and quasi mar- fees, and other “price” considerations enter. But,
kets (Simmel [1907] 1979; Weber [1922]1968: when we speak of a marriage or “dating market,”
635–40; Braudel [1979] 1982, 1977; Turner 1995, money is not the explicit medium of exchange
2010a). Markets institutionalize the exchange of (Abrutyn 2015), although such markets can be
one resource for another, typically after some usurped by more economic forces, as is the case
negotiation over the respective values of the in the dating market that is increasingly regulated
resources possessed by the actors. Such exchanges by corporate units providing match-making ser-
are often “economic” because they involve the vices for a fee. Indeed, as critical theorists like
flow of a generalized resource like money among Jurgen Habermas ([1973] 1976) have argued,
corporate units and between corporate units and cold symbolic media like money and power may
members of categoric units who are incumbent in “colonize” social relationships, with quasi mar-
corporate-unit divisions of labor. In turn, increases kets being especially vulnerable because they
in the scope, volume, and types of exchanges already have many properties of economic
force the elaboration of distributive infrastruc- markets.
tures for moving people, resources, and informa- The expansion of economic markets and quasi
tion across territorial and sociocultural spaces, markets dramatically alters that nature of social
thereby providing a new mechanisms of integra- relationships in societies, as Geog Simmel
tion. Also, exchanges generate further integrative ([1907]1979) was the first to fully explore.
mechanisms, coinage of money, regulation of Relations become more instrumental, and
24 J.H. Turner
individuals begin to have more choice in the and when these media have been used to form
resources, including friendships and group affili- institutional ideologies that in turn regulate the
ations, that they seek. As individuals give up formation of beliefs and norms, highly differenti-
resources—time, energy, commitments, money— ated structures become more integrated.
they generally do so because they experience an
increase in their sense of value, which generates Embedding thus generates structural inclu-
commitments to the macro-level system of sion, but such inclusions also generate their
market-mediated relations and its institutional own disintegrative pressures. One is rigidity
supports that allow for a sense of “profit” to be across wide sectors of institutional domains
realized in each successive exchange in a market that makes them unable to respond to new envi-
or quasi market. Thus, exchanges not only gener- ronmental exigencies. Another is the problems
ate commitments among exchange partners, that always come with complexity of social
whether individuals or corporate units, they lead structure: poor coordination, fraud, exploita-
individuals to form commitments to macrostruc- tion, abuse of authority, and inefficiencies—all
tural systems like institutions and societies as a of which can become sources of tension and,
whole that have enabled them to experience an hence, institutional if not societal and inter-
increase in utilities or profits from exchange societal disintegration.
activities (Lawler and Yoon 1996; Lawler et al.
2009; Lawler 2001). Overlaps The divisions of labor of diverse cor-
But exchange also generates disintegrative porate units sometimes overlap within institu-
pressures. Inherent in all markets—whether eco- tional domains, with the result that the network
nomic or quasi markets—are de-stabilizing structure and culture of corporate units become
forces, such as inflation or deflation, fraud and more integrated across a larger set of positions
manipulation, oscillations in supplies and and members incumbent in these positions. If
demands, exploitation of the disadvantaged, members are from diverse categoric units, over-
increases in inequalities, pyramiding of meta- laps also generates intersections, which as I will
markets where the medium of exchange (e.g., analyze later, are a critical mechanism integrating
money) in a lower market becomes the commod- societies. And the more individuals, per se, inter-
ity exchange in higher-level (e.g., money mar- act, but especially individuals from diverse and
ket), speculative markets (equity and futures differentially-evaluated categoric units, the less
markets) that are subject of fraud, and over- salient will categoric-unit memberships or differ-
speculation and collapse. The result is that ent locations in divisions of labor become (Blau
exchanges force the elaboration of another key 1977, 1994; Turner 2002, 2010b), and hence the
integrative mechanisms: the consolidation and more integrated will be the overlapping corporate
centralization of power—to be examined shortly. units, and the greater will be the positive emo-
tions that individuals feel for the overlapping cor-
Embedding and Inclusion Social structures and porate units.
their cultures typically become embedded, with
smaller units lodged inside of ever-larger corpo- Overlaps can, however, consolidate members
rate units within an institutional domain. In this of categoric-unit memberships when each of the
way, there is a kind of meta-coordination of the overlapping units reveals high levels of homoge-
divisions of labor of corporate units, their cul- neity of memberships, which reduces rates of
tures, and their exchange relations, all of which inter categoric-unit interaction. Moreover, if
reduce the disintegrative potential of differentia- overlaps reinforce hierarchies in the divisions of
tion and exchanges as integrative mechanisms. labor, with one unit dominating over the other,
When there are network ties and relations of then the tensions associated with hierarchy will
authority across embedded structures, when the increase the potential for disintegration (see later
same generalized symbolic media are employed, discussions of hierarchy and domination).
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 25
Mobility Mobility across corporate unit within populations that have been separated but, still,
and between institutional domains increases inte- must have some ties to each other (Goffman
gration by virtue of increasing the connections 1967). Entrance/exit rules and rituals enable
among individuals across sociocultural space. actors to make the transition from one culture
Individuals bring the culture of one unit to the and/or social structure to another, without acti-
other, and out of the blending of cultures (ideolo- vating disintegrative relations with those who
gies, beliefs, norms, expectations) cultural simi- have been segregated.
larities across a larger swath of corporate-unit Yet, segregation per se will typically generates
positions increases, and hence, so does cultural disintegrative pressures over the long run because
integration. Moreover, to the extent that mobility separation of corporate units or subpopulations,
also brings members of different categoric units or both, almost always involves the use of power
together and increases their rates of interaction, and domination to impose and maintain the sepa-
inequalities in the evaluation of categoric-unit ration; and once imposed, the distribution of
memberships decline, thereby making connec- resources often becomes ever-more unequal. And
tions less stressful. And, as stress is reduced, if segregation of corporate units and subpopula-
positive emotional arousal increases and reduces tions are consolidated, this consolidation of
tensions associated with inequalities. parameters marking status locations (in divisions
of labor) with diffuse status characteristics of
However, mobility has the ironic consequence incumbents in categoric units generally works to
of sometimes increasing the sense of relative increase tensions between (a) corporate units, (b)
deprivation among those who are not mobile but divisions within them, and (c) members of valued
who must observe the mobility of others (Merton and devalued categoric units.
1968). Those left behind can be stigmatized by While such systems can promote integration
the ideologies of the domains in which they are (that is, regularized patters of relationships) for
incumbent in corporate units, thereby increasing considerable periods of time, segregation in the
their negative emotions and potential for conflict end will increase tensions and the potential for
with, or at least resentment of, those who have disintegrative conflicts because segregation is
been mobile. And, if those left behind are dispro- typically part of a larger pattern of inequality and
portionately members of devalued categoric stratification in a society or inter-societal system
units, while those who have been mobility are that is created and sustained by domination.
members of more valorized categoric units, then
the tensions among members of categoric units in 2.2.1.5 Domination and Stratification
a society will increase, thereby raising the poten- Max Weber’s ([1922]1968: 212–299) analysis of
tial for disintegration. domination is perhaps the strongest part of his
sociology because it views inequalities and strati-
2.2.1.4 Segregation fication as part of a larger process by which
The opposite of interdependencies is segregation. power is mobilized to control and regulate; and in
When corporate units and members of categoric so doing, domination provides a central mecha-
units are consistently separated in space and nisms of macrostructural integration. As popula-
time, segregation exists and, for a time, can pro- tions grow and differentiate, polity and law as
mote integration by separating corporate and cat- institutional domains differentiate and begin to
egoric units that engage in incompatible activities consolidate power. Other domains can also do so,
and/or have histories of conflict and other disinte- as is the case with religion and, at times, with
grative relations. There are almost always powerful economic actors. Consolidation of
entrance and exit rules (Luhmann 1982) for power occurs along four bases (Mann 1986;
entering and leaving corporate units that have Turner 1995, 2010a): (1) physical coercion, (2)
been segregated. There will also be highly ritual- administrative control, (3) manipulation of incen-
ized forms of interaction among members of tives, and (4) use of cultural symbols. And,
26 J.H. Turner
depending upon the particular combination of unviable. Under these conditions mobilization
bases mobilized, the resulting system of domina- for conflict by those denied opportunities to
tion will vary. Domination is also part of the secure valued resources becomes ever-more
broader stratification system in which corporate likely (Turner 2013: 337–74). Indeed, such sys-
units in various institutional domains distribute tems may be in constant cycles of conflict, with
resources unequally by virtue of whether or not the outcome of conflict never leading to a new
they allow individuals to become incumbent in and stronger system of domination.
the corporate units of differentiated institutional
domains and, if admitted, where they can become 2.2.1.6 Intersections
incumbent in the division of labor and where they Peter Blau’s (1977, 1994) last major theorizing
can be mobile within and across corporate units. on macrostructures argued that high rates of
Inequality and stratification created by domi- interaction among diverse types of individuals at
nation can promote integration, even under con- different locations of social structures promotes
ditions of very high inequality. Indeed, where integration. He emphasized that individuals,
inequality is great, where domination is extensive when viewed from a macro-level perspective, can
and extends to all social relations within and be arrayed as a series of distributions among sub-
between corporate units and members of cate- populations distinguished by what he termed
goric units, and where social strata (class and “parameters.” There are two types of parameters:
other hierarchical divisions) are consolidated Graduated parameters mark individuals location
with memberships in valued and devalued cate- with respect to markers that vary by degree—e.g.
goric units, integration can be high—albeit in a amount of income, levels of wealth, years of edu-
most oppressive manner. Highly stratified societ- cation, age, etc. Nominal parameters mark indi-
ies are integrated but they also possess high viduals as members of a discrete social category
potential for tension and conflict in the longer that is distinct from other categories, or what I am
run, but they can persist for considerable periods labeling categoric units. The key to integration,
of time across large expanses of territory. Blau argued, is intersection whereby individuals
In contrast, high degrees of integration will be with high and low locations on graduated param-
likely when domination is less pronounced. eters and membership marked by high and low
Under this condition of lower domination, inter- evaluations of nominal parameters have opportu-
section of memberships of categoric units in divi- nities to interact: the higher the intersection and
sions of labor of corporate units will be higher. rates of interaction among people located in dif-
And high levels of intersection creates less ferent places on graduated and nominal parame-
bounded classes that, in turn, encourage upward ters, the more integrated will be a society.
mobility across the class system. Thus, societies Conversely, the more consolidated are param-
revealing lower levels of dominations have eters, whereby rates of contact and interaction
greater flexibility to deal with tensions and con- across graduated and nominal parameters are
flicts as they arise. Domination and stratification low, the less integrated will the society be. I
systems between these two extremes of very high would add the caveat that such consolidations is
and low domination are the mostly likely to almost always part of a system of domination and
reveal immediate disintegrative potential (Turner stratification and, hence, by my definition, such a
2010a: 186–90). Typically, inequality is high and system can be highly integrated, at least for a
consolidation of resource-distributing corporate time. But, I think that Blau is essentially correct
units with high and low evaluations of member- that intersection of parameters promotes consid-
ships in categoric units is also high. Yet, at the erable mobility and at time chaos, but it does not
same time, the consolidation of the coercive, lead to the building up of tensions and hostility
administrative, symbolic bases of power is weak, among subpopulations compared to societies
and the lack of material resources makes consoli- where consolidation of parameters causes the
dation of a material incentive base of power accumulation of tensions and hostilities between
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 27
subpopulations defined by their categoric-unit tions in the divisions of labor and on members of
memberships. With intersection, tensions can be categoric units during the course of encounters of
resolved and conflicts can be frequent and institu- face-to-face interaction at the micro-level of
tionalized by law, thereby promoting a flexible social organization (see Webster and Foschi 1988
system of integration, whereas consolidation pro- for literatures on expectation states).
duces a more rigid system held together by (a) Cultural integration increases in a society
high levels of coercive power, especially around when there is consistency among the cultural sys-
its administrative base, (b) high levels of resource tems outlined above. If texts (e.g., histories, phi-
inequality, (c) low rates of mobility, and (d) seg- losophies, stories, folklore, etc.) are consistent
regation of individuals and families at divergent with each other and with technologies, values,
points of salient graduated and nominal and ideologies, they provide a firmer cultural
parameters. platform for the development of beliefs, norms,
and expectation states at the meso and micro lev-
2.2.1.7 Cultural Integration els of social organization. In contrast, if these
At the macro level of organization texts (written cultural systems reveal contradictions and incon-
and oral), technologies (knowledge about how to sistencies, integration by culture will be much
manipulate the environment), values (general weaker. When cultural systems are embedded
moral imperatives), ideologies (moral impera- inside each other, with less encompassing moral
tives for specific institutional domains, and meta- codes lodged inside of, and even derived from,
ideologies (moral imperative combining more generalized cultural codes, then another
ideologies from several institutional domains) level of cultural integration is achieved.
are the most important elements of culture when Ideologies, then, are derived from texts, technol-
analyzing integration. Ideologies and meta- ogies, and values; and in turn, meta-ideologies
ideologies provide, respectively, the moral tenets are built up from ideologies so derived, then
for beliefs of corporate-unit culture and status beliefs in corporate-unit culture and status beliefs
beliefs about members of categoric units operat- about members of categoric units follow from
ing as the meso-level of social organization. units ideologies and meta-ideologies that regulate and
tend to be lodged within a particular institutional legitimate actions with institutional domains and
domain. At times, meta-ideologies can also be moral evaluations of those at different places in
involved in corporate units within the set of the class system of a society. Then, if normative
domains generating a meta-ideology. And so, the systems are taken from the moral codings of
culture of any given corporate unit will be highly beliefs (and ideologies and meta-ideologies at the
constrained by the elements of ideologies and, at macro level), then expectation states on individu-
times, meta-ideologies of the domain(s) in which als will be clear, allowing interactions at the
it is embedded. Meta-ideologies legitimate the micro level to proceed smoothly.
inequalities of the stratification system in a soci- Consistency, embedding, and successive deri-
ety. Status beliefs at the meso level social organi- vation of lower- from higher- level moral codings
zation are derived by meta-ideologies, and these thus increase integration, even when they legiti-
beliefs specify the moral worth and other charac- mate structural arrangements in institutional
teristics of members of categoric units. In turn, domains that generate tension-producing inequal-
normative expectations on incumbents in the ities in the stratification system and the differen-
divisions of labor in corporate units and on mem- tial moral evaluation of members of categoric
bers of categoric units are drawn from the domi- units. Yet, under such circumstances, the underly-
nant beliefs of corporate-unit culture and the ing tensions created by inequalities will work to
status beliefs about the moral worth and charac- increase potential pressures for disintegration at a
teristics of members of various categoric units. social structural level. And, as social structural
These normative expectations then determine the level tensions increase, these can work to under-
specific expectation states on individuals in loca- mine the level of integration provided by culture
28 J.H. Turner
about the sacred/supernatural from religion). And has characterized as the proximal bias inherent in
so, if consistency in moral tenets of symbolic emotional arousal in encounters. This concept of
media is low, then ideologies and meta-ideologies proximal bias emphasizes the fact that positive
may come into conflict with each other and with emotional flows tend to circulate in local encoun-
other cultural elements such as (a) texts, technol- ters and, hence, stay at the micro level. Emotions
ogies, and values at the macro level of social that generate micro commitments can, and often
organization, (b) beliefs and status beliefs as they do, generate solidarities and sentiments among
generate normative systems at the meso level, individuals in encounters; and often these posi-
and (c) expectation states at the micro level. tive sentiments can emerge among individuals
Thus, cultural integration in societies is always who view meso and macro structures (and their
problematic because, once structural differentia- cultures) in negative terms, thereby sustaining
tion occurs, sustaining common texts and values, micro level integration at the cost of macro-level
ideologies and meta-ideologies, beliefs and sta- integration. And so, if this proximal bias is not
tus beliefs, normative expectations for incum- broken, allowing positive emotions to flow out-
bents in divisions of labor of corporate units and ward beyond the local encounter to meso and
for members in categoric units, and on-the- macro structures, the commitments to the meso
ground expectations states for individuals in and macro levels of reality so necessary for soci-
encounters all can become more difficult. etal integration cannot emerge.
Consistency among, embedding of less inclusive Moreover, the problems of breaking the proxi-
codes in more inclusive codes, and deriving mal bias to positive emotions are aggravated by
moral codes down this ladder of embedding is the distal bias for negative emotions which,
not easily assured, per se, and often becomes Lawler (2001) argues, tend to move away from
doubly problematic if cultural codes cause soci- local encounters outward toward meso and macro
eties with high levels of inequality and stratifica- structures, thus reducing the ability for commit-
tion to emerge, thereby setting up potential ments to form and, indeed, encouraging distanc-
disintegrative pressures from the unequal distri- ing emotions like alienation from, or even
bution of the very symbolic media from which hostility toward, meso and macro structures and
cultural integration is sustained. their cultures. This distal bias, I argue, is fed by
the activation of defense mechanisms protecting
persons in local encounters and activating attri-
2.3 The Microdynamics butions toward safer, less immediate structures
of Integration and their cultures (Turner 2002, 2007, 2010b).
Thus, the basic problem on micro-level inte-
The macro-level dynamics of integration revolve gration revolves around the dual problems of
around structural and cultural systems that give overcoming both the proximal and distal biases
direction and constraint to both individual and of positive and negative emotions. If positive
collective actions at the meso- and micro-levels emotions remain local, and negative emotions
of the social universe. Before examining the consistently target meso and macro structures
meso level in more detail, it is useful to skip and their cultures, then the potential power of
down to the micro dynamics of societal integra- emotions to integrate and connect all three levels
tion at the level of encounters before turning to of the social universe is not realized, causing only
meso-level corporate and categoric units. The micro-level integrations among chains of encoun-
micro level of social organization generates, or ters and small corporate units like groups. And
fails to do so, commitments among individuals to often, as noted above, these encounters and
meso and macro structures and their cultures groups sustain their local focus by viewing other
(Turner 2002, 2007, 2010b). These commitments groups in negative emotional terms, thus promot-
are generated by the arousal of positive emotions ing conflict among groups. Gang violence would
that are able to break what Edward Lawler (2001) be a good example of how micro solidarity of the
30 J.H. Turner
gang is sustained by positive emotions aroused from self and the local encounter (Turner 2007).
by interactions within the gang, reinforced by For there to be integration within and across lev-
negative emotional reactions toward rival gangs. els of social reality, it is necessary for individuals
A social universe built from rival gangs will be to perceive that they have met expectations and
disintegrated across all three levels of social real- that they have received positive sanctioning from
ity, whereas an integrated society evidences con- others in a situation.
nections within and across all three levels of But more is involved; individuals must consis-
reality. How, then, are these connections created tently experience this sense of meeting expecta-
and sustained in the presence of the proximal and tions and receiving positive sanctions in encounters
distal biases of, respectively, positive and nega- iterated over time and in encounters across a large
tive emotions? Some of my answer is given in number of different types of corporate units
Chap. 7 of this volume; let’s consider some of (groups, organizations, and communities) embed-
these arguments. ded in many differentiated institutional domains
and across memberships in diverse categoric units
(Turner 2002, 2007). Thus, solidarity at the level
2.3.1 Basic Conditions of Emotion of the encounter and across domains of reality is
Arousal not a “one shot” process, but a consistent experi-
ence of meeting expectations in iterated in encoun-
Humans are wired to be highly emotional (Turner ters across corporate units lodged in diverse
2000, 2002, 2007, 2010b); and emotions are institutional domains in a society and across
aroused under two basic conditions: (1) expecta- encounters where categoric unit memberships
tions and (2) sanctions. When expectations for have been salient and expectations for treatment
what should occur in a situation are met, individ- and sanctions have activated positive emotions. It
uals experience mild to potentially more intense is the repetition of these positive emotional experi-
positive emotions, whereas when expectations ences across many contexts that activates positive
are not realized, the opposite is the case, thereby emotions to the point where they can break the
activating the distal bias that generally takes neg- hold of the proximal bias, and move out from the
ative emotions away from the local encounter and encounter and, thereby, target meso-level and
targets more remote objects that will not disrupt macro-level structures and their cultures. Persistent
the encounter and, at the same time, will protect positive emotional arousal in many diverse con-
individuals from negative feelings about them- texts allows individuals to perceived the source of
selves. When individuals experience positive positive emotional as emanating from the structure
sanctions, or approving responses from others, and culture of meso and macro social units. And as
they experience positive emotions, whereas when these positive emotions build up, their arousal
they experience negative sanctions, they experi- dampens the effects of the distal bias inhering in
ence such negative emotions as anger, fear, negative emotional arousal.
shame, guilt, and humiliation, thus activating In this way individuals develop commitments
external attributions as a defense mechanism to to meso and macro structures, seeing them as
protect both self and viability of the local encoun- responsible for their ability to meet expectations
ter. Thus, I argue that the cognitive-emotional and receive positive sanctions. And, the more
machinery driving the distal bias to negative individuals who can have these experiences and
emotions is, first, repression of negative emotions the more often they can have them across many
toward self, second, their transmutation into safer different types of encounters embedded in differ-
emotions like anger and alienation, and, third, ent types of corporate units within diverse institu-
activation of external attributions that push nega- tional domains, the greater will be their
tive emotions outward onto safer objects, away commitments of a population to all levels of
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 31
social structure and culture outlined in Figs. 7.1 also necessary for persons to perceive that others
and 7.3. What conditions, then, allow people to are actively signaling approval of their behaviors.
meet expectations and receive positive sanctions Thus, the clarity of expectations, as this clarity
from others? follows from the conditions enumerated above, is
also critical to meeting feelings of being posi-
tively sanction by others. And, when clarity, con-
2.3.2 The Distribution sistency, and successive embedding are not
of Generalized Symbolic present, individuals are likely to behave in ways
Media that, to some degree, make them feel like they
have not met expectations and, moreover, that
In general, the distribution of generalized sym- they have failed in the eyes of others who are per-
bolic media will be highly salient in almost all ceived to be sanctioning them negatively.
encounters because these are not just symbolic As noted above, when the parameters marking
codings forming moralities (and derived expecta- individuals as members of differentially valued
tion states), they are often the valued resource categoric units are highly consolidated, meeting
distributed unequally by corporate units (Abrutyn expectations that will arouse positive emotions
2015). When people can consistently meet expec- can be difficult and avoiding the sense of being
tations for receipt of generalized symbolic media negatively sanctioned can be hard to avoid. For
across many institutional domains, they will typi- example, if ethnicity in a society is highly corre-
cally experience positive emotions, even if their lated with social class memberships, with mem-
expectations are comparatively low. But, when bers of devalued ethnic subpopulations
these expectations are not realized, the negative over-represented in lower classes and with mem-
emotional arousal will be intense and will con- bers of other, more-valued ethnic subpopulations
tribute considerably to the potential undermining incumbent in middle-to-higher social classes,
of the system of stratification, and particularly so, then interactions among these different ethnic
if there are high levels of intersection among groups will often be difficult because they will
social class and non-class memberships in cate- sustain low and high evaluations, and force those
goric units. who are less valued to meet expectations that
stigmatize them and, in so doing, that make it
seem like they are being negatively sanctioned by
2.3.3 Meeting Expectations higher-status individuals. Under these condi-
and Receiving Positive tions, even meeting expectations can be humiliat-
Sanctions ing and shame-provoking, thereby arousing
negative emotions that must often be repressed.
When expectations are clear, non-contradictory, Given that consolidation also typically involves
consistent, and successively embedded from the consolidation of members of higher- and lower-
most general (texts and values, for example) to ranked members of different categoric units with
increasingly specific moral codes (i.e., ideolo- particular corporate units, such as neighbor-
gies, meta-ideologies, beliefs in corporate units hoods, schools, workplaces, and even churches,
and status beliefs for categoric, norms and situa- some of the stigma of inter-categoric unit interac-
tional expectations), it is likely that individuals tions can be mitigated by intra-categoric unit
will, first of all, hold realistic expectations. interactions where individuals can meet intra-
Secondly, they will be able to behave in ways that categoric and corporate-unit expectations and
allows them to meet these expectations for self feel as if others are approving of them in giving
and to facilitate others’ capacity to meet the off positive responses to behaviors. Still, segrega-
expectations. tion as a macro-level integrative mechanism (as it
When expectations are met, the positive emo- generates high rates of intra-categoric unit inter-
tions aroused feel like positive sanctions, but it is action at the micro level or reality) can only go so
32 J.H. Turner
far because people know they are devalued in the thereby arousing positive emotions within the
broader society, and as a consequence, they encounter (Ridgeway 1994). Of course, if a
experience the sting of such an evaluation when higher-status person fails to honor this implicit
forced to interact as subordinates with those in bargain, the tension in the encounter will
higher-ranking positions in divisions of labor and increase, but most people, most of the time,
with those in more highly valued, even valorized, implicitly realize what is at stake: constant ten-
categoric units. sion or mild positive emotional flow, with the
Domination and other integrative mechanisms latter being more gratifying (Ridgeway 1994;
like segregation and even interdependencies can, Turner 2002). This dynamic mitigates some of
therefore, make retreat to consolidated and segre- the negative processes unleashed by consolida-
gated “safe heavens” unfulfilling. Hence, high tion of parameters, as discussed above, but does
levels of inequality and discrimination against not obviate them. And so, the corrosive emo-
members of categoric unit sustaining inequality tional effect of prolonged inequalities across
will, eventually, arouse large pools of negative many diverse situations on people trapped in
emotions—anger, fear, shame, humiliation, sad- consolidated devaluated categoric units will
ness, alienation, and unhappiness in general— gradually increase the potential for disintegra-
among subpopulations where at least some of tive conflict, as negative emotions build up to the
their interactions in encounters are not point where individuals become ever-more will-
gratifying. ing to engage in conflict.
Thus, like any other valued resource in a soci-
ety, positive and negative emotions are distrib-
uted unequally (Turner 2014); and when negative 2.3.4 Transactional Needs and Their
emotions are disproportionately consolidated Effects on Meeting
with lower class and other devalued member- Expectations and Receiving
ships in non-class categoric units, integration will Positive Sanctions
be under duress, eventually shifting into mobili-
zation by members of devalued categoric units Many expectations come from what I have
against the existing system of integration in vari- labeled transactional needs (Turner 1987, 2002,
ous forms of intra- or even inter-society conflict. 2007, 2010b), which are motive states that arouse
Still, at the micro level, even interactions and direct the behaviors of all humans. These are,
among unequals—whether the inequality stems I believe, hard-wired into human neuroanatomy,
from different locations in the divisions of labor, with sociocultural elaborations; and in virtually
memberships in evaluated categoric units, or every micro-levels encounter, these transactional
both (in the case of consolidation)—have a ten- needs establish expectations for how a person
dency for unequals to honor expectations states. should be treated by others. If others treat a per-
Higher status persons will be allowed to initiate son as expected, then the person will experience
more talk and action and will be given deference positive emotions just as this person would from
by lower status persons; and lower status persons expectations from any other source. When not
will often sanction their fellow lower-status treated as expected by the arousal of need states,
members who challenge the micro system of the failure to do so will arouse negative emotions,
inequality (imposed by the meso, and ultimately, per se, but with a super-charging effect from a
macro levels of social organization). For, to chal- sense of being sanctioned by others. This failure
lenge the inequality invites negative emotional to meet expectations arising from need states will
arousal by higher-status persons and hence nega- thus almost always be seen as a negative sanction
tive sanctions that carry the power to make by others, thus doubling up on the person’s nega-
lower-status members of groups feel even more tive emotional arousal. And, if large numbers of
negative emotions. In return for acceptance of individuals in devalued categoric units must con-
the status order, then, higher-status persons treat sistently fail in meeting their transactional needs,
those in lower positions with respect and dignity, the pool of negative emotional arousal will
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 33
consolidate with class and other devalued cate- Table 2.1 Transactional needs generating expectation
states
goric memberships.
While people may lower their expectations 1. Verification of identities: needs to verify one or
more of the four basic identities that individuals
when consistently not realized, such is more dif-
present in all encounters
ficult to do for expectations generated by transac-
(a) Core-identity: the conceptions and emotions that
tional needs that are part of the person’s sense of individuals have about themselves as persons that
who and what they are, above and beyond their they carry to most encounters
memberships in categoric units. Hence, even as (b) Social-identity: the conception that individuals
people come to accept a certain consistent level have of themselves by virtual of their membership
in categoric units which, depending upon the
of failure in meeting needs, the corrosive effects situation, will vary in salience to self and others;
of negative emotional arousal, often accompa- when salient, individuals seek to have others verify
nied by repression, further stock the pool of nega- their social identity
tive emotions that can undermine societal (c) Group-identity: the conception that individuals
integration. have about their incumbency in corporate units
(groups, organizations, and communities) and/or
Table 2.1 lists the universal transactional their identification with the members, structure, and
needs that drive the behaviors of individuals in culture of a corporate unit; when individuals have a
virtually every encounter of interpersonal behav- strong sense of identification with a corporate unit,
ior (Turner 1987, 1988, 2002, 2007, 2010b). they seek to have others verify this identity
These needs vary in the relative power, as is cap- (d) Role-identity: the conception that individuals
have about themselves as role players, particularly
tured in the rank-ordering implied by the list in roles embedded in corporate units nested in
Table 2.1. institutional domains; the more a role-identity is
As the ranking in the table denotes, verifica- lodged in a domain, the more likely will individuals
tion of various levels of identity is the most pow- need to have this identity verified by others
erful transactional need; and the ranking of 2. Making a profit the exchange of resources: needs
to feel that the receipt of resources by persons in
these various types of selves (from core-self encounters exceeds their costs and investments in
down through social-, group-, and role-identi- securing these resources and that their shares of
ties) indicate their relative power to arouse neg- resources are just compared to (a) the shares that
ative or positive emotions. The second most others receive in the situation and (b) reference points
that are used to establish what is a just share
powerful need is, I believe, the need to feel that
3. Efficacy: needs to feel that one is in control of the
one has gained a profit in exchanges of situation and has the individual capacity and
resources—both intrinsic and extrinsic—with opportunity to direct ones own conduct, despite
others. Human calculations of profit are deter- sociocultural constraints
mined by the value of resources received for 4. Group inclusion: needs to feel that one is a part of
those given up as costs and investments (accu- the ongoing flow of interaction in an encounter; and
the more focused is the encounter, the more powerful
mulated costs), evaluated against various cul- is this need
tural standards of fairness and justice. The third 5. Trust: needs to feel that others’ are predictable,
most powerful need is one that I have added in sincere, respective of self, and capable of rhythmic
recent work, and it emphasizes achieving a sustaining synchronization
sense of efficacy in interaction, or the sense that 6. Facticity: needs to feel that, for the purposes of the
present interaction, individuals share a common
one has some control over what will occur and
inter-subjectivity, that matters in the situation are as
what the outcomes will be. The fourth need is a they seem, and that the situation has an obdurate
need for group inclusion, or the sense that one is character
part of the ongoing flow of the interaction. The
fifth is a sense of trust that depends up the pre-
dictability of self and others respective actions, actional needs are the most powerful, and they
the ability to fall into what Collins (2004) rhyth- have the greatest effect on, first, establishing
mic synchronization in talk and body move- expectations in a situation and on, secondly, the
ments, and the sense that others are being intensity of the emotional reaction, whether
sincere and respective to self. These five trans- positive or negative, for success or failure in
34 J.H. Turner
meeting expectations and perceiving that others need states are internal to the individual and, as
are positively or negatively sanctioning a per- noted earlier, are part of a person’s basic sense of
son. The sixth need for facticity will arouse who they are and how they should be treated. So,
highly negative emotions when not met, as when failing to meet even lowered expectations (from
individuals do not achieve the sense that they past readjustment downward of these expecta-
are experiencing the situation in the same man- tions) arouses not only emotions like shame,
ner, but it is not as powerful as the other need alienation, and withdrawal from commitments to
states; and when the sense of facticity is macrostructures but also proactive emotions like
achieved, it does not arouse strong positive anger and needs for vengeance to strike out at
emotions. the source of this failure. The distal bias and the
People in most encounters, even those among use of external attributions toward meso and
unequals, are typically trying to meet each others macrostructures will increase disaffection from
transactional needs because, to fail to do so, will social structures, and rapidly erode commit-
breach an encounter and often arouse intense ments to all levels of social reality, except those
negative emotions, especially if an identity or that continue to offer some chance of meeting
sense of profit is denied by others. Not only are expectations.
the expectations not realized, but others are likely
to be seen as responsible, thus filling the encoun-
ter with negative emotions that are difficult for all 2.4 Mesodynamics
to endure. And so, if individuals can understand of Integration
the nature of expectations arising from these
needs—and people are very adept at reading The macro and micro levels of reality meet in the
these expectations in the gestures of others—they meso level, composed of corporate and categoric
will do so, if they possibly can. And if they can- units. Almost every encounter is embedded in a
not get a firm initial reading about each other’s corporate unit revealing a division of labor and
expectations, they will tread “interpersonal” several categoric units composed of persons who
water and stay in a highly ritualized mode of con- are placed into variously evaluated social catego-
duct until they have a better sense of which iden- ries. Corporate units are the building blocks of
tity is most salient in the situation, which institutional domains, but once these domains are
resources are in play in exchanges, what will formed, corporate units are also the conduits by
make others feel a sense of efficacy, what is which the culture and structure of the macro
involved in securing a sense of being part of the realm makes its down and imposes expecta-
action, and what is necessary to communicate a tions—derived from societal-level values, institu-
sense of trust. This positive bias to most interac- tional ideologies and the symbolic media used to
tions is part of the proximal bias; and it is one develop these ideologies, meta-ideologies, cor-
reason why people are able to experience positive porate units beliefs, norms of the division of
emotions in most—but, obviously, not all— labor of corporate units and, finally, expectations
encounters. This bias thus assures some degree of states derived from these norms that will guide
integration at the micro level, and if sufficiently interaction in micro encounters.
consistent over encounters and across situations, Categoric units are the building blocks of the
the positive emotions generated can break the macro realm, via their effects on the formation of
hold of proximal bias and begin to form commit- a system of stratification in society, whereby
ments to meso and macro structures and their cul- social strata or classes are, to various degrees,
tures in a society. consolidated with memberships in non-class cat-
Yet, when people consistently do not meet the egoric units, such as ethnicity/race, religious
expectations arising from their transactional affiliation, gender, age, national origins, and the
needs across encounters in an array of corporate like. Stratification systems are created by the
units in different institutional domains, the nega- unequal distribution of the generalized symbolic
tive emotions will be particularly painful because media summarized in Table 11.2 as valued
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 35
resources and legitimated by the meta-ideologies seek resources necessary to function, and on the
that form from the circulation of generalized other, a cultural and structural field. The emer-
symbolic media across sets of institutional gence of organizational ecology (e.g., Hannan
domains. As such, the meta-ideologies of the and Freeman 1977, 1989) changed the way orga-
stratification system set up status beliefs and nizations and, potentially, corporate units more
expectations states for individuals in encounters generally are analyzed, whereas, the so-called
who are members of diverse categoric units that “new institutionalism” (Powell and DiMaggio
are typically differentially evaluated in terms of 1991; Friedland and Alford 1991; Fligstein and
their moral worth. McAdam 2012)) did the same but in a less useful
When the conditions outlined for macro-level way than organizational ecology. In the new
integration are in place, then the structures of the institutionalism, the field of any given organiza-
macro and meso realms are well integrated, and if tion is other organizations, which is certainly true
the culture associated with these structures is also but misses the critical point that other organiza-
well connected in the patterned outlined above, tions are part of emergent institutional domains
beliefs and norms at the meso level provide clear with their own macro-level structures and cul-
expectation states for micro level behaviors tures that are sustained by the macro modes of
among individuals in encounters. Conversely, if integration examined earlier. Let me first exam-
there are gaps, inconsistencies, failures to embed ine what organizational ecology adds to a view of
or if integration is achieve by segregation and integrative dynamics in societies, and then turn to
consolidations within and between corporate and the notion of field emerging from the new
categoric units, then expectations may be some- institutionalism.
what clear but they are likely to generate negative
emotions at the level of the encounter. In so 2.4.1.1 The Ecology of Corporate Units
doing, they erode integration by reducing com- When attention shifts to the ecology of corporate
mitments of persons to meso and the macro struc- units, instead of just organizations, the ideas of
tures and cultures built up from meso structures. both urban and organizational ecology become
These dynamics have been discussed in the sec- relevant (Turner 2015; Irwin 2015), as does a
tions on macro and micro integration, but they more micro view of groups as seeking resource
can be given additional focus by viewing corpo- niches. Macro-level dynamics of integration
rate units as operating within cultural and struc- organize the environments of corporate units,
tural fields generated by the institutional domains once they have been built up into institutional
in which they are lodged and the modes of inte- domains that distribute resources generating
grating corporate units with and across institu- stratification as a macro-level system. These
tional domains. Similarly, focus is achieved by environments can be seen as distributions of vari-
examining the dynamics of consolidation and ous types of resources—demographic, material,
intersection of categoric units in cultural and cultural, and structural—needed to sustain the
structural fields generated by the structure of the operation of a corporate unit. One generalization
stratification system and the meta-ideology legit- is that when institutional domains are integrated
imating this system. Let me first take on the fields by differentiation and interdependencies, the
and niches of corporate units. number of resource niches dramatically increases,
especially as markets and other distributive infra-
structures move resources across institutional
2.4.1 Fields and Niches domains. And, as the number of resource niches
Among Corporate Units increases, the greater will be the pressures for
further differentiation within and between the
The institutional domains in which corporate corporate units in diverse institutional domains;
units are embedded constitute, on the one hand, a and hence, the greater will be the number of
set of resource niches in which corporate units corporate units organizing a population. As this
36 J.H. Turner
number increases, selection pressures build for and (b) more on positivistic law than traditional-
further mechanisms of macro-level integration ism and rigid systems (e.g., religious) of moral
outlined earlier relying more upon interdepen- codes to direct corporate-unit activities. The
dencies more than domination, and for more result is that tensions and conflicts among corpo-
equitable distribution of generalized symbolic rate units can be negotiated and resolved in vari-
media as resources within the system of stratifi- ous political and legal forums without resorting
cation. And as differentiation among corporate to coercive domination. Moreover, when an arena
unit increases, so will the level of intersection of politics and positivistic law exist as regulatory
among members of diverse categoric units across mechanisms of integration (Luhmann 1982),
the divisions of labor of corporate units in a competition among corporate units will be less
greater number of institutional domains. likely to evolve into open and potentially violent
A related set of generalizations arise from a conflict that would increase the disintegrative
view of corporate units as seeking diverse potential in a society.
resources in niches, in which the competition for Thus, integrated ecosystems at the societal
resources is regulated by markets and quasi mar- level require internal capacities to regulate com-
kets. Organizations in particular, but other corpo- petition for resources. Markets represent one
rate units as well, will compete not just for mechanisms for doing so, but the co-evolution of
clients, members, and incumbents but also the a polity relying more on incentives than coercion
additional resources that they may bring to an and a legal system built around the capacity to
organization (sales receipts, dues, positive feel- adjust legal codes and contracts to new condi-
ings, learning, knowledge, loyalty, competitive- tions (positivistic law) decrease the likelihood
ness, etc.). The result will be that generalized that regulated competition in markets will evolve
symbolic media will tend to flow across different into coercive dynamics revolving around strate-
corporate units within and across institutional gies employing violent conflict to gain access to
domains, providing a basis for integration; and if resources.
this integration is built up by intersections Yet, as resource niches become too densely
between corporate and categoric units, these population by corporate units, they can fail
intersections will reduce tensions associated with (Hannan and Freeman 1977), thereby also failing
inequalities and, thereby, increase integration. to meet the expectations of their incumbents.
Further, as both differentiation and resource- Moreover, systems regulated by markets, even
seeking efforts of corporate units encourage those with political and legal controls, are inher-
recruitment of clients, customers, members, and ently unstable, often resulting in contractions of
incumbents, individuals in a society will have the number of corporate units in resource niches,
access to more generalized symbolic media as and thus, causing once again a failure of individ-
resources across diverse resource-seeking and uals to meet expectations for resources. The
resource-giving corporate units across diverse result is that even in systems where domination is
institutional domains, thereby by increasing posi- low-key and revolves around manipulation of
tive emotional arousal and commitments to material incentive and positivistic law are vulner-
macro structures and their cultures and, thus, able to the vagaries of competition in resource
increasing micro-level integration of macro niches, which can increase disintegrative pres-
structures and their cultures. sures at all levels of social organization.
Differentiation and dynamism of resource-
seeking corporate units also increases integration 2.4.1.2 Structural and Cultural Fields
by encouraging such institutional domains as The new institutionalism tended to see the fields
polity and law to rely upon (a) material incentives of organizations as revealing such properties as
(thereby creating new resource niches) more than “logics” that directed the activities of organiza-
coercive or administrative power, which will tions in their environments. While there is a
decrease resources available to corporate units, certain vagueness to terms like “logics,” I interpret
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 37
the underlying idea in the following way: the inte- domination becomes the central mechanisms for
gration of macro structures and their cultures gen- ordering relations in a society, coupled with high
erate cultural and structural environments to levels of inequality and segregation among mem-
which not only organizations, but also all other bers of different categoric units. The emerging
types of corporate units must adapt. The modes system of relationships among corporate units,
and mechanisms of structural integration at the and the culture that they develop, will be very dif-
macro level of social organization provide create ferent than one based upon market forces guiding
and sustain a system of relationships among cor- exchanges among corporate units. All existing
porate units (and categoric units as well) to which and emergent corporate units in such a system
any given corporate unit must adapt, and in many will need to organize themselves so as to fit into
cases also adopt as part of its structure and cul- this template or, if one prefers, “logic” of social
ture. Similarly, the cultural systems of moral cod- organization at the macro level.
ing (see Fig. 7.3 in Chap. 7) attached to
institutional domains and the stratification system
provide a set of highly moralized instructions in Cultural Fields There are always idiosyncratic
their ideologies and meta-ideologies to all corpo- elements to the cultural systems that emerge as
rate units; and in so doing, this system of moral societies evolve; these elements are shaped by the
codings provides beliefs, norms, and expectations unique features of a population’s history, its geo-
directing incumbents in the divisions of labor of graphical location, and its previous modes of
corporate units and for members in categoric integration. Still, there are certain general classes
units. Let me now elaborate on both structural and of cultural systems operating in all societies. All
cultural fields as integrative mechanisms. societies reveal value systems, all evidence ide-
ologies of existing institutional domains, all
Structural Fields A structural field is created by reveal meta-ideologies legitimating the stratifica-
the macro-level integration on corporate units as tion system and evaluations of members of cate-
institutional domains evolve. For example, if seg- goric units, all generate belief system derived
mentation is the dominant mechanism of integra- from ideologies and meta-ideologies governing
tion, existing structures and their cultures provide the operation of corporate and categoric unit
both organizational templates and systems of dynamics, and all impose micro-level expecta-
moral codings that, in essence, need to be copied. tions states at the level of the encounter drawn
Segmentation always generates structural and from these meso-level belief systems. Thus, cul-
cultural fields, even as other mechanisms become tural fields will always reveal a pattern or logic
more prominent. For instance, as differentiation based upon these invariant dimensions of how
increases and, in turn, as differentiation forces culture structures itself in relation to social struc-
the evolution of new mechanisms of integration tures, and vice versa.
revolving around building up interdependencies,
the particular configuration mechanisms that The cultural field of any corporate or categoric
emerge provide structural templates for corporate unit is thus composed of the general value prem-
units to built up their structures so as to be able to ises of the society, the ideologies and meta-
fit into patterns of interdependencies generated ideologies that evolve to legitimate activities in
by these mechanisms. If, for example, exchange institutional domains, the beliefs shaping
becomes a dominant mechanism for creating and corporate-unit culture derived from ideologies
sustaining interdependencies, then corporate and the status beliefs drawn from meta-ideologies
units will develop structures designed to use mar- shaping the evaluation of members of categoric,
ket forces to secure resources and build up their and the expectations states in local encounters
structures, and they will develop culture codes constrained by these belief systems. The content
viewing competition for resources as an accept- of any of these of moral codings will, of course,
able mode of conduct. Conversely, let us say that varying by virtue of unique empirical and
38 J.H. Turner
historical events (which cannot be so easily during the period when new kinds of corporate
theorized) and by the particular configuration of units were forming and beginning to build up (a)
institutional domains that exists and the modes new and diverse institutional domains and (b) a
and mechanisms by which these domains and the stratification system composed of categoric units
stratification system are integrated. Once we created by the unequal distribution of generalized
know these structural fields that have been cre- symbolic media as resources by these new corpo-
ated, it becomes possible to determine the struc- rate units.
ture of the cultural fields, and vice versa. For By viewing cultural fields in this way, we can
example, if religion becomes a dominant institu- see their effect on meso-level integration.
tional domain and consolidates coercive power Corporate and categoric units are always being
and uses this power as a mean of domination, the forced to adapt to the more macro-level cultural
ideology of religion and the meta-ideology that is systems—values, ideologies, and meta-
built around religion will become the cultural ideologies (as well as texts and technologies)—
field to which all corporate and categoric units and as they do so, they implicitly seek to
must adapt and adopt. Present day Iran offers a incorporate the logic or the commands of these
good illustration of such a cultural field. In con- moral codes. And to the degree that the belief
trast, if the institutional revolves around eco- systems evolve around corporate units within
nomic trade with other populations and within a institutional domains and around status differ-
society, the cultural field that evolves will be very ences among members of categoric units are con-
different because it is more likely to be created to sistent with, and follow from, the ideologies,
justify exchange as a dominant mechanism of meta-ideologies, and general values of the macro
integration revolving around interdependencies, realm, they promote integration at the meso level
and the ideology of this domain will be the center because they present a coherent cultural field. As
of meta-ideologies from other institutional they do so, they increase the likelihood that
domains that are used to legitimate the stratifica- expectations at the micro level will be clear and,
tion system, and vice versa. This cultural field thereby, realized at least to some degree, thus
will then shape the evolution and modes of inte- promoting integration at the micro level. And, as
gration among corporate units that evolve in this beliefs and expectations states at the meso and
society. The emergence of capitalism, as micro level reproduce the cultural field and the
described by Weber ([1905] 1930) and Braudel structural arrangement that it legitimates, these
(1977) provide a good illustration such fields. fields thus reproduce the structures and cultures
The differences between these fields cannot of the macro realm, thereby promoting
always be predicted, but a reasonable hypothesis integration.
would be that a population with a history of con- The converse is true if there are dramatic dis-
flict with neighboring populations would produce continuities and inconsistencies in the moral
a cultural field built more around ideologies of codes of the macro realm, or if beliefs are not
domination than one that does not have such a derived from existing ideologies and meta-
history or one that has a history of external trade ideologies but, instead, are evolving on-the-
relations rather than warfare with it neighbors. ground as actors seeks to justify new types of
But, the point here is not so much the prediction sociocultural formations. Such a system will not
but the realization that, for whatever reason, the be integrated and will be likely to experience dra-
particular configuration of mechanism of integra- matic change, as ideologies of existing institu-
tion that evolve in a society at the macro level tional systems come into conflict with new ones
will shape the configuration of the cultural fields that are evolving or with new types of corporate
that evolve, and vice versa. And so, in trying to units challenging the existing “logics” of the
understand how cultural fields integrate societies, fields in which corporate units had heretofore
it is necessary to understand how they were used operated.
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Power in Organizational Society:
Macro, Meso and Micro 3
Yingyao Wang and Simone Polillo
politics for Weber, and culture/religion for are two defining features of contemporary soci-
Durkheim). Nevertheless, on the other hand, as ety. In one respect, we move beyond older theo-
discussions of control, regulation, and power ries of power that would tend to define it in terms
have crystallized into modern institutional analy- of coercion, meant to “overcome resistance (of
sis, different ways of combining insights from the power subject) in achieving a desired objec-
Marx, Weber, and Durkheim have led to distinc- tive or results.” (Pfeffer 1981: 2). For if power is
tive approaches within that general framework. as ubiquitous and as coervice a phenomenon as
Marx and Weber have been built upon in what these scholarly works acknowledge, we should
W. Richard Scott (2001) identifies as the “regula- be living in a dim world, suffering from ceaseless
tive pillar” of modern institutional analysis: a tra- emotional distress and physical constrains. This
dition that emphasizes the ways that rules and is an exaggerated scenario once squared with our
laws reproduce power systems through the coer- actual experiences with power.
cive imposition of organizational mandates and More recent scholarship has gone beyond the
standards. A second way Marx and Weber have enterprise of conceptualization to probe the
been jointly drawn from, with substantial bor- dimensions (Reed 2013), forms (Poggi 2001), or
rowings from Durkheim as well, is by focusing sources (Mann 2012a, b, c, d) of power. In cate-
on what Scott dubs the “normative pillar” of gorizing the workings of power, these lines of
institutions: the ways in which norms and values research suggest that power is plural and largely
invest social life with meanings that in turn “context and relationship specific” (Pfeffer 1981:
embody prescriptions, evaluations, and obliga- 3). Therefore power is a concept which we should
tions. Control, from this perspective, is a function treat as “sensitizing device” that orients us to
of individuals internalizing, and acting on the “certain forms and contents in a social relation-
basis of, normative orientations. A third tradition ship” (Bacharach and Lawler 1980: 15) or a form
is more squarely Durkhemeian, with strong of causality (Reed 2013).
Weberian influence as well. In line with This chapter is written in the same spirit of
Durkheim, it foregrounds the “cognitive-cultural” explaining power in terms of how forms and con-
dimension of institutions, namely, the shared tents of power are constructed. We are interested
conceptions and schemas that help individuals in understanding how power operates, instead of
constitute a meaningful social reality. Following what power is (in this respect, see Foucault 1980).
Weber, this tradition emphasizes the disciplinary Unlike Foucault, we do so by focusing on differ-
effect of such systems of cultural regulation. ent levels of observation and analysis—respec-
Cutting across these three pillars of institutional tively the macro, meso, and micro levels. Scale
analysis is a shared recognition that modern matters as it affects the forms and nature of
social order is to a large extent an organizational power. We argue that most existing research
accomplishment. By the same token, the regula- implicitly imagines power either as a macro phe-
tive, normative, and cultural-cognitive dimen- nomenon shaping large-scale social outcomes or
sions are pillars of institutional analysis because as a parameter of micro-level relations. What it
they highlight how, under what conditions, and to neglects is the meso-level of power relations,
what extent the attributes and relational proper- manifested and heavily regulated in formal orga-
ties of organizations contribute to the persistence nizations. Distinct from interpersonal or intra-
of the status quo. small-group relations, formal organizations are
In this chapter, we zero in on power as a form bounded entities that have clearly prescribed
of regulation. While we are attentive to all three rules governing the pattern of interactions among
dimensions of institutions, and their effect on organizational members, and thus possess formal
power, regulation and control, we organize our structures. As organizations permeate our social
discussion differently, in terms of levels of analy- lives, this “organizational society” enables a twin
sis. We depart from Weber’s thesis that rational- goal, or a “paradox:” organizational members are
ization and increased, organization-based control “freer from coercion through the power of
3 Power in Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 45
command of superiors than most people have tion of objective relations between positions.”
been, yet men in positions of power today prob- (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97) Fields impose
ably exercise more control than any tyrant ever causal forces on actors who reside within them,
has” (Blau and Schenherr 1971: 347). forces that are mediated by the positions they
This chapter sets to synthesize the mecha- occupy within those fields. The specific expres-
nisms of how this has been achieved. By drawing sion and measurement of power is capital, with
attention to the distinctive forms and natures of its amount proportional to positions and its types
power relations at this meso-level, our end goal is specific to fields. According to Bourdieu, capital
to extend power analysis from the macro and varies in volume and can also be of different
micro-level to analytical interactions among all types, e.g. social, economic, cultural, or symbolic
three levels of analyses. Power flows both capital; different types of capital can be converted
upwards and downwards, so that the interaction to one another. On account of the logic of conver-
and conversion of different forms of power at dif- sion, power in Bourdieusian theory is the gener-
ferent levels can generate new sets of emergent alized medium of exchange in fields, similar in
and interstitial structures and relations. this respect to Mann’s conceptualization.
Bourdieu’s notions of power and field are
macro-oriented in that Bourdieusian fields, first,
3.2 The Macro Approach ontologically and causally precede individual
to Power actions, and second, they produce macro-
outcomes. Chief among these outcomes is the
From a macro perspective, power is a force that formation of social classes, political elites, and
shapes large-scale social formations and out- the bureaucracy. The logic of specific fields also
comes. This force derives from macro conceptual determines the value and the exchange rates
entities such as spheres of action, fields or institu- between different types of capital. Bourdieu’s
tions (Abrutyn 2013a). theory is therefore a full-fledged macro-meso
Michael Mann’s voluminous works of the theory. The operation of forces in fields shapes
“history of power” are a prominent example of the general “topology” and distribution of social
this macro approach to power (Mann 2012a, b, c, spaces by clustering those who occupy similar
d). According to Mann, the constellations of four positions in the fields and generating hierarchies
sources of power—ideological, economic, mili- and oppositions among these clusters. Social
tary, and political, coterminous with four kinds of classes, formed within a field in this fashion, can
human needs and spheres of actions, determine form alliances with their counterparts across
the structures of societies in human history. The fields, generating oft-unforeseen social repercus-
force of power is causal: power triggers large- sions that go well beyond class formation. Recent
scale historical transformations. Different sources scholarship, for instance, sets out to illuminate
of power, imagined as independent causal chains, how interactions across fields, involving multi-
can join each other in different constellations and layered conflicts, and requiring geographical,
sequences, and produce emergent social entities, administrative coordination, generate large-scale
such as nation states, and mobilize new actors, change (Gorski 2013). For example, as
such as social classes. Nations and classes are nineteenth-century German officials left the
examples of macro-outcomes to which Mann’s bureaucratic field in the metropole to manage
historical analysis draws attention. German colonies, they carried over and localized
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu also existing power struggles among them. Colonial
perceives power as the exertion of forces. He bor- officials also vied with one other on the amount
rows this analytical architecture from field theory of “ethnographic capital” they would hold, which
(Bourdieu 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996a, b). The term in return fed back into, and intensified, status
“field,” which Bourdieu derives from the physics competition at home (Steinmetz 2007).
of electromagnetic forces, refers to “a configura-
46 Y. Wang and S. Polillo
Institutional theory shares much with in their theorizing of power, such as Michael
Bourdieu, but instead of fields, institutional theo- Mann (2012a, b, c, d), Shmuel N. Eisenstadt
rists attribute the source of power to another (1993), Pierre Bourdieu (1994, 2015), and James
high-order entity—institutions. Institutions are Scott (1999), are also meticulous scholars of pro-
“macro-level structural and cultural spheres or cesses of political centralization, state formation,
domains in which actors, resources, and authority and governance. According to Eisenstadt, in
systems are distributed in bounded ecological early periods, power and the state were almost
space” (Abrutyn 2013b). Major examples of synonymous for good empirical reasons. The for-
institutions are the market, the state, the corpora- mation of the “polity” is the effect of power itself
tion, the profession, religion, and the family. (Eisenstadt 1995; Abrutyn and Lawrence 2010).
Institutions are powerful in that they impose The emergence of polities from kinship organiza-
overarching “institutional logics” (Thornton tions was initiated by a group of non-kin-based
et al. 2012). Institutional logics are the “socially leaders who specialized in power possession and
constructed, historical patterns of material prac- generation, using whatever means happened to
tices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules” be available to them. As polities formed, power
which inform and compel actors to “produce and became a generalized means of control, and then
reproduce material subsistence, organize time a commodity. Whoever was interested in gaining
and space, and provide meaning to their social power, and capable of holding on to it, could bid
reality” (Thornton and Ocasio 1999: 804). for it. This new trend built up a perpetual sense of
Empirically, the point where actors cease to bear uncertainty among rulers, who responded by
the influence of such institutional logic is the seeking to stabilize their relationship with the
point where institutions reach their boundaries. ruled. “Society”, in its opposition to the political
Identifying the intensity and boundaries of such center, was called into existence in this fashion.
institutional power, is a task similar to that of State-driven projects of making societies more
delineating the boundaries of distinct institutions. “legible,” whereby political and administrative
Various institutional theorists describe these elites would construct policy on the basis of their
“institutional logics” in different terms and lan- perception of society, turned out to be cata-
guages. But they all agree that institutions have strophic for local traditions and local knowledge.
the capacity to steer individuals to act in a con- As James Scott highlights, the recent century of
certed and predictable fashion. This often occurs human history has seen no shortage of modernist,
in the context of dramatic events that capture the technocratic, and destructive programs that are a
attention of a wide public: power can then be direct consequence of states “formatting” society
considered “performative” (Reed 2013), in the and using those maps as blueprints for political
sense of being attached to an organizational control. Scott thus draws our attention to a unique
capacity to control how events, facts, and ideas type of epistemic power that the state possesses
are presented to, and perceived by, a larger audi- in the enterprise of “seeing like a state.” This
ence. Power carries an emergent status: it exists proposition is a useful complement and neces-
prior to, other than in the midst of, any concrete sary caveat to Weber’s emphasis on rationaliza-
courses of actions, in macro social entities tion and Eisenstadt’s focus on centralization: it
(Thornton and Ocasio 2008). emphasizes how political control rests on a
By imagining power as a set of causal forces capacity to gather information, and how the very
shaping societies, macro understandings of process of information-gathering is never politi-
power render analytically legible some otherwise cally neutral.
unobservable macro entities. This scholarly This strand of research on state formation
approach to power as a macro-phenomenon piv- grounds empirically the analysis of the formation
ots on an understanding of the rise of the most and institutionalization of power as a macro phe-
important macro-entities of all—the state. It is no nomenon. To an unprecedented scale, states have
coincidence that the authors who are most explicit consolidated and expanded over vast swaths of
3 Power in Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 47
territories. Geographical expansion has gone resistance” (Weber 1947) Similarly, Lukes con-
hand in hand with macro-social maneuvering on cisely states the Weberian position as “A exer-
the part of state builders, in their efforts to estab- cises power over B when A affects B in a manner
lish a manageable relationship with an increas- contrary to B’s interests” (Lukes 2005: 34). Other
ingly differentiating society. Over time, power theorists downplay the resistance compo-
state-builders either isolated or incorporated dif- nent in defining power but consistently portray
ferent social groups into the orbit of political power in terms of A–B relations. For example,
decision-making. Sustaining the mammoth insti- Dahl posits that “A has power over B to the extent
tution of the state ultimate rests on the production that he can get B to do something which B would
of “long-range trust and meaning,” which gets not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957: 202–203).
built into the exercise of power and gears politi- Likewise, according to Bell, Walker and Willer,
cal arrangements towards “broader institutional power is “A’s capacity to create change in B’s
goals and promises,” (Eisenstadt 1995: 360–161) activity based in A’s control of sanctions.” (Bell
such as economic development, administrative et al. 2000).
rationality and nation building. The macro Social psychology and exchange theory have
approach touches on the genesis of power and generated some of the most important insights on
also constitutes a wellspring for research on the how power works at the level of micro-
grand evolution of the nature of power to the interactions. Focusing on the giving and receiv-
present. ing of valued resources, and often framing
exchanges in terms of cost, benefits, and mar-
ginal utility—terms imported from economics—
3.3 The Micro Approach this perspective is broadly concerned with an
to Power expectation of reciprocity that builds up from
repeated exchanges, and of the implications of
Another strand of social theory examines power such expectations when the exchange takes place
in micro settings. Micro settings refer to small- in a situation of power imbalance. Thus Blau
scale social interactions ranging from ego- (1964) argues that over time, exchanges of
environment relationships, to dyadic interactions resources produce a normative expectation that
and small-group dynamics. A small scope of current levels of exchange will be sustained over
inquiry is not the sole reason that we call it the time. Power is exercised through dramaturgical
micro-approach to power. A micro perspective to means, when individuals enhance or even exag-
power also assumes that the presence of power, gerate the value of the resources they can bring to
the state of being constrained and controlled, is an exchange, manipulating perception and set-
empirically actualized in direct contacts and ting up expectations that validate this inflated
small-scale interactions, which makes a rela- value down the line. More generally, power
tional measurement of power relations the most derives from the fact the more individuals control
desirable. Conceptualizing power in terms of resources that are indispensable, hard to procure
micro-settings is empirically intuitive, theoreti- from alternative sources, and difficult to seize by
cally parsimonious, and has great validity. force, the more they can demand compliance: a
A relational understanding of power has surplus amount of allegiance that resource-poor
inspired and underpinned many of the classical partners must offer to compensate for their weak
definitions of power. In these definitions, power bargaining position. Over time, Blau argues,
is manifested in the dynamics of dyadic relation- escalating demands for compliance generate
ships, driven by asymmetrical possession of resentment towards perceived violation of norms
resources, capacities or benefits. For example, of reciprocity, thereby causing conflict.
Weber famously defines power as “the probabil- Emerson (1962, 1964) similarly posits that
ity that one actor within a social relationship will power is a function of resource dependence, and
be in a position to carry out his own will despite it is especially salient when it is difficult for
48 Y. Wang and S. Polillo
partners to the exchange to find alternative ways this tradition have become considerably large and
of obtaining those resources, and especially when appear “macro” in scale, the theoretical assump-
those resources are valuable. Power is used when tion about the source and distribution of power in
partners to the exchange jockey for better access networks is consistent with the micro approach
to resources and better terms of exchange, in turn under discussion. In stricter versions of the the-
causing a power imbalance that motivates their ory, network ties almost invariably imply direct
counterparts to engage in actions that reduce contacts between agents (in a tradition that har-
dependence, actions that Emerson calls “balanc- kens back to classical studies of the diffusion of
ing acts.” Cook and Emerson (1978) extend this innovations, such as Coleman et al. 1966). A dif-
argument by focusing on “commitment” between ferent tradition draws from role theory and speci-
exchange partners, the tendency of partners to fies power in terms of “structural equivalence,”
remain in an exchange even when they could similarities in patterns of relations without imply-
potentially get better terms or better resources ing direct contacts between individuals.
from others. Commitment is possible because, Throughout the studies, the power of network
functioning as a long-term expectation that positions is not conceived as an attribute derived
exchanges will continue over time, it lowers from preexisting macro-entities. Instead, it is a
transaction costs, reduces uncertainty, and, more certain kind of leverage and a range of choices
important to our discussion, decreases the likeli- built into constellations of relationships and pat-
hood of power being exercised. terns of interactions among individual entities.
As a third party is introduced, a dyad becomes The network notion of power tends to be micro
a triad. George Simmel offers an influential thesis also because the transmission of such power,
on how triads, and small group dynamics by such as in the form of information, resource or
extension, qualitatively transforms power rela- reputation is via an on-the-ground construction
tions, therefore enriching our understanding of of relationships.
the relational sources of power. Simmel explains The last instance of micro settings is small
that the third party can gain tremendous leverage groups. Dalh’s celebrated study of power in com-
through maneuvering the relationship between munity politics illustrates this category (Dalh
the two alters, for instance, by balancing them 1961). In his examination of the power structure
against each other, or monopolizing information in New Haven, he developed a pluralist view of
flows between them. In both cases, the third par- power in which power exercise is a competitive
ties derive power from certain structural posi- process in which different interest groups vied
tions without necessarily possessing resources of for control over decisions. Dalh’s theorization of
their own (Simmel and Wolff 1964). power has been discussed in several works; few
Simmel’s thinking on social relations and have dubbed it “micro.” We group his study
power keeps inspiring research on social net- together with other micro approaches on account
works. One of the latter’s core analytical mission of the way he introduced actors as independent
has been to identify structural positions in net- individual entities, and of the way he approached
works and explain how these positions can gener- power as relational and interactional dynamics.
ate power. Particularly influential in this regard is Additionally, he also isolated a range of historical
Burt’s work on brokerage through the exploita- and institutional factors and narrowed down the
tion of “structural holes,” network positions that focus to particular instances of decision-making
allow individuals to uniquely connect (“bridge”) settings where conflicts were the most visible and
social clusters that would not otherwise commu- observable and power relations could be directly
nicate (Burt 1992). Structural holes, argues Burt, measurable by decision outcomes. These episte-
afford individuals access to unique information, mological and methodological aspects set his
which individuals are then able to recombine in study apart from the macro-approach to power
new ways that gives them leverage and advan- we have described.
tage. Although the social networks under study in
3 Power in Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 49
An important critique to Dahl’s pluralist that regularizes micro-exchanges, bears the brunt
model of decision-making can be derived from of macro transformation, and constitutes the
Ridgeway and Berger (1986)’s model of power more immediate environment within which
and prestige orders in small-group settings. power is experienced, challenged, and reformat-
Ridgeway and Berger argue that small groups, ted collectively (Tuner 2012: 25). This is the
especially those focused on the accomplishment environment of formal organizations.
of a task, develop local understandings and Formal organizations are omnipresent, but the
expectations of one another’s capacity to mean- analysis of power has not been a prominent issue
ingfully contribute to the task at hand. But they in organization studies (Pfeffer 1981: 9–10). The
do not do so in a vacuum, as their expectations vast majority of us are associated with formal
are based on more diffuse understandings of organizations in one way or another, by either
whose status and whose power should be working for them, learning in them, or relying on
rewarded, regardless of the relevance of status them for goods or services. Examples of organi-
attributes to the task at hand. Group activities zations are numerous. Corporations, parties,
therefore tend to reproduce social hierarchies and schools, clubs, professional associations, and
reinforce social inequality, in contrast with Dahl’s international organizations are organizations
more optimistic view that group’s mere access to devoted to economic, political, educational, rec-
decision-making arenas is a hallmark and safe- reational, professional, or normative purposes.
guard of democracy. This meso-level reality is not just an analytical
construct. It is such an ingrained part of our
empirical routines that we tend to take our orga-
3.4 Introducing the Meso-Level nizational environment for granted. Power, as is
routinized in careers, budgets, the divisions of
The micro and macro notions of power do not labor, and all other standard operating procedures
exhaust the range of experiences we have with and rules, paradoxically remains hidden in plain
power. We don’t constantly live in dyadic con- sight. In organized purposeful settings, the line
flicts. Our exchanges with society certainly go between being compelled to do something and
beyond small group arrangements. We follow being capable of doing something can be blurry
instructions and obey authorities, even when and conflated. Uncovering how power operates,
orders come from those whom we don’t have hides, and transfers in organizations is therefore a
prior contacts with. Power will be felt most necessary scholarly exercise, especially if we aim
strongly in observable conflicts at the level of to develop a fuller understanding of how our
interpersonal relations. Yet power exists across a intentions, behaviors, and beliefs are regulated in
variety of social forms. We are compelled to act organizational society.
in certain ways by more distant forces. The What are organizations and what are their key
macro-approach to power has strengthened our features? One of the most widely accepted defini-
ability to map out these structural forces. tions of formal organizations is offered by
However, important questions remain. A particu- W. Richard Scott. Organizations are “collectivi-
larly intriguing one has to do with the reach of ties oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific
power relations. For example, those who live in goals and exhibiting relatively highly formalized
times of rapid social changes, or at the epicenter social structures.” (Scott 1992: 23) To elaborate,
of a structure undergoing transformation, will these collectivities organize social lives such that
feel the impact of power formation and redistri- they sustain long-term visions, aggregate courses
bution most directly. But the rest of the popula- of action, and give our existences collective pur-
tion will be affected by power relations only poses independent of individual choices.
through several degrees of mediation. What Internally, organizations bear formalized struc-
micro and macro notions of power leave unex- tures, of which hierarchies and specialization
plored, in short, is the meso-level architecture through an internal division of labor are two most
50 Y. Wang and S. Polillo
prominent features. One should not underrate the much more flexible social structures and mobile
extent to which formal structures construct our persons than those in traditional societies
social realities, a point to which we will return (Coleman 1974: 31). Natural persons can join or
later. For now, it should suffice to say that formal- leave corporations and can establish its relation-
ization entails the abstraction of a large amount ship with corporations through various resources
of concrete data so that further social action can invested in them without having to participate
be governed by that abstraction without having to physically.
“go behind it” (Stinchcombe 2001). Formal orga- While Coleman argues that the rise of corpo-
nizations arrange society by abstraction; they rate society increased the total sum of power in
designate roles and positions, and regularize pat- societies and therefore expanded freedom and
terns of interactions. Organizations inscribe these liberty, other authors offer mixed assessments.
designations in binding charts, procedures, and The classical author on bureaucracy, Max Weber,
rules so that goals, positions, roles, and patterns on the one hand, celebrates the effectiveness with
of interactions outlive individual participants. In which bureaucratic organizations rationalized
this sense, organizations, once created, achieve capitalist production and the administration of
an emergent reality of their own. We enter an the state. According to Weber, formal authority,
organization expecting to accept the organiza- in combination with specialized professional
tional reality as it is and “socialize” into it knowledge inscribed in bureaucratic positions,
(Wanous et al. 1984; Hall 1987). provides an unprecedented legitimate foundation
to domination and ruling. One the other hand,
Weber alerts us to the dehumanizing effect of
3.4.1 A Brief History these “iron-cages.” Bureaucratic machines can
of the Emergence thrive for the mere sake of reproducing them-
of Organizational Society selves (Weber 1978). This is the “bad” kind of
formalism that Stinchcombe also refers to, a for-
Before we delve deeper into the question of how malism that does not serve substantial purposes
power operates in organizations, a brief history and prevents others from making improvements
on the emergency of organizational society will to the abstraction on which successful formaliza-
be instructive. Various authors have reflected on tion rests (Stinchcombe 2001). Put more suc-
how the ascendance of organizations have revo- cinctly, both authors highlight the very real
lutionized pre-modern social structures and possibility that formal organizations generate a
changed the power balance between different new form of oppressive, even callous control.
segments of the populations. James Coleman In the first half of the twentieth century, the
(1974) provides a revealing account on the rise of rise of big corporations and the intensified
corporate actors that changed the distribution of bureaucratization of all spheres of lives prompted
power in societies. This gradual movement com- new waves of reflection on how organizations
menced from the “incorporation” of churches, have reconfigured political and economic power.
landed communities, and kings as these entities Michels observes that how incumbents of power-
acquired the status of unified actors with rights to ful organizational structures would become more
own, contract, engage in transactions, and collec- interested in investing in the reproduction of the
tively embody honor and authority. The corpo- structure per se rather than in pursing the goals
rate form taken by these social entities eventually that the organization was originally set up to
spread to all sorts of associations, and engulfed achieve (Michels 1959). Michels focuses on
also those originally non-purposive social units political organizations, but this same process can
in which persons were born such as the family, be observed in the conglomeration movement, a
the village and the nation. According to Coleman, historical phase in which corporations begin pur-
this layer of “intermediary entities” emerged suing growth strategies through diversification
between the state and individuals and created and vertical integration. John Galbraith argues
3 Power in Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 51
that, as large corporations extended the scope of zations in particular suffer from a “liability of
their activities, they became threats to efficiency: newness” in that for social roles and relations to
as price and wages could be determined through settle into stable patterns to answer to organiza-
internal planning instead of competition, a tional goals, organizations have to go through a
Michelsian dynamic set in (1959). Corporations, risky process of wrestling with employees’ exist-
put differently, began exercising market power, a ing identities and bonding a group of strangers
point Galbraith makes in the context of a larger including with other organizations. Stinchcombe
argument that economic organizations can pur- suggests that after a certain threshold, the attenu-
sue control and growth at the expense of earnings ation of social and cognitive discrepancies paves
and efficiency—an argument that in turn is heav- the way for routinization. This point echoes
ily indebted to Veblen (1934). In the production March and Simon’s argument and generates tre-
realm, modern technologies such as the assembly mendous insights for our understanding of
line and the practices associated with “scientific individual-organization relationships.
management” created a deep cleavage between Organizational forms have continued to evolve
workers and the managerial class. Clegg has an in the past half a century. Organization scholars
insightful account of how these new workplace have drawn our attention to at least two directions
relations, with their new routines and their push of development. First of all, it is harder for orga-
towards specialization, facilitated the production nizations to be self-sustaining: an increasing
of predictable and compliant agency. This causal amount of organizational decisions must address
process of forming collective dispositions of the inter-organizational concerns. With intensified
employees, Clegg argues, paved the “foundation market competition, faster turnover of products,
of organization power” (Clegg 2009). and more volatile technological and financial
In parallel to these critiques of large organiza- markets, incumbents find themselves in constant
tions, an array of authors emerged as the founda- battles with challengers; both also have to react
tional generation of organization researchers, to regulatory attempts of government units and a
focused on a mission to dissolve the myth of “sci- broader array of stakeholders. This type of “stra-
entific management” and to understand the orga- tegic action field” rewards the kind of “social
nizational causes of its imperfections. skills” that can secure cooperation from other
Influentially, James March and Herbert Simon organizations and forge a new form of collective
delved into the decision-making process in orga- identity (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Secondly,
nizations from a perspective of human cognition. scholars also affirm that soft power and a cultur-
They found that individuals in organizations are ally based type of legitimacy have gained more
subject to bounded rationalities in processing importance in soliciting individual compliance.
information, elaborating programs, and evaluat- This is not to say that reward and punishment
ing outcomes. Cognitive limitation drives the ten- have ceased to be the bread and butter of organi-
dency for organizations to routinize and places a zational sanctions, but “soft power” is assuming a
sunk cost on organizational innovation (March stronger role in shaping both the body and souls
and Simon 1958). Still another strand of the lit- of “organizational men” (and women) (William
erature, heralded by Stinchcombe’s famous 1965 and Nocera 2002; Clegg 2009). Organizations
essay, surveys the “relation of society outside are perceived as being capable of developing per-
organizations to the internal life of organiza- sonas and embodying “organizational cultures,”
tions” (1965: 142). Stinchcombe suggests that which employees internalize as their own values
social structure, comprising “groups, institutions, (see esp. Selznick 2010). Organization ethnogra-
laws, population characteristics, and sets of social phers disclose that even blue-collar workers
relations that form the environments of the orga- engaging the most tedious job find the moral
nization” (1965:142) leave imprints on the forms meaning in their work (Burawoy 1982; Lamont
and power relations within the organizations and 2002). Norms, identities, and moral standards
affect their survival rates. Newly founded organi- can be both homegrown and imported.
52 Y. Wang and S. Polillo
Organizational practices and forms are perceived of individuals could. This supra-individual power
legitimate simply because other organizations, of organizations has two implications.
especially the leading ones, are pursuing them as First, organized collectivities are not simply
well. Either way, individual compliance origi- the sum of individuals’ preexisting wills and
nates not from beliefs in the inherent efficiency actions; organizations generate the kind of insti-
of certain organizational structures or production tutional surplus that reduces the cost of collective
arrangements, but from cultural consensuses and action. Both eminent features of organizational
fads (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). structure—hierarchy and the division of labor—
Overall, these reflections on the evolution of have this function. Hierarchies streamline flows
organizational power provide historical back- of orders and information and reasonably narrow
ground to our understanding of their contempo- down the orientation of participants to their direct
rary variations. They also call for systematic superiors. Divisions of labor encourage patterns
efforts at taking stock of the forms of power spe- of specialization and in general can reduce the
cific to formal organizations. Let’s reiterate here cost of training, while creating stronger commit-
that this task is possible because, regardless of ment from those who accumulate human capital
the variations in technologies and management specific to the organization. Hierarchical power
styles, formal organizations share common char- can certainly be constraining; just as specializa-
acteristics and undertake similar activities, such tion is also a source of alienation. Nevertheless,
as settings goals, designing bureaucratic struc- formal organizations are expected to “get things
tures, delegating authorities, securing stable per- done” by channeling individuals into clearly des-
sonnel, utilizing expertise, and identifying ignated duties and overcoming intractable collec-
organizational boundaries. Theoretical exposi- tive action problems that any group efforts might
tions on organization and power are scattered in encounter. Individuals, irrespective of the extent
organization studies and are rarely placed in to which they personally agree with the actions
organic conversations with existing studies of organizations take, potentially benefit from the
power. Our synthesis below draws inspirations on collective gains that organizations make
existing research but also attempts to sharpen and possible.
articulate the distinctive operation of power at the Second, in most legal contexts, organizations
meso-level. have the juridical status of persons, so they enjoy
rights just as natural persons would but are
immune to certain punishments applicable to
3.4.2 Empowering Organizations natural persons. The meso-level reality indeed
has a legal infrastructure. Organizations as per-
We argue that organizations intersect with power sons enjoy limited responsibilities and only
in two major ways: First, organizations serve as receive financial rather than corporeal punish-
vehicles to power. Second, organizations shape ments. You certainly cannot ask an organization
the nature of power by making it invisible and to serve prison terms. On the other hand, organi-
multiplying the sources from which power zations are allowed to conduct many activities
springs. In this section, we focus on the first that natural persons carry out. They can buy, sell,
proposition—the “empowering” aspect of orga- invest, donate, or even vote. Presently this
nizations, while the next section is devoted to empowering effect of organizations is an interna-
elaborating our second point. tional norm. The existence of robust and diverse
Humans are purposive beings. Power is a organizations is perceived as a sign of strong and
means to achieve those purposes, however con- healthy civil societies. The absence of them, by
strued. Organizations are a regularized form of contrast, indicates that power is monopolized and
such means. Through coordination, organizations centralized in society, probably by single or oli-
can achieve much more than a mere aggregation garchic entities.
3 Power in Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 53
Both means, erecting formalized routines and March and Simon put it, because power seems
conferring legal existences to them, enable orga- “natural,” since “hierarchical ordering fits more
nizations to operate on a long-range horizon, and general cultural norms for describing social rela-
towards relatively long term objectives. Long- tions in terms of domination and subordination”
term goals compel trust building and suspend (1993: 3). Rather, formal organizations transform
short-term domination. Organized methods of power dynamics into means-end problems call-
obtaining and exercising power also appear much ing for practical solutions. As Rueschemeyer
less conspicuous than one-time use of coercive (1986) has most powerfully argued, organiza-
method. They take on evolutionary and routin- tions find legitimacy in their pursuit of efficiency
ized features, with attention divided among through endless specialization, but in doing so
staged goals and numerous small tasks. they hide the truth of efficiency: that is it not uni-
versally valid criterion independent of the inter-
ests of those who decide whose goals should be
3.4.3 The Nature of Power efficiently pursued.
in Organizations First, organizations formalize power relation-
ship into positions and ranks; positions and ranks
Organizations are effective means to pursue stabilize expectations and embody organization-
power; they also shape the nature of power itself. specific norms and values. Except for organiza-
The same features—organizational hierarchies tions in the midst of formative and transformative
and routines—that are ostensibly means to effi- times (as highlighted by Stinchcombe 1965),
ciency also exert power internally on organiza- organizational positions and ranks are indepen-
tional members. Theoretically, power is dent of the idiosyncrasies of their occupants.
hierarchical and concentrated in organizations. They create stable expectations about the scope
The pyramid organizational structures are direct of their duties, the structure of rewards, and the
reflections of hierarchical power relations. For schedule of promotions. Weber uses this point to
this reason, Michels warned against the oligar- illustrate the merit of bureaucracy in achieving
chic tendency of bureaucratic power (Michels efficiency and impartiality. We are interested in
1959). Along the same lines, Rueschemeyer dis- reconnecting formal ordering with the discussion
cusses the “disproportionate power” found in of power. Managing expectations by virtue of
organizations, that is, how power concentrated in creating career ladders plays an instrumental role
the hands of individuals and groups with similar in translating power into regulations. Patterns of
interest and preferences is amplified when mobi- expectations minimize the contingent exercise of
lized through organizational means, partly coercion. With rules and procedures in place,
because organizations justify themselves thor- individuals do not have to negotiate their benefits
ough claims to higher efficiency (Rueschemeyer with organizations individually so that they
1986: 46). reduce possible discretions. Signing onto these
But if hierarchical power were so equivocal career expectations amounts to signing onto a
and inescapable, organizations would be repres- social contract in which personal freedom is
sive and emotionally violent environments, con- traded with life security, so that voluntarily, “the
stantly threatening the viability of their social control of one’s behavior by others
organizational mandates. In reality, these are becomes an expected part of organizational life”
aberrant instances rather than the norm. We join (Pfeffer 1981: 5). Positions and ranks are also
organization theorists who submit that power is building blocks of the system of organizational
diffuse in organizations, rather than concentrated norms and values. Sociologists, despite their dis-
(Bacharach and Lawler 1980; Bell et al. 2010). It agreements on how norms and values are formed,
is not simply that power does not cause tremen- concur that norms and values play an indispensi-
dous disruptions in organizations because it is ble role in holding society together and stabiliz-
based on consent, rather than coercion, or that, as ing social interactions. Organizations are the
54 Y. Wang and S. Polillo
meso-venues where norms are deployed and intra-organizational conflicts stem from “struc-
contextualized. tural” problems, problems, that is, that inhere to
Second, power is highly depersonalized in formal organizational structures and that inevita-
organizations, which also tend to generate deper- bly contain contradictions of responsibilities,
sonalized conflicts. Authority is codified in for- overlapping jurisdictions, and goal misalign-
malized rights and privileges, attached to the ments. While structural conflicts are tolerated or
hierarchy of jobs in organizations. Positional even institutionalized, personalized conflicts are
authorities do not derive from, or die with per- usually discouraged and stigmatized in
sonal power. Organizational rules and procedures organizations.
are distributed to new recruits prior to their active Third, power in organization is differentiated
duties so that he or she will be assured that and generative. Differentiation reduces the num-
rewards and punishment will have an impersonal ber of losers and sometimes renders the question
nature. When a CEO gives his or her employee a of winning or losing entirely meaningless.
routine order, the employee would not be person- Externally, organizations stratify society into
ally offended as he or she understands that the “membership society” and subcultures in which
order is made on behalf of an organization and “members” of these communities are not readily
the same order would be made to anyone who comparable on a single dimension or along a con-
were at his or her post. Those in power certainly tinuum. Internally, power in organizations creates
carry their personal motives and interests. Such differences through the following means—the
personal power, however, is often mistaken as division of labor, the delegation of authorities,
impartiality in the eyes of the powerless. It is and entitlement—where each renders power no
because the powerful think and act in terms of longer a zero-sum game but rather the effect of a
positions (those of corporations and public multivariate structure of incentives. Division of
offices) and their personal interests tend to align labor in organizational settings generates multi-
with organizational ones (Rueschemeyer 1986: ple lines of authority and within them multiple
48). tracks of mobility. This helps reduce conflicts
Depersonalizing power is a process in which and dependence as participants will not be sub-
the source of power is removed from its means ject to only one dimension of competition.
(Coleman 1974: 37–39). In relatively large orga- Delegation transfers authority to subordinates.
nizations, even the most authoritarian commands Subordinates are agents who possess more local
at the very power center have to be dispersed information than their principals and can with-
throughout myriads of lines and orders and legiti- hold such information to bargain with their supe-
mated through layers of superior-subordinate riors. Entitlement is another activity of expanding,
relationships. It is undeniable that at the very if not inflating, the supply of power in organiza-
apex of the hierarchy, political struggles can be tions without offending the status quo. With dif-
fierce and shot through with “family and patron- ferentiation, delegation and entitlement. Overall,
age relations” (Rueschemeyer 1986: 63). precisely because of the generative nature of
Employees at various points of distances with the divided labor and its readiness to be mistaken as
power center however do not see and experience reflective of human nature or professionalization,
these struggles directly. Hierarchy acts as a buffer Rueschemeyer calls for exercising a power anal-
to “politics at the top.” ysis to uncover the process of division of labor,
Depersonalized power by no means prevents by investigating the political and economic insti-
all conflicts from rising. Conflicts are the very tutions that supported division of labor, the
“power-full” moments where the intention of resources mobilized to sustain it, and the special
exerting power is revealed, stakes are acted upon needs they meet (1986).
and challenging coalitions are formed. However, Lastly, power sources in organizations are
depersonalized power likely goes hand in hand diversified, creating multiple ways to control
with depersonalized conflicts. That is, many uncertainty. Power in organizations springs from
3 Power in Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 55
multiple sources. We often equate power with stances, micro-power in the form of personal
resources, but what counts as resources in organi- power, dyadic conflicts and small group dynam-
zations is specific to the organizational context, ics can also exist and assert their influence in
as the micro-approach to power well understands. spite of formal structures. This is because formal
Resources can be measured by the control over rules are after all enacted in myriads of behav-
the number of personnel and financial resources, ioral patterns and relationships of exchanges and
the range of the jurisdiction, or the position of transactions. Decisions, one of the most impor-
ranking, all of which is imperfectly commensu- tant forms of output in organizations, have to
rate with but largely reflected in pay structures. flow through the chains and relationships of real
Other types of sources of power are less measur- people. Organizational legitimacy likewise has
able but nevertheless consequential. These both legal and relational components. It is legally
resources include titles, reputations, information, supported but also has to be observed and
knowledge, etc. The power of this array of endorsed by organizational members and their
resource, we argue, comes from their efficacy in mutual acknowledgement of each other’s
generating or resolving uncertainty, since uncer- endorsement for that matter. These processes of
tainty is the common enemy of organizational enacting rules and decisions in interpersonal rela-
routines. This power in relation to uncertainty tionships have opened room for power dynamics
can counter-intuitively afford occupants at non- in small and informal settings. We will discuss
central locations a great amount of leverage. For various scenarios in the following space, built on
example, line workers can create enormous dis- illustrations of existing studies as well as our sug-
turbance of routines by striking. Small group gestions for future research.
leaders can be instrumental in appeasing conflicts First of all, it is common to observe that indi-
and retrieve organizational solidarity by force of viduals acquire personal power not attributable to
reputation. Lower level organizational members organizational authorization and unique to these
have power because they possess a unique set of individuals. One source of such personal power is
information, e.g. contacts with clients, or famil- charisma. Weber defines charisma as power legit-
iarity with the production process, that is hard to imized on the basis of a leader’s exceptional per-
be replaced and taken away. Experts’ power also sonal qualities or the demonstration of
ultimately lies in their indispensible solutions to extraordinary insight and accomplishment, which
uncertainties and crises (Barnes 1988). In a word, inspire loyalty and obedience from followers
organizational aversion to uncertainty produces (Weber 2004). Charisma facilitates effective
power that cannot be deduced purely from hierar- leadership. The conventional understanding is
chical power. With multiple sources of power that charisma, once routinized, gives away to
crosscutting, balancing and offsetting each other, another type of authority—rational-legal author-
the diversified source of power generates a more ity in Weber’s account. However, historical and
complicated picture of power distribution than an contemporary attempts to create “charismatic
organizational chart would predict, which makes organizations” challenge this characterization of
the study of power in organizations all the more charismatic individuals and bureaucratic organi-
intriguing and challenging. zations as incompatible (Teiwes 1984). Mao’s
Cultural Revolution called for the rebels to
embody and spread his personal charisma until it
3.5 Connecting the Micro became the institutional feature of the state
with the Meso Level Analysis bureaucracy. Although the movement ultimately
of Power failed catastrophically, the fact that it carried on
for nearly a decade offered a rare chance for
Power in organizations subordinates interper- researchers to investigates the possibility of per-
sonal relationships to the mandates of rules and sonification of power at the organizational level.
impersonalized authorities. In many circum- One reason charismatic authority can be sustained
56 Y. Wang and S. Polillo
for long periods of time lies in the dramaturgical cases ignore, formal organizational boundaries,
nature of power: as argued by Blau (1956) among between positions, subunits, or even ranks. In
others, individuals have incentive to exaggerate opposition to the sanctioned organizational
the value of the resources they can bring to an groupings, these groups are referred to as “infor-
exchange, because those perceived initial advan- mal” groups, with some of them taking on
tages constitute sources of long-term leverage as “clique”-like features, with heavily policed
expectations about levels of exchange stabilize. boundaries and strong ties among the members.
Successfully manipulating the perception of The relationship between informal and formal
one’s contribution can therefore have long-term power in organizations is an unceasingly fasci-
implications. nating research topic. Unfortunately, the current
Dyadic relationships and small exchange net- artificial separation between network analysis
works are the fabrics of organizations. These and organization studies as two subfields has
small groups are bounded by direct and frequent slowed the study of the cross-fertilization of
contacts. Close contacts increase the odds that power resided in networks and organizations.
local power dynamics will take root independent Informal networks can block, co-exist or even
of global organizational structures. Non- facilitate the exercise of formal power. Formal
organizationally-sanctioned traits of individuals, organizations can domesticate, coopt, or develop
such as strong personalities, or status acquired out of informal networks (Adams 2007). To study
outside of organizations, will likely interfere with the translation between network power and orga-
organizationally sanctioned transactions between nizational power, we might need to look for com-
organizational members. The mere fact that some mon units of analysis. “Position” is an excellent
individuals might be stuck in a long-term rela- choice, since positions are anchors of power in
tionship creates a strategic opportunity for per- both networks and organizations. The question
sonalizing it by altering or circumscribing formal then becomes how positional power that derives
organizational rules, as research on the durability from structural positions in exchange networks
of commitment in exchange suggests (see Cook differs from the one that is embedded in organi-
and Emerson 1978). Favors and personally felt zational hierarchies and divisions of labor. Are
obligations can then be utilized towards formal they mutually reinforcing or contradictory?
organizational goals. For example, in the most In extreme cases, when informal groupings
commonplace dyads of organizations—superior/ and coalitions dominate the institutional land-
subordinate relationship, order-giving-and- scape of formal organizations, power struggles in
taking rarely characterizes the full range of any these organizations might well resemble some
organizationally sanctioned relationship. Bosses kind of free-style bargaining describe by the plu-
are often keen to suspend exercise of their formal ralist model (Bacharach and Lawler 1980). In
power, or go out of their way to do a favor for these cases, our imagery for the ways power is
their subordinates beyond any of their official exercised in organizations is less like a flow of
duties. Discretion in terms of when to act and commands and more like an exchange of infor-
what do compels subordinates to increase com- mation, resources, and power among different
pliance (Blau 1956) and develop a feeling of long blocks by way of both formal and informal
term obligation (Emerson 1962). Subordinates means.
will chose to work more diligently. The exercise Overall, the interaction between the micro
of personalized and patrimonial power can level and meso level power is probably the most
become a tacit pillar of organizational authority. intense in times of uncertainty. Founding stages,
Japanese corporations are understood to thrive on moments of crisis or periods organizational
this patrimonial work culture (Rohlen 1979). reforms are times pregnant with uncertainty.
Power dynamics in small groups also intersect Since organizational structure themselves are
with formal power. Membership in small groups sediments of historical struggles, they carry
will allow individuals to defer to, or in other imprints of informal influence from these
3 Power in Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 57
sensitive periods and will continue to change as bolic power, such as regulators, professional
more uncertainties strike (Johnson 2007). associations, or rating agencies (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983). These organizations can deter-
mine, not the value of material resources, but the
3.6 Connecting the Macro exchange value of their resources to other types
with the Meso Level Analysis of power, e.g. reputation, confidence, honor,
of Power knowledge, which can all be stored and capital-
ized in the future. Symbolic power is inherently a
As group actions increasingly take place in orga- field-level property as it exists only in the percep-
nizational and institutionalized domains, organi- tion of other organizations.
zations become the major constituents of An organizational bid for symbolic power is
macro-entities. Previously loosely connected often an attempt to shape broader ideological
macro-entities, such as fields and markets can structures. Macro-institutions persist through
also grow their own organizational sinews and influence, technology, and ideology rather than
cannot be discussed without referring to their coercive power. Symbolic power can act as a gen-
organizational infrastructure. The connection eralized medium of exchange, a convertible cen-
between the meso- and macro-level reality is tral currency in institutions. On account of such
tightened and their interface enlarged. This leaves convertibility, power at the macro level can be
us with considerable empirical opportunities to very multi-dimensional and open to contestation.
examine how organizational and inter- Isaac Reed offers an extremely insightful reinter-
organizational power affect macro forces and pretation of power as taking causal effect on dif-
how such macro forces in turn impose adaptive ferent dimensions: relational, discursive, and
pressures on organizational actions (Turner performative (Reed 2013). These dimensions
2010). connect macro- and micro-level processes by
Macro-level operation of power hinges on the foregrounding meso-level dynamics: as Reed
growth of inter-organizational relations. suggests, gaining power is not only about striving
Organizations that share similar goals or employ for better and larger resources, it is also about
similar technologies tend to develop a system of uttering discourses and performing creative
mutual recognition and exchanges among them- events for the purposes of building environmental
selves. An institutional sphere, alternatively pressures to one’s advantage. Successful discur-
termed “organizational field,” or “industrial sec- sive and performative actions can enhance the
tor” in various literatures (Powell and DiMaggio status even of materially disadvantaged organiza-
1991), can develop out of such mutual recogni- tions. To this effect, Carpenter (2010) shows how
tion, exchange, and associations of organizations. the U.S. Food and Drug Administration gained
Institutional spheres tend to develop explicit and maintained unparalleled reputation and
institutional architectures of their own, such as power (in the context of a historic distrust towards
annual conventions, professional associations, government agencies) by skillfully communicat-
industrial standards or even legitimating bodies. ing with multiple audiences.
Power at the institutional level is not a simple Inter-organizational relationships bring out
aggregation of power of each organization. The emergent power dynamics at the macro level.
distribution of power at the institutional level Such relationships go beyond exchanges of prod-
does not always directly reflect resource distribu- ucts, resources, and technologies. Inter-
tion at the organizational level. The mightiest organizational transactions can be an organic part
organization, measured by either its size or capi- of social production, taking place through move-
tal might well have the power to lead pricing or ments of people, the diffusion of organizational
set industrial standards. Scholars have also found forms, and the traffic of ideas. These inter-
that institutions disproportionally reward those organizational movements facilitate large-scale
organizational actors that are blessed with sym- social and cultural formation and integration.
58 Y. Wang and S. Polillo
Inter-organizational exchanges do not always gender, class, and race boundaries. Precisely
transpire on smooth and peaceful terms. because power is hidden and bureaucracies hold
Organizations can be incompatible in terms of meritocratic façades, how organizationally pro-
their goals, values, and technological standards. duced power structures affect social inequality
Inter-organizational incompatibility halts coop- can be much less discernible and harder to detect
eration and exchanges. In some cases, however, (Tilly 1999).
ostensible inter-organizational incompatibility In conclusion, power does not simply spill
also unexpectedly creates strategic positions for over from organizational containers to their envi-
power brokers and opportunities for mutual ronments. Power coalesces, transforms and trans-
learning and innovation (Padgett and Powell lates at interstitial organizational spaces, that in
2012). turn shape the nature of power at the macro-level.
In organizational societies, macro entities are To connect the meso- and macro-level analysis of
increasingly institutionalized, even turning into power requires using an organizational lens to
organizations themselves. The state is a prime give more concrete characterizations of macro
example. Previous discussions of the state char- forces. The blurry boundary between macro and
acterize the power of the state as omnipresent and meso entities/categories also calls for analytical
ideological, radiating from an undifferentiated interpenetration. Macro studies of political power
center. What has not been emphasized suffi- and social inequality should attend to their orga-
ciently is the fact that the state has a highly elabo- nizational causes. All in all, macro-entities are
rate organizational edifice of its own, with its made of organizations; how power is formed in
authority and power divided among ministries, organizations and at inter-organizational spaces
commissions and departments. It is possible that affects power at the macro level.
each department might be more committed to
developing its constituencies in societies rather
than contributing to the bureaucratic unity of the 3.7 Conclusions
state as a whole. Therefore, what appears to be an
administrative decision from a coherent state can Power is notoriously hard to define, observe and
be a product of inter-organizational struggles, or analyze because it is mediated and regulated.
a parochial view of a particularly powerful Macro theories of power treat it as a causal force
department. These possibilities point to the that originates within differentiated social
explanatory necessity of unpacking any macro- spheres, a power that institutions channel into
entity into its organizational constituents. A min- more general frameworks within which this force
imum knowledge of power relations among these can be contained and regulated. Micro-level theo-
constituent organizations is essential to assessing ries, by contrast, understand power as leverage
the source and determinants of how power oper- which individuals gain by virtue of occupying
ates at the macro level. particular positions within social relationships
Macro-categories, such as gender, class and and networks. We have argued that, in our pres-
race, intersect with occupational and professional ent social world, it is organizations that mediate
categories of organizations as well (Stainback and regulate power. Organization-mediated
et al. 2010). Bureaucratic organizations allegedly power is embodied in authorities (such as the
have a social leveling effect as they tend to recruit state, or professional associations), dispersed in
and promote on the basis of qualifications and the division of labor among various “parties,”
performance. In organizations, classifications are jobs, and positions, and organized into collective
removed from intrinsic personal characteristics purposes that privilege routinization and trust
and rest on the dimension of occupations, titles, building.
and professions. Still, organizational routines can In this chapter, we zeroed in on the organiza-
reproduce social inequality in a systematic fash- tional level of power dynamics, a level that is
ion. Occupational differentiation often maps onto more aggregate and abstract than interpersonal
3 Power in Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 59
relations but more concrete than the diffusive is both enabling and constraining: it enhances the
notion of power held by macro-theory. potential for individual freedom while increasing
Organizations embody and make rules and rou- individual interdependence. The manufacturing
tines. We sought to reveal how rules, routines, and division of labor, by contrast, rests on coercive
differentiation obscure the potential for discretion authority in the workplace through deskilling, or
in rule making. Instead, the operation of power in the breaking down of production into simple,
organizations follows a plural, generative, and mindless steps. The manufacturing division of
depersonalized logic so much so that it tends to labor increases the power of those who already
reduce the perception of domination. With the are in a position of authority, while it deprives the
interstitial spaces and incompatible logics organi- powerless of even the most basic form of con-
zations also produce, they create expectations for trol—control over their labor. Rueschemeyer
the exercise of one’s creativity and leverage. reminds us that the two types always interpene-
The second goal of the paper is to link the trate empirically. As hierarchical organizations
meso-approach to power with examinations of multiply, for instance, the experience of the pow-
power at the macro-level of social formations and erless will deteriorate, but individuals with the
the micro-level of exchanges. We argued that skills and capital to navigate organizational poli-
even though power at each level acquires distinc- tics will thrive precisely as authority tightens its
tive structural and symbolic features, exchanges, grip. Competing sources of legitimacy and con-
translations, and conversions of power across the trol tend to also generate a space for new classes
different levels of social units generates new of experts invested with the power to assess and
types of social, institutional, and ideological for- rank (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; see also
mations that can not be reduced to power origi- Espeland and Sauder 2007). What this implies
nating from any given level alone. At these for power in the age of corporate downsizing is
emergent spaces between individual decision- that power as efficacy will multiply at the very
makings, meso-regulations, and macro- interstices of organizational boundaries just as
institutions, informalities can be an important power as coercive control intensifies within orga-
source of power and the powerless can excel by nizational boundaries. States become more puni-
exploiting structural positions. This chapter thus tive just as allegedly free markets expand
concludes that regulatory power at the meso-level (Harcourt 2011). There is tension and contradic-
is both empowering and dominating. tion between these two trends, which becomes
Does our focus on organizations as a matrix of unsustainable when organizations are no longer
power leave out dynamics that affect people out- able to meet their legitimizing criteria of effi-
side of organizations? Given the retreat of what ciency in production and delivery of goods and
Davis (2009) felicitously calls “corporate feudal- services. When power turns from generative to
ism”—the golden age of organized capitalism in destructive, organizations regain the upper hand.
the US where a generalized expectation of stabil- We believe that organizational power will remain
ity and affluence motivated the emerging middle the defining feature of the twenty-first century.
class to join corporate ranks—it may seem
anachronistic to emphasize the organized nature
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Action in Society: Reflexively
Conceptualizing Activities 4
Andreas Glaeser
4.1 Sovereignty, Rational Action, judgment, grace, and the import of free will in
and the Puzzles of Modernity theodicy (Siedentop 2014; Dumont 1983)), natu-
ral rights philosophy (above all the concept of
The concept of action transmitted by the personal freedom rights), the Enlightenment
Europeanoid tradition into the nineteenth century (especially understandings of reason as personal
presupposes a principally autonomous actor power, as well as of self-emancipation as goal
whose actions are guided by the lights of reason (Schneewind 1998)) and finally of empiricism
at the prompting of his or her own free will and early scientism (with its nominalistic tencen-
(Seigel 2005; Taylor 1989; Mauss 1938). That cies to see only the particular and individual as
there is nothing “natural” about this understand- real (Daston and Gallison 2010).
ing can be demonstrated, for example, by analyz- In the wake of the Religious Wars of the six-
ing the ways Archaic Greek or Ancient Hebrew teenth and seventeenth centuries this historically
texts present causes and consequences, motives forged notion of willed, individual, and rational
and responsibilities for action. Both of these action became the foil on which to understand the
ancient Mediterranean bodies of writing invari- emergence and maintenance of large scale social
ably emphasize the role of the community and orders which until then were seen as divinely
that of supernatural powers in stipulating, guid- chartered. The motivating circumstances prompt-
ing and taking responsibility for action. Since the ing this move were thoroughly political. The fact
Europeanoid tradition self-consciously builds on that in most of these religious wars no side could
these traditions, it follows that the notion of the simply vanquish the other, the contenders needed
free willing, autonomous, and rational actor is to come to a negotiated peace agreement
the consequence of a long historical develop- involving some form of toleration.1 This made it
ment. More specifically, it results from the com- more plausible to think of order as a consciously
bined effects of ideas and practices deriving from sought human achievement—even where it was
Roman Law (in particular the notions of personal
property and contract (Schiavone 2012)),
1
Christianity (notably ideas about person specific Examples are the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, the Edict
of Nantes of 1598, and in a different constellation the
English Act of Toleration of 1688. Historically, such
agreements were echoing medieval efforts of the church,
A. Glaeser (*) of the emperor, and of cities to create systems of adjudica-
Department of Sociology, The University of Chicago, tion with centralized monopolies of violence in lieu of the
Chicago, IL, USA feuding rights of nobles. Perhaps the most famous one of
e-mail: [email protected] these is the Old Swiss Confederacy of 1291.
seen as divinely enabled.2 Accordingly, contract social life which gave sensations, feelings and
theory (Hobbes 1651; Locke 1689a; Rousseau communal belonging a much greater role, lead-
1762) proposed to understand societies and states ing to the celebration of authenticity (rather than
as the intentional product of rational action. In calculation) as favored modality of social rela-
accordance with this view, states were seen as tionships on all scales. This holistic critique
governed by the will of sovereigns, divine and found expression in literature and philosophy,3
secular; and history became the narration of the but also in experimentation with new forms of
deeds of great men (embodying sovereignty social association from literary salons to reli-
rather than the unfolding of Providence). The gious revival movements. Holism received unex-
successful revolutions in England, the United pected but also confounding nourishment in the
States and France lent credibility to the individ- descent of the French revolution into terror, dic-
ual actor/contract model of self and society. tatorship, and restauration. Further corroboration
At the same time, and once more prompted by for supra-rational holistic understandings of
the splitting of the church (and thus authority), social life was provided by the seemingly author-
the notion of rationality favored by philosophers less, unwilled, and in its consequences chaotic,
began to move in the direction of formalization. self-accelerating social transformations of the
In other words it began to shift towards logics of nineteenth century with all the unspeakable
operations and away from the discovery and human misery they produced in their wake.4 Both
articulation of substantive norms, motives, and human activities and society appeared to a grow-
goals. As faith had become in principle open to ing number of theorists ever less like the result of
conversion, norms, motives and goals were seen deliberation, reason and will, and ever more like
increasingly as a matter of conscience-induced the result of uncontrollable and yet probably law-
choice and as such simply personal (Luther 1520; governed processes. These were seen as unleash-
Spinoza 1677; Locke 1689b). That is to say while ing “forces” akin to those of nature in their
there was growing awareness that any kind of inevitability, scope, and might. The call of the
agreement on substance may be elusive, hope moment was, then, one for a naturalization of the
emerged that agreements on formal aspects of perspectives on human beings and social life and
reason were still possible. The beginning indus- thus to make sense of the experience that the indi-
trial revolution and the expansion of commerce in vidual human appears entirely powerless in face
the 18th and its virtual explosion in the nine- of society and that therefore any assumption of
teenth century contributed further to the formal- individual autonomy is simply preposterous.5
ization of the concept of rational action (Weber
1920a) which through the idea of self-regulating
3
markets created a second model for association What I call here holism was articulated in different coun-
tries at around the same time in different ways, to different
through rational action. extents, and with different emphasis, which came to be
Other historical developments, however, known under different names. Paradigmatic examples are
began to raise serious doubts about the rational Sentimentalism in England and Romanticism (with a pre-
action model and its expansion into explaining cursor in “Sturm und Drang”) in Germany. Importantly,
both were simultaneously literary and philosophical
social orders. The stifling over-regulated, calcu- movements.
lating and isolating atmosphere of absolutist 4
Earlier critics were Vico (1744; Herder 1784–1991) and
court life and society (Reddy 2001; Elias 1969) the Romantics after them.
triggered a search for models of personal and 5
This shift in concerns and attention can be nicely brought
to the fore by contrasting graphical depictions of supreme
power and sovereignty. Whereas medieval and early
2
What Parsons (1937) characterizes as a universal prob- Renaissance images show the Christian divinity in the
lem of social order has thus very specific historical roots, guise of an old man who as heavenly puppeteer holds the
which is to say it gets thematized as a problem only in strings of his own creation, the frontispiece of Hobbes’
particular historically specific circumstances. Leviathan shows the sovereign state made up of all
4 Action in Society: Reflexively Conceptualizing Activities 65
This ancient sentiment of helplessness that previ- trade reflecting on social life, then, explicit and
ously led people to join mystery cults, embrace implicit activity concepts are a linchpin of that
Stoic philosophy, or take refuge in piety found an social life scholars want to study. For that reason,
entirely modern expression in the drive for a sci- emic and etic notions of activity have to be care-
ence to find new routes to overcome it. fully differentiated from each other and a plural-
The new times required new concepts. Before ity of such concepts has to be considered.7
discussing the activity concepts (or their studious Therefore, and this is the first criterion for a good
avoidance) deemed appropriate for the modern- sociological activity concept for our time:
izing world, however, I want to disrupt my his-
torical narrative to discuss criteria to adjudicate 1. Sociological activity concepts need to be such
the adequacy of activity concepts. I want to do so that they can integrate a possibly diverse set of
because the theories discussed in what follows all emic notions of action into a multidimen-
still have contemporary resonance. sional etic analysis. One could also say then
need to be loadable.
4.2 Thinking About Appropriate This suggests further, that the social sciences
Activity Concepts must generate two kinds of activity concepts.
They need particular ones to model historically
Even this very brief introduction makes it quite specific and where needed domain specific activ-
clear that the ways in which actors and actions ity concepts. They also require general concepts
are understood vary culturally and historically in that can be used to compare local understandings
rather profound ways. Moreover, these under- of acting and the differences they make for the
standings appear to be deeply intertwined with institutional fabric within which people live
other central aspect of a culture such as notions while also supporting an analysis of how people
of self, intentionality, agency, culpability, and in move over time (or across domains) from one set
fact politics. As such they appear as a constitutive of emic concepts of acting to another.
aspect of the institutional fabric of a particular The import of activity concepts for social life
time that is shaped in part at least by the very also requires that scholars think about how they are
activity concepts in use.6 Moreover, the moral part of a historically specific culture and how their
tone with which activity concepts are imbued and etic musings can become ideologies supporting or
the vigor with which they are argued against undermining particular emic understandings of
alternatives suggests that there are often not one activities with all the institutional consequences
but several activity notions in play in any social this move may entail. From this consideration fol-
context. Those articulated by intellectuals may lows a second criterion for a social-scientifically
also not be the (often not so explicitly formu- adequate activity concept namely:
lated) ones guiding the actions of other people of
which there may be once more a plurality. Far 2. Activity concepts need to enable critical
from serving merely as tools of the intellectual reflection on their own limits while remaining
open to change.
citizens together in front of the beautiful order they have
created together and govern through him in scepter and Such openness requires that theories are taken
sword. Nineteenth century depictions are much less flat-
tering. Daumier for example shows Louis Philippe the
to operate as metaphors which can be more or
“citizen king” chained by his own obesity to the throne less appropriate in lighting up those aspects of
where he is force-fed the goods of the kingdom while he
is at the same time endlessly defecating laws keeping his
brown-nosing underlings busy. 7
Emic refers to the study of a cultural phenomenon based
6
This does by no means imply, of course, that the emic on its specific, internal elements and their functioning, in
notion of activity is in any sense true. It simply means that short local use, whereas etic refers to the study of cultural
their employment does have an effect on the course of phenomenon by applying general, external for example
activities. academic frames.
66 A. Glaeser
reality that a researcher is interested in (Glaeser cepts need to show how the activities of others
2015). This immediately raises the question what including very many others can be influenced in
our interests in creating concepts to analyze desirable directions. This, however, is to say that
social life are or ought to be, for as Weber (1904) politicians need reliable guidance for their activi-
has pointed out, self-consciously perspectival ties in the world which translates directly into the
concept formation is the only chance we have to final demand of a suitable action concept:
get to a meaningful social science in the first
place.8 Historically, the aim has often been to 4. Sociological activity concepts must be onti-
generate impulses and in more ambitious cases cally fecund.
even goals and guidance for politics. The third
criterion is therefore: In other words, action concepts need to pro-
vide useful guidance in the world. Some philoso-
3. Sociological activity concepts need to be phers of science (e.g. Vaihinger 1922) but also
politically fecund. many practicing social scientists (e.g. Friedman
1953) have argued strongly in favor of the predic-
Putting it in this way raises the question how tive power of a social scientific model as a master
activity concepts can become politically relevant. criterion of goodness that could be interpreted to
Since politics is, according to the criteria pre- guarantee both political and ontic fecundity. The
sented here, best understood as any intentional advantage of this criterion would be that the
activity to establish, alter, or maintain institutions problematic notion of correspondence evoking
(Glaeser 2011, 2015), that is to say since as an some similitude between conceptual edifices and
activity politics is both motivated and enabled by world could be safely discarded. Yet, prediction
the possibility of alternative states of the world, has proved to be a most elusive goal, attainable,
politically fecund activity concepts need to be if at all, only in the most rarified circumstances.9
linkable to imaginaries which can generate such Worse, perhaps, even where it works it offers
alternatives. Moreover, since institutions as the only a narrow range of politically relevant infor-
proper object of politics are, again to keep with mation. Prediction tells at best what state to
the criteria presented here, most fruitfully under- expect, not how to intervene successfully in the
stood as self-similar replications of action- world to get to a particular state. The only viable
reaction webs (Glaeser 2014 and below Sect. 4.4), measure for ontic fecundity is the concept’s qual-
politically fecund concepts must show how activi- ity as a metaphor highlighting relevant features
ties can form institutions. And finally, since insti- of the world to orient and guide action
tutions exist in the coordination of the activities of successfully.
often very many people politically fecund con- Metatheoretically speaking, the four criteria
together imply a significant departure from the
scientific pretentions that have carried large parts
8
Historically, efforts to theorize social life emerged at the of the social sciences for far too long (Glaeser
interstices between cognitive and political interests. In
2015). Substantively speaking, these criteria in
some cases the political element is more obviously in the
foreground, as with Machiavelli’s Prince, Hobbes’ the very least imply a renewed search for inte-
Leviathan, Smith’s Wealth of Nations, or with Marx and grating models of social analysis that can help to
Engels’ Communist Manifesto. In other cases, say overcome the fragmentation of the social sci-
Mommsen’s Roman History, or Malinowski’s Argonauts
ences into subject-hyphenated domain specialties
the description of the lives of people at some other time
and place may make it appear as if social inquiry was a and paired oppositions of research perspectives
content-neutral purveyor of facts of life at some distant such as the positive and normative, micro-macro,
place. Yet the political purpose of such writing, often the
other as an example to emulate (or to avoid), self-discov-
9
ery, calls for help, preservation or transformation etc. are Not surprisingly it is rarely used as a criterion to discard
everywhere shining through the prefaces, styles, and rhe- beloved concepts notably by its strongest proponents in
torical structures of these texts. economics.
4 Action in Society: Reflexively Conceptualizing Activities 67
values are seen in these formalized models as In spite of all criticisms, it has to be recog-
matters of private tastes and choices that are, nized that utilitarian rationalism has become
where not explicitly stated, taken to be “revealed” politically fecund in a number of different ways.
in action (Samuelson 1938). Understood as pref- The most important of these is that utilitarian
erences, they are viewed if not as irrational, then rationalism proposes with the idea of positive and
certainly as extra-rational, and as such outside of negative incentives a very powerful but simple
the purview of proper scientific inquiry. In disem- model to shape the behavior of people thus offer-
boweling reason of its substantive capabilities, ing a seemingly universally applicable means of
utilitarian rationalism completely breaks with the directing politics. Unlike much action-distant
traditional Europeanoid models of rational sociological macro theory, the firm grounding of
action. utilitarian rationalism in a theory of action
For utilitarian rationalists, the social is the enables it to make action recommendations. The
result of aggregated individual actions. Where second reason for its political fecundity lies in the
these are mediated by free markets the outcome fact that if politicians want to allocate scarce
of this mediation is also thought to show socially resources in an efficient fashion over competing
optimal characteristics. The market has therefore targets with differential impact on the overall
replaced contract as the central integrating imagi- goal, it offers excellent tools of reasoning through
nary of this model. this process. And finally, efficiency has become a
So how does utilitarian rationalism fare vis-à- paramount historically specific criterion for judg-
vis the criteria of goodness I have spelled out in ing action itself.
the last section? The most important point to note Ontologically speaking, the action model of
is that utilitarian rationalism operates with a utilitarian rationalism is, owing to its commit-
monothetic model of action which it deems if not ment to ontological individualism, quite bar-
as universally valid then certainly as the best ren. It has no credibility as reasonably good
available approximation for how humans in fact guide for how people actually act in general.
act. This monism has a number of consequences. The historical and culturally comparative, as
First, emic action concepts are either treated as well as psychological-experimental evidence
forms of false consciousness or they are simply speaks against it as much as the following three
deemed irrelevant. Second, monothetic models theoretical arguments aiming to demonstrate
obliterate any space for critical reflections about the fundamental sociality of internal life above
the performative consequences of the posited all of reason itself. Reason has two main
action model. In other words, there is no room for dimensions. Its basis is the capacity of human
what has been called self-reflexivity in the social beings to be object and subject at the same
sciences (Marcus and Fischer 1986; Wacquant time, that is to be a self. Humans acquire both,
and Bourdieu 1992). Third, monothetic action the general capacity and the particular form of
concepts completely obliterate the existential self-hood by internalizing their relations to
tensions created by the co-existence of a multi- others (Mead 1934; Vygotsky 1986; Stern
plicity of action logics (Weber 1922). Fourth, for 1985). The second dimension of reason is to
the same reason monothetic action concepts make oneself object of oneself in a systematic
reduce the evaluation and thus meaning of action fashion which is to say to do so in a rule gov-
to a single dimension. Thus they forfeit important erned way. The capacity to follow rules men-
insights into the dynamics of social life. tally, however, as Wittgenstein’s private
language argument makes clear (1953) is con-
ful first in justifying and later also in conducting business. tingent on a self’s embeddedness in a commu-
The possibility to formalize the pursuit of advantage, that nity of interpretation in which to follow this
is pure scientific form mattered as well. There were, need-
rule is a practice. Finally, reflection has to take
less to say, efforts to formalize the pursuit of truth and
justice as well. Yet these have not gone nearly as far as the place in some structured symbolic medium
pursuit of advantage now dubbed “utility”. such as ordinary language or mathematics,
4 Action in Society: Reflexively Conceptualizing Activities 69
which is likewise socially derived and requires a diverse group of approaches which continued
social relations for its upkeep. to see activity concepts as central and which I
This said, the utilitarian rationalists’ model of will call here for want of a better term social
action is relevant as an etic theory of action wher- activity theorists.
ever something like utility maximization is the
desired outcome. It is relevant as an emic theory 4.3.2.1 Emergent Social Facts:
precisely where the model has become performa- Sociology Without Activity
tively relevant because people actually use it con- Concepts
sciously or have become habituated to work in The scholar who has for the longest time been
accord with it. That is to say because it has been credited with the honor of having invented the
politically so fecund and because in the mean- term sociology, Auguste Comte (1844), devel-
time generations of managers have been trained oped over the second quarter of the nineteenth
in its image and workers are supposed to follow it century a rather influential model that mapped
down to their sports activities and even eating his understanding of a stratified reality onto a
habits it is of considerable import as an emic system of sciences each addressing itself to one
model. of these strata. For Comte the layers of reality are
hierarchically nested in such a way that the more
complex higher layers are materially grounded in
4.3.2 Communalism14 the lower ones. The layers are separated by
thresholds of emergence through which new laws
For communalists not individuality but sociality come into effect which must become the object
has become the basic assumption about human of specialized sciences if progress is to be made
life, if one that has been conceived as varying in in capturing the phenomena as they really are.
form phylogenetically and historically, ontoge- The most complex layer of reality, social life,
netically and biographically. In fact, individual- forms the top-most layer of being and accord-
ity has been understood by communalists as a ingly requires its own science, sociology.
particular modality of organizing the relations Emile Durkheim (1895) has adapted this model
between human beings and as such the result of to justify his design for a truly scientific sociology.
a particular historical development (e.g. Simmel He is much concerned, therefore, with establishing
1908; Durkheim 1893). Due to this shift in fun- the autonomy of sociology as a discipline, and does
damental ontological assumptions, sociologies so in two related steps. The first is to delineate the
felt compelled to break completely with tradi- proper object for sociological research which he
tional rational action and contract models. This designates as social facts. Working on the paradigm
break came in two main varieties, as structural- of sanctioned norms he characterizes them as exert-
ism feeling compelled to abandon any ground- ing force on individual humans as well as by their
ing of social analysis in activity concepts, and as diffusion, that is their independence from individ-
ual acts and modes of thinking which can for that
14
reason also not simply be willed away (1895). In
Proponents of individualism typically denigrate com-
munal perspectives as collectivist playing on not so subtle Durkheim’s view, these social facts emerge from
associations with fascism and socialism. Conversely, individual activities as objective characteristics of
communalists of either of the two stripes of discussed the world through social organization which can be
below often reciprocate by calling the opposing perspec-
studied with regards to its particular objective
tive atomism with likewise not so subtle overtones of con-
fusing the study of social life with the study of dead structure. Knowledge of this structure renders an
matter. Although I am in some sense clearly taking sides investigation of the underlying individual actions
in the debate I want to avoid such name calling not least superfluous; worse, attention to action would be as
because all well-established models discussed in what fol-
distracting and misleading as attempting to study
lows have value if typically in a domain much smaller
than the one imagined by their authors. the evolution of life by aiming to grasp it at the
70 A. Glaeser
molecular level.15 Ancillary to this object definition lie the roots of Durkheim’s vision of sociology as
is an effort to differentiate that new science of a positive religion in Comte’s sense.16
social facts, sociology, from that older science of The Durkheimian vision of a sociology
individuals and their actions, psychology. The beyond activities is chiefly responsible for the
result of this procedure is a stark contrast between paradoxical situation with which I started this
an individualistically conceived psychology and a chapter. The large segments of the discipline that
communally framed sociology. make do without an action concept are often
The second step is taken with the development called structuralist or structure functionalist in
of methods to measure social facts empirically. direct reference to Durkheim’s example. Of
This meant turning away from individual actions course from the vantage point of the Comte-
toward observable manifestations of social facts. Durkheim theory this is only an apparent paradox
Among them are large scale institutions (notably which disappears as soon as the fact of emer-
the law and religion), forms of social organiza- gence is taken seriously.
tion, or otherwise statistical averages minimizing There are, however, two fundamental prob-
the adulterating effect of an attention to individu- lems with the argument of emergence in social
als and their idiosyncratic choices. From a study life. First, it posits the independent pre-existence
of such indicators of social fact Durkheim is then of the elements from which something is said to
deriving what in his eyes are laws of macro-social emerge. For the social world emergentists must
development the most prominent of which is his argue, therefore, that the social emerges from
assertion that societies evolve from simple to individual activities. However, as I have already
more complex forms passing on their way argued in the last section, the social as it is most
through distinct modes of social organization, fruitfully understood today, has no pre-social to
and mental composition of people. emerge from.17 As far as sociality is concerned, all
Durkheim’s sociology is not entirely without that happens is that its forms change both ontoge-
attention to activities. At the center of his analysis netically and biographically as children move
lies an interest in rituals through which both the from their entanglements in smaller (e.g. dyadic)
social ties of people and their individual life relationships to the mastery of larger (e.g. triadic
energy are renewed in the experience of actions, and onward) and more complexly structured
feelings and thoughts shared in each other’s co- groupings of humans. Much the same holds his-
presence (1893; 1912). These moments of “effer- torically as many sociologist have pointed out,
vescence,” and the order they create are and perhaps even phylogenetically as evolution-
existentially meaningful in Durkheim’s under- ary anthropologists and linguists are beginning to
standing of social life because they perform the speculate (Tomasello 2014). In other words with
transcendence of individuality towards the point the social sciences the use of the term emergence
of origin of all human life: society. And it is this in the Comte-Durkheim sense of a “strong” emer-
contrast between power inducing collective gence is ontically quite problematic.
embeddedness and individual isolation that for
Durkheim becomes the contrast between the
sacred and the profane, the source code of all sig-
16
nification and meaning. Indeed here and in his The fruitful tradition of looking at nationalisms, notably
the American one as a “civic religion” (Bellah 1968) has
ethics specifying his own categorical imperative
taken off from here and it has contributed to communitar-
to live a life in perfect attunement to the need of ian thought the only successful normative school of social
one’s society at its present stage of development, thought in which American sociology after World War II
was represented with important scholars such as Bellah.
17
The emergentists much quoted examples from nature
cannot serve as proper analogies here. While natural sci-
15
This is of course precisely what is done in biology entists can for example observe elements and their proper-
today—a valuable lesson in the half-time of naturalistic ties independently of the molecules of which they can be
metaphors. a part, the same is not true in society.
4 Action in Society: Reflexively Conceptualizing Activities 71
The second fundamental problem with emer- 4.3.2.2 Social Activity Concepts
gence is that it treats the process of emerging While the radical political and social transforma-
more or less as a black box. Apart from general tions during the long nineteenth century prompted
hints (Durkheim 1895) and a few thought experi- and in a sense even demanded a fresh conceptual-
ments (Archer 1995) which are cited time and ization of action and social life, the quickly loos-
again in the literature, there is no systematic ening immediate grip of Christianity freed the
attempt to theorize the process of emergence. Its social imagination and made it more plausible for
invocation has therefore something mystifying. scholars to develop a whole range of social activ-
Rather than pointing to possibilities for political ity concepts. Hegel plays a crucial role as an
intervention, it effectively obscures processes and inspiration for theorists of social action. His
it posits the existence of doubtful entities such as Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) and later his
a base line of general sharing—Durkheim’s col- Philosophy of Right (1818–1832) set an example
lective conscience enabling a fundamental level for the idea of historically changing forms of
of mechanical solidarity—for the existence of sociality which are configuring and being config-
viable political communities. It is therefore a ured by the actions of people. He also conceives
politically highly problematic concept. forms of sociality as entangled in a dialectical
Emergentists (e.g. Bhaskar 1979; Archer et al. relationship with changing forms of peoplehood
1998; Sawyer 2005; Elder-Vass 2010) often pres- characterized by the differentiation and growth of
ent their own paradigm as the only alternative to mental capacities. Hegel thus systematically
individualism. Yet, the sociological phenomena reinterprets as historical achievements and rela-
they point to in order to make their case for emer- tionally configured the very characteristics of
gence remain unpersuasive because they can be humans that Enlightenment thinkers have attrib-
explained without either taking recourse to the uted to them as fixed, inalienable patrimony,
concept of emergence or by relapsing into the while insisting that these changing characteristics
individualist reductions favored by utilitarian of humans entail changing possibilities for orga-
rationalists. There is indeed a third possibility, nizing social life. Ontologically speaking, then,
namely making sense of social life dialectically Hegel opposes traditional nominalism by
that is by taking recourse to processes of co- showing how individuals are abstractions from
constitution in which parts and whole get recon- the dialectical processes that constitute them. At
figured together—if often through a conflict the same time he opposes traditional realism by
ridden process of adjustments. Indeed, the three historicizing the forms concepts take. In the
arguments about the social constitution of inner Phenomenology’s account of human develop-
life I have provided in the last section do exactly ment of which the master-slave dialectic is but
that. If humans are fundamentally social in the the best known part, he argues, for example, that
sense in which these theories think sociality, then self-consciousness, the very basis for rational
action is never individual rational action, but the thinking, is attainable only in the recognition of
socially embedded action of a person whose very others. Since property rights are for Hegel the
rationality is produced and reproduced through crucible of recognition, this leads to violence and
institutionalized social relations. But this also subjugation. In general Hegel assumes that inten-
means that we can think of what sociologists like tional actions inevitably lead to failures or resis-
to call structure as fully grounded in activities
without having to add to it some mysterious emer-
court, but only oxygen in something else. It would be
gent properties. People and their modalities of pointless then to be puzzled by the fact that the properties
acting simply change with the social and cultural of oxygen and hydrogen would not “add up” to form those
environment, the institutions and structures.18 of water, simply because nobody had ever seen oxygen
and hydrogen and carbon by itself. At the level of biology:
yes humans are made of cells, but these cells operate dif-
18
To say it with the natural metaphors of the emergentists: ferently from mono-cellular beings in spite of very many
It is as if the oxygen in water was different from the oxy- structural similarities. Humans emerge no more from flag-
gen in carbondioxide. It is as if there was no oxygen tout ellates than society from individuals.
72 A. Glaeser
tance in the sense that they all entail what we now tual growth, but as a material necessity. Activities
call unintended consequences in nature and soci- in the world assume a much greater role in Marx’
ety. Thus, the struggle for recognition does not theory and concept formation takes a back-seat as
lead to the anticipated death of one of the con- a super-structural phenomenon. The dialectic that
tenders, but to domination; and once more con- unfolds in his theory is still one of self and other
trary to the intention, domination stunts the embedded in a wider system of social forms. Yet
master, but forces the slave to transcend himself the main failures, forms of resistance and con-
and to develop and finally overcome domination flicts (i.e. “contradictions”) are no longer lodged
etc. Failure and resistance, however, lead human between mind and world, but between material
beings to form better concepts about the world interests and within systemic institutional incom-
and themselves. The formation of these concepts patibilities. And as in Hegel there is in Marx’
is wrapped up in an ongoing process of revision theory the positing of an inevitable development
because they need to be adjusted constantly to the towards a secular paradise; yet it is no longer
effects that humans have brought about through achieved by state bureaucrats (as a universal
their past intentions formed on the basis of these class) acting in the interests of all, but by a prole-
concepts. This “history of spirit” as a history of tariat universalized by generalized exploitation
concepts, of social forms, of social organization, and suffering which enables them to launch a
will continue to unfold until ideas and world are world revolution.
perfectly aligned and humans have thus realized Marx’s theorization of activities is grounded
their potential in harmony between their univer- in a reinterpretation of the notion of praxis. For
sality and their particularity. In the Hegelian the ancient Greeks, praxis was an integrated and
world action assumes basic subjective meaning organized set of activities such as shoe-making or
because it is driven by intentions, it is existen- lyre-playing that was systematically connected to
tially meaningful as a step, however minute, in a particular forms of knowing.19 During the
process of human self-liberation and in its high- Enlightenment praxis was juxtaposed to theory
est form move in the objective drama of self- as modality of engaging with the world, and by
unfolding sprit in the history of the World. emphasizing practice Marx thus signals both his
Marx honed his skills in historical and dialec- movement from a focus on ideas to one on mate-
tical reasoning in the encounter with Hegel, and rial production and with it a turn away from
even where Marx’ language begins to shed its naturalized conceptions of intentional action to
Hegelian sound in his later writings, the methods socially preconfigured activities (1845; Marx and
remain with him. Yet, in Marx’ mind Hegel’s Engels 1846). The early Marx distinguishes
work suffered from two fatal conceits. First between free activity and determinate activity
among these is Hegel’s insistence that history had where the former marks only the end point of his-
already reached the point where reason had come torical development in communism, the latter the
into its own by having reshaped the world in its form of human activities take on the path to the
image (Marcuse 1941; Avineri 1968). Yet, the final proletarian revolution. Indeed, Marx ana-
dramatic situation of the working classes in lyzes determinate activities as standardized forms
Europe indicated that the present order could not of operating that integrate knowledge, specific
possibly be anywhere near the realization of locations where they are performed etc. Most
human potential that Hegel had assumed. Second, importantly, however, he shows through a discus-
Marx accused Hegel and his followers of misun- sion of the historicity of the division of labor, of
derstanding human beings as principally idea
driven whereas in his mind they needed to be pri- 19
Aristotle (322BCEa, b) gave praxis the added specific
marily understood as material beings in need to meaning of a set of activities that is not undertaken for the
sake of something else that is what he calls poiesis, but
produce their own livelihood for survival.
completely for its own sake. As central as this distinction
Following Hegel, he took a deep interest in labor, is to Aristotelian practical philosophy, it is specific to him
but now understood not as a vehicle to intellec- and his school.
4 Action in Society: Reflexively Conceptualizing Activities 73
ownership, of family relations, of forms of com- cratic responsibility (as the Enlightenment did),
merce, and of government, how a wide variety of but in the rootless, dissipated individual (e.g.
practices are interdependent and presuppose each Durkheim 1897; Thomas 1923). In American
other across society with a particular mode of pragmatism, especially in the work of Dewey
production at its center. Modalities of producing (1922) habit is both the vehicle to reintroduce the
knowledge, raising children, or doing politics are sociality of action as well a means to eclipse the
in this sense dependent on modalities of running significance of will and rational planning.22
commerce, laboring in factories and managing Norbert Elias (1935) brings significant inno-
them under conditions of changing markets and vations to the concept of habitus by understand-
ever new technologies. ing it as a response to particular institutional
Closely related to the notion of praxis/practice configurations. At the same time Elias sees in
is that of habitus/habit. Like its cousin’s its theo- habitus the means for the structural continuation
retization began in ancient Greece, where it des- of these configurations. In particular Elias
ignated the mental disposition corresponding to employs habitus to come to an understanding
practices.20 Yet, with all the individualizing ten- how increasing requirements for coordination in
dencies I have mentioned above, habit came to be lengthening action chains can be met institution-
side-tracked as an important component of theo- ally. His answer is that this is possible only to the
rizing actions. Worse, perhaps, it appeared as old- degree that control becomes internalized. In other
fashioned, anti-modern, as that which resists words, Elias provides us with a way to investigate
reason.21 This changed dramatically in the late the co-constituting relationships between institu-
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Growing tional arrangements on a larger scale and their
psychological empiricism (e.g. James 1890), but presuppositions in the psychological makeup of
even more so a changing social threat scenario the persons carrying these institutions. Equipped
cultivated in contemporary imaginaries placed with this dialectical imaginary, Elias directs our
danger to society no longer in the pigheaded attention to what he calls “mechanisms of inter-
farmer resisting scientific innovation and demo- weaving” that is everything that brings human
beings into the range of each other’s activities
allowing on the one hand lengthening chains of
20
The ancient Greeks saw good habits as a basis for good
interaction requiring on the other new tools of
practice and as such of virtuous behavior. Accordingly,
habits became the target of educational efforts. Yet, the coordination.23
Greeks also saw that these habits are the results of prac- Pierre Bourdieu (1972; 1986) follows Elias in
tices as much as of direct instruction. Although manifest- seizing upon habitus as the mediating link
ing themselves as characteristics of persons, then, the
between the personal and the social. Yet, while
Greeks saw habits as the result of a social process of
instruction as well as of experience, of repeatedly acting Elias’ animating questions pertains to large scale
in social context (Aristotle 322BCEa). Politically good historical transformations, Bourdieu’s centers
habits were seen as the basis of a stable and reliable social around the reproduction of class boundaries. To
order (Aristotle 322BCEb).
21
answer his questions he suggested a productive
It appears that habit was generally suspect to thinkers
set of metaphors that described habitus shaped in
aspiring to effect changes. Missionizing Christianity is,
unsurprisingly, not interested in habit. In the work of the struggle for status (“symbolic capital”) in
Augustine, and this is very significant for the place of which the contestants have to differentiate them-
habit in Europeanoid social thought after the Reformation, selves along several dimensions from other con-
will and choice are emphasized and habit no longer plays
a roles as a significant theoretical concept. Of course there
are sound theological reasons for this preference as well.
22
Yet, with Christianity firmly established and through the Dewey even collapses will into habit.
23
reappropriation of Aristotle’s practical philosophy in the Elias is concerned here with processes of colocation
thirteenth century, habit once more played a significant, if (e.g. urbanization) or connection (e.g. trade) following
secondary, role notably in the work of Thomas Aquinas. political centralization and expansion as much as in socio-
Subsequent revolutionary movements kept to Augustine technological means of coordination (e.g. money, stan-
rather than Aquinas. dardization, clocks).
74 A. Glaeser
testants. Habitus is both the result of this struggle teristics. It is “sociating”, that is to say that it pro-
and its animating principle. As among the Greeks, duces particular forms of social relations which
Bourdieusian habitus conveys know how for mediate the flow of effects in either direction; it
practices.24 And it does so—Bourdieu is in agree- also more or less subtly transforms both interact-
ment here with previous habitus theorists—in ing parties. Moreover, Simmel envisions how
form of tacit, embodied knowing which is hard to several kinds of interactions can dovetail and
penetrate for critical reflection. how objects fit into interaction. Exchange is a
The notions of practice and habitus belong good example for how Simmel reasons about
together; they form two sides of the same coin. these matters and how the notion of interaction
The problem with this approach is that most prac- can be usefully deployed to better understand
tices do not only build on tacit knowledge, habi- social processes of co-constitution (1900).
tus, but they are often shot through with forms of Possession, a form of interaction with objects
deliberation making use of explicit theories rang- shapes both, the thing and its proprietor. In giving
ing in their degree of sophistication and explicit up a possession in exchange for something else
awareness from sayings to elaborate theories. the two objects in play obtain value. All compo-
Yet, it is also important in this context to point nents of this form of interaction can become
out with Wittgenstein’s private language argu- objectified in repeated exchange; both propri-
ment that systematic reasoning (which inevitably etors are set in relation to each other; and so as
is a form of rule following) needs to be grounded are the goods. Now consider how bringing in
in practices. Moreover, it is clear that praxis/hab- money changes the entire character of the
its as highly institutionalized forms of activity exchange and all that participates in it.
cannot stand on their own and require more basic A very important dimension of the Simmelian
activity concepts to account for their genesis. theory of interaction is provided by his transcen-
Georg Simmel begins a completely new strand dental reflections on the conditions for the possi-
of thinking with the physical sciences inspired bility of interaction to take place in the first place.
notion of interaction (Wechselwirkung) (1908). In keeping with Kantian language he calls the
He introduces this term as a metatheoretical conditions aprioris (1908) and points to three
activity concept to think through a wide variety necessary aspects of what I would prefer to call a
of dialectical, co-constituting social processes. social imaginary. The first is typification of self,
The basic imaginary behind the notion of interac- other, and situation, the second is an awareness
tion casts two people acting towards each other in that the types employed fail to exhaust reality,
mutual orientation. Examples discussed in detail and the third is a kind of general trust that there is
by Simmel are exchange (1900), competition and a workable place for the interaction in some
other forms of conflict, as well as subordination vaguely conceived larger social whole.25
and super-ordination (1908). Interaction for Simmel’s concept of interaction bore extraordi-
Simmel has especially two intertwining charac- nary fruit in the work of George Herbert Mead’s
24
Elias too was concerned about the habitus generating
25
powers of status competition. Yet, in his work it works as These three aprioris are not reconcilable with caretaker-
only one kind of interweaving mechanisms among many infant interaction (e.g. Stern 1984) because they presup-
others. The similarities in both accounts are as interesting pose a fully developed self with linguistic abilities. As
as their respective differences. Suffice it to say here that such they fail as aprioris in the sense intended by Simmel.
Elias’ concept is wide enough to see that cooperation is as However, the Simmelian aprioris can be interpreted fruit-
powerful a generator of habitus as competition. Bourdieu fully as dimensions of a social imaginary for fully sym-
on the other hand adds a Cartesian precision and level of bolized social interactions. Yet, since early developmental
self-reflective theorizing which is absent in Elias. This interactional forms make much use of affect attunement
depth is particularly useful where Bourdieu provides to and since they do not simply subside it is clear that
tools to study the self-normalizing tendencies of fields and Simmel’s notion of interaction is fundamentally incom-
the symbolic violence they exert on participants (1990). plete even for adult interaction.
4 Action in Society: Reflexively Conceptualizing Activities 75
theory of self-formation discussed above and becomes a discipline engaged in a double resolu-
through him (as well as directly) on the symbolic tion hermeneutics: that of the actor and that of the
interactionism (Blumer 1962) of the second wider context of actions.28 To help with this task
Chicago school. Weber develops an ideal typical framework to
The theory of dialogue as developed by Martin reconstruct the subjective meaning of actions that
Buber (1923) and significantly expanded by urges its user to differentiate between means-
Mikhail Bakhtin (1929; 1938/1939) offers impor- ends rational, value-rational, affective, and tradi-
tant depth to the notion of interaction.26 First it tional motives for action. One of the great
emphasizes the import of the emotive and cogni- strengths of this approach is its effort to think
tive attitude with which the other is encountered. together different modalities of acting, different
As dialogic thinkers show, these attitudes have action logics if you will, fathoming the possibil-
dramatic consequences for processes of self- ity of ambiguities, ambivalences and even contra-
development of both participants as well as for dictions. Not only does Weber’s framework make
the course of the interaction. In particular Buber more room again for pre-nineteenth century
distinguishes between completely open and Europeanoid notions of rationality but he allows
closed (objectifying) relationships which Bakhtin for the integration of habitus and emotions into a
labels dialogic and monologic.27 Second, the the- thoroughly pluralistic, if you will multi-voiced,
ory of dialogue opens an important normative or polyphonic analysis of action. It is almost sec-
perspective on social interaction. Beyond reiter- ondary in this regard that he has failed to grasp
ating that most of what we call ethics lies in the the ways in which precisely the affective and the
manner of engaging with others it produces an traditional modalities of acting can be experi-
attractive positive vision of what ethical interac- ences as profoundly meaningful.
tion should look like. Unfortunately Weber’s own efforts at develop-
Max Weber (1922) is the inventor of the very ing a methodology to use his scheme have
term social action and made it, in his famous defi- remained sketchy at best. Worse, perhaps, Weber
nition of sociology, the proper object of socio- created very unfortunate misunderstandings by
logical research. Action becomes social for recommending instrumental rationality as the
Weber when it is oriented in its intended meaning primary measuring device against which actual
toward the actions of others. According to Weber performance should be measured as deviation.29
understanding the subjective meaning imbued in Taking Weber as a starting point, few have done
the action is tantamount to understanding the more than Alfred Schütz (1932; Schütz and
action in its causes and effects, sociology Luckmann 1984) to elucidate both meaning in
action and the challenges to understanding sub-
jective meanings. Critical of Weber’s understand-
26
Bakhtin systematically builds on Buber (Friedman ing of motives as preceding action, Schütz draws
2001). At this point it is unclear to me, however, whether
either Buber or Bakhtin had actually read Simmel’s appo-
28
site texts and whether they saw themselves developing his This of course includes the possibility that that the inter-
notion of interaction further. In a certain sense Simmel’s pretation given to an action by a sociologist may deviate
work was prolific but was often received in a piecemeal significantly from the meaning the actor may have con-
fashion. nected with it. The point Weber is making is simply that
27
Feminism and postcolonial theory (Fabian 1983) have no matter what the actor may have thought he or she was
drawn significantly on a dialogic imaginary. On the mono- doing, their intended meaning matters to understand the
logic/objectifying end of these attitutes there has been particular course of action they have taken as other mean-
something of a common thematic focus and intensive ings would have putatively led to other actions.
29
cross-fertilization of ideas emerging from dialogism, a In the lack of a more sophisticated understanding of
reinvigorated interest in Hegel’s notion of recognition meaning comes to the fore one of the lacunae of Weber’s
(Honneth 1992) a postmarxian Lukacs (1923) inspired otherwise so stunning erudition: the complete absence of
interest in processes of objectification (Honneth 2005) linguistic knowledge of either the classical historical
and a Freud inspired line thinking of processes of school of linguistics, of the synchronic linguistics of
fetishization (Kaplan 2006; Böhme 2006). Saussure or of Peirce’s semiotics.
76 A. Glaeser
attention to the temporal constitution of meaning actors to steer the perception of their actions by
during, in, and through the process of acting others in the right direction. At the same time, the
itself. “new rhetoric” (Burke 1950; Perelman and
Starting in the late 1930s, the terms social Olbrechts-Tyteca 1952) recovered, once more,
action and theory of action became closely asso- the ancient idea that speaking is addressed to par-
ciated with Talcott Parsons (1937; respectively ticular audiences and crafted in relation to them.
Parsons and Shils 1951) and his school. Parsons, Wittgenstein-inspired speech act theory (Austin
more than anybody else after Weber, saw in 1962; Searle 1969), finally argued the two closely
action the very building block of the social and related points that speaking can be very often
then also of the psychological and finally of the fruitfully understood as acting to achieve a par-
organismic world (1978). Yet he did not share ticular effect however elusive its actual attain-
Weber’s hermeneutic approach to the social sci- ment may be, and that in fact the combination of
ences instead endorsing Durkheim’s scientistic a particular speech act, following a particular set
vision. Not surprisingly, then, Parsons very self- of rules whereby a ‘scertain set of signs are
consciously saw his work as integrating a signifi- deployed, and its subsequent uptake by others
cantly enriched version of Durkheim’s prompted by the very decoding of these signs,
functionalism and Weber’s focus on action. The may produce, where successful, the very thing
hallmark of Parsons’ approach is considering the speech act intended. Austin labeled the suc-
action at the crossroads of what he defines as sys- cessful conjuncture of speech intentions and
tems, namely the social system, the cultural sys- uptake performativity. Three core ideas are pres-
tem, the behavioral system and the personality ent in all of these theoretical departures:
system. Any concrete action is for Parsons at the addressivity, the deployment of signs in action,
same time understandable as the expression of and a decoding of these signs in evaluative reac-
these systems’ interaction as well as a functional tion. In short, successful performance leads to
operation within these systems aiming to either performativity.30
adapt the systems to the environment, and/or to
set the systems’ goals (or target values); to either 4.3.2.3 Weaknesses and Strengths
coherently harmonize and integrate the system of Established Social Action
and/or to latently maintain the system as a struc- Theories
ture. Parsons thus furnishes the aspiring analyst The notions of praxis/practice, habitus/habit,
with a systematic way to think about action in interaction, social action, and performance all
various kinds of contexts (Alexander 1988). contribute significant components to the commu-
The last social activity concept I want to dis- nal coproduction of seemingly individual activi-
cuss briefly is performance and with it the related ties. Yet, it is unclear how these concepts can be
notion of performativity. It is perhaps not surpris-
ing that these concept emerged only after WWII
30
when the experience of mass mediation in cin- The tracing of ideas is of course an endless business. An
alternative but crucially incomplete line of reasoning
ema, radio and press photography had already
unfolds from Kant’s epistemology (together with Aristotle
become mundane. The extensive use of mass and Plato the terminus a quo par excellence), to
media for propaganda in commerce and politics Durkheim’s (1907, 1912) pioneering work on the impor-
both in authoritarian and liberal-democratic gov- tance of socially derived categories operating as systems
of classifying the world; then came the acquisition of
ernance significantly contributed to the develop-
these ideas by W. I. Thomas (1928) who thus remembered
ment of these concepts (Bernays 1928; Lippmann them for a younger American audience, yet without the
1926; Dewey 1927). The concepts of perfor- important layer of a mediating semiotics to then feed into
mance and performativity were developed to in Merton’s notion of self-fulfilling prophecy again sens lin-
quitics. These ideas have since then been recycled a num-
the intersection of several theoretical innova-
ber of times (e.g., Butler, Mckenzie). I have highlighted
tions. There was Goffman’s (1956) employment the rhetorical strand here because the symbolic mediation
of theatrical metaphors to describe the efforts of matters here centrally.
4 Action in Society: Reflexively Conceptualizing Activities 77
thought together. How would we get from social In sum, while each concept offers a useful
action and interactions to practices? Worse per- partial perspective, none of them offers much that
haps, how would we get to institutions, and to would allow for their mutual integration into a
that level of analysis that is usually at play when more comprehensive framework and thus they
scholars invoke the term social structure? Or how fall short of the criteria enumarated in part two of
do we understand from within these concepts the this chapter. What is needed, then, is a metatheo-
dynamics, the historical transformations of the retical activity concept that can show any of the
forms of practices, habitus, interactions and social activity concepts discussed as special cases
social actions? There is nothing in the Simmelian of a more general framework, while making up
theory of interaction, for example, that explains the gaps I have just pointed to, especially the gaps
how local interactions congeal into a transpos- in internal plurality, scalability and historicity
able form while detailing something like the con- while doing the very best possible to avoid black-
ditions for the form’s reproduction. The boxing. I have developed such a concept over the
Bourdieusian notions of practice and habitus are last years (2011, 2014) and will discuss it now in
well articulated for multidimensional processes the final section of this chapter.
of status competition taking place within what he
calls fields. However, the theory offers next to
nothing by way of expanding these notions to 4.4 Action-Reaction Effect
other kinds of social processes and institutional Sequences
arrangements, thus leaving the question of the
emergence and transformation of field logics and It is the aim of this section to craft a general,
their wider integration into social life mostly loadable, reflexive, and politically as well as onti-
unclear. cally fecund concept of action that can draw on
Parsons’ action theory offers an integrative what is best in extant activitiy concepts while cre-
framework that in spite of its enormous reach, ating a roadmap for empirical research. It pro-
remains fixated on systems’ maintaining and inte- ceeds from a basic, consequently processualist
grating processes and is of little use in under- and dialectical account of social life.31 It assumes
standing contradictory pluralities of action logics that the social exists in the complex flow of
as well as the temporal dynamics of institutional- actions prompting each other in multiply inter-
ization and deinstitutionalization. secting and spatially and temporally differentiated
The notions of performance and performativ- ways. Within this model, any action is reaction to
ity open up an imaginary that points in fruitful a number of temporally prior actions of self and
directions to remedy some of the problems inher- others while at the same time giving rise to a mul-
ent in other activity concepts. Performance brings tiplicity of other actions by self and others.32 One
back the idea of a double mediation in the nexus
between actors: a primary mediation through 31
I have elaborated the following sketch of the model in
some symbolic medium and then a secondary much greater detail in Glaeser 2011 where I also put it to
use in interpreting a major “macro-structural” transforma-
medium ranging from stages to TV channels tion. I have traced the historical roots of this model in the
through which primary mediation can become hermeneutic tradition of social thought in Glaeser 2014.
effectively disseminated. Yet, phenomena of both 32
To avoid misunderstandings: Reaction does not mean
primary and secondary mediation are much wider reactive. Neither does it imply any other kind of mecha-
than envisioned in performance theory. nistic response. Reactions can be eminently creative, like
the clever repartee in a dialogue. Indeed, creativity lies in
Performativity in turn focuses our attention on what is made of the available pieces in the immediate
the dialectical interplay of activities and their present or in the more distant past, not in a divine creation
transformation of reality, without, however, pro- ex nihilio. And these pieces are even as memories, under-
viding a satisfying answer on how this transfor- standings etc. ultimately traceable to actions, past and
present. When Arendt (1958) leaning on Augustine (395)
mation works. describes creativity as a capacity for new beginnings I
78 A. Glaeser
particularly nasty problem of conceptualizing when a gesture registers as threat rather than a
activities, namely finding proper boundaries greeting, a speech as a call for revolution rather
demarcating an action, is immediately addressed than a mere description of grievances etc. The
by this formulation, as any activity can become simultaneous use of a number of understandings of
something determinate only in the reaction by several modes can then provide orientation, direc-
others.33 tion, and where necessary the means for coordinat-
It is important to keep in mind that both the ing and justifying courses of action. In other words
antecedent and consequent actions can have taken/ understandings can systematically guide, that is
could take place at faraway places and distant structure, activities because they themselves are
times. If so, their effects need to be projectively structured.
articulated with the help of socio-technological Evidently, then, stable reactions can be thought
means of storage and transportation for things, and of as prompted and guided by the primary media-
memory and communication for ideas. Under cer- tion of constant understandings. Hence, the next
tain circumstances actions and reactions are step in solving the puzzle of institutionalization is
repeated in a self-similar manner over a certain to wonder how understandings as self/world
stretch of time possibly even by a changing cast of mediators become stable. The ordering of activi-
participating actors. If this is the case, they have ties suggested by understanding is first of all a
become regularized and common parlance nomi- process, an open-ended flow of differentiation and
nalizes (and by implication objectifies) such a integration that may originally flow from nothing
complex of intersecting, self-similar action-reac- more than acting itself. And yet, where orderings
tion chains as an institution. Institutionalized webs in action become validated in agreement with
of action-reaction sequences vary in scope, com- other human beings (I call this form of validation
plexity and temporal staying power from family recognition), where they are confirmed or discon-
rituals to the papacy. So here is a very simple and firmed in the ex post assessment of action success
in principle researchable way of seeing structure (here I speak of corroboration), or where they fit
as activity and activity as structured. The question in or are compatible with already objectified
is now how that self-sameness, how that stability understandings (that is when they begin to reso-
comes about? nate), they congeal into more rigid, at the far end
An answer to the question of institution forma- even objectified forms. Thus, understanding (con-
tion emerges by first wondering how reactions pick tinuous verb) becomes an understanding (gerund)
up and respond to antecedent actions and how the which as memorized exemplar or abstracted
concrete temporal form of acting itself comes to be schema hence forth allows for its decontextual-
ordered. And here the answer is through the media- ized application, which is nothing other than what
tion of consciously or unconsciously employed we more commonly call learning.
understandings which are discursive, emotive, and/ And yet once more an answer to the question
or sensory (including kinesthetic) modalities of dif- of institutionalization seems to be simply pushed
ferentiating and integrating the world.34 Through backward to another level of analysis. And indeed
understanding, antecedent actions obtain relevant so it is, because we now have to puzzle how vali-
specificity and perlocutionary force, for example dations can become regularized. And here the
answer can only be that they must issue from
institutionalized sources. Recognitions for exam-
would respond that what looks like the ability to start
something new is better understood as the jiu-jitsu-like art ple may come forth from a constant source, say
to alter trajectories thanks to the artful triangulation of the stable character of a friend who reliably
vectors pointing in all sorts of directions. praises the same sorts of behavior/understand-
33
See Glaeser 2011, introductory chapter for an extended ings and disparages others with the same con-
example. The reasoning here is analogous to Bakhtin’s
stancy. But that is to say that the friend is an
delimination of meaning units in speech (Bakhtin 1953).
34 institution in the sense in which it is defined here,
Subjective means here merely employed by this actor.
Understanding therefore does not imply truth in any and one is thus forced to admit that there is no
objective sense of that word. ending to this process, that there is no stopping
4 Action in Society: Reflexively Conceptualizing Activities 79
point, just seemingly infinite deferment. And ple present in different situations differentially
indeed I have called this endless deferment insti- validate understandings, because the space reso-
tutiosis, in adapting the Peirceian concept of nates with some understandings more than with
semiosis to institutional analysis. What gives others and because different situations afford dif-
society stability then, are either loops, that is ferent possibilities for corroborating understand-
recursive patters or, more importantly, the very ings in action, while different contexts may
inertia caused by the friction involved in the actualize different understandings hence making
interplay of so many processes which are difficult us act differently. The upshot of this idea is that
to orchestrate at will by any one participant. we can live quite well and in many modern cir-
The two notions of projective articulation and of cumstances need to live with contradictory under-
institutions are the central link between what goes standings which become actualized differentially,
traditionally for micro-analysis and for macro- leading quite “naturally” to different action pat-
analysis. Both of these notions can be employed terns in different contexts.36
systematically to think through the flow of action These deliberations immediately shed light on
effects temporally from sources to consequences, the notorious issue of structure and agency. If
as well as spatially to their distribution between agency is the capability to act, than besides the
people and institutional domains. If one wants to physical preconditions of time, space and energy,
use these terms at all, macro and micro thus become the capability to perform particular actions is
mere labels for more or less temporally, spatially dependent on particular actualized understand-
and domain dispersed action effects.35 ings of the actor, as well as of the actualized
The mundanely observed fact that actions of understandings of others whose participation is
one and the same person seem to follow different necessary to complete the act (Austin 1962). In
logics in different contexts as well as the dis- other words, anybody’s capability to act is deeply
crpancy that may occur between the actors own enmeshed with the institutionalized activities of
understanding of her actions and the understand- others. Conversely, any institution exists in
ing that an observer suspects is underlying the repeatedly enabled action and thus agency. The
actual also appear in a new light. The understand- opposition between agency and structure is there-
ings through which we operate do not only have fore entirely misleading.37
an ordering dimension but also carry with them an The problem of agency articulated in this
accent of validity which distinguishes them into manner leads to a fresh consideration of power
those that are actualized because they appear valid and politics. From the perspective of consequent
enough for us to act upon and those which do not. processualism, politics is a very particular and
Continuously validated understandings become socially most significant form of activity, namely,
naturalized; we forget that we could understand as I have already indicated above, the intentional
differently which is to say that we literally embody effort to form, maintain or alter institutions of
these understandings. Now, since validation is various spatial and temporal depths and import.
situationally variant simply because different peo- Since institutions are formed by minimally two
but potentially millions of people constituting the
35
From the perspective of the consequently processualist
model presented here it is therefore highly misleading to
36
speak of micro and macro as “levels”. It makes no sense This model therefore allows for a much more nuanced
to talk, as Coleman (1990) does of “social conditions” approach to the vexing ambiguity in the results of experi-
causing the micro- phenomenon of frustration. What ments on cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957; Petty and
causes frustration are the concrete actions of concrete oth- Cacioppo 1981). Dissonances can only occur if two con-
ers, if potentially many of them and repeatedly, for exam- texts actualize the same profiles of understandings. As
ple competing with ego for few goods, creating price such the model also provides the resources to think
hikes, etc. that is the level of action-reaction effects is through the “tensions” (Spannungen) Weber (1920a, b)
never left. To say this is of course not to argue that every- thematizes as a major driver of innovation in institution
thing is “micro” which would totally overlook the fact formation and ideas.
37
that even single actions can be the consequence of a wide For further critiques of this opposition see Bourdieu
variety of spatially and temporally dispersed actions. (1972, 1980) and Sewell (2005).
80 A. Glaeser
targeted institution through their actions, the situations. Indeed, different kinds of institution-
elicitation of support from others is the central forming projects require different capabilities
axis around which politics revolves. And that axis and forms of control.41 Money is power only if
has two poles. The first is rhetoric that is the style money can buy the kinds of actions required for
and content of addressing others in speech and the institutionalizing project under consideration.
other kinds of performances to join in the politi- Neither is knowledge per se power. Indeed it is
cal project. Apart from naked coercion there is no important to note, that under certain circum-
politics, big and small, without rhetoric (Burke stances knowledge may even be detrimental to
1950).38 The second pole of the political axis is the exercise of power, for example if it raises
organization. It comes into play simply because doubts thus undermining the trust in understand-
the elicitation of participation in the constitution ings that enable acting (Glaeser 2011). However,
of institutions on a larger scale requires many situationally specific knowledge can become
helping hands making use of techniques of pro- political knowledge, where it enables an imagi-
jective articulation which need to be coordinated nation of alternative states, provides understand-
and focused to yield the desired institution form- ings concerning the action-reaction effect chains
ing effect. The hitch is, that organizations them- central to the particular institution politically tar-
selves are institutions, and a very particular kind geted, and where it involves knowledge about
at that. What distinguishes them from other insti- how to mobilize the people that need to partici-
tutions is that they have become self-conscious pate in carrying that institution. Knowledge satis-
through a dedicated staff of people maintaining fying all three of these requirements is indeed a
and or directing them.39 constitutive aspect of power.
Power is the ability to succeed in politics. That
is to say power is potentiated agency; beyond the
ability to act it includes the ability to deliver on 4.5 Conclusion
intentions. This can happen by a whole spectrum
of different ways structured by the degree to The aim to create a unitary, monothetic and uni-
which the involvement of others proceeds dia- versal theory of action for the social sciences is
logically such that they become in fact fully equal highly misguided both in terms of describing and
co-politicians, or monologically by subjecting analyzing social life under particular circum-
others to some form of control (Glaeser 2013).40 stances as well as for political efforts other than
Power is constituted in different ways in different blatantly ideological uses. As the brief historical
introduction has shown, different historical con-
38
It is no accident, therefore, that the art of rhetoric as a stellations characterized by different institutional
self-conscious practice bloomed first in participatory poli- arrangements and existential, political and eco-
tics of the ancient Greek poleis and in Republican Rome. nomic problematiques have given rise to different
Accordingly within the Europeanoid tradition Aristotle’s
On Rheotoric and Cicero’s Orator have become the defin- activity concepts which highlight different aspect
ing texts. of human action at the expense of others. In ret-
39
This has very interesting consequences. As institutions rospect these are not simply false if replaced in
organizations require a self-politics to maintain them for the course of time by a newer one. Instead they
the purposes of engaging in target politics. That creates all
are merely superseded by new concepts answer-
sorts of interesting problems concerning the relationship
between both kinds of politics. Many of the problems and ing to new constellations of institutional arrange-
frustrations commonly seen in politics are closely related ments, problems, and intentions. Moreover, the
to conflicts between target politics and self politics. pleading tone with which changing conceptual-
Pioneers in the field of political organization had to wait
izations of action are introduced and defended
for mass-modernity to appear. The most important first
generation encompasses Lenin (1902), Michels (1911). indicates that in activity concepts are often argued
and Weber (1922).
40
Control efforts can have rather interesting ironic effect
41
in that they produce the illusion of power while actually For a discussion of the ironies such control efforts can
undermining it. produce see Glaeser 2013.
4 Action in Society: Reflexively Conceptualizing Activities 81
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Interactionism: Meaning and Self
as Process 5
Iddo Tavory
our world. In this, Mead’s philosophy gave theo- First, the symbolic interactionist approach
retical meat to an influential idea that an early that Blumer crafted centers on interaction as a
Chicago sociologist, Charles Horton Cooley medium that lies between people. And though
(1902), has called “the looking glass self”—that this may sound obvious (after all, this is what
the way we understand ourselves is always medi- interaction implies), it means that rather than
ated by the way we think others understand us. looking at the personal characteristics of peo-
As a sociological perspective, however, the ple who enter interaction, it is more important
study of interaction needed to move beyond phil- to focus on what actually happens in it. That is,
osophical abstractions and into the realm of the the unit of analysis in interactionism is what
empirical. The person who is credited with doing Blumer (following another one of his teachers,
so, and who coined the term “Symbolic Robert Park) called “the collective act.”
Interactionism” was Herbert Blumer, a Chicago- Interaction deals with relations, not so much
trained sociologist who was Mead’s student and with attributes.
research assistant, and who took over his course Closely related, a second tenet that emerges
on Social Psychology when Mead became too ill from the interactionist definition above is the
to teach (see Huebner 2014). importance of the situation. People negotiate
Blumer became, both intellectually and orga- meaning not in the abstract, but in actual concrete
nizationally, the most important figure in the situations. In this, Blumer was harkening back to
development of interactionism. First, in training the early work of D.S. Thomas and W. I. Thomas’
cohorts of students at Chicago—where he and his (1928), the only sociologists who presented
colleague Everett C. Hughes made an indelible something that others recognized as “a
impression upon students such as Erving theorem”—“If men [sic] define situations as real,
Goffman, Anselm Strauss, Howard Becker, Fred they are real in their consequences.” The situa-
Davis and others. Later, he also built up the tion, then, is the key arena for interactionists.
department of sociology at Berkeley, which, The third is the assumption that works its way
again, was to become an important intellectual into the “symbolic” part of symbolic interaction-
center. ism. Based on Mead, but also drawing on the
But perhaps the main force of Blumer’s sym- work of German sociologist Georg Simmel,
bolic interactionist insight was its theoretical Blumer assumed that the relevant facets of com-
simplicity. Blumer (1937, 1969: 2) set up three munication and self were symbolic—that is,
tenets of interactionism. First, that “human meanings turned into words. Rather than the kind
beings act toward things on the basis of the mean- of conversation of gestures that most animals are
ings that the things have for them”; second, that able to enact, the kinds of meanings that Blumer
the “meaning of such things is derived from, or stressed were those that could be turned into
arises out of, the social interaction that one has words. The realm of embodiment and emotion
with one’s fellows”; and last, that “meanings are did not figure prominently in this vision of
handled in, and modified through, an interpretive interactionism.
process used by the person in dealing with the Lastly, there is no simple link between method
things he encounters.” And there you have it, the and theory (Meltzer et al. 1973). Interactionism
tenets of interactionism, from which a deluge of received different interpretations, from postmod-
research has subsequently emerged. ernist renditions in which all reality is fluid
But, simple as it sounds, there are a few impor- (Denzin 1992) and selves endlessly shifting and
tant assumptions and assertions that work their protean (Lifton 1993), to a positivist rendering
way into this definition. Assumptions that, as I that used a 20-question personality questionnaire
will show throughout this chapter, set up both to work through the formation of selves (Kuhn
interactionism’s incredible strength, but also its 1964), and social psychological experimentation
moments of blindness. (e.g. Stets and Burke 2000; Heise 1986). And yet,
5 Interactionism: Meaning and Self as Process 87
in the main, theory in this case did select for a logical project that emerges out of this insight
method. Following Blumer, most interactionists asks how we then end up with social types: with
agree that if we are interested in the ways in people who do not only do certain things, but that
which people collectively make meaning in inter- also, we think, are certain things.
action in concrete situations, then it would be a To understand why this was a radical research
good idea to look at what these interactional project it is useful to think about “deviance,” the
moments look like. If we try to take shortcuts array of unsanctioned behaviors and social types.
through statistical analysis of survey responses, Take, for example, teenage delinquents. One way
or even through interviews, we would lose the to think about delinquency—say, vandalism,
processual nature of meaning. We will take fro- some violence and light drug use—is that the
zen reflections, and substitute them for the fluid people who engage in these activities are “natu-
realm of emergent meaning. Interactionism, then, rally” deviant. That is, that there is something
became identified with ethnographic methods. If wrong about them, either psychologically, or,
you want to understand the situation, you had who knows, perhaps even biologically.
better be there. But if we take an interactionist perspective,
the contours of the question radically change.
Instead of asking about what these people “are”
5.2 Research Projects we ask about the process in which they are
defined in such a way. Rather than thinking about
While the precepts above provide a general theo- deviance and deviants as natural objects, we
retical orientation to symbolic interactionism, the think about it as an interactionally emergent
proof is in the pudding. What made interaction- “career”—not something that naturally happens,
ism into a prominent intellectual position were but something that is negotiated; rather than a
the research projects that it engendered. And state of being, it become re-conceptualized as an
although there is a vast number of interactionist- accomplishment.
inspired empirical projects, we can identify three One of the best examples of this form of
important paradigmatic research traditions: one research is Howard Becker’s (1953) early and
focused on patterned transformations of self, one celebrated paper on “Becoming a Marijuana
on the patterning of situational outcomes, and User.” In an era in which smoking pot was seen as
one on the emergence and ongoing construction a dangerous criminal activity done by depraved
of collectives. individuals, Becker flipped the question. Rather
than asking about personal characteristics, he
asked how people become successful pot smok-
5.2.1 Patterns of Self: ers. His answer, based on research with Jazz
“Becoming a…” musicians and quite a bit of introspection, was
that in order to become a smoker one needs to
Perhaps the best known interactionist research learn three things. The successful pothead needs
tradition centers on the construction of recogniz- to learn the techniques (e.g. how long to keep the
able social characters—things like “the crimi- smoke in; how to roll a joint); they then need to
nal,” “the pothead” or “the bureaucrat.” Here, we learn to recognize the physical effects as the
start from G. H. Mead’s idea that the self devel- effects of the drug (e.g. you aren’t just very hun-
ops socially, as we learn to take on the perspec- gry, you have the munchies; you aren’t simply
tive of the group we take part in. Seen from this confused, you’re high); and one needs to learn
perspective, the self is best thought of as an ongo- that these physical effects are actually enjoy-
ing process. Since the groups we take part in are able—which isn’t completely obvious since the
constantly changing, the self is never completely effects themselves are ambiguous.
congealed. We are never “finished” products, Each of these phases (especially in pre-
always in the process of becoming. The socio- internet days) needed to be interactionally
88 I. Tavory
never see again. And this, too, gives rise to pre- predictable situation in which all parties know of
dictable interactional patterns. the coming death, but where they all keep a pre-
On the driver’s side, as Davis shows, the situa- tense of an optimistic diagnosis.
tion comes to mean that they—like others in busi- Sometimes, the institutional structure is mani-
nesses that depend on fleeting interactions—end fested even more concretely, physically inscribed
up with a system of classification that uses superfi- in the situation. To see how this works, we can take
cial traits of the clients to guide their interaction. the case of racial classification, one of the most
This is true for drivers, but also for waiters, air pernicious recurrences of our times. How does
hosts, and other such professions. For clients, it such classification emerge interactionally?
was the fleeting nature of the interaction that was of Shouldn’t we trace it back to people’s attitudes and
utmost importance. On the one hand, the pragmat- stereotypes? As in the “becoming a…” project out-
ics of the situation is such that they might tell the lined above, interactionists tend to be cautious
driver secrets that they would perhaps not divulge about assuming such attitudes. It isn’t that attitudes
to even their closest friends. On the other hand, don’t exist, but that there are important elements of
they can engage in behaviors that they would never the situation that give rise to forms of classification
engage in with someone they would have more even when the people involved in enacting the
than a fleeting interaction with: making out with a classification do not use racial stereotypes.
partner, or changing clothes. These two negotiated In a first example, Phil Goodman shows how
reactions—extreme intimacy and complete disre- officers who process inmates end up assigning
gard—as Davis shows, stem from the same institu- them to predefined racial groups. As the officers
tional structure: that the interaction is so fleeting work with documents they need to fill, they need
that the driver can be seen as a “non-person.” to know where to house the inmates. Thus, eth-
A second, and a bit more morbid, example nicity becomes omni-relevant as a way to orga-
comes from the research of death and dying. As nize people’s lives in interaction. See the
Glaser and Strauss argued in a series of publica- following conversation (Goodman 2008: 759):
tions (1964, 1965), people who had terminal ill-
ness in America faced predictable circumstances. Officer: Race?
Doctors, at that time, were not obligated to inform Inmate: Portuguese.
patients of their condition. And, obviously, they Officer: Portuguese? [pause] You mean
had quite a bit of information, whereas the patient White?
had very little to go on. As they show, since doc- Inmate: Nah, I’m Portuguese, not
tors wanted to make their treatment as smooth as White.
possible, they wanted to avoid a conversation in Officer: Sure, but who do you house
which they confronted their patients regarding with?
their impending death. What it amounted to was Inmate: Usually with the “Others.”
a coalition of caretakers hiding the situation from Officer: We don’t fuck with that here.
the patients. Doctors, nurses, but also often the It’s just Black, White, or
families of patients, colluded to create a “closed Hispanic.
awareness context,” in which the patient was not Inmate: Well, I’m Portuguese.
aware of their situations although everyone else Second officer, looking on the
around them knew they were dying. As Glaser whole time: Put him with the
and Strauss then showed, as the hospitalization Negros, then [“Negro” pro-
and the disease progressed, the parties engaged in nounced in Spanish].
a delicate choreography of awareness contexts— Inmate: What?!
in some situations, the reality of impending death Second officer: Oh, now you’re serious, huh.
would be revealed, but in most cases it wouldn’t. So you want to house with the
And, as not to destroy the fabric of the situation, Whites, do you?
patients who strongly suspected that they were Inmate: Fine, with the Whites.
going to die kept on performing, thus creating a Officer: OK, with the Whites it is.
90 I. Tavory
What is going here? Are the officers simply 5.2.3 Patterns of Collectivity
racist? The answer, in an interactional vein, is not
so simple. The officers have a practical aim: they Whereas the first stream of research outlined
need to process people as quickly as possible. above begins with the self and the second is pri-
After all, there is a long line to prison, especially marily about the patterning of situations, the third
in California, where Goodman conducted his is primarily about the emergence of collective
research. In order to process inmates they need to life in the process. That is, even if we know some-
fill in a form that says where inmates should be thing about how selves arise, and how situations
housed. At some point, probably because of are structured, we may understand relatively little
inter-gang conflict in prison (but maybe also about how groups take shape. And, for sociolo-
because they held racial stereotypes), someone gists, this is obviously an important question.
decided that inmates should be housed according By and large, there are two interactionist
to their race. This decision was then codified into attempts to answer this question. The first, led by
a seemingly small detail of the situation—a box sociologist Gary Alan Fine (see, e.g. 1979, 1998,
that needs to be checked. But this little box pow- 2012), focuses on the emergence of small group
erfully channels and shapes the meanings that cultures, what he called an “idioculture.” The
people can craft. In the example above, the insight fueling this agenda is that in order to
inmate doesn’t want to be put into a box, he is understand any collectivity, we need to under-
Portuguese, an “other” in his own self-definition. stand how they come to develop and share a sym-
But in the California prison, there are no “oth- bolic universe. The image that emerges through
ers.” And so he must decide between the given Fine’s work is that of a bottom-up process of
categories. And although he might be able to emergence. As people hang out together over an
assign himself into multiple categories, the offi- extended period of time they begin to share a his-
cer pressures him to self classify. Without anyone tory, a set of memories, shared future projects,
in the situation being racist, a racist outcome jokes, and even linguistic terms. A collectivity, in
emerges. this reading, is made of the congealed set of
Similarly, Kameo and Whalen (2015) show meanings and ties within small aggregations of
that because 911 call-takers need to send the people. The social world writ large, in this read-
police a form that includes the suspect’s race, the ing, is the sum of these small groups and their
operative ends up putting pressure on the caller to relationships.
identify the “race” of the suspect, even when the To understand the utility of this notion, think
caller didn’t use racial classifications as part of of the smallest idiocultural unit—the one that
their description. Race becomes salient through emerges between two people, say a dating cou-
interaction, as the pragmatics of the situation— ple. After a while, the couple does not only share
here codified in forms—propels the dispatcher to jokes and stories (the common refrain “you
pressure the caller to make race into a salient should have been there…” may be the first sign
marker of personhood. of an emerging idioculture), but also ways of
In sum, the “situational pragmatics” project being together, and even new terms and short-
sets out to show how recurrent patterns are built hand expressions that are completely opaque to
up from the situation. It is not that the wider others (see also Bernstein 1964). And, like the
social structure doesn’t matter. The wider histori- model of the couple, we can begin thinking of
cal and institutional context sets up the kinds of cliques, of the idioculture that congeals when
constraints and affordances of the situation. But people are engaged in shared work or leisure
once set up, outcomes tend to become uncannily activities (Fine’s first noted example of
similar. The world is made predictable one situa- idioculture-construction was the little-league
tion at a time. baseball team).
5 Interactionism: Meaning and Self as Process 91
Importantly, this way to interactionally theo- make and sell the canvases and paints, the guards
rize collectivities is slightly suspicious of any and cashiers at the museum, etc. By beginning
talk of “Society” or of “Culture” if they are with the concrete activity, then, a social worlds
thought of in an all-encompassing sense. perspective gives one a very different view of life
Meanings do congeal, and aren’t completely mal- than if we would think about them as “fields” or
leable once they are set. Yet they congeal in spe- “professions.” Rather than the rarefied few, we
cific and concrete interactional contexts. The must, as Becker puts it (1982a: 34) incorporate
study of small groups, in this reading, is the study “all the people whose activities are necessary to
of society in miniature (Stolte et al. 2001). the production of the characteristic works which
The second stream of research, spearheaded by that world, and perhaps others as well, define as
writers such as Tamotsu Shibutani, Anselm Strauss art.”
and Howard Becker (all students of Blumer from
his Chicago days) takes a different approach.
Rather than beginning with the small group, it 5.3 Interactionism: Challenges
starts with the social organization of activity— and Developments
with the collective act. As Shibutani (1955) put it
in an early and influential article, a social world is Like all intellectual traditions, Interactionism has
“a universe of regularized mutual response.” That had its challenges. These can be parsed out into
is, it is a plurality of actors organized around a different clusters. First, for many sociologists,
shared activity, where the actions of one set of the focus on the situation seemed to induce blind-
actors in this world affects, and is expected to ness to questions of power and inequality. In
affect, others who are engaged in different aspects being locked in an “occasionalist illusion” as
of the same activity (see also Strauss 1978). Bourdieu (1977: 81) once called it, interactionists
The image emerging here is perhaps (so the argument goes) ignored the weight of
more amenable to a macro-oriented approach. If structural injustice. In other words, since
the idiocultural approach imagines a world made Blumer’s definition of interactionism places its
of the intersection and emergence of a multitude emphasis on what occurs within situations, we
of small groups, the social worlds perspective could forget both that (a) situations are already
imagines the world as made of a multitude of set up in uneven ways, and that; (b) actors’ ability
actors, through whose actions specific arenas of to navigate these situations may not be evenly
activity emerge. It is a visualization that looks a distributed.
lot more like a network-image than like the bud- Closely connected to this critique is what the-
ding idiocultures of Fine’s analysis. This is still, orists used to think of as “the micro-macro prob-
however, a deeply interactionist vision. The focus lem.” As interactionists think about concrete
is on the concrete activity and the ways actors situations, they seem to necessarily think of
practically affect each other’s actions, and there- micro-contexts of action. What of larger struc-
fore the way to circumscribe the activity is quite tures that are the bread and butter of sociology—
different than the way we usually do so. what of the state? What of world capitalism? This
Thus, for example, Becker’s (1982a) Art micro-macro critique also had an additional cor-
Worlds takes a social worlds perspective to the relate: that interactionism is largely blind to cul-
study of art. In doing so, Becker makes a decep- ture. In its focus on the construction of meaning
tively simple point. Usually when people think in the interactional context, it seems to overlook
about art worlds they imagine a world made by widely shared sets of meanings and ways of
the artists, sometimes the consumers of art. But doing things. For many research questions, so the
as Becker begins with the collective act of art, a argument goes, specific situations are little more
different set of protagonists emerges—these than instantiations of wider patterns of meaning.
include the artists, but also include the people Looking at the situation, then, is looking at pre-
who install the art in the museum, those who cisely the wrong place.
92 I. Tavory
Lastly, critiques have also arisen from other much emphasis on actors’ ingrained bodily habits
micro-sociological traditions, with some or culture.
phenomenologically-inclined sociologists of the In fact, most ethnographers who draw on
body being wary of what seems to be a deep cog- interactionism today combine research on the
nitive bias in interactionism. The gist of the argu- macro-organizational, legal and economic setting
ment here is that the symbolic in symbolic of the situation, and the actual interaction they
interactionism elevates deliberation and language observe—as, in fact, did the early proponents of
as the key sites where meanings are made. What, the Chicago school of sociology from which
however, of emotion? What of embodiment? interactionism emerged. This, for example, is the
Should sociologists only study purposeful mean- research strategy used in Forrest Stuart’s (2016)
ingful action, or should they also take careful book, Down, Out and Under Arrest. The book
stock of pre-conceptual, embodied, behaviors traces the social effects of zero-tolerance policing
that also tend to be socially patterned? on the inhabitants of Skid Row, a Los Angeles
I would like to propose that although interac- downtown area that has become the place of last
tionism has its share of problems, critics have resort for people when they’re down on their
been usually barking at the wrong tree. Thus, to luck. Stuart documents an intensive form of
take the set of studies already outlined above, it policing in which people are at risk for arrest for
already becomes clear that the research traditions minor infractions and violations (sitting on the
that stem from interactionism are far from blind sidewalk, jaywalking).
to the ways in which the situation is set up. That Setting the stage, Stuart delves deeply into the
911-call dispatchers need to fill in a box that tells historical emergence of Skid Row as well as the
the police what is the suspect’s race is crucial; legal structure that underlies the situations he
that doctors hold the information and the patient describes. Once he sets up the macro-
none at all sets up the entire research program on environment, however, Stuart shows how the
awareness contexts in dying. When laws that interactional situation is set up in predictable
mandate disclosure were set the situation deeply ways. In a poignant move, Stuart shows that this
changed. Power, in the interactionist tradition, form of intense policing results in men and
comes from the uneven institutionalization of women on the street policing each other’s actions.
situations. As Stuart writes:
Of course, a critic can argue that it is crucial The constant threat of police interference forced
for sociologists to trace how unequal situational the vendors to adopt the gaze of the police and to
footing developed in just these ways. But, inter- act as surrogate officers, thus engendering a per-
actionists could retort, this is simply not the proj- verse mode of privatized enforcement that under-
mined the commonly theorized benefits of informal
ect they outlined for themselves. Interactionism control, undercut the possibilities for rehabilita-
never claimed that power did not exist on a tion, and worsened the social and economic mar-
macro-level, or that tracing the history of power ginalization of Skid Row residents. (p. 190)
relations wasn’t important. What it said was that In effect, Stuart depicts an interactionist mecha-
meaning-making in the situation cannot be com- nism: one of the unforeseen effects of intensive
pletely reduced to these structures, and that to policing is that people who constantly get
understand both stability and change in macro- stopped, frisked and arrested, begin to “see like a
regimes requires a close attention to the ways in cop.” That is, as a result of the back and forth
which people make and reshape meaning in the between police and Skid Row, citizens change
actual world. In fact, there is a provocative—and the definition of the situation and assume the per-
humanistic—theory of power at play in interac- ceptive schemas of police officers. Because this
tionism. While the situation may be unevenly set, reaction is modeled after repeatedly-observed
the capacities of actors is treated as equal. It is for police actions, residents integrate the contextual
this reason that interactionists are loath to put aspects typical of police modus operandi: if
5 Interactionism: Meaning and Self as Process 93
police officers stop someone in your vicinity, tantly, research into the process of embodiment
they are likely to also ticket you for some infrac- has shown that emotions very often emerge inter-
tion, real or imagined. Here, then, emerges a sec- actionally. Thus, for example, as Jack Katz
ond part of the mechanism Stuart describes, (1999) shows in how emotions work, laughter
where some men and women begin to themselves emerges as people align their bodies and selves to
enact modes of “third party policing” in order to others. To show that, Katz has videotaped people
keep their environment safe from police going to fun-house mirrors. Rather than finding
presence. that people laugh as they see themselves distorted,
The irony is not only that third party policing he finds that people laughed much more when
emerges from fear rather than a spirit of collabo- they walked together. And, by analyzing the vid-
ration, but also that these men and women react eos in painstaking detail, he showed that in order
to perceived infractions. Thus, for example, since for laughter to emerge, people walking together
white men (unless they are extremely disheveled) took great pains to position themselves so that
seem out of place, residents police them away; they saw the same thing. It was when people were
since women are assumed to be sex-workers, a together, and managed to sustain a shared percep-
few men forcefully removed a man from Skid tual vantage point, that they laughed.
Row who was trying to keep his drug addicted What we get out of these studies, then, is a
wife with him. When policing the perceived per- corrective to some of the usual critiques leveled
ceptions of the police, the men on the street ended against interactionism. By taking the pre-
up replicating some of the most repressive and structured nature of the situation into account,
unjust forms of such policing. interactionists (both in social psychology and in
Stuart’s work, like that of other leading inter- ethnography) have been able to incorporate the
actionist ethnographers (e.g. Jerolmack 2009; larger macro-context—including contexts of rac-
Lee 2016; Timmermans 1999), moves between ism or poverty. By looking closely at feeling
the situation and the larger social context. It rules and at the actual processual production of
shows both how interactions are shaped by the emotion, interactionists have been able to incor-
macro-processes they are embedded in, but also porate elements of emotion and embodied behav-
why it is crucial to look at the interactional situa- ior into their explanation without making them
tion in order to understand these macro-contexts. any less interactionist in the process.
Although the way Skid Row citizens interaction-
ally negotiate the meaning of their situation may
make sense in hindsight, it is only through paying 5.3.1 The Tricky Problem of Culture
attention to the situation that some of the most
problematic aspects of the policing of Skid Row But not all questions are so easily answerable.
came to the fore. In sum, then, there is little in Both the question of embodiment and the ques-
interactionism to hinder a macro-analysis of tion of macro-structures contain features that are
power. Just the opposite seems to be the case, as far trickier to approach from an interactionist per-
an analysis of the macro-structure on its own spective. The problem in both cases is quite simi-
would be blind some of its the most nefarious lar—though coming at it from opposite ends. If
effects. we think about the macro-patterning of the social
Much like the problem of macro-structures world as the multiplication of structurally pre-set
and power, aspects of the problem of the body situations, we may be able to capture some ele-
and emotion were somewhat overblown. This ments of power, but we will miss more subtle
is both because, as researchers such as Arlie forms of discursive power (Lukes 1974). In other
Hochschild (1979) and Susan Shott (1979) have worlds, by assuming that the only element that
shown, we learn how to feel in certain situations, skews situations in predictable ways is structural,
and these feelings-rules are mediated by interac- we miss the whole realm of ideology and
tion (see also Barbalet 2009). But, more impor- discourse. More generally (and less power-
94 I. Tavory
centered) we miss the sharedness of culture, as it These attempts, however, fall short of taking
sets people’s anticipations of what they can either culture or people’s embodied positions
expect in a given situation, and how to go about seriously. For Becker, that people come into the
muddling through it. situation with a repertoire of action seems too
On the other end of culture, the most genera- taken for granted. Rather than thinking about the
tive sociological projects that emphasize embodi- complex relationship between the cultural reper-
ment argue that what makes the body and emotion toire that people come armed with and what hap-
so salient is that it precedes the situation and pens in the situation, he relegates culture to a
shapes the way that selves are molded over time. background characteristic. For Stryker, selves are
Thus, for example, Bourdieu’s (e.g. 1977, 2000) structurally located as individuals are socialized
notion of habitus focuses on the way in which to appreciate a different “generalized other”
both our bodies, tastes and modes of perception (G. H. Mead’s term for the internalization of the
and cognition are shaped by the conditions of social as such), but the mechanism for such dif-
existence in which we grow up. Thus, in any ferent locations is purely cognitive, and a theory
actual situation, we are enacting schemas of of the interaction of shared culture and interac-
action and perception that we arrived with. The tion is lacking.
challenge that this position implies is that inter- To answer these challenges, recent interac-
actionism seems to assume that people generally tionists have moved in two complementary direc-
come into the situation with the same capacities tions. Thus, Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003)
and embodied ways of enacting their selves. If locate this meeting point in the notion of “group
we problematize this assumption, some aspects style.” As they put it, cultural meanings (such, for
of symbolic interactionism may be treading on example, as “civic action”) are ever present. They
shaky ground. are a resource that both constrains and enables
These criticisms are not new, and classical social action across a wide variety of settings. We
interactionists were well aware of the problem of all know what civic action means, at least “sort
culture. And yet, there was something a little too of.” However, it is this “sort of” that provides a
facile about their initial responses to this chal- clue to the relationship between culture and inter-
lenge. Thus for example, Howard Becker tried to action. What something like “civic action” actu-
provide an interactionist’s account of culture by ally means is more ambiguous than cultural
arguing (1982b) that culture was the set of pre- theorists often acknowledge. People don’t go to
given expectations that actors brought with them the dictionary or to the nearest sociologist to
into interaction. Taking Jazz musicians as his check whether what they are doing is “civic.”
example, he argued that we can compare “culture” This, for Eliasoph and Lichterman, is where
to the shared repertoire of songs and expected interaction becomes crucial. As people interact
variations that musicians come armed with. It’s an with each other, they invest meaning in general
important part of the situation, no doubt, but the cultural concepts. And although there may be a
more important aspect of the action is the kind of certain family resemblance between the different
improvisations and unexpected variations that ways in which groups breath practical meaning
happen when musicians actually work together. In into culture, the actual practices they enact are
a different vein, Sheldon Stryker (1980), the most different at every given case, as actors face differ-
important architect of symbolic interactionist ent practical problems and different group
social psychology, attempted to come to terms dynamics.
with larger cultural considerations by producing a This position may sound a lot like Fine’s “idi-
structuralist variety of interactionism. In his ver- ocultural” perspective describes above, but there
sion, the theorist takes the position of actors seri- are important theoretical differences between the
ously, as each position entails different significant two. For Fine, the most interesting dynamic is the
others, and thus different conceptions of self. emergence, from the bottom up, of local forms of
5 Interactionism: Meaning and Self as Process 95
meanings. For Eliasoph and Lichterman, the then; whether it is defines our identity in impor-
most interesting location is the medium between tant ways, or considered an appendage to other
the interaction and the wider culture. activities. A scene, in this reading, can be under-
A complementary attempt to tie wider notions stood as the predictable intertwining of actors’
of culture to interactionism takes a different biographies, and their pragmatic and existential
route. Rather than thinking about the availability concerns.
of general cultural tropes that actors then mold Rather than holding the situation as the most
anew, the new generation of interactionists are important element for interactional analysis, it is
increasingly trying to see how actors biographies the situation as it fits into actors’ longer terms
and notions of the future shape the way they textures of life. To understand a party, for exam-
interact. In order to do so, these theorists need to ple, is not only to understand what happens in the
account for actors’ ingrained habits, and see how situation, but also at what point of the life course
actors’ locations shape the interaction. This, as of actors it appears. A party held when partici-
we will see, forces us to relax quite a lot of the pants just turned 21 is going to be markedly dif-
situational purism of some early interactionists. ferent than a party held two years later, when
But it does so without losing sight of the creative drinking is less of a novelty. The tenor of a party
potential of the situation as a locus of will depend on how the specific situation fits the
meaning-making. trajectories of actors—whether it is something
To understand the direction taken by these they do every Friday? Every day? Almost never?
theorists it is useful to think about the notion of Taking a similar tack, the author of this chap-
time. For classical interactionists, the most rele- ter and others (Snyder 2016; Tavory 2016; Tavory
vant temporality is that of the situation. Although and Eliasoph 2013; Trouille and Tavory frth)
they may trace the history that set up the situation have argued that in order to understand both
in a particular way, once the stage is set the actors and social worlds sociologists need to
unfolding of the narrative arc of the situation is think inter-situationally. That is, not only within
their primary focus. But if we want to understand the situation, but in the predictable rhythms of
how people operate within a wider culture, and situations that make up the social world. Simply
why social worlds are structured in predictable put, we can’t completely understand what hap-
ways, it isn’t enough to look at this situational pens within a situation as an isolated incident,
unfolding. In any particular situation, people ori- since people live not only in the present situation,
ent themselves towards other temporalities. They but also implicitly compare this situation to other
are shaped by their pasts through habits of situations that they have experienced, as well as
thought and action—often deeply ingrained in implicitly locating this situation in relation to the
their very bodies—and they are anticipating and situation they expect to find themselves in later.
coordinating their futures. Since actors extend in So, from the point of view of actors’, the focus
time, the situation cannot be understood without only on the here and now of the situation misses
such extensions. much of what makes it what it is. This, then, is all
One current direction, inspired by the work of the more true for the study of social worlds:
Jack Katz, lies in the notion of biography. As focusing on specific situations and aggregating
Michael DeLand (frth) has recently argued, in them into a social world, as do writers in the clas-
order to understand a social situation, and espe- sic social worlds tradition outlined above, ignores
cially a recurring social scene, we need to under- the rhythms and patterns of situations and
stand where the interaction fits in the biographies interaction.
of actors. The very same activity—in his exam- In an ethnography of an Orthodox Jewish
ple, playing pickup basketball at a local park—is neighborhood, Tavory (2016) argues that being
very different depending on whether going to the an orthodox Jew in that neighborhood was not
park is a recurring part of one’s everyday life, or simply a matter of belief or affiliation. As
whether it is something we do every now and important as these individual projects were,
96 I. Tavory
residents needed to practically learn how to change and the etching of identities occur over
expect the rhythms of their social world. These time. Combined with the theorization of the
included the obvious—the recurring moments of notion of “group styles,” as the negotiation of
synagogue life and religious observances, the shared available tropes and their interactional
structured demands of their children’s schools— negotiation, it doubly locates the situation in its
but also included a host of other predictable cultural environment—both “from above” in the
rhythms. Thus, for example, Orthodox residents form of shared culture, and “from below” in the
learned to expect comments on the street (usually shape of actors own complex biographies and
just questions about their Orthodoxy, but also the anticipated futures.
rarer anti-Semitic incidents), and had to learn
how to transition between their work in the non-
Jewish world around them to their seemingly 5.4 So Where Does This All
insular Orthodox life at home. To understand Leave Us?
both the way in which Orthodox residents’ identi-
ties were constructed, and the way the social Once upon a time, when first year students
world operated as a whole, the researcher needs walked into an intro class in sociology, they
to be attentive to the ways these rhythms of situ- learned that there were three paradigms in sociol-
ations defined both actors and situations. ogy—conflict paradigm (Marx was the hero, or
Thinking between situations allows the villain, depending on instructor), structural func-
researcher to think about wider temporal hori- tionalism (with Parsons taking the lead), and
zons, and about the anticipations and skills that interactionism. These days are no more. It is
people bring into each situation. Paying attention questionable if this was ever the true lay of the
to the rhythm of situations, as Snyder (2016) land, but even if it was, as sociology developed it
shows, allow as to gain purchase on what it has fractured into multiple parties, and the battles
means, for example, to experience unemploy- lines are not as intensely drawn. Interactionism,
ment in the aftermath of the 2008 economic cri- as others have observed (Fine 1993) has enriched
sis. As he shows, the shock of unemployment in a the imagination of sociologists throughout the
changing world occurred not only the moment of discipline, but became less and less of a well-
termination, but as situation after situation shows defined paradigm.
the job seeker that the world they knew seems to Interactionism is also not alone in focusing on
have disappeared. As they meet others who send the realm of everyday life. As other chapters in
CV after CV in vain, and their own effort increas- this volume show, other research traditions have
ingly seems unmoored from the new economic mined these grounds. Erving Goffman was cru-
reality, they realize what it means to live in unset- cially influenced by early interactionism, but
tled times. It is in the concatenation of situations went on to craft a more dramaturgical perspective
and as people try to make sense of them together that focused on actors’ ongoing performance in
and piece negotiate the meaning of their world social settings; exchange theorists have looked at
and their own identities that the social world is the interactional situations through the lenses of
made. rational choice; ethnomethodologists and conver-
The recent emphases on inter-situational anal- sation analysts have been theorizing and observ-
ysis, futures, rhythms and biographies thus ing the ongoing emergence of taken for granted
attempts to inject a more complex temporality social structures in everyday life.
into the situation. Although the situation, and the Still, interactionism remains an important the-
interactions of actors within it, is still extremely oretical locus. By focusing on the situation, on the
important, extending the temporality of actors collective act and on the malleability of meaning
allows us to better theorize their expectations of in interaction, interactionists were able to think
the situation, their proclivity to act and interpret about both creativity and the patterning of the
their world in certain ways, and the way that both social world in ways that other theorists simply
5 Interactionism: Meaning and Self as Process 97
could not. Rather than assuming that actors acted Bernstein, B. (1964). Elaborated and restricted codes:
Their social origins and some consequences. American
rationally, they could see how actors practically
Anthropology, 66(6), 55–69.
made sense of their world within the situation; Blumer, H. (1937). Social psychology. In E. P. Schmidt
rather than focusing on actors’ performances, they (Ed.), Man and society: A substantive introduction to
looked to the way meaning interactionally the social sciences (pp. 144–198). New York:
Prentice-Hall.
emerged. And by remaining with the concreteness
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective
of the social, interactionism was able to show the and method. Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
dizzying possibilities of everyday life, as well as Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice.
its predictable patterns. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (2000). Pascalian meditations. Stanford:
Like all important theoretical accounts of the
Stanford University Press.
social, interactionism also attracted quite a bit of Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social order.
criticism. These ranged from arguing that it was New York: Scribner.
blind to power and to macro-structures, not being de Saussure, F. ([1916] 1986). Course in general linguis-
tics. New York: Open Court.
attentive enough to the body, or pointing out that
Deland, M. (Frth). The ocean run: Stage, cast, and perfor-
it was insensitive to the workings of culture. As mance in a public park basketball scene. Journal of
this chapter makes clear, some of these criticisms Contemporary Ethnography.
were based on a misreading of the interactionist Denzin, N. K. (1992). Symbolic interaction and cultural
studies. Oxford: Blackwell.
project, but others did point to important prob-
Eliasoph, N., & Lichterman, P. (2003). Culture in interac-
lems in early interactionists’ approach to the tion. American Journal of Sociology, 108(4),
social world. 735–794.
In response, interactionists over the past two Fine, G. A. (1979). Small groups and culture creation:
Idioculture of little league baseball teams. American
decades developed different ways to think about
Sociological Review, 44, 733–745.
the social world in ways that acknowledged the Fine, G. A. (1993). The sad demise, mysterious disappear-
place of shared meaning and of temporality in a ance, and glorious triumph of symbolic interaction-
fuller way. They did so, however, without letting ism. Annual Review of Sociology, 19, 61–87.
Fine, G. A. (1998). Morel tales: The culture of mushroom-
go of the crucial importance of concrete social
ing. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
situation, and the ways that actors make their Fine, G. A. (2012). Tiny publics. New York: Russell Sage.
worlds together in them. It is this promise of Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1964). Awareness con-
interactionism that still makes it so exciting and texts. American Sociological Review, 29(5), 669–679.
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1965). Awareness of
radical as a theoretical perspective.
dying. Chicago: Aldine.
Goodman, P. (2008). “It’s just Black, White, or Hispanic”:
An observational study of racializing moves in
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Cultural Theory
6
Omar Lizardo
perennial problems in sight (e.g. Vaisey 2009; classics (here I restrict my definition of “classics”
Alexander 2003; Sewell 2005). This unsatisfac- to the standard canon of Marx, Weber, Durkheim).
tory détente acquires more importance, when we This means that many of the issues that preoc-
consider the fact that the basic theoretical debates cupy contemporary cultural theorists only have
in the discipline in the American scene—e.g. superficial similarity to those that preoccupied
those inaugurated by Parsons’s (1937) problem- Marx, Weber, and Durkheim; this also means that
atic interpretation of a selection of European the retroactive recasting of the sociological clas-
thinkers—now take place largely under the aus- sics as budding cultural theorists (e.g. Parsons
pices of “cultural theory” and not “theory” in its 1951; Swidler 1995) is an anachronism of conse-
unqualified form (Swidler 1995). quential import. In this sense, contemporary cul-
Whether the culture concept or cultural soci- tural theory inherits a post-classical problematic
ology as a general analytic approach is up to this which has no strict analogue in the classics.
task remains to be seen. What is not in doubt is Given this, my argument is that it makes little
that continuing progress (or possible resolutions) exegetical or analytical sense to project a “con-
to contemporary theoretical impasses will depend cept of culture” to such pre-cultural theorists
on whether “culture” has the potential to serve as Marx, Weber, and Durkheim (or even the early
such a unifying meta-concept. The basic argu- Parsons!). Instead, we should go back to the
ment in this chapter is that the contemporary ver- drawing board and dissociate the classics from
sion of the culture concept in sociology is simply the contemporary culture concept. All the same,
not the sort of analytic resource that is up to this they may also provide a model for how to do
task and that “cultural theory” as currently con- social theory without relying on that concept as a
figured will not make headway on the relevant central line of support.
analytical issues. The reason for this is that the The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.
concept of culture in contemporary sociology In the next section I outline the conceptual arma-
melds (in somewhat anachronistic ways) both mentarium deployed by Marx, Weber, and
basic concerns inherited from the classics and Durkheim to deal with theoretical issues that
post-classical issues inherited from the incorpo- have now been retroactively (and anachronisti-
ration of the modern (“analytical”) concept of cally) remapped as central problems in cultural
culture developed in anthropology into this clas- theory. The basic argument is that none of the
sical tradition by Talcott Parsons.1 As such, the classics had anything close to what can be called
status of cultural sociology as a meta-field unify- a “concept of culture” because they did not need
ing other areas of substantive inquiry in the disci- one to deal with the analytical issues that preoc-
pline will remain problematic, even as “cultural cupied them. I will then argue that it is the figure
theory” will continue to serve as a stand in for that marks the transition from “classical” to
“theory” in the general sense. “contemporary” sociological theory namely,
An important, if often unremarked issue, is Talcott Parsons, who recasts the classics as “cul-
that the “modern” culture concept had no strict tural theorists” status nascendi thus retroactively
conceptual analogue among the sociological recruiting them to deal with basic problems that
emerge from his own (failed) attempt to link his
1
By the “analytical” concept of culture I mean what used own version of the anthropological concept of
to be called the “anthropological” concept (when that dis- culture to theoretical issues in action theory and
cipline had full ownership of it) and like that concept it
normativist functionalism. We will see that
should be contrasted with the “classical” or “humanist”
(Arnoldian) culture concept along the usual dimensions of Parsons’s primary analytic concern in regards to
the denial of absolutism in favor of relativism, the denial cultural theory has to do mainly with the mecha-
of “progressivism” in favor of homeostatic functionalism, nisms of how persons become “encultured,”
the denial of a hierarchy among “cultures,” and the
which for Parsons is essentially a resolution to an
emphasis on the determinism of inherited traditions over
conscious reasoning in the shaping of conduct (see unfinished chapter in his own interpretation of
Stocking 1966: 868). Durkheim. Parsons coupled his solution
6 Cultural Theory 101
action (Warner 1978) was largely thought of in references to a theory of action; the Kantian ver-
terms of “ideas.” The German tradition came in sion, on the other hand, operated from an a priori
two brands; the first one came from the Hegelian methodological presumption (somewhat muddily
obsession with the “motor forces” of history and articulated by Max Weber) that there were no
basically dealt with a controversy in the so-called emergent macro-social “forces” (either “mate-
Philosophy of History as to which one of the two rial” or “ideal”), that “society” as an organismic
set of forces was most important in accounting whole was a spurious analytic unit, and that the
patterns of historical and social change usually Hegelian “debate” in the Philosophy of History
conceptualized in teleological “evolutionary” (in (of which Marx and Engels’s historical material-
the pre-Darwinian “telos of history” sense) terms. ism was viewed as an entry) was just a useless
The second flavor is (Neo)Kantian and has a conceptual muddle. It was only in the twentieth
more direct concern with the battle between ideal century recuperation of this debate by Parsons
and material forces within the individual in deter- that problems of action theory were again linked
mining conduct and not as macro-social “forces” up to “macrosocial” issues, in so-called
or “factors” in historical societies. In the (neo) structural-functionalism.
Kantian version of the tradition, ideas are thought
of as subjective conceptions of the world held by
actors, which may or may not accurately reflect 6.2.2 Marx and Engels’s “Big” Idea
its objective features. Accordingly, ideas are seen
as the creative, “active” elements determining The problematic that was most poignant in the
action via relations of non-Newtonian, inten- early nineteenth century and that was thus the
tional (final) causality, counterposed against one inherited by Marx and dealt with primarily in
external “deterministic” elements that push peo- the collaborative writings with Engels from the
ple around via relations of physical (inclusive of mid 1840s to the late 1850s4 was the Hegelian
the bodily instincts), efficient causation. Ideas “macrosocial” one (essentially the middle “soci-
were thus thought of as a possible driver of action ological” period between the philosophical
along with other forces, most importantly instinc- anthropology of the early 1840s and the “politi-
tual (biological) and environmental determinants cal economy” writings of the 1860s). The so-
(which we may refer to as “material” for short). called “materialist conception of history” of
In this respect, this tradition linked “cultural Marx and Engels essentially boils down, in
analysis” (with this term being used in an admit- between withering satire of the so-called Young
tedly anachronistic way) with the problematic of Hegelians, Proudhon, utopian socialists or who-
“action theory” (another anachronism as this ever stood in their way, to arguing that at the
term does not become prevalent until after macrosocial level “ideal” factors as conceptual-
Parsons). ized by philosophers of history up to that stage
The distinction between the “societal” and did not matter for explaining historical change as
“individual” version of the German “idealist” tra- much as the “material” factors of classical politi-
dition is important because these two debates cal economy (essentially land, labor, and capital,
tend to be run together and continue to be con- which “technology” being the most important
flated in contemporary “cultural” analysis. part of the latter). Note that what counts as “ideal
Conceptually however, they are thoroughly inde- factors” in this tradition is essentially mostly the
pendent and rely on very different premises. The intellectual outputs of symbol producing elites,
Hegelian debate deals with (to use a modern inclusive of political theory, theology and popu-
term) “emergent” factors at the level of “societ-
ies” conceived in quasi-organismic terms as 4
These include, most importantly, the set of notes that
coherent wholes. The Kantian debate deals with came to be known as “The German Ideology” (finished
approx. 1846) but also the first part of the “Communist
action at the level of the individual. Most of the
Manifesto” (1848) and the programmatic “Preface to a
arguments regarding the Hegelian debate over Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy”
ideas operated with either no or very rudimentary (1859).
6 Cultural Theory 103
lar religious doctrines, but also “philosophies of ity between the theoretical tradition initiated by
history” or even the “philosophies” peddled by Marx and Engels and that of Max Weber. The
the “Young Hegelians.”5 position taken here is that the preponderance of
However, Marx and Engels also counted evidence suggests a radical incommensurability
“technical” ideas such as the ideas produced by (in the Kuhnian sense) between Weber and the
the classical political economists (e.g. Malthus, Marx/Engels’s project. In essence, while the lat-
Smith and Ricardo) and even radical movement ter were radical “reverse-Hegelians” concerned
actors (such as syndicalists like Proudhon and primarily with evolutionist issues that began in
anarchists such as Bakunin) as “ideas.” Note that the philosophy of history and which they
from the point of view of modern “cultural the- attempted to move to the empirical terrain of
ory” this conception of “ideas” would be consid- “science,” (understood mainly as classical politi-
ered radically limited as it ignores the schemas, cal economy) the former is a neo-Kantian con-
practices, beliefs and normative commitments of cerned with proto-phenomenological issues of
the folk and essentially everything that is not the existential determinants of human action as it
ordered into some expert “system” either “scien- pertains to the generation of unique historical
tific” or “political.” Yet, this makes perfect sense complexes at given conjunctures (Weber 1946a,
for Marx and Engels, as their primary goal had b). While the solution of these neo-Kantian con-
nothing to do with culture as some generic cerns had implications for our understandings of
“dimension” of society but with the role of cer- the origins and trajectory of these unique histori-
tain “ideological” (meaning systematized and cal complexes (such as “rational capitalism”).
possibly distorting) belief systems in directing These had no real ontological status (existing
social change. Their point was that rather than only as nominal “ideal types”), and Weber never
directing change, transformations at the level of saw himself theorizing about them as such at a
the “infrastructure” (unterbau) happen first, and macrosocial level.
the “ideologues” emerge at the level of the super- Attempts to recast Weber as a macrosocial
structure (überbau) to justify those changes by theorist in the realist mode hinge on extremely
crafting ideas into ideology. The key issue is that partial (and exegetically indefensible) readings
Marx and Engels never talk about anything that of some of the least reliable of his “writings” in
would be recognized as “culture” today at the English (such as the lectures known as General
level of individual action. Economic History or excerpts from Economy and
Society) that downplay the bulk of the work that
was actually published in Weber’s lifetime and
6.2.3 Max Weber’s Little Ideas that he gave his living editorial approval to
(essentially the writings known as The Economic
The theorist who would move the German debate Ethics of the World Religions [EEWR]). They
over ideas to the level of the individual was Max also ignore Weber’s explicit pronouncements in
Weber. Rivers of ink have been spilled on the the methodological writings that pure holistic
issue of whether there is a direct line of continu- analysis was a non-starter both substantively and
theoretically. As such, there is nothing wrong
5
Sometimes this distinction is lost because Marx and with Weberian inspired macrosociology (e.g.
Engels’s historical materialism is interpreted as making Collins 1986) as long as it is understood to be a
statements about the balance between ideal and material fundamental deviation from Weber’s own line of
“forces” at the level of group of individuals or even indi-
thinking. This has implication for modern debates
vidual themselves and not historical societies. Yet, there is
little evidence that Marx or Engels cared about classes (or in cultural theory. For instance, while it is per-
individuals) in this sense or predicated theories taken fectly legitimate to claim Weber as a pre-
standalone “classes” or “groups” as their referent. It was Parsonian forerunner of “culture in action”
in fact Max Weber (especially in the writings on religion)
debates (Swidler 1986), it is madness to think
who moved the debate to this level. Most of the ideal ver-
sus material interest debate in sociology is thus a purely that Weber prefigured (macro) debates about
Weberian and not a Marxian debate. “culture and structure” at the “societal” level.
104 O. Lizardo
As first noted by Parsons, Weber’s fundamen- We know now, especially after the efflorescence
tal concern was precisely with “the role of ideas of Durkheimian studies in the 1990s, that this
in social action” (Parsons 1938) and this approach characterization—still repeated as late as
is distilled in the two “theoretical” essays in Alexander (1982)—is patently non-sensical as
EEWR.6 In this respect, Weber targets the histori- there is an even deeper Kuhnian incommensura-
cal materialists only secondarily. More directly bility gulf separating Durkheim from any repre-
located in his line of fire were all sort of instinc- sentative of the German idealist tradition
tual psychologies (such as Nietzsche’s proto- (properly called because it derives its preoccupa-
Freudianism), environmentalism, generic motive tions from German Idealism). We also know
theories of the origins of historical complexes thanks to the pioneering (and painstaking) work
(such as Sombart’s “acquisitive motive” account), of such scholars as Stephen Turner, W. F.
and other assorted biologisms prominent at the Pickering, Warren Schmaus, Sue Stedman-Jones,
time. Because he was working at the level of indi- Anne Rawls, Robert Alun-Jones and others, that
vidual action, Weber is able to develop something Durkheim actually belonged to a non-German-
pretty close to a modern action-theoretic perspec- idealist tradition of French Neo-Kantianism,
tive on the role of “culture” in social action as which combined a set of problematics that while
long as we understand that the Weberian notion derived from the French reception of Kant in the
of “ideas” is semantically much more restrictive early to mid nineteenth century, featured a set of
than the modern concept of culture. Weber does solutions actually derived from Aristotelian,
this by arguing that “ideas” as historically con- Thomist, and personalist conceptions autochtho-
structed conceptions characteristic of given per- nous to the French tradition (Schmaus 2004).
sons (or in the aggregate groups) have an These conceptual approaches have little if noth-
independent effect on conduct, and that this was ing to do (in a substantive sense if not in allusive
noted precisely in those historical cases in which sense) with German neo-Kantianism.
we see persons essentially override, instincts, The French Neo-Kantian tradition, system-
biology, generic motives and environmental pres- atized by such thinkers as Renouvier, Maine De
sures (all swept under the rug of “material inter- Biran, and Victor Cousin, rejected the Kantian
ests”) in order to fulfill an “ideal interest” (Weber problematic of ideas, derided Kant’s departure
1946a). from the Humean skeptical argument as to the
problematic origin of general categories as a non-
starter, and even questioned the whole notion that
6.2.4 Emile Durkheim’s “ideas” could be different from or “independent”
Représentations from a “non-ideal” objective reality. Instead,
these thinkers, beginning with Renouvier, devel-
One of the most disastrous bits of classical exege- oped an ontology of representations (représenta-
ses enacted by Parsons (1937) concerns his clas- tions) in which the dualistic tendencies typical of
sification of Durkheim as an (inconsistent) the German tradition (in which ideas and mate-
member of a tradition of (German?) “idealism.”7 rial forces fight it out to determine action or his-
tory) is renounced in favor of a “naturalistic”
conception in which représentations exist in the
6
These are the “Social Psychology of the World Religions”
same natural plane as objects in the world (thus
(1946a, serving as the “introduction” or Eilentung) to the
collection and the interlude or “intermediate reflections” Parsons, in his mangled interpretation of
(zwischenbrachtungen) known in English as “Religious
Rejections of the World and their Directions” (1946b).
7
Durkheim was an inconsistent member of the idealist These claims can only be made sense of by accepting
category because, according to the now thoroughly dis- Parsons’s idiopathic (and exegetically obsolete) under-
credited “two Durkheims” argument in Structure, he standing of the term “idealism” to encompass any human
begins his career as an idealist (in Division) but ends it by being who considers the mental component important for
going “clean over” into “idealism” in Elementary Forms. explaining action.
6 Cultural Theory 105
Durkheim, confused good old fashioned entific method (as with the German neo-Kantian
Aristotelian naturalism with the German buga- tradition) and everything to do with scientific
boo of “materialism”).8 Contra the German tradi- object. Durkheim noted that what sociologists
tion, French thinkers did not see the causality were lacking was not a special method but a spe-
pertaining to représentations as different from cial “thing” to study. Durkheim “solved” the
material or efficient causality (Turner 1984), problem as follows: While Wundt and the nascent
thought that persons became epistemically science of German scientific psychology (and
acquainted with concrete (e.g. “perceptual”) even German “social psychology”) would be
représentations in the same way that they became concerned with “individual representations”
acquainted with “abstract” (e.g. “categorical”) (représentations individuelles) as their natural
ones (Schmaus 2004), and asserted that représen- object, the “new” French science of Sociology
tations in this sense could not fail (unless under was going to re-direct the same scientific bravado
pathological conditions) to match reality, since to a set of natural objects that had yet to be dealt
représentations (like persons and their conscious- with in the same vein: collective representations
ness) were natural objects and thus an integral (représentations collectives). The only thing left
part of that very same reality (Stedman-Jones to do (e.g. Durkheim 1893) was to write an anti-
2001; see the essays collected in Pickering 2000). philosophical manifesto proclaiming the exis-
This representationalist ontology is adopted tence and causal preponderance (in relation to
wholesale by Durkheim who sees in this concept représentations individuelles) of this novel scien-
the key to the founding of a new “special” sci- tific object, and their analytic resistance to arm-
ence (actually a “special psychology”) of a par- chair (read classical philosophical) introspective
ticular kind of object. Because représentations methods. Collective representations are “things”
were a natural object (as opposed to “ideas” (and thus a “natural kind” in modern parlance)
which Kantians held to be non-naturalistic), they just like chairs, pains, atoms, and chickens, and
could form the foundation of a plain-old science can be studied with the same methods and using
(in the same sense as Physics and Biology) and the same old concepts of causation.
there was no need to go through all of the tortured It is hard to overstate, in light of recent discov-
hand-wringing (productive of mostly unreadable eries in Durkheim scholarship, how incredibly
texts) that German neo-Kantians participating in alien is Durkheim’s original conceptual appara-
the methodenstreit had to go through in question- tus (Rawls 2005), methodological approach
ing whether scientific methods were proper or (Schmaus 1994), and set of epistemic and onto-
not for such non-naturalistic entities as ideas. logical commitments (Stedman-Jones 2001)
Instead, having travelled to the laboratories of from contemporary “germanic” cultural sociol-
Wilhelm Wundt as a young representative of the ogy in the United States. Most importantly, how
best that the French intelligentsia had to offer alien is the naturalistic conception of représenta-
after the national humiliation suffered during the tions (Pickering 2000) from the (germanic!)
Franco-Prussian war, Durkheim had seen con- Boasian-Parsonian “concept of culture” that
crete institutional proof that représentations continues (to paraphrase a germanic theorist) to
could be studied scientifically, naturalistically, weigh heavily upon the brains of living American
and objectively. sociologists.
From the point of view of the nascent science For instance, it is clear that neither the stan-
of sociology, the issue had nothing to do with sci- dard “culture versus structure” nor “culture in
action” debate fit the Durkheimian problematic
8
In what follows, I use the conventional tactic in modern because the notion of représentations is not com-
Durkheimian studies of using the untranslated term mensurable (once again in the Kuhnian sense)
représentations to refer to the original French notion, as
with any modern conception of the culture con-
the term is not semantically equivalent to the English
word “representation” which is beset by Germanic (e.g. cept. To wit, (the “early”) Durkheim was a
Kantian) hangups not applicable to the French notion. “monist” organicist for whom the issue was not,
106 O. Lizardo
as it was for the dualist organicism of the middle- German “ideal/materialist” frame. All modern
period Marx or modern “culture and structure” Durkheim scholars now reject this formulation
theorists (e.g. Archer 1995), whether there was along with associated non-problems such a the
one “factor” (e.g. the material or “social”) that (non-materialist) meaning of “thing” in
was preponderant upon another factor (the ideal). Durkheim’s definition of social facts, along with
Interpreting Durkheim in a “germanic” mode (as the related non-shift from “materialism” to “ide-
do Parsons and Alexander) leads to bizarre alism” (Schmaus 2004). In the 1970s there was
notions such as “Durkheimian materialism” or an entire anti-functionalist movement designed
the even crazier idea of the “paradigm shift” from to free Max Weber from the cage of normativist
the “materialism” of Division to the “idealism” functionalism (e.g “de-Parsonizing Weber”). Yet
of Elementary Forms (Schmaus 1994). a movement to “de-Parsonize Durkheim” (e.g.
For Durkheim, the primary analytic issue was Stedman-Jones 2001) has only been enacted
whether the whole “social” organism composed recently among a small cadre of specialty
primarily of social facts (inclusive of person to Durkheim scholars having little impact on social
person bonds, institutional facts, traditions, and and cultural theory writ large. But this matters,
mores) conceived as représentations collectives, because it is my contention that modern cultural
held together as a unity or not. This is the sort of theory is the unholy offspring of Parsons’s con-
formulation that Weber would have rejected as ceptual mixture of German neo-Kantian and
non-sensical mysticism. At this level, the issue post-Hegelian hangups concerning “the role of
was whether different sets of collective represen- ideas in social action” and the “balance” between
tations fit together or not. At the level of the indi- “cultural” and “material” forces at the social
vidual Durkheim does not face the level with Durkheim’s (as we saw above abso-
action-theoretical problematic of whether “ideal” lutely incommensurable) conceptual apparatus.
factors were most important than “material” fac- The result is a “Germanized Durkheim”; an ana-
tors in determining conduct. For Durkheim all lytically incoherent conceptual “monster” (in
action had to be driven by représentations, (the Douglas’s 1966 sense) that continues to play
notion of action without representations is havoc on the theoretical imagination of modern
patently non-sensical from the point of view of cultural theorists.
the Aristotelian neo-Kantianism under which Parsons’s conceptual monster emerges in two
Durkheim was reared). The key issue is thus, steps. From the point of view of modern cultural
which kind of representation is preponderant in theory the key conceptual moves occur in two
determining action; représentations individuelles distinct periods; the “action-theoretic” period of
or représentations collectives. According to “the early essays” and Structure (1935–1938)
Durkheim’s “dualist” conception of the individ- where Parsons still operates with a pre-cultural
ual, when the social organism is whole and vocabulary steeped in the nineteenth century
healthy action is driven (unproblematically) by germanic neo-Kantian tradition (e.g. volun-
the appropriate (for that social type) set of collec- tarism, ideas, materialism, positivism). At this
tive representations although these must be of stage, the “anthropological” (analytic) concept
sufficient strength and carry enough authority to of culture is absent; what we have instead are the
subjugate the dissipative force of individual (and twin germanic concepts of “ideas” (Parsons
thus eogistic, evanescent) representations. 1938) and “values” (1935; including ultimate
values). The second period is the so-called “mid-
dle period” of normativist functionalism proper
6.3 Enter “Culture”: Talcott culminating in the publication of The Social
Parsons System (1951), and most importantly for cultural
theorists the book co-authored with Parsons and
As alluded to above, the biggest theoretical Shils (Towards a General Theory of Action
disaster in modern social theory consists of (1951)) and the collection of essays, mostly writ-
Parsons’s shoehorning of Durkheim into a ten from the late 1940s to the late 1950s, known
6 Cultural Theory 107
as Social Structure and Personality (1964). This equipped with a modern (analytic) culture con-
period is key because it is here that Parsons cept (Kuper 1999).10
becomes acquainted with various fledgling ver- Where did Parsons get an analytic version of
sions of the “analytical” culture concept floating the culture concept? The short answer, is that he
around in American anthropology since at least got it from the anthropologists in particular via
1911 (Stocking 1966; Bidney 1967) and uses the influence of Clyde Kluckhohn (the leading,
them to develop his own, and ultimately decisive because he was the only, cultural anthropologist
for us, version of the culture concept (Parsons at Harvard) and the professional link to one of
1972; Kroeber and Parsons 1958). Franz Boas’s most influential student: Alfred
Kroeber. The influence of Clyde Kluckhohn’s
notion of culture as “pattern” and Alfred
6.3.1 Parsons Invents “Culture” Kroeber’s neo-Spencerian conceptualization of
culture as “superorganic” on Parsons’s thinking
We have seen that the classics, in particular on this score, the equally important influence that
Weber and Durkheim, did not have a concept Talcott Parsons had on anthropological defini-
that maps onto the “modern” (anthropological) tions of the culture concept, as well as the famous
concept of culture; as such, it is an analytical and disciplinary turf-splitting “deal” enacted by the
exegetical mistake (as well as an embarrassing two doyens of American social science—such
anachronism) to treat the classics as budding that Anthropology got to keep the “cultural sys-
“cultural theorists.” However, this is done regu- tem” and sociology got “the social system” (e.g.
larly by both cultural analysts (e.g. Swidler Parsons and Kroeber 1958)—is an unwritten
1995) and by everybody who has been tasked chapter in the history of sociology (but see Kuper
with writing a “classics” question for a qualify- 1999 coming to bat for anthropology). For
ing exam on “culture” in a contemporary gradu- instance, it is clear that Kroeber and Kluckhohn
ate program in sociology (myself) in the United (1952) were spurred to clarify systematize, and
States. How did we get to this sad point? The update the Tylor-Boas analytic culture concept
answer is that the classics became “cultural the- right after Parsons began to make use of his own
orists” because Talcott Parsons re-read them as (ultimately decisive) twist on this very notion
such. The story of how this happened is messy, (e.g. Parsons 1951) as one of the central concepts
because everybody focuses on the “rewriting” of of the middle-period functionalist scheme (with
the classics that Parsons enacted in Structure of the other two being the “social” and “personal-
Social Action (1937) when Parsons still did not ity” systems). As Kuper has noted, this is hugely
have access to the modern culture concept. important because the culture concept did not
Everybody forgets, however, that Parsons kept emerge from anthropology as a result of an inter-
rewriting and re-interpreting the classics nal conceptual need within the discipline. Instead,
throughout his entire career.9 This was especially “it was Parsons who created the need for a mod-
true during the highly active (both theoretically ern, social scientific conception of culture, and
and in terms of institution building) middle who persuaded the leading anthropologists of the
period that saw the publication of The Social United States that their discipline could flourish
System (1951) and various mid-career theoreti- only if they took culture in his sense as their par-
cal essays (1964), when Parsons was fully ticular specialty” (1999: 68).
9 10
As we have seen, it is important to note that Parsons kept Of most immediate direct influence was Clyde
trying to demonstrate the existence of various “conver- Kluckhohn the leading anthropologist at Harvard, and via
gence theses” after 1937, including the even more fantas- Kluckhohn, Berkeley’s Alfred Kroeber who received the
tic (and ridiculous) “Freud/Durkheim” convergence thesis first PhD in anthropology awarded at Columbia by Franz
around the issue of “cultural internalization.” Boas.
108 O. Lizardo
It is also clear that at that time the disciplinary of (what later came to be known as) cultural
identity and intellectual coherence of the socio- anthropology and then known as “ethnology”
logical and anthropological projects hung of the (Stocking 1966). In Boas, culture becomes equiv-
balance of this definitional contest, which was alent to the “social heritage” essentially every-
precisely what lay behind the famous Kroeber/ thing from beliefs, values, morals, and technology
Parsons “truce” (Kroeber and Parsons 1958), one that is not given by the human biological consti-
that was no truce at all but essentially the capitu- tution is learned by novices and is preserved and
lation on the part of Kroeber to give “society” the transmitted from generation to generation.
sociologists (something that would have been, But the funny thing is that even though Boas
and was, unthinkable for a Malinowski or a developed this concept in early writings before
Radcliffe-Brown) and keep the desiccated 1920, most anthropologists did not take notice.
Parsonian version of “culture” as an idealist sym- Instead, a variety of definitions, counter-
bol system made up of “patterns” for the anthro- definitions, and redefinitions of culture began to
pologists. The culture concept is thus as American accrete during the 40 separating Boas’s early
as apple pie and an inherent (not accidental) out- writings from Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s emer-
growth of normativist functionalism. gency intervention as a reaction to the Parsonian
The career of the analytic concept of culture incursion (so much so that they were able to col-
within anthropology has been written on exten- lect about 164 of these in 1952). It is obvious that
sively both during the heyday of functionalism no anthropologist during this period thought that
(e.g. Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952; Bidney 1967) anything big for the professional status of anthro-
during the immediate post-functionalist period pology actually rode on coming up with a “crisp”
(e.g. Stocking 1966) and more recently (e.g. consensual definition of the culture concept and
Kuper 1999) and as such it is relatively not very that was an entirely correct perception. For once
obscure, although it is clear that most cultural Boas vanquished the bugaboo of racialist biolo-
sociologists are blissfully ignorant about it. gism, his particular version of the culture concept
However, there is no doubt that there had been an seem to have done its knowledge-political job
“analytic” concept of culture available to anthro- and people felt free to ignore and develop their
pologists since at least the 1870s, when Tylor own twists on the idea. Accordingly, other anthro-
defined the concept in a sufficiently “value-free” pological writers with their own partial and con-
way as to serve the relevant scientific purposes. crete interests began to propose other ideas about
Yet, Tylor’s formulation remained inherently tied what culture might or might not be some (like
to ethnocentric views of cultural evolution that Sapir and the early Kroeber) even harking back to
saw something like Victorian era England as the “normative” or “humanistic” notions of culture.
pinnacle of civilization (with “Australians” at the Lines of division (and here I rely on Bidney
bottom and the “Chinese” in between). As such 1967) began to form those who remained loyal to
Tylor’s famous “complex whole” rendering of Boas’s more naturalistic “social heritage” notion
the culture concept, in spite of the largely inac- (which includes artifacts, buildings, habits, tech-
curate hagiography enacted by Kroeber and niques, mores, and essentially everything that is
Kluckhohn (1952) remained indelibly tied to learned and “man-made”) from those who
nineteenth century (racist) version concept. It thought of culture as more restrictive terms as
was in fact Kroeber’s teacher Franz Boas, him- referring exclusively to non-material, non-
self drawing on his upbringing in a (liberal, not naturalistic ideal or conceptual elements.
racist) version of the germanic tradition, who Most importantly, there were those who
developed something like the modern (fully rela- thought of culture not as a set of contents (either
tivist) culture concept and who used it to van- material or ideal) but as a pattern (later on
quish the last remnants of ethnocentric referred to as cybernetic “program” by both
evolutionism and racialism still extant in the Parsons and Geertz) abstracted out from the
American field. This begat the American version social behavior of persons (importantly
6 Cultural Theory 109
Kluckhohn was of this persuasion, but both Ruth (cultural) objects linked to one another to form a
Benedict and Margaret Mead provide popular system (Parsons 1951; Parsons and Shils 1951);
versions of this story). This “pattern” was akin to this system contained both the content via which
a set of general recipes or abstract guidelines for persons expressed their values and constructed
how to behave but did not reduce to particular their beliefs and the (following Kluckhohn) more
bits of behavior or even the symbols via which generalized “patterns” via which they organized
they are expressed. Patterns could be typed and their actions. The cultural system was thus a
classified, and therefore the job of the cultural Kroeberian superorganic addendum to both per-
anthropologist was to uncover these and possibly sons and society, hovering above them while at
come up with exhaustive list of variants across the same time serving as the storehouse of the
the world’s “cultures.” At the time, most anthro- system of ultimate values that gave persons their
pologists linked their definitions of culture to the motivations and provided the necessary order to
Kroeberian (1917) notion of the “superorganic” systems of social interaction.11
(even if they were critical of the details Kroeber’s In this way, what was for the anthropologists a
particular formulation they all liked the autono- substantive proposal used for the pragmatic pur-
mist implications) in which “culture” was thought pose of arguing against racialist and “primitive
to constitute its own emergent level analytically mentality” theories (e.g. Boas 1911) became for
and ontological separate from the biological indi- Parsons a full-fledged analytic abstraction used—
vidual and acting back on persons to constrain for the first time—as a macro-level repository for
their behavior. all of the Germanic elements that had received
It is from these idea bits that Parsons built up separate treatment previously (ideas, values,
his own version of the concept of culture in the beliefs). It is at this point that Parsons first devel-
1940s and 1950s. In contrast to the anthropolo- ops the essentializing assumption (Biernacki
gists, Parsons understood full well the knowledge- 2000) with respect to culture as an analytic cate-
political implications of nailing down a culture gory installing it as a fundamental component of
concept, for he was engaged in his own bit of the full functionalist systems ontology. In
empire making at Harvard at the time. These Parsons’s hands, culture thus goes from a rela-
were the years (1946 to be exact) when Parsons tively non-committal concept used to refer to cer-
leveraged an outside offer to finally take down tain habitual modes of acting, feeling, and
rug down from under Sorokin in Sociology. This believing along with the requisite set of material
would be done by agreeing to lead the formation objects and know how used by persons to get by
of the “Social Relations” department that would in the world (as in the Boasian/Malinowskian
include a group of like-minded psychologists and tradition) to a set of “substantialized ideal
sociologists along with Clyde Kluckhohn in objects” (cultural objects) existing in their own
anthropology. Because the department was to be ideal world (in a cultural realm?), expressed in
a combination of sociology, anthropology, and cultural symbols, communicated via symbolic
psychology, each of the branches (in good media, and towards which persons may be “ori-
Durkhemian fashion) was to have its own ented” in the same way that they orient them-
“object.” To sociology would go “the social sys- selves in relation to tables, cats, and other people.
tem” to psychology “the personality system” and Culture (while still “expressive” of underlying
to anthropology “the cultural system” (Parsons
1951). 11
The full definition, first previewed in The Social System
Working analytical definitions of society and and then fully brought out to the world in the famous
personality were already there, but Parsons noted “truce” paper with Kroeber is “transmitted and created
that no such neat definition existed for “culture” content and patterns of values, ideas and other symbolic-
meaningful systems.” Culture in this sense serves as a
and that meant that he needed to provide one. To
“factor” in the “shaping of human behavior and the arti-
construct his definition, Parsons combined the facts produced through behavior” (Kroeber and Parsons
notion that the elements of “culture” were ideal 1958: 583).
110 O. Lizardo
sentiments and value patterns) is now part of the via the theory of “internalization,” a pseudo-
“furniture” of the world. Freudian concept that Parsons not only devised
whole cloth but which he later went on to claim
Durkheim had also come up with independently
6.3.2 Culturalizing the Classics from “Freud.” Parsons goes on to propose the
implausible notion that because Durkheim and
Parsons basic conceit was that while this particu- Freud had “converged” on the same (bizarre)
lar concept “culture” could of course not be found notion that therefore the convergence spoke (in a
in any of the classics, they somehow had intuited perfect circle) to the scientific validity of the
something pretty close to it except that they did notion. The foundational Parsonian moves
not have the right words for it. In Parsons’s (fan- (essentially defining the basic set of problems of
tastic) proposal, “Comte and Spencer, and Weber modern cultural theory) have had disastrous con-
and Durkheim spoke of society as meaning essen- ceptual consequences.
tially the same thing Tylor meant by culture” In essence, middle-period Parsons replaces
(Kroeber and Parsons 1958: 583). This is a state- Weber’s nineteenth century focus on “ideas”
ment that is radically ludicrous in its brazen (even if he earlier endorsed it; see Parsons 1938)
anachronism and completely inaccurate in every and Durkheim’s focus on “representations” in
word. We know now for a fact that what Tylor favor of a hyper-inflated and hypostatized version
meant by culture had little to do with what Boas of the culture concept. But we have also seen that
meant by culture, which had even less to do with Parsons’s concept was not the anthropologists’s
what Parsons meant by culture. Regardless, for concept; it was an idealist abstraction that sepa-
Parsons, given that the classics had a concept of rated culture from “society” (or social structure)
culture (except that it was “society” and except as a sui generis entity. Not even Kluckhohn was
that they really did not) then it was perfectly fine ready to go that far for it implied that anthropol-
to simply project, his own invented notion of cul- ogy was no longer in the business of studying
ture as behaviorally relevant symbolic patterns society (although clearly Kroeber was willing to
transmitted from generation to generation to play).
Durkheim and Weber without remainder. By cul- Finally we have also seen that while basic ele-
turalizing the classics, Parsons is able to “demon- ments from which Parsons cobbled together his
strate” that Durkheim and Weber “converge” version of the concept seems deceptively harm-
once again (but the 1950s convergence argument less and all were available in Parsons’s milieu;
is not quite the same as the 1930s one) because it but together they generate a powerful conceptual
turns out that they were talking about two sides of monster. In the Parsonian recasting of the modern
the same coin: objective culture (existing as “pat- anthropological concept, culture becomes a
terns” in a superorganic system) and subjective “superorganic” system of ideal elements (but
culture (existing as internalized norms, values, most importantly beliefs, norms, and values)
and ideas about the world inside the person). expressed in significant symbols and communi-
The key move in this “middle” period is there- cated via symbolic media (e.g. language) that act
fore the integration of Parsons’s twist on the to constrain (following Parsons favorite recourse
anthropological concept of culture into the early to cybernetic metaphors) via a top-down “pattern
action-theoretical problematic (essentially swap- maintaining” process both action (for agents) and
ping the nineteenth century germanic notion of patterns of interaction (for social systems)
“ideas” for the his notion of culture), the incorpo- (Parsons 1951).12 Under the middle-period
ration of Kroeber’s (1917) notion of “superor-
ganic” culture pattern into the functionalist 12
On the quite non-sensical—in Wittgenstein’s sense—
macro-sociology, and the proposal that the
status of the very idea that something like “culture” as
(Weberian) action-theoretical level could be conceived in the analytic sense can “constrain” see Martin
joined to the (Durkheimian) macro-social level (2015, Chap. 2).
6 Cultural Theory 111
scheme, Durkheim’s concern with “collective nalization of values.” This account, while correct
representations” now comes to be recast as a con- in spirit, is actually summarily incorrect in the
cern with (institutionalized) elements of the “cul- most consequential details. The problem is that
tural system,” thus taking care of culture’s public, by focusing on “values” as the central element
external side. Weber’s concern with subjective that is allegedly internalized, it ignores a funda-
“ideas” then gets recast into a concern with the mental shift in Parsons’s thinking, one that is cru-
subjective (internalized) elements of the same cially involved in his incorporation of the
pseudo-Durkheimian cultural system. anthropological theory of culture into the
Durkheim fixes Weber by providing him with normativist-functionalist scheme.
a theory explaining why cultural worldviews As we saw above, the Parsons of the 1930s (up
come to acquire validity and authority, and Weber an including the so-called “early essays” (esp.
fixes Durkheim by providing him with a theory 1935, 1938) and the uber-classic Structure of
explaining how external culture comes to acquire Social Action, is still operating with a “pre-
subjectively binding forms for the actor and cultural” vocabulary one that still tethers him
comes to be directly implicated in driving and more or less directly to two nineteenth century
motivating action.13 Properly anthropologized, germanic sources, one the germanic cultural
the classics now provide justification for a “cul- vocabulary of “ideas” (e.g. 1938) and the
turalist functionalism” that is “cultural” through Americanized neo-Kantian vocabulary of “val-
and through, in which “culture” had an external ues” (e.g. 1935). Both of these terms appear in
order (in terms of the patterning of symbolic ele- Structure, and provide the first attempt to
ments in the cultural system) and an internal “update” the nineteenth century classics for
order (in terms of the patterning of internalized Parsons’s twentieth century theoretical concerns.
norms and value orientations in the personality). Because the Germanic language of ideas and val-
The Parsonian problem of external patterning is ues was already closer to Weber (and Parsons for
taken up by Geertz and yields the modern prob- biographical and intellectual reasons was at this
lematic of “interpretation” around the (fuzzy) point just an American broker for the transatlan-
notion of “cultural system” (Geertz 1973). The tic importation of the Germanic tradition into
problem of internal patterning was taken up by sociology) Weber does not come off too badly in
Parsons’s more directly (in the middle period Structure. As we have already seen, the theorist
work) and resulted in the unwieldy edifice of that gets absolutely mangled is Durkheim,
“socialization theory” in normativist functional- because Parsons has to retrofit the awkward
ism. Let us take a closer look at this, as it is vocabulary of “ideas” to a theorist for whom this
important for the overall story. was a meaningless concept.
However, the more important point is that
there is a fundamental shift in Parsons’s vocabu-
6.3.3 Classical Socialization Theory lary post-structure, so that the classical theory of
internalization does not reduce to a “value inter-
Textbook introductions to normativist functional- nalization” account. Instead, the little-discussed
ism usually propose that Parsons thought that Freud/Durkheim convergence (that it was even
social order was accomplished via “socializa- more exegetically preposterous as the Weber/
tion” whereby this process reduces to the “inter- Durkheim convergence at the center of Structure
is not important) comes to play a key role. In this
13
As Parsons acknowledges in his last published statement respect, few contemporary theorists actually
in this regard, “Durkheim did not work out a Weberian comprehend the radicality of Parsons’s proposal
analysis of the various steps between religious commit- at this “middle period” stage, because they still
ment and obligations in the field of social action, espe-
confuse the Parsonian model of enculturation
cially in what he called the profane sphere, but the
congruence with Weber s analysis is quite clear” (Parsons with the value internalization account and dis-
1972: 259). miss it as a “special” and not a “general” pro-
112 O. Lizardo
posal. The key is to realize that Parsons came to Accordingly, the Parsonian theory of culture
realize that both “values” and the broader “con- and cognition is (discouragingly) hard to distin-
ceptual schemes” through which social actors guish from contemporary approaches, especially
come to know and classify the entire world of in presuming the wholesale internalization of
objects, agents, and situations (essentially what entire conceptual schemes by socialized actors.
we moderns use the term “culture” to refer to) For instance, Jeffrey Alexander chides post-
have to be internalized. Thus, any theory that pre- functionalist conflict theory for failing to empha-
supposes that persons internalize the basic cate- size “…the power of the symbolic to shape
gories with which they make sense of the world interactions from within, as normative precepts
from the external environment is still essentially or narratives that carry internalized moral force”
consonant with a “Parsonian” model. (Alexander 2003: 16; italics added; see also
Parsons only tweak on Freud consists in his pp. 152–153 of the same book on the internaliza-
chiding him for not having a (“Durkheimian”) tion of cultural codes). Eviatar Zerubavel for his
theory of cognitive socialization. According to part notes, that when it comes to the “logic of
Parsons Freud’s mistake was precisely to think classification,” by the age of three a child has
that only normative standards externally (e.g. already “internalized conventional outlines of the
culturally) specified and thus internalized within category ‘birthday present’ enough to know that,
the personality as the “Superego” but that the if someone suggests that she bring lima beans as
organism does need to internalize a cognitive a present he must be kidding” (1999: 77, our
apparatus with which to make sense of the object- italics).
environment, relying instead on a pre-social, These so-called “contemporary” accounts are
naturally given (and thus always veridical) sys- simply not conceptually distinguishable in any
tem of perception and cognition. For Parsons, (as way from the culturalized Parsonianism of the
for most sociologists of culture) this is mistake. middle period (which goes to tell you that just
In Parsonese, Freud, “failed to take explicitly into because somebody writes something today it
account the fact that the frame of reference in does not make contemporary). Thus, rather than
terms of which objects are cognized, and there- being some sort of ancient holdover from func-
fore adapted to, is cultural and thus cannot be tionalism, a model pretty close to Parsons’s
taken for granted as given, but must be internal- Durkheimian Freudianism continues to be used
ized” (Parsons 1964: 23). by contemporary theorists, whenever those theo-
One ironic consequence of not recognizing rists wish to make a case for enculturation as a
that Parsons’s theory changes dramatically once form of mental modification via experience.
the early language of “ideas” and “values” is There do exist a family of contemporary propos-
junked and the theory goes “full cultural” is that als that is truly “post-functionalist” in the sense
even though contemporary cultural sociologists of recasting the question of culture in action away
are quick to reject the Parsonian value- from issues of “internalization,” this leads us to a
internalization account, they continue to abide by consideration of “contemporary” cultural theory.
the Parsonian model of cognitive socialization. In
essence, most sociologists continue to believe
that people share cultural contents (e.g. world- 6.4 Contemporary Cultural
views and beliefs) because they internalize those Theory: Fighting
contents from the larger culture. Any theory that the Parsonian Ghost
presupposes that persons introject the basic cate- in the Machine
gories with which they make sense of the world
from the external environment is still essentially From this account, it is easy to see that the cultur-
a “Parsonian” theory of enculturation even if the alized functionalism of the middle-period Parsons
adjective Parsonian has come to (wrongly) be provides a skeleton key to understand contempo-
limited to the “value internalization” account. rary cultural theory. The classic text is Swidler
6 Cultural Theory 113
(1986) who essentially uses sound pragmatist equally wide range of settings and situations than
sensibilities to develop a “negative” (in the pho- elements towards which the actor only owes
tographic sense) theoretical system in which the “shallow” allegiance.
two basic premises of culturalized functional- Contemporary cultural theory can be read as
ism are denied. In Swidler there is no “internal” a repeated attempt to relax the stipulation that
cultural order (because actors don’t “deeply cultural power derives from “deep internaliza-
internalize” any culture) nor is there any “exter- tion” (Swidler 1986; Sewell 1992). The guiding
nal” cultural order because culture does not observation is that individuals do not seem to
exist outside of people’s heads in the form of possess the highly coherent, overly complex
tightly structured systems. Instead, actors are and elaborately structured codes, ideologies or
only lightly touched by culture (learning what value systems that the classical theory expects
they need ignoring the rest) and draw on disor- they should possess (Martin 2010). Instead of
ganized external cultural elements in expedient regular demonstrations of the possession of
ways. We may refer to this “negative” of cultur- coherent cultural systems on the part of “social-
alized functionalism as the “cultural fragmenta- ized” agents what these newer “toolkit” theories
tion” model. This account is essentially suggest (and what the empirical evidence
hegemonic in contemporary cultural analysis appears to support) is that persons do not (and
and heterodox positions today (e.g. Vaisey 2009; cognitively cannot) internalize highly structured
Alexander 2003) can only be understood within symbolic systems in the ways that classical
the context of this hegemony. A good entry into socialization accounts portray. These cultural
this debate thus is the quasi-functionalist prob- systems are simply too “cognitively complex”
lematic of “cultural depth” opened up by to be deeply internalized; people simply
Swidler (1986) and repeatedly revisited by sub- wouldn’t be able to remember or keep straight
sequent cultural theorists (e.g. Sewell 1992; all of the relevant (logical or socio-logical) link-
Patterson 2014). ages (Martin 2010).
Instead, as Swidler (2001) has pointed out,
much coherence is actually offloaded outside of
6.4.1 The Problem of “cultural the social agent and into the external world of
depth” established institutional arrangements, objecti-
fied cultural codes and current relational commit-
As we have seen, Between the 1930s and 1950s, ments. That is, “cultural meanings are organized
it was the synthetic work of Parsons (Parsons and brought to bear at the collective and social,
1937, 1951; Parsons and Shils 1951) that pro- not the individual level” (Swidler 2008: 279), and
vided the first fully developed account of how gain whatever minimal coherence they can obtain
some cultural elements acquire the capacity to “out of our minds” through concrete contextual
become significant in their capacity to direct mechanisms-instead of “inside” them. However,
action. Parsons’s centerpiece proposal was that this is not a return to functionalism because
some cultural elements come to play a more sig- external culture is also unstructured, acquiring
nificant role in action because they are subject to whatever “coherence” it has via extra-cultural
an internalization process whereby they come to (political, economic, institutional) means (Sewell
form an integral part of the cognitive and motiva- 2005).
tional makeup of the actor. This internalization This view of internal and external culture as
mechanism, as a particularly powerful variant of “fragmented,” “contradictory,” “weakly
the learning process, arranges cultural elements bounded” and “contested” has become the de
according to a gradient of “cultural depth.” facto standard in contemporary discussions in
Cultural elements that are deeply internalized are cultural sociology (e.g. Sewell 2005: 169–172),
more crucial in determining an actor’s subjective cognitive sociology (e.g. DiMaggio 1997) and
stances towards a wide range of objects across an “post-cultural” anthropology (e.g. Hannerz
114 O. Lizardo
1996), the latter of whom have thoroughly straint as the source of external structuration.
rejected the “myth of cultural integration” Through the systematic “organization of differ-
(Archer 1985) inherited from culturalist func- ence” by powerful institutional actors (and
tionalism. Contemporary cultural theory thus counter-movements) cultures can become (quasi)
relies primarily on an unquestioned conception coherent. DiMaggio (1997: 274), drawing on
of cultural fragmentation. What is distinctive research from the cognitive sciences (broadly
about the cultural fragmentation model in rela- defined), argues that the “sources of stability in
tion to its Parsonian counterpart is (a) its primary our beliefs and representations” should not be
empirical motivation (the failure of persons to sought in the structure of our minds but rather in
display highly structured ideologies), (b) its “cues embedded in the physical and social envi-
rejection of any form of a positive account of ronment” (see also Shepherd 2011).
subjective modification of the actor via cultural The point to keep in mind is that coherence
transmission, and (c) its theorization of the does not exist “inside of people’s heads” but
“power” of culture as located “outside of the instead is offloaded towards “the efforts of cen-
head” of the actor. tral institutions and the acts of organized resis-
As Swidler noted in her classic paper, “[p] tance to such institutions” (Sewell 2005: 174).
eople do not build lines of action from scratch, From this perspective, persons do not need to
choosing actions one at a time as efficient means internalize highly coherent sets of classificatory
to given ends. Instead, they construct chains of structures and “value systems” in order for their
action beginning with at least some pre-fabricated action to be “systematic” since a lot of the “syste-
links” (1986: 276). This implies a critique of maticity” and regularity in human action actually
socialization models that operate via the “psy- lies outside, in the world of objectified institu-
chological modification” of actors: “[c]ulture tions and situational contexts (Swidler 2001). In
does not influence how groups organize action the contemporary conception, culture is not pos-
via enduring psychological proclivities implanted sessed in a “deep” way, but rather in a “shallow,”
in individuals by their socialization. Instead, pub- disorganized fashion that requires structuring and
licly available meanings facilitate certain patterns support from the external social environment to
of action, making them readily available, while produce coherent judgments.
discouraging others” (Swidler 1986: 283). What
is appealing about the fragmentation formulation
is that we get to keep the phenomenon of interest 6.4.2 Reactions to the (Over)
(e.g. occasionally systematic patterns of action) reaction
without relying on the doubtful assumption than
an entire model of the social world or a whole If the cultural fragmentation reaction against cul-
system of values or logically organized concep- turalist functionalism is the contemporary ortho-
tual scheme has to be internalized by social agent doxy, then it is easy to predict the shape that the
(Martin 2010). heterodoxy has to take (Patterson 2014). Either
Contemporary cultural theorists are thus one tries to bring back some semblance of theo-
nearly unanimous in proposing a common mech- rizing the “internal” order of culture as embodied
anism that accounts for how “coherence is possi- in actors (Vaisey 2009) or one tries to bring back
ble” when the norm is that culture tends toward a conception of the strong external patterning of
incoherence; cultural coherence is possible culture. This first route has been followed by con-
through external structuration. The specific form temporary cultural theorists who draw on post (or
in which external structuration mechanisms are non)functionalist theoretical traditions (e.g.
theorized is less important than the agreement on practice theory) to develop a conception of inter-
this basic point. For instance, Sewell (2005: 172– nalization that is not subject to Swidlerian
174) points to mechanisms of power and con- objections.
6 Cultural Theory 115
The rising appeal of Vaisey’s (2009) appro- of it and emerges from the same set of problemat-
priation of the discursive/practical consciousness ics inherited from Parsons.
distinction (Giddens 1979), and his importation Recall that Parsons’s main contribution was to
of “dual process” models from moral psychol- develop a culture concept that made robust
ogy, in order to suggest that culture can be inter- assumptions about the makeup, nature, of culture
nalized in both weakly and strongly patterned as a macro-level ontological category. These were
ways can be traced to this. In the same way, reviv- ideas that a lot of anthropologists had played
als of “strong external patterning” of the “super- around with (inclusive of the more brilliant Boas
organic” element of culture such as Alexander students such as Sapir and Kroeber) but which
(2003) or Reed (2011) attempt to conceptualize none had systematically laid out (Kuper 1999). It
this patterning without relying on the problem- is Parsons that comes clean and offers the notion of
atic (quasi-organicist) conception of culture as a the “cultural system” as a scientific object of study.
“system.” Instead, these analysts have attempted However, it was an upstart student in the depart-
to revive neo-Saussurean conceptions of pattern- ment of social relations, Clifford Geertz, who runs
ing as ordered sets of binary codes, which license away with the culture notion of “cultural system”
strong theoretical proclamations as to the coher- and actually cashes in on the analytic potential of
ence of culture, and justify an “interpretative” Parsons revolutionary notion. In a series of essays
(textualist) approach to cultural explanation. This written primarily in the 1960s (collected in 1973 in
is of course a methodological approach that was the classic Interpretation of Cultures), Geertz is
advocated by Geertz (1973) but which was not able to formulate both an evolutionary/naturalistic
quite compatible with the Parsonian notion of the foundation for the culture concept and a non-natu-
“cultural system” that he was conceptually stuck ralistic, “interpretative” methodological manifesto
with (at least in the core essays written in the that Geertz seduced everybody into thinking that it
1960s). Today these heterodox conceptions of followed from that foundation. Geertz’s approach
both the internal and external order of culture was masterful in the knowledge political sense; for
compete against still hegemonic fragmentation Geertz sees Parsons “gift” of culture to anthropol-
ideas for explanatory hegemony. ogy and ups the ante by taking this gift and using it
to argue into irrelevance the other two denizens of
the Parsonian systems ontology (personality and
6.4.3 Whatever Happened society).
to the Cultural System? Geertz thus squares the Germanic circle by
separating ontology from methodology or more
Accordingly, a contradictory aspect of contem- accurately by using ontology to justify methodol-
porary cultural theory in American sociology is ogy. Not surprisingly, this “methodology” is
that while some version of the fragmentation nothing but good old fashioned “interpretation”
model is usually the first thing cultural sociolo- (verstehen) updated with nods to (for Geertz)
gists trot out of their toolkit when trying to contemporary anti-naturalistic arguments in the
explain something, there has been a simultaneous philosophy of action (Gilbert Ryle) and herme-
movement to see strong patterning in cultural neutics (Ricoeur). In this way, Geertz becomes
systems at a “deep level” and to see cultural frag- the conduit via which a host of Parsonian prob-
mentation as a surface mirage. These “strong lematics (and associated issues from the Kantian/
program” sociologists, tend point to culture as Hegelian Germanic legacy that Parsons only pro-
the fundamental dimension of social reality and vide pseudo-solutions to) have been passed along
link a methodological interpretivism to a sub- to modern cultural theorists in essentially pristine
stantive conception of culture as a “system of forms. How did he do it?
signs.” This approach, seemingly antithetical to Geertz basically used a loophole in the
the fragmentation idea, is actually a close cousin Parsonian charter. For while Parsons was content
116 O. Lizardo
to define a new object of study for anthropology This attempt to bring together the most abstract
and even give clues as to its ontological constitu- of naturalistic generalities (e.g. the notion that
tion, he said little about how to study. The hint, culture is a program, like a computer program or
left hanging by Parsons for Geertz to take, was a code like the genetic code) with the most spe-
that while an ontology of systems emphasizing cific of humanistic particularities is the key to
the cold scientific language of homeostasis, pre- Geertz’s counter-charter; and in this sense the nod
requisites, cybernetic control, and so on was to culture as a naturalistic phenomenon that
appropriate for the more “physical,” or “mate- emerges in evolution as an external control sys-
rial” (or biological) of the three systems (society tem (in the form of programs or models) for
and personality) given the symbolic nature of human behavior is only a sideshow (as in the
culture its “systemness” was not to be conceived much overhyped essay “The Growth of Culture
in the same physicalist terms. Instead, the cul- and the Evolution of Mind”; see e.g. Sewell
tural system was held together by meaningful 1997). For what Geertz was after was the founda-
links and its mysteries could only be cracked by tions for an analytic approach to cultural analysis
mixing a scientistic language that conceived of that justified a purely non-naturalistic understand-
the cultural system as a sort of “program” or ing of the sources of human action. The naturalis-
“code” (similar to the genetic code; Parsons tic fact that persons are born incomplete and
1972) with a humanistic language that cracked depend on cultural programming to become “fully
that code by relying on the deep interpretation of formed,” leads to an anti-naturalistic conclusion:
meaningful action. that these foundational meanings can only be
The classic text here is the early essay on the grasped via hermeneutic methods and not by
“The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the uncovering psychological needs, biological
Concept of Man” (Geertz 1973: 33–54; origi- underpinnings, or appeals to the functional pre-
nally published in 1965). Here Geertz takes on requisites of social systems (Kuper 1999).
Parsons indirectly by attacking Kluckhohn’s For Geertz, the most important thing is that
attempt to pursue a sort of Parsonian “psycho- people necessarily become entangled in and
logical anthropology” aimed at uncovering and external “web of meanings” to give pattern and
typologizing universal cultural patterns across meaning to their actions; both the social and per-
societies. Geertz’s point is simple: culture does sonality system are just the formless clay upon
not exist in dessicated cross-cultural generalities which the form giving powers of the cultural sys-
tied to the empty generalizations of psychologi- tem work to produce the phenomena available for
cal science, but in the irreducibly unique configu- analytic inspection (see Reed 2011 for an update
ration that produce the uniqueness of each on this argument). While cultural theorists tend to
cultural display in explicit symbolism. These read the Geertzian “web of meanings” aphorism
configurations (which may include the shaping of as a nod to Weber, it is important to understand
a person’s most intimate desires and worldviews) that this is actually a nod to Parsons’s “cultural-
can only be described not catalogued; it is thus in ized” Weber and that Geertz understood both the
the sum total of these time and place specific con- ontological existence of this cultural web and
figurations of cultural elements that “generality” people’s entanglement in it in a quite substantive
will be found in the anthropological project. (rather than a heuristic) sense. In this last respect,
While it is true that in theory nature of culture can if Geertz’s is supposed to have provided an early
be described as a Parsonian/Kluckhohnian “pat- preview of the “strong program” in cultural anal-
tern,” “program,” or “code,” culture does not ysis (Alexander 2008), then it is clear that con-
present itself to the analyst in this form; its con- temporary versions of this approach are a direct
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even the most exotic patterns of behavior and functionalists” (e.g. Alexander 2003) who have
action. gone farthest in reviving a neo-Parsonian notion
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Part II
Rethinking the Macro-Micro Link
The Macro and Meso Basis
of the Micro Social Order 7
Jonathan H. Turner
delineated in the scheme. Too often scholars as 7.2.1 Levels of Social Reality
diverse as Talcott Parsons and Anthony Giddens
see such schemes as explanatory, but in fact, the As is evident, the scheme is organized around
theoretical explanation is not to be found in a sys- three levels of social reality: (1) the macro realm
tem of categories but, rather, in abstract models of inter-societal systems, societies, institutional
and abstract principles explaining the dynamics domains, and stratification systems, (2) the meso
within and between the levels denoted in the realm of corporate units and what I term cate-
scheme. Conceptual schemes are only the start- goric units, and (3) the micro realm of focused
ing point, not the endpoint, of an explanation. and unfocused encounters among individuals.
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 125
As is evident in Fig. 7.1, I have added at the micro and my charge in this chapter is to explain how
level of reality behaviors as these are affected by this constraint operates.
biologically based behavioral propensities of
humans as evolved species of ape; and while I
have done a great deal of work at this level (e.g., 7.2.2 Embedding
2013a, b; 2014a, b; 2015a; b; Turner and
Maryanski 2012, 2013, 2015), I will confine This explanation is greatly facilitated by the fact
myself in this chapter to terrain that is more famil- that micro levels of reality are embedded in the
iar and comfortable for most sociologists. Thus, meso, and that meso levels of reality are embed-
the most micro-level unit of sociology for my pur- ded in the macro. Embedding generates conduits
poses will be what Erving Goffman (1961, 1983) by which the more and the less inclusive struc-
termed focused (face-to-face) and unfocused (face tures affect each other. Smaller structures and
avoidance) encounters, while the most macro their cultures will always be constrained by the
level is inter-societal system but for reasons of more inclusive structures and their culture in
space I will emphasize societies and the institu- which they are lodged. Of course, as the building
tional domains and stratifications from which blocks of larger structures, the smaller always
inter-societal systems are ultimately built. The have the potential to change the structure and
meso level, which mediates between the macro operation of those larger-scale units in which
and micro, is composed of corporate units (i.e., they are embedded—which is, of course, the bot-
groups, organizations, communities) revealing a tom-up side of my story in this chapter. The fact
division of labor to pursue variously defined goals that the social universe is built around micro
and categoric units composed of members defined structures embedded in meso structures, and
by traits or characteristics (e.g., gender, class, eth- meso structures lodged in macro structures does,
nicity, age, religious affiliation, national origins, however, greatly facilitate explanation of social
etc.). A top-down theory, then, must explain how reality from a top-down perspective. Still, as the
the dynamics of the macro realm affect the meso arrows in Fig. 7.1 indicate, there are also impor-
realm which, in turn, affects the micro realm of tant relations occurring within each level; that is,
encounters. There are, of course, reciprocal affects focused and unfocused encounters influence each
from the micro to meso to macro, but these will be other, as do corporate and categoric units, or
underemphasized because of the charge given to institutional domains and stratification systems.
me in writing this chapter. Moreover, these within-level dynamics are often
It is certainly true that this conceptualization mediated by the effects between the structures
of levels of reality is a set of analytical distinc- and their cultures at different levels of social
tions, but it is also how reality actually unfolds organization—which, of course, adds complica-
empirically. Interacting humans create, repro- tions to the explanations.
duce, and often change the basic corporate units
organizing their activities—in groups, organiza-
tions, and communities—and as they do so, they 7.2.3 Structure and Culture
may also change institutional domains, stratifica-
tion systems, societies, or even inter-societal sys- Since Marx’s distinction between substructure
tems. Similarly interacting individuals create (the “real” driving structure) and superstructure
social definitions of individual differences, codi- (the derivative structure and culture), sociologists
fying these in labels and evaluative beliefs that have had a tendency to visualize structure and
are used, in part, to form stratification systems culture as “two different things” that have to be
and, hence, societies and inter-societal systems. snapped together like Lego blocks. Indeed, soci-
Once meso and macro units are in place, how- ology seems to wax and wane between periods
ever, they always constrain what transpires at any when culture or structure is given priority. The
given level and between any two levels of reality; advent of conflict sociology in the 1960s
126 J.H. Turner
gave emphasis to structure, whereas the new this is why I insert biology and behavior at the
“strong program” in cultural sociology over the bottom of Fig. 7.1). One cannot explain all of
last two decades does the opposite (e.g., meso and macro reality by humans’ biological
Alexander and Smith 2001). In my view, it is not capacities and propensities, but understanding
useful to slice and dice structure and culture in how these drive the micro realm would, if I were
this way, and then put them back together. Any engaged in a bottom up explanation, will help
definition of social structure must include refer- explain how and why humans created the meso
ences to the symbol systems inhering in this and macro realms in the manner that they are now
structure, and vice versa. Here, the analytical constituted. Thus, evolutionary sociology must
separation of culture and structure is just that— be part of our theorizing at all levels of social
an analytical distinction that gives us a vantage reality—despite the reservations of many theo-
point for examining structure and culture. Yet, we rists and sociologists more generally.
must put them back together again when theoriz-
ing because they are mutually constitutive.
Flowing across and down the conduits of embed- 7.3 The Macro Level of Social
ded structures are symbols that, first of all, make Reality
structures possible and meaningful and that, sec-
ondly, that drive many of the dynamic properties For most of human existence, social life was
of social reality within and across levels of social lived out in smaller sociocultural formations: (a)
organization. group-level corporate units (nuclear kinships
units embedded in hunting and gathering band)
and (b) basic categoric units denoting gender and
7.2.4 Evolution of the Social age differences. The beginning of a macro realm
Universe became evident as soon as bands began to see
themselves as part of a larger “people” or popula-
The cosmos of stars evolved from something— tion living in a given territory, but these were
once thought to be a big bang, but now with some only loose cultural constructions with variable
doubts and proposed alternative scenarios. The sociocultural networks. But the potential was
social universe also evolved from something— there, and it was periodically used to create
the agency and actions of individual persons try- exchange networks and alliances among mem-
ing to adapt to environments. Thus, part of the bers of one set of bands with another set. And,
explanation of the macro universe will involve an once humans began to settle down into new types
“origins” story of how humans created the levels of corporate units, such as communities and then
of social reality outlined in Fig. 7.1, but we do organizations (in kin-based complex organiza-
not need to get too involved here. But in under- tions structured around descent rules), the meso
standing how meso and then macro reality realm expanded and could then be used to build
evolved, we will gain insight into some of the up a more macro realm. Then, around 10,000
dynamics that, like the forces of the physical uni- years ago, the scale and complexity of human
verse, bind the social universe together. I have societies began to grow at an increasing rate,
tried to tell this evolutionary story in more detail leading to the evolution of the macro realm.
(e.g., Turner 2010a), but here my point is only to
touch upon evolutionary processes as they pro-
vide useful information for developing explana- 7.3.1 Selection Pressures
tory theory. The same, by the way, would be true and the Formation of Macro
if I were starting from the micro level: I would Reality
want to know how humans evolved as a species
and how this evolution determined their capaci- Sociological theorizing has been reluctant to
ties and behavioral propensities that set into employ the notion of selection as a driving force
motion the building up of the social universe (and because of its connection to Social Darwinism
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 127
and even evolutionary theory more generally. there are certain universal fault lines along which
With a few notable exceptions (Runciman 2015; adaptive problems develop and begin to increase
Abrutyn 2013a, b; Carneiro 2015), selection is the pressure on members of a population and the
not explicitly analyzed but, nonetheless, has units organizing their activities to develop socio-
implicitly been part of much theoretical sociol- cultural formations to deal with these problem.
ogy. As I have argued, natural selection operates The fault lines are rather familiar: production (of
at both the biological and sociocultural levels of resources needed to sustain life and sociocultural
reality, but selection at the biological level is dif- formations), reproduction (of persons and struc-
ferent than that at the sociocultural level. Herbert tures organizing their activities), regulation and
Spencer ([1874–1896] 1898) had the most com- coordination (with power, interdependencies,
plete model of selection dynamics among early and culture), and distribution (through material
sociologists who have, in essence, built upon his infrastructures and eventually markets).
insights. Unfortunately, Spencer’s ideas were Unfortunately, these fault lines got converted by
converted into functional analysis that de- subsequent theorists into functional needs or req-
emphasized the selectionist argument. For uisites; and while Spencer also emphasized func-
Spencer, persons and the corporate units organiz- tions, he always remembered the selectionist
ing their activities seek to adapt and adjust to argument implicit in functionalism but ignored
their physical, biotic, and sociocultural environ- by modern-day functionalists. Sociocultural for-
ments; and as populations grow, they are forced mations represent a response to adaptive prob-
to use their capacities for agency to create new lems in production, reproduction, regulation
types of social structures and cultural systems to (coordination, control, and integration of social
do so. Figure 7.2 outlines the basic argument structures and their cultures), and distribution. If
developed by Spencer. new sociocultural formations prove adaptive,
As populations get larger, they are increas- they are retained in the morphology of a society,
ingly under pressure to differentiate new types of whereas if they do not, a population can die out,
sociocultural formations, or suffer the disintegra- disintegrate into a simpler form, or be conquered
tive consequences. Spencer also emphasized that by a more adapted population.
Fig. 7.2 Spencer’s model of selection on, and differentiation of, societies
128 J.H. Turner
For Spencer and most subsequent sociologists, tion). The properties and dynamics of societies,
institutional domains evolve in response to these therefore, are very much determined by macro-
selection pressures by forcing individual and col- level sociocultural formations—i.e., institutional
lective actors to create new types of corporate domains and stratification systems—from which
units and new configurations of relations among they are constructed, and of course, the corporate
such units that can resolve—for a time—the adap- and categoric units from which institutions and
tive problems generating selection pressures (see stratification systems are built.
Chap. 11 for more details on institutional
domains). Institutions are thus congeries of cor-
porate units responding to the pressures from 7.3.2 Properties of the Macro Realm
these universal fault lines; and as they do so, they of Reality
generate a core set of corporate units and a rela-
tively common culture. As Spencer emphasized, Before turning to dynamics of the macro realm as
the first societies were very small and simple, these affect meso and micro reality, it is neces-
meeting all selection pressures with nuclear kin- sary to outline some critical properties of the
ship units organized into bands. With population macro realm as it is formed in response to selec-
growth, however, selection pressures increased, tion pressures. By breaking reality apart for anal-
forcing populations to develop new kinds of cor- ysis, the nature of these properties and the
porate units for dealing with intensifying adaptive dynamics that inhere in them can be better under-
problems. Once this process of institutional dif- stood, as long as we remember to put them back
ferentiation was initiated, it became the template together again. Accordingly, I will begin with
for addressing subsequent adaptive problems, culture and then isolate some of the key dynam-
with the result that virtually all societies in the ics inhering in these properties of the macro
world today reveal a more complex set of differ- realm when viewed as a distinctive level of socio-
entiated institutional domains: kinship, religion, cultural formation that exerts powerful effects on
polity, economy, law, education, medicine, sci- the meso and, through the meso, the micro level
ence, arts, sport, and perhaps a few others (Turner of social reality.
1972, 1997, 2003, 2010a; Abrutyn 2009, 2013b).
These domains are built from corporate units 7.3.2.1 Cultural Properties
(groups embedded in organizations located within of the Macro Realm
communities); and societies are, in part, the sum When engaged in general theorizing, we need to
total of institutional domains organizing the activ- embrace a “weak” rather than “strong program”
ities of members of a population. when examining culture. We need to remain
As Fig. 7.1 outlines, valued resources are dis- detached from the specific empirical and histori-
tributed unequally by corporate units within cal contexts in which culture is produced and
institutional domains; and thus, stratification reproduced in order to examine the fundamental
increases along a number of fronts as institutional and universal properties of culture of the macro
domains differentiate. Thus, institutional domains realm as they constrain meso and micro-level
directly provide the structural and cultural back- social dynamics. This goes against the grain in
bone of a society and, indirectly, they create the today’s revival of cultural sociology (See Chap.
other, less-steady pillar of societies: systems of 6), but something has been lost in much recent
stratification that can, for a time, integrate a pop- theorizing that needs to be recaptured.
ulation and thus facilitate regulation but that, Surprisingly, perhaps, we need to go back to
over the long run, generate tension and conflict functional theory—for all of its obvious flaws—
that lead to social change in all societies (see dis- to see what was thrown out with the bathwater in
cussion in Chap. 2 on integration and disintegra- the rush to kill off functional analysis.
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 129
7.3.2.2 The Ordering of Cultural about how to manipulate the environment), and
Elements values (highly abstract moral codes on rights and
In Fig. 7.3, I have outlined elements of culture wrongs). All of these basic elements have large
that I believe are most important in understand- effects on how the macro world becomes orga-
ing macro to micro dynamics. I have arranged nized; and often, this societal-level organization
these hierarchically, with the arrows denoting the is influenced by connections to other societies,
influence of one level of culture on another. True, where texts, technologies, and the ideologies of
this figure looks something like Talcott Parsons’ other societies penetrate the culture of a particu-
long forgotten, or rejected, “cybernetic hierarchy lar society. Thus, complex or simple texts, high
of control,” but its only similarity to Parsons’ for- or low levels of technology, and highly charged
mulation is the recognition that like social struc- or lower-key moral codes exert pressures on
tures, cultural systems are embedded in each members of a society and the corporate units
other. organizing their activities. This influence results
The culture of any society reveals texts (oral in the development of more specific codings—ide-
and/or written), technologies (or information ologies, meta-ideologies, beliefs, and normative
Fig. 7.3 Elements of micro-level culture as they constrain meso- and micro-level culture
130 J.H. Turner
Table 7.1 Generalized symbolic media of institutional that is incorporated into, for example, the ideol-
domains ogy of capitalism emphasizing that profits and
Kinship Love/loyalty, or the use of intense accumulation of capital are right, proper, and
positive affective states to forge and mark
commitments to others and groups of
moral, thereby moralizing and justifying capital-
others ist behaviors and actions. Similarly, as power is
Economy Money, or the denotation of exchange increasingly used to consolidate control of other
value for objects, actions, and services by institutional domains in an emerging polity, it is
the metrics inhering in money not only the resource used to do so, but its mobi-
Polity Power, or the capacity to control the lization is justified by the symbolic nature of
actions of other actors
power—that a moral good that is needed to estab-
Law Imperative coordination/justice, or the
capacity to adjudicate social relations and lish control and order in a society.
render judgments about justice, fairness,
and appropriateness of actions Generalized symbolic media of exchange thus
Religion Sacredness/Piety, or the commitment to have several unique properties (Turner 2010b, c,
beliefs about forces and entities inhabiting
2014b). They are (a) the terms of discourse within
a non-observable supernatural realm and
the propensity to explain events and an evolving institutional domains; (b) they are
conditions by references to these sacred the resource that is used to justify the organiza-
forces and beings tion of corporate units to deal with selection pres-
Education Learning, or the commitment to sures; (c) they can often be the actual valued
acquiring and passing on knowledge
resource that is unequally distributed within and
Science Knowledge, or the invocation of
standards for gaining verified knowledge
institutional system and thereby one of the
about all dimensions of the social, biotic, resources that leads to the formation of a stratifi-
and physico-chemical universes cation system in a society; and (d) they are the
Medicine Health, or the concern about and moral codes that are used to form ideologies and
commitment to sustaining the normal meta-ideologies that constrain all meso and
functioning of the human body
micro level social processes.
Sport Competitiveness, or the definition of
games that produce winners and losers by In addition to these properties, generalized
virtue of the respective efforts of players symbolic media are often reified as “totemized”
Arts Aesthetics, or the commitment to make objects of worship toward which ritualized
and evaluate objects and performances by appeals are often made. For example, people do
standards of beauty and pleasure that they indeed “worship” money and power; and such as
give observers
also the case for other generalized symbolic
Note: These and other generalized symbolic media are
media such as love-loyalty in family and kinship,
employed in discourse among actors, in articulating
themes, and in developing ideologies about what should imperative coordination and justice in law, learn-
and ought to transpire in an institutional domain. They ing in education, sacredness-piety in religion,
tend to circulate within a domain, but all of the symbolic verified knowledge in science, competition in
media can circulate in other domains, although some
sport, and aesthetics in arts. As symbols of moral-
media are more likely to do so than others
ity and as valued resources, generalized symbolic
media can become totems of worship, thereby
Turner 2011). What eventually emerges is an ide- reifying them and giving them even more moral
ology specifying the moral correctness of a par- power to constrain the emergence of beliefs, nor-
ticular line of conduct by individuals and mative expectations, and expectations states in
corporate-unit organizing individuals’ activities meso- and micro-level sociocultural formations.
within an institutional domain. For example, as To some degree these properties of general-
money is increasingly used to expand economic ized symbolic media were recognized by Gorg
trade, it is not only the medium by which such Simmel ([1907] 1990) in his early analysis of
trade occurs in emerging markets, its ability to money, and by more recent theorists such as
symbolize value also makes it a moral symbol Talcott Parsons (1963a; b) and Nicklas Luhmann
132 J.H. Turner
(1982). Even more recent theorists (Turner emotions determine the structure and culture of
2010a, 2013b; Abrutyn and Turner 2011) have the stratification system (2008, 2014). The degree
extended the analysis of generalized symbolic of stratification in a society is a positive and
media because they are the basis of those cultural cumulative function of (Turner 1986): (1) the
coding systems—ideologies and meta- degree of inequality in the distribution of valued
ideologies—that constrain the formation of cul- resources, (2) the degree to which configurations
tural codes and expectations at the meso and of resource shares of persons and families con-
micro levels of social organization. And, from an verge, thereby forming a distinctive stratum
evolutionary perspective, generalized symbolic within the overall stratification system, (3) the
media evolved in response to selection pressures linearity and clarity of ranked-ordering of strata
as actors seek to cope with adaptive problems by the respective total resource shares of resource
arising from selection pressures, and to justify of their members, (4) the level of homogeneity in
and legitimate their solutions to these problems. culture and lifestyles of members of distinctive
Thus, in a sense, generalized symbolic media strata, (5) the extent to which meta-ideologies
arise at a more micro and meso level in history, valorize or stigmatize members in high and low
but once institutionalized they become external social strata, (6) the degree of correlation between
constraints on the culture of these meso- and membership in strata and other categoric-unit
micro-level social structures. memberships, and (7) the pervasiveness of
restrictions on mobility of persons and families
7.3.2.3 Structural Properties across strata.
and Dynamics of the Macro
Realm Inter-societal Structural Properties and
The macro realm consists of societies, variously Dynamics When societies are embedded in
embedded in inter-societal systems or, alterna- inter-societal systems, it is typically through par-
tively, in conflict with other societies. The nature ticular institutional domains, such as the econ-
of inter-societal relations affects the structure and omy (in trade), polity (political alliances),
culture of institutional domains within a society. religion (common religious beliefs and struc-
Societal structures are built on two basic pillars: tures), education (exchanges of students), kinship
(a) Institutional domains resolving adaptive prob- (migrations of families), or science (coordination
lems (see Chap. 11) and (b) stratification systems of searches for knowledge), and at times through
(see Chap. 12) revealing distinctive strata as a locations in stratification systems. Thus, much of
consequence of the unequal distribution of the influence of inter-societal systems filters into
resources by corporate units within institutional a society through connections among institu-
domains. tions, which, in turn, have large effects on the
Institutional domains are congeries of corpo- evolution of the stratification system in a society.
rate units integrated by structural relations with And, as corporate and categoric units are, respec-
each other and culture (see my discussion on tively, embedded in institutions and stratification
integration in Chap. 2 in this volume) that, as systems, the effects of intersocietal embedded-
noted above, have evolved to solve adaptive ness eventually filter down through meso struc-
problems facing populations. Each institutional tures to micro-level encounters.
domain distributes through its constituent corpo-
rate units its own distinctive generalized sym- It is, of course, an empirical/historical ques-
bolic media and, often, the media of other tion about such embedding in an inter-societal
domains; and because most corporate units evi- system, but the more embedded is a society in
dence hierarchical divisions of labor, this such a system, the more the nature of the embed-
distribution of resources is unequal. The unequal ding affects the institutional systems and the
distribution of generalized symbolic media and resulting stratification system of a society. If the
other valued resources like prestige and positive embedding involves domination by another soci-
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 133
ety, or its converse, the effects will work primar- tutional domains as they determine the dynamics
ily through political domains as these influence of the stratification system within a particular
unbalanced economic exchanges. If the embed- society. Thus, analysis at the micro level is some-
ding is mutual and among more or less equal what simplified by this fact. For example, if soci-
societies, then the embedding will be more eco- ety is at war, polity will centralize power and use
nomic and cultural, revolving around exchanges this power to regulate other institutional domains
of symbols and material products as well as high and, hence, corporate and categoric units at the
rates of mobility among societies. In these more meso level and, encounters at the micro level.
equal inter-societal relations meta-ideologies are The effects of war on inequality will similarly be
more likely to involve the dominant institutional mediated by constraints on corporate units within
domains of different societies. institutional domains and how these affect strati-
fication dynamics and the meta-ideologies legiti-
Societal Properties and Dynamics The dynam- mating these dynamics. Similarly, the migration
ics of societies at the macro level revolve around into a society of members of a new religion will
(a) the patterns of differentiation among institu- affect the internal dynamics of religion as an
tional domains, (b) the unequal distribution of institutional domain, the meta-ideology of reli-
valued resources, including generalized symbolic gion, and perhaps a new, differentially evaluated
media, by corporate units within domains, (c) the categoric unit based upon religious affiliation and
degree of stratification emerging from this modal location of its members in the class sys-
unequal distribution and (d) the extent to which tem. It is these effects at the level of institutional
memberships in categoric units is correlated with domains and stratification that will, as I will out-
class locations in the stratification system. The line below, have the greatest impact on micro-
ideologies and meta-ideologies are formed from level social processes.
the circulation of generalized symbolic media Additionally, inequalities always generate ten-
across domains and legitimate, with varying sions in societies, and when inequalities are asso-
degrees of success, the inequalities of the stratifi- ciated with categoric unit memberships, these
cation system. In general, these meta-ideologies tensions can become more intense. In either case,
denote the moral worth of individuals and fami- inequalities often lead to the mobilization of sub-
lies by virtue of their class locations, with those populations for conflict; and as conflict unfolds,
at upper-, middle-, and lower-class locations hav- challenges to meta-ideologies legitimating
ing high, medium, and lower moral evaluations. inequalities will increase, as will challenges to
Moreover, to the extent that class locations are discriminatory practices of corporate units in key
correlated with categoric-unit memberships, resource-distributing domains. And, conflict
evaluations of categoric units will follow their often begins at the micro level as emotions among
location in the class system, although there can individuals in encounters and corporate units are
be additional evaluations beyond the class system aroused because of discrimination against their
based upon other criteria arising from the history memberships in categoric units; and as mobiliza-
of categoric-unit members in a society. tion around grievances ensues, changes in the
structure and culture of institutional domains and
If a society is part of an inter-societal system the profile and culture of the class system occur,
or if it is in conflict with other societies, these thereby altering the dynamics at the micro level
relationships will always involve economy and of social organization. Even if a social movement
polity, and at times other domains such as or episode of conflict fails to alter discriminatory
kinship, religion, education, science, and sport. patterns that fuel resentments over inequalities,
Yet, the direct effects on individuals at the micro micro level interactions at the level of encounters
realm of social reality of these inter-societal rela- may be altered because, once challenges to the
tions will generally be highly constrained and institutional order occur, new ideologies come
mediated by the properties and dynamics of insti- into play and begin to circulate across domains;
134 J.H. Turner
and as new ideas circulate, they have effects on memberships, the meta-ideology legitimating the
the beliefs and expectations that guide interac- stratification system becomes the moral codings
tions at the micro level. All of these effects are, that are drawn upon to formulate status beliefs
however, mediated by the meso level of social about, and evaluations of, members of categoric
reality. units. Not all status beliefs are connected to the
stratification system, but those beliefs carrying
moral power to judge and evaluate members of
7.4 The Meso Realm of Social categoric units almost always invoke implicitly
Reality the moral standards of meta-ideologies.
Cultural beliefs typically flow down to corpo-
7.4.1 The Cultural Beliefs rate units from institutional domains, whereas
of Corporate and Categoric beliefs about members of categoric units—some-
Units times referred to as status beliefs in the social
psychological literature (e.g., Webster and Foschi
7.4.1.1 Beliefs in Corporate Units 1988; Berger et al. 1977; Berger and Zelditch
Within any corporate unit, a culture specific to 1993) disproportionately come from the meta-
that unit can typically be found, especially if the ideology legitimating the stratification system.
unit endures for a time and is embedded in insti- Encounters embedded in corporate and categoric
tutional systems. This corporate-unit culture is units are, and subsequently, directed by expecta-
constrained by the institution within which it is tion states that are derived from of these status
lodged and, potentially, by several institutional that are often generated “on the ground” as
domains in which it may also be partially embed- encounters are iterated over time. Beliefs from
ded—thereby invoking meta-ideologies. The corporate and categoric units, as well as the
moral codes of these ideologies and meta- expectation states that they engender, are very
ideologies provide the moral force of corporate- much influenced by the structure of the meso
unit culture, while the specific history, realm because it is along the conduits provided
technologies employed, division of labor, distri- by patterned relationships within and between
butions of authority, and goals of the organization structures that culture travels, much like trans-
provide other cultural beliefs that fill in around mission wires in older forms of wired communi-
these moral codes. In this manner beliefs remain cation. The analogy to a more wireless network is
isomorphic with what is actually occurring in the also appropriate, because at times ideologies and
corporate unit, but these beliefs are almost always the beliefs that they generate are free floating and
moralized by ideologies and meta-ideologies. are picked up in key structural “hot spots” where
density of interaction is high. Thus, to understand
7.4.1.2 Beliefs About Categoric Units how culture flows to the encounter from meso
As the literature in social psychology on status and often macro levels of social reality requires
beliefs documents, members of categoric units that we examine structure relations of corporate
(see Chap. 16) are almost always defined and and categoric unit to, on the one hand, build up
evaluated by beliefs about their relative worth as macro structures and their cultures and, on the
defined by locations in the stratification system. other, constrain the structure and culture of
These status beliefs generally get their power focused and unfocused encounters.
from the meta-ideologies legitimating the stratifi-
cation system of a society because once individu-
als are defined as distinctive and members of a 7.4.2 The Structure of Corporate
category, they are often treated differentially and and Categoric Units
thus over-represented at particular points in the
class system of a society. And once a correlation Cultural beliefs vary along a number of dimen-
exists between class location and categoric-unit sions, the most important being (a) the clarity of,
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 135
(b) the consensus over, and (c) the regulatory evaluations moving from high levels of stigma
power of these beliefs. In turn, if meso-level cul- for those in the lowest classes to less stigma, if
tural beliefs are clear, widely held, and authorita- any, for those in higher classes, unless there exists
tive, the expectations on individuals at the micro open class conflict in a society in which case the
level of social organization will also reveal these moral order of the upper classes in general is
properties. The question then becomes what under assault. Memberships in identifiable cate-
structural properties and dynamics increase clar- goric units are often correlated with class loca-
ity, consensus, and authoritative influence on tions in the stratification system, and the more
meso-level beliefs. Some of the most important that such is the case, the more status beliefs will
for a top-down theory of the micro order are be additive, if not multiplicative, with the com-
explored below. bined evaluation of class and categoric unit.
However, categoric-unit memberships often
7.4.2.1 Successive Embedding reveal an alternative scale of evaluation of moral
In general, the more embedded are micro-level worth from the ideologies of particular institu-
structures in meso structures, and meso in macro tional domains. For example, membership in a
structures, the more integrated is a society and stigmatized religion within a society can lower
the more likely are expectations at the level of the evaluations of persons and families, regardless of
encounter to be derived from the ideologies and their class position. The same can be true also of
meta-ideologies legitimating, respectively, the highly stigmatized ethnic subpopulations (for
particular institutional domains in which an various historical reasons not wholly related to
encounter is embedded (via corporate units) and class). But, if members of these categoric units
the system of stratification. At the level of corpo- are over-representative in lower social classes,
rate units, there can be additional successive then the effect of this double stigma is more mul-
embedding because groups are often embedded tiplicative than additive. And, if stigmatized
in organizations and because organizations are memberships in categoric units are correlated
located in communities and in a particular insti- with higher class locations, some of the prestige
tutional domain, such as polity, economy, kin- of these higher locations is deducted by virtue of
ship, religion, law, education, etc. And so, the other moral standards. For instance, Jews in
more there is successive embedding of (a) Europe and even in the United States are among
encounters in groups, (b) groups in organiza- the most successful of religious/ethnic subpopu-
tions, and (c) organizations in communities and lations economically but some of the prestige that
institutional domains, the more readily will the normally would be associated with upper-middle
culture of the larger units flow down to the level and upper-class locations is lost because of preju-
of the encounter and constrain the flow of inter- dicial beliefs about Jews. These intersectional
action. Moreover, because embedding imposes dynamics will be discussed in more detail in the
structural constraints on culture, this structural next section and in Chap. 2 as well.
embedding increases the likelihood that higher- Since class locations are the outcome of status
order cultural formations like ideologies and locations in resource-distributing corporate units
meta-ideologies will provide the moral underpin- (e.g., organizations), with evaluations of people
nings for lower-order cultural. In so doing, the in lower, middle, and higher locations in divi-
greater will be the clarity of, consensus over, and sions of labor of organizations generally correlat-
power of the expectations derived from beliefs ing with their class locations. However, a number
in corporate units on micro-level interpersonal of factors can distort this correlation. One is the
behavior. particular corporate units from which individuals
For categoric units, embedding is sometimes gain their resources. For example, a higher-level
less linear. Meta-ideologies legitimating the employee in an educational bureaucracy will not
stratification system establish moral evaluations earn as much income and, hence, occupy the
for members of different social classes, with such same class position as a high-level incumbent in
136 J.H. Turner
law or economy; and so under these conditions, distinguish men from women, but these will carry
there can be a complex interplay between pres- increasingly less moral evaluation. The same is
tige associated with locations in divisions of true of members of ethnic minorities as they gain
labor and class positions. The same might be true access to mobility across class lines.
of an established artist or musician and a higher- As implied above, the converse of this gener-
class lawyer or business executive. Again, I will alization is also true: The more membership in
explore the complexity of consolidation and categoric units is correlated with high, medium,
intersection of status shortly, as well as in Chap. and low positions in hierarchical divisions of
2. Yet, even with these complexities, what is labor in corporate units and with distinctive loca-
remarkable is that at the level of encounters, indi- tions in horizontal divisions of labor, the more
viduals are usually able to sort sets of expecta- salient will the evaluative content of status beliefs
tions out during the course of the encounter, or become. And, the more likely will the evaluative
even before the encounter because they have had content of status beliefs about memberships in
previous experience with reconciling class loca- categoric units affect the beliefs about status
tions with markers of prestige in the divisions of locations in divisions of labor. As status beliefs
labor in various types of organizations in diverse about categoric unit have this effect, the power of
institutional domains, since many domains offer status beliefs increases within any given corpo-
highly valued resources that do not always trans- rate unit, as well as in all situational encounters in
late into more money and higher class locations. the broader society.
Thus, while the distribution of resources
7.4.2.2 Consolidation and Intersection within corporate units in institutional domains
An important property of corporate and categoric determines the basic structure of the stratification
units that sets into motion important dynamics is system, the distribution of categoric-unit mem-
the degree of consolidation or intersection of berships across divisions of labor also has large
memberships in categoric units with locations in effects on the culture of corporate and categoric
the divisions of labor in corporate units (Blau units. When distributions consolidate member-
1977; Turner 2002). If the distribution of mem- ships in categoric units to particular types and
bers across both horizontal and vertical divisions levels of locations in corporate units, categoric-
of labor in corporate units is proportionate to unit memberships and status beliefs about loca-
their numbers in the general population, and if tions in divisions of labor consolidate and harden
this proportionate distribution occurs across a (Turner 2002); and as a result, a society becomes
wide variety of corporate units in a large number more stratified. Conversely, when high rates of
of institutional domains, then the salience of sta- intersection between memberships in categoric
tus beliefs about categoric unit members declines, units and status locations in corporate units
and beliefs about individuals are derived from exists, the salience and evaluative tenor of status
their status in the division of labor (rather than beliefs about categoric-unit memberships decline,
status beliefs about categoric-unit memberships). relative to locational status; and as a result, a
Thus, only when the distribution of members of society becomes less stratified since resources in
devalued categoric units across all social classes general are distributed more proportionately
approximates their proportion of the total popula- across members of categoric units. Class as a cat-
tion will the moral codes, derived by meta- egoric unit, however, may persist even as
ideologies that stigmatize members of a categoric resources are distributed across other categoric
unit, begin to decline. For example, as women units, but once some intersection of categoric-
have moved into positions in divisions of labor unit memberships and diverse locations in divi-
once held only by men and once they are more sions of labor occurs, social mobility in a society
proportionately distributed across class levels, is likely to increase, with class memberships
the less stigmatizing are the status beliefs directed becoming less distinct, except perhaps at the very
at them. There may still remain status beliefs that top and bottom of the stratification system.
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 137
In sum, then, (1) the number of distinctive cat- diverse categoric units does not correlate with
egoric units, (2) the degree to which they are dif- locations in the division of labor and, hence,
ferentially evaluated, and (3) the degree of their intersects with these locations, then the salience
consolidation or intersection with locations in of expectation states arising from categoric unit
corporate units will have large effects on the situ- membership will decline relative to normative
ational expectations on individuals in micro-level expectations inhering in status locations within
encounters—as I outline below. Moreover, the the division of labor of corporate units. Thus,
degree to which categoric-unit membership is under conditions of high intersection, the default
correlated or uncorrelated with social class and expectations become those of the corporate rather
with locations in the division of labor will have than categoric unit.
large effects on the level of integration in a soci- Mobility of members of stigmatized categoric
ety across micro, meso, and macro levels of real- units begins with mobility up divisions of labor
ity (see Chap. 2). in corporate units, and the more mobility there is
across a wide range of corporate units in diverse
institutional domains, the less salient will be
7.5 The Micro Level of Social expectations states attached to diffuse status
Reality characteristics for the mobile members of cate-
goric units. The converse, however, is also true:
7.5.1 The Culture of Situational lack of mobility up a hierarchical division of
Expectations in Micro-level labor in corporate unit will make even more
Encounters salient the evaluations attached to categoric-unit
memberships, particularly those who must
Virtually all encounters, both focused and unfo- endure stigmatized status beliefs in lower-level
cused, are embedded in corporate and categoric positions of the division of labor.
units. Hence, the culture of these units sets up When the corporate-unit in which focused and
normative expectations for individuals. For cor- unfocused encounters occur is ambiguous, indi-
porate units, there will always be normative viduals will initially rely upon status beliefs and
expectations tied to their location in the division expectation states tied to categoric-unit member-
of labor, while for members of categoric units, ships, but this reliance will generally be tempered
what are termed expectation states in the social by highly ritualized interpersonal diplomacy so
psychology literature (e.g., Berger and Webster as to avoid hostility and potential conflict. Thus,
2006; Berger and Zelditch 2002; Ridgeway 2001; expectations from corporate units and categoric
Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Ridgeway and units interact in complex ways, but as a general
Erickson 2000) will follow from status beliefs, rule, when embedding of an encounter in cate-
ultimately tied to the stratification system. And, goric units or locations in divisions of labor in
to the degree that categoric-unit memberships meso-level units is not clear, the status with the
correlated with high, medium, and low (in author- most clarity will generally become the default
ity, pay, prestige) locations in the division of reference point in determining initial expecta-
labor, normative expectations will always carry tions for micro-level behaviors. But these expec-
additional evaluative content—whether stigma- tations can change with more information about
tizing or valorizing—of status beliefs and expec- categoric-unit status or locational status in the
tation states for members of categoric units. In divisions of labor of corporate units.
fact, if the correlation is very high between loca- If categoric unit memberships remain salient
tions in divisions of labor and categoric-unit and are correlated with divisions of labor in cor-
memberships, normative expectations at different porate units, then divisions in the stratification
levels of a corporate unit will be heavily influ- system will persist and increase the salience of
enced by expectation states tied to categoric-unit status beliefs and expectation states. As categoric
memberships. Conversely, if membership in unit memberships increasingly intersect with
138 J.H. Turner
positions in a broad range of corporate units in an giving positions in corporate units. Evaluation of
equally diverse number of institutional domains, diffuse status becomes more problematic (due to
then the general salience of status beliefs and shifting status beliefs), with the result that people
expectation states in all interactions among mem- in encounters will generally use locational status,
bers of a population will decline, and if the loca- if relevant, as the default position and invoke
tion in a corporate unit is known, the normative expectations states for differentiated positions in
expectations attached to places in the division of the divisions of labor of corporate units rather
labor will become the dominant expectations at than expectations derived from diffuse status
the micro level. If the corporate unit locations of characteristics. If neither locational or diffuse
participants in an encounter are not known, but status are clear, then individuals will need to do
the salience of categoric-unit membership has considerable interpersonal work “on the ground”
declined in general, then individuals will need to to create or discover relevant expectation states
use tact to create new situational expectations to for guiding their conduct.
guide the flow of the interaction—often a very
stressful process but the price to be paid for a 7.5.2.2 The Nature of the Corporate
reduction in stratification at the macro level of Units
social organization. There have been just three basic types of corporate
units invented by humans: groups, organizations,
and communities. These units vary in the explicit-
7.5.2 The Structural Properties ness and formality of their respective divisions of
of Micro Reality labor, with organizations the most likely to evi-
dence explicit vertical and horizontal divisions of
The basic building blocks of social structures are labor. Thus, expectation states will be more
status along with associated roles and expecta- explicit, clear, agreed upon, and authoritative in
tions. Thus, the nature of how status is organized organizations than in either groups or communi-
at the level of the encounter has considerable ties. Such is particularly likely to be the case if an
effect on how expectations affect the actions and organization has explicit goals, and the division of
interactions of individuals. Some of these key labor is set up to meet these goals. Of course, if a
organizational properties of status are reviewed group is embedded in an organization, then the
below. expectations guiding the division of labor will be
very evident to all; but over time, groups tend to
7.5.2.1 The Nature of Status develop a more informal and relaxed set of expec-
The most important dimension of status is tations states, unless those in authority push them
whether it is tied to corporate units or categoric on subordinates, in which case subordinates may
units (diffuse status characteristics). As noted develop their own unique subculture and expecta-
earlier, when high and low moral evaluations of tion states (often dedicated to resistance against
diffuse status characteristics are correlated on a authority). In communities, if the encounter is part
consistent basis with, respectively, higher and of one of the organizations that make up a com-
lower positions in divisions of labor across munity (e.g., police, medical offices, schools,
resource-bestowing institutional domains, then churches, etc.), then the expectations inhering in
the effects of diffuse and locational status are the division of labor of the organization in which
consolidated and hence more influential. The an encounter is embedded will be operative. At
opposite is the case with intersection; increasing other times, in less focused encounters in public,
intersections of locational status with diffuse sta- expectations will be ambiguous or will have to
tus characteristics decreases the influence of sta- evolve if an encounter becomes focused, espe-
tus beliefs, especially as intersections come from cially so if the encounter is iterated over time.
upwardly mobile of previously devalued mem-
bers of categoric units into new, more resource-
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 139
7.5.2.3 Boundary Markers and Rituals individuals will monitor to determine if such
The more bounded is a corporate unit in physical proper demeanor is being practiced (Goffman
space, with explicit entrance and exit rules and 1963, 1971). If there is deviation from what is
rituals (such as entering a Catholic church or a expected, the situation will be monitored more
lecture hall), the more explicit will be expecta- carefully to determine if this deviation poses a
tion states (Luhmann 1982). And, the more con- threat to the public order. Naturally, those wish-
scious will individuals be of their respective ing to assert their status, especially where higher-
status locations which, in general, will dominate status others are not in a position to sanction
over diffuse status characteristics in establishing deviations, can often be a means for chronically
expectations states in encounters. lower status persons to gain some sense of effi-
cacy and esteem by forcing higher status people
Situational Ecology to give way or retreat. Societies with high levels
Unfocused encounters occur in an ecology that of inequality and with low-levels of monitoring
carries cultural meanings for partitions, props, of public places by forces of social control will
use spaces, and other physical properties. These often see lower-status persons and groups using
meanings will almost always carry rights and unfocused encounters as a means to gain some
privileges associated with status. For example, in increase in status, or to release hostilities against
the segregated south in the United States, higher status persons and families. And again, it
benches, drinking fountains, and partitions were should not be surprising that when larger-scale
all arrayed to mark the diffuse status characteris- uprisings over inequality begin in a society, they
tics of blacks and whites; and thus, it was not sur- often begin with violations of expectations about
prising that the mid-twentieth century civil rights unfocused encounters in public places. But, most
movement began and often challenged the tradi- of the time, individuals and groups of individuals
tional meanings of situational ecology (e.g., sit- tend to abide by the expectations of places where
ins at lunch counters and refusals to go to the encounters are to be unfocused.
back of a bus). But, more generally and less
oppressively, situational ecology often carries Whether by intent or accident, encounters in
more benign meanings. Sometimes these increase places where unfocus is normatively expected,
the salience of status but often they do just the but suddenly become focused lead stereotypical
opposite: they become places where status con- apologies or, alternatively, greeting rituals to sig-
siderations are relaxed, as is the case when highly nal a basic willingness to abide by expectations
diverse persons sit on public park benches, or use of a more focused encounter. Moreover, some
playground equipment, or gather on the edge of a situations that are normally unfocused can be
public fountain. become situationally focused among strangers in
close proximity, such as standing in line outside
an Apple store on launch day for a new product or
Nature of the Encounter Encounters are either just standing in line to enter a movie or sport
focused or unfocused, although they can flow activity. These local breaking of expectations for
between these two poles. Focused encounters unfocus are almost always highly animated in
almost always force some judgment of relative very ritualized ways as individuals, without status
status, if only to determine its relevance to the cues about locations in organizations and without
situational expectations that are in play. salience of categoric unit expectations, work to
Unfocused encounters are intended to avoid face sustain a positive emotional flow and, thereby,
engagement, but this does not mean that individ- avoid breaching the focus. Thus, most of the time
uals do not assess diffuse and locational status of when unfocus is breached by accident rather than
others as they monitor each others’ movements in by intent, individuals will work very hard to pre-
space. There will almost always be expectations vent a breach of the focused encounter in order to
as to the appropriate demeanor in space; and so,
140 J.H. Turner
avoid the conflict that also accompanies breaches Table 7.2 Transactional needs generating expectation
states
of focused encounters.
1. Verification of identities: needs to verify one or
more of the four basic identities that individuals
present in all encounters
7.6 Motivational and Emotional (a) Core-identity: the conceptions and emotions that
Dynamics in Encounters individuals have about themselves as persons that
they carry to most encounters
Encounters are episodes of interaction among (b) Social-identity: the conception that individuals
individuals, but I have yet to address fully how have of themselves by virtual of their membership
in categoric units which, depending upon the
individuals respond to the structural locations
situation, will vary in salience to self and others;
that they occupy in encounters and the expecta- when salient, individuals seek to have others verify
tions that filter down form the macro through the their social identity
meso to micro levels of social reality. Humans (c) Group-identity: the conception that individuals
are always motivated, and they react to the cul- have about their incumbency in corporate units
(groups, organizations, and communities) and/or
tural expectations that constrain them and the their identification with the members, structure, and
resources that they can derive from status loca- culture of a corporate unit; when individuals have a
tions in corporate units. And, their reactions strong sense of identification with a corporate unit,
determine how an encounter will proceed. But, they seek to have others verify this identity
more is also involved: people’s emotional reac- (d) Role-identity: the conception that individuals
have about themselves as role players, particularly
tions to what transpires at the level of the encoun- roles embedded in corporate units nested in
ter will also have large effects on the viability of institutional domains; the more a role-identity is
all those structures and their cultures that are lodged in a domain, the more likely will individuals
built from encounters—which, in essence, means need to have this identity verified by others
all of the social structures and cultures of a soci- 2. Making a profit the exchange of resources: needs
to feel that the receipt of resources by persons in
ety. The meso and macro levels of reality do, encounters exceeds their costs and investments in
indeed, constrain interaction at the micro level, securing these resources and that their shares of
but the reverse is also true: motivated and emo- resources are just compared to (a) the shares that
tional humans determine just how viable an others receive in the situation and (b) reference points
that are used to establish what is a just share
encounter is to be and, thus, how viable social
3. Efficacy: needs to feel that one is in control of the
structures at all levels of human social organiza- situation and has the individual capacity and
tion are to be. opportunity to direct ones own conduct, despite
sociocultural constraints
4. Group inclusion: needs to feel that one is a part of
7.6.1 Meeting the Expectations the ongoing flow of interaction in an encounter; and
the more focused is the encounter, the more powerful
States Generated is this need
by Transactional Needs 5. Trust: needs to feel that others’ are predictable,
sincere, respective of self, and capable of rhythmic
In Table 7.2, I posit what I see as universal trans- sustaining synchronization
actional needs that individuals seek to meet in 6. Facticity: needs to feel that, for the purposes of the
present interaction, individuals share a common
every encounter. These needs are arrayed in their
inter-subjectivity, that matters in the situation are as
order of salience in most encounters; and thus, they seem, and that the situation has an obdurate
verification of various levels of self or identity is character
the most powerful need that individuals must
meet (Burke and Stets 2009; Tajfel and Turner
1986), followed by perceptions of receiving a In general, individuals make an implicit calcula-
“profit” in exchanges of resources with others. tion of whether or not, as well as to what degree,
Experiencing a sense of efficacy, group inclu- these needs can be realized within the expecta-
sion, trust, and facticity are also important needs. tions attached to status, both locational in corpo-
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 141
rate units and diffuse status characteristics for tures, in ways that de-legitimate institutional
members of categoric units. There is both an domains and the stratification system. Thus, a
absolute need to meet these needs that generates society in which there is persistent negative
one level of expectations, which in turn, is quali- arousal in a wide variety of encounters across a
fied by implicit calculations of what is actually large number of corporate units embedded in
possible. The emerging meta-expectation states institutional domains will be potentially unstable
become the ones that will guide a person through as a result of large pools of negative emotions
an encounter. Meeting this composite set of among members of the population (Turner 2010c,
expectations for each need state leads to positive 2014a, b); if, meeting expectations imposed by
emotional arousal at relative low levels, such as micro-level culture from corporate and categoric
satisfaction, contentment, pleasure, whereas not units is difficult or imposes further degradations
meeting these needs immediately generates more on individuals, then negative emotional arousal
intense negative emotions, such as shame if self and its targeting of more remote structures will
is on the line and/or guilt if the situation was be that much more intense.
defined as highly moral (Turner 2002, 2007, In general, then, failure to meet expectations
2010b). These emotions can be repressed, but of any sort causes negative emotional arousal.
they will transmute, respectively, into such emo- The conflagration of situational expectations fil-
tions as diffuse anger and diffuse anxiety, thereby tering down via status to situational expectations
increasing the sense of negative emotional states and expectations derived from the relative
arousal. power and salience of transitional needs repre-
Even when individuals can meet expectations sents one of the key dimensions generating emo-
of the situation that have filtered down from tional arousal among humans. And so, as noted
macro to meso to micro encounters, the failure to above, failure to meet expectations will activate
meet expectations generated by transactional negative emotions, often made more complex by
needs will arouse negative emotions (Kemper the activation of defense mechanisms that will
1978b; Kemper and Collins 1990). If negative also activate attribution processes and thereby the
emotions are aroused, the most likely defense distal bias inherent in negative emotional arousal.
mechanisms to be activated is attribution as to In contrast, when expectations are realized, indi-
who or what has caused these negative feelings. viduals will experience positive emotions but,
Attribution operates under both conditions of unlike negative emotions, these reveal a proximal
repression and transmutation, or non-repression bias, as individuals make self-attributions or dis-
and cognitive awareness of the painful emotions play positive feelings to those in the local
being experienced. Furthermore, as Edward encounter. The result is that positive emotions
Lawler (2001; see Chap. 8) argued, negative have a tendency to stay local, charging of the
emotions reveal a distal bias and are pushed out positive emotional flow in interaction rituals in
beyond the encounter to local corporate unit, encounters (Collins 2004; Lawler 2001). The
members of categoric units, or even further to problem that emerges here is that if positive emo-
institutional domains and the stratification sys- tions stay local and negative emotions are pushed
tem. People tend not to make self or attributions outward toward macrostructures and their cul-
to immediate others because, to do so, breaches ture, how does a society hold together? What
the encounter and invites negative sanctions from forces break the centripetal hold of the proximate
others and hence more negative emotional bias and thereby allow positive emotions to flow
arousal. Only when others in the local situation outward and legitimate macrostructures, while
cannot fight back, as is the case with domestic generating commitments to these structures and
abusers, will individuals make local attributions their culture?
for their feelings. The cumulative result of this My answer to this question is that when expec-
process is that negative emotions tend to target tation states associated with status and, even
meso and macro structures, as well as their cul- more importantly, with meeting transactional
142 J.H. Turner
needs are (1) consistently realized (2) across a encounter. Conversely, negative sanctions have
wide variety of encounters embedded in corpo- the same effect as failures to meet expectations,
rate units in (3) a large set of diverse institutional from whatever source. Negative sanctions gener-
domains, positive emotions begin to filter out to ate negative emotions that activate defense mech-
macrostructures via the structural paths provided anisms and the external bias driven by attribution
by successive embedding of encounters in dynamics. Thus, societies in which there is a con-
groups, groups in organizations, organizations in siderable amount of punishment generating anger
communities, and organizations in resource- and shame will generally produce large pools of
giving institutional domains that, in turn, are negative emotional arousal among subpopula-
embedded in societal and even inter-societal sys- tions and, as a consequence, make a society less
tems. In particular, I would argue that meeting stable. High levels of differentiation of authority
needs for self verification, exchange payoffs, and in corporate units, large numbers of people in
efficacy dramatically increase the likelihood that stigmatized categoric units; and high levels of
the hold of the proximal bias will be broken and, resource inequality as a result of discrimination
as a result, positive emotions will begin to legiti- denying access to resource-bestowing corporate
mate institutional domains and their culture as units or to positions in these corporate units for
well as the society as a whole. People will develop large numbers of persons across a wide spectrum
commitments to the micro, meso, and macro of institutional domains will all increase the rate
structures that have rewarded them, and this even of negative sanctioning in a society. Even when
includes the meta-ideology of the stratification people have come to expect this fate, the sanc-
system that generates inequalities in a society. As tions themselves arouse negative emotions that, if
these processes of legitimation and commitment sufficiently widespread and intense, can cause
develop, the ideologies and meta-ideologies of conflict and change in a society.
macrostructures gain in power and salience. In contrast, positive emotions when experi-
Consequently, the culture of macrostructures will enced in many encounters embedded in corporate
filter down to meso-level beliefs about locational units across a wide range of institutional domains
and diffuse status characteristics and to sets of will have the same effects as meeting expectation
clear and powerful expectation states at the level states in breaking the hold of the proximal bias
of the encounter. In this way, microdynamics and leading to legitimation of, and commitment
reproduce social structures and their cultures, and to, macrostructures and their cultures. Indeed,
as they do so, they also reinforce the culture of meeting expectations can double up and often be
structures at all levels of social organization, viewed as a positive sanction, thereby increasing
thereby intensifying the power and clarity of the pressure to break out of the centripetal pull of
expectation states operating at the micro level of the proximal bias. Additionally, the consequence
social organization. will be much the same as meeting expectations,
especially expectations for self-verification and
positive exchange payoffs because sanctions
7.6.2 Receiving Positive or Negative from others are always taken “personally” and
Sanctions seen from the identities being brought to bear by
a person in an encounter. Positive sanctioning
Beyond the multiple sources of expectation will thereby increase the power of the culture in
states, the second major dimension affecting macro and meso structures and hence the expec-
emotional arousal is sanctioning. Positive sanc- tation states on individuals in micro-level encoun-
tions have the same effect as meeting expecta- ters. Once the proximal bias is broken,
tions, and the more these sanctions revolve microdynamics become more likely to reproduce
around positive sanctions for self and identities, the meso and macro structures, along with their
the greater will be the emotional arousal and the cultures, that constrain interactions in encoun-
more will positive emotions flow through an ters. Conversely, if large segments of the popula-
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 143
tion fail to meet expectations or do so only under primarily from Richard Emerson’s (1972) semi-
conditions of high rates of negative sanctioning, nal insights on exchange networks and power
then reproduction of the structure and culture of dependence relations, whereas as my work has
meso and macro structures becomes increasingly always been purely theoretical in the often dis-
problematic, with social control at the level of the credited “grand theorizing” tradition. Curiously,
encounter revolving around constraint and pun- our work has increasingly converged over the last
ishment which, in the long run, will only add fuel 15 years in our respective efforts to explain the
to the distal bias of negative emotions and de- connections among micro, meso, and macro lev-
legitimate meso and macro structures and, els of social reality. Since Lawler, Thye, and
thereby, encourage mobilization for conflict by Yoon devoted a section comparing our respective
those persistently experiencing negative theories, let me do the same from my perspective.
emotions. There is little that I disagree with in their por-
Ironically, there is a vulnerability built in soci- trayal of my approach, although there are a cou-
eties where expectations and receipt of positive ple of misunderstandings that I can resolve here.
sanctions have consistently been met over time in The similarities in our approaches, especially
the corporate units of wide variety of institutional when taking the bottom-up perspective of
domains. The vulnerability resides in raised Lawler’s, Thye’s, and Yoon’s chapter are more
expectations for meeting situational expectation important than our minor differences: Micro
states, especially those from transactional needs, interactions generate the emotions and feelings
and for raised expectations for receipt of positive that can be valenced as positive and negative;
sanctions. When these suddenly do not occur, as such emotions are the glue that binds societies
might be the case, for example in the United together or the explosive fuel that tears them
States, with dramatically increasing levels of apart; attributions for positive and negative emo-
wealth and income inequality, the middle classes tional experiences are a critical dynamic of the
may suddenly experience spikes in negative emo- social universe; these attributions are biased with
tions (Turner 2014); and while their commit- positive emotions revealing a proximal bias of
ments to existing institutional arrangements from staying in the local encounter or group whereas
past experiences may delay their mobilization for negative emotions evidence a distal bias of tar-
conflict, these individuals have resources (some geting meso and macrostructures; and the basic
money, organizational affiliations, experience in dilemma of the social order is how the distal bias
social movements organizing various causes, and for negative emotions can be overcome by break-
historically high rates of voting) to effectively ing the centripetal force of the proximal bias and
mobilize once they begin to withdraw commit- thereby allowing positive emotions to flow out-
ments to at least some aspect of the institutional ward toward meso and macro structures and their
order (Turner 2014). respective cultures.
The differences in our respective approaches
revolves around the mechanism by which the
7.7 Comparing Top-Down proximal bias is broken, although some of these
with Bottom-Up are not large differences and, in fact, are highly
Explanations complementary. As I have emphasized in this
chapter, clarity of expectations is one important
For over a decade now, my efforts to build gen- mechanism because it increases the likelihood
eral theory have been shadowed and, more that individuals will hold realistic expectations
importantly, informed by the work of Edward that they can meet and, at the same time, receive
Lawler and his colleagues (1992, 2001), particu- positive sanctions from others. Lawler, Thye and
larly S. Thye and Y. Yoon (2000, 2008, 2009, Yoon argue that emotions are always generated in
2013, 2014). Lawler’s approach has evolved from interaction, regardless of clarity of expectations
experimental psychological experiments drawing and that a sense of efficacy and shared control
144 J.H. Turner
and responsibility are probably more important units can have autonomy from other like units
in generating positive emotions than clarity of and institutional domains in which they are
expectations. Moreover, successive embedding embedded. They importance of embedding is that
of social structures—encounters in groups, it places encounters within a delimited culture,
groups in organizations, organizations in com- within specific institutional domains dealing with
munities, organizations in institutional domains, delimited range of adaptive problems in a society,
etc.—implies hierarchies of authority than can and within meso-level corporate and categoric
undermine the forces that they posit—productive units where expectations are also more delimited
exchange, efficacy, and shared control and auton- and hence clear. The more these connections
omy—to generate positive emotions. For them, involve authority in a larger, society-wide system
positive emotions arise from the nature of shared of domination, there more true is Lawler’s,
control, efficacy, and support of higher-level Thye’s, and Yoon’s portrayal: clarity at a very
meso structures within which interactions are high cost of excessive control, which only aggra-
played out. I do not disagree with their portrayal vates the distal bias (see Chap. 10 where I outline
of the effects of efficacy and shared control/ the disintegrative effects of integration based
autonomy, but I do need to qualify their portrayal upon a system on domination). And so, they are
of embedding as equivalent to hierarchies of correct in emphasizing that encounters must
authority. involve meeting the transactional needs outlined
I would agree that if there are high degrees of in Table 7.2, which all converge with the proposi-
authority imposed from macro to meso to micro, tions that Lawler et al. develop on mechanisms
this excessive control along with punitive aspects on non-separability of actions, joint responsibili-
of any authority structure will arouse negative ties, share autonomy, group-level focus.
emotions, even as local encounters produce some I am subsuming much of their analysis under
positive emotions. Thus, they are correct that the motivational need states, basic to humans.
nature of the embedding is critical in determining Encounters must verify self, at any or all of the
whether or not encounters can break the proximal four levels portrayed (including both group or
bias and allow positive emotions can migrate out, corporate-unit identities and social or categoric-
first, to meso and, then, to macro structures and unit identities); encounters must yield profitable
their cultures. High levels of inequality, consoli- exchange payoffs where profits exceed costs and
dations of parameters marking categoric units, investments, measured against cultural standards
and high levels of authoritative control all work of justice and fairness; encounters must allow
against breaking the proximal bias and, in fact, people to achieve a sense of efficacy (an ideas
increase the likelihood that the distal bias of neg- that, once again, I began to include in my
ative emotions will de-legitimate meso and macro theorizing about the time Lawler et al. began to
sociocultural formations. Moreover, the positive draw out the meso and macro implications of
emotions arising from encounters at the micro their theory); encounters must allow people to
level will often mobilize positive emotions in feel a sense of group inclusion, which perhaps I
support of ever-more negative portrayals of meso should be broadened to include their emphasis on
structures which, in turn, increases the likelihood shared control and autonomy; and encounters
of conflict in the system on domination. must generate a sense of trust or feelings that the
But embedding across multiple levels of social actions of others are predictable, that these
reality does not need to involve long chains of actions lead to interaction rituals (Collins 2004)
domination, as in a Soviet-style society. that arouse positive emotions about the encoun-
Encounters are embedded in groups, which can ter, that people are sincere and respectful of self
have varying degrees of autonomy from other and, perhaps I should add, that increase individu-
groups and the larger meso-level corporate unit als’ positive orientations to the group-level struc-
in which they are embedded. Similarly, corporate tures in which an encounter is embedded.
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 145
Thus, what Lawler, Thye, and Yoon character- the social universe, as portrayed in Fig. 7.1. This
ize as mechanisms are, for me, motive states that is the same goal as Lawler, Thye, and Yoon, but
come from individuals (Turner 2002, 2007, they are coming at the issue of commitment (for
2010b); they are, in my view, hard-wired biologi- me, one mechanisms of integration) from a micro
cally; and they are present in each and every perspective; I am coming at it as a general theo-
encounter; and if they can be realized, these need rist and, in this chapter, as a macro-level theorist.
states will lead to positive emotional arousal, Our differences are still surprisingly minor; and I
even under structural conditions of meso-level do not find any really large disagreements—
constraint. Perhaps the positive emotions aroused although they might not buy into my more psy-
under constraint may not break the proximal bias, choanalytic views of emotions (not examined
but they will make the micro level world of here)—in our theories. My emphasis on expecta-
encounters more gratifying and forestall their tions and sanctions as generic emotion-arousing
rejection of the meso and macro worlds con- mechanisms actually encompasses many of the
straining their options. concepts that they employ. I use these ideas
A final clarification along these lines is also in because they are also very well documented
order. When I argue that embedding of the micro dynamics from the experimental literature in
in meso, and the meso in the macro, provides social psychology as well as in other theories of
conduits by which positive emotions can travel emotions (e.g., Kemper 1978a), but there is prob-
outward when the proximal bias is broken, I have ably room to expand these in ways that incorpo-
a much more robust conception of how this pro- rates the mechanisms outlined by Lawler, Thye,
cess works. In complex societies, individuals and Yoon. We are almost at the same place with
engage in hundreds and indeed thousands of overlapping theories which, to me, means that we
encounters in a surprisingly short period of time are all on the right track because we started at
in a wide variety of groups, lodged inside of a such divergent places and have, it appears, arrived
wide variety of corporate units and categoric a pretty much the same place.
units, in at least 8–12 institutional domains, and
within various strata of the larger stratification
system. As I argued earlier, the key to the positive 7.8 Conclusion
emotional arousal that breaks the proximal bias is
not experiencing positive emotions in a delimited Humans are born into ongoing patterns of social
set of groups and corporate units in one or two relations in societies. Each newborn begins to
institutional domains, but experiencing positive acquire the behavioral capacities that enable
emotions (1) consistently across (2) many groups them to role take with varieties of others in orga-
(3) lodged in many organizations across (4) mul- nized contexts and within common culture. Thus,
tiple institutional domains for extended periods from a biographical standpoint, it is the person
of their life course. Under these four conditions, that must first learn how to navigate in the expec-
positive emotions—first here and then there— tations of micro, meso, and eventually macro-
break the hold of the proximal bias and begin to structures and, only later, become part of
send positive emotions to corporate units and encounters that can reproduce or change meso
then to most institutional domains and most sec- and, perhaps eventually macrostructures and
tors of the stratification system, thereby legiti- their cultures. Much depends upon the ratio of
mating macrostructures and their cultures. My positive to negative emotional arousal that indi-
theory is not about particular encounters in a par- viduals experience at the level of the encounters
ticular organization, although the dynamics that in meso units across a range of institutional
both Lawler et al. and I outline are relevant, but domains. As such, a top-down perspective from
my goal is to explain how positive emotions macro and micro encounters gives us a good look
become the force integrating the three levels of at what all humans must do. Together with the
146 J.H. Turner
ability to meet or the failure to meet expectations realm and to arouse persons to mobilize into vari-
states derived from ideologies and meta- ous types of organizations to change the structure
ideologies of institutional stratification systems, and culture of particular institutional domains
expectations generated by transactional needs, and perhaps the whole society. In short, a top-
coupled with sanctioning experiences, set into down analysis tells us only one half of the story
motion complicated emotional dynamics that about how societies remain integrated, but unlike
either reproduce and thereby reinforce the power most other sciences, sociology also has the abil-
of expectation states and the macro-level cultural ity to outline the bottom-up dynamics that allow
beliefs generating these states, or alternatively, sociology, as much or more than any other sci-
undermine the culture (i.e., ideologies, meta- ence, to have theories explaining the relations
ideologies, status beliefs, and corporate unit among all levels of the social universe. Lawler’s,
beliefs) of meso and macrostructures. As with- Thye’s, and Yoon’s theory demonstrates how far
drawal of legitimacy proceeds, the expectations sociology has come and, I hope, so does mine.
at the level of micro-level encounters become Sociology is close to doing what no other science
less coherent, consensual, and powerful—thereby has done: explain all levels of its operative uni-
disrupting encounters even more and causing verse theoretically.
negative emotional arousal.
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The Problem of Social Order
in Nested Group Structures 8
Edward J. Lawler, Shane R. Thye,
and Jeongkoo Yoon
8.1 Introduction people form to local groups and the larger ones
that often encompass them.
People tend to form commitments to multiple Multiple group commitments pose issues of
social objects, including activities (volunteer choice, priority, and identity for individuals and
work), specific behaviors (exercise), other people the groups, organizations, or communities of
(family and friends), careers (professions), neigh- which they are members. In this paper we theo-
borhoods or communities, organizations, and to rize “nested group commitments” which can be
nations in which they are citizens. Commitments construed as a particular form or manifestation of
organize action and interaction and make it pos- the multiple commitment phenomenon (Lawler
sible for people to individually or collectively 1992; Lawler et al. 2009). Nested commitments
produce outcomes of value to them and to their can occur in contexts where people interact with
groups, communities, or organizations. The others in a local or immediate group (i.e., a proxi-
social world of the twenty-first century, however, mal group) that is nested within a larger more
is often characterized as a fragmented world in removed group, organization, or community (i.e.,
which people and organizations have multiple, a distal group). A decentralized or loosely-
often conflicting, commitments, and also a world coupled organizational structure exemplifies a
in which commitments to groups and organiza- context where nested commitments can be prob-
tions are in decline (see Putnam 2000). The focus lematic (Orton and Weick 1990). Nested commit-
of this paper is the multiple commitments that ments accentuate problems of coordination in a
complex differentiated organization and make
social dilemmas even more difficult to resolve.
For example, the problem of nested commit-
Authorship is alphabetical. This paper is based on a pro-
gram of research that was supported by five grants from ments tends to be integral to the daily experience
the National Science Foundation. of central administrators in universities, political
E.J. Lawler (*) leaders in federalist political structures, and man-
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA agers in loosely-coupled organizations. If mem-
e-mail: [email protected] bers form stronger commitments to a local unit or
S.R. Thye proximal group (e.g., an academic department)
University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, USA than to the larger unit or distal group (e.g., the
e-mail: [email protected] university), this makes it harder for the larger unit
J. Yoon to mobilize collective efforts on behalf of its
Ewha Womans University, Seoul, South Korea overarching goals or to sustain them over time. In
e-mail: [email protected]
this paper we theorize the conditions under which larger groups at the scale of concern to Hobbes
people develop stronger or weaker commitments and his contemporaries; (ii) the idea that person-
to the local immediate group versus the larger to-group ties are more stable and resilient if they
group within which it is nested and, relatedly are affective (emotional) rather than purely trans-
when these multiple, nested commitments are actional in form as Hobbes and others presume
mutually reinforcing or in tension. (e.g., Hechter 1987; Coleman 1990); and (iii) the
Our theorizing is cast in highly abstract, fun- idea that transactional ties, under some condi-
damental terms such that it might be applied to a tions, evolve into affective ties (e.g., Lawler et al.
wide variety of specific contexts. It bears on 2014). The locus or scope of the group unit is
questions such as: How and when faculty mem- important as is the form of the prevailing person-
bers develop stronger commitments to their uni- to-group tie. Overall, these ideas complicate but
versity than their department? When employees also deepen the analysis of the generic problems
develop stronger commitments to a larger corpo- of social order posed by Hobbes and contempo-
ration than to their local organizational subunit? rary rational choice (Hechter 1987; Coleman
When citizens have stronger commitments to 1990) and social dilemma theorists (Fehr and
their ethnic communities than to their larger Gintis 2007). Our purpose is to take up this theo-
nation-state? Our aim is to identify common retical task, building upon a longstanding pro-
underlying conditions and processes that operate gram of theory and research that has produced a
across very different organizational contexts substantial evidentiary basis for these ideas (e.g.,
where a local group is nested within a larger, Lawler et al. 2014; Thye et al. 2014 for recent
more encompassing group. The proximal group reviews).
is the locus of core activities (i.e., interaction, The central theme in this program of research
performance, production) whereas the distal is that emotions and emotional ties to groups are
group is the locus of higher level governing activ- the foundation for stable, resilient social orders.
ities (i.e., strategy, management, administration). Groups that are a context for repeated experi-
A broad orienting premise for us is that ences of positive emotions are likely to be the
“nested commitments” are an important, yet strongest and most affective objects of commit-
unrecognized, dimension of the Hobbesian prob- ment. We posit that commitments emerge and are
lem of social order. In the Hobbesian framework sustained through a “bottom up” process in which
the problem is primarily about individual-level people who are engaged in task interactions
orientations and behavioral propensities (cut- experience positive emotions and feelings. These
throat competition, mutual avarice, and hostility), individual feelings, in turn, shape the form and
and the capacities of central organizational gov- strength of person-to-group ties or commitments
ernance systems to control these behaviors. (see also Turner 2007, 2014). We argue that peo-
People ostensibly are prepared to cede control to ple in interaction tend to attribute positive (indi-
central authority in exchange for the normative vidual) emotions to their local immediate group
regulation and security this authority provides. A and negative emotions to the larger, more
person-to-group transaction or exchange, there- removed or distal group (Lawler 1992; Lawler
fore, is the prospective solution to the problem of et al. 2009); this is a fundamental reason that
social order. Much of the contemporary work on larger groups confront problems of fragmenta-
rational-choice and social dilemma solutions to tion and balkanization. Despite this tendency it
problems of coordination and cooperation echoes makes sense that if the larger more removed
the Hobbesian solution. group is the primary facilitator of the positive
We move beyond this Hobbesian framing by emotions, then the larger group unit rather than
introducing three new ideas: (i) the idea that peo- the local group could conceivably become a
ple may form stronger and more resilient ties to stronger object of commitment. The distal group
smaller more immediate groups instead of to or organization might counteract balkanization
8 The Problem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 151
tendencies in this way. We theorize some of the cal truism that any social order is tenuous and
basic contingencies or conditions under which fragile. What is socially constructed can be
nested-group commitments undermine or socially unraveled or reconstructed in a new
enhance social order at the smaller or larger form. In fact, history is replete with instances of
levels. established orders, seemingly inviolate and per-
manent, self-destructing unexpectedly and then
being reconstructed or reconstituted in a different
8.2 Theoretical Orientation institutional form. The abrupt and unexpected
demise of communism in Eastern Europe is a
This section presents orienting ideas and elabo- recent historical example.
rates the backdrop for this paper, starting with the Yet, while social orders are inherently fragile,
concept of social order. they are not equally so. It is reasonable to suspect
that some social orders have more potential than
others to decline, self-destruct, or otherwise
8.2.1 Concept of Social Order change radically in a short period of time. One
might conceive of many historical and institu-
Social orders are defined here in simple terms as tional reasons why order in some groups are
repetitive, regular, or predictable patterns of highly resilient while others are incredibly frag-
behavior and interaction in groups, organiza- ile. We propose that the form of social tie between
tions, communities, and the like (e.g., see Berger people (members) and their group units (organi-
and Luckmann 1966; Collins 1981; Wrong zation, community, or nation) is a key differenti-
1995). Repetitive interactions in local settings ating property of more resilient versus more
congeal into regularities but also reflect the fragile groups or organizations. Group ties are
impact of existing macro-level organizations and more fragile if based solely on instrumental (indi-
institutions. Repeated social interactions consti- vidual) benefits to members, which is the primary
tute the micro-foundation of macro social orders focus of Hobbes and social dilemma theorists.
in the sense that order cannot exist or be sustained With such ties, members commit to a group only
without affirmation by individuals and their con- as long as that flow of individual benefits con-
comitant social interaction processes. Macro tinue to outweigh those of alternatives.
structures and cultures likely frame social inter- Continuation of benefit flow is never certain
actions at the micro level but those interactions because it requires group level resources that
represent independent, “agent like” forces that may wax and wane, and groups of whatever scale
undergird the framing force of macro-level orga- exercise only limited control over their environ-
nizational and institutional patterns. We argue ments. Thus, instrumentally-based person-to-
that emotions drive this force (see also Turner group ties are likely to be brittle in the face of
2007, 2014). limited or varying resources. A second form of
This simple, micro-based concept of social group tie is affective or emotional. An affective
order is founded on the notion that a semblance tie is a “gut level” positive feeling about the
of social order is necessary for people to navigate group or organization. The tie entails additional,
their social worlds, deal with uncertainties in larger meaning to people beyond the instrumental
their lives, and produce collective goods, ser- benefits they receive as members. The group
vices, or other benefits to individuals. Yet, social affiliation itself is meaningful, intrinsically plea-
orders can take many different forms, unexpect- surable, and often self-enhancing. Such affective-
edly change, and often are contested implicitly if emotional group ties are non-instrumental in the
not explicitly (Rawls 2010). People impose order sense that the group is an end in itself, not just a
and act to affirm and reproduce it in order to means to an end as is the case with an instrumen-
make their lives predictable but it is a sociologi- tal tie.
152 E.J. Lawler et al.
8.2.2 Emotions and Social Order ences to local (proximal) groups and negative
emotions and experiences to the larger more
The overall implication is clear: Groups that gen- encompassing (distal) groups. The main hypoth-
erate and sustain the commitment of members esis is that people develop stronger affective ties
(employees, citizens) through instrumental incen- to those groups that provide them a greater sense
tives are more fragile and less stable than groups of efficacy and control, and this is most com-
that generate and sustain the commitment of monly the local group. Relational cohesion the-
members through affective ties. Affective ties ory (Lawler and Yoon 1996; Lawler et al. 2000)
lead members to stay and support the group even specifies an endogenous emotional process
if benefits decline significantly because the through which repeated (instrumental) exchanges
intrinsic feelings about membership have com- produce affective commitments to a relational or
pensatory effects. The contrast of instrumental group unit. The implication is that the proximal
and affective ties is probably as old as the disci- bias is grounded in the emotional byproducts of
pline of sociology itself (e.g., see Weber 1968; repeated interactions among actors in the local
Parsons 1947), and it is central to research on unit. The Affect Theory of Social Exchange
organizational commitments in business organi- (Lawler, 2001; Lawler et al. 2008) keys on the
zations (see Mathieu and Zajac 1990). However, nature of the task or task structure in social
the interrelationships of instrumental and affec- exchange contexts. It indicates that the more joint
tive commitments, as well as the social- a social exchange task, the more likely it is to fos-
interaction foundations of these, have not ter a sense of shared responsibility among those
received much attention (see Johnson et al. 2009). accomplishing it; a sense of shared responsibility,
Over the past two decades we have developed in turn, promotes social unit attributions of indi-
four complementary theories about the bases, vidual feelings from the task interaction.
interrelationships, and consequences of such Affective group commitments, therefore, are
commitments. The common focus is on how and strongest to groups in which tasks are accom-
when instrumental ties become affective or plished jointly with others. Social Commitments
expressive over time in the context of repeated Theory (Lawler et al. 2009) generalizes the above
interactions around joint tasks. The four theories three theories into a broader explanation regard-
are: nested-group theory (Lawler 1992); rela- ing the role of affective group commitments in
tional cohesion theory (Lawler and Yoon 1993, the problem of social order. The proximal bias is
1996, 1998; Thye et al. 2002); an affect theory of weaker here because jointness and a sense of
social exchange (Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. shared responsibility can be generated not only in
2008); and the theory of social commitments the local, immediate unit, but also the larger more
(Lawler et al. 2009; Thye et al. 2015). The com- distal unit. The locus of shared responsibility is
mon focus of these theories is to understand how contingent on how jointly the task is structured,
emotional aspects of micro-level interactions can how collectively it is framed, and whether that
generate non-instrumental, affectively-imbued framing is by leaders (managers) of the proximal
ties to a group, whether it is a small, local one or or distal group.
a broader more encompassing one. Here, we
selectively draw upon elements of these theories
to build a deeper more comprehensive under- 8.2.3 Research Evidence
standing of the nested-group problem.
Each of the four theories has a distinct empha- There is substantial empirical evidence on key
sis. Nested-group theory (Lawler 1992) first pro- principles of the four theories. Most of the evi-
posed the proximal-group bias in attributions of dence is from laboratory experiments in which
emotions (positive and negative), indicating that subjects repeatedly engage in an exchange task
people attribute positive emotions and experi- with the same others over time (see Lawler and
8 The Problem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 153
Yoon 1996; Lawler et al. 2008). In this context, clearly indicates that positive emotions medi-
we measure the frequency of exchange, ate the impact of repetitive exchange on rela-
self-reported emotions (pleasure-satisfaction and tional or group ties.
interest/excitement), as well as perceptions of 3. Relational ties with such an emotional foun-
cohesion and behavioral commitments (see dation tend to fragment networks of exchange
Lawler and Yoon 1996 for the experimental con- around “pockets of cohesion,” based on fre-
text and measures). Only one study set out to quent exchanges and resulting positive emo-
directly test the nested-group formulation tions; ties are to the local proximal exchange
(Mueller and Lawler 1999), but several bits of relation not the larger more distal network
evidence from experimental research on the other (Lawler and Yoon 1998). Yet, if networks are
theories can be interpreted in terms of the nested- high in density and consist primarily of equal
group commitment problem. This cumulative power relations, this breakdown around pock-
empirical foundation sets the stage for our theo- ets of cohesion does not occur. Under these
retical analysis of the nested-group problem to conditions, networks are transformed into per-
follow. Four relevant points that can be extracted ceived group entities and thus there are group
from the research. ties to both the relational and more encom-
passing network unit (Thye et al. 2011).
1. The most direct evidence for the nested group 4. When two or more people undertake joint
theory comes from a survey study of work tasks, they tend to perceive a shared responsi-
attitudes in a decentralized (school system) bility and, when this occurs, positive feelings
and centralized (military) organization, both from the task interaction are attributed to the
with nested subunits: schools (proximal) in a group in which the task is accomplished. The
school district (distal), and a medical center result of social unit attributions of individual
(proximal) in the air force (distal) (Mueller emotion is affective ties to the group unit
and Lawler 1999). The study indicates that (Lawler et al. 2008, 2009; Thye et al. 2015).
commitments to the local unit were stronger Tasks that generate greater sense of shared
in the decentralized than in the centralized responsibility lead to stronger affective group
organization. The locus of control and auton- ties. This research, however, dealt only with a
omy over work conditions was associated single immediate group (the local or proximal
with the locus of organizational commitments. unit). One might hypothesize that if a sense of
Work conditions controlled locally affect shared responsibility is produced at a distal
commitments to that local organizational unit, group level, as well as the proximal level, the
whereas those controlled by the larger unit result should be a positive relationship
shape commitments to that larger unit. between commitments to the local and larger
Importantly, the locus of commitment corre- unit. An important question is when or under
sponds with the locus of control (Mueller and what conditions are commitments at the local
Lawler 1999). level in competition with those at the larger
2. Turning to our experimental research on level (i.e., a zero sum relation) or positively
dyads, networks, and small groups, when peo- related (i.e., mutually supportive)?
ple repeatedly exchange things of value, they
experience positive emotions and these feel- As a whole, these theories suggest that in ana-
ings, in turn, generate commitment behaviors lyzing nested-group contexts, three conditions
such as the propensity to (i) stay in the rela- warrant careful attention: (i) autonomy and con-
tion, (ii) give unilateral benefits or gifts to oth- trol at the local and larger group level; (ii) the
ers in the group, and (iii) cooperate with frequency or density of interactions within and
members in a social dilemma (Lawler and outside the local unit; (iii) the jointness of the
Yoon 1996; Lawler et al. 2000). Evidence task structure and locus of shared responsibility.
154 E.J. Lawler et al.
affective commitments to the local group and administrators. Those more distant structural lev-
greater willingness to sacrifice on behalf of it. els, offices, or individuals often are perceived as
Conversely, if members of the local group are clueless, unaware, or mindless when it comes to
low in choice, autonomy, and control, negative what is necessary for the core work of the organi-
feelings ensue and these, in turn, are more likely zation which is accomplished at the local group
to be attributed to the distal than the proximal level (for an interesting explanation for why this
group. In this manner, structures and perceptions occurs see Dunning 2015).
of control are the key condition determining Turner (2007) pushes the logic of this argu-
whether positive or negative emotions occur and ment in several interesting ways. He elaborates
also whether these are attributed to proximal or the nested group problem by explicitly theorizing
distal groups (See Lawler 1992; Lawler et al. that proximal and distal biases protect the local
2009; Thye and Yoon 2015). groups which people are dependent on and regu-
The theory posits a strong tendency for people larly interact within (i) by “internalizing” posi-
to attribute positive events, experiences, and tive emotions within the local group and thereby
emotions to their most local, immediate groups. building cohesion and solidarity and (ii) by
The rationale is that this is where people interact “externalizing” negative emotions and blaming
and define the situation, and these definitions larger units or groups. He implies that the micro
tend to favor the local, proximal group. In con- social orders are stronger to the degree that posi-
trast, people tend to attribute negative events, tive emotions are internalized and negative emo-
experiences, and feelings to a removed, overarch- tions externalized, but these processes
ing, or distal group (e.g., university, corporation, simultaneously tend to weaken order at higher
community), and these perceptions also emerge meso or macro levels. Turner (2007) proposes an
from interactions in the local group. Attributions important qualification of the proximal bias for
of negative emotion to the larger group may be a positive emotions. Positive emotions can “exter-
source of cohesion and solidarity in the local nalize” and essentially spread to larger (distal)
group. Overall, the proximal bias for positive group units if people are involved in multiple
emotions and distal bias for negative emotions social interactions (encounters) in multiple
captures the fundamental problem of order in groups within that larger, distal group unit. This
nested group structures. means that the proximal bias is likely to be stron-
Lawler (1992) and Turner (2007) offer differ- ger if members interact primarily in only one
ent but complementary explanations for the prox- local (proximal) group and the boundaries among
imal/distal biases in positive/negative emotion local groups in the larger organization are not
attributions. It is instructive to consider these crossed or bridged regularly. A more fluid or per-
closely. Lawler (1992) reasons that proximal meable local group structure, therefore, is impor-
groups are the locus of interactions with others, tant to mitigate excessively strong commitments
and perceptions of control are likely to be devel- to local groups and facilitate the spread of posi-
oped or socially constructed in these proximal tive emotions from repeated micro level encoun-
contexts or situations. Local groups essentially ters in multiple groups to meso- or macro-level
have an “interaction advantage” in shaping social groups (see Turner 2007). Commitments to prox-
definitions of control in the situation (See Collins imal and distal groups may not be inversely
1981 for a similar idea); and they are likely to related if emotions spread upward in this sort of
take responsibility for positive indications of way.
control and resulting feelings, while blaming
larger, more distant groups for constraints or lim-
its on control. These interpretations and attribu- 8.3.2 Interaction Frequency
tions are often revealed in negative or pejorative
comments and attitudes by employees toward Both Lawler (1992) and Turner (2007) aim to
“higher ups,” corporate headquarters, and central ground macro phenomena in micro-level encoun-
156 E.J. Lawler et al.
ters or interactions (see also Collins 1981). and Yoon 1996, 1998; Lawler et al. 2000; Thye
Emotions that can forge affective ties to larger et al. 2011, 2014). First, it elaborates why local
social units emerge here. Thus, it is important to units become available and salient targets for
consider how this happens – that is, what are the individual emotions and feelings, specifically,
mechanisms that generate emotions in the first because positive emotions generated by repeated
place and then lead people to interpret them in interactions make the local unit salient. To the
collective, group-based terms. This boils down to degree that interactions of members in an organi-
a question of “social emergence.” The theory of zation are organized in and around local group
relational cohesion (Lawler and Yoon 1993, units, stronger ties may develop to those local
1996) takes up this question for social exchange groups than to the overarching larger group
contexts. through the emotion-to-cohesion process.
Social exchanges occur because people can Horizontal differentiation in an organization may
receive something they value by giving some- generate such effects. Second, relational cohe-
thing in return (Homans 1961; Emerson 1972). sion theory examines exchange in dyads or triads
By definition, social exchange is purely instru- without making any predictions for higher level
mental as are the relations that emerge from units. A study by Thye et al. (2011), however,
repeated exchanges by the same persons. Lawler demonstrates micro-to-macro effects in the fol-
and Yoon (1996), however, develop and test a lowing form: relational cohesion in dyads (micro
theory that indicates otherwise; repeated level) within a network has positive effects on
exchanges even if instrumentally-driven have perceptions of connectedness and group-ness at
unintended social byproducts. The byproducts the network level. At the network level people
might entail a reduction of uncertainty from perceive a connection even to those that they do
exchanging with the same others or the emer- not exchange or interact with. In effect this
gence of trust (Kollock 1994; Cook et al. 2005). “spread” is not unlike that theorized by Turner
Lawler and Yoon (1996) propose that mild posi- (2007), but occurs for different theoretical rea-
tive, everyday emotions (e.g., uplift, pleasure, sons. In this case the effects are stronger in net-
satisfaction, and excitement) are a distinct class works that promote equal power relations and
of byproduct with a distinct effect on exchange those with greater network density. The overall
relations. These emotions create affective ties to point is that relational cohesion research points to
the relation itself. an interaction-to-emotion-to-cohesion mecha-
An exchange relation is defined as a pattern of nism for nested group commitments and suggests
repeated exchange by the same actors over time some conditions under which there are positive
(Emerson 1972). The theory of relational cohe- rather than negative effects on ties to larger, more
sion indicates that repeated exchanges build encompassing social units. The salience of the
expressive, non-instrumental relations that peo- relevant unit – dyad or network – is central to
ple are motivated to sustain and nurture. This these emotion-infused processes.
occurs through an emotional process: repeated Turner’s (2007) theory also suggests that posi-
exchanges generate positive emotions and these tive emotions constitute the fundamental link
emotions in turn produce relational cohesion, between repeated interactions (termed encoun-
defined as perceptions of the relation as a unify- ters) and integrative ties to larger social units. He
ing social object in the situation. Through the argues more specifically that social encounters
cohesion effects of positive emotion, the relation produce positive emotions if they fulfill or con-
takes on a “life of its own,” becoming salient as firm expectations of the actors. Fulfillment of
an object for actors; and emotions from exchange expectations leads to expressions of gratitude and
are associated with that object. positive sanctions back and forth among those in
Relational cohesion theory and research does the encounter; and positive affect tends to build
not address the nested-group problem directly, across encounters. Thus, confirmation of expec-
but it does contribute in a couple of ways (Lawler tations plays the same role as exchange frequency
8 The Problem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 157
does in relational cohesion theory. Turner (2007) behaviors, and the same task may be socially
uses the “clarity of expectations” to explain how defined in terms of individual behaviors and
and when emotions at the micro level spread to responsibilities or in terms of collective or joint
larger, more encompassing units. behaviors and responsibilities. Collective out-
comes, for example, may stem from the mere
aggregation of individual behaviors (e.g., sales
8.3.3 Tasks and Shared totals in an office or retail department) or from a
Responsibility combined set of behaviors that generate a distinc-
tive joint product (e.g., a team of authors who
The Affect Theory of Social Exchange (Lawler collaboratively produce a book). This individual-
2001; Lawler et al. 2008) focuses in on the struc- collective responsibility dimension of tasks is
ture of social exchange “tasks,” arguing distinct fundamental to social commitments theory.
structures have differential effects on group ties Social commitments theory posits that social
(cohesion, commitment, and solidarity). Social interactions in nested group contexts entail tasks
Commitments Theory (Lawler et al. 2009, 2014) likely to vary along an individual-collective
generalizes and applies principles of the affect responsibility dimension, i.e., how joint or indi-
theory to how social interactions bear on prob- vidual is the task activity (Lawler et al. 2009).
lems of social order. Here we highlight the Tasks, objectively structured or subjectively
broader formulations and the new social mecha- defined as joint efforts, are a stimulus for social
nism offered by social commitments theory. The unit attributions of emotion. If people undertake
orienting assumption is that social interactions a task collectively or jointly with others and that
inherently entail one or more tasks, implicitly or task activity generates positive feelings, they are
explicitly; but, tasks as such receive very little likely to attribute those emotions in part to the
attention in sociological analyses of structure and relevant group unit. Consider a simple example.
interaction. Social interactions are organized Having a nice meal at a restaurant is likely to fos-
around tasks and, therefore, these can help to ter positive feelings regardless of whether a per-
understand the interrelationships of social struc- son has dinner alone or with a group of friends.
ture and social interaction. Many others (e.g., However, having dinner with a group of friends
Homans 1950; Collins 1981, 2004; Wrong 1995; may lead them to attribute positive feelings from
Berger and Luckmann 1966) have theorized how the meal in part to the friendship group itself,
micro level social interactions bear on macro especially if they repeatedly go to dinner together.
phenomena, but none have seriously considered The result is a stronger and more affective tie to
the role of the interaction task itself. the friendship group. This is the central proposi-
A task is defined as a set of behaviors that tion of the theory. Importantly, it is general
enact methods and procedures (means) for pro- enough to apply to work groups or teams in a
ducing a desired result (goal, outcome). The work organization, local chapters of an environ-
methods, procedures, and goals have exogenous mental group, departments in a university, or
(objective) and endogenous (subjective) compo- regional offices in a corporation.
nents; together they focus the attention and The individual-collective dimension of a task
behavior of participants. On an objective level, bears on the degree that group members perceive
tasks are a component of social structures; they a shared responsibility, not only for whether it is
frame and shape how and why people interact in successfully accomplished, but also for the pro-
pursuit of instrumental ends in a concrete situa- cedures (means) or processes for undertaking it.
tion; on a subjective level, elements of a task are The sense of shared responsibility tends to
cognitively definable or interpretable in varied emerge from the process of interacting around
ways and these definitions are socially con- the task. Repeated interactions that promote a
structed (see Lawler et al. 2014). Tasks may be sense of shared responsibility foster social unit
structured in terms of individual or collective attributions of positive emotions from the task
158 E.J. Lawler et al.
activity which, in turn, increase the affective gion effects are limited to contexts of “bodily co-
commitment to the group. The sense of shared presence” or face-to-face interaction, but
responsibility therefore is a contingency (moder- emotional inferences can have similar effects in
ator) for social unit attributions, whereas social the absence of bodily co-presence (see Lawler
unit attributions are how (mediator) joint tasks et al. 2013).
engender the formation or strengthening of affec- The nested group problem is touched on in
tive commitments to the group. Logically the the affect theory of social exchange but social
argument specifies a moderator (perceptions of commitments theory develops it further than
shared responsibility) for a mediator (social unit Lawler (1992). The main points implied by
attributions) of the task-to-commitment process. social commitments theory are as follows. First,
Repeated social interactions are central to this the strength of affective ties to proximal and dis-
process, but individual emotions may be felt but tal group depends on the locus of shared respon-
not expressed in ways visible to others. There are sibility, not the locus of autonomy and control.
at least two ways people in interaction influence This shifts the basis of a proximal bias. If joint
and magnify each other’s felt emotion. The first tasks are enacted and accomplished in local
way is through emotional contagion, that is, the groups, ties to those local units should be stron-
mere tendency of people to read subtle behav- ger than those to the larger, more distal unit,
ioral cues, synchronize their behaviors, and in the even if the locus of control is the distal unit.
process feel what others are feeling at the moment Second, while tasks are enacted locally, they
(see Hatfield et al. 1993). Emotions readily may be designed and framed by either proximal
spread across individuals in face to face settings or distal groups. If designed and framed locally,
or where there is “bodily co-presence,” and this is then the locus of control and locus of responsi-
one reason work teams often have collective bility converge at the proximal group level, and
affective or emotional tones (Bartel and Saavedra ties to the local group should be strongest here.
2000; Barsade 2002). Social commitments the- If tasks are designed and framed by the distal
ory indicates that the sense of shared responsibil- group, the local group could generate a strong a
ity and emotional contagion are reciprocally sense of shared responsibility even with little
related, each accentuating the other and in the sense of control or autonomy. Third, the larger,
process generating cycles of positive feeling (See more encompassing and removed group is likely
Lawler et al. 2009). The second mode of mutual to have greater capacity to shape perceptions of
influence stems from the possibility that those responsibility in non-zero sum, collective terms
experiencing a given emotion infer that others than to shape perceptions of control in such
like them in the same situation are experiencing terms. Control and autonomy have an underlying
the same feelings, i.e., inferences of common zero-sum structural basis that is not inherently
emotions. Joint tasks make salient the common present for shared responsibility. The organiza-
focus and activity of those interacting and thus tional design of roles and tasks, as well as com-
are likely to enhance inferences of common emo- munications from leaders have the capacity to
tions. An important implication is that even in extend a sense of shared responsibility or “we
purely virtual interactions without bodily co- are all in this together” perceptions beyond the
presence, people mutually infer others are experi- proximal group by embedding joint tasks at the
encing the same feelings and this boosts local level into broader or larger organizational
perceptions of shared responsibility and the like- tasks and responsibilities. For such reasons, joint
lihood of social unit attributions (Lawler et al. tasks and a sense of shared responsibility may
2014). In sum, either emotional contagion or prevail in the context of highly variable levels of
emotional inferences are sufficient to strengthen local control and autonomy.
the impact of joint tasks, perceptions of shared Thus, in theorizing conditions for proximal or
responsibility, and social unit attributions on distal group ties, nested group theory (Lawler
affective group commitments. Emotional conta- 1992) and social commitments theory (Lawler
8 The Problem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 159
et al. 2009) key on different structures and pro- 8.3.4 Interconnections of Proximal
cesses. Nested group theory asks: Where is the and Distal Groups
locus of control and autonomy? With stronger
local control and autonomy, proximal groups will What structural properties are likely to promote
become the prime objects of commitment, and or weaken the proximal bias for affective com-
the larger distal groups face serious obstacles to mitment? We consider two that have been ana-
collective mobilization around larger group lyzed elsewhere: social embeddedness (Turner
goals. It is not clear how these obstacles can be 2007) and the degree that the distal group sup-
overcome except through potentially costly ports the local group (Thye and Yoon forthcom-
instrumental means (e.g., selective incentives) ing). Each is discussed in turn below.
that build instrumental rather than affective com- For Jon Turner “social-embeddedness” is a
mitments to the distal group. In contrast, social fundamental structural condition under which
commitments theory asks: Where is the locus of positive emotions in micro (proximal) encounters
a sense of shared responsibility? Joint tasks and spread outward and upward to larger group units
perceptions of shared responsibility may exist (meso and macro); and, conversely, macro/meso
simultaneously in both proximal and distal forces penetrate and permeate the local through
groups. To the degree that organizational struc- ideologies and norms, and other shared cultural
tures or leaders define tasks as joint and promote elements. When positive emotions spread, the
a sense of shared responsibility at the larger, dis- proximal bias is weakened or eliminated. The
tal group level, this should mitigate the nested tighter the structural connections between proxi-
group problem and make the distal unit a stronger mal groups and distal – meso or macro – group
object of affective commitment. An understand- units, the more likely are micro-based emotions
ing how and when proximal and distal commit- to have such meso- or macro-level effects. Tighter
ments complement and mutually support one connections, however, also imply tighter control
another is an important but neglected issue in from the distal unit and thus less autonomy and
research on organizational commitments (see for control at the local level. The theoretical rationale
an exception Johnson et al. 2009). is that with tighter connections, distal groups pro-
To summarize, the current formulation of duce greater “clarity of expectations” for people
social commitments theory (see Lawler et al. in proximal level social encounters (interactions).
2009) predicts that affective group commitments Recall that for Turner, social encounters (micro
are strongest if group members perceive both (i) level) arouse positive emotions when people con-
a high degree of autonomy and control and (ii) firm their expectations in those encounters or
joint tasks that promote shared responsibility. groups. Embeddedness, by increasing the clarity
The proximal bias remains but it can be mitigated of expectations, improves the prospects for satis-
or overturned if local joint tasks are subsumed fying (expectation-confirming) encounters that
within or tied directly to joint tasks at the larger make people feel good and weakens the proximal
group level. There is, nevertheless, an important bias. Macro level organizations and institutions
gap or unanswered question in the theory. At the are the primary source of clear expectations, and
local proximal level, low control and autonomy the spread of micro level positive emotions
may combine with joint tasks and a strong sense upward to the micro level occurs in this context.
of shared responsibility. For this condition nested Thus, “clarity of expectations” mediates the
group and social commitment theories make con- impact of structural embeddedness on positive
tradictory predictions based on different mecha- emotions in micro level encounters. Implied is
nisms. One way to address this problem is to the notion that the clarity of expectations is a
more explicitly theorize the nature and degree of macro-to-micro (“top down”) process, and con-
interconnections between proximal and distal firming expectations in encounters initiates a
groups in the group, organization, or society (see micro-to-macro (“bottom up”) process. The bot-
Turner 2007). tom up process is contingent on positive emotions
160 E.J. Lawler et al.
from multiple encounters in multiple local groups Thye and Yoon (2015) tested this hypothesis
within the same meso (organizational) or macro in a survey of teams within a large electric com-
(institutional or categorical) group. In sum, there pany in South Korea. Teams were the local, prox-
are two primary structural conditions for the imal unit and the larger company was the distal
micro-to-macro spread of emotions in Turner’s unit. The survey measured job satisfaction (posi-
(2007) argument: (i) The local unit is tightly tive feelings about the job), perceived organiza-
embedded in the distal unit, meaning that the dis- tional support, affective commitment, and various
tal unit conveys clear expectations for behavior job characteristics (autonomy, variety, etc.) as
in local units, and (ii) members interact with oth- well as other controls. There are two findings of
ers in multiple local units, and experience posi- particular relevance to the nested group problem.
tive emotions across such unites (Turner 2007, First, job satisfaction had a stronger impact on
2014).1 commitment to the team than to the company, a
Thye and Yoon (2015) take a different finding generally consistent with nested group
approach by using and adapting theory and theory and Turner’s (2007) proximal bias.
research on “perceived organizational support” Second, the predicted interaction effect of team
(POS). They set out to test and further specify commitment and perceived organizational sup-
nested-group theory (Lawler 1992). port confirmed the study’s main hypothesis: team
Organizational support refers to the degree that commitment had a stronger positive effect on
an organization values its members’ contribu- organizational commitment when employees
tions and cares about their individual well-being perceived greater organizational support for
(Eisenberger et al. 1986). It is a perceptual phe- employees. This study extends nested group the-
nomenon with a structural foundation, but gener- ory by suggesting a general strategy for organiza-
ally treated in perception terms by research on tions to overcome the nested group problem and
organizations (see Eisenberger et al. 1986). In also by pointing to the role of group identities.
brief, the research indicates that if employees The overall message to be taken from both Turner
perceive organizational support in these ways (2007) and Thye and Yoon (2015) is that both (i)
(i.e., valuing and caring), they reciprocate with structural and (ii) cognitive interconnections of
attitudes and behaviors that benefit the organiza- proximal and distal groups must be taken into
tion. The employee-employer relationship is con- consideration and analyzed to fully understand
ceived as an exchange of valued goods or how these are intertwined.
outcomes, and in this context Thye and Yoon
(2015) analyze the identity (or self-definitional)
implications of perceived organizational support. 8.3.5 Comparing Our Approach
The main hypothesis is that if employees per- to Jon Turner’s
ceive organizational support, the organizational
identity becomes more salient and meaningful to There are important similarities and differences
them, and they “re-categorize” self in terms of between our theorizing and that of Turner (2007).
not only the local unit but also the larger, distal The following ideas represent key similarities.
unit. This then counteracts the proximal bias pos- First, micro level social interactions at the person-
ited by the nested group theory, and by extension, to-person level are the ultimate source of emo-
Turner’s (2007) analysis. tions and feelings, albeit positive or negative.
Second, positive emotions constitute the funda-
mental glue or social adhesive that hold together
1
Important to note is that emotions from confirming groups, organizations, communities, and societ-
expectations at the micro level have a moral component to ies; whereas negative emotions threaten to
the degree that, not only is the micro level tightly con-
weaken tear apart social units. Third, the impact
nected to or embedded in meso (organizational) level
organizations, but the meso level units also are tightly of positive emotion is contingent on the kinds of
embedded in macro level institutions and culture. attributions (e.g., to people, to units, to which
8 The Problem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 161
units) that people make in the course of interpret- sume that the group is a distinct and salient social
ing their emotions and feelings. Finally, people object, and social unit attributions are directly
are more likely to attribute positive emotions to made to the group itself. Moreover, in Turner’s
proximal social objects (self, other, group) and theory, emotions spread upward to meso or macro
negative emotions to more removed or larger units to the degree that positive emotions are pro-
social objects (organizations, communities, duced across a variety of encounters in a variety
nations). The latter poses a fundamental threat to of local groups within the same overarching meso
the stability of those larger units. or macro entities. In our theory, the spread of
There also are key differences between out emotions only requires repeated social interac-
theorizing and that of Turner, primarily regarding tion in a single local group where people demon-
the emotion-generating mechanism and the social strate a capacity to work together. If the local task
context for it. Turner deploys “clarity of expecta- is undertaken or enacted jointly with others and it
tions” as the central emotion-generating mecha- fosters a sense of shared responsibility among
nism in his theoretical analysis. When people those doing it, conditions are established for
confirm expectations they feel good and reward social attributions to proximal, distal, or both
each other and this strengthens further those pos- types of social units.
itive feelings. In our research program, interac- Having reviewed these approaches to the
tions generate emotions regardless of how clear nested group problem, there are several unan-
expectations are or whether they are necessarily swered questions that suggest the need for more
fulfilled. Positive emotions stem from social theoretical work. One concerns the role of
interaction, task structure, how well individuals control-autonomy (Lawler 1992) and shared-
work together, and what sort of collective impact responsibility (Lawler et al. 2009) as the basis for
such interactions produce. Expectations are not a proximal bias and also for understanding how
necessarily explicit or clear, in fact, people may distal groups or organizations overcome it. A sec-
perceive greater control and shared responsibility ond concerns the role of identities in the ties to
under conditions of ambiguity. One implication proximal and distal groups. The more encom-
or hypothesis, developed in our general theory passing distal group may provide individuals a
(Lawler et al. 2009: Chapter 7), is that network- broader context of meaning for enacting roles
based organizations tend to generate affective and identities than the more immediate local
commitments whereas hierarchy-based organiza- group. One condition for this is that the self-
tions tend to generate instrumental commitments enhancing effects of a group identity are stronger
because of a greater sense of shared responsibil- for the more encompassing distal group (e.g., a
ity in flatter network structures (Lawler et al. nation) than a smaller proximal unit (e.g., a
2009). In contrast, Turner’s clarity-of- neighborhood). A third concerns the role of dense
expectations mechanism seems to suggest that interactions in a single local group versus more
hierarchical organizations generate stronger varied interactions across multiple local groups
affective ties because the expectations are likely in a larger social unit. There are good reasons to
to be clearer in this context. posit that a proximal bias will be stronger in the
There is also a subtle difference in the primary single-group case; and if it is countered, the
social objects to which emotions are attributed. locally-based feelings may forge a stronger affec-
For Turner (2007) the proximal bias entails posi- tive tie to distal organizations than where group
tive emotions being attributed to social objects ties diffuse across multiple local groups.
within the group – i.e., to self or others – not Interaction in multiple groups may generate more
explicitly to the group itself as an object, although diffuse or looser local or proximal ties, but they
the group benefits from these internal attributions also broaden the range or variety of positive emo-
of emotion within the group. By implication, tional experiences within a larger, distal unit
attributions to the group occur through attribu- (Turner 2007). Below we suggest some ways to
tions of emotion to self and/or other(s). We pre- resolve the control-responsibility and
162 E.J. Lawler et al.
single-multiple group issues and build in a stron- cooperation and social order (Hechter 1987;
ger role for identities. Fehr and Gintas 2007).
2. Affective ties to local, proximal groups make
it easier for social dilemma problems to be
8.4 Developing a New solved at the micro level, but in the process
Theoretical Formulation they generate a fragmented or federated social
order with weaker ties to macro group entities
This section does not present a new theory but than to local entities. This fragmentation is
instead an outline or sketch of a few ideas to driven by either the control-autonomy or the
explain the strength and interconnections of shared-responsibility mechanisms.
proximal and distal group ties. The purpose is to 3. Macro social orders become stronger and
look more closely at the nature of person-to- more resilient if (i) affective ties to macro
group ties and further specify the conditions units are strong and those to micro units are
where a proximal bias is stronger or weaker. We weak; or if (ii) there are mutually-supportive
assume a nested group context in which the distal affective ties at micro and macro levels. The
group has an oversight/governing role and the former (i) will obtain if the distal, removed
proximal group is the locus of the core tasks or group or organization is more salient as the
activities of the distal group.2 In this context primary locus of control-autonomy or the pri-
proximal and distal ties have the capacity to gen- mary locus of members’ sense of shared-
erate commitment behaviors, such as staying responsibility than local units.3 The latter (ii)
(low exit rates or turnover), prosocial behaviors will obtain if there are tight interconnections
(donations to the organization, informally help- between micro level structures or task activi-
ing others), and citizenship behaviors (involve- ties and macro level structures and strategic-
ment in or sacrifice of time for the group). These level tasks (Turner 2007).
behaviors are directed at local (proximal) or
larger encompassing (distal) groups contingent The nested-group problem of social order, there-
on the strength and resilience of group ties. fore, boils down to whether or when group ties
Several ideas motivate and orient a new theo- have an affective, non-instrumental component,
retical effort, all of which are implied by previous and whether or when the affective component is
sections of this paper. stronger at one level than at another.
McPherson et al. 2001). Common or shared iden- goods are the most unique instrumental benefit of
tities are a unifying thread binding people to group members and an indicator of collective
groups. The rationale is that people tend to asso- efficacy. Each dimension is elaborated, in turn
ciate with and form ties with people like them- below.
selves. This could be due to their own preferences Group ties are symbolic and expressive
or to their structural opportunities for interaction because groups can be an important marker for
(Blau 1977). In comparison, the instrumental how a person defines themselves and how others
class of group-formation theories indicates that also define them. These self-other definitions are
groups are based on the rational choices people shared meanings and often affectively imbued
make about where they receive the greatest indi- (Burke and Stets 2009; MacKinnon and Heise
vidual benefits or rewards (Hechter 1987). People 2010). If the group is a context in which a person
are profit maximizers and they join groups that verifies or affirms a self-definition in social inter-
are important to their individual rewards, in par- action with others, it makes sense that they would
ticular, where they benefit from joint or collective intrinsically value the group membership and
services or goods that they cannot access alone. treat the group as an end in itself. A group mem-
In sum, groups are instrumental objects if they bership has self-enhancing effects as long as the
mediate valued individual rewards or collective group identity is an important part of how people
outcomes or goods that are the source of those define themselves. The implication is that people
individual rewards or benefits (see Hechter 1987). form stronger affective ties or commitments to
The social identity tradition demonstrates that groups within which they affirm and verify
social categories, even those that have little value important self-definitions. Identity verification,
or extrinsic meaning, are sufficient to generate therefore, is the principle motivation for group-
perceptions of being in a group and promote pos- oriented behavior (Burke and Stets 2009).4
itive behaviors toward other members (Tajfel and Given this logic the implication for nested
Turner 1986). One rationale for such common group contexts is clear. A distal bias for positive
identity effects is that being with similar others or emotions should be present if the larger, removed
being in the same social category is self-defining. group is more self-defining than the local, imme-
Social categories and groups shape how people diate group. This is quite plausible for distal
define themselves and also how others define group units that are high in status, reputation, or
them, and these self-other definitions are mani- brand-recognition. Examples might be a faculty
fest in behavior and interaction. If a group member for whom their university (e.g., Harvard,
becomes an important part of how people define Cornell, UC-Berkeley, Stanford) is more self-
themselves, the ties to that group becomes at least defining than their college or departmental unit,
partly non-instrumental. The result is that posi- or an employee who defines self primarily with
tive qualities of the group become positive quali- reference to a corporation’s name (e.g., Goldman
ties of self. Sachs, IBM, Apple, Google) rather than their
This simple characterization of instrumental team, department, or division within that corpo-
and non-instrumental ties suggests two condi- ration. A self-defining larger group is more likely
tions for strong person-to-group ties: (i) whether to be subject to the distal bias. Thus, the degree
or to what degree the group identity is self- that proximal or distal groups are self-defining
defining for members, that is, the group identity may determine the target of social unit attributions
is an important aspect of “who they are” or “how either by shaping perceptions of control or the
they view themselves;” and (ii) whether the group
mediates the access of people to collective goods
4
that are the basis for valued individual rewards, Some separation of group and personal identity remains
except in extreme cases where the group and personal
i.e., the group is a source of collective efficacy.
identities are so intertwined as to be inseparable (e.g., in
Identities entail shared meanings about self, role, cult memberships). The self-defining link between person
and group membership, whereas, collective and group is variable.
164 E.J. Lawler et al.
sense of shared responsibility. If positive defini- definitions are wrapped up with the fate of the
tions of self are based on self-efficacy in the situ- group, i.e., self and group are more tightly inter-
ation, perceived control and autonomy will be connected. What is positive and enhancing for
most important, but if positive definitions are the group is positive and enhancing for self and
based on collective efficacy, shared responsibility vice versa. Similarly, what is negative or dimin-
will be most important. Finally, if proximal and ishing for one is negative or diminishing for the
distal group identities are highly interwoven, other.
affective ties or commitments to each should be In contrast, beliefs in collective efficacy repre-
mutually supportive and positively associated sent an endogenous condition that requires
(see Thye and Yoon 2005; Yoon and Thye 2002). repeated production of collective goods with
Turning to the second condition, groups are of instrumental value to members. Such beliefs are
instrumental value especially if they generate trans-situational interpretations of situational
collective or joint goods that individuals cannot experiences of shared responsibility and they
generate alone or in other groups or groupings bear on the group’s generalized capacity to pro-
(Hechter 1987). This implies that groups may be duce goods of value to individuals. Stronger
a source of collective efficacy. Repeated genera- beliefs in collective efficacy should produce
tion of collective goods should promote beliefs in stronger person-to-group ties but the nature of
the “collective efficacy” of a group unit because these ties is primarily instrumental, unless the
members become more confident that that group is also self-defining. The main principles
“together they can make things happen” and have of social commitments theory help to account for
an impact not possible or likely by themselves. beliefs in collective efficacy, whereas self-
Recall that the logic of nested group theory defining group identities accentuate positive
(Lawler 1992) stipulates that the experience of emotions and likelihood of social unit
individual self-efficacy is one reason local con- attributions.
trol and autonomy is so important to affective
group ties or commitments. It seems reasonable
to infer then that if a group mediates access to 8.5 Conclusion
collective goods and these goods are instrumental
to individuals, perceptions of self-efficacy are The problem of person-to-group ties in the con-
likely to be intertwined with perceptions of col- text of nested groups is ubiquitous in the contem-
lective efficacy. Beliefs in the collective efficacy porary world. A key issue for small businesses,
of the group should make it more likely that organizations, large corporations, radical social
joints tasks generate a sense of shared movements, or even nation states is how to foster
responsibility. and encourage group membership, prosocial
More work is needed to flesh out these ideas, behavior, sacrifice, and commitment to the
but a tentative conclusion is implied: either prox- agenda of larger, more distant and removed,
imal or distal groups may be strong objects of social units. The theory and research, presented
commitment contingent on the degree that they here, suggest that strong commitments to larger
(a) are self-defining and (b) generate beliefs in a units occur, but only to the degree that certain
group’s collective efficacy. The confluence of structural and cognitive social conditions are
both conditions generates the strongest and most realized. If left unchecked, primary or fundamen-
resilient social orders tal interaction processes tend to promote commit-
The self-defining property of a group is an ment and stable orders in more local or proximal
exogenous condition that strengthens the sense of groups while inhibiting or weakening ties to
shared responsibility and social unit attributions larger, distal groups. This is termed the “proxi-
of emotions that occur. People will do much more mal bias” in commitment formation. In this paper
for groups that are central to how they define we have reviewed and identified several
themselves, in part because the fate of those self- sociological mechanisms that promote person-to-
8 The Problem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 165
unit bonds from the micro-to-macro levels. These logical levels, ranging from the most proximate
can explain the source of the proximal bias but or immediate to the most distal, removed, or
also how larger social units overcome it. encompassing.
There are three primary micro-social mecha-
nisms that come to the foreground in our theoreti-
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Mathieu, J., & Zajac, D. M. (1990). A review and meta- Westcott, M. R. (1988). The psychology of human free-
analysis of the antecedents, correlates, and conse- dom: A human science perspective and critique.
quences of organizational commitment. Psychological New York: Springer.
Bulletin, 108, 171–194. White, R. W. (1959). Motivation reconsidered: The con-
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). cept of competence. Psychological Review, 66,
Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. 297–333.
Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 415–444. Wrong, D. (1995). Power: Its forms, bases, and uses.
Mueller, C. W., & Lawler, E. J. (1999). Commitment to New York: Harper and Row.
nested organizational units: Some basic principles and Yoon, J., & Thye, S. R. (2002). A dual process model of
preliminary findings. Social Psychology Quarterly, organizational commitment. Work and Occupations,
62, 325–346. 29, 97–124.
Social Networks and Relational
Sociology 9
Nick Crossley
respondents (case-wise independence). They erence to the functions which they serve within
design relations out of consideration. This is social systems. The ‘parts’ of the system were
clearly problematic from the perspective of rela- explained by reference to the whole and more
tional sociology. And our other main method of specifically its ‘functional pre-requisites’. Having
sociological research, analysis of qualitative argued for the importance of the actor in his ear-
interviews, is seldom much better. It is very often lier works (Parsons 1937), moreover, Parsons
focused upon the experiences and perceptions of (1951) shifted them out of focus in his later, more
‘the individual’, again failing to consider interac- holistic works. Actors were assumed but only as
tion, ties, networks and, by default, rendering incumbents of roles and it was the roles, along
experiences and perceptions as properties of the with norms and other institutionalized ‘social
individual rather than interactional accomplish- facts’ that comprised the ‘parts’ of the systems he
ments and positions (see Billig 1991). Relational sought to analyze.
sociology must address this. It must employ and During the 1960s functionalism’s dominance
develop ways of analyzing interaction, ties and began to wane. It was subject to extensive chal-
interactions. lenges. In some cases, however, most notably cer-
A number of methods do already exist. In my tain varieties of Neo-Marxism which themselves
work to date I have focused upon one such achieved a degree of dominance within the disci-
method, social network analysis (SNA). In this pline, the primacy of the whole and this same way
chapter I reflect upon this methodological choice, of theorizing it were retained. Marxists adopted
showing how SNA facilitates genuinely rela- their own version of functional explanation,
tional work in sociology. explaining social institutions by showing that and
The largest part of the chapter will be an elab- how they serve capitalism and referring morphol-
oration and justification of these opening remarks. ogy and changes in society’s ‘superstructure’ to
I begin by reflecting upon the holism/individual- the needs of its ‘economic base’. Furthermore, the
ism debate. I then discuss the key concepts of Marxist approach to history was, as Karl Popper
relational sociology, considering how networks, (2002) observed, ‘historicist’; referencing ‘laws’
in particular, can be researched by way of and a telos to which the process of social life
SNA. Having done this, however, I turn to two would inevitably succumb (see also Merleau-
further dualisms which have troubled sociology Ponty’s (1973) critique). In the work of Althusser
in recent years: structure/agency and micro/ (1969) in particular, moreover, the apparent break
macro. Whilst these dualisms point to issues marking Marx’s later work, where (according to
which relational sociologists will always need to Althusser) all reference to ‘man’ was removed in
be sensitive to, it is my contention that the favor of such structural concepts as ‘mode of pro-
approach is well prepared to deal with them and I duction’ and ‘social formation’, was celebrated.
explain how. Althusserian Marxism, like Parsonian functional-
ism, removed human actors from the picture,
identifying institutions as the relevant parts of the
9.2 Holism and Individualism capitalist system for analysis and critique
(although Althusser (1971) later reintroduced ‘the
During the 1940s and 1950s functionalism, a subject’ in his theory of ideology).
variety of holism, was the dominant paradigm I am simplifying but this way of thinking
within sociology and Talcott Parsons (1951) was about ‘wholes’ persists within sociology and it is
its key point of reference. Notwithstanding deeply problematic. The concept of ‘functions’ is
Parsons’ own reticence regarding the problematic legitimate and often useful but the problems of
teleological form of ‘functional explanations’ functional explanation are well-documented
(advocated, for example, by Radcliffe-Brown (Hollis 1994), even, in some cases, by writers
1952), and that of Merton (1957), whom he cites from within the functionalist camp (esp. Merton
approvingly, ‘social facts’ were explained by ref- 1957). To explain a social fact, such as a role,
9 Social Networks and Relational Sociology 169
norm or convention by reference to the function where they have a means of making decisions
which it serves within a system, especially when which are irreducible to those of their members,
any reference to the actor who executes it is and of acting upon those decisions. An economic
removed, is to explain it by reference to its effect. firm, for example, typically has a means of mak-
The causal arrow runs backwards, effect becom- ing decisions (e.g. a ballot of shareholders),
ing cause, without any explanation being offered which are then binding upon its members, who
as to how such a counter-intuitive chain of events are both empowered and compelled to execute
is possible. And a similar problem is evident in this decision. The decisions of such corporate
relation to historicism; the end of history, its actors can be shown to be irreducible to those of
telos, is identified as the cause of those actions their human participants, Hindess argues, because
which bring it about –again without any explana- different procedures of collective decision mak-
tion of how such ‘backwards causation’ is ing (e.g. different voting systems) give different
possible. outputs for the same individual inputs. In addi-
The whole is hypostatized and reified in this tion, the actions of a corporate actor are often
form of holism. It is not only more than the sum irreducible to those of the human actors who staff
of its parts but more than the sum of their rela- it in virtue of its legal status, power and resources.
tions too; a metaphysical essence separate from Only a national government can declare war or a
and determining both parts and their relations. state of emergency, for example, and only a trade
Society is not constituted through the interaction union can call a strike. The human individuals
and ties of its members but is rather something who act on the corporate actor’s behalf in such
‘above’ or ‘behind’ such praxes, steering them. cases act in the name of the corporate actor,
The sociological holist, or at least this type of drawing upon its (not their individual) resources
holist, commits what Gilbert Ryle (1949) calls a and its (not their individual) legal status.
‘category error’, imagining a separate substance A focus upon actors and their causal powers is
of ‘society’ behind all manifestations of it, which important and affords a robust response and
explains those manifestations. Society is con- rebuttal to those forms of holism which invoke
ceived as a thing, a substance. Relational sociol- ‘society’ or ‘the system’ as a mysterious ordering
ogy offers an alternative to this. Before I outline principle of social life. However, this position is
the relational approach, however, I want to briefly often couched in terms of individualism, and this
consider the other side of this coin. is problematic.
A number of Parsons’ critics called for ‘men’ In some cases individualism is ontological.
(sic) to be brought back into sociological theory, The theorist claims that social facts and practices
arguing that ‘systems’ and the ‘social facts’ which are merely shorthand ways of referring to the
form their parts do not do anything and possess actions of individuals. For the ontological indi-
no causal power; that they are mere patterns of vidualist ‘there is no such thing as society, only
human activity, done by social actors (Homans individuals …’,1 to cite ex-British Prime Minister,
1973; Wrong 1961). Actors ‘do’ the social world Margaret Thatcher. Or rather society is a mere
and everything in it from this perspective. They, aggregate of individuals. Many sociological
not systems or social facts, have causal powers advocates claim to be methodological rather than
and should be the focus of our analysis. ontological individualists, however. What this
In some versions of this argument ‘actor’ means is not always clear but I will suggest two
means ‘human actor’. Other versions, however, variants.
admit of ‘corporate actors’, such as trade unions,
political parties, economic firms and national
governments (Coleman 1990; Axelrod 1997). 1
Actually she said ‘… individuals and families …’ but her
Hindess (1988) offers a good argument in favor
politics was a clear manifestation of this individualism.
of the idea of corporate actors, suggesting that a The quote is from an interview in Women’s Own magazine
collective of human actors form a corporate actor 31/10/87.
170 N. Crossley
In some cases it means that the sociologist ory, including individualistic theories, is con-
acknowledges the existence of ‘emergent proper- cerned. The human actor is an outcome of sexual
ties’ in social life; that is to say, they accept the relations; takes shape, biologically, within the
existence of ‘social facts’ which can only exist in womb of their mother; and then emerges into the
the context of collective life and which are irre- world helpless and dependent upon others for
ducible to individuals or aggregates of individu- many years. At birth they possess very few of the
als; but they maintain that such properties must properties of ‘the social actor’ and they only
be oriented to by individuals to enjoy any effect acquire these properties as a consequence of
and that sociology should therefore remain interaction with others. Through social interac-
focused upon individual actors. Max Weber tion the human organism acquires language and
(1978) falls into this camp. He recognizes that the thereby a capacity for reflective thought; a sense
social world comprises various emergent phe- of self/other and identity; tastes and preferences;
nomena as well as social actors and that social a moral sense; and many of the ‘body techniques’
actors orient to such phenomena in their deci- necessary for getting by, to name only the most
sions and actions. However, such phenomena obvious. It becomes a social actor and the process
only affect social life in virtue of the choices and of becoming is unending. Actors are continually
actions that individuals adopt towards them, from reshaped by the interactions and relations in
his perspective, and he therefore focuses upon which they participate. They are always active in
those choices and actions. such interactions and relations, from the very
The second approach, characterized by James beginning, never mere passive recipients of a cul-
Coleman (1990), amongst others (e.g. Laver ture thrust upon them, but who and what they are
1997), adopts much the same stance but pushes is shaped and reshaped in interaction in ways
the position further by seeking individual level often unintended by them. There is no social
explanations for emergent phenomena. Coleman actor before or outside of the social world. The
accepts that human behavior is affected by norms, two emerge together.
for example, but argues that sociology must This process of becoming is also a process of
explain the origin and maintenance of norms; a individuation in which the actor takes on a dis-
task which, he insists, entails a focus upon indi- tinct identity and becomes aware of herself as a
vidual actors and their motivations. Individuals distinct and unique being. Consciousness of self
pre-exist the social world, from this point of arises against a backdrop of consciousness of
view, and to explain the social world, which is the ‘not self’. And as Mead (1967) and Merleau-
job of the sociologist, we must therefore begin Ponty (1962), both important philosophers for
with individuals (see also Laver 1997). relational sociology, argue, consciousness of self
The individualist position is flawed on a num- presupposes consciousness of the consciousness
ber of grounds. Firstly, its tendency to abstract of the other. I become conscious of myself by
individuals from society, in some cases invoking becoming conscious of the other’s consciousness
a pre-social ‘state of nature’, in order to explain of me. Furthermore, consciousness, in these phil-
society is artificial and flies in the face of much osophical traditions (which inform relational
evidence. In phylogenetic terms we know that sociology), is conceived not as an ‘inner realm’,
our primate ancestors lived in groups and that separate from the world, but rather as a tie con-
group living was amongst the selection pressures necting the individual to the world. To be con-
which shaped our evolution into human beings. scious of something or someone is to connect
We were social, living with and in-relation-to with them.
others, before we were human and our biological The social actor, on this account, is an emer-
evolution, qua humans, was shaped by this. No gent property of social interaction and relations.
less importantly, however, ontogenetically our We become who and what we are by way of our
biology is only a starting point as far as ‘the involvement in social worlds; that is, in networks,
social actor’ assumed in much sociological the- ties and interactions with others. And our capacity
9 Social Networks and Relational Sociology 171
to engage in such interactions is rooted in our political thought, I suggest, stems from this.
earlier history of interaction and its formative Against such empiricism, however, we should
effects. remind ourselves of the role of ‘unobservables’ in
A further, no less serious problem with indi- other sciences (Keat and Urry 1975). Neither
vidualism is that it treats social actions as dis- gravity nor electricity can be directly perceived,
crete, failing to give proper consideration to for example. We only perceive them indirectly,
interaction and interdependency between actors. by way of their effects (e.g. falling bodies or illu-
The social world is not an aggregate of individu- minated light bulbs). However, nobody would
als and their actions but rather arises from inter- dispute their existence or importance. If we can
action, relations and the interdependence of demonstrate the effect of relational phenomena,
human actions and thoughts. it follows, then it is legitimate to infer their exis-
Interestingly, some ‘methodological individu- tence, whether or not we can directly observe
alists’ acknowledge this point, incorporating them. This is the task of relational sociology – to
interaction and interdependency in their work by which I now turn.
way of game theory (which assumes that actors
make decisions on the basis of how they observe
and/or anticipate others will act and which, cor- 9.3 Networks, Interactions
respondingly, models the interdependence of and Ties
individual decisions and its aggregate effects)
and even, in some cases, social network analysis Human interaction is unobservable in strict
(which, like game theory, focuses upon interde- empiricist terms. Actor i can be perceived to act.
pendence) (Coleman 1990; Hedström 2005). In Likewise actor j. But the effect of each upon the
my view such thinkers are individualists in name other is not directly perceived unless it involves
only and have, in practice, crossed over to a rela- physical contact and causation, and even then
tional perspective – albeit a fairly minimal rela- empiricist conceptions of causality struggle with
tionalism which would benefit from further the idea of connection.2 To ‘observe’ interaction
embellishment. Neither their ontological nor is to infer that i acted as she did in response to j.
their methodological inventories are reducible to Such inferences would not be contentious in most
‘individuals’, since they acknowledge, at both cases, however, and it is this mutual affecting that
levels, the significance of interaction and, in characterizes and allows us to speak of social
some cases, ties and networks. interaction: i affects j and her actions; j affects i
In what follows I elaborate upon the funda- and her actions. Each is affected by and stimu-
mental concepts of relational sociology: i.e. lates the other in an irreducible circuit which
interaction, ties and networks. Before I do, how- takes on a life of its own, drawing its participants
ever, I will briefly address a potential obstacle to along with it. Gadamer captures this with respect
the acceptance of relational thought in sociology: to conversation:
namely, a residual empiricism which resists the The way one word follows another, with the con-
idea that relational phenomena are real. versation taking its own twists and reaching its
Empiricism identifies the real with the percepti- own conclusion may be conducted in some way,
ble and this generally favors individualism. but the partners conversing are far less the leaders
of it than the led. No one knows what will come
Human beings, qua bodies, can be seen, heard, out of a conversation. (Gadamer 1989, 383)
touched etc. and their existence is therefore obvi-
ous. Relations, by contrast, cannot be directly
perceived and, to the empiricist frame of mind,
2
this renders their existence questionable. On a As critique of empiricist accounts of causation have
noted, the tendency to conceptualize causation as a suc-
strictly empirical level the social world is an
cession of two events (constant conjuncture) avoids refer-
aggregate of biologically individuated beings and ence to any connection between them (Keat and Urry
the popularity of individualism in social and 1975).
172 N. Crossley
not make the distinction and, like me, use exchanges are often imbalanced, with one party
‘interaction’ in a way which overlaps with what having more of a hold over the other. These varia-
Dewey and Bentley call ‘transaction’. tions are important and we are often only inter-
ested in power relations where they are strong
and imbalanced. To reiterate, however, power
9.3.1 Interdependence and Power balances are ubiquitous in social ties.
9.4 Social Worlds and the Social 1. Conventions: which are generated through
World interaction, diffuse through networks, evolve
in subsequent interaction and which both
The social world, as conceived by the relational facilitate coordination of the interactions con-
sociologist, is a vast and complex network; a net- stitutive of the world and serve to distinguish
work which is: it from others worlds (where other conven-
tions are in evidence).
1. Multiplex: pairs of actors are tied in multiple 2. Resources: which are mobilized and
different ways. exchanged in interaction and unevenly distrib-
2. Multi-Modal: a network not only of human uted across networks, generating power
actors but also corporate actors (e.g. firms, imbalances and conflicts of interest.
governments etc.), places, events and other
node types.
3. Multi-Leveled: certain nodes and networks are 9.5 Analyzing Networks
nested within others.
4. Dynamic: a network which is constantly I suggested at the outset of this chapter that rela-
evolving. tional sociology is not only a theoretical but also
a methodological program in sociology.
This begs questions of scale which I return to. Relational sociology requires relational method-
Presently, however, note that, like most sociolo- ologies. One such methodology is social network
gists, relational sociologists recognize that the analysis (SNA). SNA affords a means of explor-
social world, writ large, is subdivided into smaller ing patterns of ties empirically, studying actors-
social worlds, centered upon particular shared in-relation and capturing social worlds not as
foci of interest, and much analysis, in practice, is mere aggregates of actors but rather as relational
focused upon one or more of these worlds. ‘wholes’. Furthermore, it allows us to empiri-
My chief concern in this chapter is with the cally measure network properties and investigate
network element of these worlds. It is important their effects. This is not the place to offer a
to note, however, that other elements are in play detailed introduction to SNA, nor to tackle the
too. At the very least, social worlds are struc- complex issues of multiplexity, multi-modality
tured by: etc. referred to above. However, it would be
9 Social Networks and Relational Sociology 175
Charlie
Martin
Diana
Nisha
Frank
Sarah
Billie
Errol
Nina
Nick
John
Kirk
Fred
Paul
Jane
Jake
Bud
Gill
Sue
Raj
John 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jane 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jake 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sue 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paul 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gill 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Fred 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Errol 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Nina 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Raj 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Kirk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Billie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Nick 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Frank 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Nisha 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Sarah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Martin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Charlie 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bud 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Diana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
instructive to give a brief overview, showing how where his row intersects her column (indicating
the approach might inform relational sociology. his liking for her) and a 0 where her row inter-
I begin with two basic elements of the sects his column (indicating the absence of any
approach: graphs and adjacency matrices. The liking for him by her). Some relations are undi-
left-hand column of the matrix in Fig. 9.2 lists all rected, however, such that we would record the
of the actors involved in a particular context of same information in each cell. If John plays ten-
interest. The top row repeats this list. Each actor, nis with Jane, for example, then Jane necessarily
therefore, has both a row and column, and the plays tennis with John, or rather they play tennis
presence of a tie between any two of them can be together. We might be interested in multiple
captured by placing a number in the cell where types of tie or interaction, of course, in which
one’s row meets the other’s column. In the simple case we can have multiple matrices, each captur-
case a 1 represents the presence of a tie and a 0 its ing a different tie.
absence. If we have measured tie strength or Note that I have left the diagonal of the matrix
counted the number of interactions between two in Fig. 9.2, which captures a node’s relation to
actors, however, then we may use whatever range itself, blank. For some purposes it may be mean-
of values is required. ingful to ask if a node enjoys a tie to their self (a
The matrix has two cells for each pair of reflexive tie), and SNA can allow for this. In
actors, one on either side of the diagonal which many cases, however, it is not meaningful and we
runs from the top left to the bottom right of the ignore the diagonal.
matrix. There is a cell where John’s row inter- An adjacency matrix facilitates mathematical
sects Jane’s column, for example, and one where manipulation of relational data. The same infor-
her row intersects his column. This allows us to mation can be recorded in the form of a graph,
capture direction in ties. Perhaps we are inter- however, where, in the simple case, actors are
ested in relations of liking and though John likes represented by shapes (vertices) and ties by con-
Jane she does not like him. If so we can put a 1 necting lines (edges) (see Fig. 9.3) (this graph has
176 N. Crossley
Bud Fred
Billie
Charlie
Nisha
Sarah Nina Gill
Frank
Errol
Kirk
Raj
Nick
Martin
Jake
Diana
Jane
Sue
John Paul
Fig. 9.3 A network graph (visualizing the relations recorded in Fig. 9.2)
been drawn and all network mesures derived Belonging to a discrete component therefore may
using Ucinet software (Borgatti et al. 2002)). A afford a node safety from wider dangers.
graph makes both the structure of a network and Conversely, it may cut them off from important
the position of specific nodes within it more resources, including new ideas, innovations and
immediately apparent, and it affords a more information. Similarly, if we were interested in
intuitive way of explaining certain network prop- collective action we would not expect any coordi-
erties (at least for smaller networks). In what fol- nation or solidarity between members of discrete
lows I will briefly describe a number of these components because they lack the necessary con-
properties, for illustrative purposes, subdividing tact. Furthermore, we would expect to find differ-
them into three levels: the whole network, sub- ent emergent cultures across components as the
groups and individual nodes. relations of mutual influence generative of culture
do not traverse them.
Even within the main component, however,
9.5.1 The Whole Network and certainly for the network as a whole, we can
see that only a fraction of the number of connec-
Looking firstly at the whole network we see tions that could exist actually do. There are 20
immediately that there is a break in it, with a nodes in this network and therefore 20 × 19/2 =
cluster of nodes to the bottom of the plot whose 190 pairs of actors. Assuming that ties are undi-
members each have a path connecting them to rected there are therefore 190 potential ties.
one another but no path connecting them to the Empirically, however, we only have 27 ties. This
rest of the network (all other nodes are connected gives us a network density of 27/190 = 0.14.
to one another by a path). We express this by say- Density is important for various reasons. To
ing that the network comprises two components return to the above examples: higher density has
(some networks may have more than one compo- been shown both to speed up the rate at which
nent and some only one). goods/bads diffuse through a network (Valente
The existence of distinct components might be 1995), and to cultivate trust, solidarity and incen-
of interest to us if we are interested in the flow of tive systems which, in turn, increase the likeli-
goods or ‘bads’ (e.g. viruses) through a network hood of collective action (Coleman 1990;
because goods cannot flow where there is no path. Crossley 2015a).
9 Social Networks and Relational Sociology 177
high centrality is not always a benefit, therefore, their component. Often, however, we are inter-
but it exposes a node to different opportunities ested in the distribution of geodesic distances in a
and constraints to less central nodes and we network or their average. Amongst other things,
would expect this to make a difference. this tells us how likely it is that information and
Furthermore, we may be interested in the impact instructions will pass quickly through the net-
of exogenous resources and statuses upon cen- work, facilitating coordination.
trality. Are men, on average, more central than I have only scratched at the surface of SNA
women in a particular network, for example, and here. My intention has been to illustrate how the
therefore advantaged within it? ties, interactions and networks which comprise
Building upon this, we can average degree for the conceptual core of relational sociology can be
the whole network, thus enabling comparisons methodologically incorporated and empirically
across networks (average degree is a closely explored. Many other measures, covering other
related measure to density), and we can explore properties, exist and, beyond these descriptive
the distribution of degree in order to assess how measures, there are many methods for both statis-
(degree) centralized a network is. A skewed dis- tically modeling network structure (including
tribution in which a small number of nodes are dynamic changes over time) and exploring the
involved in a high proportion of all ties reveals significance of exogenous attributes and identi-
that the network is centered upon those nodes. ties (both as factors which affect and factors
This points to inequalities in the network but also which are affected by network patterns) (Borgatti
perhaps to an enhanced opportunity for coordina- et al. 2013; Lusher et al. 2013; Scott 2000;
tion of activities (Oliver and Marwell 1993), Snijders et al. 2010; Wasserman and Faust 1994).
since the central nodes are in a position to cen- Furthermore, SNA is not the only relational
tralize information and distribute orders. method one might use and many studies will mix
As a final illustration of measurable network methods. The process of interaction might be
properties I will briefly discuss geodesic dis- analyzed by way of conversation analysis, for
tances, a concept I return to later. Any two nodes example, or indeed modeled by way of game
within a component have a path (comprising ties theory, and the access to interaction and ties
and nodes) connecting them. In Fig. 9.3, for afforded by both participant observation and
example, there is a path between Frank and Gill archival analysis often makes them good meth-
via Sarah, Nina and the three ties between them. ods for relational-sociological research. SNA is
Paths are measured in ties or ‘degrees’, as they an important relational method, however, and
are called in this context, so we say that Frank hopefully this brief introduction has been suffi-
and Gill are at three degrees of separation. There cient to give some inphenomena, however, and
are often several paths between the same two innumerable studiesdication of this. With that
nodes. For example, Gill and Fred are directly said I want to conclude this chapter by consider-
connected (one degree) but there is also a more ing where relational sociology stands in relation
circuitous path between them via Errol and to two thorny dualisms which have dogged soci-
Charlie (three degrees). The shortest of these ology in recent years: (1) structure and agency,
paths is referred to as the ‘geodesic distance’ and (2) micro and macro.
between the nodes involved and it is this path-
length, in particular, that is often of most interest
in SNA because, all things being equal, it is the 9.6 Structure and Agency
quickest route through which goods (and bads)
can travel and involves the least likelihood of The relational position involves both agency and
them being ‘damaged’ in transit. structure. Network nodes are typically social
Sometimes we may be interested in the geode- actors, locked in relations and interactions with
sic distances between particular nodes or each others which affect them, but also loci of decision
individual node’s total distance from all others in and action and therefore agents all the same.
9 Social Networks and Relational Sociology 179
Structure figures by way of the conventions is empirical. The structure/agency debate arose in
actors observe (and both co-create and modify in some part from the theoretical divide between
interaction), the uneven distribution of resources holists and individualists which I discussed
(including status) and power imbalances between above. Holists exclude actors and thus agency
them but more importantly, for present purposes, from their account. Individualists exclude struc-
in the form of network structure which, I have ture. However, when a theory includes both
suggested, generates both opportunities and con- agency and structure, as relational sociology
straints for those involved in it. The question of does, and the question becomes one of relative
structure and agency, in this context, concerns the weighting, we cannot answer that question in
relative weight that we accord to each. theory and cannot expect the same answer for
This is a live issue, as attested by a number of every situation. Structure is more constraining in
critiques of SNA published in recent years, both some contexts and at some times than others.
by network analysts themselves and others Both structure and agency are important in every
(Crossley 2010; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; context but their relative weight will shift between
Knox et al. 2006; Mische 2003). ‘Old school’ contexts and it is the job of the sociologist to
network analysis stands accused of positing a determine the weighting in the specific contexts
deterministic interpretation of networks which they are researching.
attributes fixed effects to particular network
properties and suggests that incumbents of par-
ticular positions in a network are constrained to 9.7 Micro and Macro
play certain roles within it. These criticisms are
partly focused upon the neglect of culture in There is yet another dualism that relational soci-
much SNA and also partly methodological. ology is required to tackle, however; namely, the
Network effects and dynamics are mediated by micro-macro divide. As I understand it, the
meanings, identities, actors’ understandings and micro-macro debate focuses upon scale.
thus by culture, it is argued, none of which is nec- Sociology might focus upon the details of a few
essarily captured in formal network analysis. The seconds of conversation between two people or
critics therefore call for a mixed method approach upon matters of world history, begging the ques-
to SNA which brings qualitative data regarding tion of how such foci are linked and whether the
these cultural elements to bear. The debate is also principles governing one are relevant to the other.
about agency, however. Meanings, identities, This is a potentially very complex issue and I
understandings etc. are negotiated in interaction, cannot do complete justice to it here. It is impor-
for example, as are opportunities and constraints. tant, however, to say something about context
Actors can fail to take the opportunities which and something about scale. I begin with the
their network position affords them and might former.
respond in different ways to the same constraints. The link between micro and macro is not
Agents work within and around structure. It does always as difficult to envisage as it initially
not determine their action. sounds. The events which turn the wheels of
These criticisms are important and inform world history, affecting large numbers of people,
relational sociology. We must be attentive to cul- are sometimes, in themselves, relatively ‘small’.
ture, which, as shared, is itself relational (see As I write, for example, the Greek Parliament has
Crossley 2015a, b), and we must avoid determin- just agreed, very reluctantly, to pass a number of
istic readings of the effect of network properties, ‘austerity laws’ demanded by the European
recognizing the ways in which actors negotiate Union in return for a (third) financial bailout,
them. I am not convinced that there is a great deal involving billions of Euros, in an effort to protect
more to be said, theoretically, about structure and their country from economic disaster and possi-
agency, however, and would suggest that, beyond ble exit from the Eurozone. This is an event of
these general theoretical considerations, the issue global significance with huge implications,
180 N. Crossley
especially in Greece but across Europe and, to they generally have no means of making deci-
some extent, the world. With the exception of the sions or enforcing their own resolutions (Offe
huge crowds of protestors who gathered outside 1985), even if some of the ‘social movement
the Greek Parliament when the decision was organizations’ within them do. Movements are
being made, and who I return to below, however, relational phenomena, however, and innumerable
most of the decisions shaping and steering this studies have pointed both to their network char-
situation were made in interactions between a acter and to the role of pre-existing networks in
relatively small number of people over a rela- their formation and mobilization (Crossley 2007;
tively short period of time. Greek politicians sat Crossley and Krinsky 2015; Diani and McAdam
face-to-face and debated. Similarly, the demands 2003).
of ‘the European Union’ were decided by a small It isn’t always possible to pin the twists and
number of European politicians over a few days, turns of history down to particular interactions.
face-to-face in various committee rooms, and Certain trends and dynamics cannot be localized
relayed directly to the Greek Prime Minister. in this way. The relational approach is still the
Any analysis of these interactions would have best way of making sense of such dynamics,
to understand their context: the various pressures however. Complexity theory in the natural sci-
upon those involved, the stakes involved, and so ences and the agent-based models employed
on. However, this moment in global history was therein provide a useful reference point for think-
decided through face-to-face interaction which, ing about these issues (Watts 1999; Barabási
whatever its particularities, assumed much the 2003; Newman et al. 2006). In complex systems,
same form as any other human interaction. This which are usually conceived of as networks
is not atypical. As the individualists recognize, it involving interaction between millions of nodes,
is actors who do things and make things happen the multiplication of interactions and interven-
in the social world. All sociological phenomena tion of cascade, feedback and other such mecha-
can and should be tracked back. nisms generate fascinating organizational forms
The Greek government is a corporate actor, and dynamics akin to those sometimes observed
involving irreducible mechanisms of decision by sociologists. These dynamics and forms are
making and implementation. Likewise the often extremely impressive; everything happens
European Union. The decisions made by and ‘as if’ by grand design. Unlike the sociological
between these corporate actors often affect mil- holists discussed above, however, complexity
lions of people. They are global in their reach; scientists are able to show by way of their models
macro-cosmic. But they are interactions between that such emergent forms are indeed emergent,
actors all the same. The ‘world system’ or ‘global that is, generated from the bottom up by way of
social order’ is not a mysterious force affecting interactions and their concatenations, and not
our lives from without but rather a network, albeit inevitable outcomes of history’s grand plan.
a hugely complex network, involving millions of Complex systems are networks and their emer-
actors, both human and corporate, and the vari- gent organization can be analyzed as such. We
ous (often unequal) ties between them, and as might not be able to graph such networks very
such it can be analyzed by way of SNA (Smith clearly, given their size, but we can analyze them
and White 1992; Snyder and Kick 1979). The using SNA and related methods. Interaction, ties
social macro-cosm may involve ‘bigger’ actors and networks remain the bedrock of our under-
and/or more actors (see below) but it is no differ- standing of what is going on.
ent in kind to its constituent micro-cosms. The focus on networks in complexity theory
In the Greek example social movements and has also led to an interesting exchange with
their protests also played a role. They put pres- social science. Emergent effects in complex sys-
sure on the Greek government and sent a signal to tems are sometimes difficult to comprehend
other European politicians. Social movements do because it is difficult to imagine how order
not fit my definition of corporate actors because could emerge between such a large number of
9 Social Networks and Relational Sociology 181
nodes (millions). Surely, complexity theorists asking people to mail a package to others whom
puzzled, geodesic distances would be too long they knew, with the ultimate aim of delivering the
to facilitate any significant transfer of energy or package to a target individual who was not
information? In puzzling this question complex- directly known to those involved at the start of
ity theorists stumbled across work by social the experiment. The study suggested that pack-
psychologist, Stanley Milgram (1967), which ages often traversed geographical space with rel-
suggested that any two citizens picked at ran- ative ease and speed but that, where they were
dom from the US population, are, on average, required to cross a racial divide, the process often
separated by only six ties (‘six degrees of sepa- stalled. Participants enjoyed good relations with
ration’). This so-called ‘small world’ phenom- others of their own race across the country, in
ena was intriguing to the complexity physicists other words, but few such relations with mem-
because it rendered the idea of mutual influence bers of other racial groups even in their own
between nodes in a network of millions far more town. Ties were shaped by status and more espe-
plausible. Geodesics need not be very long even cially ethnic homophily. I mention this here to
in huge networks; in which case, influence and demonstrate that and how relational sociology
coordination across such networks is plausible. allows us to begin to think about and research
This prompted complexity theorists both to con- such social divisions, on a macro-level. Social
duct a variety of studies looking for ‘small divisions, from a relational point of view, mani-
world’ examples in the natural world, which fest in patterns of connection (and lack of con-
they found in abundance, and to solve the math- nection) within a population and those patterns of
ematical problem posed by Milgram’s work: connection are empirically analyzable using SNA
namely, how can nodes in a network of millions (see also Blau 1974, 1977).
be linked by such short geodesics? They came Status homophily is an example of what I
up with two possibilities, both of which work described early as ‘cohesive subgroups’. Actors
(mathematically), and have been demonstrated who share a particular status tend to gravitate
empirically and in simulations. More important towards one another. Actors with different sta-
for our purposes, however, is the support that it tuses do not. They may even actively avoid one
lends to my idea, introduced above, that the another. As noted earlier, however, this is not the
social world is a (multiplex, multi-modal, multi- only way in which nodes might cluster. Nodes
leveled and dynamic) network. This idea some- can be clustered where they occupy ‘equivalent’
times attracts resistance because sociologists positions in a network, as defined in SNA and
are inclined to believe that the scale of national measured by a number of dedicated clustering
and international societies is so big that ‘some- algorithms. A good example of this ‘blockmodel-
thing else’, something other than interaction, ing’ in action is Peter Bearman’s (1993) analysis
ties and networks are at work. The work of the of kinship networks and elite structures in
complexity theorists suggests that this need not Norfolk (England) prior to the (1642–1651) civil
be so and that a network model of society is war. The details of the study are not strictly rele-
plausible. vant here but it is important to note, firstly, that
What the complexity theorists overlook in Bearman uses blockmodeling to render a very
their use of Milgram, however, is his focus upon large network intelligible and to track both hier-
social division. Milgram conceived of social archy and changes in hierarchy within English
structure as a network. His research was focused, society; secondly, that he identifies changes in
in some part, upon the basic properties of such this network which played an important role in
networks, not least average geodesics. However, the precipitation of the civil war. Again here SNA
he was also interested in the impact of status dif- proves a useful tool for exploring ‘macro’ pro-
ferentials upon network structure. His work sug- cesses and events, and again the keys to under-
gested that this could be considerable, particular standing those processes and events are shown to
in relation to race. His methodology involved be networks, ties and interactions.
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Varieties of Sociological Field
Theory 10
Daniel N. Kluttz and Neil Fligstein
or goal. Being oriented toward one another, field theoretical lines of inquiry. In particular, Martin
actors frame their actions and identities vis-à-vis (2003) provides a concise review of field theory’s
one another (i.e., relationally). Actors within a roots in the physical sciences (particularly classi-
field recognize (if not always follow) shared cal electro-magnetism), the contributions of the
meanings, rules, and norms that guide their inter- Gestalt school of psychology apart from Lewin,
actions. Fields structure actors’ interests and influ- and the contributions of other intellectual ances-
ence them to think and act in accordance with the tors not discussed here, most notably Ernst
rules and expectations of the field. Nevertheless, Cassirer, Karl Mannheim, and Friedrich
field actors have the agentic capacity (again, to Fürstenberg.
varying degrees depending on the version of the Max Weber argued that social relationships
theory) to accumulate resources and/or seek require meaningful action between two or more
advantages vis-à-vis others. Such resources and actors whose actions are based on an awareness
advantages can include legitimacy, the accumula- of and orientation to the other (Weber 1978:
tion of various forms of capital in order to exert 28–30). Weber also took the position that social
power over others, and the building of political relationships can scale up to higher levels (e.g.,
coalitions to further collective interests. organizations, associations, etc.) and become a
Field theorists use the field construct to make social order that encompasses a multitude of
sense of how and why social orders can be repro- actors. A social order can simultaneously be its
duced. But they have increasingly become inter- own complex of meaning and part of a broader
ested in how fields emerge and are transformed. complex of meaning. Weber identified a small
Underlying this formulation is the idea that a number of orders present in every society: legal,
field is an ongoing game-like arena, where actors social, economic, political, and religious. He
have to understand what others are doing in order thought that something different is at stake in
to frame their action. This has caused field theo- each order and the struggles over a particular
rists to consider agency and action and to develop order could only be interpreted from the perspec-
sociological views of how cognition works, tive of groups vying for advantage in that order
focusing on issues of culture, framing, identity, (1978). For example, honor or status is at stake in
habit, and socialization. Finally, while the role of the social order, power in the political order, the
actors varies across formulations of field theo- saving of souls in the religious order, and eco-
ries, such theories explicitly reject rational actor nomic advantage in the economic order. Weber
models and instead rely on phenomenology and argued that power in one order could bring about
symbolic interactionism to understand what power in another. So, for example, economic suc-
actors do under varying field conditions. cess could spill over to social honor or esteem.
However, Weber also thought that the relation-
ship between orders was the product of history.
10.3 Classical Roots For example, in a theocracy, the religious order
of Contemporary could dominate the political and economic order.
Sociological Field Theory With his emphasis on the symbolic in addition to
the material dimension of relations, Weber was of
We trace the classical roots of contemporary fundamental importance to field theorists’ con-
sociological field theory to two primary influ- ceptions of fields as socially constructed arenas
ences, Max Weber and Kurt Lewin. Then we of action.
briefly discuss how phenomenology and sym- As a social psychologist with a background in
bolic interactionism have provided the founda- Gestalt psychology, it was Kurt Lewin who most
tions of field theories’ models of action. We direct directly transferred the ideas of field theory from
the reader to Mey (1972) and Martin (2003) for the physical sciences into the social sciences.
more detailed accounts of the classical founda- Lewin applied Gestalt concepts of perception –
tions of field theory that draw from many more that stimuli are not perceived as individual parts
188 D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein
but by their relation to the whole field of percep- saying” for a specific group. Elias used the hab-
tion – to social psychology and, in particular, itus concept to make sense of the changes in
human motivation and how social situations personality he detailed in The Civilizing
influence cognition (Mohr 2005). Lewin (1951: Process (1939).
240) also developed formal models to represent Neo-institutionalists rely heavily on Berger
fields, which he defined as the “totality of coex- and Luckmann’s The Social Construction of
isting facts which are conceived of as mutually Reality (1967) for their model of actors (Powell
interdependent,” and the life space, defined as and DiMaggio 1991). Berger and Luckmann
“the person and the psychological environment drew their inspiration from Alfred Schutz, a soci-
as it exists for him” (1951: 57). ologist who was trained in phenomenology.
For Lewin, the individual’s phenomenological Berger and Luckmann argued that the world is a
apprehension of the world could be simultane- social construction. It requires effort for this to
ously influenced by the field environment and his/ emerge, effort that implied institutionalization
her navigation of the life space. The life space is and legitimation. Like the habitus for Bourdieu,
made up of regions of experience, the meaning of an existing social world gets internalized via
each being defined by its relations to other regions. socialization.
And because one’s apprehension of a field also Compared to the neo-institutional elaboration
influences the field itself, the effects of one on the of organizational fields, Fligstein and McAdam
other are reciprocal. Individual behavior, then, (2012) draw more heavily on Mead’s (1934)
could be explained only by considering the total- symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interaction-
ity of the interaction between the individual’s ism is a perspective grounded in American prag-
navigation of the life space and the environment. matist philosophy (Menand 2001). It bears many
Although Lewin has been criticized for, among resemblances to phenomenology, viewing the
other things, his ultimately unworkable topologi- social world as a construction and socialization
cal formalizations (see Martin 2003: 18–19), his as the main way in which that world is inculcated
explicit use of the field metaphor and his empha- in individuals. But Mead’s symbolic interaction-
sis on the co-constitution of fields and actors ism also proposes that one of the main goals of
served as an important foundation on which con- social action is for actors to help shape and create
temporary sociological field theories were built. their worlds. At the core of interaction is the idea
Field theorists have used a variety of sources that we have identities that we share with others.
to construct their model of the actor. For exam- These identities provide the basis for our coop-
ple, Bourdieu’s notion of habitus has many eration with others. Bourdieu also cites symbolic
sources – some in philosophy like Husserl, interaction as a source for his view of social
Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty as well as action. Because he was interested in how power
sociologists who were philosophically inclined was actually experienced in interaction, he saw
and influenced by phenomenology, like Mauss symbolic interaction as a way to frame how the
and Elias.2 Mauss (1973[1934]) defined habitus less powerful accepted their fate in interaction
as those aspects of culture that are anchored in with the more powerful.
the body or daily practices of individuals,
groups, societies, and nations. It includes the
totality of learned habits, bodily skills, styles, 10.4 Contemporary Elaborations
tastes, and other forms of non-discursive of Sociological Field Theory
knowledge that might be said to “go without
10.4.1 Bourdieu’s Field Theory
2
Crossley (2004) provides a lengthy discussion of
Merleau-Ponty’s deep influences on Bourdieu’s theoreti- Pierre Bourdieu is the contemporary sociologist
cal framework. Interestingly, it was also through Merleau-
Ponty’s work that Bourdieu first encountered Weber
most often associated with field theory. Bourdieu
(Bourdieu et al. 2011: 112). deployed the idea of field as part of a more com-
10 Varieties of Sociological Field Theory 189
plex theoretical framework that included two ceptions, judgments, tastes, and strategies for
other major concepts, capital and habitus (see actions. But habitus is not simply produced or
generally Bourdieu 1977, 1986; Bourdieu and employed subjectively. It is a highly structured
Wacquant 1992). For Bourdieu, social life takes system of dispositions. Strategies and actions
place in fields. Fields are arenas of struggle, and generated by habitus are not products of moti-
Bourdieu frequently uses the game metaphor to vations for future goals so much as products of
describe how action takes place in fields. In past experience (Bourdieu 1977: 72). Habitus is
fields, players occupy positions relative to one internalized via (mostly early) socialization.
another but have a shared sense of the socially But habitus is neither wholly static nor deter-
constructed, centralized framework of meaning, ministic. It can change as one traverses the life
or what is at stake in the field. Bourdieu’s fields course and interacts within different fields.
are relatively autonomous, meaning each tends to Because an actor’s habitus-generated percep-
have its own logic (or “rules of the game”) and tions and strategies lead to practices, they have
history. Players compete with one another for real impacts on capital allocations and field
resources, status, and, most fundamentally, over structure. The habitus of actors is both consti-
the very definition of the “rules of the game” that tuted by and constitutive of the social structure
govern field relations. Relations within of the field.
Bourdieu’s fields are mostly hierarchical, with Bourdieu uses these concepts of field, capi-
dominant individuals or groups imposing their tal, and habitus to understand why, in general,
power over dominated groups as a result of their fields’ structures of dominance tend to be repro-
ability to control the field, what is at stake, and duced. Given a field that contains a set of rules
what counts as rules and resources. and players with fixed capital, the “game” will
The main source of power for dominant actors generally be rigged. Actors will perceive what
is the capital that they bring to the field. Actors others are doing and respond to their actions by
within a field are endowed with physical (or eco- deploying their capital in such a way as to pre-
nomic), social, human, and cultural capital serve their current position as much as possible.
(Bourdieu 1986, 1989: 17).3 One’s position in a In this way, both dominant and dominated
field is defined by the volume and form of capital actors play the game to the best of their abili-
one possesses. Those with similar volumes and ties, but in doing so tend to reproduce their field
forms of capital tend to cluster in similar posi- positions. The reflexive field-capital-habitus
tions in a field. Actors within a field wield capital relation gives Bourdieu powerful theoretical
in order to improve or maintain their field posi- leverage to include both agency and structure in
tions. A field is thus the site where actors carry his explanation of social order. Bourdieu him-
out and reproduce power relations over others self suggests that it gives him the ability to
based on their capital endowments. reject what he sees as false antimonies between
Habitus is the “strategy-generating princi- objectivism and subjectivism (Bourdieu and
ple” that enables actors to apprehend, navigate, Wacquant 1992).
and act in the social world (Bourdieu 1977: 78;
see also Bourdieu 1990: 53).4 It is subjective in
that it represents the bundle of cognitive and 10.4.2 Neo-institutional Theory
evaluative capacities that make up one’s per- of Fields
3
All of these forms of capital, when perceived or recog- Scholars across disciplines, most notably sociol-
nized by others as legitimate, confer symbolic capital ogy, political science, and economics, have
(akin to prestige or honor) and thus the ability to exercise developed substantial lines of inquiry, many shar-
symbolic power over others (Bourdieu 1986, 1989). ing affinities with field-based approaches, under
4
For an extended discussion of Bourdieu’s habitus, see
the broad umbrella of “new institutionalism” (for
Lizardo (2004).
190 D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein
reviews, see Hall and Taylor 1996; Fligstein nectedness (Laumann et al. 1978) and structural
2008). In order to avoid confusion, and in the equivalence (White et al. 1976).
interest of space, when we discuss “neo- For DiMaggio and Powell (1983), the answer
institutional” theories of fields, we limit our dis- to the question of why organizations within fields
cussions to neo-institutional theory in tend to look the same is that organizations, once
organizational sociology. Even within sociologi- they are part of an organizational field, are usu-
cal neo-institutional organizational scholarship, ally driven more by institutional concerns (e.g.,
there is considerable variation in approaches, legitimacy) than by other factors, such as compe-
emphases, and analytical techniques (Powell and tition. Institutions, defined as “social patterns
DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2013). We focus here on that, when chronically reproduced, owe their sur-
classic neo-institutional formulations of organi- vival to relatively self-activating social processes
zational fields (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), first (Jepperson 1991: 145),” confer legitimacy. Over
contextualizing when and why neo-institutional the course of institutionalization, such self-
scholars developed the concept then explaining sustaining patterns become more legitimate and
the essential characteristics of organizational stable, eliciting shared meanings and providing
fields. cultural models for organizing and acting (Zucker
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, neo- 1977; Suchman 1995; Berger and Luckmann
institutional sociologists began explicitly incor- 1967).
porating field-based principles to theorize the As a field undergoes structuration (see Giddens
connection between organizations and their envi- 1979), organizations within the field tend to
ronments. Departing from organizational ecolo- become isomorphic, meaning that they become
gists (e.g., Hannan and Freeman 1977a, b), whose more similar. They do this because the imperative
fundamental motivating question was to examine of an institutionalized field is to appear legitimate
why organizations within populations differ from (Suchman 1995). For neoinstitutional scholars,
one another, neo-institutional scholars asked why legitimacy is “a generalized perception or
organizations within fields tend to exhibit similar assumption that the actions of an entity are desir-
forms, practices, or cultures. Although others able, proper or appropriate within some socially
employed similar constructs such as “institu- constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
tional environment” (Meyer and Rowan 1977) definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574). Mechanisms
and “societal sector” (Scott and Meyer 1983), of isomorphism include coercive force from
“organizational field” (DiMaggio and Powell authorities or resource dependencies, normative
1983) is the most widely accepted term used to sanctioning from experts or professional associa-
denote an environment made up of organizations tions, and mimetic pressure to copy what others
that interact around a given issue and affect one are doing, particularly during times of uncertainty
another via institutional processes. (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 2013).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 148) define an Regardless of the mechanism, as something
organizational field as “those organizations that, becomes increasingly institutionalized, it takes
in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of on an increasingly rule-like or taken-for-granted
institutional life: key suppliers, resource and status. Thus, it becomes increasingly legitimate
product consumers, regulatory agencies, and in the eyes of the field actors, which serves to
other organizations that produce similar services reinforce and accelerate its being followed and
or products.” Theirs is a broad definition of fields, reproduced by organizations in the field.
encompassing “the totality of relevant actors” in
an “institutionally defined” arena of organiza-
tions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 148). Their 10.4.3 Strategic Action Fields
account of organizational fields draws primarily
on phenomenology (Berger and Luckmann The most recent elaboration of field theory is the
1967), the structuration theory of Anthony theory of strategic action fields proposed by
Giddens (1979), and network-based ideas of con- Fligstein and McAdam (2012). Fligstein and
10 Varieties of Sociological Field Theory 191
McAdam work to synthesize neo-institutionalist ized organizational fields, SAFs are rarely orga-
insights about fields as being driven by actors nized around a taken-for-granted “reality.”
who live in murky worlds and seek legitimacy Although there is more consensual perception of
with Bourdieu’s ideas about contestation within opportunities and constraints in highly settled
fields that reflect mainly the power of dominant SAFs, actors constantly jockey for position even
actors. Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 9) thus in settled fields. Contention is highest when SAFs
define a “strategic action field” (hereinafter SAF) are unsettled, most often when a field is emerging
as “a constructed meso-level social order in or when a field undergoes crisis.
which actors (who can be individual or collec- Similar to Bourdieu’s fields, SAF membership
tive) are attuned to and interact with one another is structured along incumbent/challenger dynam-
on the basis of shared (which is not to say con- ics, with actors possessing varying resource
sensual) understandings about the purposes of endowments and vying for advantage. Incumbents
the field, relationships to others in the field claim a disproportionate share of the material and
(including who has power and why), and the symbolic resources in the field, and their interests
rules governing legitimate action in the field.” As and views tend to be disproportionately reflected
with the prior two versions of field theory dis- in the rules and organization of the field.
cussed above, the theory of SAFs places utmost Challengers usually conform to the prevailing
importance on understanding how actors, who order of the field by taking what the system gives
occupy positions within a socially constructed them, but they can also usually articulate an alter-
order, relate to one another within that space. native vision of the field. Importantly, although
SAFs are socially constructed in that (1) mem- SAFs have incumbents and challengers who
bership is based more on subjective than any always compete, SAFs are not necessarily
objective criteria, (2) boundaries of the field can marked by extreme hierarchy and conflict. SAFs
shift based on the definition of the situation and the can also have coalitions and cooperation.
issue at stake, and (3) fields turn on shared under- Fligstein and McAdam suggest that the higher
standings fashioned over time by members of the the degree of inequality in the distribution of ini-
field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 12–13). These tial resources at field formation, the more likely
shared understandings are of four kinds. First, the field will be organized hierarchically, with
actors share a sense of what is at stake in the field incumbents exerting their dominance over
(a shared sense of what actors are vying for or the challengers.
central issue around which the field revolves). Fligstein and McAdam introduce an important
Second, actors have a shared sense of the positions new actor to their fields – “internal governance
of others in the SAF (a recognition of which actors units.” These actors, often present within SAFs,
in the field have more or less power and who occu- generally serve to maintain order within the field.
pies which roles). Third, they have a shared under- In practice, they usually serve to reinforce the
standing of the “rules” that guide what is position of the incumbents in the field, whether it
considered legitimate action in the field. Finally, be to stabilize a field settlement, respond to crises
actors in certain positions within the field share in order to produce stability, or act as a liaison to
interpretative frames (these frames vary within the other fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:
field but are shared by actors in similar locations). 94–96). Examples of internal governance units
Importantly, Fligstein and McAdam propose include certification boards set up by profes-
that the degree of consensus and contention inter- sional organizations in a newly formed SAF, the
nal to a field is constantly changing. Bracketing a World Bank, which often disproportionately
description of how SAFs themselves emerge and serves the interests of more developed econo-
change for now (we discuss this in Sect. 10.6.3), mies, and a trade association that lobbies on an
the degree of consensus in a SAF depends on the industry’s behalf.
degree to which a field is settled. Contrary to a Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 34–56) also
neo-institutional account of highly institutional- propose a novel micro-foundation of action based
192 D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein
homologous positions in other fields. Indeed, Responding to this criticism, a second wave of
Bourdieu’s individuals tend to become embedded neo-institutionalists began to develop a literature
within habitus classes, “the system of disposi- on actors with the agency to initiate institutional
tions (partially) common to all products of the change. The earliest and most developed idea of
same structures” (Bourdieu 1977: 85). Thus, hab- actors and agency within fields is the concept of
itus, and as a consequence actors themselves, will institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio 1988,
usually operate to reproduce the very structures 1991). In general, an institutional entrepreneur is
from which it arises (Bourdieu 1977: 78; some actor (whether individual or collective)
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 121–22).5 who initiates and participates in change to an
institution.
Although DiMaggio (1988) is frequently cited
10.5.2 Neo-institutional Field Theory as inspiration for the idea of institutional entre-
preneurs, its main argument is that the neo-
Classic neo-institutional accounts of organiza- institutional theory of Meyer and Rowan (1977)
tional fields provide a rich account of institutional and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) lacks an ade-
persistence and constraint on actors, but they quate theory of agency, power, and conflict.
under-theorize how actors who are subject to DiMaggio (1988) posits the idea of an institu-
institutional effects could nevertheless enact tional entrepreneur because he is trying to make
agency to affect those institutions. Neo- sense of how a field comes into existence or
institutional scholars identified this problem rela- experiences dramatic transformation. He sug-
tively early on (see DiMaggio 1988; DiMaggio gests institutional entrepreneurship occurs when
and Powell 1991). Others have termed it the ‘par- someone (or some group) comes along and fig-
adox of embedded agency’ inherent in neo- ures out how to do something new and is able to
institutional theory. That is, if action in a field is convince others to go along with them. For
constrained by the prescriptive, taken-for-granted DiMaggio (1988), institutional entrepreneurs are
scripts and rules of the institution in which actors especially important early on in the institutional-
are embedded, then how can actors conceive of, ization process, when organizational fields are
contest, and enact endogenous change to a field being constructed. Then, as institutionalization
(see Battilana 2006)? takes hold, field participants usually settle down
to playing their part as actors who operate mostly
by habit or by watching and imitating others.
5
This point should not be overstated. For Bourdieu, Scholarly interest in institutional entrepre-
although habitus tends to align with the logic and expecta- neurship has grown considerably since
tions of the field, it is not necessarily a perfect alignment.
DiMaggio’s (1988) formulation, particularly
The extent to which it does align is a matter of degree.
Bourdieu’s concept of “hysteresis,” for example, accounts among organizational sociologists and manage-
for situations in which one’s habitus becomes mismatched ment scholars. Neoinstitutionalists have con-
or lags behind the logic of a field (Bourdieu 2000:160– ducted numerous empirical studies across
161). This is exemplified in the character of Don Quixote,
domains and made important theoretical advances
whose antiquated knightly disposition no longer fits in his
contemporary world. However, other than a vague nod to on the concept (for recent reviews, see Garud
crisis as a possible necessary condition (see our discus- et al.’s (2007) introduction to a journal issue on
sion of crisis below), Bourdieu does not systematically institutional entrepreneurship; Hardy and
theorize the causes or consequences of such hysteresis.
Maguire 2008; Battilana et al. 2009). However,
Why and when do some experience the disjuncture when
others align? Why might some experience the disjuncture we take the position that institutional entrepre-
when, at other moments of field succession, they can neurship has become a concept so all-
align? Under what conditions does hysteresis lead to encompassing with regard to agency and change
active efforts to hold on to the misaligned habitus? When
that it is not the most useful concept to employ to
might it lead to efforts to change the logic of a field rather
than adapt the habitus to fit the different logic? For a simi- theorize agency within and across fields. As
lar critique, see Burawoy and Von Holdt (2012:38–39). Suddaby (2010: 15) noted of the current state of
194 D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein
the literature: “Any change, however slight, is retical development, as it incorporates Fligstein’s
now ‘institutional’ and any change agent is an (2001) concept of “social skill” into their theory
‘institutional entrepreneur.’” of action and therefore provides a new, more sys-
Indeed, as contemporary neoinstitutional tematic way to think about agency, actors, and
scholars have pointed out (e.g., Powell and field relations. Strategic action is “the attempt by
Colyvas 2008: 277; Lawrence et al. 2011: 52), social actors to create and maintain stable social
the institutional entrepreneurship literature now worlds by securing the cooperation of others”
tends to replace the actors of foundational neo- (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 17). The primary
institutional theory – over-socialized and with micro-level mechanism through which fields are
relatively little reflexivity and agency – with constructed, transformed, and even maintained is
actors who seem to have prescient views about “social skill,” which is the cognitive capacity for
new possible worlds, the motivation to contest reading people and environments, framing lines
institutional arrangements, and the power to of action, and mobilizing people in the service of
enact change. In addition, institutional entrepre- broader conceptions of the world and of them-
neurship’s focus on divergent institutional change selves (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 17). Some
has resulted in a tendency to conflate agency with are endowed with greater social skill than others
wholesale field-level change. Consequently, there and are thus more likely than others, all else
is a selection bias in the institutional entrepre- being equal (which of course, in reality, is hardly
neurship literature of analyzing only situations in the case), to realize their interests and exert con-
which contestation leads to change (Denrell and trol vis-à-vis others in a field.6
Kovács 2008). This produces a strange concep- This may beg the question of why social skill
tion of institutional agency: actors are thought of is so important as a driver of field relations. In
as agentic only when they “successfully” form other words, if social skill is the mechanism for
new fields or change existing ones, and only a stepping into the shoes of the other and mobiliz-
few such actors really matter for field-level ing collective action, what is the motivation for
change. This idea flies in the face of common- doing so? Like Bourdieu, Fligstein and McAdam
sense experience, where we see people acting recognize that actors pursue their interests in the
strategically all of the time. name of power. Indeed, SAFs are organized
Finally, institutional entrepreneurship’s overly along incumbent/challenger dimensions and are
heroic view of actors tends to shift focus away sites of struggles for power and influence.
from fields and avoid questions such as what However, their answer is not simply that actors
alternative paths fields might take, why entrepre- draw on social skill in the pursuit of material
neurs choose the strategies of field contestation self-interest.7
that they do, and what field-building projects are Fligstein and McAdam provide a second,
likely to win and lose. In essence, we submit that deeper motivation that is deeply rooted in our
despite its substantial theoretical development evolutionary psychology – the basic human need
over the last three decades, the concept of institu- to fashion a meaningful world for oneself and to
tional entrepreneur lacks an adequate conceptual- engage in collective action. They call this the
ization of fields that would explain structural
conditions enabling agency within and across dif-
6
It remains an empirical question as to the distribution of
ferent types of fields and during different stages
social skill in given fields or across the population.
of a field’s existence. Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 17) only offer an unsup-
ported speculation that social skill could be distributed
normally across the population.
7
10.5.3 Strategic Action Fields Here, they join Bourdieu in his critique of Marxist mate-
rialist conceptions of interaction. Like Bourdieu, they
argue that interests themselves only have meaning
Fligstein and McAdam’s addition of “strategic because they are socially constructed and thus have sym-
action” to the term “fields” is an important theo- bolic meaning to field participants.
10 Varieties of Sociological Field Theory 195
“existential function of the social.” They argue and Benford 1988), Fligstein and McAdam pro-
that even the exercise of power and conflict with vide an answer to the ‘paradox of embedded
others are often manifestations of the more fun- agency’ that has plagued neo-institutional
damental pursuit of collective meaning-making, accounts while managing to avoid the overly
identity, and belongingness. Innumerable exam- heroic correctives proposed by theories of insti-
ples of this abound. To list a few of the more tutional entrepreneurship.
extreme ones, the various religious crusades and Importantly, however, Fligstein and McAdam
wars waged throughout history were fundamen- (2012: 109–110) do not reject outright the idea of
tally about identity (“I am a Christian; I am a holy institutional entrepreneurs. Instead, they situate
warrior.”) and meaning-making and belonging- the role of institutional entrepreneur within the
ness (“This is a battle between good (us) vs. evil broader SAF environment and theorize that in the
(them)). However repulsive Nazism is from a moment of field emergence or transformation
moral standpoint to most in society, there is no when things are more or less up for grabs, such
question that Hitler was a supremely skilled actors may emerge to help create a field.
social actor who could frame unambiguous Institutional entrepreneur is thus a role that
“truths” in ways that valorized the lives of believ- highly skilled social actors can play in unorga-
ers and serviced his interest in attaining power. nized social space to help produce a field. They
Of course, the focus on intersubjectivity, collab- do so by convincing others to accept their own
orative meaning-making, identity, and collective cultural conception (via an appeal that resonates
mobilization does not mean that power relations, with others’ identities or meaning), fashion polit-
conflict, preferences, and the pursuit of those ical coalitions of disparate groups, and establish
preferences (whether or not to the exclusion of new institutions around which a field is ordered.
others pursuing theirs) are not characteristic of If a field is in a more settled state, incumbents,
SAFs. The point is that social skill is deployed who set the rules of the game and exert their
for both kinds of pursuits. power to reproduce the social order, are more
The dual motivations in SAFs of the pursuit of likely to thwart attempts by an institutional entre-
material interests and the existential function of preneur to usurp the established field order. That
the social represent a key point of departure from said, actors even in settled SAFs are able to con-
neo-institutional and Bourdieu’s explanations of struct alternative understandings of the dominant
what drives field relations. For neo- field order and can act strategically to identify
institutionalists, the basic driver of action within with others and engage in collective action.
institutionalized organizational fields is the con- The theory of SAFs also differs from
cern for legitimacy (Suchman 1995). Whether Bourdieu’s in its conception of actors and agency.
through coercive force, normative influence, or For Bourdieu, fields are sites of conflict, striving,
mimetic pressure to follow others in times of and the pursuit of one’s interests over another’s.
uncertainty, organizational field actors tend to act True, Bourdieu recognizes that what one’s inter-
similarly in order to appear legitimate (DiMaggio ests are and how they are pursued are outcomes
and Powell 1983). Fligstein and McAdam agree of social dynamics; they correspond to the one’s
with neo-institutional theorists that field actors position in the field, one’s own habitus, and one’s
tend to cohere in their actions, but instead of unique allocation of forms of capital. But the
arguing that this is due to a mostly unreflective defining features of internal field relations for
concern for legitimacy, they posit this is due to Bourdieu are no doubt conflict and domination.
the existential function of the social. By combin- The theory of SAFs shares Bourdieu’s concep-
ing symbolic interactionist approaches to empa- tion of fields as sites of struggle between incum-
thetic understanding and identity (Mead 1934; bents and challengers over resources and the
Goffman 1974) with social movement theory’s ability to define the “rules of the game,” but it
insights into framing processes as a path to goes further to make room for the crucial micro-
collective action (e.g., Snow et al. 1986; Snow foundations of meaning, identity, cooperation,
196 D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein
and collective action that are pursued by socially of SAFs depicts fields as more changeable than
skilled actors. Actors can both engage in struggle neo-institutional field theory or Bourdieu’s theory
and fashion cooperative coalitions. Fligstein and of fields. Moreover, we argue that, compared to the
McAdam (2012) thus present a more agentic other accounts, the theory of SAFs provides the
actor than the other two theories of fields dis- most comprehensive, systematic conceptualiza-
cussed here. tion of field emergence, stability, and change. As
Finally, the theory of SAFs differs from both with the prior section, we develop these arguments
neo-institutional and Bourdieusian accounts of by first analyzing how Bourdieu and neo-institu-
field actors in that it explicitly accounts for indi- tional theorists deal with the issue then juxtapos-
viduals and collectivities as field actors and ing those accounts against the theory of SAFs.
expressly theorizes each of their roles within
their fields. Neo-institutional field theory, being
born out of organizational theory, tends to focus 10.6.1 Bourdieu’s Field Theory
on organizations as the actors within a field space.
As such, neo-institutional accounts of organiza- Bourdieu’s theory of fields is primarily one of
tional fields care very little about individuals’ social stability and reproduction. This is inten-
positions in fields and must abstract up to the tional, as it is Bourdieu’s goal to understand and
organizational level when explaining an “actor’s” solve the agent-structure problem by positing
subjective orientations, strategies for obtaining how both actors (whether consciously or uncon-
legitimacy, struggles for resources, etc. Although sciously) and structures correspond to one
we take no issue with this abstraction (we very another and are complicit in the reproduction of
much view organizations as actors in social social order. For Bourdieu, although fields are the
space), we recognize that it is less intuitive to sites of constant struggle and competition
think only of organizations as social actors in a between the dominant and dominated, the social
field. Bourdieu’s theory of fields, on the other order ultimately tends to be reproduced. True, it
hand, deals primarily with individuals as field is not uncommon for groups to succeed their
actors and locates dispositions and practices pri- prior equivalent group in terms of their place in
marily in individuals’ trajectories through social the social order; this is what Bourdieu calls the
space.8 The consequences for the theory of SAF’s “order of successions.” (Bourdieu 1984: 163).
flexibility in scaling up or down is non-trivial, as The key here, however, is that relations between
it forces Fligstein and McAdam (2012) to develop groups in a field (i.e., the social distance between
a more general, yet still workable, theory of rela- them) remain mostly unchanged.
tions between field actors, no matter whether Bourdieu touches upon the conditions for how
they are individuals or organizations. field logics could change when he mentions crisis
as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for
the questioning of doxa. Doxa is the undiscussed,
10.6 Field Emergence, Stability, taken-for-granted aspect of the social world.
and Change Within it are those systems of classification, tra-
ditions, and rules for interaction that are so legiti-
We turn now to a discussion of how each theory mate and ingrained that they are taken for granted
deals with field-level emergence, stability, and as self-evident ‘truths’ about the world (Bourdieu
change. In short, Fligstein and McAdam’s theory 1977: 169).9 Crisis can lead to the arbitrariness of
the doxa being revealed to field actors’ conscious-
8
We acknowledge that Bourdieu did not solely study
fields in which individuals were the primary participants.
9
For example, he identifies firms as the key players in the We note the affinities between Bourdieu’s doxa and a
economic field and speaks of the importance of their inter- highly objectivated and internalized social reality, as
actions with the state (Bourdieu 2005). He also links elite defined by Berger and Luckmann (1967), or a highly insti-
universities, corporations, and the state to the field of tutionalized social institution (Meyer and Rowan 1977;
power (Bourdieu 1996a). Jepperson 1991).
10 Varieties of Sociological Field Theory 197
ness and thereby finding its way into the universe institutional research on organizational fields
of discourse, where orthodox and heterodox since DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) seminal
opinions can be expressed and contested. article has pertained to how isomorphism among
However, Bourdieu does not systematically theo- organizations occurs after an organizational field
rize what brings about such moments of crisis, exists and, relatedly, how fields are stable and
nor does he explicitly theorize the additional reproducible. In our view, then, the neo-
condition(s) besides crisis that result in a critical institutional formulation of field theory has
discourse. accounted for field stability and field reproduc-
Even when the doxa is brought into the uni- tion quite well. However, from the outset, it
verse of discourse, such questioning does not lacked a systematic theory of field emergence
necessarily lead to challengers displacing the and divergent field-level transformation.10 A new
dominant class at the top of the field hierarchy. generation of neo-institutional scholars has partly
Indeed, challengers with heterodox views of the corrected for these limitations by proposing that
world rarely displace the dominant group, who institutional change can occur by way of institu-
work to preserve the “official” ways of thinking tional entrepreneurship, but, as we have argued,
and speaking about the world and who aim to this is less a systematic theory of field change and
censor heterodox views. Finally, and most impor- more a thinly veiled “heroic man” theory of
tantly, on the rare occasions that challengers do change that does not link entrepreneur-led change
manage to displace incumbents as the dominant to broader field conditions.
actors in a field (e.g., Bourdieu 1996b), they tend The under-development of theories of field
to do so by using, and therefore reproducing, the emergence and divergent change can be traced
underlying “rules of the game” on which the field back to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) all-too-
is based. For example, in Bourdieu’s studies of brief discussion of the formation of an organiza-
the fields of cultural production (e.g., art, litera- tional field (or in their words, how it is that a set of
ture, theatre), one of the most fundamental prin- organizations come to be “institutionally
ciples of these fields, especially for the dominant, defined”). Using Giddens’s (1979) terminology,
is an outward indifference to or disavowal of the they propose that a set of organizations comes to
profit motive. Not coincidentally, the best strat- be a field through a process of “structuration:” (1)
egy for challenger groups to unseat the dominant interaction among organizations involved in some
cultural producers within the field is to disavow area of social life increases, (2) hierarchies and
the commercial and promote their own activities coalitions develop, (3) the amount of information
and products as “purer” art than that of the domi- with which field members must contend increases,
nant group. In doing so, however, the fundamen- and (4) awareness among field members that they
tal logic of the field only gets reinforced. “Thus,” are involved in a common enterprise develops.
Bourdieu writes, “[challengers’] revolutions are However, the remaining focus of their article cen-
only ever partial ones, which displace the censor- ters around institutional isomorphism in an
ships and transgress the conventions but do so in already-existing organizational field and, as a cor-
the name of the same underlying principles” ollary, how actors follow rules or scripts, either
(Bourdieu 1993: 83–84). consciously by imitation or coercion or uncon-
sciously by tacit agreement (Jepperson 1991).
Of course, we do not mean to say that
10.6.2 Neo-institutional Field Theory neo-institutional literature has failed to elabo-
rate any other concepts of field emergence and
Although recent efforts by institutional scholars change after DiMaggio’s (1988, 1991) seminal
have improved the situation, the neo-institutional
theory of organizational fields continues to lack a 10
Neo-institutional scholars have provided a wealth of
well-developed and empirically tested theory of theoretical and empirical insights into convergent change
field emergence and change. The majority of neo- (i.e., isomorphism) once a field exists.
198 D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein
works on institutional entrepreneurship. Indeed, Lounsbury et al. 2003; Morrill 2006). An exem-
since that time, several subfields within the plar of this line of scholarship is Morrill’s (2006)
neo-institutionalist literature have developed analysis of the “interstitial emergence” of the
lines of inquiry that account for the possibility of court-based alternative dispute resolution field.11
institutional contestation and change. Examples The key to the institutionalization of alternative
include the continued development of the afore- dispute resolution was the innovation of prac-
mentioned institutional entrepreneurship litera- tices, mobilization of resources, and champion-
ture as well as the institutional work (Lawrence ing of ideas by networks of actors who were
et al. 2009) and institutional logics (Thornton located in overlapping fields. Their ideas and
et al. 2012) perspectives. There has also been a practices gained legitimacy because they reso-
concurrent increase in empirical studies of insti- nated with different players across overlapping
tutional change (for reviews, see Clemens and fields. As we discuss below, the importance of
Cook 1999; Schneiberg and Clemens 2006: 217– field linkages and borders to the emergence of
220). However, we maintain that a field theory of new fields is an insight developed further in the
field emergence and divergent field change, cast theory of SAFs.
specifically within the classic neo-institutionalist
framework of organizational fields, is underde-
veloped compared to its theories of field stability 10.6.3 Strategic Action Fields
and isomorphic field change.
One particularly promising avenue for cor- Of the three contemporary field theories dis-
recting this weakness, however, has been the inte- cussed here, the theory of SAFs provides the
gration of social movement theory with clearest yet most nuanced conceptualization of
neo-institutional theories of organizations. A few field emergence, stability, and change (see
sociologists have bridged social movements and Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 84–113; Fligstein
organizational analysis for decades (Zald and 2013). Not only does it depict SAFs as sites of
Ash 1966; see Zald and McCarthy 1987). constant internal change due to conflict and jock-
Moreover, some of the classic works in the social eying for position (similar to Bourdieu’s fields),
movement literature took field-like approaches it also sees entire field structures, especially at
even if they did not cite field theories at the time. certain points in their evolution, as being more
For example, McCarthy and Zald (1973) devel- subject to change than the other two theories. We
oped a multi-leveled approach to social move- discuss each of these issues in this section.
ment organizations and theorized meso-level SAFs emerge through a process akin to a
“social movement industries” (McCarthy and social movement. An emerging field is a socially
Zald 1973), which are like fields of social move- constructed arena in which two or more actors
ment organizations oriented to the same general orient their actions toward one another but have
social issue. Additionally, McAdam (1999) took not yet constructed a stable order with routinized
a field-like analytic strategy by situating the patterns of relations and commonly shared rules
American civil rights movement within the for interaction. Similar to Morrill’s (2006) inter-
broader political and economic environments in stitial emergence thesis, SAFs begin to form typi-
which it was embedded and the institutions that cally after some kind of exogenous change, more
fostered black protest. often than not in nearby proximate fields. This
Since the early 2000s, however, we have wit- happens through “emergent mobilization,” a
nessed an increase in such scholarship (Davis social movement-like process in which actors
et al. 2005). Because of that, what we may still begin fashioning new lines of interaction and
label neo-institutional studies have increasingly shared understandings after (1) collectively
incorporated ideas from social movement theory
and have more directly linked institutional emer- 11
Morrill borrows the term “interstitial emergence” from
gence to field emergence (Rao et al. 2000; Mann (1986).
10 Varieties of Sociological Field Theory 199
attributing a threat or opportunity, (2) appropriat- SAFs become increasingly subject to change.
ing organizational resources needed to mobilize SAFs are subject to two distinct kinds of field-
and sustain resources, and (3) collectively engag- level change: (1) continuous piecemeal change,
ing in innovative action that leads to sustained the more common situation in which change is
interaction in previously unorganized social gradual and due to internal struggles and jockey-
space (McAdam 1999; McAdam et al. 2001). ing for position, and (2) revolutionary change, in
As it is at every stage in the life of a SAF, which a new field emerges in unorganized social
social skill is vitally important here, as actors space and/or displaces another field. Both kinds
fashion the shared understandings that we dis- of change occur, but under different conditions.
cussed in our overview of the theory of SAFs. Change is constantly occurring within SAFs
The state can also facilitate field emergence because actors constantly jockey for position
through processes such as licensing, passing/ within fields, whether through cooperation with
repealing laws, and the awarding of government allies or conflict with adversaries. Actors can
contracts. Internal governance units, also dis- occasionally shift strategies, forge subtle new
cussed earlier, can further encourage stability. alliances, and make small gains or losses in their
Actors organize the structure of their emerging position relative to others. However, from a field-
field along a continuum of cooperation and coali- wide perspective, these are usually piecemeal
tion on one end and hierarchy and differences in changes because incumbent field actors, who
power on the other. Whether an emerging field have access to relatively more resources and con-
will become a stable, reproducible field depends, trol the “rules of the game” in a SAF, can usually
in part, on how it gets organized; as one moves reinforce their positions and therefore reproduce
toward either extreme of this continuum of field the field order. Fligstein and McAdam (2012:
organization, the likelihood of stability increases 103) do note, however, that these gradual incre-
because both extremes imply clear role structures mental changes, even if they usually result in
for the actors. overall field reproduction, can have aggregate
A field becomes settled when its actors have a effects. Eventually, they can undermine the social
general consensus regarding field rules and cul- order to a ‘tipping point’ and begin the process of
tural norms. Like highly institutionalized organi- emergent mobilization discussed above or to
zational fields, highly settled SAFs typically get ‘episodes of contention,’ in which the shared
reproduced. Because incumbents and challengers understandings on which fields are based become
continue to engage in conflict even in settled in flux and result in periods of sustained conten-
SAFs, however, they share more similarities to tious interaction among field actors. Change is
Bourdieu’s fields. Incumbents in such a settled more possible in both situations than in settled
field will have an interest in maintaining field sta- fields.
bility. They will also have the resources to exer- The more common sources of transformative
cise power over challengers and will enjoy the field change, however, come from outside of the
benefit of the rules of the field, which they likely field. First, fields may be transformed by invad-
constructed, being slanted in their favor. Perhaps ing groups that had not previously been active
even more importantly, because actors in settled players in the focal field. These outsiders will not
fields are more likely than those in unsettled be as bound by the conventional rules and under-
fields to share common understandings and have standings of the field as challengers who had
similar conceptions of possible alternatives, even already been field players. The success of outsid-
challengers in these fields usually will not mount ers at altering the field order may depend on
serious challenges to the social order absent an many factors, including their strength prior to
exogenous shock to the field. invasion, the proximity (in social space) of their
However, not all SAFs are highly settled. In former field to the target field, and their social
the theory of SAFs, settlement is a matter of skill in forging allies and mobilizing defectors.
degree. As the degree of settlement decreases, Second, transformative change can be due to
200 D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein
large-scale, macro-level events that disrupt pendent field relations can also buffer against
numerous field linkages and lead to crises. These change to the focal field (Fligstein and McAdam
often, but not always, involve the state. Examples 2012: 59–61). This is because that field can count
include economic depressions, wars, and regime on the reciprocal legitimacy benefits and resource
change. flows that it shares with related fields to resist
The third and final exogenous source of trans- change from within. Fligstein and McAdam
formative change for SAFs emanates from (2012: 61) cite Bourdieu’s (1996a) study of elite
Fligstein and McAdam’s emphasis on inter-field universities, corporations, and the state in France
linkages. The effects of a field’s relations with as an example of how fields depend on one
other fields traditionally have been under- another to reproduce their positions – elite uni-
theorized, as field-level studies tend to examine versities depend on the state and elite corpora-
only the internal dynamics of a focal field or else tions to hire their graduates into prestigious jobs,
capture the structure of external field relations and the state and corporations depend on the cre-
without developing a general theoretical frame- dentialing process that elite universities provide.
work for field interrelations. Bourdieu, for exam- We note, however, that Bourdieu’s interdepen-
ple, stated: “I believe indeed that there are no dencies here ultimately serve to reproduce order
trans-historic laws of the relations between fields, in an even-higher, more abstract field (the “field
that we must investigate each historical case sep- of power”); his is not a direct account of interde-
arately” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 109) pendencies buffering against change within a
(emphasis in original). However, for Fligstein focal field.
and McAdam (2012: 18, 59, 100–101), fields are In conclusion, Fligstein and McAdam (2012)
not isolated social systems; they stand in relation provide a more detailed, systematic account of
to other fields in a broader social space. These field emergence and divergent change than neo-
relations play a key role in whether a field will institutional theorists of organizational fields.
change or remain stable. The authors conceptual- They are also much clearer than Bourdieu on the
ize field-to-field linkages mostly based on the conditions under which field change can occur.
extent to which fields are dependent or interde- Whereas Bourdieu really only points to rare
pendent with other fields in social space. times of crisis, in which the doxa may be revealed
Because fields are often tied, via dependen- and questioned by the dominated members of a
cies or interdependencies, to other fields, a field (as discussed above), Fligstein and McAdam
destabilizing change in one field is “like a stone (2012) elaborate a clearer and more elegant
thrown in a still pond, sending ripples outward framework for the mechanisms of field stability
to all proximate fields” (Fligstein and McAdam and change.
2011: 9). Usually, such a ripple is not so disrup-
tive as to lead to an episode of contention within
a field. But dependent field relationships yield 10.7 Discussion and Conclusion
unequal power relations and unidirectional
influence by the dominant field, making a field In this essay, we have pursued two goals. First,
particularly susceptible to change when there is we have tried to show that a general notion of
rupture or crisis in the field on which it a field can be gleaned from the work of neo-
depends.12 institutionalists in organizational theory,
In contrast to the idea of dependent field rela- Bourdieu, and Fligstein and McAdam’s theory of
tions leading to change to a focal field, interde- SAFs. The consensus emphasizes the nature of
fields as meso-level social orders populated with
12
actors who take one another into account in their
As we noted in our overview of the theory of SAFs, field
actions. Second, while these ideal-typical ver-
dependencies can be based on legal or bureaucratic
authority and on resource dependencies (Pfeffer and sions of field theories have many agreements,
Salancik 1978). they differ markedly in terms of how they under-
10 Varieties of Sociological Field Theory 201
stand the role of actors, power, consensus, and This is certainly also an empirical question. So,
the dynamics of fields. for example, figuring out how to tell if a particu-
In order to make progress on understanding lar field is more driven by legitimacy, power and
the significance of these disagreements, our basic dominance, or identify and cooperation, is a dif-
message is that these differences should be con- ficult question that we have little experience
fronted and explored not just theoretically, but attempting to answer empirically.
empirically. Scholars should then be reflexive Field theory also can occupy an ambiguous
about how to revise theory in light of the differ- epistemological status. On the one hand, field
ences. Instead of treating these ideas as separate theorists may assume that fields are real, they can
schools of thought about fields, we should place be measured, and their effects discerned. This
them more directly in conversation with one would imply a more positivist or realist approach
another by examining which way of thinking to fields that would emphasize common struc-
about fields makes more sense in certain kinds of tures and mechanisms that researchers could look
situations. for and model across settings. But, one can also
It is useful to consider how to proceed to adju- view field theory as a set of concepts, ideal types
dicate these differences of opinion. What should that help researchers make sense of some histori-
be done next is both conceptual and empirical. cal situation. Here, analysts deploy the sparse
The concepts of field theory have been fleshed ideas of which field theory consists to help them
out in an abstract manner. The degree to which put a structure onto empirical materials, be they
they differ needs to be made more explicit in historical, ethnographic, or quantitative. We are
order for them to be empirically useful. At the comfortable with either version of field theory.
same time, while we have many studies that But some scholars will find it difficult to take
employ field theory in one form or another, we seriously those who opt for one or the other view
have very little general sense of how to produce of fields.
measurement and comparability in observation Field theory also makes very general claims
in order to evaluate the conceptual disagree- about its empirical scope. Given our view that
ments. So, for example, Bourdieu’s one can observe fields in most of organized social
Distinction (1984) remains one of the few com- life, it is necessary to consider what field theory
prehensive field-level studies of social life. But does and does not apply to. Indeed, one can see
the issues it raises have simply not been addressed field theory as a nascent attempt at a general the-
consistently from a specifically field-theoretic ory of society. Although Bourdieu tried to main-
point of view. Instead, scholars have picked and tain his perspective was not such a theory, it is
chosen aspects of Bourdieu’s framework and difficult given the wide-ranging character of his
ignored the general issue of the degree to which work and the myriad topics he investigated not to
such a field of cultural production exists and how see field theory in this way. The theory of SAFs is
stable it may be across time and place (Sallaz and a useful model because it builds upon not only
Zavisca 2007). the other field theories discussed in this chapter
Moreover, scholars should clarify whether or but also incorporates other lines of inquiry like
not the disagreements between field theories is a social movement theory, social psychology, and
matter of specifying more clearly the possible identity theory to create a novel and general the-
scope conditions of each of these perspectives or ory of action and structure.
of their fundamental incompatibility. Again, this Another way to test the generalizability of
issue is both conceptual and empirical. From a field theory is to engage other perspectives that
conceptual point of view, it may be that there are posit meso-level processes but do not use the
conditions where one or the other perspective field idea. We have only mentioned network anal-
operates to make better sense of the world. Our ysis and the institutional logics perspectives. But
ability to specify the mechanisms by which these there are others. For example, population ecology
concepts actually operate need to be clarified. in organizational theory, with its conception of
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Part III
A Coherent Social Universe
Institutional Spheres: The Macro-
Structure and Culture of Social Life 11
Seth Abrutyn
and practical reasons for doing so. Second, the concerned with organizations (cf. Powell and
major elements of institutions are elucidated, DiMaggio 1991; Nee 2005)—is dizzying. That
focusing particularly on the evolutionary, eco- is, if the presidency, the handshake, Harvard, and
logical, and entrepreneurial dynamics of institu- sexism are all institutions (cf. Jepperson
tional spheres. Third, and final, we consider the 1991:144), then one must logically ask what is
“frontiers” of institutional analysis. In particular, not an institution? Or, perhaps the real question
the temporal and symbolic spaces of institutional is, “are the differences in these phenomena more
domains seem ripe for major advances, while the important than their similarities?” Besides the
physical and social dimensions remain important criticism surrounding the integration of collo-
and in need of further consideration. quial vagaries with social scientific precision, we
might raise several other issues with the new
institutionalism. First, a close examination of the
11.2 The Many Varieties new institutionalist tradition reveals a focus on
organizations with mostly taken for granted con-
I have commented elsewhere that the concept sideration of what the institution is, often point-
institution is one of the most commonly used ing to an underexamined environment in which
concepts in sociology, yet is perhaps one of the organizations do things (Sutton et al. 1994;
vaguest and least precisely defined (Abrutyn Sutton and Dobbin 1996; Edelman and Suchman
2009b, 2014b). An exhaustive review is not nec- 1997). Second, like a lot of contemporary sociol-
essary, though it is worth noting the most com- ogy, there is an ahistorical bias. Alford and
mon usages before moving on. Colloquially, an Friedland’s (1985) work, for example, is rooted
institution often refers to an enduring organiza- in modernity and things like the “state” or “capi-
tion or association (e.g., Harvard; a research cen- talism,” which do not have one-to-one compari-
ter), a long-standing member of said organization sons in other times, unless we take an overly
(e.g., a professor whose existence is synonymous simplistic Marxian view of polity or economy.
with the department) or a formal position (e.g., Third, and closely related, neo-institutionalists
the Presidency); it may also refer to an enduring have been criticized for overemphasizing conver-
custom (e.g., the handshake) or law. Early social gence and isomorphism, while ignoring the tre-
scientists, and many today, used it to refer to mendous variation in “state” or “capitalism.” At
enduring, patterned actions (e.g., marriage) or times, the John Meyer “school” seems to assume
legal relations (e.g., private property), while rationality is the master process and all organiza-
those like Spencer used it both to refer to broader tions, regardless of local custom or broader
spheres of social structure like religion or law as inequalities in the world-system, easily conform
well as the interrelated components that shaped in lockstep to the basic pattern (Boli et al. 1985;
social action. More recently, a loosely coupled Thomas et al. 1987). And thus it might be tempt-
group of scholars and scholarship, new or neo- ing to scrap the term itself, yet Durkheim (1895
institutionalists, use it in several divergent ways: [1982]:45) once described sociology as the “sci-
cultural myths and patterns that generate isomor- ence of institutions,” which both speaks to the
phism (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and centrality of the concept and the necessity in
Powell 1983); “rules of the game” that govern more precisely defining it.
economic organizations (North 2005); forces of However, rather than try and reinvent the
broad social control with varying levels of nor- wheel, or even challenge the status quo, this
mative, regulative, and cognitive-cultural mecha- essay avoids the term institution to some degree,
nisms (Scott 2001); or, broad organizational and its verb form institutionalization, for a more
forms of modernity like “capitalism,” “the State,” precise concept: institutional sphere or domain.
or the “church” (Friedland and Alford 1991). Doing so affords us several ways to leverage
The number of uses—many of which stem greater swaths of sociological theory and
from the new institutionalist school that is largely research. First, it allows us to rescue aspects of
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 209
functionalism and its close cousins (Shils 1975; institutional spheres), vary in terms of their level
Eisenstadt 1964, 1980; Turner 2003; Luhmann of differentiation and, more importantly, auton-
2012) that may shed insights when consider in omy (Abrutyn 2009b).
new light. Second, it moves us away from “sys- Differentiation occurs along four axes, the
tem” language that overemphasizes similarities first three of which are common whereas the
across levels of social reality so that we can talk fourth is directly related to autonomy: physical,
about meaningful differences, as well as employ temporal, social, and symbolic. By physical, we
wide ranging explanatory frames like networks are referring to the act of carving up geographic
or social psychology. Third, and perhaps most space and setting it aside for activities related to
importantly, we can move beyond the vague cul- an institutional sphere; as well as stratifying
tural theories of Parsons and functionalism (see access to these spaces. This may include build-
Chap. 6) and offer a robust cultural theory to bet- ings, monuments, statues, and the like. Temporal
ter balance the structural dimensions of institu- differentiation refers to the act of setting aside
tions. This alone allows us to leverage the distinct time for activities, as well as hierarchi-
institutional logics perspective (Thornton et al. calizing how time shapes action, goals, and deci-
2012) as well as revisit Weber’s (1946) social sions. Temporal differentiation may resolve
psychological work on worldviews, ideas, and space limitations in so far as a space serves as an
interests surrounding social orders. Fourth, we arena for two or more institutions, but only dur-
can introduce and embed the notion of history ing certain times. Social differentiation involves
and evolutionary processes to underscore the the creation of new roles and status distinctions
ubiquity of institutional spheres, highlight some linked to the emergence of new groups, catego-
of the processes of change, and find the points of ries, and organizational units. The earliest form
sociocultural and historic specificity that lend of this may be the growth of patri- and matrilines
discrete texture to time and place. that signify a person’s kinship position, descent,
and inheritance (Levi-Strauss 1969). Finally,
symbolic differentiation refers to the concomi-
11.3 Institutional Spheres tant generalization and particularization of cul-
ture. On the one hand, generalization proceeds as
In essence, institutional spheres are the macro- space, time, and social relations grow complex
level structural and cultural milieus in which and differentiated, as one mechanism of bringing
most lower-order phenomena (e.g., fields; orga- all of these disparate pieces together (Alexander
nizations; encounters) are organized and con- 1988). On the other hand, each disparate unit can
nected (Turner 2010). Though one can imagine a come to “claim” a part of the broader culture as
limitless number of potential spheres, ethno- signifying something unique about it.
graphic, historical, and sociological analyses Thus, returning to institutional spheres, each
point to a select set of domains that may be sphere in a given society varies in terms of its
deemed institutions. In nearly every society, we level of physical, temporal, social, and symbolic
find kinship (Fox 1967), political (Johnson and differentiation. The greater is the degree to which
Earle 2000), religious (Radin 1937 [1957]), eco- each type of differentiation is higher, the greater is
nomic (Sahlins 1972), and legal spheres the degree to which the institutional sphere will be
(Malinowski 1959); as well as, arguably, educa- distinguishable by a significant proportion of the
tion (Turner 2003) and, perhaps, military (Collins population vis-à-vis other institutions. Put another
1986). In modern societies medicine (Starr 1982), way, as polity becomes distinct from kinship
science (Abrutyn 2009a), art (Luhmann 2000), around 5,000 years ago, the Palace and other pub-
and possibly media and/or sport (Abrutyn 2014b) lic spaces become distinct from kinship buildings
join this list. Across time and space institutional in size and scale—and, to some degree, function;
spheres, and what may be called a society’s insti- public holidays and rituals are likewise distinct
tutional complex (or the total configuration of from local, familial rituals; kin relations and rela-
210 S. Abrutyn
tions between subject and king become cogni- they come to cognitively understand religion as
tively and materially consequential; and, finally, separate—in the abstract and ideal—from polity
the polity usurps certain symbols that come to or economy (Abrutyn 2014a); or, in the language
signify power and force as opposed to loyalty and of some institutional scholars, a unique logic, or
love found in the family (Abrutyn 2015b). symbols and practices that give “meaning to
Differentiation, however, does not necessarily [actors] daily activity, organize time and space,
mean autonomy, as the Palace in Mesopotamian and reproduce [actor’s] lives and experiences”
society was often conceptualized as a kinship (Thornton et al. 2012:2), comes to mold the shape
domain, but one whose function mattered more and texture of religion vis-à-vis kinship or econ-
than the ordinary house—e.g., the king’s principal omy. “How autonomous” is an empirical ques-
function was to uphold the secular and sacred tion revolving around historical factors, a given
order (Yoffee 2005). But autonomy cannot emerge sphere’s relationship to other spheres, and the
without increasing levels of all four types of dif- ease with which resources (people, generalized
ferentiation; especially symbolic. media, etc.) flow across one sphere to the other
By autonomy, we mean the process by which signifying the circulation of intra-institutional
institutional spheres become discrete cultural meanings to other spheres. What matters, for
spaces in so far as the physical, temporal, social, now, is that societies are characterized by institu-
and symbolic elements come to orient most peo- tional spheres having greater or lesser autonomy;
ple’s emotions, attitudes, and actions towards the and which ones are more autonomous (as well as
institutional sphere’s cultural system and source how many have become relatively autonomous)
of authority (Abrutyn 2014b).1 On your way to matters for understanding the underlying ethos of
work, driving by a church, for instance, comes to a given group of people as well as why cultural
signify a distinct set of actors, actions, attitudes realities as expressed in micro-level processes
and values, goals and preferences, and temporal like identities vary across time and space.
dimensions. Even if an individual does not belong
to the church or the broader religion, she can ori-
ent herself towards that building as if it is a 11.3.1 Evolutionary Institutionalism
microcosm of the religious sphere; and, as we
shall see, the closer the actor is to the religious An evolutionary analysis is essential to theoriz-
sphere, the more salient the meanings of the ing about institutional domains and their struc-
church will be when she drives past it. Hence, tural and cultural components; as well as what I
autonomy matters because institutional spheres call institutional ecology (see below). That is,
come to penetrate the everyday lived experience institutions cannot be divorced from the long nar-
of significant portions of the population such that rative of human history and the varieties of soci-
etal arrangements. Moreover, as Turner (2003)
1
The concept of autonomy is borrowed from Niklas has asserted, neo-evolutionary thought provides
Luhmann’s (2012) neo-system’s theory. While Luhmann us with the foundations for rehabilitating the
saw the system autonomy as tantamount to closure and, functionalist trope of needs or requisites in ways
thus, a solution to the problem of differentiation, our con-
ceptualization moves away from closure to a more that illuminate why humans construct macro-
Weberian, social phenomenological perspective: auton- level spaces and why there are delimited numbers
omy means spheres become relatively discrete cultural of institutional spheres (Abrutyn 2013a, b,
systems that increase the probability that an actor or set of 2015a). Thus, an evolutionary perspective sheds
actions will orient their emotions, attitudes, and actions
when physically or cognitively near the institutional light on why the structure and culture of institu-
sphere. Hence why physical, temporal, social, and sym- tional spheres look the way they do.
bolic space matters: all four of these dimensions can make In the following section, we consider what
salient one institutional sphere’s cultural reality vis-à-vis institutional evolution is by examining (a) the
others.
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 211
material exigencies commonly driving societal They are macro in so far as they contain large
evolution, (b) the universal human concerns that inventories of cultural elements that few, if any
motivate humans, individually and collectively, one person, can know or access. However, these
try to solve problems around under the pressure libraries of culture are grafted onto physical, tem-
of one or more of these material exigencies, and poral, social, and symbolic spaces that are
(c) the role institutional entrepreneurs play in embodied in a series of encounters (more or less
evolution. Before exploring these three main top- micro). Unlike libraries, institutional spheres are
ics, a brief elucidation of my view on sociocul- structural spaces with real positions reflective of
tural evolution is in order. power and authority, stratification patterns unique
to the sphere and also indicative of broader soci-
11.3.1.1 Sociocultural Evolution etal patterns, and resource flows (Abrutyn
Evolutionary thought and/or concepts have been 2014b:147–171). Thus, they do not serve as pas-
a staple in sociology since Marx, Spencer, and sive sites of storage, but also as arenas of compe-
Durkheim, as well as many other now-forgotten tition and conflict that further fuel sociocultural
sociologists. Much of this thinking occurred evolution. If they are macro in that they contain
before the modern synthesis of Darwinian natural numerous elements beyond the control of any
selection and Mendelian genetics (cf. Mayr one person, they are also macro in so far as they
2001), and before the types of empirical data nec- contain series of embedded sites of contesta-
essary to draw good inferences were readily tion—in many ways, like Fligstein and McAdam’s
available. For many early sociologists, evolution (2011) notion of embedded fields of strategic
implicitly or explicitly meant progressive gradual action (see also Chap. 10)—as well as numerous
change that unfolded primarily at the macro-level structural connections like divisions of labor, pat-
in terms of time and space. It both fit the crude terns of exchange, and the like that tenuously link
efforts at societal classification (e.g., savages- various levels of social reality as well as these
barbarians-civilized societies), and the growing embedded sites of contestation.
social scientific efforts to understand colonized Because they are macro and collective and
peoples. Hence, many of the criticisms of highly complex in their substance, institutions do
Eurocentrism were at least partially valid. In the not evolve based on Darwinian principles—
1960s, evolutionism returned in the form of stage though, like all things attached to the biotic
models that sought to learn from the past (Bellah world, institutions can be wiped out along with a
1964; Lenski 1966; Parsons 1966). These too society in the face of massive environmental
failed to use evolutionary principles and were change. To draw, then, from Turner (2010), insti-
more about discerning developmental stages and tutional spheres reflect two of our very own theo-
less about theorizing about sociocultural evolu- rists’ models of evolution: Spencerian and
tion (Blute 2010). In the last 25 years, neo- Durkheimian. The gist of Spencer’s model chal-
evolutionary theories have grown exponentially lenges purist Darwinian thinking because it does
(for a review, see Chap. 24). not rely on competition between species or traits
For our purposes, we are interested primarily or whatever is the unit of selection. Instead, he
in how institutions evolve, with autonomy being posited that societies were always at risk of col-
the principal dimension along which we can lapse or conquest because environmental exigen-
measure institutional evolution. Like libraries, cies were not so much a constant, but an inherent
institutional spheres become warehouses of risk of population growth and density; under
material and symbolic elements which are some- “normal” conditions, existing structural (and I
times combined into extant patterns that reflect would argue cultural) solutions could be mobi-
past solutions, but remain capable of being lized to resolve exigencies, but often times these
recombined, forgotten and rediscovered, and were not sufficient and a society faced a “choice”:
manipulated in previously unforeseen ways. either create new structural (and/or cultural)
212 S. Abrutyn
arrangements to resolve the problems or risk benefit (cf. Chaps. 25 and 26; also, Abrutyn and
breaking down.2 Spencerian evolutionary pro- Van Ness 2015).
cesses, then, operate by purposive, directed In short, evolutionary processes are real in
efforts of people in the face of real (and I would sociology. Though our focus is on how and why
add, perceived) problems. As we shall see below, institutions evolve, there are plenty of other lev-
I believe Spencerian evolution also requires els of evolution under which other principles
thinking about the link between macro-exigencies apply (Blute 2010). By moving towards
and micro-level exigencies, which often goes Spencerian and Durkheimian processes, how-
unexamined and assumed. ever, we gain several advantages to strict
Durkheimian selection processes are more Darwinian accounts. First, we are freed from
similar to Darwinian. In essence, Durkheim saw using biological concepts as metaphors for socio-
competition between individuals or groups for cultural evolution when they are not really one-
position and resources as the driving force of to-one fits. Second, they open the door to thinking
sociocultural evolution: some individuals or about who, that is what actual persons, are affect-
groups would prove more “fit” for a niche or ing evolution; as well as when, why, and how.
position, while others would create new special- Third, we can bury unidirectional and unilinear
izations, carve out new niches, or die. This model stage models for good, acknowledging that evo-
is more of an ecological evolutionism that has lution is not necessary progressive in terms of
been developed extensively by human ecologists growing complexity or differentiation, but in fact,
(Hawley 1986) and organizational ecologists evolution may mean different things across cases.
(Hannan and Freeman 1977). Like Darwinian While Bellah (1964), for instance, considers the
processes, competition over resources and spe- Protestant reformation a moment of increasing
cialization are key components; unlike Darwinian complexity, I would characterize this transforma-
processes, Durkheim acknowledges that culture tive event as a moment of simplification when
has the capacity to overcome the biotic world, comparing the organizational, material, and sym-
expand resource bases, and reduce conflicts— bolic elements of Protestantism to Catholicism.
and thus, like Spencer’s model, humans can and Likewise, institutional evolution may be the pro-
do act purposively and creatively. Moreover, as cess by which one or more institutions grow in
strategic action field theorists (Fligstein and autonomy, or it may reflect the changing levels of
McAdams 2011)—who, admittedly, are not evo- autonomy across a series of institutions including
lutionists—would add: competitions, their out- the loss of autonomy in some cases. Finally, as
comes, and thereby potential evolutionary Abrutyn and Lawrence (2010) have argued else-
change, are not always blind and directionless where, evolution though often gradual and slow,
from a Durkheimian perspective, but do involve is sometimes rapid qualitative transformation; it
strategizing, purposive actors working to improve often depends on the case, the historical scale one
their position, protect their power, destroy their is interested in, and how we relativize temporal-
opponents, and, under other circumstances, ity. We turn, now, to the basic material exigencies
increase the collective’s (or some segment of it) that seem ubiquitous to all societies.
2
First, by “choice” I do not believe Spencer literally saw 11.3.1.2 The Material Exigencies
societies as making choices. He was aware that supraor- One of the principal critiques of structural-
ganisms, like societies, are not like organisms because
functionalism is that it relies too heavily on needs
they have myriad “central nervous system” and therefore
choices require quotations. Second, Spencer was not or requisites for societal equilibria (Parsons 1951);
naïve to think the process was as simple as create new moreover, these needs are often conceptualized as
structures and/or cultures or collapse. His model was social or collective needs, which imply a supra-
recursive, and when solutions were not found or were
consciousness. Herbert Spencer, for instance,
unsuccessfully implemented, rather than collapse, exigen-
cies likely became amplified or intensified or new exigen- famously argued that all societies had to deal with
cies emerged (Turner 2010). three basic adaptive problems (Turner 1985):
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 213
operation (production of resources and reproduc- able outcomes. Nor can we adopt the functionalist
tion of people); distribution; and, regulation (con- perspective that often whitewashes (1) the purpo-
trolling and coordinating differentiated social sive efforts to deal with these pressures—or, to
units). While other functionalists would provide deal with the secondary problems that people
their own lists, the basic argument was the same: perceive like threats to a person or group’s stan-
as societies grow larger, social equilibria are upset; dard of living, (2) the proposed solutions that are
in part, new structures with discrete functions sometimes beneficial to one group vis-à-vis oth-
emerge to deal with imbalance, but also cause new ers, and (3) the maladaptive consequences of
imbalances that are ultimately reduced by new short-sighted solutions. One solution Turner
integrative mechanisms. In short, structural differ- (2003) has offered is to focus, instead, on selec-
entiation is always the master process in function- tion pressures, or the types of generic forces that,
alism, with emphasis either on the process of when present, press against a social unit’s extant
differentiation and its consequences (e.g., Spencer) structure and culture in ways that lead to change;
or on the integrative mechanisms that bring whether coerced, unintentional, or intentional.
differentiated society back into harmony (e.g., Though an exhaustive list of selection pressures
Durkheim). would be preferable, for our purposes we can
Several problems emerge with structural- provide several exogenous and endogenous
functional logic. First, there is a sense of inevita- examples: population growth or rapid decline;
bility and conservativism in most functionalisms. population and social density; material, human,
Durkheim, well aware of the competition and and/or symbolic resource scarcity; heterogeneity,
conflict found in modern, urban differentiated stratification, and inequality; external threats or
societies, incessantly searched for the lynchpin internal conflict; ecological degradation or cli-
that balanced society; Parsons (1951), a worse matic disasters. What links these examples
offender, propagated a version of functionalism together are several key aspects: (1) they all have
that led to studies legitimating inequality as the potential to threaten the survival of a given
“healthy” for society (Davis and Moore 1945). social unit; (2) they can appear, in variable size,
Second, most “solutions” to the problem of inte- scale, and magnitude, across all levels of social
gration were weak or underdeveloped cultural reality; (3) they all have short- and long-run
solutions: for Durkheim, it was ritual and collec- structural and cultural solutions that are just as
tive effervescence; Parsons settled on universal likely to fail or create new secondary pressures,
value-patterns; and for Merton, it was norms. In as succeed; (4) more often than not, solutions
all of these cases, the outlines of a truly cultural include reconfiguring the physical, temporal,
solution to the problem of integration is present, social, or symbolic spaces in directions of either
yet in functionalism always put structure ahead greater or lesser differentiation.
of culture. Third, there is little room for multi-
linear, multi-directional, contingent social 11.3.1.3 Universal Human Concerns
change. Structural differentiation generally pro- Despite the importance of these exigencies in
ceeds in a “progressive” direction (cf. Parsons explaining sociocultural evolution and institu-
1966), whether from simple to compound tional change, it is far less common—especially
(Spencer 1897), mechanical to organic (Durkheim before scientific inquiry became distinct from
1893), or archaic to modern (Bellah 1964). religious, legal, and philosophic epistemolo-
Yet, in spite of these criticisms, macro-level gies—for people to feel macro-level exigencies.
sociology must be able to explain and contend That is, not many people conceptualize their dis-
with macro-level material exigencies (Hawley comfort and pursuit of individual or collective
1986; Lenski 1966; Turner 2010). That is, we solutions as coming from, say, “too much popula-
cannot turn a blind-eye to ubiquitous exigencies tion!” Rather, these macro-level exigencies tend
like population growth or density, resource scar- to exacerbate concerns that appear to be ubiqui-
city, or heterogeneity that have relatively predict- tous to humans in both time and space (Abrutyn
214 S. Abrutyn
2014b). Admittedly, sociologists tend to balk at cerns are grafted onto institutional spheres is what
lists that involve universals, but several caveats gives every society or social unit its unique tex-
should put these fears in abeyance. First, by ubiq- ture and timbre.
uitous, I mean that any mentally, physically, and That being said, there are a limited number of
genetically “normal” human is capable of feeling concerns and when these concerns become
these concerns are salient to their well-being. salient, and the production, distribution, and
How they are made salient, however, is an empiri- access to their solutions become monopolized by
cal question: for instance, it could be a direct feel- a specialized group, institutional spheres can
ing, cultivated from the person’s actual experiences become autonomous. That is, institutional spheres
just as much as it could be a feeling derived from come to be the central locus for dealing with one
a significant or prestigious other’s influence. The or more human concerns. Table 11.1 offers a list
point is that some concerns are universal, and of autonomous institutional spheres and the con-
under the right conditions can be made to feel cerns often embedded within them. Of course,
problematic and in need of correction. Second, this fact does not necessarily lead to the function-
just because a concern is made salient does not alist or old evolutionary notion that structures and
mean individuals or groups will or can resolve the cultures are adaptive. Rather, institutional spheres
assumed problem. Technology or culture may not are dominated by collectives who monopolize
allow resolution; existing power structures may access to the goods and services associated with
work in opposition to efforts to innovate; individ- dealing with one or more concerns, and under
uals or groups may fail to perceive the problem, or most circumstances, these rights and privileges
simply misperceived the problem or its solutions; are unevenly distributed. An institution’s auton-
finally, solutions have no guarantees over the omy, then, does not depend on objective adaptiv-
short, medium, or long haul. Third, some ubiqui- ity but instead on whether it penetrates the lives
tous concerns remain undifferentiated in many and experiences of a significant proportion of the
human societies, conflated or synthesized with population, while allowing the group and its cul-
other more “important” ones. That is, cultural tural assemblage to persist over an indefinite
variation is, in part, a product of the historical and period of time. The greater this penetration, (1)
sociocultural contingent nature of selection: one the greater the legitimacy granted to those monop-
group may define justice as salient under the same olizing the institution’s core, (2) the greater the
exact pressures as another that defines sacredness subjective belief that the institution “correctly”
and loyalty to be most relevant. How these con- distributes and produces solutions, and (3) the
Table 11.1 Ubiquitous human concerns and institutions often involved in their resolution
Biological reproduction Kinship, polity
Cultural reproduction Kinship, education, polity, religion, science
Security Polity, kinship
Communication with the supernatural Religion, polity, art
Conflict resolution/justice/fairness Law, kinship, polity
Knowledge of the biotic/social world Science, education, religion, polity, economy, art
Subsistence Economy, polity, kinship, science, medicine
Transportation/communication tech. Polity, economy, science, media
Distinction/status Polity, economy, sport, religion, art, education
Moral order Kinship, religion, law, polity
Socioemotional anchorage Kinship, religion, art
Health Medicine, kinship, religion
Note: This list is not definitive, but rather suggestive. Other concerns can become salient and, therefore, ubiquitous
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 215
greater the likelihood that individuals and collec- associated with concerns like sacredness/piety
tives will orient their emotions, attitudes, and during the Axial Age (Abrutyn 2014a, 2015a);
actions—under the right conditions (which are law and conflict resolution/justice during the
elucidated in detail below)—towards the cultural Gregorian Reformation (Abrutyn 2009b); or,
and authority system(s) of the institutional core health and medicine during the early twentieth
(and the specialists who are granted the right to century (Starr 1982).
impose a legitimate vision of reality). Note, some
of these concerns are ubiquitous in so far as there 11.3.1.4 Institutional
are biological and, especially, neurological foun- Entrepreneurship
dations for them. A strong sense of justice, for Currently underexplored, a significant question
example, is found in both our primate kin and that faces evolutionary accounts is how the
across all human brains (Gospic et al. 2011)— macro-level processes are “translated” into the
and, thereby, shapes the microdynamics con- lived experience of people, motivating them to
straining our everyday experience of social reality innovate and invent new organizational, sym-
(Chap. 18). The specific cultural framework var- bolic, or technological elements of culture. One
ies, to be sure, but the salience of justice as a possible answer to this dilemma may derive from
human concern appears everywhere, with the ear- the transformation of exigencies into real or per-
liest expression being in relatively distinct legal ceived threats to individual or groups of individu-
mechanisms (Hoebel 1973), but sometimes being als’ standards of living. That is, in the face of
grafted onto other concerns like sacredness, loy- objective or subjective relative deprivation, actors
alty, and power. are motivated to identify the source of threat and
A further note, whose full exploration is resolve it by eradicating the threat, adapting to it,
beyond the scope of this chapter, is the fact that stemming it, etc. However, this perspective
widespread sense of salience is often historically avoids the possibility of purposive innovation
phased (for more, see Abrutyn 2009a, 2014a, where no perceived threat or exigency is present.
2015a). Thus, while power is a concern across all Innovation for the sake of innovation as well as
social units across all times and places, its institu- out of self-interest or collective benefit must be
tionalization and, therefore, widespread salience, considered plausible sources of new cultural
only occurs when roles like chiefs become dif- traits that, once present, can either spread by way
ferentiated. Its scale and magnitude continues to of typical mechanisms such as propinquity,
increase as polity becomes autonomous. That is, prestige-biases, or conformity (Abrutyn and
when chiefs become kings seeking to generalize Mueller 2014) or from being imposed from above
power across social units and monopolize its pro- by power elites (Abrutyn and Van Ness 2015). In
duction and distribution within the political both cases—reaction to threat or innovative
core—and thereby expropriating it from local kin agency—the primary driving force can be char-
relations—power becomes problematic more fre- acterized as collective specialized actors who
quently and more complexly (Abrutyn 2013a). may best be called institutional entrepreneurs.
For instance, on a cognitive, micro/meso-level, Entrepreneurs are Eisenstadt’s (1964, 1980)
political autonomy and the monopolization of interpretation of Weber’s charismatic carrier
power meant political goals become perceived as groups. They are entrepreneurial in so far as they
“different from other types of goals or from goals embark on high-risk/high-reward projects that
of other spheres [in so far as their] formation, can lead to, in the most extreme cases, their death.
pursuit, and implementation became largely When truly successful, they are capable of recon-
independent of other groups, and were governed figuring the physical, temporal, social, and sym-
mostly by political criteria and by consideration bolic space and carving out distinct autonomous
of political exigency” (Eisenstadt 1963:19). The institutional spheres that encompass those differ-
same point can be made about religion and the entiated dimensions of space (Abrutyn 2014b;
production and distribution of goods and services Abrutyn and Van Ness 2015). From Weber,
216 S. Abrutyn
Eisenstadt saw these groups as evolutionary neurs, or those who begin to modify institutional
when they are capable of convincing others that reality from a distant position from the core; a
their project and the very grounds of their group’s process that seems to have occurred in some
existence is rooted in the fundamental social, Axial Age (c. 1000–100 BCE) religio-cultural
moral, and cosmic order (cf. introduction in movements (Humphreys 1975; Abrutyn 2014a,
Weber 1968). It was their charismatic “fervor” 2015a); and, in addition, the liaison, or the entre-
that became the force driving qualitative transfor- preneur whose position is at the overlap between
mation. I (2014b) have added to this that the fun- two or more autonomous institutional spheres
damental grounds were rooted not in vague and can draw from both in new, creative ways
notions of moral order, but rather linked to one or (Abrutyn 2014b). More on these different types
more human concerns in that they became the of entrepreneurs will be said shortly. For now, we
producers and distributors of goods and services turn to the ecological dynamics of institutions so
associated with substantive or ultimate ends. As that elucidating entrepreneurs and their positions
the purveyors of these goods and services, like will be anchored in something much more
priests dispensing grace or politicians transform- concrete.
ing raw power into delimited authority, they are
given the right to carve up institutional space.
Bourdieu (1989), for instance, recognized the 11.3.2 Institutional Ecology
ability to appropriate social and symbolic space and the Dynamics
and differentiate it however one group sees fit as of Institutional Space
the ultimate form of symbolic power and vio-
lence. Groups, however, also carve up physical One of the oldest problems macrosociology has
and temporal space. What makes entrepreneur- wrestled with is how macro level forces are trans-
ship tricky, however, is the fact that entrepreneur- lated into micro-level dynamics (for more, see
ial projects are often both self- and Chaps. 7 and 8). Parsons (1951), for instance,
collectively-oriented; finding a balance between posited a model (AGIL) that supposedly worked
the two diametrically opposed goal structures at all levels of reality, capturing the four basic
matters for success, as too much of the former needs individuals, groups, and societies were
loses potential members and too much of the lat- required to find structural solutions to. In this
ter invites organizational and movement section we explore the way institutional domains
disasters. organize ecological space and the ecological
Finally, there are different types of entrepre- dynamics across levels of social reality.
neurs and projects based on their own originating Conceptualizing ecological space allows us to
position. DiMaggio (1988), for instance, bor- move away from the abstraction present in
rowed the term from Eisenstadt to discuss how Parsons or Luhmann, and take purchase of the
existing organizational fields adapt or are modi- way macro-reality, through real physical, tempo-
fied by purposive innovation. A more ral, social, and symbolic space comes to facilitate
Durkheimian, gradualist model of “reform” and and constrain emotions, actions, and attitudes.
quantitative growth underscores this model, as Taking as my departure point, Shils’ (1975) long-
entrepreneurs work from within the existing forgotten functionalist ecology, it is possible to
institutional sphere. Eisenstadt (1964, 1980), visualize how institutional spheres become
conversely, pictured a different embedded entre- actualized in everyday reality without reducing
preneur: authorized by more powerful individu- the macro to the micro or vice versa. In addition,
als to resolve pressing problems, they could this strategy further bolsters the role of entrepre-
leverage their success and monopoly over organi- neurs who, as we shall see below, become the
zational, technological, and symbolic secrets to “fulcrum” between the macro and micro worlds;
balance power differentials between their entre- a strategy that Turner (2011) has long advocated
preneurial unit and the extant power elite. To for but which he has not fully elucidated in terms
these two, I have added the “marginal” entrepre- of actual groups doing real things.
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 217
11.3.2.1 Macro Ecology well as those who spend much of their day work-
In trying to think about the macro-micro link, ing or acting within them. And, so, the core or
Shils (1975) argued that societies have a “center” cores become important not because they do not
that penetrates, in varying degrees, the environ- exist in abstract reality; rather we are embedded
ment surrounding it. Inside the core are the prin- in the core when we enter a courthouse, a church,
cipal institutions (polity; economy; cultural), a college campus or building, or a home.
authority system, and values, which emanated On the other hand, the core is not something
outward into the “mass” society. Besides the only salient in physical reality. A lawyer can
functionalist assumption of consensus and stabil- imagine and practice her courtroom role-
ity, Shils’ model assumes a single core, offers performance at home, while chance encounters at
only vague descriptions of what the center con- a grocery store between a parishioner and his
sists of, and has little explanation as to how and priest thrust both into an ephemeral religious
why the core form and whether it changes over encounter that is detached from the physical rou-
time. However, I (2013c, 2014b) have made clear tine location(s). Hence, humans spend time in
that this metaphor can work for understanding these places, can see them in real time and in
institutional autonomy, evolution, and macro- their minds, and, as such, can reify religion or
micro linkage. polity in ideal typical physical locations (e.g.,
We begin with a simple proposition: the Jerusalem or Washington D.C. respectively).
greater is the degree to which an institution is These reifications and the actual “microcosms”
autonomous, the greater is the degree to which we inhabit like houses or churches extend, cogni-
one (or more) discrete institutional cores form.3 tively, our orientation, encounters we engage in,
The core is a physical and cognitive dimension of and groups or other collectives we perform tasks
macro-reality. On the one hand, with greater within. By “extend,” I mean they enlarge the cir-
autonomy comes the increasing likelihood that cumference, in Kenneth Burke’s (1989) terminol-
physical space—including buildings, pathways, ogy, or widen the frame, in Goffman’s parlance,
and even people lodged temporarily or full-time by which we label our self, sift through emotion/
in these spaces—will become distinguishable feeling rules, choose lines of action and order
from other types of physical space. At first, phys- preferences, and define the situation.
ical space becomes differentiated temporally, In addition to these “locational” or “spatial”
such as the public “square” of a chiefdom serving elements, an autonomous core also implies dif-
as the daily meeting ground and, during the holi- ferentiated temporal, social, and symbolic space.
est of days, the sacred center once cleansed. For instance, working hours get split apart from
Eventually, however, residential zones become family time; political holidays can be carved out
bounded vis-à-vis politico-legal zones (e.g., vis-à-vis religious ones; and, decisions made in
downtown areas with courthouses, town halls, hierarchical space can shape the sequences of
jails, and police stations); and, within a given action in lower-order spaces. In addition, fields,
institutional sphere, multiple cores can take up organizations, groups, and role/status positions
different or overlapping space such as an eco- become increasingly distinct from each other. In
nomic sphere subdividing into commercial and the home, we expect people to be in kinship roles,
industrial zones. These spaces are real and macro even though work does not clearly end at the
in their totality, scale, size, and ability to impose threshold of the doorway; when entering a court-
cultural orientations on those passing through as room, all other roles are temporally constrained,
while we immediately assume a status far lower
3
The “core” metaphor is preferable to center if only than the judge and, indeed, jurists and lawyers.
because a core does not assume centrality, but rather an Finally, symbolic markers emerge to carve up the
essential space from which key elements of institutional
physical, temporal, and social spaces and make
domains are produced and distributed. Hence, there can
be more than one core, and cores do not have to be harmo- them meaningfully discrete. Building architec-
niously integrated or coupled. ture, for instance, stereotype the expectations,
218 S. Abrutyn
activities, and attitudes inherent in a physical rules and resources and divisions of labor of the
location; “totems” like a status of blind lady jus- core (e.g., Fig. 11.1). The environment, like the
tice, a cross, or Latin phrasing cue appropriate core, is real. It is composed of the various meso-
role transitions; calendars and other means of level spaces sociologists often study to avoid the
demarcating time allow us to anticipate institu- abstraction of macrosociology: fields (Bourdieu
tional rituals; and, various identity kits like white 1993; Fligstein and McAdam 2011) or niches
lab coats, tweed jackets with elbow patches, (Hannan and Freeman 1977). Some of these
black robes, or business suits stereotype role meso-level spaces are located within the core, but
expectations and obligations, as well as signify not all. Figure 11.1 presents an example of an
the social milieu in which a person has entered. autonomous institutional sphere, its core, and the
Thus, the core is active in physical and temporal surrounding environment. Here we see an auton-
space, as well as social and symbolic space. More omous legal sphere found in many urban spaces.
autonomy means more discreteness. The core is constituted by the federal and/or state
Likewise, surrounding any given institutional courthouse that is often located in a downtown
core is its environment. The environment and area. It is both real in the sense that it physically
actors located throughout the environment are and symbolically marks the legal zone, and cog-
governed by the rule of proximity: the greater is nitive in the sense that it often blends stereotyped
the degree of institutional autonomy and the architecture (e.g., huge columns) with local flour-
closer is the degree to which a person, group, of ishes that serve to both mark the generalized and
cluster of groups (e.g., field; niche; sector) is specific elements of the core. Support and liaison
located vis-à-vis an institutional core, the greater actors pockmark the physical landscape near the
is the degree to which the core exerts centripetal courthouse. A police headquarters and local jail
force—that is, draws actors into the orbit of the is often close, as are numerous law offices,
Police HQ-
Local Jail District
Atty.
Law:
Fed./State Law Offices
Courthouse
Bail Bonds
Law Offices
Law Schools
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 219
bailbondsmen, and, likely, a city hall or city the top-right of the legal environment, have
office for the district attorney. Actors entering direct ties to the political sphere, including, in
this zone are inundated with legal symbols cue- some cases, the core itself. The legal core, on
ing their actions and attitudes. And while there the one hand, tests legislation, makes decisions
are numerous non-legal organizations like restau- that Congress must react to, and also has over-
rants, cafes, convenient stores, apartments, and lapping social relationships; conversely, on the
the like, these are invisible during legal hours as other hand, legislation shapes court dockets, the
they are filled with legal actors talking “shop” or President nominates judges that the Senate must
taking a temporary break from their official roles. approve, and some Congress persons were
To be sure, no institutional space, no matter judges. Similar connections can be drawn
how autonomous, is an island unto itself. Figure between the police (who are an extension of the
11.2 presents a complex, yet simplified, version executive office), the district attorney (who
of the legal example extended beyond its institu- work for the state or justice department), and
tional boundaries. Beginning with the institu- law offices which are regulated by federal law
tional core, we see double-sided arrows and where many politicians come from or return
extending towards every space in the environ- to upon retirement or lost elections.
ment, denoting the flow of human, material, and The rest of Fig. 11.2 is focused on the other
symbolic (e.g., information) resources; addi- institutional linkages. Bailbondsmen and lawyers
tionally, many of these have their own connec- act as liaisons between the legal sphere and the
tions with each other as resource flows across kinship sphere; helping shepherd normal people
units. Some of these units, especially those on through the labyrinthine legal sphere; law offices,
Political
Sphere:
Police HQ E.g.,
- District Congress
Local Jail Atty.
Law:
Fed./State Law
Bail Courthouse Offices
Bonds
The Law
Kinship Offices
Sphere
Law
Schools
Religious
Sphere Educational
Sphere
Economic
Sphere
of course, also do the same for religious and eco- Second, being closer and routinely subject to
nomic actors, though in many cases, individual the institutional core’s structural and cultural
organizations have their own lawyers on retainer reality increases the likelihood that our feelings,
or entire legal departments devoted to interacting thoughts, and actions will increasingly become
with the legal core. Law schools also act as liai- aligned with those prescribed by entrepreneurs or
sons, and key traffickers of human and symbolic the cultural system we internalize (Abrutyn
resource mobility. Linking the educational sphere 2014b; Abrutyn and Mueller 2015). At the social
to the legal sphere, law schools produce lawyers psychological level, this means that our self is
for law offices and district attorneys; judges who more likely to merge with the role/status-position
have been professionalized within a legal sphere we find ourselves within the institutional sphere
(who, like high profile lawyers, often return to because of the intensive and extensive commit-
their alma mater or some other prestigious school ments, as well as the recurring rewards and pun-
to teach later in their careers); and, of course, are ishments we earn (Turner 1978). As such, our
shaped by federal laws for higher education, but institution-specific role-identity is more likely to
also which produce clerks, campaign advisors, be (a) prominent (McCall and Simmons 1978),
interns, and the like for politicians. To be sure, (b) salient (Stryker 1980), (c) socioemotionally
this model oversimplifies the much more com- anchored to individuals, groups, and even sys-
plex social reality, and necessarily omits numer- tems (Chap. 8; also, Lawler et al. 2009), (d)
ous “arrows” or resource flows for the sake of restricted in its access to alternative institutional
parsimony, while also highlighting the complex cores, (e) governed by institution-specific status
interplay between autonomous institutional beliefs (see Chap. 16) rooted in the institution-
spheres. specific status hierarchy (Abrutyn 2014b), and,
finally, (f) the central identity by which we mea-
11.3.2.2 Micro Reality sure our global self-esteem, efficacy, and worth
At its most basic level, this briefest of ecological (see Chap. 17).
accounts matters at the micro-level. We can pres- Third, there is no need to turn to a Parsonsian
ent several different propositions capturing how (1951) view of the self and action that overem-
and why it manifests or translates into everyday, phasizes structure and underemphasizes culture.
phenomenological reality (Abrutyn 2014b). First, Indeed, the divisions of labor and other structural
being physically and/or cognitively closer to an mechanisms of control are essential to under-
autonomous institutional core means that actors standing certain dynamics of core-environment
are more likely to inhabit relationships, groups, ecology. Yet, I (2015b; also 2014b:121–146)
and networks in which institution-specific roles have argued elsewhere that we can return to and
and status positions will be routinely activated by rehabilitate the concept generalized symbolic
intensive and/or extensive ties within institution- media first present in Simmel’s (1907) work on
specific encounters; institution-specific resources money and most prominent in Parsons’ (1963)
act as means and ends of interaction patterns in systems theory to explain how culture from the
said encounters; and, external mechanisms of core comes to be an independent force in institu-
control are visible, known, and easily adminis- tional life. Media are, in essence, the symbolic
tered. In short, the rule of proximity predicts and material resources that denote institutional
probabilities with which actors will be repeatedly value and which constrain and facilitate feeling,
subject to the people, resources (as both things to thinking, and doing by acting as both means and
pursue and things that are used in everyday life), ends deemed appropriate. Primarily, media mani-
and rules (both in terms of agents of control and fest themselves in three ways: as (a) language
sanctions) of a given institution and thus, their and, more specifically, in the form of themes of
level of habituation, normative commitment, and discourse (Luhmann 2012) as well as the “forms”
the salience of their institutional identity. of actual talk (Abrutyn and Turner 2011)
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 221
governing institutional communication; (b) the spheres on a daily basis, while a legal actor will
normative and cognitive-cultural framework and be more oriented towards the legal sphere. The
routines of social exchange—e.g., instrumental more access to a particular generalized medium a
vs. moral; and (c) as external referents of value person has access to, the more “fluent” and active
(Abrutyn 2015b), or the objects that signify to the he or she will be in the institution’s cultural real-
possessor, user, pursuant, and audience the com- ity. Table 11.2 provides a list of common media
petence (Goffman 1967), authenticity (Alexander and the institutional spheres they generally circu-
2004), and status (Bourdieu 1991) institutionally late within.
prescribed. Taken together, these three axes allow In many ways, this approach has strong paral-
for the embodiment of the macro-level into daily lels to the institutional logic perspective
routines, mundane and ceremonial performances (Thornton et al. 2012), but we add several key
and rituals, and general encounters. Moreover, as wrinkles. First, while institutional logics remains
Goffman’s body of work suggests, as actors work rooted in the systems of modernity like capital-
to be better performers they increasingly become ism, church, and state (Friedland and Alford
attached and committed to their roles as well as 1991; Thornton et al. 2012), I take an evolution-
the situational spaces that allow them to “shine” ary and historical view of economy, religion, and
the most. Hence, a professor who derives much polity. Second, the model presented above
of her self-esteem and worth from academic set- remains committed to seeing institutions as real
tings will be more likely to orient her emotions, beyond just the beliefs and practices that folks
attitudes, and actions to the educational-scientific adopt, conceptualizing their external presence in
physical, temporal, social, and symbolic space. routinization of charisma. Third, entrepreneur-
Third, as external referents or objects media ship does not come from nothing; it reflects rela-
allow us to recognize a very key aspect of cul- tively predictable patterns of ecological
ture: tangible things are as important as internal- dynamics and how interests compete and con-
ized values, embodied practices, or habituated flict with each other based on positioning. Three
norms because they are “out there” and can be particular sets of locations and entrepreneurs
touched, tasted, smelled, and seen. Humans are warrant our attention and deserve more system-
visual creatures and use objects to understand the atic empirical elucidation.
universe. Culture externalized means culture that
can be hoarded, pursued relentlessly, used deftly 11.3.3.1 Secondary Entrepreneurs
or clumsily, and sacralized into the totems Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy rests on the
Durkheim saw as so essential to group life. tacit assumption of bounded rationality, stability,
and taken for granted authority; characteristics
reinforced by Michels’ (1911 [1962]) “iron rule
11.3.3 Meso-Level Entrepreneurs of oligarchy” and the tendency towards conserva-
tivism in bureaucracy and organization. Yet, con-
We are now in a position to return to the concept trary to these idyllic visions, history is littered
of entrepreneurship. Like most things in life, the with examples of “secondary” entrepreneurs, or
macro and micro levels of social reality become actors close to the core—such as the district
realized in meso-level social units like groups, attorney’s office in Fig. 11.1 above—whose pri-
networks, and so forth. More specifically, it is at mary function is to interact with non-core actors
the meso-level within the ecological dynamics and core actors, facilitating the flow of resources
described above, that institutional change occurs. both directions (Eisenstadt 1980). Thus, on the
Some basic principles underscore this assertion. one hand these actors serve to support and rein-
First, once autonomous, institutional spheres are force the core and its entrepreneurs, yet on the
subject to external and internal exigencies no other hand some fascinating institutional dynam-
different from any other group. While institu- ics of contestation, conflict, and change are
tional spheres are by no means self-contained rooted in secondary elites.
environments, the actors who derive the majority Rueschemeyer (1986), for instance, cogently
of their material and symbolic resources become argued that most political change and instability
subject to the same types of pressures associated came from secondary actors, as bureaucratic
with resource scarcity or challenges and threats units do not always march in lockstep with their
to power and legitimacy. Entrepreneurs who superiors; the latter of which come to depend on
carve out cores gain privilege and power and, the former, and thus cede some power and
like any interest group, work hard to protect and, authority. Moreover, secondary actors develop
in many cases, expand their influence over the goals that transcend simple support: as a distinct
institutional environment and across institutional corporate unit, they too become interested in
boundaries (Abrutyn and Van Ness 2015). survival as well as expansion of their influence.
Second, while Weber’s charismatic authority has Hence, these ancillary goals are not always
been identified with individual traits, he (1968) commensurate with efficiency or productivity.
was clear that the lasting consequences of an Furthermore, their unique position encourages
individual’s impact on social structure and/or the development of new worldviews, as well as
culture came not from the individual, but from positions them to resolve major or minor prob-
the charismatic group charged with either propa- lems to further their interests (DiMaggio 1988),
gating his ideas or succeeding him—see, for or because extant elites authorize them to
instance, Akhenaten’s failed monotheistic revo- resolve these problems and, therefore, increase
lution in the mid-second millennium BCE; insti- their dependency on the secondary actors
tutional change, therefore, is driven by the (Abrutyn 2014a).
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 223
alien to traditional forms of kinship and religion. exclusivity [that had the double function of effect-
ing] the patterns of habitual movement of all the
Hence, the dominant counter-ideologies, across
inhabitants of the site, stratifying space and hence
cases, is a religio-kin traditionalism focused on the people who were allowed access to different
particularism and fundamental values. Other space, creating and marking centers and peripher-
examples of marginal actors can be found in ies [and] permanently inscribed a small number of
figures as actors linking the natural and supernatu-
Collins’ (1981) geopolitical theory of “marcher”
ral world.
states or Chase-Dunn and Hall’s (1997) similar
idea of peripheral conquerors—both cases high- Physical space, then, becomes infused with
light the freedom to innovate militarily, organi- meanings associated with patterns of behavior,
zationally, and symbolically in ways that make role performances, temporal distinctions, activi-
them swifter and stronger against city-states and ties and beliefs, and power/prestige differentials.
empires that are too big to change rapidly. To be sure, we often take for granted space, but it
undoubtedly organizes reality for us, and often
demarcates institutional space. This is especially
11.4 Institutional Spheres in Four clear when consider the physical construction of
Dimensional Space small towns where institutional space blurs
together—e.g., city hall is next to the courthouse,
Besides further exploring and using entrepre- the main church, and main street—and big cities
neurs as means of introducing evolutionary where zones or districts emerge that differentiate
accounts to historical methods, the cutting edge the institutional activities (Abrutyn 2014b).
of institutional analysis finds itself in the four
dimensional space—physical, temporal, social,
and symbolic—that have become central to 11.4.2 Temporal Reality
understanding how macro-level reality presents
itself to people and affects their lives. Indeed, it is Sociologists have been slower to think about
within each of these four dimensions that institu- social structure in temporal terms, though clearly
tions make important cross-cutting linkages to some have in abstract ways (Luhmann 2004). In
other levels of analysis and substantive fields. short, temporality becomes important in three
sorts of ways: (1) for compartmentalizing activi-
ties and orientations to reduce the complexity of
11.4.1 Physical Reality role performances; (2) for sedimenting previous
encounters into ritualized interactions that both
Archaeologists have long recognized the impor- reduce the need to produce culture completely
tance of space and place, both in terms of size, anew and impose a sense of structure that guides
scale, and differentiation; and place matters for interactions (Goffman 1967); and (3) as authori-
political economy and, therefore, reverberates tative decisions made by one segment of institu-
across other institutional spheres (Logan and tional life reverberate and shape the reality of
Molotch 1988). Palaces were very often set upon others. In each of these ways, time aids in the
a hill; built much larger and adorned with gaudier realization and manifestation of macro-level
architecture than normal houses; surrounded by space. Sometimes it is in the cues that signal we
large courtyards to intensify the scale vis-à-vis are to reframe our identity performance to match
the visitor; and, surrounded by walls that pre- the expectations of others, while other times it in
sented physical and cognitive barriers. Joyce the strain and conflicts that arise over the inter-
(2000:71–2) remarks, stices of temporal institutional boundaries—e.g.,
By creating different kinds of space within sites, when, not where, does the economic institution
the continuing elaboration of monumental archi- (e.g., work) end and the kinship institution begin?
tecture served to create spatial arenas with These are not individually based conflicts, though
restricted access, a constantly visible form of each person may experience them uniquely.
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 225
Rather, they become known sites of contestation, merely “cognitive” things, but linguistic (themes;
resistance, and struggle. Of the four dimensions, texts) (Luhmann 1995) and present in physical
however, temporality demands the most future objects that act as referents of value (Abrutyn
research. 2014b, 2015b). The latter is a major difference
between the functionalist and the institutional
logics program, and my own read on institutional
11.4.3 Social Reality spheres. In part, as value adheres in actual objects,
the institution and commitment to the role-
Conversely, the institutional differentiation of identity and status position one accesses the insti-
social space has been well documented, ranging tution become powerful forces: objects are
from research on role differentiation (Freidson tangible, can be touched, hoarded, gazed long-
1962), group differentiation (Merton 1967), orga- ingly, monopolized, and provide sensual pleasure
nizational differentiation (Blau 1970), and cate- in their ownership and use. Money is not just a
goric differentiation (cf. Chap. 16 of this volume). medium that regulates exchanges, then, it is also
Moreover, the division of labor is central to the a language embedded in texts, themes of dis-
classics. If there is any frontier here, is finding course, strategies mobilized in speech and perfor-
ways to empirically link the macro-level to the mance and a set of objects—coins, cars, etc. It
level of identity, self, and status. Social psychol- can be displayed or relegated to special places
ogy assumes this link exists (; Fine 1991; Burke and rituals that reinforce its importance to the
2006), while some of my work on ecology explic- person’s identity and, perhaps, global self. Same
itly highlights potential testable propositions that with love, sacredness, and knowledge—all of
could bring the two into closer dialogue. these media can be transformed into referents of
value which are signs to the owner and the audi-
ence of the person’s institutional self, their status,
11.4.4 Symbolic Reality the expectations one might have of them, the
obligations they have for themselves, and so
One of the more exciting areas of institutional forth.
research is in the cultural and symbolic aspects of
institutions that Parsons’ left quite flat and unsat-
isfactory. The institutional logics perspective, for 11.5 Conclusion
example, has worked to create ways of measuring
specific logics, such as love and the way it shapes The study of institutions has a long, rich history
the practices and beliefs of real people (Friedland with sociology, and has become increasingly
et al. 2014). The idea of a “logic,” has its roots in important to political science (Evans 1995) and
the concept generalized symbolic media; a con- economics (North 1990, 2005; Nee 2005). Yet,
cept, unfortunately and unfairly, linked to like culture (see Chap. 6 in this volume), it is one
Parsonsian (1963) functionalism. Its use, as noted of the hardest concepts to nail down because it is
above, predates Parsons in Simmel’s (1907) work used in so many different ways. While debatable,
on money transforming the economy and eco- institutions were presented above as the major
nomic relations and Mauss’ (1967) and Levi- macro-level structural and cultural spheres of
Strauss’ (1969) respective work on non-economic social reality such as polity, religion, or economy.
media of exchange. As noted above (see Table They are constituted by meso-level social units
11.2), I have added numerous media to account like groups or organizations, micro-level units
for the number of autonomous institutional like encounters and identities, and cross-cut by
spheres. Like logics, media are vehicles of cul- global and situational stratification systems.
ture; unlike logics, media “circulate” along the While systems and subsystems, in the Parsonsian
many structural connections, are unevenly dis- or Luhmannian traditions, are often overly
tributed like Bourdieuian capital, and are not abstract in their conceptualization, it was further
226 S. Abrutyn
argued above that institutional spheres, as they Abrutyn, S. (2014a). Religious autonomy and religious
entrepreneurship: An evolutionary-institutionalist’s
grow autonomous, carve up physical, temporal,
take on the axial age. Comparative Sociology, 13(2),
social, and symbolic reality in ways that impose, 105–134.
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individuals may not be fully conscious of this, the ogy: Putting the “Institution” back in institutional
analysis. New York: Routledge.
fact that ordinary people reify these spheres by
Abrutyn, S. (2015a). The institutional evolution of reli-
talking about “the law,” or “religion,” or “econ- gion: Innovation and entrepreneurship in ancient
omy,” as entities that act collectively and beyond Israel. Religion, 45(4), 505–531.
their control indicates just how powerful a force Abrutyn, S. (2015b). Money, love, and sacredness:
Generalized symbolic media and the production of
these spheres have on people’s everyday reality.
instrumental, affectual, and moral reality. Czech
A vibrant, and more empirically grounded, Sociological Review, 51(3), 445–471.
macrosociology becomes possible when we start Abrutyn, S., & Lawrence, K. (2010). From chiefdoms to
to reconceptualize institutional spheres as such. states: Toward an integrative theory of the evolution of
polity. Sociological Perspectives, 53(3), 419–442.
Logics and media are created by elites, perpetu-
Abrutyn, S., & Mueller, A. S. (2014). Reconsidering
ated by “canonical” texts, experts, routines, and Durkheim’s assessment of tarde: Formalizing a tardian
the differentiation of those four dimensions of theory of imitation, contagion, and suicide suggestion.
space, and, they circulate along structural con- Sociological Forum, 29(3), 698–719.
Abrutyn, S., & Mueller, A. S. (2015). When Too much
nections that are infused with meaning by the
integration and regulation hurt: Re envisioning
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a different terminology, also offers much for an
Perspectives, 54(3), 283–306.
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examine the synchronic or diachronic variation sociocultural evolution: Institutional entrepreneurship
of a sphere or set of spheres, their autonomy, and as a force of structural and cultural transformation.
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Stratification
12
Katja M. Guenther*, Matthew C. Mahutga*,
and Panu Suppatkul
why some countries are so much richer than oth- Goesling 2001; Korzeniewicz and Moran 1997;
ers, the answers to which vary from circumstantial Milanovic 2002; Schultz 1998; Theil 1979;
differences in the timing of major technological Whalley 1979). From a historical perspective,
advances to the enrichment of some nations at the however, large material inequalities across coun-
expense of others through historically varying tries are relatively new. As recently as the early
forms of coercion. The within-country ques- VHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\&(WKHGLIIHUHQFHLQZHDOWK
tion—the one most addressed by sociological between the “richest” and “poorest” countries of
approaches to stratification—instead asks why the world was probably no greater than 3:1 (Jolly
some people are rich, while others struggle to 2006). However, beginning in the early 1800s,
survive, given their national context. As we the world witnessed what has been referred to as
describe below, these answers vary from those the “great divergence”—the rapid expansion in
that treat inequality as the outcome of political material prosperity among a very small subset of
and economic processes to those that focus the world’s population.
instead upon categorical attributes like class, The great divergence has been explained in
gender, and race or the types of institutions that two distinct ways: 1) the geographical concentra-
prevail in a given country. tion of technological advancements associated
We conclude by identifying what we see as with the industrial revolution among a handful of
key problems to be addressed in the sociology of Western European countries, and 2) the coloniza-
stratification. First, there is a divide between tion of most of the non-European world by
those who contend that contemporary patterns of Western European powers. We consider each of
stratification are the result of the historical accu- these in turn, as these two explanations in some
mulation of patterned deprivations, and those ways foreshadow theories of stratification more
who argue instead that stratification results from generally.
behavior that is patterned by discriminatory There is no denying that the timing of the
ideas. Second, we suggest that perhaps a grand great divergence coincides roughly with the
sociological theory of stratification with endoge- industrial revolution. And there is little doubt that
nously determined macro and micro dynamics is the industrial revolution mattered for the great
both overly ambitious and unnecessary. Instead, divergence: if Great Britain doubles the produc-
sociologists may make better progress by focus- tivity of its labor force and everyone else does
ing on the ways in which the stratifying effect of not, ceteris paribus, Great Britain will grow
macro-level dynamics are conditional upon strat- faster than everyone else. That is, the industrial
ification processes at the micro level, and on the revolution contributed to the great divergence
ways in which micro-level dynamics are in turn through technology that increased rapidly the
conditional on aggregate levels of material productivity of economic activity in places where
inequality. it occurred. Because these technological advance-
ments were spatially concentrated, first in Great
Britain, then in other parts of Western Europe,
12.2 The Wealth and Poverty and only much later spread to European colonies,
of Nations the European continent experienced an extended
period of much more rapid economic growth.
In the twenty-first century, the vast majority of all To see how the aiding of labor with capital can
of the material (i.e., income) inequality in the dramatically boost productivity and thereby
world lies between countries. Studies examining QDWLRQDOLQFRPHFRQVLGHUWKHQRZFODVVLF´&REE
data from the 1950s through the 1990s, for exam- Douglas” production function:
ple, find that between country inequality accounts
Y = ALβ K α (12.1)
for somewhere in the range of 65–86 % of all
world income inequality, though these statistics In (12.1), Yis national output, A is technology, K
are hotly contested (see Berry et al. 1991; is capital and L is labor. β and α are “elasticity”
12 Stratification 231
coefficients (weights) determined by the sophisti- diate inputs and expanding markets abroad, con-
cation of available technology. To see how this tinued to boost the growth of Western Europe at
affects per capita national income (proxied by per least through the period of decolonization in the
worker output), we can manipulate (12.1) alge- post WWII period.
braically by dividing by labor throughout: &RORQL]DWLRQDOVRPDWWHUHGIRUWKHJUHDWGLYHU-
gence in how it affected development among
Y A1− β K α − β
= (12.2) colonies and former colonies. Nevertheless, what
L L L matters from the large and rich literature on colo-
What is clear from Eq. 12.2 is that, holding the nization for our discussion here is that coloniza-
supply of labor constant, per-worker national tion was an active form of stratification, insofar
income increases multiplicatively with an as the developmental trajectories of colonies
increase in technology, and it does so by increas- were heavily influenced by the direct action of
ing the productivity of labor. Thus, the concentra- colonizers. The long list of deleterious effects of
tion of technology emerging from the industrial colonization includes mechanisms such as the
revolution in Western Europe can go a long way establishment of outward-oriented economies
in explaining the great divergence. (Bunker 1985 &KDVH'XQQ 1998), the inculca-
However, we also know that industrialization tion of dependent trade relations between colo-
did not occur in a vacuum. One of the earliest nies and colonizers (Galtung 1971), the
observers—and critics—of industrial capitalism imposition of colonial institutions (Lange et al.
in Great Britain, Karl Marx, argued that the 2006), cultural destruction, and the creation and
British industrial capitalist must be understood maintenance of a native elite with interests tied to
not as a product of the slow accumulation of colonial administrators, among others. Processes
wealth through frugality and hard work (e.g., such as these not only hindered the development
Weber 1930 [2001]), but rather as a benefactor of of good governance institutions from within, but
force and plunder: also represented forms of exploitation whereby
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the economic relations between colonizer and colony
extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines enhanced the former at the expense of the latter
of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the (Hochschild 1999).
conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning After the end of formal colonization, many
of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting
of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era suggest that Western states and capitalists engage
of capitalist production (Marx 1867 [1967]: 751). in neo-colonialism by reasserting their control
via indirect ways that include a disproportionate
Marx’s point in this quote and in the chapter in influence on transnational governance institu-
which it appears is threefold. First, the capitalist tions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
mode of production would not have been possi- World Bank (WB) and the World Trade
ble absent an accumulation of capital that Organization (WTO) (Milanovic 2005), by
occurred before the capitalist mode of produc- HQJDJLQJ LQ IRUHLJQ GLUHFW LQYHVWPHQW &KDVH
tion. Second, the political success of industrial Dunn 1975), and by military aggression. Early
capitalism was financed by colonization. Third, analysts of economic globalization very much
historically, colonization expanded in lock step analyzed it through the lens of neo-colonialism,
with the advance of industrial capitalism. but changes in the trajectory of between-country
&RORQL]DWLRQ WKXV PDWWHUV IRU WKH JUHDW GLYHU- inequality have problematized that lens.
gence in two important respects. First, coloniza- While between-country inequality remains
tion may have created a pre-existing level of “high” by historical standards, the last few
wealth in Great Britain that made the industrial decades have witnessed a declining trend in
revolution possible, financed the political ascen- EHWZHHQFRXQWU\ LQHTXDOLW\ &ODUN 2011;
dance of the industrial capitalist in Great Britain, Firebaugh 2003; c.f. Milanovic 2005; Dowrick
and, by facilitating the import of cheap interme- and Akmal 2005). While some point to this trend
232 K.M. Guenther et al.
to draw inferences about the efficacy of interna- quences of inequality are for individuals, groups,
tional institutions (e.g., UN development goals) and societies, and what role, if any, states can
or the international dynamics of the world capi- play in reducing income inequalities. Figure 12.1
talist system (Korzienwicz and Moran 1997 c.f. displays the Gini coefficient of income inequality
Firebaugh 2000), the underlying driver of the among 14 advanced capitalist country from 1960
declining trend belies such inferences. This is to 2010. The Gini coefficient is a statistical mea-
because measured levels of between-country sure of income distribution within a country; a
inequality are driven by two components: aver- value of 0 indicates equality and a value of 1
age income differences between countries and complete inequality. As a basis for comparison,
population size. Two of the fastest growing coun- Fig. 12.1 also reports the average Gini for this
WULHVRYHUWKHODVWVHYHUDOGHFDGHVDUH&KLQDDQG group. These data come from Fred Solt’s
India, which together account for roughly 36 % Standardized World Income Inequality Database
of the world’s population. Because the declining (SWIID) (Solt 2009). What is clear from a casual
trend in between-country inequality is driven by inspection of Fig. 12.1 is both that income
&KLQD DQG ,QGLD·V UDSLG HFRQRPLF JURZWK DQG inequality generally began to rise during the
EHFDXVH&KLQDDQG,QGLD·VUDSLGHFRQRPLFJURZWK 1980s after a period of decline, but also that the
is exceptional vis-à-vis the rest of the less- level of inequality is much higher in some coun-
developed world, one cannot draw much in the tries than others.
way of theoretical insight from the trend. Indeed, In what follows, we consider explanations for
UHFHQWHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWLI&KLQDDQG,QGLD both the rising trend in inequality commonly
maintain their trajectories of rapid economic observed among advanced capitalist countries
growth, between-country inequality will rise since the 1980s, as well as explanations for the
again (Hung and Kucinskas 2011). Paralleling large inequality differences that remain between
the declining trend in between-country inequal- these countries. That is, we consider inequality
ity, however, is a rising trend in within country increasing processes that are common to all these
inequality, a subject to which we now turn. countries, as well as inequality reducing pro-
cesses that are more common in some of them
than others.
12.3 Within Country Inequality
40
35
30
25
20
migrates from agriculture to industry (or manu- in less developed countries. In turn, rapid popula-
facturing), where wages are much higher. This tion growth expands the young, non-earning
creates a wage gap between the agricultural and members of the population, who occupy the low
industrial sectors that increases inequality pro- end of the income distribution. As countries
portionately to the share of the labor force in each develop, the demand for household and agricul-
sector. After a certain point, inequality begins to tural labor declines, whereas the status of women,
fall as the percentage of the population residing the proportion of the population living in cities,
in the industrial sector becomes large enough that and access to contraception generally increase. In
the wage gap between agriculture and industry combination, these and other factors slow popu-
contributes a dwindling amount of variation to lation growth and thereby shrink the proportion
the whole income distribution. The dynamic rela- of the population occupying the low-end of the
tionship between development and inequality income distribution. The second added factor is
hypothesized by Kuznets is displayed in Fig. the spread of education, which tends to reduce
12.2, which depicts a rising and then falling the wage premium for skilled workers. That is, as
inequality trend over the course of development. educational skills become less scarce, the finan-
Sociological inequality theorists have added cial rewards associated with skills decline.
two components to the basic Kuznets model. There is much empirical support for this gen-
Beginning with Nielsen (1994), sociologists eral theory of the relationship between income
began to recognize that the demographic transi- inequality and economic development. This
tion is also a prominent social change over the includes the observation of a non-linear u shaped
course of economic development. A combination relationship between measures of economic
of factors including low survival probabilities, development (e.g., GDP per capita) and income
declining death rates, high demand for household inequality, where middle-income countries have
and agricultural labor, a low status for women, the highest level of inequality. This also includes
etc., combine to produce rapid population growth cross-sectional and panel-levels studies showing
234 K.M. Guenther et al.
Income Inequality
that the percent of the labor force in agriculture national trade. Adrian Wood (1994) employed
lowers income inequality, “sector dualism” (a the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model of trade to
measure of the dispersion of wages between the suggest that economic globalization should
agriculture and manufacturing sectors) increases increase inequality in rich countries. The theory
inequality, population growth increases inequal- postulates that international trade reduces the
ity and secondary education enrollments reduce price of economic inputs to that which prevails in
inequality (e.g., Nielsen 1994; Nielsen and countries for which the input is most abundant.
Alderson 1997; Alderson and Nielsen 1999; c.f. Wood argued that this basic insight has implica-
Alderson and Nielsen 2002). tions for inequality because unskilled labor is
Thus, while this general theory of the relation- relatively abundant in the global South, while
ship between economic development and income high skill labor is abundant in the global North.
inequality is not without critics, the Kuznets Thus, if trade increases between the North and
curve created something of a paradox for schol- the South, one would expect the demand for
ars of inequality among advanced capitalist coun- unskilled labor to fall, and the demand for skilled
tries after the 1980s. Succinctly, if all of these labor to rise in the North (Wood 1994). The
countries had passed the developmental thresh- changing demand for skilled and unskilled labor
old at which income inequality should decline, will then manifest itself in changing wage premi-
why was inequality increasing in so many cases? ums (declining for unskilled; rising for skilled),
While the answers are varied, several have and thereby rising inequality.
received the bulk of scholarly attention. The second theoretical perspective also sug-
gests that the increasing within-country inequal-
ity is explicable in terms of inversely changing
12.3.3 Globalization, Skill Biased wage premiums to skilled and unskilled labor,
Technological Change, but that rising trade between the North and the
and Skill-Wage Premiums South is not the cause (or primary cause). Instead,
this explanation suggests that skill-biased tech-
One pair of (potentially competing) explanations nological change—i.e., the introduction of tech-
place the changing fortunes of skilled and nological fixes that reduce the demand for
unskilled workers at the center of the analysis. unskilled labor—has been the major driver of the
The first draws from economic theories of inter- changing fortunes of the skilled and unskilled
12 Stratification 235
(e.g., Katz and Autor 1999). In this formulation, The more rapid increase in income inequality in
low-skilled labor is not substituted by comparable the United States than continental Europe despite
labor from poorer countries, but rather by comparable rates of technological change and
machinery and computing. educational expansion constitutes a puzzle in
The relative importance of North/South trade need of explanation. According to Picketty,
and skill-biased technological change for the rise what’s unique about the US case is the excep-
in income inequality among Northern countries tional rise in executive compensation, which he
has been particularly difficult to determine. First, attributes to US tax policy and social norms about
it is clear that both processes are happening inequities that glorify the super-rich.
simultaneously, which creates identification The other key explanation locating rising
problems for observational studies. Second, some inequality in a growing rift between labor and
suggest that the two processes are related. On one capital is the ascendance of finance capital.
hand, labor-saving technological change and off- Giovani Arrighi (1994) was among the first soci-
shoring are complimentary strategies by which to ologists to theorize finance (also see Krippner
reduce the overall share of labor in output and 2011). His argument was that “financialization,”
thereby increase profitability. Theories of defined as an increase in the returns to finance
inequality for which antagonistic class relations relative to the returns to fixed capital investment,
reside at the center of the analysis view these as is a repeating “signal crisis” in the historical
two sides of the same coin. On the other, some development of capitalism. Economic expan-
suggest at least some of the labor saving techno- sions begin with (product or process) innovations
logical changes is caused by rising North/South in the core of the world-economy. As these inno-
trade. Here, labor-saving technological change is vations diffuse throughout the world-system, the
a competitive response by a subset of Northern rate of return on fixed capital investments begins
manufacturing firms to the offshoring behavior of to fall, which causes capital to shift into specula-
their rivals (Wood 1998). tive endeavors.
Subsequent analyses focus upon the effect that
financialization has on income inequality in the
12.3.4 The Accumulation of Wealth United States. In a series of papers, Ken-Hou Lin
and the Ascendance and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey argue that finan-
of Finance Capital cialization matters for US income inequality
because it erodes the reliance of capital on, and
While the twin theories of the globalization of thereby the bargaining power of, labor in the
production and labor-saving technological United States. According to this perspective, the
change focus on the distribution of income within rise in income inequality in the United States is
the working class to explain the rise of income driven at least in part by the effect of financializa-
inequality since the 1980s, others focus on the tion on the labor share of income (Lin and
distribution of income between labor and capital, Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; Tomaskovic-Devey
or between the super-rich and the rest. In Capital and Lin 2011).
in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Picketty
(2013) argues that rising inequality is an inherent
feature of capitalism. While the thesis resonates 12.4 Class, Gender, and Race
with classic Marxism, it is much more informed
by traditional economic thought than anything 12.4.1 Class Inequality
else. He suggests that it is incorrect to presume
that income inequality follows a natural course. Thus far, we’ve discussed theories of income
5DWKHU ´LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG SROLFLHV WKDW VRFLHWLHV inequality within countries that are “general” in
choose to adopt” determine whether inequality so far as they explain inequality with systematic
rise or falls (Picketty and Saez 2014: 842–843). relationships among variables like skills,
236 K.M. Guenther et al.
Individuals encounter the mechanisms of class about how the nuclear family emerged as a tool to
reproduction, including families, communities, promote men’s control over women’s reproduc-
and schools, at every turn, which limits possibili- tive capacities and their labor in the capitalist sys-
ties for changing their class position. tem, laying a groundwork for future feminist
theories linking capitalism to women’s exploita-
tion. Later expansions of Marxist feminism
12.4.2 Gender Inequality retained an interest in the relationship between
economic power, sexual politics, and women’s
Theorizing gender differences in wealth, income, political power and status (Blumberg 1984).
power, and status are central areas in stratifica- Given the apparent linkages between women’s
tion studies. Joan Wallach Scott (1988) identifies economic exploitation and their low status in the
two key dimensions of gender when she states household, sociological theory and research on
that, “Gender is a constitutive element of social gender inequality has especially focused on gen-
relationships based on perceived differences der in the workplace.
between the sexes…a primary way of signifying Understanding the wage gap—which in turn
power” (42). Gender thus refers not only to the helps explain women’s overrepresentation among
social relations that divide individuals and groups poor and low income people, as well as their more
into differentiated gender statuses, but also to the limited wealth accumulation—has been a core goal
consequences of those differences for a system of for stratification scholars interested in gender
inequality. The most frequent consequence is that inequalities. Since the gap in wages contributes to
men enjoy a status superior to that of women and the gender gap in wealth, status, and power, the
thus have greater access to power and resources. wage gap may be an underlying problem. The pri-
Women’s formal political rights and economic mary group of theories that seek to explain the
participation have swelled globally over the last emergence and the persistence of the wage gap
century, yet substantial gender gaps exist in focus on occupational sex segregation, or the clus-
wealth and income, even in countries where tering of women and men into different occupa-
women and men ostensibly enjoy similar rights. tions or into different jobs within the same
In the United States and globally, women are occupations. Such theories generally fall into sev-
more likely to live in poverty than are men, are eral overlapping categories. Social psychological
paid less, assume greater responsibility for and behavioral perspectives emphasize the status
household management and child care, and expectations and the internalization of social norms
amass less wealth than men. Functionalist socio- and gender stereotypes (including through gender
logical theories and neoclassical economic theo- socialization) as effecting women’s and men’s
ries both attempted to explain away these RFFXSDWLRQDOSUHIHUHQFHVDQGEHKDYLRUV5LGJHZD\
inequalities as the logical outcomes of sex differ- DQG&RUUHOO2004). Men, for example, enjoy greater
ences, but these perspectives have been largely rewards in the workplace because their colleagues
abandoned in favor of those that offer more perceive them as more competent and committed.
nuanced understandings of gender stratification. Institutional perspectives consider the implications
Such nuance is necessary to untangle the com- of organizational practices for gender inequalities;
plexities of why gender inequality remains so such theories also sometimes incorporate cultural
intractable; this is particularly perplexing in perspectives that focus on how cultural gender-
nations like the United States where women typing of work and occupations shapes wages and
make up nearly half of the paid work force and workplace opportunities (Bielby 2000; Britton
graduate from college at higher rates than men. 2000). Such theories suggest that women and men
Marxist feminist theories of gender stratifica- are pushed into gender-typed occupations and
tion view women’s subordinate social status as work cultures reinforce boundaries, especially to
directly tied to the rise of capitalism and private keep women out of workplaces dominated by men,
property. Friedrich Engels (2010 [1884]) wrote VXFKDVVWRFNEURNHUV5RWK2006; Williams 1995).
238 K.M. Guenther et al.
Feminist theories, which can cut across social 1992; England et al. 2000, 2001; Levanon et al.
psychological and institutional perspectives, 2009). Sexist belief systems also reinforce the
view sex segregation and the wage gap as main- idea that women and men are naturally better
taining men’s privilege over women (Acker 1992; suited to some occupations, but the cross-national
5LVPDQ2004; Williams 1992). That is, sex segre- variation in the gender-typing of jobs reveals that
gation and the mechanisms used to maintain it, occupational sex segregation is socially con-
such as the glass ceiling, hostile work environ- VWUXFWHG&KDUOHVDQG*UXVN\2004).
ments, and other elements of gendered organiza-
tions, are tools that protect men’s status and
SULYLOHJH 5HFHQW UHVHDUFK VKRZLQJ WKH ZRUN- 12.4.3 Racial Inequality
place benefits of transmen’s transitions support
theories pointing to the importance of status as Stratification also occurs along racial lines.
male for occupational success (Schilt 2006). Globally, those nations and regions with predom-
Feminists are particularly concerned with wom- inantly white populations tend to be wealthier
en’s economic equality for at least two key rea- and have better access to resources than those
sons. One is because feminist theories generally with predominantly non-white populations. In
hold that money enhances power, such that wom- much of the industrialized world, racial inequali-
en’s status in the family will only improve as her ties are persistent, and, like gender inequalities,
economic power increases. A second is because are slow to change even though racial and ethnic
of the reality that in industrialized nations, minorities have formal legal rights.
women are overrepresented among people living In the United States, African-Americans expe-
in poverty: in the United States, an estimated five rience particularly pronounced disadvantage,
million more women than men live in poverty. In especially when compared to whites. Empirical
the developing world, poverty strikes women and research consistently establishes yawning gaps
men more equally, but investments in women’s between blacks and whites in the United States in
education are particularly effective in reducing terms of income, wealth, education, and health
poverty. and longevity. Between 1980 and 2009, for
Since the 1970s, feminist perspectives have example, blacks made a varying relative wage of
significantly influenced the study of gender strat- 57.6–67.5 cents for every white dollar. Over the
ification, which have moved away from essential- same period, the relative wage of Hispanic
ist notions that women and men are simply Americans varied from 63.9 % to 75.5 % of
fulfilling “natural” talents and toward social and whites, and Asian Americans earned a relative
structural explanations. Key theoretical insights wage varying from 114 % to 127 % of whites.
that have emerged from this sea change include After an increasing relative wage from 1980 to
attention to gender stereotypes at both the level of 2000, the trend for all three groups stalled in the
individuals and institutions, recognition that 2000s, as did the average wage of whites (US
unintentional discrimination is often central to &HQVXV%XUHDX2012).
maintaining occupational sex segregation and the Historically-oriented perspectives recognize
wage gap, and a collective effort to develop theo- the legacies of slavery and the legal codification
retical and empirical works that offer possible of discrimination in the United States (e.g., Oliver
pathways for reducing gender stratification. and Shapiro 2005 [1995]), which limited oppor-
Feminists have also noted how the devaluing of tunities for black Americans through the 1960s,
feminized occupations points to the persistence when civil rights legislation offered new protec-
of sexist ideologies about gender and work; that tions against discrimination. Legal changes, how-
is, when a job that once was done mainly by men ever, have not afforded blacks the same
becomes one done mainly by women, the occu- opportunities as whites; African-Americans lag
pation loses status and compensation for the in the intergenerational transmission of wealth,
work shrinks (the inverse is also true) (England are disproportionately clustered in the low-wage
12 Stratification 239
labor market, and most often live in racially seg- market, as more powerful, higher-wage workers
regated neighborhoods where schools are poor engage in exclusion movements (attempts to
and where social networks and other resources expel lower-priced workers from a fixed geo-
that support upward mobility are absent. graphical space) or to erect a caste system
In the mid-twentieth century, a “culture of (attempt to exclude lower-priced workers from a
poverty” theory dominated social science theo- particular type of work). Thus, ethnic niches
UL]LQJ DERXW UDFLDO LQHTXDOLWLHV &KDPSLRQHG emerge at least in part as a consequence of lim-
across a range of academic disciplines and among ited opportunities, and become self-reinforcing
policymakers (e.g., the Moynihan report of over time.
1965), this theory held that poor communities Theories stressing the power of racism and
respond to structural poverty and systemic exclu- discrimination counter that racially-specific bar-
sion by developing behaviors and norms that ulti- riers, including institutional mechanisms that
mately inhibit their ability to escape poverty. restrict blacks from accessing equal opportunities
Widely criticized for blaming the poor for their and rewards, remain key for understanding the
disadvantage, competing theories alternately racial gap in income and wealth. Joe Feagin
emphasize the structural obstacles to upward (1991) for example, holds that discrimination
mobility for low income blacks, or focus on remains central to the lived experiences of
structural and individual racism as the primary African-Americans at the micro level, even as
explanation for the continued persistence of structural racism—configured as residential and
racial inequality in the US. occupational ghettoization—dominates the
One key example of the structural approach is macro level. Sometimes micro-level discrimina-
William Julius Wilson’s controversial argument tion is obscured by race-neutral language, such as
that poor blacks in the United States are disad- employer emphasis on “soft skills,” or interper-
vantaged by their social and economic isolation, sonal skills that are seen as particularly important
which is itself an outcome of shifts in the labor in the service economy and which employers see
market that have reduced opportunities for peo- blacks as less likely to possess than whites (Moss
ple with lower educational attainment to hold and Tilly 2001). Devah Pager and colleagues
jobs that offer subsistence wages. Wilson’s per- (2009), for example, have documented how black
spective thus ultimately asserts that class trumps men seeking entry-level jobs experience a sub-
race as an obstacle to upward mobility, a perspec- stantial race penalty; employers prefer to hire
tive captured in the title of his book The Declining even whites with felony convictions before hiring
Significance of Race (1980). blacks. Many employers are oblivious to their
Split labor market theory also deemphasizes own racial bias, and/or use race-neutral language.
race-ethnicity in favor of other factors that con- However, rather than interpreting race-neutral
tribute to wage differentials and inter-group language as evidence of an absence of racism,
antagonisms (Bonacich 1972). A split labor mar- critical race theories argue that color-blind rac-
ket contains at least two groups of workers whose ism simply enables perpetrators of discrimination
price of labor differs for the same work, or would to deny their racist actions (Bonilla-Silva 2003;
differ if they did the same work. However, Moss and Tilly 2001).
Bonacich argues that the price of labor is not a Wealth inequalities are perpetuated through
response to the ethnicity of those entering the the gap in the intergenerational transmission in
labor market per se. Instead, a price differential wealth (Oliver and Shapiro 2005 [1995]).
results from differences in resources and motives, Because African-American families historically
which are often correlates of ethnicity. All else were blocked from the major pathways to wealth
equal, employers will prefer the lower wage (i.e., accumulation, such as home ownership and well-
non-white) workers, which then generates antag- paid jobs, they have yet to amass wealth that can
onism with the higher-wage white workers. The be passed down generation to generation. The
ensuing conflict tries to eliminate the split-labor persistence of residential segregation, which
240 K.M. Guenther et al.
pushes blacks into neighborhoods with lower with how class, race, and gender intersect to
property values, weaker public services, and con- shape life chances and life stories; future research
stant contact with poorer blacks, also continues will hopefully engage more deeply with
the cycle of the non-accumulation of wealth. intersectionality.
5DFLDO LQHTXDOLWLHV SHUVLVW WKHQ QRW MXVW
because of individual-level prejudices, but also
because of how race structures all aspects of 12.5 (De)stratifying Institutions
social life in the US. For blacks, the consequences
include lower incomes and less wealth, residen- In this section, we review sociological theories of
tial segregation, and shorter life expectancies. stratification in which institutions occupy the
For whites, the results are unearned advantages center of the analytical space. One of the most
or privileges (McIntosh 1988). Lipsitz (1988) important institutions in this regard is the state.
refers to the possessive investment in whiteness Theories of the welfare state seek to understand
by which whites maintain a system that protects the causes and consequences of state interven-
their assets (whether cultural or material) by lim- tions in social inequalities, including various
iting opportunities for upward mobility and IRUPV RI UHGLVWULEXWLRQ 5HGLVWULEXWLRQ FDQ WDNH
resource accumulation among non-whites. many forms, including social programs like
5DFH DOVR RSHUDWHV LQ FRQMXQFWLRQ ZLWK FODVV unemployment insurance, retirement and health
and gender to shape inequality. Intersectionality care benefits, family benefits, educational assis-
theory, first introduced conceptually by legal tance, food stamps, and progressive tax systems.
VFKRODU .LPEHUOH &UHQVKDZ 1991) and later Because many of these social programs have pro-
HODERUDWHG E\ VRFLRORJLVW &ROOLQV 1990), offers gressive qualification requirements attached to
a powerful theoretical framework for understand- them, they amount to a direct transfer income
ing how race, class, and gender intersect to shape from wealthy to poorer individuals or families. In
the experience of inequalities for individuals and short, welfare states modify the effects of social
groups in society. The intersectionality approach or market forces on their citizens in order to
critiques additive approaches to oppression that achieve greater equality (Orloff 1996).
conceptualize gender, race, and class as descrip- Early theories of the welfare state viewed wel-
WLYH YDULDEOHV DWWDFKHG WR LQGLYLGXDOV &ROOLQV fare policy development as an outcome of indus-
(2005) describes intersectionality theory as “two trialization: as nations industrialized and
types of relationships: the interconnectedness of urbanized, welfare states emerged to protect citi-
ideas and the social structures in which they zens from the market. However, social scientists
occur, and the intersecting hierarchies of gender, soon recognized the importance of political pro-
race, economic, class, sexuality, and ethnicity” cesses for shaping welfare policy, and began to
(p. 5). She argues that all groups possess varying focus on understanding variations across welfare
amount of penalty and privilege in one histori- states. Power resource theory emphasizes com-
cally created system. For example, white women parative welfare state studies, highlighting the
are penalized by their gender but privileged by market modifying force of welfare states and
their race. To date, intersectionality theory has their capacity to mitigate class inequality
not been integrated into quantitative analyses of (Esping-Andersen 1990). Power resource theory
inequalities, other than through interaction asserts that class alliances determine the expan-
YDULDEOHV IRU DQ H[FHSWLRQ VHH 0F&DOO sion of modern welfare states. This perspective
2005). However, ethnographers and qualitative thus established politics—and political configu-
sociologists have used intersectionality theory to rations of class power—as a major force behind
illuminate the significance of multiple axes of welfare state evolution and policy-making.
inequality (e.g., Bettie 2002; Ferguson 2000). Furthermore, power resource theory introduced
Intersectionality theory offers scholars of decommodification, or the degree to which social
inequalities the opportunity to engage critically rights allow individuals to meet their living
12 Stratification 241
standards independent of pure market forces, as tinental European countries, such as Germany,
DQDQDO\WLFFRQFHSW5DWKHUWKDQYLHZLQJZHOIDUH Austria, and Italy, are identified as representing
state evolution as a by-product of industrializa- the conservative welfare regime type. Finally,
tion and capitalist expansion, power-resource social democratic regimes provide universal ben-
theory recognizes the importance of class con- efits that are intended to equalize the disparities
figurations and politics in shaping welfare states, between classes. Such states, which include the
thereby combining elements of earlier non- Scandinavian states, socialize family costs, and
Marxist political approaches and of structural the state often serves as a substitute to a male
0DU[LVWDSSURDFKHVWRWKHZHOIDUHVWDWH5HVHDUFK breadwinner by providing high levels of support
XVLQJ3RZHU5HVRXUFHWKHRU\WRH[SODLQLQHTXDO- for single mothers.
ity is vibrant and ongoing (Huber and Stephens Feminist scholars mobilized and modified
2014). Esping-Andersen’s framework to consider the
Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) Three ways in which welfare regimes regulate gender
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism has been an espe- via the state, the market, and the family
cially influential component of this perspective. 2·&RQQRUHWDO1999). Including family in theo-
Esping-Andersen advocates for a set of typolo- ries of the welfare state illuminates a core site of
gies that may be used to compare welfare regimes state regulation that has been a flash point for
across types and which have been used to com- feminist state theory. Feminist state theory, pio-
SDUH ZHOIDUH UHJLPHV ZLWKLQ W\SHV 2·&RQQRU neered by American and British Marxist femi-
et al. 1999; Sainsbury 1999). Most simply, a wel- nists in the 1970s, views women as simultaneously
fare regime may be understood as “patterns oppressed by both capitalism and patriarchy
across a number of policy areas,” and within (Hartmann 1979). With its strong emphasis on
comparative welfare state studies usually includes capitalism as the determining force behind the
the full range of domestic policy interventions as state’s actions and policies, dual systems theory
well as broader patterns of provisioning and reg- asserts that the state guides changes in the family
XODWLRQ2·&RQQRUHWDO1999: 12). and women’s domestic behavior based on capi-
Esping-Andersen’s original typology classi- talism’s needs. According to this perspective,
fies welfare regimes along three dimensions, women’s labor, both inside and outside of the
namely relations between the state and the mar- home, is manipulated by the state to serve capi-
ket, stratification, and social rights. Liberal wel- talism’s interests at a given historical point.
fare regimes seek to keep market forces sovereign. Women thus became party to the social reproduc-
Such regimes tend to practice free-market liberal- tion of both class and gender.
ism, and are characterized by modest means- The state is implicated in the oppression of
tested benefits and limited universal benefits and women because it supports a specific household
social insurance plans. Generally speaking, lib- structure, namely the two-parent or “nuclear”
eral welfare regimes offer their citizens few alter- family, a structure that relies on male wages and
natives to relying on the market. The United female domestic labor (Eisenstein 1983). By
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia are keeping welfare payments low, and by limiting
frequent examples of this type of welfare regime women’s employment opportunities to low-wage
W\SH&RQVHUYDWLYHZHOIDUHUHJLPHVDWWDFKULJKWV jobs, the state in essence forces women to find a
to class and status, and operate on the principle of male breadwinner. The state is also implicated in
subsidiarity, such that the state only intervenes the creation of public patriarchy. The state does
with transfers and services when the family’s not serve as the indirect oppressor of women via
ability to care for its members is exhausted. the nuclear family, but rather renders women
These regimes highlight the importance of the dependent on the state itself. In line with this per-
traditional two-parent family, as reflected in spective, social welfare programs are analyzed
social policies that support marriage and wom- for their tendency to make women dependent on
en’s reliance on a male breadwinner. Several con- men as collectively embodied in the state. In
242 K.M. Guenther et al.
essence, the state takes on the role of a husband, gap between labor and capital. In terms of the
both as provider and as controlling patriarch. As former, wage coordination dampens the link from
such, the state becomes the manager of women’s wages to variance in the demands for particular
dependence (Mink 1990). sub-sets of workers because wages are deter-
Both power resource theory and feminist state mined through collective bargaining, which has
theory draw attention to how welfare regimes can been shown to benefit low-skill workers dispro-
maintain and reproduce inequalities. That is, portionately (Wallerstein 1999). In terms of the
although the stated goal of welfare states is to income gap between labor and capital, wage-
protect citizens from the market and reduce strat- coordination shifts some workplace authority
ification, welfare states also have hidden agendas from capital to labor, and fosters collective iden-
that reinforce the status quo of inequality. tity among differentiated workers (Wallerstein
&RPSDUDWLYHUHVHDUFKUHYHDOVWKDWWKHUHSURGXF- 1999). Thus, it provides an institutional source of
tion of inequalities varies across welfare states, bargaining power that tends to increase the labor
but is consistently present. Even as they purport share of income in countries with strong corpo-
to reduce inequalities, welfare states support the ratist institutions. As a product of both these
continuation of inequalities of class, gender, and mechanisms, a negative association between
race. wage-coordination institutions and income
In addition to welfare states, there are other inequality has been a persistent finding in the
types of national institutions that matter for the comparative political economy literature
distribution of income. Wage coordination among (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Bradley et al. 2003;
labor, capital and sometimes the state also stands &KHFFKL DQG *DUFLD3HxDORVD 2010; Pontusson
out as prominent in this regard (Kenworthy 2001; et al. 2002; Wallerstein 1999).
Wallerstein 1999; Alderson and Nielsen 2002;
&KHFFKL DQG *DUFLD3HQDORVD 2010; Mahler
2004). Examples of wage coordination include 12.6 Conclusions
industry-level wage bargaining through formal
relations between capital, peak labor confedera- Sociological theories of stratification have guided
tions (Austria) or large unions from influential social scientists towards deeper and more
industries (Germany), between employer confed- nuanced understandings of social inequality. The
erations and large firms (Japan and Switzerland), topic remains gripping precisely because inequal-
or by government imposition of wage schedules ities appear to be intractable, even as their form
or freezes (e.g., Belgium, Denmark and the changes across historical periods. Given the com-
Netherlands) (Katzenstein 1985; Traxler 1999). plexity of inequalities, it is not surprising that
On one hand, countries with strong corporatist, many questions remain about both the causes and
wage-setting institutions have strong labor consequences of stratification, and we expect that
unions, which tend to increase wages for both theory and research on inequalities will continue
union and non-union members. Indeed, the to be central to the discipline of sociology. We
declining rates of unionization in the United hope that future theory and research on the con-
States have subjected workers to stagnant wages sequences of inequalities include greater atten-
and limited workplace protections vis-à-vis tion to the developing world, where inequalities
workers in other developed countries, which in have been taken for granted and understudied.
turn helps explain why the United States has the These contexts may reveal dynamics different
highest levels of income inequality among devel- from those in industrialized capitalism
oped nations and the greatest rise in inequality economies.
(along with the UK) between 1975 and 2000 Theorizing the institutional and societal con-
(Neckerman and Torche 2007). sequences of inequality also requires consistent
Wage-coordination itself reduces inequality attention. Does between-nation inequality foment
within the working class, as well as the income resentment and increase risk of conflict and, if so,
12 Stratification 243
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The Concept of Community
as Theoretical Ground: Contention 13
and Compatibility Across Levels
of Analysis and Standpoints
of Social Processes
Michael D. Irwin
13.1 Introduction: Community Pahl and many others had come to see the prom-
as a Theoretical Linkage ise of community studies as a sociological
method and empirical endeavor rather than as a
Forty years ago community sociologists were foundational movement to develop a theory of a
widely expressing frustration with the concept of sociological phenomenon (Bell and Newby 2012;
community. In summarizing 200 years of socio- Day 2006).
logical work on the subject, in 1974 Bell and Within the community studies arena this failure
Newby seemed to have admitted defeat. “Yet out seemed to undercut the foundation for theoretical
of community studies, there has never developed discourse on community. “One of the main prob-
a theory of community, nor even a satisfactory lems concerning the study of community is that it
definition of what community is” (Bell and has little or no substantive sociological theory of
Newby 2012, l. 795). Such a definition seemed its own. … Thus we cannot draw upon a body of
unachievable “It should be apparent by now that theory of the community— rather we must fall
it is impossible to give the sociological definition back upon a list of individuals who have written
of community” (Bell and Newby 2012, l. 788). about the concept of community itself” (Bell and
Likewise Cohen (1985) states “Over the years Newby 2012, p. 3). If no definite theoretical body
(community) has proved to be highly resistant to of work on community emerged during this time
satisfactory definition in anthropology and soci- period, the list of individuals writing about com-
ology, perhaps for the simple reason that all defi- munity continued to accumulate. A practical
nitions contain or imply theories, and the theory regard for community as concept and as an object
of community has been very contentious” of analysis would remain the mainstay of socio-
(p. 8–9). Reflecting a generalized sentiment logical study in the latter twentieth century.
Stacey declared “It is doubtful whether the con- From that empirical literature a common con-
cept ‘community’ refers to a useful abstraction” stellation of characteristics emerged. According
and characterized the search for a cohesive the- to Bruhn (2005) the concept of community
ory of community as sociological ephemera involves (1) locality (2) a sense of place and (3) a
(Stacey 2012, p. 13). Pahl (1966) describes the sense of community. Similarly Flora and Flora
effort as a ‘singularly fruitless exercise’. Stacey, (2013) situate the concept of community in local-
ity but stress the importance of a locally bounded
social system containing locally oriented organi-
M.D. Irwin (*) zations. Elias (2012) shifts the orientation from
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA individuals to residence thus stressing the notions
e-mail: [email protected]
of spatial proximity as a characteristic of com- space and place in community association? Has
munity. Similarly McClay (2014) emphasizes locality lost its associational force or has it sim-
both the tangible and intangible resources of ply been transformed? Contemporary works by
place as well as the pervasive importance of com- Auge (2008), Bauman (2001, 2013), Bellah et al.
munity as place: “There is no evading the fact (1992, 1996), Florida (2004, 2005), Fukuyama
that we human beings have a profound need for (1995, 1999), Putnam et al. (1993, 2000), and
‘thereness,’ for visible and tangible things that others concerned with the relationship between
persist and endure, and thereby serve to anchor individuals and social life elevated the impor-
our memories in something more substantial than tance of community as concept and moved com-
our thoughts and emotions” (p. 2). Notably, munity theory to the center of sociological
despite very different basic theoretical assump- interest. Their works on social capital, civic
tions, these definitions yield a common core of engagement, trust and meaning were infused
issues involving community. As Keller (2003) with discussions of community that recalled the
notes, despite major differences in basic theoreti- 19th theoretical treatment of community by de
cal assumptions there are constant elements that Tocqueville, Tönnies, Durkheim, Marx, Simmel,
theorists use to describe community. “These and Weber. Why?
include physical properties, such as land and The concept of community has been used
boundaries, to cultural and social properties” since Greek times to situate individuals in a larger
(p. 266). Beyond agreements on these very gen- social context. Linking the experiential world of
eral dimensions, however, the discipline had the individual to the abstraction of society and
never coalesced around deeper theoretical issues. culture has been an enduring analytic and theo-
As Day (2006) states “At every level, it does retical problem in sociology and related disci-
appear community is contested, and contestable. plines (Cresswell 2015; Nisbet 1966; Keller
There is disagreement about its essential mean- 2003). Society, however influential on daily lives,
ing, and endless argument about what it signifies is not readily perceived as an object or as context
in terms of entitlements and responsibilities, and by individuals. And if these lines of influence
for whom” (p. 245). Bruhn (2005) echoes this lack experiential reality, then the processes by
assessment noting “The word ‘community,’ much which individuals are integrated into society and
like the word ‘culture,’ has been used so freely in culture are equally indefinite. The concept of
the lay and scientific literature that it is often community provides a theoretical counter to this
assumed that everyone understands it and is in ambiguity that is at once abstract and concrete.
agreement about its importance. Yet, while the However, theorizing community necessarily
definitions of both words can vary substantially, confronts two issues: the problem of locality and
they seem to be as protected as if they were the problem of association. The problem of asso-
totems” (l. 469). ciation includes the nature of association among
If community as a concept had limited com- individuals and the relationship of community
mon ground across perspectives, community as both to individuals and to society at large. The
an important conceptual element permeated theo- nature of association has long been contrasted as
retical approaches in social science in the late either originating in social structure and culture
20th century. Technological developments in or originating with individual recognition of
infrastructure and globalization of economic common advantages and identity. This problem
relations transformed the spatial limitations of of association also involves the role that commu-
interaction while shifts in the basis for affiliation nity plays in linking individuals to the broader
among individuals created a new nexus of asso- social and cultural milieu. Here community may
ciation that raised deep questions about the nature be seen as simply a microcosm of society or as a
of community in the twenty-first century. Is the conceptually separate social form. The two
concept of community still meaningful in an age aspects, community as a source or consequence
of transcendent individualism? Is there a role for of association, and the role of community as a
13 The Concept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 249
Durkheim, Cooley) and in philosophy (Hegel, communal rather than individual ends. Social
Whitehead, systems theorists) (Kirkpatrick integration lies most especially in the cultural
2008). Where atomistic/contractual assumptions ideals of community. Community, as an ideal,
highlight individual autonomy, association in played two important integrating roles: linking
organically conceived notions of community an autonomous local people to a wider world-
tends toward the notion of individuals filling view – the cultural traditions, religion, and philo-
socially proscribed roles and behaviors (Benn sophical perspectives of a more extensive Greek
1982). cultural system and (b) forging collective bonds
Nisbet proposes a very clear statement of among individuals that moderate local tension
community as an organic and holistic aspect of between individual ambition and collective needs
social organization. “Community is founded on (Keller 2003). These wider cultural links were
man conceived in his wholeness rather than in forged through religious ceremony, community
one or another of the roles, taken separately, that festivals and other civic activity while individual
he may hold in a social order … it achieves ful- affiliation was achieved through laws and norms.
fillment in the submergence of individual will “[G]roup goals and loyalty to the totality were to
that is not possible in unions of mere convenience be put above individual striving for wealth and
or rational assent” (1966, p. 46). Community is, fame. The highest honors were according to those
in the organic view, the center of the communal. who put the common good above individual
Here the basic unit is the social group, not the gain” (Keller 2003, p. 20).
individual. The sum total of community structure While linkages between the individual, com-
and culture are taken to be cohesive. Remove any munity and society were clearly emphasized in
part and the communal glue weakens (Carroll the writings of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, it is
2014, l. 4779). For Nisbet and others in this vein, community that plays the preeminent role
this is not to deny volitional aspects of individu- (Cresswell 2015). Community is somewhat
alism. Yet they do posit an essential tendency autonomous from larger culture and it is commu-
among individuals toward community engage- nity that shapes the contractual connection
ment, for “the yearning for a feeling of participa- among individuals on a daily basis (Keller 2003).
tion, for a sense of belonging, for a cause larger Notably this contractual bonding was not simply
than one’s own individual purposes and a group an expression of enlightened self-interest, but a
to call one’s own” (Douthat 2014, l. 59). mechanism for enhancing individual natural fac-
ulties and common goals (Kirkpatrick 2008,
p. 14). As Keller states “For Plato, virtue rather
13.2.2 Greek Conception: than happiness was the path to an integrated life
Community for Common and virtue was rooted in communal well-being
Good and Locality as Place (Keller 2003, p. 287).
In this sense community is the mechanism for
Keller (2003) argues that “It was the Greeks who individual self-actualization. The community
were the first to work out the complex links provides a basis for individual rational and philo-
between the individual and community” (p. 20) sophical common interest. The shared common-
and in seeing community as an integrating force ality of this interest is of location, “Both ‘politics’
with the larger sociocultural system. The utilitar- and ‘ethics’ go back to Greek words that signify
ian conception of community as atomistic affilia- place: polis and ethea, ‘city-states’ and ‘habitats’
tion is often the foil of the more organic idea. respectively. The very word ‘society’ stems from
However, the classic Greek conception of ideal socius, signifying ‘sharing’ – and sharing is done
community provided a somewhat different take in a common place” (Casey 1997, p. xiv). It is for
on affiliated interests among individuals (Minar this reason that community as place predomi-
and Greer 1969). For the Greeks, the polis had a nates Greek thought. Society, like space, is every-
contractual basis of association, yet one based on where, yet nowhere in particular. Community
13 The Concept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 251
without spatial identity on the earth lacks the economic commonwealth to a conception of
commonality. a common spiritual good that transcends spatial
It is this spatial commonality of place that boundaries and creates a community of the faith-
solidifies Greek culture and philosophy. ful (Keller 2003). Building on the Augustinian
Community of place becomes the basis of the concept of a universal community, Aquinas
contractual aspect of social organization. It had argues that such communities rise based upon
an individual centered and contractual formula- this common spiritual good and: “infused the
tion of individual relationship to community, notion of community as organism, an idea derived
albeit one immersed in culture and meaning. from Augustinian thought, added as an additional
Individuals were immersed in community and ingredient of community the pursuit of the com-
through it society. Yet, community is an ongoing mon good” (Keller 2003, p. 38).
agreement among individuals. The weight of Individuals are mutually bound together by
influence is from individuals up. The polis is only community although each person maintains iden-
loosely coupled to larger culture. Community is tity and independent action. These bonds are not
the primary sociocultural mechanism linking ones of self-interest but reflect “a notion of mutu-
individuals to larger society and affiliation among ality in which one person seeks out another and in
individuals is derived from notions of a common some sense lives for it and not itself” (Kirkpatrick
good. Community is contractual but not in the 2008, p. 105). It is the overarching spiritual prin-
sense posited later by utilitarian thinkers. Delanty ciples that bind individuals to this universal com-
(2009) argues that this is the first of two modern munity rather than the overlapping interests that
ideas of community “the human order of the polis emerge from the individuals themselves. In this,
and the universal order of the cosmos. These tra- the ideal is the community that exists prior to and
ditions – one particularistic and the other univer- apart from the individuals. Communal cohesion
salistic – correspond approximately to the Greek among individuals is shaped by this universal
and Christian traditions … Where the Greeks recognition of a greater, trans-individual ideal.
gave priority to the polis as the domain of com- The concept of community arising from the
munity, Christian thought stressed the universal monastic conception of affiliations is organic, sui
community as a communion with the sacred” generis, deriving essential meaning as a mecha-
(pp. 5–6). nism linking individuals to the larger (religious)
culture. The monastic notion of community is
one based on the power of ideals and culture.
13.2.3 Medieval Christian This holistic notion of community would later
Conceptions: Community return in early sociological writings of Comte,
as Organic and Universal Durkheim and Cooley (among others), but with
the advent of the Enlightenment, an organic con-
The conceptual alternative to the polis is found in ception would be set aside. The utilitarian basis
the monastic community and in the early writings of community was found in mutual self-interest
of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Where the (Minar and Greer 1969).
polis is local, territorial, concerned with the
immediate and daily actions of its members, the 13.2.3.1 The Age of Enlightenment:
monastic community is organic, holistic and Community as Contract
embedded in a specific shared ideology. A posi- for Individual Good
tion in space and territoriality is the least impor- In this conception the basis of sociality lies exclu-
tant dimension of community. Instead, the sively in the protection of individual property.
normative order transcends space and the con- Community plays a minimal role in these forma-
nections binding individuals together transcend tions (Keller 2003; Minar and Greer 1969). For
individual interests (Keller 2003). Augustine Hobbes community is seen as largely an anti-
melds this ideal together with Cicero’s concept of quated social convenience. Locke retains the
252 M.D. Irwin
the contextual conditions forming contractual losophy (Kirkpatrick 2008; Keller 2003, Nisbet
association, rather than pure self-interest. Critical 1966). Nisbet in particular argues that the con-
to the formation of this mutuality among com- temporary view of community and alienation is
munity members are the public associations that found in the philosophical conservative’s view.
typify the local community. They saw loss of institutional traditions as leading
De Tocqueville places the two types of con- to alienation (Keller 2003; Nisbet 2014). Their
tractual association in opposition to one another: response to the self-interested autonomy of the
society and individual self-interest vs. commu- Enlightenment was to return to the organic, social
nity and transcendent interests. This approach individual of Augustine (Nisbet 1966). In part this
represents a break with the characterizations of reflects a nostalgia for the disappearing commu-
association and community underlying utilitarian nities of the medieval age (Bell and Newby 1975),
thought. Instead his formulation of community but it is also a reaction to the rise of political
recalls the Greek notions of contractual associa- thought that prioritizes the national political state.
tion for higher purposes. This becomes de “The idea of the abstract, impersonal, and purely
Tocqueville’s analytic quest. Can community legal state is challenged by the theories resting on
moderate society? Can the common weal triumph the assumed priority of community, tradition, and
over self-interest? As Keller states of de status” (Nisbet 1966, p. 51). Social, moral, episte-
Tocqueville “Crucial here is that individuals think mological and metaphysical attacks in philoso-
it is to their interest to link themselves to others. phy by Hegel, Bradley and Bergson mounted
But how to plant the same thought into a thou- against the atomistic perspective, especially as it
sand minds at the same moment?” (Keller 2003, centered on self-interest. It is in this light that
p. 230). De Tocqueville thought the answer lay in sociological treatises of the period should be
part in the local press but also in the proliferation understood (Kirkpatrick 2008; Keller 2003).
of associations that created a shared identity in Using community as a central organizing con-
the community. For him, this was by no means an cept, Durkheim rejected the notion that self-
assured outcome. To the extent that community interest was the foundation of social cohesion,
triumphed, individuals would find meaning in substituting common beliefs and sentiments – the
shared identity and in sharing common goals. To collective conscience (Keller 2003). This concep-
the extent that society triumphed individuals tion parallels Comte’s idea of the moral commu-
would isolate themselves and only associate nity (Nisbet 1966). Both see society simply as
according to the expedience of individual gain. community written large. It is from both commu-
This view of community association as a process nity and society that all phenomenon above the
would re-emerge with Tönnies (1887). However, purely physiological is derived. The transition
for Tönnies this transition would be more pro- from mechanical to organic association in no way
found. He would conceive this as a change in the reflected a loss of the communal origins of attach-
essential nature of association, in the movement ment and affiliation. Rather this was a change
from the organic to the contractual. from one type of community attachment; local,
immediate, sentimental, to another type of attach-
ment; less bounded by locality and similarity. In
13.3 Community, Association analyzing the shift to organic solidarity
and Locality: Development “Durkheim was gratified to conclude that, far
in Sociology from community disintegrating, society was
becoming one big community” (Bell and Newby
13.3.1 Classic Sociology: 1975, p. 23). His concern was that the emergence
From Community to Society of organic solidarity might be threatened by a
readiness to cooperate on behalf of common pur-
De Tocqueville aside, the reaction to the utilitar- poses (Day 2006). This could lead to greater ano-
ian concept of community sets the foundation of mie. However, this transition, for Durkheim,
discussion for subsequent social science and phi- should not be mistaken for a shift to an atomistic
254 M.D. Irwin
character for association. Association in the divisions (Nisbet 1966). This is seen as a shift
organic society remains embedded in the com- from a natural, organic character of local associa-
mon culture, the collective conscience of society tion, one based on shared history, traditions, and
(Keller 2003). The social system remains the affective social connections to one of impersonal
force shaping individual attachment and associa- rationality. As Day (2006) characterizes Tönnies,
tion, not individual volition. This conception is “Community stands for real ties of interdepen-
holistic with individual behavior shaped condi- dence and emotion between people who form
tions by the divisions of organic society rather part of an organic, bounded, entity, often linked
than the communal mechanic solidarity of com- to place or territory. ‘Association’ refers to
munity. What does change is the role that com- exchanges among individuals who engage in
munity plays. Rather than the immediate mediator essentially boundaryless, contractual relation-
of larger culture, community is subsumed as a ships; the ties between them are merely conve-
component of the larger division of labor. nient” (p. 6). Tönnies argues that modernization
Community becomes society. brings with it a shift to contractualism.
For Marx, community never differentiated This shift is one from individual association
from society. Like Durkheim, he rejects the utili- embedded in community itself to one of associa-
tarian notions of association in favor of an organic tion arising from the individual and based solely
conception (Kirkpatrick 2008). Individual asso- on mutual self-interest. In Gemeinschaft commu-
ciation is shaped by society. Unlike Durkheim, nity binds individuals together through reciproc-
community is relegated to a secondary role in ity, history, and shared culture. While Tönnies
shaping association. Both in his critique of pre- provided a central role for individual volition in
socialist society and in his prospective commu- this attachment, in community this volition is
nist society, Marx turns away from localism in directed by the culture of place (Wesenwille) and
favor of a communal association at the societal is therefore of the community. In Gesellschaft
level (Nisbet 1966). The importance of commu- society, that community is lost and with it the pri-
nity lies in its historically specific role in mediat- macy of place. Kurwille (purposive-rational)
ing socioeconomic relationship. Community is volition predominates and is of the individual.
simply the most local characterization of society Thus contractualism comes to characterize asso-
(Nisbet 1966). Here community is simply a spa- ciation in Gesellschaft society. Rudolf Heberle
tial node of larger society. Those elements of highlights this point in his preface to Community
community association highlighted by his con- and Society (2002).
temporaries, cooperation, mutuality and affection Tönnies showed that Aristotle and Hobbes were
had little place in Marx’s treatment of commu- both right. Each had focused on different aspects
nity (Kirkpatrick 2008). Those elements of asso- of social life: Man was indeed by his very nature a
ciation would not develop in community but social being who would unfold his essence only by
living in communities of kinship, space (neighbor-
ultimately they would in communist society. hood), and spirit, but who was also capable of
Tönnies, unlike Marx, begins with the histori- forming and, at certain stages in history, compelled
cal preeminence of community over society. to form new kinds of associations by agreements –
Unlike Durkheim, he did see the transition from associations which could be understood as instru-
ments for the attainment of certain ends – whereas
community to society as a fundamental shift from those ‘older’ communities were taken as ends in
individuals as embedded social beings to indi- themselves and therefore could not be understood
vidual autonomy, from the holistic to the atomis- by a utilitarian approach. (2002, p. x)
tic. With this shift comes the loss of community
as a mechanism for organizing association. This point is echoed by Delanty (2009) “there is
Tönnies stresses Gemeinschaft as typified by no doubt that Tönnies tended to polarize these
cherished modes of community association (love, terms, seeing community as encompassing tradi-
loyalty, honor, friendship) all of which are super- tion and society as modernity, and both inter-
seded by utilitarian ‘society’ the Gesellschaft of locked in a ‘tragic conflict’…” (p. 21). This
atomistic individualism and association based on theoretical synthesis is consequential, given that
13 The Concept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 255
Tönnies’ typology continued to influence sociol- By the end of the nineteenth century the con-
ogists throughout the twentieth century. Rather cept of community was established in these two
than positing an essential character to association traditions. The organic notion viewed community
and community, Tönnies and subsequent work in as the ultimate cause of individual association
this vein recognized the transitional nature of through the influence of immediate norms, values
community and of association. and local goals. Community exists sui generis, as
Tönnies, like Weber, treated community as either the mediator between individuals and soci-
typology although not in the empirical sense. For ety (as with the monasitic vision), or as the imme-
both, types of community represented types of diate and primary mechanism shaping individual
association. This theme is picked up by association (as with the Conservative reaction to
Simmel (1971) and Weber (1958) (especially in the Enlightenment). However, in this conception,
his traditional vs rational types of authority, social the immediate influences of community were
action oriented to (1) interpersonal ends, (2) abso- being subsumed in organic society. Community
lute value-ends, (3) emotional/affectual states, and may exist as a social entity but increasingly the
(4) tradition and convention – as well as the transi- character of community was dominated by the
tion from non-rational to rational society) and character of society. With this, the importance of
later by Cooley 2008) (in his primary vs community as place correspondingly is de-
secondary types of associations) and Durkheim emphasized. Association no longer is seen as
(1964) (mechanical vs organic solidarity). organized in space as communities of place. With
Notably these thinkers focus on a transition in that change, the organic bonding elements of
general association rather than explicitly assign- association no longer have a particularly spatial
ing the concept of ‘community’ to either. For identity. Society creates attachment and society is
Weber the communal is the antithesis of rational territorially pervasive.
associative solidarity. With a shift to the rational Contractualist approaches viewed community
associative comes an increase in atomistic isola- as shaped by loosely amalgamated individual
tion of the modern individual. In Durkheim how- association aggregated up to form common
ever, this transition remains fundamentally mechanisms that either enhanced self-interest, as
determined by society. Here society operates in the utilitarian approaches, or shared goals and
through communal moral consensus and ideals, as with the Greek classic notion of the
Durkheim, in his methodology, prioritizes com- polis. In the latter, locality reigned supreme in
munity (in the sense of community of beliefs and that the transmission of interests were local, face-
sentiments) as the mechanism through which soci- to-face and immediate. Society and culture were
ety influences individual behavior (Nisbet 1966). filtered through community. For the utilitarians,
Simmel parallels Durkheim’s interest in insti- such localism was simply the remnant of an ear-
tutions and associations, but at a micro level. A lier era. Contractual association was reorganized
critique of utilitarian individualism, Simmel’s across commonalities that transcended locality.
view of society was one of individual contribu- Neither ideals nor goals were contained within
tions that aggregate up to society, although not any particular community. Individual interests
necessarily on a contractual basis. Simmel puts had universalized and the local community disap-
autonomy into the forefront of sociological con- pears as a recognizable theater of common
cern. “The deepest problems of modern life interest.
derive from-the claim of the individual to pre- Thus for both groups the foundational posi-
serve the autonomy and individuality of his exis- tion of community’s role in relation to associa-
tence in the face of overwhelming social forces, tion had shifted. The immediacy and proximity
of historical heritage, of external culture, and of of social relations were of less importance. The
the technique of life.” His Metropolis and Mental universality of associations became the problem
Life is concerned with the transition from cohe- of interest. For Durkheim, Marx, Simmel and
sive traditional community to de-socialized anon- Weber, the importance of community gives way
ymous life (Nisbet 1966, 95–97). to society as the primary aspect of social
256 M.D. Irwin
on an assumption of rationality, like the utilitari- and cultural processes in these communities of
ans, but only as a material condition creating attachment (Wirth 1928; Lynd and Lynd 1929;
association. Community explains individual Park et al. 1984; Zorbaugh 1929; Whyte 1955;
association. “The question to be asked in an eco- Redfield 1955; Frazier 1957; Warner and Lunt
logical approach is not why persons do what they 1941; Hollingshead 1949). Here community
do, but under what conditions do given actions attachment was considered to be an outcome of
occur” (Hawley 1986, p. 6). This approach the organic whole of the ecological community.
emphasized both the organic nature of commu- Individual attachment arose from the processes
nity and social nature of individuals. and interrelationships between the whole (the
In this, human ecology rejected the utilitarian, metropolitan community) and its parts (neighbor-
contractual foundations human association hoods and local districts). Thus individual asso-
instead applying sociological notions of cohesion ciation was, in this view, shaped by the ecological
and embeddedness in group processes (Irwin and community. Further, society was seen as consti-
Kasarda 1994). Community is both the building tuted by the interrelationships among these eco-
block for larger society and the boundary within logical communities (McKenzie 1967; Hawley
which social life takes place (Gans 2015; Park 1950).
et al. 1984; Hawley 1950, 1986; McKenzie
1967). With boundaries set by spatial constraints,
by economic division of labor and by the demo- 13.4 The Post WWII Division
graphic structures of cities, the ecological com- in Community Sociology
munity was seen as setting the limits and
possibilities for association. For the early Chicago In the post-WWII era, Chicago School scholar-
school ecologists “One tendency was to see ship split along these two lines, with the cultural
urbanization, industrialization and moderniza- elements of community attachment seen as a
tion as transforming the town into the city, creat- separate issue from the development of the eco-
ing new kinds of social relations and presenting logical issues of community (Irwin 2015;
new challenges for community” (Delanty 2009, Saunders 1986). With very few exceptions
p. 39). (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974) the whole/part
One implication of this change was the sepa- relationships became of less importance and with
ration of community as an ecological force bind- that change, the role and theoretical orientation
ing together individuals towards a common of community shifted. The two approaches came
material support, and community as attachments, to be regarded as separate enterprises with neo-
sentiments and emotional commonality. As classical human ecology pursuing the structural
Delanty (2009) states “it might be said that these aspects of community and the second Chicago
studies tend to see community as something pre- School pursuing the processes and elements of
served in the locality while being under threat in community attachment (Gans 2015). This cre-
the wider city. An interpretation might be that the ated a division between scholars that emphasized
city has become absorbed into the Gesellschaft of the material elements that constitute community
society, while Gemeinschaft is preserved in the as an object of study vs those who study the cul-
vestiges of locality” (p. 40). The ecological com- ture and ideology binding individuals together
munity contained many communities of attach- within community. More than a split in focus,
ment and shaped such communities. Much of the this becomes a split between an organic and con-
work of early human ecology was dedicated to tractual conception of community.
the study of the relationship between these two For neoclassical human ecology individual
types of communities. attachment was relatively unproblematic and
From Wirth (1938) on, community studies in taken as a postulate of the organic nature of the
this vein focused on the relationship between ecological community (Hawley 1986). The role
material structures of the ecological community of place is conceptually straightforward.
258 M.D. Irwin
Community is coterminous with the territory of point of view of its members. Despite very dis-
community. Space, territory and place are insepa- tinctive approaches, both lines of scholarship
rable concepts. The focus falls upon a) the social retained the early human ecological notion that
and spatial interrelationships among ecological community was the critical linkage to society.
communities and b) the implications of these This was seen either as a linking mechanism to
macro relationships for societal processes broader society (as in the second Chicago School)
(Hawley 1971). or as the structural building blocks of society at
In many ways society is viewed as arising large (as in neo-classical human ecology).
from and built upon community. Work in this In the 1970s and 1980s scholars working in
area focused on the communities themselves to Marxian traditions focused on the ways that soci-
the exclusion of micro-level social interaction. ety created community. This new urban school
Association among individuals was derived from reoriented this community centered understand-
their position in the community, an organic for- ing of places to one which situated community in
mulation. The socio-spatial organization of com- larger society. Place is seen as a microcosm of
munity was studied as an integrated system. larger social forces. The new urban approach
Scholarship in this approach pursued issues of retained the organic and materialist assumptions
community interdependence, social morphology, outlined by Marx. Society was a system which
division of labor among communities and related determined the character and nature of social
issues (Berry and Kasarda 1977; Hauser and association, of social institutions and especially
Schnore 1965; Schnore 1965; Zimmer and of community. Impactful in sociology, geography
Hawley 1968; Frisbie and Poston 1978). The pro- and urban planning, the new urban approach
cesses by which this took place at the micro-level highlighted the rise of global capitalism as the
were less emphasized than the macro-level struc- context in which places develop. Space more
tures which resulted. than place is conceptually ascendant in this point
For the second Chicago School (the intellec- of view. Castells brings this issue front and center
tual extension of the Chicago community studies (Castells 1996, 2000; Susser 2002).
school) and for related work elsewhere in com- For Castells (1996) globalization and new
munity studies, the focus was on people at the technology gave rise to the reorganization of
local community level, and the institutions, pro- space. Noting that social flows always have a spa-
cesses and patterns of attachment that create tial component, Castells argues that society is
association. Without positing community as sui reorganizing space, from a space of places to a
generis, their analyses shifted solely to the cul- space of flows. The space of flows is not based on
ture, history, institutions and local meaning that propinquity but refers to the networks of finance,
encourage affiliation. This line of work became production, communication and power across the
associated with the careful explication of social landscape. While these may come together in
interaction within communities. The focus high- space, place and community are seen as epiphe-
lighted people, not communities themselves nomenal of these flows. “…[T]he space of flows
(Gans 2015). Scholars in this vein explored types does include a territorial dimension, as it requires
of local communities, differences in affiliation a technological infrastructure that operates from
among these communities, individual attachment certain locations, and as it connects functions and
and meaning within communities and the social people located in specific places” (Castells 1996,
problems of these communities (Hunter 1953, p. 14). Place is a function of spatial organization,
1974; Gans 1962, 1967; Wellman 1979; Suttles but one that shifts with the lines of power, pro-
1972; Bell and Newby 1975). These scholars duction and technology. Place is always an out-
emphasized community as a social contract come of spatially based networks, which are
although they rejected utilitarian notions of self- themselves products of society. Although Castells
interest as the primary motivating factor in asso- differs with Lefebvre on the importance of place,
ciation. Here community was studied from the both see place and space as ultimately linked to
13 The Concept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 259
society. In this sense, community is simply the social organization and in a rejection of contrac-
local manifestation of society. tual foundations for community organization.
For Lefebvre (1991) place as a lived, tangible There are of course, many fundamental differ-
territory is the center of space as experienced in ences between the two approaches. Most perti-
everyday life. Locality, as lived space, involves nent here is that, unlike neoclassical ecology, the
different experiences for individuals according to new urban sociology views community as a
their position in society. That is, the experience microcosm of society. Community is a conse-
of community is itself shaped by larger social quence of forces of production and for contem-
forces. Thus the lived experience of place is also porary community these are national and global
an experience of space as a product of capitalist forces. Although community may provide a basis
society. For Lefebvre “ideas about regions, media for organization and resistance to these forces,
images of cities and perceptions of ‘good neigh- ultimately the nature of community follows from
bourhoods’ are other aspects of this space which the structure of society.
is necessarily produced by each society” (Shields The commutarian approach, following the
2012, p. 284). traditions of de Tocqueville and the ancient
Building on the work of Lefebvre space, Soja Greeks, sees communities arising from common
(1989, 1996, 2010) explores the implications of goals, common purpose, and shared ideology
space as the central dimension of capitalist soci- (Bellah et al. 1992, 1996; Etzioni 1993, 1995,
ety. Here he sees his work as linking Marxian and 1996). Community arises as a contractual obli-
post-modern approaches. His concept of third gation for the greater good. Commutarianism
spaces extends the idea of space as (1) a material explicitly recalls de Tocqueville’s contrast
condition and (2) as a symbolic construction. between self-interest and common interest as a
Third space is the expression of space as lived basis for community association. Like de
experience that combines the abstract and con- Tocqueville they clearly acknowledge commu-
crete dimensions into one (Latham 2012), imply- nity association can be typified by either form of
ing that community is epiphenomenal of these contract. However, this work highlights the
other, more important elements, since the experi- problems of self-interested individualism as
ence of community varies by all three dimen- opposed to the development of the common
sions. Thus in Postmodern Geographies (Soja good. Community is the ground where this
1989), different routes taken at different times opposition is engaged.
through Los Angeles lead to distinct communi- Etzioni for instance contrasts the problems of
ties, such as the post-Fordist industrial metropo- persons acting as free agents as opposed to com-
lis, the globalized cosmopolis, the fractal city munal action based on common identities and
shattered by social divisions, and others, each purposes. As Bruhn (2005) typifies Etzioni “It is
occupying the same place. the challenge of communitarians to pull people
The organization of space as intrinsic to capi- together from the extremes of autonomy and
talism (or any other social form) and the material antagonism to a middle zone of mutuality by
implications of space as a social product are per- relying on community pressure and individual
vasive themes in new urban sociology. These are morality. Communitarian thinking basically
foundational concepts to the work of Logan & involves a return to ‘we-ness’ in our society, in
Molotch (1987), Harvey (1989), Massey (1994), our social institutions, and in our social relation-
Gottdiener (1985) and many others. The organic ships” (l. 673). Similarly Delanty (2009) says of
nature of society, especially in its capitalistic Etzioni’s work, “His advocation of community
form, and the material implications of space as a may be seen as an American reaction to the dom-
social product parallel human ecology as both inance of rational choice and neo-liberalism in
Hawley (1984) and Smith (1995) have noted. the 1980s. … Community entails voice – a ‘moral
They find commonality in the material founda- voice’ – and social responsibility rests on per-
tion of community, in the organic nature of macro sonal responsibility” (p. 68).
260 M.D. Irwin
Bellah and colleagues (1992, 1996) also fol- are found in the complex of community institu-
low this neo-Tocquevillean theme however they tions acting together as a system. Local govern-
highlight the importance of community based ment, informal institutions, community
institutions and culture. For Bellah and col- associations, and economic enterprises interact to
leagues the language of individualism and its enhance civic welfare, and the benefits of this
impact on the nature of community association is social capital accrue. In this sense benefits accrue
especially important. They center their work on to the system of institutions, not the institutions
both the moral voice discussed by Etzioni and on themselves. The beneficial outcomes too tend to
the role that community plays in creating this be seen as public goods that are structural charac-
voice. In their analysis they argue that in contem- teristics of community, such as decreased
porary communities a culture of coherence, based inequality, less poverty and other aggregate social
on traditions, memory of place, and common welfare outcomes. In this social capital and its
identity is in contention with the a culture of sep- benefits are not reducible below the community
aratism (Bellah et al. 1996). This is clearly a level. The benefits of social capital (both eco-
battle for contractual cohesion based on the nomic and social welfare) accrue to communi-
greater good vs one based on limited individual ties. The benefits to social capital are collective
self-interest. In exploring the nature of commu- gains. Better government, local economic growth
nity cohesion, Bellah et al note “We found that it and civic welfare are outcomes shared within the
took a both a ‘hard’ utilitarian shape and a ‘soft’ collectivity, not owned by individuals. However,
expressive form. One focused on the bottom line, individuals rightly understand that this general
the other on feelings…” (p. viii). The choice good is shared among individuals. It is a lesson
between these two lies with their moral and social that is founded in community and from there
conception of community more than the material extends to society at large.
or structural conditions. In the works of Putnam, Bellah and Etzioni,
This distinguishes their approach from that contractualism is moderated by a sense of com-
later developed by Putnam. As Bellah typifies the munity as sui generis. Pre-existing local institu-
central argument of Habits of the Heart “The tions and a culture of civic engagement create
argument for the decline in social capital was collective local identity that is the foundation of
essentially a cultural analysis, more about lan- the communitarian notion of community. It is
guage than behavior” (p. xvii). However they also a perspective that looks at the interaction
acknowledge the role the more institutional argu- between the material and cultural elements of
ments put forward by Putnam. “We believe the community. The cultural elements associated
culture and language of individualism influence with community identity and the structural ele-
these trends but there are also structural reasons ments of social capital are, in practice, inter-
for them…” (p. xvii). In this they situate com- twined. Thus, while association is based upon
munity cultural changes in community institu- contractualism for the public good, community
tional arrangements lauded by de Tocqueville has an organic quality to it that supersedes the
and the loss of these arrangements lamented by individual contract. These elements are not
Putnam (2000), Putnam et al. (1993, 2003). strictly born from individual agreements, they
Putnam’s analysis focuses on the interrela- also shape such agreements. The proliferation of
tionships among social institutions, civic engage- civic organizations in a community creates a
ment, and organizational performance. Some sense of community purpose and identity. At the
institutions, according to Putnam, promote “hori- same time general norms encouraging civic par-
zontal ties” that cut across diverse groups, link ticipation encourage the formation of civic
together isolated institutions (thereby enhancing organizations.
their effectiveness) and foster trust and civic This intertwining of cultural and material
involvement in the local population. The collec- bases of community is also found in phenomeno-
tive elements of social capital, in this perspective, logical approaches albeit with an entirely differ-
13 The Concept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 261
ent emphasis. Cresswell (2015) differentiates the create meaningful and continuous social associa-
phenomenological approach as one focused on tion (Merriman 2012). Instead they exist as spa-
the deeper elements of human association. tial nodes of accumulation and consumption that
This approach is not particularly interested in the are bondless and self-serving.
unique attributes of particular places nor is it pri- A person entering the space of non-place is relieved
marily concerned with the kinds of social forces of his usual determinants. He becomes no more
that are involved in the construction of particular than what he does or experiences in the role of pas-
places. Rather it seeks to define the essence of senger, customer, or driver … The space of non-
human existence as one that is necessarily and place creates neither singular identity nor relations;
importantly ‘in-place.’ This approach is less con- only solitude, and similitude. There is no room for
cerned with ‘places’ and more interested in ‘Place’ history unless it has been transformed into an ele-
(l. 1439). ment of spectacle, usually in allusive texts. (Auge
This work has an abiding concern on the internal- 2008, p. 103)
ization of community into individual’s identity. Auge sees non-places in ascendancy and mean-
Here the perception of space becomes as impor- ingful association among individuals in decline.
tant as place in understanding community. As Here Auge points to the loss of the social con-
Tuan (2014) states “Human beings not only dis- tractualism of community, much in the traditions
cern geometric patterns in nature and create of Töennies. However in his view, if identity
abstract spaces in the mind, they also try to becomes devoid of sociality, then even the mini-
embody their feelings, images, and thoughts in mal contractualism of the utilitarians is lost.
tangible material” (p. 17). “Place and non-place are rather like opposed
Place becomes the meanings attached to polarities: the first is never completely erased, the
space, especially in its symbols such as monu- second never totally completed… But non-places
ments, characteristics buildings and other icons are the real measure of our time” (p. 79).
of community. It is this meaning through the A similar concern is expressed by Certeau
symbols of community that roots individuals to (1984). As Crang (2012) explains “he sees tactics
place. “Abstract space, lacking significance other transforming the places designed by hegemonic
than strangeness, becomes concrete place, filled powers and envisioned as the neat and orderly
with meaning” (p. 199). For Tuan, this phenom- realm of the concept city, into unruly spaces; that
enology of place was of central importance. Yet is, he sees practices as spatialising places”
his concern lay less in the implications of this (p. 108). This loss of place in the midst of global-
phenomenology and more in “the emotional and ization is also a theme presented in Bauman
intimate engagement of people, culture, environ- (2001, 2013). Arguing that a global community is
ment and place” (Rodaway 2012, p. 427). This developing, place now becomes more associated
concern with meanings and attachment perme- with all of humanity, at least for those who are
ates most of the subsequent literature in the phe- geo-mobile. Contrasting this ‘glocalization’ with
nomenological approach to community. localization, Bauman notes that failure to reorient
Another recurring theme is the problem of to the global community leaves some caught
hyper-individualism associated with the loss of in local space just as the foundations of associa-
place in a globalizing society. Auge’s (2008) con- tion shift. Locality no longer is community. As
cept of ‘non-place’, those elements of space Clarke (2012) says “Globalisation, Bauman
devoid of common culture, exemplifies this idea. maintains, is best thought of as glocalisation –
“If a place can be defined as relational, historical, which implies more than deterritorialisation and
and concerned with identity, then a space which reterritorialisation occurring simultaneously, or
cannot be defined as relational, historical or con- the reassertion of place in the midst of space–
cerned with identity will be a non-place” (p. 78). time compression. It implies a worldwide restrat-
His non-places are spaces devoid of the tradi- ification of society based on freedom of
tional cultural characteristics of community that movement (or lack thereof)” (p. 51).
262 M.D. Irwin
influences individuals and it also takes on the Community is the vehicle of action, but these
meanings and characteristics of its constituent vehicles come in many models. Each community
population. This leads Casey to view culture and has its own structures, culture, history, and there-
place as inextricably intertwined and propose to fore character for action. Individuals, in engaging
put culture back in place – to reunite the division in community, accept (or at least participate) in
between a behavioral/material view and a sym- the mechanism of that place. Individual auton-
bolic view. omy is limited by the social and spatial character
Casey’s assertion is that place re-emerges as a of place. Here, as with the commutarian
central philosophical concept following centuries approaches, organic and contractual conceptions
relegation to a type of space. He argues that in the of community association are synthesized, as are
early modern era space is rethought as place and material and symbolic bases of community. This
that this comes to fruition in post-modern is not to say that, in Kolb’s view, places are
thought. Bachelard reimagines place as a psy- autonomous from larger society.
chic, non-spatial entity; Foucault, Deleuze and The structure of place never exists on its own: it
Guattari rethink space as heterogeneous places of results from larger social processes and decisions
power and social differentiation; Derrida exam- received into local processes of interpretation and
ines how building coverts space to places. The embodiment. … Local interpretation keeps norma-
tive and physical structures flexible, and it keeps
outcome is that these contemporary postmodern larger causal and political processes from forcing
takes recapitulate the original Aristotelian view every detail in a place. On the other hand, outside
that space is not distinct from place. “… if place processes provide resources and keep local inter-
became increasingly lost in space after the demise pretive processes from closing in on themselves.
(p. 45)
of the classical era, in the twentieth century we
stand witness to a third peripteia: space is now As with the new urban approaches, place/com-
becoming absorbed into place…” (p. 340). munity links individuals to society. Place filters
Although Casey’s interest is in the philosophical meaning from society and allows local variation
implications of place and space, his work is inte- yet links the local to the larger processes and cul-
grated in sociological literature by Kolb (2008). ture of society.
Kolb synthesizes these ideas in both postmod- Thus while community limits individual
ern and Marxian theory to explore the territorial autonomy it allows heterogeneity of interpreta-
basis for community. Place is seen as the essence tion and social action. This strikes a balance
of community and is defined both by its norma- between the social deterministic nature of indi-
tive character (recalling organic traditions) and viduals proposed by some of the classic theorists
by intentional unity (contractualism). That is, (Cooley, Marx, Durkheim) and the self-interested
place exists independently of the individual by autonomy of the utilitarians but one not solely
benefit of its location within spatially and norma- predicated on inter-individual commitment.
tively connected social organization: “to experi- Neither purely an aggregation of the individuals
ence a place is to encounter an expanse of space within it nor exclusively a microcosm of society,
as manifesting a web of social possibilities and community becomes a normative and structural
norms” (p. 33). This notion of community then mechanism that mediates and attaches individual
exists independently of any individual actor yet and society that exists in situ as place.
encompasses the mechanism (possibilities) for Kolb’s analysis (drawing on Lefebvre 1991)
cooperative actions for any individual to achieve also attempts to integrate spatial and symbolic
social action. “A place opens a landscape of aspects of community. In discussing his approach
action possibilities set in a spatial landscape” to place he lays out the relationship between spa-
(p. 35). tially based concepts and place (which he takes to
In Kolb’s formulation then, individual partici- be the normative order associated with commu-
pation in community is an autonomous decision, nity). His typology of concepts is at once spatial
but one required for effective action (p. 39). and social. ‘Areas’ are expanses of space, ‘loca-
264 M.D. Irwin
tions’ are events associated with area, ‘locales’ nological approaches to bring back interrelations
emerge when perceived meanings are associated between the material and normative aspects of
with locations with perceived meanings. ‘Places’ community as well as the micro level processes
bring these socio-spatial concepts together as a of association in line with macrolevel community
meaningful social unit. “Places in the sense I pro- aspects of space and place. Incorporating these
pose is an extended location consisting of one or elements together requires a formulation of com-
more expanses of space where social norms of munity as involving networks, connections and
action define significant areas and transitions for social fields that overlap. Unlike the more unidi-
activities. Places are permeated by social norms mensional concepts of place, community involves
offering possibilities for action” (p. 32). complexity. “By complexity I mean interacting
Kolb, like Lefebvre, highlights the spatial multiplicities. A complex place will have multi-
dimension shaping place though economic, envi- ple roles, forces, norms, processes, internal spa-
ronmental and technological connections to other tial divisions and external links to other places
places. These systematic linkages among places and to the processes that bring together multiple
across space are the material causal constraints forces and systems” (p. 54). This conception of
on place action and community normative order. community involves both the phenomenology of
“Lefebvre’s discussion emphasizes how places, personal awareness, linking individuals together
in the sense that I propose, come linked to one within a community, and also larger structural
another and intertwined with causal systems that forces that contain and shape this phenomenol-
influence social norms. … Systematic effects ogy. Here the macrolevel and microlevel integra-
constrain possibilities” (p. 39). tion of community forces are once again merged
This recalls the integration of material space as was classical human ecology before its schism.
and culture that defined early human ecology, Community is both action and structure, both
however, more full develops the normative order emerging from persons and from social forces.
of place. Like the classical ecologists, the mate- However, the contemporary melding of these
rial spatial conditions set constraints on cultural levels, of space and place, and of organic and
possibilities. Also like the ecologists community contractual community solidarity comes as much
(as place) becomes a vehicle for individuals to from grounded empirical studies as theoretical
act. However, Kolb and Lefebvre include more tradition.
room for elements of conflict and a greater role Social movements literature is one such arena
for norms in this process than an was ever made for this blending of these elements. Not explicitly
in ecological approaches. Describing how local directed at community, work by Fligstein and
normative order reinforce bias and make oppres- McAdam (2011, 2012) nevertheless directly
sive ideology seems natural, Kolb states “Places address these issues in their formulation of strate-
are not the single origin of oppression, but they gic action fields (see, also, Chap. 9). In applying
spread it over space and people” (p. 39). Also their approach Irwin and Pischke (2016) argue
unlike the ecologists, Kolb and Lefebvre take “In their work, these authors have moved the
society as a social dimension that exists sepa- study of social movements into the realm of net-
rately from community whereas ecologists treat works and tied these networks to space, geogra-
the ecological community and interrelations phy and community” (p. 205). Here, particular
among these communities as the foundation of attention is paid to inter-areal interactions and the
society. On a phenomenological level, place overlapping of institutional influences in space.
mediates between culture and the individual. “… First, the theory rests on a view that sees strategic
as places gather bodies in their midst in deeply action fields, which can be defined as mesolevel
enculturated ways, so cultures conjoin bodies in social orders, as the basic structural building block
concrete circumstances of implacement” (p. 348). of modern political/organizational life in the econ-
omy, civil society, and the state. Second, we see
Kolb’s conception of community synthesizes any given field as embedded in a broader environ-
much of the new urban sociology and phenome- ment consisting of countless proximate or distal
13 The Concept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 265
fields as well as states, which are themselves orga- individuals. As this chapter has outlined, social
nized as intricate systems of strategic action fields.
theory has long relied on the concept of commu-
(McAdam and Fligstein 2012, p. 3)
nity to link these issues together. What is new in
Where these come together, communities have a the twenty-first century is the synthesis of once
greater capacity for grassroots based social action antithetical dimensions of community. Rather
(McAdam and Boudet 2012). The approach than positing an essential character to commu-
highlights the coalescence of movements in nity, approaches are exploring the interrelation-
space, much like the new urban school. Rather ship between contractualism and organic
than conceiving these networks as emerging from elements of the communal, between material and
society at large, however, they see this as a phe- cultural origins of association, between space and
nomenon generated by individual interests com- place and between society and community. In
ing together in space. However they also addressing the central questions of sociology,
incorporate elements of network and community community has become a multilayered, complex,
structure, which they see as equally important and nuanced concept, synthesizing previously
factors shaping these social fields (p. 5). This disparate and separate theoretical elements.
synthesis integrates contractual and structural
approaches (Diani 2003; Gould 2003). Working
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Organizations as Sites and Drivers
of Social Action 14
Walter W. Powell and Christof Brandtner
structures and perceived boundaries that both dis- ing the organization to its external audiences. On
tinguish it and its members from the wider envi- the other hand, many products—from cars to
ronment and draw a distinction between members medical drugs to apps—go through extensive
and external stakeholders. Organizations are market research with potential clients outside the
made up of individuals pursuing a common goal, organization before the assembly lines start mov-
such as producing a good or service or advocat- ing. This feature of organizations is particularly
ing for some cause. Organizations usually also evident in the following section on networks.
display a certain level of formality, such as being Consequently, organizations have significance for
registered with the government and having docu- sociological theory from both perspectives: as
mented rules and regulations. In this sense, orga- sites of social action and as drivers of it.
nizations form the social context in which people Our goal in this chapter is to illuminate the
work, volunteer, or lead. This view of organiza- processes through which these recursive relations
tions underlies most economic and behavioral occur. To do so, we introduce important proper-
theories of firms, which are interested in under- ties of organizations as nouns, and the processes
standing the day-to-day events of organizations, and causal mechanisms of organizational life as
such as deciding between making or buying a verbs.
component part of the final product, improving
the motivation of employees, or determining
what inhibits or stimulates careers. 14.1.2 Verbs and Nouns
Organizations can also be seen as discrete
entities that are exposed to a social environment Most overview essays, as well as textbooks, on
of their own; market institutions, the state, the the sociology of organizations start with the
professions, and society at large constrain and viewpoint that it is a field typified by contrasting
enable organizations in fulfilling their mission. theories and lines of research. The ‘theory-group’
From this ‘open systems’ point of view, the indi- approach to surveying the literature has persisted
vidual actions of people are less important than for several decades. This pedagogical strategy
what they amount to on the organizational level. has provided students of organizations with a
The open-systems view emphasizes different good deal of insight, as well as notable texts by
social processes: people are busy responding to Charles Perrow (1972) and Richard Scott (2013).
and negotiating external pressures, as well as A number of handbook-type chapters also survey
entering into transactions and collaborations the field by making stops along the way at vari-
with other organizations and individuals. ous theory communities.
Consequently, theories associated with organiza- We think the time is right to try a different
tions as an open system attempt to measure the approach. Rather than emphasize differences
implementation and diffusion of organizational among rival theoretical perspectives, we want to
practices, competition and collaboration between stress commonalities. Moreover, in lieu of exam-
organizations, and the comparative status, power, ining the literature at a high level of abstraction
and prestige of organizations. and discussing only disembodied things referred
As the boundaries between organizations and to as organizations, we want to bring the varied
their environment, and sometimes even between world of organizations to life. Contemporary
two organizations, are often porous, a clear-cut studies have been conducted in hospitals, restau-
distinction between the internal and external rants, social movements, biotech firms, invest-
world of organizations is hard to make. Many ment banks, call centers, and factories. But this
organizational activities also cross the boundaries rich diversity is elided in most reviews, which
of the organization at some point. For instance, a focus only on particular theoretical approaches
press release is drafted, circulated, and authorized that deal with highly general statements about
by people internally before eventually represent- organizations.
14 Organizations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 271
Our attention is directed toward processes that ent approaches. Three, we describe the kinds of
occur in different kinds of organizations. We organizational settings in which these phenom-
emphasize that organizations are the locus where ena have been studied, illustrating the wide pur-
many of the critical activities of modern society chase of organizational research. We summarize
take place. Organizations compete, collaborate, the processes we cover in Table 14.1.
create, coordinate, and control much of contem- Our approach to reviewing the organizational
porary life. Consequently, it is not surprising that theory literature was iterative. We started induc-
the sociology of organizations spills over into tively by looking at the core themes of organiza-
related subfields, including public administra- tional theory articles published in major journals
tion, medicine and public health, education, over the past 25 years, using methods from com-
industrial engineering, business history, and putational linguistics. The emerging themes
international business. reflected the field’s conventional theoretical per-
We posit a handful of critical processes, or spective, as well as the types of organizations
mechanisms, that we argue are at the center of studied.
contemporary organizational research and are These topic models, or linguistic clusters,
attended to by scholars of varied theoretical ori- were dominated by nouns and adjectives rather
entations. These include (1) discrimination and than verbs, and they obscured the mechanisms
formalization, (2) institutionalization and associated with the various perspectives.
imprinting, (3) socializing and mobilization, and Following the recent turn in social theory to focus
(4) learning and access. Using these phenomena on mechanisms (Hedström 2005; Hedström and
as the lens through which to view the field has Bearman 2009; Padgett and Powell 2012), we
several distinct advantages. One, we will show chose to focus on processes that cut across
that these ideas come from multiple theories and research schools. Although each of the eight
that this attention unites rather than fractures the dynamics that are at the center of the chapter is
field. Two, we discuss the varied methods that useful for predicting multiple outcomes, we posit
have been used to study these phenomena and four primary outcomes associated with the mech-
again highlight the complementarities of differ- anisms: inequality, persistence and order, change
272 W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner
and disorder, and networks and relations. Because companies. A 2015 survey by Page Mill
we see these attributes as central to sociological Publishing of 257 US venture capital firms iden-
inquiry at large, we structured the chapter in tified a total of only 403 women involved in the
accordance with the four outcomes. We are mind- industry. Women are less likely to apply for jobs
ful of the theoretical origins of these mechanisms, at venture firms with no female employees, and
but draw largely on recent, empirical research female entrepreneurs are less likely to approach
about a variety of organizational forms to illus- all-male firms for funding. Similarly, a 2014 sur-
trate the processes. vey by the National Association for Law
Placement revealed that only 5.6 % of US law-
yers who hold top leadership positions at law
14.2 Organizations as Equalizers firms are non-white. And fewer than 2 % of law
and Stratifiers firm partners are African-American. Black law-
yers operate in a profession that is one of the
Organizations are often considered the great country’s least racially diverse (Rhode 2015),
equalizers of modern civilization. Weber, one of despite growing demands from clients to see
the founding fathers of contemporary sociologi- more diversity.
cal theory, described the ideal-typical organiza- Baron and Bielby (1980) depicted the organi-
tional form—bureaucracy—as a champion of zation of work as a primary mechanism of socio-
both reliability and equality. By adhering to the economic stratification, in both how workers are
rules of law and merit, corporate and public stratified inside organizations and how organiza-
administrations could level social differences. tions are stratified in the market: “If firms are
Even though bureaucratic organizations are often indeed ‘where the action is,’ then social scientists
complicated by informal relationships among interested in the structure of social inequality
colleagues (Blau 1955), influences that are often should find the vast literature on complex organi-
antagonistic to hierarchical structures (Dalton zations illuminating” (Baron and Bielby 1980,
1959), administrative arbitrariness is limited by 748).
both the primacy of expertise and the imperson- Contemporary empirical research has demon-
ality of the office. Despite the shortcomings of strated that organizations from all walks of life,
bureaucracy, equality is one of the core promises from daycare centers to research universities,
of complex organizations today. Many people contribute to the way society is stratified. Two
regard universities as escalators to social mobil- particular organizational processes through
ity, see the armed services as a vehicle for upward which organizations shape societal outcomes are
mobility for racial and ethnic minorities, and per- formalization and discrimination. Formalization
ceive corporations as the manifestation of meri- (e.g., the introduction of written rules of conduct,
tocracy. Thus Weberian bureaucracy, in theory, is normative codes of ethics, or policies) obviously
the backbone of democracy and fairness. has important implications for social outcomes.
That promise has often been belied by reality, If hiring, for instance, is regulated by formal cri-
however. Organizations are also the locus of vari- teria and overseen by labor unions, organizations
ous mechanisms of stratification. Firms, in can be assumed to lead to a leveling of social
particular, contribute to unequal income distribu- hierarchies (Perrow 1972). Equal employment
tion and social hierarchy, through steps ranging opportunity (EEO) legislation, for example, is
from hiring to wage negotiations, gender and meant to restrain discrimination in the labor mar-
racial segregation of jobs, promotions, and ket by targeting organizations (Dobbin 2009),
firing. and workplace policies aim to reduce work-life
Organizations reinforce gender and racial conflicts, for instance by improving employees’
hierarchies, even when their clients are diverse, schedule control (Kelly et al. 2011).
and such biases can inhibit the kinds of clients Discrimination, in turn, may play out on the
and employees that are subsequently attracted to individual level. One example is racial
14 Organizations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 273
discrimination among police, which has been ment to meritocracy may have enabled preju-
shown to be a result of implicit biases against diced behavior. Their finding shows that “gender
African-American men (Eberhardt et al. 2004; and racial inequality persist in spite of manage-
Saperstein et al. 2014). Another is the baseball ment’s efforts to promote meritocracy or even
field, where umpires favor white over black because of such meritocratic efforts” (Castilla
pitchers in spite of high levels of scrutiny from and Benard 2010: 544).
players, fans, and commentators (Kim and King Biased behavior in organizations is by no
2014). But once sorting and exclusion become means limited to salary, but can even affect where
organizational practices, they can reproduce and people can work. United States Department of
persist regardless of the intent or interest of any Labor agents consistently discriminate against
of the individuals involved. In organizations, Latin American green card applicants and favor
institutionalized discriminatory practices pro- applicants of Asian descent (Rissing and Castilla
duce persistent and ever-increasing inequality 2014). The authors find that this bias is much
through the process of accumulative advantage, smaller in a quasi-random set of audited cases, in
which Merton (1968) famously described as the which more performance information is available
Matthew Effect: high-status actors stay on top to the agents. This finding suggests that the bias
because they are rewarded disproportionally for against some applicant groups is not the result of
their good performance. As a result, those at the the agents’ own preferences regarding certain
apex of a social order pull further away from ethnicities, but more likely the outcome of statis-
those in the middle or at the bottom. Once a hier- tical bias introduced by a lack of information.
archy—one of the constitutive elements of a DoL agents, Rissing and Castilla conclude,
bureaucracy—exists, the status order can exacer- unlawfully—but also unknowingly—use nation-
bate societal segregation. This is true for indi- ality as a proxy for performance in the absence of
viduals in organizations as well as for more detailed information. In this case, the orga-
organizations themselves. Sharkey (2014), for nization of the application process gives rise to
instance, shows that investors judge firms in opportunities for discrimination that would be
higher-status industries less harshly than those of absent if agents had access to more detailed
lower rank when the firms restate their earnings information. Rissing and Castilla’s study is a
because of some form of wrongdoing. good example of how larger societal trends such
as prejudice against immigrants from certain
nationalities, which are usually believed to
14.2.1 Organizations as Sites operate at the individual level of analysis, shape
of Inequality social outcomes through organizations.
Sterling (2015) sought to understand how
Typically, organizational practices are not variation in social position can shape workplace
intended to introduce bias against particular opportunities. She studied the influence of indi-
groups of people, but they may have that unin- viduals’ social connections at the time of organi-
tended effect. As one illustration, Castilla and zational entry on the subsequent formation of ties
Benard (2010) find evidence for ‘the paradox of within the workplace. In a study of new business
meritocracy.’ The authors asked MBA students to and law professionals, she found that individuals
reward the performance of fictitious employees with an initial advantage in social ties formed
and then randomly manipulated the descriptions more extensive networks post entry than those
of the corporate setting. Study subjects who made without such an advantage. But when there was
decisions on behalf of firms with more merito- clear evidence about the accomplishments of
cratic corporate values tended to distribute new hires, network formation was moderated by
rewards based on gender rather than on talent and ability.
performance. The authors speculate that ‘moral Another illustrative case is Fernandez’s (2001)
credentials’ stemming from a formal commit- quasi-experimental study of a food processing
274 W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner
firm before and after a retooling. The study inves- fore prefer candidates from the same social back-
tigates the black box of technological changes grounds. Those doing the hiring establish an
that underlie skill-based bias explanations of emotional connection with culturally similar
wage inequality (Autor et al. 1988; Card and applicants. “Whether someone rock climbs, plays
DiNardo 2002). By studying one organization in the cello, or enjoys film noir may seem trivial to
unusual detail, Fernandez illuminates how an outsiders, but these leisure pursuits were crucial
endogenous technological shift leads to wage for assessing whether someone was a cultural fit”
inequality, rather than treating technological (Rivera 2012: 1009). Through homophily, even
change as a residual variable that may be due to highly formalized hiring procedures can repro-
self-selection. Even though Fernandez links duce social segregation.
increases in wage inequality to the increased Organizational procedures and bureaucratic
complexity of tasks, a result consistent with skill- formalization are therefore not a guaranteed rem-
based wage bias, he finds that the actual reason edy for inequalities. Kalev (2014), in a mixed-
for increasing inequality is organizational turn- methods study of 327 firms from 1980 to 2002,
over. There are significant wage differences investigated how formal rules and managerial
between stayers and leavers: high-wage stayers accountability affect gender and racial inequality
(mostly electricians) received a wage increase, in light of corporate downsizing. She finds that
whereas low-wage leavers were replaced with some forms of formalization—particularly
even-lower-wage entrants. In this case, bureau- restricting layoffs to people with certain lengths
cratic structures—unionization and a seniority- of tenure and in certain positions—in fact exacer-
based pay scale—rendered the stayers better off. bate the effects of downsizing on workforce
diversity because recent hires are more likely to
be women and minorities. In contrast, layoff
14.2.2 Organizations as Drivers rules that are based on performance evaluations
of Inequality improve the prospects of black and female man-
agers. Moreover, both managerial discretion and
Particularism is not always purged through orga- reviews by an external attorney can offset the
nizational structures; inequalities following from negative effect of formal rules on the diversity of
discrimination are a problem in hiring and firing employees. In short, “organizational structures
alike. In some cases, such as Rivera’s (2012, and institutional dynamics, coupled with execu-
2015) study of cultural matching in the hiring tives’ accountability and agency, play an
process in elite professional firms and Kalev’s important part in shaping inequality” (Kalev
(2014) research on the effects of corporate down- 2014: 129).
sizing on workforce diversity, managers are driv-
ers of larger social inequity.
Rivera (2012) studied how employers made 14.3 Organizations
decisions about new hires based on fit; she con- as Standardizers
ducted extensive interviews and observations in and Monuments
investment banks, law firms, and consulting
firms. She finds that behind the closed doors of The social forces that give rise to social arrange-
hiring committees, skills sorting—hiring based ments are often different from those that hold
on competence—is frequently supplemented by them in place (Stinchcombe 1968). Yet organiza-
cultural matching—hiring based on cultural simi- tional dynamics are important for both: as much
larity. Such homophily occurs not only because as organizations can determine and create soci-
formal evaluation criteria emphasize fit between etal outcomes, they can solidify social relation-
employee and company, but also because ships and standardize practices.
decision-makers evaluate performance through a In fact, rigid organizations can be inadvertent
cultural lens that they are familiar with and there- anchors of the status quo. The role of organiza-
14 Organizations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 275
tions in the reproduction and stability of social text at the time of their founding. Society leaves
settings and practices is particularly central to deep marks on organizations. Through such
institutional theory. In that research program, the imprinting, social arrangements can subsequently
taken-for-grantedness of certain behaviors is become extraordinarily persistent (Stinchcombe
seen as the source of persistence of culture and 1965). Stinchcombe illustrated his classic argu-
structure (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Zucker ment about the enduring influence of the social
(1977) cites “some sort of establishment of rela- context at the time of an organization’s founding
tive permanence of a distinctly social sort” as the by showing that the labor supply at the founding
primary characteristic of institutions; her view of of various firms—from farms to construction
institutionalization highlights that institutional- companies—deeply affected how they were
ization is both a property variable (the fact that staffed much later. This observation applies
something is considered real) and a process (that equally to modern-day organizations such as
meanings and taken-for-grantedness of actions Silicon Valley start-ups. In a study of 100 tech-
change). Taken-for-granted norms are a strong nology ventures in California, Baron et al. (1999)
form of conservation; for example, most people show that the founder’s premises about employ-
do not even consider questioning the fact that ment relations are a better predictor of the current
they have to go to work in the morning, and going organizational model than the views of the cur-
to work requires no justification vis-à-vis others rent CEO, even after the founder’s departure.
(Berger and Luckmann 1966; Colyvas and Taken together, institutionalization and
Powell 2006). But what is considered ‘normal’ imprinting are the fabric that weaves together
also depends heavily on core sociological catego- and reproduces societal relations, for both good
ries, such as class, race, or gender. For instance, and ill. Organizations help to crystallize a status
women are evaluated less favorably when they quo by copying wages, quotas, and policies from
take on stereotypically masculine jobs or work purportedly successful role models and relying
above-average hours because of prescriptive on routines that invoke the authority of tradition.
norms about how women ought to behave; and in Organizations also create standards for what is
some areas the working class might be expected considered normal, such as how much more a
to work two or even three jobs to make a living CEO can earn than his or her employees, or to the
(Heilman 2001; Ely et al. 2011). Such norms degree to which citizens can participate in the
limit people’s range of action and create realities formation of public policies.
and routines that are difficult to disrupt.
At the same time, the rigidity of social hierar-
chies is directly linked to the fact that social 14.3.1 Organizations as Sites
structure can hold people and organizations in of Persistence
place. Organizations’ limited ability to alter their
realities arbitrarily is a fundamental assumption Institutionalization (and de-institutionalization)
of the population ecology paradigm in organiza- is not a uniquely organizational process, but it
tional theory. For organizations, such inertia, or frequently becomes manifest in organizational
difficulty in changing, has internal as well as practices and routines. Practices initially adopted
external causes (Hannan and Freeman 1984). out of contingent circumstances or for sensible
Sunk costs, political contention, and habits political or economic reasons can enter the stan-
restrict change inside organizations, and regula- dard repertoire of organizations, regardless of
tive and economic trade barriers as well as social their specific champions or function (Tolbert and
norms lock whole industries within powerful Zucker 1983; Colyvas and Powell 2006). The
constraints. idea of institutionalization—and especially
Inertial forces are particularly important for decoupling of ceremonial structures and actual
the reproduction of social orders because organi- practices—may explain why many reforms
zations are strongly influenced by the social con- hardly change the daily activities in organiza-
276 W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner
tions (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Bidwell 2001; fact that mothers’ “stress is lucrative” (Turco
Hallett 2010). 2012: 390). She also observes decoupling
The similarity of structures across organiza- between commercial practices—the marketing
tions and over time is not just a result of the invis- and sales of products to a vulnerable target
ible hand of culture: myths about what behavior group—and the euphemistic discourse surround-
is proper and rational can be reflected in such ing the business. By posing as the ‘trusted advi-
mundane things as people’s professional educa- sor’ to young mothers, Motherhood Inc. could
tion, the criteria of performance evaluation, gain public legitimacy for filling the supportive
codes of ethics, or even binding laws (Scott role of friends and family with ‘child develop-
2013). Institutionalized ideas can travel far and ment professionals’—for a price. But the sugar-
wide, despite (or because of) vague labels such as coating trickled down into organization culture
‘managerial reform’, ‘accountability’, or ‘sus- and was co-opted by lower-level employees. In
tainability’ (Czarniawska-Joerges and Sevón turn, this led to increasing resistance to the firm’s
1996; Bromley and Meyer 2015). But empirical perceived ruthless profit-making, surprisingly
research has shown that institutional myths are from the company’s own employees. In one case,
not merely hot air. In various cases they can an employee even told a customer not to “waste
become manifest in organizations. money on [the company’s] products” and to buy
Institutionalized myths may constrain change a swaddle blanket at a box store instead (Turco
by becoming incarnate in individuals and organi- 2012: 397). Events like this one undercut the
zational culture. An apt example is Hallett’s company’s profitability and ultimately led to lay-
(2010) ethnographic study of teachers’ compli- offs and business failure. Hallett’s and Turco’s
ance with accountability reforms at a public ele- studies show that institutional myths and dis-
mentary school. Hallett (2010: 53) observes a course can constrain organizations and ultimately
dynamic that he calls recoupling, “creating tight restrict societal change, be it the push for class-
couplings where loose couplings were once in room accountability in education or market-
place.” Put simply, the ceremonial accountability taking services intruding into the personal realm
structures that enhance public legitimacy can of motherhood.
become manifest in the daily practices of the peo- The power of institutional myths to create tan-
ple inhabiting organizations. In this case, the hir- gible constraints for organizations and ultimately
ing and managerial approach of a determined lead to the standardization of structures and prac-
school principal transformed a previously cere- tices is apparent not only in micro-level studies.
monial commitment to accountability into a new The phenomenon of rankings, ratings, and awards
classroom reality. The disruption of teachers’ and how they standardize organizational behav-
autonomy and routines led to uncertainty, tur- ior to fit institutionalized understandings of per-
moil, and even political mobilization. By focus- formance has been widely studied (Timmermans
ing on the local, micro-level dynamics of and Epstein 2010). Espeland and Sauder (2016),
accountability reform in schools, Hallett shows drawing on a series of interviews with officials in
that recoupling of institutionalized myths can law schools throughout the United States, dem-
create resistance and ultimately alter the legiti- onstrate that U.S. News and World Report rank-
macy of reform endeavors. What began as reform ings have introduced and materialized standards
momentum ended up in a morass of ambiguity for law schools that have astonishing behavioral
and frustration. effects. Law school officials, despite widespread
Turco’s ethnographic investigation into skepticism about the utility and methods of the
Motherhood Inc., a for-profit company that pro- rankings, react to evaluations by resorting to sim-
vides services to young mothers, illustrates that ilar admission practices, pushing students to
institutional processes also constrain change enter private practice over public service because
through organizational culture. As the firm’s of higher starting salaries, and re-classifying stu-
CEO put it, its business model was built on the dents to appear in a better light. Rankings alter
14 Organizations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 277
how legal education is perceived through both founders import workplace routines, including
coercion and seduction (Sauder and Espeland flexible work schedules and part-time employ-
2009). Bromley and Sharkey (2014), in a study of ment, from their previous employers to their new
US firms’ responses to ratings of environmental companies. Such copying can be both positive
performance, find not only that rankings have and negative. For example, having worked along-
direct effects on organizations; firms whose peers side high-status women in previous positions
are ranked also tend to reduce their emissions of tends to improve the views of new founders about
toxic pollutants in certain contexts. Firms in the legitimacy of female leaders. Compared to
highly regulated industries decrease their emis- newly founded firms, organizations with parental
sions as more of their peers are rated, even if they ties to Silicon Valley law firms with established
are not evaluated themselves. These two studies, female leadership are more likely to have women
and a host of related research, suggest that rank- in partnership positions.
ings and ratings can have direct and indirect Johnson’s (2007, 2008) analysis of the famous
effects on the behavior of organizations, leading Paris Opera vividly illustrates the power of per-
to new standards of environmental or educational sistence. Johnson develops a theory of cultural
management that are dictated neither by the law entrepreneurship in order to unpack the mecha-
nor by market dynamics. nisms that underlie the observation that organiza-
tions reflect the social, economic, and
technological context of their creation. Her argu-
14.3.2 Organizations as Drivers ment highlights that this process of imprinting
of Persistence involves critically thinking people activating and
recombining the resources available at the time.
As the studies above illustrate, social reform is Her description of how the poet Pierre Perrin
often inhibited and shaped by how people and founded the Paris Opera in the seventeenth cen-
practices inside organizations represent larger tury illuminates the resilience of history. Drawing
social trends. A different perspective on the fixity on organizational models available at the time of
of social orders sees organizations as carriers of Louis XIV, Perrin was able to secure funding for
practices through time and space instead. As the foundation of an opera modeled after the
Marquis and Tilcsik (2013) point out, organiza- prestigious royal academies, with elements of a
tions (as well as organizational collectives, build- commercial theater. But the Opera also persisted
ing blocks of organizations, and individuals) can after the French Revolution. Thus, as a second
go through various sensitive periods that make step, imprinting also includes the reproduction of
them particularly susceptible to influences of the historical elements at a later time, which implies
organizational environment. In light of the many that inertia and related dynamics can “reproduce
inertial forces that prevent organizations from the organizational status quo” (Johnson 2007:
changing at the discretion of policy makers and 121). The opera’s properties of a commercial the-
managers, organizations can become monuments ater, for example, helped it survive the French
(or museums) of the past. revolution, when the royal academies were abol-
One insightful study of the tenacity of social ished. Throughout the process, the political goals
relations is Phillips’s ecological account of the of the authorities and stakeholders were as impor-
genealogies of gender hierarchies in firms. Why tant for the outcome as the creative recombina-
does workplace discrimination—and inequality tion of established organizational forms by the
at large—change so little? Using longitudinal cultural entrepreneur, Perrin. This century-old
data on established law firms and their offspring mélange of zeitgeist and interests still shapes
‘progeny firms’ in Silicon Valley, Phillips (2005) French culture and the panorama of Paris today, a
finds that many newly founded firms copy the reminder that social history undergirds contem-
gender hierarchy of existing firms. They do so as porary society.
278 W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner
operatives (Schneiberg et al. 2008), wind energy film crew works on a set for only a few days and
(Sine and Lee 2009), and soft drinks (Hiatt et al. does not necessarily undergo any formal training,
2009). On a more mundane level, the movement the work gets done consistently and layoffs are
of people between organizations and the ideas rare. Bechky argues that roles, not swift trust or
they carry around in the course of their careers formal rules, allow coordinating complex tasks.
are a major source of change and its diffusion in Socialization into roles as diverse as electricians
society. (called gaffers) and cameramen commonly
occurs through everyday interactions, such as
reinforcing appropriate behavior by saying thank
14.4.1 Organizations as Sites you, making a joke to lower-status workers, and
of Change giving polite feedback.
Okhuysen (2005) studied Special Weapons
One important organizational process that and Tactics (SWAT) police teams and found that
enables action in organizations is coordination, their professional, coordinated behavior is largely
that is, a set of interactions that allows the com- based on behavioral routines. SWAT teams are
pletion of a larger task (Okhuysen and Bechky deployed in situations in which highly concerted
2009). Organizational theorists have long been action is required. For members of a special unit,
preoccupied with coordination problems. Coase’s organizational arrangements at various levels
(1937) famous essay on the nature of the firm introduce “sets of actions by individuals that
contends that the very existence of bureaucracy make up a larger unit of performance that repeats
is tied to the cost advantages of coordinating eco- over time” (Okhuysen 2005: 140). Routines,
nomic changes within firms rather than through such as how to enter a building dynamically, are
the market. Chandler’s (1977) seminal explana- introduced through a common ‘basic school’
tion of the rise of professional managers in the training at the beginning of the career, adapted in
United States argued that technological change the context of each specific SWAT group, and
required more sophisticated coordination of tasks then continuously rehearsed in the group to
and people within capitalist enterprises. refresh the core knowledge. In addition, special-
Organizational sociologists have criticized these ized schools allow members to learn new prac-
arguments for their limited understanding of tices, such as controlling crowds or handling
organizational environments, the role of bounded explosives, to introduce them to the group.
rationality, and social network effects Okhuysen also observes that SWAT team mem-
(Granovetter 1985; Scott 2013). Nevertheless, bers organize the routines in bundles of coherent
sociologists concur that the coordination of social practice and hierarchies of more or less preferred
action is a central organizational task. routines. His research highlights that the complex
Organizations and their participants can create interrelated tasks that define coordination can be
order out of chaos and render difficult situations completed only if individuals learn a common
manageable, by providing rules and infrastruc- core of routines and practice them collectively.
ture for challenging situations and problems and But at the same time, for routines to really grease
by establishing a basis for members’ socializa- the wheels, “the group must also rely on individ-
tion into specific roles. ual members to use their experience to initiate
Research on organizations as diverse as film change or to help maintain the repertoire as an
crews and police teams vividly illustrates the ongoing activity” (Okhuysen 2005: 162).
social processes that enable the coordination of There are obviously many other mechanisms
highly complex tasks. Bechky (2006: 4), in a through which organizations coordinate work,
comparative ethnography of four film sets, shows divide tasks, and allocate resources. The core
that temporary organizations can be structured insight of the Carnegie School (March and Simon
through “enduring, structured role systems whose 1958; Cyert and March 1963) is that through rou-
nuances are organized in situ.” Even though the tines, standard operating procedures, and rules,
280 W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner
organizations can accomplish complex actions Rosenfeld 2003; O’Mahony and Bechky 2006).
and even respond “on the fly” to new situations For studying social outcomes, organizations mat-
and challenges. By managing coordination, orga- ter because of the simple fact that they employ all
nizations enable change as much as they con- kinds of diverse people, who in turn move
strain it; in so doing, they create social capital, between organizations frequently. People move
facilitate and perform the law, and produce and up and down career ladders inside and between
curate culture. organizations and bring along ideas and skills,
transferring standards and practices; in so doing
they can even generate novelty (Powell et al.
14.4.2 Organizations as Drivers 2012).
of Change To understand the wide-ranging effects of
careers on societal outcomes—at the individual
Change is by no means an endogenous process as well as the organizational level—consider
that occurs only inside organizations; social con- Bidwell and Briscoe’s (2010) study of the careers
flicts, power struggles, and technological innova- of information technology workers. The authors
tions occur outside organizations as well. Debates investigate the way people move between jobs
on the external determinants of change in organi- over the course of their lives. They find that the
zations are rich in both theoretical insights and sequence of employers is life-changing: most
empirical evidence. Among the often discussed people move from large, generalist organizations
mechanisms of change are learning from others early in their careers to smaller workplaces that
(March 1991), the creation of resource dependen- require more specialized knowledge. In other
cies (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), the adoption of words, people do not arbitrarily move across
societally recognized templates (Meyer and jobs; their careers follow a structured progres-
Rowan 1977), and selection pressures stemming sion, in which workers transpose the skills
from competition for resources (Hannan and required in one position to other organizations
Freeman 1989). that build on those skills. Inter-organizational
These various theoretical traditions have gen- career ladders thus have “important conse-
erated a rich understanding of the trans- and quences for both firms and workers” (Bidwell
inter-organizational dynamics that produce a het- and Briscoe 2010: 1034).
erogeneous landscape of organizations and lead The effect on workers’ life chances through-
to large-scale shifts in how society pursues its out their careers is a contested issue within orga-
goals. Such macro-organizational research is nizational theory. In line with our discussion
sometimes difficult to connect with micro- above about the constraints that organizations
sociological theories, in part because people’s create, some jobs lock people into specific posi-
behaviors are treated as only secondary to that of tions. For feature film actors, having a “simple,
organizations. As one illustration, a core feature focused identity,” that is, being renowned for
of studies of institutional change is the travel of appearing in a certain genre, can be beneficial for
ideas: numerous empirical studies deal with the securing future work. But typecasting also limits
diffusion of organizational practices and struc- actors’ opportunities outside the genre they are
tures (for an early review, see Strang and Soule known for and effectively constrains their career
1998), the ensuing isomorphism of organiza- paths (Zuckerman et al. 2003). Another illustra-
tional form and content (Strang and Meyer 1993), tion is found in Briscoe and Kellogg’s (2011)
and the variety that results from heterogeneous longitudinal study of family-friendly, reduced-
local translations and editing of global ideas hours programs in a law firm. The authors find
(Sahlin and Wedlin 2008). that an initial assignment with a powerful super-
A related mechanism of change in and across visor makes it easier for workers later to use
organizations is the mobility of people through- work-family programs and more generally
out their careers (Stewman and Konda 1983; improves their subsequent career outcomes.
14 Organizations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 281
Such career dynamics also have important Researchers have developed numerous tools
implications for the industries and sectors in to try to capture the importance of networks and
which organizations are situated. One the one applied these both inside organizations and to
hand, organizations can benefit economically inter-organizational relationships. Attempts at
from the skill and creativity of workers who join quantification reflect efforts to depict properties
them, as brain drain can pose severe problems for of both nodes and relationships; these include
management (Wang 2015). On the other hand, social processes such as influence, centrality,
core sociological outcomes can be affected by prestige, awareness, and leverage, as well as con-
workers’ mobility. One example mentioned cepts including distance, centrality, cohesive-
above is Fernandez’s (2001) study of a plant ness, equivalence, and density. These various
retooling in which worker turnover was a major indicators portray how networks permeate orga-
determinant of internal income inequality. nizational life and reflect our core contention that
Another case, from the nonprofit sector, involves organizations are both venues for action and driv-
managerial practices in public charities, which ers of social and economic relations. When we
Hwang and Powell (2009) show are driven by the analyze how networks influence organizations,
hiring of increasingly professional executives. the relationships can be portrayed at multiple lev-
Nonprofit leaders recently trained in professional els. As sites of action, organizations host net-
schools are more likely to introduce rational works of people whose decisions are affected by
methods—from strategic planning to quantitative their relations to people in other organizations.
performance evaluation—than long-tenured non- As drivers, organizations constitute and shape
profit executives or passionate activists (Hwang large inter-organizational networks that are usu-
and Powell 2009; Suarez 2010). The managers ally perceived as communities—including indus-
exiting and entering charities thus contribute to tries, organizational fields, and cities.
transforming how civil society is coordinated.
Through their roles in both structuring and man-
aging careers, organizations embody and abet 14.5.1 Organizations as Sites
change in people’s lives and social structures. of Social Relations
manner of ways, from formal job-referral sys- Computer is a classic example. And recent efforts
tems in which the referrers are paid bonuses, to at open innovation have created new models,
automobile maker Tesla’s use of referrals for new such as the confederacy represented by Wikipedia
car sales and rewards to loyal early purchasers. or crowd-funding forms such as Kickstarter (Von
Fernandez et al. (2000) analyzed employee refer- Krogh and Von Hippel 2006).
rals at a call center within a large bank and found The social relations among people inside
that employee referrals not only were cost effec- organizations not only shape professional mobil-
tive, but resulted in a richer applicant pool. Burt ity, they also enable and constrain organizational
(1992) has shown that employees whose net- behavior. Classic research in organizational the-
works span disconnected parts of organiza- ory (Gouldner 1954) and a foundational work in
tions—that is, “bridge a structural hole”—are economic sociology (Macaulay 1963) demon-
promoted faster than those with more limited strate that even highly purposive economic
ties. In subsequent work, others have shown that exchanges are enmeshed in and driven by social
such brokerage networks work differently for networks. Organizational and economic actions
men and women and minority groups (Ibarra result from a complex lamination of motivations
1992). More generally, Burt (2004) has shown and meanings that participants draw from the
that employees who are located in positions that various relations in which they participate.
enable them to bridge ideas from different units In a study of auto dealers, Macaulay (1963)
can capitalize on their positions to propose better found that businessmen often disregard the legal
ideas. rights and responsibilities inherent in contracts
Internally, organizations can be more or less in favor of more social means of dealmaking and
porous. Some organizations have relational dispute resolution. Networks shaped how busi-
spaces where members from various ranks and nessmen approached transactions. As one of his
departments can mix freely, undeterred by formal respondents commented, “You don’t read legal-
role differentiation (Kellogg 2010). Organizations istic contract clauses to each other if you ever
can be structured more like a network than a hier- want to do business again. One doesn’t run to the
archy; this has long been a common practice in lawyers if he wants to stay in business because
the construction, film, and fashion industries, one must behave decently” (Macaulay 1963:
where projects come together on a short-term, 61). Lawyers should be excluded, not because
temporary basis. Many activities, from fashion to they are personal strangers, but because they
computers, are created in fast product cycles, view the same relationship through a different
where speed and timing are urgent concerns lens, which explains why they find the business-
(Uzzi 1996). In such cases, a group of people act man’s approach “startling.” As Macaulay noted,
as the project organizers and work with others where businessmen see orders that can legiti-
from the outside on teams of relatively short mately be cancelled, lawyers view the violation
duration. The relationships may become repeated of contracts as having strongly negative
games, as has been shown in the case of particu- consequences.
lar genres of films where directors, writers, and The meaning of a relationship and the actions
actors come together on a project, disperse, and appropriate to it depend on the character of the
return to work with one another on a later project parties to the tie and their broader professional
(Faulkner and Anderson 1987). Similarly, in the milieus. Put differently, car dealerships promote
electronics sector, the model of contractors who a relational view suggesting that the parties will
design equipment but outsource the making of solve problems as they arise; lawyers, on the
the parts is commonplace. There are also manu- other hand, see their firms’ role as drafting con-
facturers, sometimes critically referred to as “box tracts that anticipate problems. The relational
stuffers,” who outsource many stages of the pro- view, as opposed to a transactional one, eases the
duction process, performing only some high- cost of doing business, enhances flexibility, and
level integration work (Sturgeon 2002). Dell offers support during lean times (Dore 1983).
14 Organizations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 283
works, but they differed in their organizational networks dominated by universities and hospi-
demography. tals. In contrast, Bay Area biotech firms pursued
The Boston network grew from its origins in medicines for larger markets in which the poten-
the public sector, and public science formed the tial patient populations run into the millions, and
anchor for subsequent commercial application for which there was likely to be stiff product
(Owen-Smith and Powell 2004; Porter et al. competition. This high-risk, high-reward strategy
2005). Because the Boston biotechnology com- reflected the imprint of the venture capital
munity was linked by initial connections to pub- mindset.
lic research organizations, this cluster manifested This extended illustration underscores the
an open trajectory. By contrast, the Bay Area was dual effects of networks, both within and across
influenced by a host of factors: the prospecting organizations. Networks are constitutive in the
and matchmaking work of venture capitalists, the sense that the people inside organizations are
multidisciplinary science of the UCSF medical simultaneously embedded in both work and per-
school, and pioneering efforts at technology sonal relations, sometimes to such an extent that
transfer at Stanford University (Colyvas and it is difficult to disentangle the two. And organi-
Powell 2006; Popp Berman 2012; Powell and zations both learn and access resources and new
Sandholtz 2012). The San Francisco Bay Area knowledge through their inter-organizational
evolved out of a more entrepreneurial orientation relations. These sources of ideas and relation-
than Boston’s. Both the Boston and Bay Area ships also define what organizations do, as they
clusters were catalyzed by a non-biotech organi- are influenced by the actions of their peers. In so
zational form, but these different forms left dis- doing, networks shape how organizations come
tinctive relational imprints on the respective to regard themselves and conceive of their goals.
clusters.
The two clusters also differed in how they pro-
duced knowledge and the products they devel- 14.6 Implications
oped. We compared the patent citation networks
of biotech firms in the two clusters (Owen-Smith The studies reviewed in this chapter combine
and Powell 2006). The results suggest that Boston insights from a wide variety of recent research on
biotechs more routinely engaged in exploratory different types of organizations across sectors,
search, which typically yields a few very-high- geography, and time periods. The authors we
impact patents at the expense of numerous inno- have discussed study schools, jazz producers,
vations with lower than average future effects SWAT teams, maternity counselors, wind power,
(Fleming and Sorenson 2001). In contrast, the corporate foundations, art festivals, social move-
dominant Bay Area patenting strategy had a more ment organizations, drug courts, childcare cen-
directed ‘exploitation’ design, as one might ters, breweries, soft drink producers,
expect of companies supported by investor net- environmental rating agencies, the film industry,
works that demand demonstrated progress. the civil service, call centers, government
Companies that pursue exploitative strategies bureaus, biotech firms, and law and investment
generally develop numerous related improve- firms.
ments on established components of their in-
house research. Boston area companies were
much more reliant on citations to prior art gener- 14.6.1 Organizations Reflect
ated by universities and public research organiza- and Remake Society
tions than were Bay Area companies, which
relied more on citations to their own prior art. As Organizations matter for the study of society in
for medicines, many Boston-based firms have two fundamental ways. First, organizations
focused on orphan drugs, as one might have reflect social structure. Society tailors organiza-
expected of companies that were enmeshed in tions in many meaningful ways: the professions
14 Organizations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 285
and the state, labor market structures, cultural end of long-term employment and creating a new
fads, and political movements and ideologies all period of downward mobility and rising inequal-
leave their mark on organizational practices and ity. In contrast, today we live in the age of the
structures. Various processes, from imprinting to lean start-up, with work futures precarious and
isomorphism, make organizations an effigy of the distribution of rewards highly skewed. But
society. In Perrow’s (1972: 4) apt language, peo- the model of disruption that is the hallmark of
ple “track all kinds of mud from the rest of their Silicon Valley start-ups has become an enviable
lives with them into the organization, and they symbol worldwide for its innovative capabilities,
have all kinds of interests that are independent of even if its rewards do not generate stable employ-
the organization.” On the other hand, even though ment for large numbers of workers. Thus one can
organizations are frequent sites of larger societal view both social history and social change
processes, organizations also forge and remake through the lens of organizational models.
society. Once an organization has been founded Two luminaries of organizational research
that capably performs a certain task or represents have made the argument that we live in an orga-
some interest, structural dynamics such as inertia nizational society more succinctly. Nobel laure-
and institutionalization enable such interests and ate Herbert Simon (1991: 42) averred that “the
tasks to persist. economies of modern industrialized society can
The effect that organizations—be they public more appropriately be labeled organizational
agencies, business firms, or civil society groups— economies than market economies,” and organi-
have on society is quite profound. They are zational sociologist Charles Perrow (1972: vii)
responsible for hiring and firing people, for pay- made the striking claim that “all important social
ing and promoting them, for giving them voice processes either have their origin in formal orga-
and instilling loyal membership, and even for nizations or are strongly mediated by them.”
provoking resistance. Organizations facilitate
innovation, sort people through careers, repro-
duce stratification and solidify discrimination, 14.6.2 Organizational Dynamics
and determine the reputation and power of cer- at Multiple Levels of Analysis
tain individuals. Organizations matter because
they are monuments of times past as well as Distinguishing among the different levels through
sculptors of the future. which social relations shape organizational
Indeed, extending Stinchcombe (1965), one behavior and by which organizations alter social
might argue that generations and society are ties can be challenging. Networks spill over both
shaped by the kinds of organizations that are pre- within and across organizations, and an ostensi-
dominant in an era. Consider the post–World War bly internal relation can easily become an exter-
II era, which some have termed Pax Americana, nal affiliation as careers and organizations
running from the 1950s to the 1980s. This period develop over time (Padgett and Powell 2012).
was characterized by the dominance of large cor- Similarly, for inter-organizational relations, what
porations, with stable internal labor markets, and makes for an attractive partner is an obvious
good middle-class and skilled blue-collar jobs. question, and here having prior knowledge of and
This era of US manufacturing dominance meant experience with a specific partnership eases
that employment futures were relatively secure external relations (Rosenkopf et al. 2001). The
for those who worked for such companies, and propensity to form an alliance, or create a regional
the larger society, from housing to shopping cluster, depends on the parties sharing mutual
malls, was molded by these organizational interests. Such prior relations are more likely
dynamics. forged by individuals than by corporate entities.
The postwar organizational regime split apart Sorenson and Rogan (2014) argue that three
at the seams in the face of global competition and factors enhance the likelihood that individuals
the quest for cheap overseas labor, ushering in the are the key to inter-organizational affiliations: (1)
286 W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner
the extent to which the needed resources, such as comprehensiveness of administrative data. More
tacit knowledge, belong to individuals rather than informal arrangements—such as movements,
organizations; (2) the extent to which indebted- casual groups, or temporary projects—are some-
ness and gratitude are owed to persons rather times systematically excluded from organiza-
than formal organizations; and (3) the degree of tional data.
emotional attachment associated with a linkage. Another limitation is that the importance of
Thus interpersonal relations are often the glue organizational dynamics is often revealed only in
that binds inter-organizational relations. In this retrospect. Some exemplary studies of race, eth-
sense, organizations are the conduits through nicity, and culture applying an organizational
which interpersonal relations are actualized. lens are historical. One such study shows that
How society affects organizations and vice organizational dynamics shape the politics of
versa is also often a dynamic process. Viewing ethnic categories. Why, despite their different
organizations as sites and drivers of social action country of origin, skin color, and social class, did
does not imply that these two dimensions can, or Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Cubans end up
should, always be separated. The relationship under the umbrella label of ‘Hispanic’? Mora
between organizations and society is rarely a (2014) shows that it was neither a common lan-
one-way street. guage nor perceived cultural similarities that led
Organizations may intervene in the regulation to the emergence of the Latino category, as
and structuring of their own institutional environ- Spanish-speaking Haitians are left out whereas
ment or resource space. Corporations, for non-Spanish-speaking Mexicans are included.
instance, not only are influenced by public opin- Instead, she finds that a field-spanning combina-
ion, but can themselves alter public opinion by tion of pan-ethnicity activists, government
lobbying, contributing to electoral politics, or bureaucrats, and media executives was responsi-
supporting grassroots efforts (Walker and Rea ble for creating a new identity category over the
2014). In her study of historically black colleges decades from the late 1960s to the 1990s.
in the United States, Wooten (2015) shows that Another compelling historical example of the
the organizational development and resource influence of organizational context is Phillips’s
access of black colleges was constrained by (2011, 2013) comprehensive study of the role of
American social and educational policy. One of producers and places for predicting the success
her findings is that the legitimacy-building of jazz music. Why are some pieces of music,
accreditation of the foundation-supported United particularly those recorded in peripheral places
Negro College Fund in the 1950s and 1960s and with elements hard to categorize, rerecorded
favored organizational structures that maintained many times in later years? Phillips argues that the
the discrimination against blacks in US society. appeal of ‘authentic outsiders’ explains the evo-
Similarly, rankings and ratings are important lution of this cultural market. He finds that jazz
touchstones for organizations ranging from law from cities that were more disconnected from
schools to companies, but how that information other jazz-producing cities was more likely to
is implemented and used is subject to organiza- enter the jazz canon than jazz from cities central
tional involvement, as is the creation of rankings to the jazz music industry. The studies by Mora
and ratings itself (Espeland and Sauder 2016). and Phillips illuminate how culture and ethnicity
Although organizational perspectives have are shaped by organizations.
many theoretical applications, their actual use
may be limited. One problem is that data tend to
be biased toward formal models of organization. 14.6.3 Conclusion
Quantitative studies of civil society, for instance,
are frequently limited to organizations formally Many accounts of organizational performance,
registered as 501(c)(3)s, and studies of unem- whether in schools, hospitals, or firms, are unable
ployment, crime, and inequality often rely on the to explain why one unit has positive outcomes
14 Organizations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 287
and another middling success. For example, why nizational processes we have detailed here. We
do hospitals vary in their rates of Caesarian close with a nod to the father of organization
births, even within the same county, or why do studies, Max Weber, and invoke one of those
charter schools do better than public schools in delightfully indecipherable German terms,
low-income, non-white urban areas, but produce ‘Querschnittsmaterie’, which describes a cross-
little difference in student performance in subur- sectional field that may apply across the board to
ban school districts? Learning from the “bright a range of sub-disciplines. In our view, organiza-
spots” among hospitals, schools, manufacturing tional sociology played this intellectual role
plants, or government bureaus, and understand- throughout much of the twentieth century, and
ing how these successes might be spread, could we hope that it resumes this position in the com-
be immensely valuable, but researchers often ing years.
struggle to explain variation, both within organi-
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Small Groups: Reflections
of and Building Blocks for Social 15
Structure
field; much excellent work was necessarily omit- minimal groups. We begin with a general over-
ted. It is also important to note that most of the view of small groups as a source of structure,
work we discuss here has been conducted in a before moving on to discuss specific structure-
western cultural context; researchers have sug- producing mechanisms: status, power, identity,
gested that some social psychological processes influence and social norms, and culture.
work differently in other cultural contexts (e.g.
Zhong et al. 2006).
We focus in this chapter on the sociology of 15.2 Small Groups as Self-
small groups, although we draw on research from Organizing, Emergent
other fields, including psychology, organizational Structure
behavior, and economics. Modern small groups
research in sociology generally focuses on how How do groups organize and accomplish desired
social structure and culture influence group inter- goals? Why do some individuals attain positions
action and behavior, and in turn how these behav- of power and influence within groups, while other
iors influence social structure (Thoits 1995). From individuals find themselves on the margins?
a sociological perspective, many macro-level fac- Questions such as these have been addressed by
tors can be best understood by observing them at small groups researchers at least since the mid-
an interactional level. For instance, while race, twentieth century. Although small groups often
gender, and socioeconomic status are structural reflect the structure of society, they also work to
factors, their effects on individuals take place in create structures. Robert Freed Bales and col-
part through interpersonal and intergroup interac- leagues (1951) found that when small groups of
tion (Cohen 1982; Ridgeway 1997). It is this individuals worked together on a task, consistent
emphasis on structural factors that distinguishes patterns emerged. In particular, certain individu-
modern small groups research in sociology from als tended to dominate the group discussion while
the “psychological social psychology” research others largely remained silent. Interestingly, these
that House outlined almost 40 years ago (House patterns developed among groups of similar indi-
1977; Oishi et al. 2009; Stryker 1980). That said, viduals (same sex, race, and education level).
these boundaries are porous and there is substan- Therefore, even in the absence of easily observ-
tial overlap across disciplines. As a result, while able cues about social status or ability, certain
we focus on the sociological literature, we draw on individuals gained greater influence and visibility
work in allied fields when it is relevant for under- in the group. Those who attained the highest
standing problems of interest to sociologists. ranks of the group tended to speak more and to
While definitions of the term “group” vary, address the whole group, while those of lowest
many researchers agree that at a minimum, rank tended to address only one individual at a
groups include three or more individuals “inter- time, usually the highest ranking individual.
acting with a common purpose” (Kelly et al. The level of inequality within the groups was
2013: 413). This more minimal definition is com- rather striking. Figure 15.1 displays the percent
mon in the experimental literature, which often of the total number of remarks made to the group
focuses on groups created in a lab and observed by each group member, for different size groups.
under controlled conditions (e.g. to see how indi- For example, in a four-person group (middle fig-
viduals work together to solve problems). Other ure in left column) we would expect each indi-
scholars, particularly those who study groups in vidual to contribute 25 % of the total remarks
the field, prefer more comprehensive definitions given complete equality. Instead, the highest
that specify a shared sense of culture, commit- ranking individual tends to make roughly 50 % of
ment, and identity among group members (Fine the total remarks for the entire group while the
2012). We include research taking a minimal as lowest ranking individual tends to provide only
well as a more comprehensive view of groups in about 10 % of the remarks. In addition, the nature
this chapter. This line is not always clear-cut: of the remarks varied based on one’s status
aspects of culture and identity emerge in initially ranking. Those of higher rank gave more opin-
15 Small Groups: Reflections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 295
n=3 n=6
s = 26 s = 18
50 N = 26 50 N = 213
30 30
10 10
PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS
0 0
1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
50 50
n=4 n=7
s = 89 s = 15
N = 582 N = 220
30 30
10 10
0 0
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
50 n=5 50 n=8
s=9 s = 10
N = 107 N = 128
30 30
10 10
0 0
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
RANK POSITION
Fig. 15.1 Percent of the total number of remarks made to the group by each group member, by group size (Bales et al.
1951, Chart 1)
ions while those of lower rank agreed more often Specifically, men and those with higher status
(Bales et al. 1951). Thus, even in groups of simi- occupations dominated jury deliberations and
lar individuals, status hierarchies form and struc- were more likely to be selected as a jury foreman
ture interaction. (Strodtbeck et al. 1957).
Strodtbeck and colleagues (1957) built on the This tendency towards order, structure, and
findings of Bales to examine how groups use hierarchy appears to develop early in the life of
observable characteristics of individuals to create groups. In his classic “Robber’s Cave
status hierarchies. In observing mock jury delib- Experiment”, Sherif and colleagues (1961)
erations, they found that status hierarchies formed recruited well-adjusted middle-class boys to a
that closely matched the status order of society. summer camp. He then sorted the boys into two
296 S. Benard and T.D. Mize
groups randomly. Almost immediately, leaders attribute – such as gender or race – sometimes
emerged in each group and clear hierarchies carry different expectations for performance (see,
formed. This finding is similar to the findings of also, Chap. 16). As a result, those who possess a
Bales: both illustrate that groups tend to have one more advantaged state of the attribute more eas-
or a few influential and outspoken individuals, ily attain status and influence in groups. For
with most others falling much lower in the status example, men are often expected to perform
hierarchy and rarely being heard. more competently than women on stereotypically
male tasks, and accordingly groups are more
likely to follow the suggestion of a man rather
15.3 Status than a woman on such tasks, net of the actual
competence of the man or woman on the task in
As both Bales et al. (1951) and Sherif et al’s question (e.g. Thomas-Hunt and Phillips 2004;
(1961) studies demonstrate, groups tend to form Kalkhoff et al. 2008).
status hierarchies quickly, with certain individu- Two types of characteristics impact someone’s
als attaining more influential positions that reflect status within a group: specific and diffuse.
their status within a group. These early studies Specific status characteristics refer to attributes
led to a tremendous amount of work on the con- of an individual that carry specific and relevant
cept of status in groups. Sociologists define status assumptions of competence for the task at hand
as an individual’s position in a group’s hierarchy (Berger et al. 1972; Berger and Webster 2006).
of “evaluation, influence, and participation” For example, someone’s score on a standardized
(Correll and Ridgeway 2003: 29) while psychol- math test would influence their specific status for
ogists define status similarly as “… an individu- a group task involving math skills. In many ways,
al’s prominence, respect, and influence in the the link between specific status characteristics
eyes of others” (Anderson and Kilduff 2009b: and status in groups are clear: it is not surprising
295). that group members known to have scored well
Expectation states theory offered an early and on a test of math ability are assumed to be better
still-influential explanation for these patterns. performers on math-related tasks. Diffuse status
The theory argued that when group members see characteristics, in contrast, refer to characteristics
a need to work together (“collective orientation”) that affect expectations for performance in a
in order to accomplish a particular task (“task ori- broad range of situations, regardless of their rel-
entation”), they will attempt to determine which evance to a specific task (Berger et al. 1972;
group members are likely to have the most help- Berger and Webster 2006). Race has been shown
ful contributions towards this goal. Those indi- to affect interaction, with individuals often
viduals who are seen to have more to expecting minorities to perform worse in a broad
contribute – because they are perceived to be range of situations, producing racial inequality in
more skilled, competent, or motivated to help the groups (Cohen 1982; Goar 2007; Goar and Sell
group – will attain greater status in the group. 2005). Gender also acts a diffuse status charac-
They will see their opinions given more weight, teristic, with women assumed to be generally less
will be granted more opportunities to speak, par- competent, regardless of gender’s relevance to
ticipate more often in group discussions, and the task at hand (Correll and Ridgeway 2003;
their contributions to the group will be viewed Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Pugh and Wahrman
more positively than those of lower-status group 1983; Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989; Thomas-
members (Correll and Ridgeway 2003). Hunt and Phillips 2004).
Berger and colleagues (1972) further argued Importantly, these status-based performance
that characteristics of individuals are partially expectations derive from widespread cultural
responsible for the observed power and prestige beliefs and are not necessarily associated with
orders that form in groups. Their theory of status actual differences in competence or ability
characteristics proposed that certain states of an (Berger and Webster 2006). Status beliefs further
15 Small Groups: Reflections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 297
operate at an unconscious level and affect indi- Several types of interventions have been
viduals even if they do not consciously endorse shown to effectively reduce status effects, par-
them (Ridgeway et al. 1998; Correll and ticularly in regards to gender discrimination.
Ridgeway 2003). Years of experimental research Women can attain relatively high status positions
has shown that individuals draw on these macro- in groups when they demonstrate group-oriented
level cultural beliefs in interaction, leading to motivation; but not when they demonstrate more
disadvantages for racial minorities, women, less self-centered motivations. In contrast, men can
educated individuals, less attractive individuals, attain high status regardless of their motivation
and sexual minorities to name a few (Cohen (Ridgeway 1982). Settings in which women are
1982; Goar and Sell 2005; Kalkhoff et al. 2008; known to succeed can also reduce status effects.
Webster and Driskell 1983; Webster et al. 1998; Lucas (2003) shows that creating an organiza-
Correll and Ridgeway 2003; Lucas and Phelan tional setting where women were known to be
2012). successful leaders led to women leaders being
These status hierarchies can be self-fulfilling: given equal influence to men leaders. Goar and
if someone is perceived as having little to offer Sell (2005) find that task groups show less racial
the group, they will receive fewer opportunities inequality in participation when they believe they
to speak, and their opinions will be given less are trying to solve a complex task for which no
weight, reinforcing the perception that they have one group member is likely to have a complete
little to offer. Lower-status individuals are also solution. Importantly, these interventions should
often held to stricter standards, meaning that they apply to any disadvantaging status characteristic.
must offer greater evidence of ability in order to That is, the examples are not limited to gender or
be viewed as equally competent as higher-status race, but the interventions instead help overcome
individuals (Foschi et al. 1994; Foschi 1996; status disadvantages, regardless of their source.
Wenneras and Wold 1997; see Foschi 2000 for a Other research shows that increased motiva-
review). Similarly, individuals may shift the stan- tion to avoid stereotyping can help decrease ste-
dards of evaluation to match the qualifications of reotyped judgments of groups such as women
a preferred individual, rather than using consis- and minorities (e.g. Devine et al. 2002). That is,
tent standards (Norton et al. 2004). when individuals put greater effort and care into
thinking through their decisions, they are less
likely to rely on stereotypical judgments that dis-
15.3.1 Overcoming Disadvantaging advantage lower status groups. Correspondingly,
Status Beliefs individuals rely on stereotypes to a greater extent
when they lack the motivation to examine their
An individual’s status in a group reflects not only thoughts or behaviors closely, such as when they
their actual performance, but also perceptions of are angry (Bodenhausen et al. 1994), tired
their performance, potentially filtered through (Bodenhausen 1990), or when their self-view has
stereotypes and other cognitive distortions. As a been threatened by criticism (Sinclair and Kunda
result, status imperfectly reflects actual compe- 2000). Similarly, settings that encourage individ-
tence and can disadvantage otherwise deserving uals to think through their decisions more care-
individuals. These errors in status judgments can fully – such as when individuals expect they will
also impair group performance, by leading have to explain their judgments to others – reduce
groups to overweight the input of less competent stereotyping (e.g. Foschi 1996; see Lerner and
group members and underweight the input of Tetlock 1999 for a review). Further, asking indi-
more-competent group members (Thomas-Hunt viduals to commit to a specific, transparent stan-
and Phillips 2004). Correcting misperceptions of dard of evaluation limits the likelihood that
competence is therefore beneficial for both individuals will apply different standards to dif-
groups and individuals. ferent group members (Norton et al. 2004).
298 S. Benard and T.D. Mize
15.3.2 Status Construction Theory ing confidence (Kennedy et al. 2013), extraver-
sion (Anderson et al. 2001), trait dominance
How do status beliefs develop? Ridgeway (2006) (Anderson and Kilduff 2009a); generosity (Flynn
proposes that we attach diffuse status beliefs to 2003; Flynn et al. 2006), sharing expertise
particular categories (e.g. gender and race) when (Cheng et al. 2013), and self-sacrifice for the
it is easy to observe the different resources held group (Willer 2009).
by members of these groups, but difficult to Although those of higher status receive more
observe the processes and behaviors through respect and influence, not all individuals are able
which these resources were acquired. For exam- to claim or even desire higher status. Anderson
ple, in many organizations men disproportion- and colleagues (2006) find that people dislike
ately hold high status positions. These high status individuals who do not accurately perceive their
men’s gender is easily observable, while the cir- own status. In particular, those that overestimate
cumstances that led to them obtaining these posi- their own status (have overly-flattering views of
tions are harder to ascertain. Over time, themselves) are disliked compared to individuals
individuals attach status value to those higher in who accurately perceive their own status. In con-
the status hierarchy, and attribute their differen- trast, those who are self-effacing (view them-
tial position to the characteristics of the individu- selves as lower in status than they truly are) are
als (Ridgeway 2006). Thus, in situations where particularly well liked by others.
high status individuals such as men enact more Berger and colleagues’ (1972) original formu-
high status behaviors (e.g., assertiveness) and are lation of status characteristics theory referred to
given more deference, individuals attribute status as the “power and prestige order” while
greater status value to the category of “men” as Anderson emphasizes the “…prominence,
their gender is easily observable, while men’s respect, and influence” an individual has in a
structurally advantaged positions are more likely group (Anderson et al. 2006, Anderson and
to go unnoticed. Empirical tests of status con- Kilduff 2009b). In an empirical test, Anderson
struction theory have generally supported its and colleagues (2012) show that what sociolo-
basic propositions. Both men and women treat gists generally refer to as status has both a rank
others unequally on the basis of established sta- and a respect dimension. All individuals desire
tus distinctions. However, men are more likely to respect and would like to be valued; however not
act on emerging status distinctions – with women all individuals desire high rank within a group’s
more cautious about using new distinctions as hierarchy. Put in status characteristics theory
reasons to guide their behavior (Ridgeway et al. terms: not all individuals appear to want the
2009; see also Brashears 2008 for a cross-national “power” part of status, but all individuals desire
test in support of the theory). the “prestige” aspect.
person because they can compel us to do so. In small group traditions (e.g. Emerson 1962, 1964,
this section, we discuss the sources of power as 1976; see Cook et al. 2006 for a review).
well as the experience of power – how having or The key insight of power-dependence theory
lacking power shapes our thoughts, feelings, and is that power is relational. This means that no
behavior. individual is inherently powerful; instead, indi-
Many sociologists study power from the per- viduals are powerful to the extent that they hold
spective of exchange theory (e.g. Homans 1951 power over others. Emerson argued that power
[1992]; Blau 1964; Emerson 1976; see Cook and stems from dependence, such that A has influence
Rice 2003 for a review). Exchange theory argues over B to the extent that B is dependent on A in
that in a wide range of social interactions, people order to reach goals that are important to B. In
exchange material and non-material resources in turn, dependence stems from two sources. The
an effort to reach their goals (e.g. money, grati- first of these is the availability of alternative
tude, social status, see Blau 1964). This process means of reaching one’s goals. To the extent that
is obvious in formal negotiations over cars, B can find other individuals who will help her or
houses, or an employment contracts, but also him reach a valued goal, B is less dependent on
occurs informally in many settings. Couples A, and A will have less influence over B. For
explicitly or implicitly negotiate where to eat for example, workers are less likely to put up with
dinner, who does the housework, and whose abusive supervisors when they plan to change
career receives priority. Social exchange is not jobs in the near future, while those who do not
always negotiated; indeed, people often recipro- expect to be able to leave their job tend to tolerate
cally exchange resources with no explicit prom- more abuse (Tepper et al. 2009).
ise of repayment (Molm 2010). For example, The second source of dependence is motiva-
friends might give each other birthday gifts, rides tional investment. To the extent that B is motiva-
to the airport, or social support as needed. The tionally invested, or in other words strongly cares
concept of power helps us understand why social about a goal that A can help B to reach, A will
exchanges sometimes favor one party over hold more influence over B. This is sometimes
another, and how these imbalances shape our referred to as the “principle of least interest”; in
thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Research on romantic relationships, the partner with less emo-
power also helps us understand the quality of our tional attachment to the relationship tends to
interpersonal relationships: while exchange in have more power (Sprecher et al. 2006).
unequal-power relationships can be exploitative, Emerson’s conception of dependence as a
exchange in equal-power relationships tends to source of power leads to a number of interesting
produce trust, commitment, and solidarity. insights. One is that the distribution of power
across exchange partners predicts the likelihood
that they will develop a cohesive, trusting, com-
15.4.1 Dependence and Power mitted relationship. The distribution of power in
a relationship is not necessarily zero-sum: rela-
Informally, we can think of power as one per- tionships can be high or low in total power. When
son’s capacity to get what they want in a social A and B are equally and highly dependent on one
exchange, regardless of the wishes of the other another, the relationship is high in total power;
person. Emerson (1962: 32) offered a more for- when neither depends on the other, the relation-
mal definition: “[t]he power of actor A over actor ship is low in total power. High total power rela-
B is the amount of resistance on the part of B tionships are expected to be cohesive, because
which can be potentially overcome by A.” This both partners depend on one another and should
definition forms the starting point for Emerson’s be less likely to leave the relationship.
power-dependence theory, which has played an Accordingly, experimental work finds lower lev-
important role in shaping sociological research els of conflict in high total power relationships
on power, particular within the group process and than unequal power relationships (Lawler et al.
300 S. Benard and T.D. Mize
1988). Further, work on the theory of relational suggests that low power individuals can increase
cohesion finds that individuals in high total a higher-power partner’s motivational invest-
power relationships tend to see their relationships ment by treating that person with respect and def-
as more cohesive and to be more committed to erence. The logic is that the high status person
those relationships (see Chap. 8; also, Lawler and enjoys being treated in this way, and is thus less
Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998; Lawler et al. 2000). likely to take steps that would end the relation-
Similarly, a field study of car dealers and their ship. Individuals can also be constrained in their
suppliers found that the partnerships that were use of power by their commitment to the relation-
highly and equally interdependent had more ship, or by social norms prescribing fairness
committed relationships than those that were not (Cook and Emerson 1978).
(Kumar et al. 1995). The insight that power derives from depen-
Within equal power relationships, a number of dence has motivated decades of systematic
other factors affect the partners’ levels of trust, research to map out precisely how power and
cohesion, and commitment. These include the dependence are related. This has led to the devel-
form of exchange (i.e. negotiated, reciprocal, opment of a family of network exchange theories,
generalized, or productive; Lawler et al. 2008; which take Emerson’s insights and examine how
Molm et al. 2007) and the extent to which the they operate in increasingly complex social net-
relationship is perceived as competitive versus works (e.g. Bienenstock and Bonacich 1992;
cooperative (Kuwabara 2011). At least one study Cook and Emerson 1978; Cook and Yamagishi
finds greater cohesion in triads than dyads, per- 1992; Friedkin 1992; Heckathorn 1983;
haps due to lower levels of uncertainty and con- Markovsky et al. 1988; Markovsky 1992). These
flict in triads (Yoon et al. 2013). Rational choice theories differ in their formal or mathematical
theories also predict that, as individuals are more methods for predicting when and how individu-
dependent on the group, they will accept more als will use power, and substantial debate has
extensive obligations on behalf of the group and occurred around the best method for predicting
will be less likely to exit (Hechter 1988). power in networks (e.g. Willer 1992).
A second set of insights from power- Nevertheless, these research programs concur on
dependence theory concerns how individuals can Emerson’s primary argument that power derives
balance power in a network (Emerson 1962). from dependence. This body of work consistently
Individuals often find low power positions finds that our location in a social network –
uncomfortable and seek to tilt the power imbal- including the number of alternative exchange
ance more to their favor. By identifying depen- partners we have, and the value of those relation-
dence as the source of power, the theory provides ships to us – shapes our dependence on others
a road map to equalizing power relations. and correspondingly shapes how much power we
Because power is based in part on the availability hold. This extends beyond our direct connec-
of alternatives, one can equalize power by tions: individuals with the same number of alter-
increasing their own alternatives or limiting their native exchange partners may not be equally
partner’s alternatives. A dissatisfied employee powerful if the partners to whom they are con-
may apply for other jobs, broadening their range nected differ in power (Cook and Emerson 1978).
of alternatives (Tepper 2009), and weaker parties To illustrate, Fig. 15.2 shows two exchange
in many settings form coalitions to prevent higher networks based on those studied in Cook and
power actors from using a “divide and conquer” Emerson (1978), but simplified for this example.
strategy (Emerson 1964; Simpson and Macy In this figure, the lettered boxes represent indi-
2001). In addition, because power is also based viduals, and the lines represent connections
on one’s motivational investment in a goal, one indicating that those actors can exchange with
can balance power by reducing one’s own moti- one another. This could represent, for example, a
vational investment, or by increasing their part- network of acquaintances who trade help and
ner’s motivational investment. Emerson (1962) information. In both networks, the central actor is
15 Small Groups: Reflections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 301
deal with crises, such as when the group is at risk influence (Deustch and Gerard 1955). Normative
of overusing a scarce resource (Messick et al. influence occurs when people conform to the per-
1983). ceived expectations of other group members in
A number of studies investigate how power order to gain social rewards (acceptance,
and status are related. Thye (2000) finds that the approval) or avoid social punishments (embar-
resources owned by high status actors tend to be rassment, disapproval) from others. Normative
valued more than those owned by low status influence is at work when people don’t voice
actors. For example, a car owned by a celebrity their true opinion for fear of criticism, laugh at a
can sell for more than a similar car owned by a joke they don’t understand to avoid appearing
non-celebrity. This can serve as a source of power humorless, or buy articles of clothing because
when the resources of a high status person offer they hope others will approve of them. In con-
more leverage in negotiation. Other work finds trast, informational influence occurs when people
that status moderates the behavior of those in conform to the behavior of their peers because
power, such that powerful actors who lack status they believe this behavior provides useful and
(e.g. are not respected) are more likely to treat accurate information that will improve the qual-
interaction partners in demeaning ways (Fast ity if their decisions. Informational influence is at
et al. 2012). Powerful individuals can gain status work when people choose to eat at a busy restau-
through generosity or philanthropy, which may rant because they believe the busyness reflects its
offset the often negative perception of powerful quality, or when lost individuals follow a crowd
individuals as selfish or exploitative (Willer et al. because they believe the crowd must be headed
2012). to the same destination.
Sociologists have had a particular fascination
with social norms and normative influence since
15.5 Social Norms and Influence the early days of the field (Hechter and Opp
2001), and often rely on social norms to explain
When we are part of a group, we often take our particular phenomena (Horne 2001; Wrong
cues from the behavior or expectations of other 1961). There are a number of reasons for this
group members. Students hesitate to raise their interest in norms. Broadly, groups often use
hands in class if no one else does, and many peo- social norms to define their rules and boundaries
ple choose which movie to watch or which res- (Durkheim [1894] 1988; Erikson 1966; Mead
taurant to visit based on what their friends do. 1918). In small groups, social norms can sustain
Not surprisingly, sociologists and social psychol- and encourage group cohesion, and serve as the
ogists have devoted considerable attention to building blocks of more complex social struc-
understanding how social influence works. As tures and forms of social organization (Hechter
early as the 1930s, studies found that people tend 1988; Hechter and Opp 2001). Social norms are
to rely on the opinions of other group members transmitted across generations (Sherif 1936),
when making judgments about ambiguous stim- helping groups maintain an existence indepen-
uli, such as how much a point of light appears to dent of particular group members, because group
be moving in a dark room (Sherif 1937). Many traditions continue even as membership changes.
people are familiar with the famous Asch (1951) Norms also help explain how human groups
conformity studies, which found that participants worked together effectively before the advent of
were more likely to agree with a clearly incorrect legal systems to forestall exploitative or harmful
statement about the relative length of several behavior (Ellis 1971; de Quervain et al. 2004).
lines when other group members unanimously Even today, individuals often rely on social
supported this statement. norms to resolve disputes informally, without
More broadly, social psychologists have iden- turning to the law (e.g. Ellickson 1994).
tified two processes by which groups influence This interest in norms has led sociologists to
their members: normative and informational focus on different questions than psychological
15 Small Groups: Reflections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 303
studies of influence. While psychologists often how this happens is explaining why individuals
create a norm in the laboratory to understand the are willing to enforce group norms, given that
circumstances under which people conform, doing so is often costly. For example, criticizing
sociologists have more often been interested in a free-riding member of a work team might
the conditions under which norms will arise. This encourage them to change their behavior and
is a trend rather than an absolute distinction: soci- help the group, but it might also be uncomfort-
ologists have conducted intriguing studies on able, and provoke resentment or even retaliation.
how social influence contributes to unpredictabil- As a result, individuals sometimes hesitate to
ity in online markets (Salganik et al. 2006), or enforce group norms, even when doing so bene-
how the social status of majority and minority fits the individual and the group (Horne 2009;
group members shapes conformity when groups Oliver 1980).
fail to reach unanimity (Melamed and Savage To answer this question, small groups
2013). For this reason, our discussion of social researchers often use experiments in which they
norms and influence will tend towards emphasiz- create groups in the laboratory, and ask the
ing normative over informational influence. In groups to engage in a public goods or social
addition, because the voluminous work on the dilemma task (e.g. Kollock 1998; Komorita and
Asch study and related paradigms and debates Parks 1994). These group tasks give participants
mainly occur in psychology, and have been sub- a choice between acting in a self-interested way
ject to extensive reviews and meta-analyses (e.g. or in a way that helps that group. Individuals fare
Bond and Smith 1996; Bond 2005; Wood et al. better when they make the self-interested choice,
1994) we do not review them here. but if everyone behaves in a self-interested man-
ner, the group as a whole fares more poorly than
if individuals had opted to help the group. For
15.5.1 How Do Social Norms Arise? example, individuals on a project team might be
tempted to free-ride and let others complete the
While there is no universally agreed-upon defini- project for them, thus allowing the free-rider to
tion of social norms, many scholars conceptual- succeed with minimal effort. However, if every-
ize norms as rules for behavior, consensually one chooses to free-ride, the group fails and all
held by group members, and supported by members are worse off than if they had all opted
rewards or punishments (Horne 2001). Under to work hard. In these studies, researchers give
this definition, norms exist to the extent that indi- participants the option to enforce norms – often
viduals are willing to spend time and effort by allowing participants to spend some of the
enforcing them (Hechter 1988; Oliver 1980). A money that they are being paid to take part in the
team working to complete a group project may experiment to penalize free-riders or reward
hold the norm that group members should work those who do contribute to the group’s success.
hard to help the group succeed, rather than free- The overarching pattern is that people are
ride and create more work for their peers or willing to enforce norms of contribution to the
endanger the group’s success. Those that con- group, even when doing so is personally costly
form to this rule receive praise or other forms of (e.g. Fehr and Gachter 2002; Horne 2009; Ostrom
social approval from their peers, while those who et al. 1992; Yamagishi 1986). A number of fac-
deviate experience disapproval or criticism. tors moderate this tendency. Individuals are more
Scholars disagree about the extent to which such likely to enforce norms of group cooperation
norms are generally clear and observed by group when the costs of enforcing norms are lower
members, or instead continually shifting and (Horne and Cutlip 2002), when they don’t trust
renegotiated (Hechter and Opp 2001). other group members to cooperate (Yamagishi
Early discussions of social norms suggested 1986, 1988a), when the risks faced by the group
that they arise through social interaction (Homans are serious (Yamagishi 1988b), or when the
[1951] 1992). A key problem in understanding group is threatened by a competing outgroup
304 S. Benard and T.D. Mize
(Benard 2012; Sherif 1966). Individuals also Members of groups that rely on both punish-
appear to be more receptive to norm enforcement ments (Mulder et al. 2005) and rewards (Irwin
from a democratically elected versus a randomly et al. 2014) to maintain order tend to have lower
assigned leader (Grossman and Baldassari 2012). levels of trust in one another, compared to groups
This willingness to enforce norms despite the that do not rely on rewards and punishments.
cost seems in part driven by anger at non- Further, groups do not always restrict them-
contributors (Fehr and Gächter 2002); one study selves to punishing free-riders. Research has
using PET scans found that punishing non- documented “antisocial punishment”, in which
contributing group members appears to be group members punish those who contribute to
rewarding at the neural level (de Quervain et al. the group at a high rate (Herrman et al. 2008;
2004). Individuals may also enforce norms as a Homans [1951] 1992; Parks and Stone 2010).
way of signaling that they are committed to the This may occur because high contributors are
group, which in turn encourages valuable seen as atypical (Irwin and Horne 2013) or
exchanges with other group members (Homans because they are seen as “rate-busters” who make
[1951] 1992; Horne 2004). Those who enforce others look bad (Homans [1951] 1992).
group norms tend to be rewarded by other group In especially puzzling cases, groups maintain
members, and are rewarded more as the cost of norms that harm the group. Some college stu-
enforcing norms increases (Horne and Cutlip dents publicly endorse binge drinking, while pri-
2002) and as the direct and indirect benefits of vately holding reservations about it (Prentice and
exchanging with other group members increase Miller 1993), and some disadvantaged groups
(Horne 2004). Individuals who enforce group hold “leveling norms” that discourage their mem-
norms are also seen as more worthy of respect bers from attaining economic success beyond
and trust than those who do not, as long as they that of other group members (Portes 1998).
are perceived to enforce norms fairly (Barclay Historically, social norms have encouraged duel-
2006). ing and other dangerous activities (Axelrod
1986). One possible explanation for these “bad”
norms is that individuals may enforce them to
15.5.2 The “Dark Side” of Social signal their commitment to the group (Centola
Norms et al. 2005; Willer et al. 2009). Under this expla-
nation, those who publically conform to a norm
The tendency of groups to enforce norms by pun- that they privately oppose fear that their insincer-
ishing low-contributing group members or ity will be discovered. To compensate, they make
rewarding high-contributors can help groups to a special effort to criticize those who do not con-
achieve their goals, by reducing the level of free- form to the norm, under the logic that publicly
riding in the group (e.g. Gürerk et al. 2006). defending the norm will convince others of their
Indeed, because willingness to contribute to or sincerity. Willer et al. (2009) found that people
sacrifice for one’s group is often viewed as a who conformed to an incorrect majority group
behavioral indicator of group solidarity, norms opinion in a wine-tasting study – by agreeing that
can be an important mechanism for maintaining two wines differed greatly in quality when they
solidarity (Hechter 1988). However, the use of were actually poured from the same bottle – were
rewards and punishments to encourage solidarity publically critical of the wine-tasting ability of an
can have negative consequences as well. When individual who accurately described the wines as
groups depend on rewards and punishments to identical, while privately agreeing with that
maintain order, they may undermine the develop- individual. Because individuals in these cases
ment of trust because individuals do not know if misrepresent their true feelings, this can lead
their peers behave cooperatively because they are group members to mistakenly overestimate sup-
motivated to help the group, or because they fear port for norms that most group members disagree
being sanctioned by other group members. with.
15 Small Groups: Reflections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 305
an identity for an individual is further determined when men’s masculine identity is threatened,
by the number of social ties that stem from a role. they react with compensatory behavior that reas-
Individuals are more committed to role identities serts their masculinity – and thus restores their
that involve important connections and ties to original identity. Specifically, men whose mascu-
others, resulting in those particular identities linity was threatened compensated by espousing
becoming more salient (Stryker 1980, 2008). more homophobic views, showing higher sup-
Thus, to the extent that small groups provide port for war, and expressing greater belief in
individuals with roles, and connect them with male superiority (all of which were shown to be
others who know them in the context of that role, associated with masculinity by the study
they generate and maintain identities. population).
Why do role-identities matter? Thoits argues Research has both supported and challenged
that role-identities give individuals purpose and identity control theory’s proposition that individ-
meaning in life and behavioral guidance, which uals attempt to confirm their identities in interac-
leads to a stable sense of our selves and positive tion. However, although individuals strive to
mental and physical health outcomes (Thoits confirm their identities, it is not always possible
1983, 2011, 2012). Although early theorists sug- to do so. One experimental test showed male
gested that holding multiple roles may be stress- leaders faced such high expectations that they
ful or bad for health due to the conflicting were unable to meet them, and thus unable to
demands of balancing multiple responsibilities confirm their leadership identity (Burke et al.
(Merton 1957; Goode 1960), Thoits (1983, 1986, 2007). Another interesting test showed that indi-
2003) instead argues for and finds consistent evi- viduals strive to maintain their identity even
dence that holding multiple roles has positive when that identity is negative. That is, individu-
influences on mental and physical health. als will chose to maintain a negative identity over
Therefore, membership in more groups and thus a positive identity, if the positive identity is
more role-identities appears beneficial for incongruent with how they see themselves
health – largely due to the intrapersonal rewards (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1992).
that come from occupying social roles. More recent work has attempted to connect
Burke’s (1991) more micro-oriented identity identity theory with other theories, both within
control theory argues that individuals are moti- and outside of the identity tradition. Stryker and
vated to confirm their identity in interaction. If Burke (2000) work integrate identity and identity
their identity is not confirmed, they feel distress control theory, arguing that Stryker’s structural
and are motivated to act to restore their identity. identity theory explains how social roles and
Identities are not seen as fixed, but as a continu- positions in the social structure shape identities
ous process that is played out in interaction and the self. Once these identities are established,
(Burke and Stets 2009; Stets and Serpe 2013). Burke’s identity control theory explains how
For example, a group member may consider behavior in interactions confirms and stabilizes
themselves to be a high-status leader. If this iden- these identities over time.2 Stryker (2008) has
tity is challenged, perhaps by learning that other further argued that identity theory shares many
group members view them as occupying a low- underpinnings with theories of status in sociol-
status subordinate role, the individual should feel ogy, in particular status characteristics theory. In
distress, which will motivate them to restore their both theories, individuals determine what to
original identity as a high-status leader. It is expect from themselves and from others based on
through their behavior in interaction that indi- consensual expectations and meanings placed on
viduals can alleviate the distress they feel and re- characteristics and identities. For instance, a per-
establish their original identity. A recent son interacting with a doctor has a sense of how
experimental study found support for identity
control theory’s propositions in regards to gender 2
See Burke and Stets (2009) and Stets and Serpe (2013)
identity. Willer and colleagues (2013) show that for integrated versions of the two identity theories.
15 Small Groups: Reflections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 307
the interaction should play out based on expecta- tion and conflict (Coser 1956; Sherif 1966; Simmel
tions that derive from cultural meanings attached [1908] 1955; Sumner [1906] 1960; see Benard
to the role of doctor. This means that identities and Doan 2011; Stein 1976 for reviews). Early
may play an important role in structuring small work on identity and intergroup conflict led to the
group interaction, by moderating – or being mod- development of Muzafer Sherif’s realistic group
erated by – how individuals respond to status conflict theory (Sherif 1966; see Jackson [1993]
cues and other information about social position for a review). Sherif’s theory argues that when two
within groups. If one’s identity is strongly predi- groups share incompatible goals – for example
cated on the belief that men are more competent both seeking to possess the same resource – the
than women, how will such individuals respond groups tend to become more internally cohesive
to information indicating that women in their and externally competitive. Individuals develop
group are highly competent (Stryker 2008)? Such more positive attitudes, stereotypes, and emotions
individuals might be less receptive to this infor- towards their ingroup members, and more nega-
mation, or alternatively may revise their tive attitudes, stereotypes, and emotions towards
identities. outgroup members. Thus, while conflict may
begin from a rational basis, such as contesting
ownership of a resource, the ensuing stereotypes
15.6.2 Social Identity, Realistic Group and emotional attachments that develop around
Conflict, and Group Position group identities can lead the conflict to escalate
out of proportion to the original dispute. This
Identities not only stem from the roles we hold in argument finds support in Sherif’s field studies on
groups, but also from the social categories we conflict, conducted in summer camps in the late
belong to. Sociologists and psychologists have 1940s and early 1950s (Sherif 1966), as well as
distinguished between identities individuals hold later studies using different settings (Blake et al.
based on their social roles (as reviewed above), 1964; Struch and Schwartz 1989).
and from identities that derive from social cate- Blumer’s (1958) group position model views
gories: an individual’s race, ethnicity, nationality, intergroup conflict as rooted not simply in com-
religious affiliation, and others. The delineation peting goals, but in the response of a dominant
between the two types of identities is not always group to the perception that they are losing
clear, and some roles and groups likely provide a ground to a subordinate group. Proponents of the
sense of both types of identities (see Hogg et al. group position model argue that it is compatible
(1995) and Deaux and Burke (2010) for a discus- with, but more comprehensive than, realistic
sion of the similarities and differences between group conflict theory (Bobo 1999). Under the
the two types of identities). Below, we review group position model, intergroup prejudice arises
three additional perspectives on group member- when a dominant group, which feels superior to
ship and identity that describe the impacts that and entitled to greater rights and privileges than a
groups have on our beliefs and behavior beyond subordinate group, perceives the subordinate
the influence of role occupancy: realistic group group to be threatening its longstanding
conflict theory, the group position model, and advantage. This implies that individuals take
social identity theory. changes in their group’s position seriously, even
Group membership – regardless of its source – when their own individual position is unchanged.
promotes cognitive, emotional, and behavioral Blumer developed the theory to explain white
identification with the group, which are important attitudes in the midst of the civil rights movement
sources of positive outcomes such as group bond- in the United States, but later empirical work has
ing and attachment (Dimmock et al. 2005; Henry found support in the contemporary US (Bobo
et al. 1999). At the same time, ingroup identifica- 1999; Bobo and Hutchings 1996) and interna-
tion is closely bound up with intergroup competi- tionally (Minescue and Poppe 2011).
308 S. Benard and T.D. Mize
Tajfel and Turner’s (1979, 1986) social iden- t-shirt or a shirt signaling loyalty to a rival team.
tity theory challenged realistic group conflict In a subsequent study, they primed individuals to
theory by showing that groups often show in- think of themselves as soccer fans more broadly.
group favoritism and out-group hostility even in When the study participants’ “soccer fan” iden-
the absence of conflicting goals. Experiments in tity was salient, they were more likely to help
the “minimal group paradigm” tradition found those wearing a t-shirt supporting either their
that even small, inconsequential distinctions – favorite team or its rival; they were less likely to
such as a preference for the painter Klee versus help those in a plain t-shirt. Identity thus leads us
Kandinsky – cause individuals to favor those in to demonstrate ingroup favoritism, but the par-
their own group. Even “the mere perception of ticular identity that we favor may shift with the
belonging to two distinct groups…” triggers in- situation. This situational nature of social identi-
group favoritism and out-group discrimination ties is in contrast to Stryker’s (1980, 2008) iden-
(Tajfel and Turner 1986, p. 81). Empirical tests of tity theory, which describes role-identities as
this idea show that trivial and even explicitly ran- relatively stable across various situations.
dom distinctions suffice to form groups and influ-
ence differential attitudes toward in-group and
out-group members (Tajfel et al. 1971; Tajfel and 15.6.3 Optimal Distinctiveness
Turner 1979, 1986).
In-group favoritism is motivated by self- While social identity theory focuses on group
enhancement: we desire to view ourselves and identification as a source of self-esteem, Brewer
our groups positively (Tajfel et al. 1971; Tajfel (1991; see also Pickett and Brewer 2001) pro-
and Turner 1979, 1986; Hogg 2006). The close poses that individuals strive for “optimal distinc-
tie between ingroup and self-evaluation leads tiveness” when joining social groups. She argues
individuals to be more extreme in their evalua- that individuals have a human need to be similar
tions of ingroup members than outgroup mem- to and validated by others, but also a simultane-
bers: likable ingroup members are rated more ous need to be unique and individual. Groups
highly than likable outgroup members, but unlik- must facilitate affiliation and belonging within a
able ingroup members are rated lower than unlik- group, but must also maintain boundaries that
able outgroup members (Markovsky et al. 1988). differentiate them from other groups. For exam-
Similarly, people often judge ingroup deviants ple, youth cohorts often look and dress like each
more harshly than outgroup deviants (Marques other, which allows them to form a group iden-
et al. 1998), especially when ingroup members tity. However, youth fashions often look quite
deviate in ways that lead them to be more similar different from those of other age groups, which
to the outgroup (Abrams et al. 2000). allows them to distinguish themselves as unique
Most people belong to a large number of (Brewer 1991). The basic tenants of optimal dis-
groups, but a particular group affiliation may tinctiveness have been supported, with individu-
seem more relevant in a given situation and will al’s using both a need for assimilation and a need
correspondingly do more to determine our behav- for differentiation as motivations for their views
ior in that situation. For example, one’s American of their own groups and of out-groups (Pickett
identity might be most important at a fourth of and Brewer 2001).
July parade, while their soccer allegiance might The basic ideas underlying Brewer’s theory
matter most when attending a soccer match. In share many aspects with some early sociological
support of this, Levine et al. (2005) found that theory. Specifically, Simmel ([1908] 1971)
when British study participants were primed to argued that modern life led to increased individu-
think of their favorite soccer team, they were alization of individuals. As societies and groups
more likely to help the victim of a staged acci- expand and become more diverse, the individual
dent if the victim was wearing a t-shirt signaling members become more individuated and distin-
loyalty to their favorite team, compared to a plain guished. Simmel further argued that individuals
15 Small Groups: Reflections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 309
have a “dualistic drive” or “a need within us both interactions, either by modifying previously-
for individuation and for its opposite…” (Simmel known aspects of mainstream culture, or by
[1908] 1971, p. 259). That is, individuals strive to inventing new beliefs, behaviors, and customs.
be seen as unique and individual, but also simul- Children learn culture from adults, but also
taneously strive to belong. interpretively create their own peer cultures
(Corsaro and Eder 1990). In Sherif et al’s (1961)
Robber’s Cave study, groups of young boys cre-
15.7 Group Culture ated symbols such as group names, logos, and
flags that demarcated their group as unique. They
While culture is often thought of as a property of also collectively developed shared histories in
society at large, small groups also develop cul- the form of discussions about meaningful events
tures of their own. These “idiocultures” or in the group’s recent past. Fine (1979) reports
“microcultures” arise through social interaction, that little league teams generate nicknames,
as groups accumulate “…a system of knowledge, norms, and even taboos through interaction. Fine
beliefs, behaviors, and customs shared by mem- argues that the emergence and longevity of these
bers of an interacting group to which members new cultural practices depend on a number of
can refer and employ as the basis of further inter- factors, including how well they support the
action” (Fine 1979). These local cultures play a group’s status structure and functional needs,
key role in patterning social life. In this section, how well they relate to mainstream cultural refer-
we highlight three important aspects of culture in ence points familiar to the group, whether they
small groups (noted in Fine 2012, see that paper are consistent with existing group practices, and
for a more extensive review). First, small groups whether they are triggered by key events that
are a key location in which individuals learn, occur in the course of group life.
modify, create, and diffuse culture. Second, by In organizations, informal cultures often
defining local contexts and shared meanings for emerge that are “decoupled” from the official,
individuals, culture shapes group members’ formal practices of the organization (Meyer and
behavior, either through scripting appropriate Rowan 1977). This may occur when workers dis-
actions for group members in particular situa- cover that two formal rules conflict, and must
tions (Goffman 1959, 1983; Fine 2012) or pro- informally negotiate a solution. Similarly, when
viding a “toolkit” of strategies for approaching organizational rules are vague or abstract, indi-
particular situations (Swidler 1986). Third, cul- viduals and groups within the organization have
ture plays an important role in group members’ wide latitude to interpret them and develop their
efforts to demarcate and police the boundaries of own practices, leading to local cultures that differ
the group, define group identity, and build group widely. When “re-coupling” occurs – that is,
cohesion. when individuals come under pressure to make
their informal practices correspond to formal
requirements – intra-organizational conflict often
15.7.1 Learning and Creating Culture ensues (Hallett 2010). For example, Hallett
(2010) finds that when teachers who had previ-
Although culture exists at the level of society as ously been free to implement their own
a whole, people’s day-to-day experience with approaches to accomplish their educational mis-
culture occurs on a smaller scale (Fine 2012). sion were held to more rigid, uniform standards,
People absorb much of what they know about many became frustrated and distressed.
culture through interaction in small groups, often At times, groups create cultures that depart
beginning with families, and continuing with quite substantially from the mainstream cultures
peer groups, teams, coworkers, and others. In in which they are embedded. For example, peer
addition to learning culture in groups, individuals groups sometimes embrace “oppositional” cul-
also create novel bits of culture through their tures that reject mainstream emphasis on institu-
310 S. Benard and T.D. Mize
tions such as school, work, and family (e.g. and self-presentation and choose their subse-
Anderson 2000; MacLeod 1987; Shibutani quent course of action accordingly.
1978). Such cultures are often thought to arise Studies of interpersonal aggression provide an
when traditional routes to success are blocked, example of how group culture shapes individual
prompting individuals to find new ways to estab- action. While early research saw aggression as a
lish a sense of identity and self-respect (Bourgois product of social learning or frustration, much
1995; Portes 1998). Despite their oppositional work in recent decades has focused on aggression
stance, such groups have their own hierarchies of as a form of impression management (Felson
power and status, and their own norms for appro- 1978; Gould 2003). According to this work, indi-
priate behavior, which at times can be quite rigid viduals use aggression as a way of negotiating
(Becker 1963). their identities and social standing within a group.
The novel bits of culture created by small For example, if two individuals in conversation
groups can diffuse outwards to other groups, occa- come to a disagreement, their subsequent actions
sionally becoming part of mainstream culture. For may depend on whether they interpret this dis-
example, hip-hop culture began among a small agreement as a simple difference of opinions, or
group of adolescents in the Bronx in the 1970s, instead an attack on their intelligence or compe-
before becoming a tremendously influential global tence. In the latter case, individuals may feel
phenomenon (Chang 2005). While this process is pressure to re-assert themselves initially through
in part driven by mass media and other macro-level verbal means, but if they fail, to resort to violence
phenomena, interpersonal influence also plays a (Felson 1978).
role Strang and Soule 1998). This occurs when Many components of such interactions – inter-
individuals bow to conformity pressures or imitate pretating a remark as a grave insult, subsequently
prestigious individuals (Henrich 2001), when indi- needing to assert one’s social status, the accept-
viduals adopt cultural practices in use by those ability of violence as a means of doing so – vary
who are similar to themselves in other dimensions substantially by context. In some local cultures,
(Mark 2003), or are influenced by “opinion lead- escalating a verbal argument to violence is
ers” in their personal networks (Katz 1957). viewed as natural, in others, as absurd. For exam-
ple, Anderson’s (2000) ethnography of a
Philadelphia neighborhood distinguishes
15.7.2 Group Culture Shapes between “decent” and “street” subcultures. The
Individual Action “street” subculture places a premium on tough-
ness, and members of this subculture believe that
Small groups – especially ongoing groups with a failure to demonstrate toughness can lead them to
history and a sense of collective identity – play be labeled as a victim or an easy target. As a
an important role in shaping individuals’ behav- result, they are highly sensitive to perceived
ior, because they create “[a] local context, or set slights and insults that may undermine their
of shared understandings arising from continuing social standing. Similarly, work comparing the
interaction…” (Fine 2012: 160). As Goffman northern and southern United States finds that
(1959) notes, a set of shared understandings or a southerners are more likely to emphasize the
common “definition of the situation” is necessary importance of personal reputation and honor, and
for people to understand how to act in a given more likely to respond aggressively to perceived
setting. These shared understandings signal to affronts (Nisbett and Cohen 1996). One study, for
individuals what their role in a given situation is, example, found that southerners tended to be
and what the roles of others are. To illustrate, angered by an insult from a stranger, while north-
Goffman (1983) uses the example of a person erners tended to find it amusing (Cohen et al.
approached by a stranger. To determine if the 1996). Thus, local cultures can produce differing
stranger is friendly or dangerous, people rely on interpretations of the same event, and corre-
culturally relevant cues such as manner of dress spondingly lead to different behaviors.
15 Small Groups: Reflections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 311
Culture also shapes behavior within small around symbols of group membership serves to
groups by providing a “toolkit” of strategies that strengthen perceived group boundaries and group
individuals use in their daily life (Harrington and identities. For example, Tavory (2010) observes
Fine 2000; Swidler 1986). This toolkit consists of that for Orthodox Jewish men in Los Angeles,
various “symbols, stories, rituals, and world- their religious attire – especially yarmulkes –
views” that inform individuals’ daily habits and leads strangers to interact with them primarily on
interpersonal styles, and that they draw on for the basis of their Jewish identity. This ranged
solving everyday problems (Swidler 1986: 273). from requests for advice on how to prepare
For example, Lareau (2011) finds that middle- kosher foods to verbal abuse. In contrast, the
class children are raised with a stronger sense of Orthodox men were so used to wearing yarmul-
entitlement, and encouraged to use self-advocacy kes that they rarely thought about them, except in
as a strategy for interacting with authority figures these types of interactions. This led their
to a greater extent than working-class children. Orthodox Jewish identity to be more salient to
Similarly, Calarco (2014) finds that middle-class them than it might have been otherwise.
and working-class children tend to take different Even groups of children create social bound-
approaches when having difficulty with their aries, often along gender lines (Thorne 1993).
schoolwork, with middle class children more Gender can persist as a social boundary into
likely to ask a teacher for help, and working class adulthood, for example, when groups develop
children more likely to persist in working on the norms about which kinds of jobs are considered
problems alone. These results can have implica- appropriate for men and women (e.g. Pierce
tions for social stratification, as middle-class stu- 1995). Individuals also rely on a variety of other
dents subsequently receive more help and factors to define group boundaries, ranging from
attention from teachers. More generally, these ethnicity to patterns of cultural consumption
patterns illustrate how small groups serve as the (Lamont and Molnàr 2002). Becker’s classic
setting in which individuals experience and (1951) study of jazz musicians found that they
express larger social realities. In this case, while drew distinctions between groups (e.g. musicians
social class is a macro level-phenomenon with versus an audience of non-musician “squares”),
deep roots in institutions – such as the labor mar- and within the ingroup (financially successful but
ket, the education system, and the welfare state – artistically compromised “commercial” musi-
these roots are not salient to individuals in their cians versus true “jazz” musicians). Such distinc-
daily lives. Instead, they experience these macro- tions helped musicians maintain positive
level phenomena in their everyday interactions self-views in the face of their frustrating depen-
with parents, teachers, and friends. dence on “square” audience members for income.
Indeed, groups often support social boundaries
by developing negative stereotypes about
15.7.3 Culture and Group Boundaries outgroups and positive stereotypes about out-
groups, which can serve as a source of group
Individuals draw on culture to define and adjust cohesion (Blumer 1958; Sherif 1966), or by
group boundaries (Fine 2012; Lamont and employing relational means of social exclusion
Molnàr 2002). Such boundaries help to define such as gossip (Eder 1985).
what it means to be a group member, and to gen-
erate cohesion and solidarity within groups
(Durkheim [1894] 1988; Erikson 1966; Mead 15.8 Conclusion
1918; Sherif et al. 1961). Both ingroup and out-
group members rely on cultural signals of group Sociologists aim to understand social structure –
membership when deciding how to interact with the institutions, networks, hierarchies, roles, and
strangers. These interactions may be positive, other extra-individual factors that make up the
neutral, or negative, but the fact that they center complex web of society. Structure fascinates soci-
312 S. Benard and T.D. Mize
ologists in part because it shapes individual retical and empirical approaches. In general, this
behavior and choices. The same person born is beneficial for small groups researchers because
today versus a century ago, or in Spain versus it provides a wealth of perspectives and findings
Japan, would face a somewhat different set of to build on. At the same time, the sheer size and
constraints and options. Social structure also fas- diversity of the literature can make it challenging
cinates sociologists because, even while it con- to navigate and synthesize these findings. In our
strains people’s choices, people can modify, build, view, there is much to be gained from building
and disseminate new forms of social structure. bridges between these spokes, both within and
Much of sociology thus revolves around the puz- across disciplines and subfields. Moving for-
zle of how people simultaneously create and are ward, we suggest three broad ways in which
constrained by the social world in which they live. small groups researchers can connect the spokes
Small groups play an important role in solving to further develop the small groups literature and
this puzzle, existing in an intermediate “meso- contribute to sociology. These include (1) recon-
level” space between individuals and larger necting with other disciplines, especially psy-
social systems (Fine 2012: 160). Small groups’ chology, (2) bridging the small groups literature
shared history, identity, structure, and culture with other subfields within sociology, and (3)
make them more than simply the sum of their continuing to synthesize areas of research within
individual members (Simmel 1898). Small the small groups literature.
groups serve as a key setting through which peo- The first point – reconnecting with other dis-
ple feel the constraints of social structure – such ciplines – might on the face of it seem unneces-
as family obligations, team rules, coworker sary, since the study of small groups has
expectations – as well as a key setting for creat- traditionally been an interdisciplinary field on
ing social structure. As we have discussed, small the boundary of sociology and psychology. Over
groups provide an important setting in which sta- time, however, sociological and psychological
tus, power, identity, norms, and culture develop, social psychology have moved further apart, and
organize behavior, and are transmitted to other genuine engagement between the two fields is
groups. They thus provide a useful setting for less common (Thoits 1995; Oishi et al. 2009).
sociologists to observe how people create and This may stem, as noted, because psychologists
respond to small-scale social structures. are increasingly interested in cognitive mecha-
Despite the utility of small groups as a setting nisms while sociologists primarily focus on
for the study of social structure, most reviews of structural factors. But structural factors often
the literature note that interest in this area peaked moderate cognitive processes, and cognitive pro-
in the middle of the twentieth century and has cesses in turn often mediate the effects of struc-
since declined. This may reflect the fact that tural factors. To the extent that both fields work
sociologists have more options for studying separately, we are less likely to have a complete
social life: the quality and availability of picture of how small groups work, particularly if
nationally-representative survey data has there are cross-level interactions between the
improved, as has the availability of data and structural factors emphasized by sociologists and
tools for studying social networks or construct- the cognitive processes often examined by psy-
ing simulation models. It may also reflect the chologists. For example, Anderson and col-
“cognitive revolution” in psychology, which leagues (2012) fruitfully examined a range of
some psychologists argue has moved the field both micro-level (e.g. individual personality
too far from studying behavior, in favor of under- measures) and more meso-level factors (e.g.
standing cognitive mechanisms (Baumeister group expectations) to build a better understand-
et al. 2007: 398; Cialdini 2009). ing of why individuals sometimes prefer to
We have noted the “hub and spoke” nature of occupy low-status positions in groups.
of small groups research, in which the central A second area for future work is building
concept of small groups animates a range of theo- additional bridges between small groups and
15 Small Groups: Reflections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 313
other areas of research in sociology. For example, identity theory to other areas. For example,
Bobo and Hutchings (1996) bridged social psy- Yamagishi et al. (1999) argue that the ingroup
chology and work on race and ethnicity to pro- favoritism reported in studies of social identity is
ductively extend Blumer’s group position not driven by psychological identification with
model – formulated to understand the relation- the group, but instead by a rational expectation
ships between dominant and subordinate that group members will reciprocate the favorit-
groups – to the study of a complex multiracial ism in the future. This suggests that what appears
society. Useful bridging could also occur between to be a social identity process could be a form of
the areas of social networks and small groups – exchange, similar to those documented in work
both function as meso-level connections between on power. Yamagishi et al. (1999) provide some
individuals and larger social structures, but in dif- evidence in favor of this argument, but as far as
ferent ways. Networks can link far-flung individ- we are aware there has not been a great deal of
uals, but do not necessarily impart a sense of additional work addressing this question. Further
shared identity or community – indeed, one of research exploring the link between identity and
the fascinating aspects of social networks is that exchange could help elucidate this relationship.
we may be structurally connected to other indi- To offer a final example, perhaps some of the
viduals without being aware of it (Watts 1999). largest gains to be made are in linking work on
One example of bridging these areas is Lawler’s culture with the other areas. While work on
(2002) work on micro-social orders, which helps power, status, identity, and influence often uses
explain how a network of individuals may begin laboratory experiments and surveys, much work
to develop a sense of themselves as a group. Fine on culture employs ethnography and open-ended
(2012) also suggests examining connections interviews (although some work takes a quantita-
between networks of small groups, which may tive approach, e.g. Vaisey 2009; Fishman and
help explain how ideas and other aspects of cul- Lizardo 2013). The methods preferred in the two
ture diffuse across groups. areas yield different, but complementary types of
A third approach is to build bridges within knowledge. For example, experimental work
small groups research, further linking work on often examines short-lived groups that offer a
status, power, identity, influence, and culture. high degree of control and allow researchers to
There has been much promising work linking the make causal inferences – but provide little evi-
concepts of power and status (e.g. Fast et al. dence as to how groups change and develop over
2012; Thye 2000; Willer et al. 2012), status and time (McGrath et al. 2000). The qualitative
influence (Melamed and Savage 2013), identity approaches more common in studies of culture
and social identity (Hogg et al. 1995; Stets and are excellent for abductively generating hypoth-
Burke 2000), and status and identity (Burke et al. eses and theories (Timmermans and Tavory
2007). There are many ways to profitably con- 2012), and examining groups over longer periods
tinue in this vein. For example, as a theory of the of time. However, these methods don’t offer the
self, identity theory has been less focused on same degree of control or causal inference found
group interaction than work in other areas of in experimental work. That is, while these meth-
sociological social psychology. While all social ods both contain limitations, together they have
roles individuals occupy should provide them high potential to generate holistic inferences
with a sense of identity – including those stem- about the social processes present in small groups
ming from membership in groups – we know less when considered in tandem. We believe that
about how these identity processes interact with future work could benefit by considering creative
other intragroup processes such as status or new ideas that broker links between the two
power dynamics. Given that few studies drawing methods (e.g. Burt 2004; Jick 1979). Others have
on identity theory examine small groups, this emphasized the value of bridging social psychol-
could be a fruitful avenue for future research. As ogy and culture (see, e.g. the special issue of
a second example, more work could link social Social Psychology Quarterly and the introduc-
314 S. Benard and T.D. Mize
tory article by Collett and Lizardo 2014; Asch, S.E. (1951). Effects of group pressure upon the
modification and distortion of judgments. Groups,
Dimaggio 1997), but there remains much room
Leadership, and Men. pp. 222–236.
for further development. Axelrod, R. (1986). An evolutionary approach to norms.
For sociologists, small groups have moved American Political Science Review, 80(04),
from being a relatively central to a relatively 1095–1111.
Bales, R. F., Strodtbeck, F. L., Mills, T. M., &
peripheral part of the field. For most of us, how-
Roseborough, M. E. (1951). Channels of communica-
ever, small groups have always been an integral tion in small groups. American Sociological Review,
part of our daily lives. Small groups provide the 16(4), 461–468.
settings in which we learn about our social world, Barclay, P. (2006). Reputational benefits for altruistic
punishment. Evolution and Human Behavior, 27(5),
and where abstract concepts such as status,
325–344.
power, and identity become real for us. They are Barclay, P., & Benard, S. (2013). Who cries wolf, and
also the setting in which most people play a role when: Manipulation of perceived threats to preserve
in shaping their social world, whether inventing a rank in cooperative groups. PLoS ONE, 8(9), e73863.
Bargh, J. A., Raymond, P., Pryor, J. B., & Strack, F.
nickname for a friend, or launching a movement
(1995). Attractiveness of the underling: An automatic
with global implications. In the end, it is this cen- power→ sex association and its consequences for sex-
trality to our daily lives that keeps the study of ual harassment and aggression. Journal of Personality
small groups crucial for sociologists. and Social Psychology, 68(5), 768–781.
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., & Funder, D. C. (2007).
Psychology as the science of self-reports and finger
movements: Whatever happened to actual behavior?
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2(4),
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The Theories of Status
Characteristics and Expectation 16
States
16.1 Overview and Background 1. If members of a task group begin meeting with
some noticeable social status inequality differ-
Status Characteristics and Expectation States entiating them (for instance, on juries where
names a family of interrelated theories, along occupation and education differentiate mem-
with research settings devised to help develop the bers), that status inequality will create a rec-
theories and bodies of empirical tests and practi- ognized inequality among group members.
cal applications. While we mostly describe the 2. If members of a task group begin meeting as
theories and their structures, we will mention equals (for instance workers at the same level
empirical work and applications as they are sig- in a business organization or college students
nificant for theory development. working on a group project) the interaction
These theories all involve various sorts of process will create a recognized inequality
social inequality, from the smallest social set- among group members.
tings, face to face interaction, through institu-
tional settings including the family and business In the next two sections we will develop theo-
organizations, to entire social systems, nations retical explanations for those two findings.
and cultures. We begin with the theories’ analy- Following that, we describe further development
ses of how inequality develops and is maintained of the theories for other theoretical questions and
or changed in small, face to face task groups. some applications of the work. Issues of inequal-
Task groups are ubiquitous in all societies. They ity at the interpersonal level, such as in groups,
include committees and task forces in business, and at the level of society long have been central
sports teams, juries, military units, classroom to sociological theorizing. Although all of the
group activities, and many others. theories in this chapter cannot be said to have
Two of the best established findings in face-to- developed out of a particular older theory, some
face social interaction are: of the concerns of older theorists appear in topics
of the theories in this chapter.
Status—consisting of respect, prestige, and
social advantages and disadvantages—has been
studied and theorized from many different view-
points. Early in the twentieth century, status was
M. Webster Jr. (*/6:DONHU important in the writing of the American econo-
Department of Sociology, University of North mist Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929). In an essay
Carolina, Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, USA that also identifies “conspicuous consumption,”
e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]
Veblen (1899/1953) analyzed the importance of Robert Freed Bales (1916–2004), who worked
status value of objects. Status value impresses with Parsons (Parsons et al. 1953), studied small
others without conferring any utilitarian value. discussion groups in a laboratory and focused on
For instance, an expensive new car in the drive- how the nature of interaction develops during the
way can impress the neighbors but it offers very course of a meeting.1 To study interaction pat-
little practical value above what could be gotten terns, Bales developed a famous 12-category sys-
from a secondhand economy car. The German tem, Interaction Process Analysis, (Bales 1950,
philosopher and social theorist Georg Simmel 1999; Bales et al. 1951) for classifying every
(1858–1918) wrote that “The first condition of speech and other communicative action, such as
having to deal with somebody… is to know with gestures, in the group.2
whom one has to deal” ([1908] 1950: 307). A Bales group comprises approximately 2–20
Presumably, knowing the status position of a per- members, the upper limit determined by the num-
son is important social information for knowing ber of people that we can interact with as indi-
how to deal with him or her. More recently, viduals. (Beyond 20, the situation becomes a
Erving Goffman (1922–1982) wrote about self- speaker and an undifferentiated audience, and
presentation, efforts to control the impressions participation is mostly one-way rather than inter-
that one makes during interaction (1959, 1970). active.) Bales recruited individuals, often college
Goffman’s writing often focuses on techniques to students, to join a problem-solving group and at
convey a high-status image, presumably for the the end of discussion, the group must settle on a
interaction and other advantages that it can con- single “best answer” to the group problem. The
fer. Veblen and Goffman treat status as desirable problem-solving task must be reasonably inter-
and something that people seek. Simmel treated esting to facilitate participation, and its outcome
status as only one part of an overall identity, and has to be somewhat ambiguous so that people can
was silent about whether people expend energy express different views and offer different contri-
seeking status. As we will see later in this chap- butions. An arithmetic problem would not be
ter, the contemporary view is that, while status suitable since it has a clear-cut answer; a question
confers some advantages it also entails costs of how best to handle a case of juvenile misde-
including responsibility, and thus whether it is meanor would be perfect.
desirable rests on other concerns and conditions. It is worth pointing out that terms sometimes
Under all conditions, status differences are applied to theories—whether they refer to macro
related to social inequalities. phenomena, meso phenomena, or micro phenom-
Talcott Parsons (1902–1979), influenced by ena—do not really fit here. The theories in this
early theorists, primarily Emile Durkheim
(1858–1917), developed a conception of social 1
In Bales’ view, early interaction emphasized defining the
systems that dominated sociological thought for problem—remember, these are task groups—and collect-
at least a quarter century after the end of World LQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ /DWHU SKDVHV HYDOXDWHG DQG V\QWKHVL]HG
War II in 1945. In Parsons’ view, all social sys- information and reached conclusions, and towards the end
of the meeting, individuals turned to planning how to
tems, whether entire societies or small groups
implement the conclusions (Bales and Strodtbeck (1951).
such as a family, faced the same four problems, 2
Many people are unaware how many innovations from
called “functional prerequisites,” for effective Bales’ research have become accepted parts of our cul-
functioning and even for survival (Parsons 1937, ture. A one-way mirror is essential equipment for every
1951). To fulfill the functional prerequisites, cop show on TV; Bales was the first to equip a laboratory
with one-way mirrors so that observers were removed
groups organize and develop patterned interac-
from the interaction. Marketing research relies on focus
tion. Often the organization is what Durkheim groups to assess potential new products and even plotlines
(1893 [1933]) had called “organic solidarity,” a in movies; those are modifications of the research design
division of labor such that some subsets of a that Bales developed. Many leadership training courses
adapt the idea of phases in group problem-solving that
group emphasize solving one prerequisite and
were first studied by Bales and his students. And the dis-
other subsets emphasize other prerequisites. tinction of “pro-active” and “reactive” styles of speech
traces to Bales’ reports of group interactions.
16 The Theories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 323
chapter, and many other theories as well, span the parties are mainly process oriented. An outsider
range of sizes. As will be seen, expectation states cannot really judge whether a party or a therapy
and interaction involve individuals and face to group was successful because that depends on
face interaction. Status characteristics are fea- subjective experiences of those who were there.
tures of larger society, e.g., the social definitions Collective orientation means that the task is a
of the characteristics gender, race, occupation, group task. It is legitimate and necessary to take
education, and age. Theories in this section apply everyone’s ideas into account. A soccer team is
to the smallest units, individuals and dyads; they collectively oriented; most coaches like to say
also apply to groups and larger social structures; “There is no ‘I’ in ‘team’.” In contrast, a class-
and they explain how societal social beliefs and room of students taking a test are individually
definitions affect interaction and group structure, oriented if it is not legitimate to share ideas and
and how status beliefs themselves form and everyone can come up with different right or
become established. wrong solutions. A jury, which must reach a
We begin, in the next section, with develop- unanimous verdict, must be a collectively ori-
ment of a theory explaining how face to face ented group.
interaction can create expectation states, which /HW XV UHWXUQ WR RXU LOOXVWUDWLYH %DOHV JURXS
are roughly comparable to ideas of task skill. We composed of volunteer students who will discuss
show how expectation states affect individuals’ a group problem for 50 min or so, and at the end
awareness and behavior, change the nature of they will produce a single group answer. They
interaction, and create group structure. will then complete confidential post-session
Subsequent sections address larger social settings questionnaires asking who had the best ideas,
within which interacting groups exist. who seemed to understand the problem best, who
showed leadership, who exerted influence, and
other measures of inequality among the mem-
16.2 Performance Expectations bers.3 During interaction, observers behind a one-
and Behavior way mirror will code every speech act during
discussion. Here we focus on how often each per-
Theories include scope conditions, descriptions son speaks and how often each person is spoken
of the kinds of situations to which they apply, and to.
by exclusion, situations where the theories can-
not predict. The scope conditions for theories in
this chapter are more precise definitions of the 16.2.1 Interaction Regularities
kinds of groups we have been discussing as “task
groups.” Two scope conditions are crucial for all Four regularities in speaking are virtually certain
the theories in this chapter, task focus and collec- to appear in task focused collectively oriented
tive orientation. groups:
Task focus means that the primary reason for
meeting is to solve a problem or set of problems. 1. Inequality. The members will differ in how
Another feature of task focus is that the outcome much of the group’s time each of them con-
can be evaluated by extra-systemic standards. trols. Some people speak frequently, some
That simply means that someone doesn’t have to infrequently, and some participate hardly at
be a member of the group to judge whether it did all. Inequality is clear even in groups as small
a good job; the standards for evaluation are not as three or even two members.
different for different people or for different
groups. While many groups are task focused, oth-
ers are process focused; that is, the members’ 3
To avoid normative answers such as “Everyone showed
main concern is the interaction itself rather than
great leadership,” participants are asked to rank all mem-
producing a product or a right answer. Friendship bers of the group, including themselves, on most of the
groups, therapy groups, and social events such as questions.
324 M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker
2. Reciprocity. If you rank group members from influence, etc. If the observers also have rated
the highest interactor to the lowest, you also group members, observers’ ratings concur
will have ranked them in order of receipt of with those of group members. And the ques-
interaction. People who speak most are those tionnaire measures correlate highly with initi-
who are most often spoken to. ation rates. In other words, a person speaks
frequently because others have decided that
/HWXVSDXVHWRFRQVLGHUWKHVHWZRUHJXODULWLHV he has good ideas. This means that the behav-
The first shows the inequality that we said is ior and questionnaire measures reflect a single
characteristic of task focused collectively ori- power and prestige structure which we dis-
ented groups. Furthermore, as groups get larger, cuss in more detail below.
the amount of inequality increases. In a three- 4. Persistence. The inequality structure that can
person Bales group, the highest interactor con- be seen after the first few minutes is the
trols about 43 % of the group’s time; the second, inequality at the end of the meeting. If the
about 30 %; and the third, about 23 %. In a six- same group returns to discuss a different task
person group, the numbers are about 43 %, 19 %, (even if one or two members have been
14 %, 11 %, 8 % and 5 %. The trend is that as the replaced), the inequality that developed in the
group gets larger, the top interactor controls first meeting tends to persist through subse-
about 45–50 % of the group’s time, and the quent meetings. This suggests that a
remaining 50 % or 55 % is spread more and more semi-permanent mechanism has been created
thinly across everyone else. By the time we get to during interaction that tends to maintain the
a 12-person group such as a jury, there will be particular inequality structure that emerged.
some members who hardly contribute at all.
The second regularity shows that, in task
focused, collectively oriented groups, participa- 16.2.2 Abstract Conception
tion rates are socially controlled. People speak of Interaction
frequently because they are spoken to frequently,
and not otherwise. It is not true that someone runs Joseph Berger, a student of Bales, became inter-
on and on without social permission. Group ested in the inequality and the four regularities
members usually are very effective at controlling that we have just discussed. However, Berger was
each other through appearing interested or bored, concerned with understanding abstract general
asking questions or telling someone to let others patterns rather than particular features of each
speak. Why do they do that? The reason is task group. He sought general patterns, and more
focus; they have to solve the group’s problem, importantly, he sought an explanation for the pat-
and time is limited. Even in a jury, which has no terns. This led him to formulate the first theory of
official time limit, people still want to finish their performance expectations and behavior.
work and go home. Nobody wants to waste time All of the four regularities can be explained by
while someone goes talks on without helping to an underlying structure of performance expecta-
solve the problem; or worse, gives bad ideas that tion states that develop during interaction and
could mislead the group. And on the other side, if then creates and maintain the power and prestige
it looks as though someone can help solve the structure. This concept—expectation states—is
problem, that is a powerful reason to encourage key to all of the theory development and empiri-
that person to participate more. cal research described throughout this chapter,
and we describe it in some detail.
3. Consistency. On the confidential question- Expectations are anticipations of the quality
naires, group members show high agreement of future performances. They are specific to
with each other on the various rankings. There particular actors and particular tasks, as in “I
is consensus on who had good ideas, under- think she understands this task better than I do.”
stood the problem, showed leadership, exerted Thus expectations are not quite the same as
16 The Theories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 325
common usage such as “I think she’s really tion of task focused interaction. This is a simpli-
smart” because what matters here is: “Relative fied model of task interaction. Omitting
to the task at hand and relative to other people pleasantries, jokes, irrelevant talk and other kinds
in the group, I expect that she will perform bet- of social-emotional speech, task focused interac-
ter at this task than some specific other person tion can be seen as having the following four
(possibly myself).” components, in sequence:
Furthermore, although it is sometimes possi-
ble to bring expectations into conscious aware- 1. Action opportunities, or socially distributed
ness through careful interviewing and in other chances to perform. In a discussion, group,
ways, most of the time expectations operate someone might say “Do you have a sugges-
below the conscious level. People in a task group tion for how to do this task?”
do not often state, even to themselves, just where 2. Performance outputs, or attempts to move the
they feel everyone’s task ability stands. Instead, group towards problem solution. For instance,
they act as if they thought about relative expecta- “I suggest we begin by listing all possible
tions before acting. We measure expectations options.” A performance is likely, although
through some of their behavioral effects, such as not certain, to follow a given action
participation rates or influence. The theory pre- opportunity.
dicts behavior; it does not predict what people are 3. Unit evaluations of performance outputs. For
thinking when they act.4 instance “That’s a good (or a bad) idea.” A
Berger’s approach was to develop a theory unit evaluation follows every performance
explaining the development and maintenance of output, although it might be formed privately
inequality using the mechanism of expectation rather than expressed openly.
states. The interaction process creates expecta- 4. Influence when two or more performance out-
tions for each group member, and once those puts or expressed evaluations disagree. For
expectations exist, they affect all components of instance, “I guess you were right and I was
the power and prestige structure of the group. So wrong.”
group members participate at a high rate because
they hold relative high self-expectations. Other We can think of interaction as composed of
group members let those people participate at a series of these sequences. Why does everyone
high rate because they hold high expectations for make private unit evaluations of every perfor-
their performances. mance output, even if they are not going to voice
them? Because group members are highly task
focused; they need to know who is helping reach
16.2.3 Building a General Theory the group’s goal and who is not. Why must every
disagreement be resolved through accepting or
To construct a theory describing the processes of rejecting influence? Because the group members
expectation formation and maintenance, Berger are collectively oriented and they cannot just
(1958) first developed an abstract conceptualiza- “agree to disagree.” That would mean not reach-
ing a conclusion to the group task.
4
An expectation state is a theoretical construct; a term Unit evaluations are crucial to forming perfor-
used for things that are not directly observable, but that mance expectation states. An expectation state
produce effects that can be observed. Gravity is a familiar
theoretical construct. We cannot see gravity or touch it,
forms after a series of unit evaluations. If some-
but we can see its effects and predict the effects with great one thinks “She’s right” “good idea,” “she’s
accuracy. In everyday usage, a conscience is another theo- right,” “good idea,” etc., at some point that gener-
retical construct. We cannot observe a conscience directly, alizes into “I think she knows how to do this.”
but if we believe that someone has a well-developed con-
science, we can use that belief to make predictions of his
That shows formation of high expectations for
or her likely behavior. Andreas (2013) describes theoreti- that person. In the same way, people form self-
cal constructs more fully. expectations through unit evaluations, and a task
326 M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker
group fairly quickly becomes structured in terms 16.2.4 Explaining the Interaction
of the unequal distribution of expectations Regularities
attached to its members.
Once expectations form, they will affect all We now have a theoretical explanation for the
components of interaction and other elements of four regularities noted earlier.
power and prestige in the group. The higher the
expectations associated with a given individual, 1. Inequality. The fact that participation is
the more likely is he or she to receive action unequal is caused by the formation of perfor-
opportunities; the more likely is that individual to mance expectations that get associated with
accept an action opportunity and make a perfor- every group member.
mance output; also, the more likely is any perfor- 2. Reciprocity. The correlation of initiation and
mance output to receive a positive unit evaluation; receipt of interaction is produced by the fact
and if disagreement arises, the more likely is that that both elements are produced by the same
person to reject influence attempts. underlying structure of expectations.
Expectations, once they have formed, tend to 3. Consistency. Interaction, perceptions of abil-
persist. Why don’t they change? The main reason ity and leadership, and behavioral outcomes
is that expectations affect the very conditions that including influence and leadership choices all
created them; that is, the unit evaluations of per- are produced by the structure of expectations.
formances. A performance coming from a person 4. Persistence. The stability of inequality, once it
linked to high expectations “just sounds better” emerges, is produced by the stability of expec-
than a similar performance coming from a person tation states.
associated with low expectations.5 Unless they
are powerfully contradicted, once expectations
form, they tend to persist. Expectation states pro- 16.3 Status Characteristics
duce effects that could be considered self- and Expectations States
fulfilling prophecies.
Besides affecting the interaction sequence, To this point, we have described how task focused
differentiated expectations will account for ques- interaction will create expectations and a struc-
tionnaire measures of ability, leadership, etc., and tured group inequality in a group of people who
will also explain actual choices for leadership begin interaction as equals. The Harvard students
positions and other positions of honor. The the- who made up the groups that Bales studied were
ory describes the following sequence shown in about as homogeneous as you could find, reflect-
Fig. 16.1 for formation of expectation states ing the Harvard student body in the 1950s. All
through interaction in task groups. were white males who had done well in high
school, their family incomes were high, they
were all about the same ages, and they dressed
similarly. That initial homogeneity is what made
the inequality that formed in Bales groups so
striking to observers.
5
Most natural task groups are composed of
Most of us can remember a time in school when a child
who was generally considered to be smart—that is, a child members who are differentiated on many charac-
for whom other students and the teacher held high expec- teristics. Consider a jury. Its members differ on
tations—gave an answer that was less than stellar, but the gender, occupational prestige, income, educa-
teacher said “good.” The opposite happens with perfectly tional level, race, age, and many other social
good answers from a child thought to be dumb.
Expectations affect unit evaluations of performances, characteristics. How does interaction differ in a
which usually makes expectations stable. heterogeneous group?
16 The Theories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 327
Initially homogeneous and initially heteroge- to the task group so that group structure is con-
neous task groups are alike in one way: they both sistent with social inequalities. This is the pro-
display inequalities of power and prestige. cess of status generalization illustrated in
However the inequality develops differently in Fig. 16.2. This process adds an additional way
the two kinds of groups. Rather than developing that expectation states can form to the process
over a few minutes as in Bales groups, heteroge- shown in Fig. 16.1 earlier. We turn to construct-
neous groups usually are differentiated from the ing a more rigorous theoretical explanation of
outset of interaction. Another difference is that the process.
homogeneous Bales groups often pass through an
initial period of contentiousness as several mem-
bers vie to dominate the discussion. 16.3.1 Defined Terms
Heterogeneous groups, in contrast, very seldom
go through a struggle for control; the power and To begin, we use precise definitions of the types
prestige structure is evident from the very begin- of characteristics that will function in status gen-
ning of the interaction. eralization. There are two types, specific status
Those similarities and differences would all characteristics and diffuse status characteristics,
be explainable if people in differentiated groups denoted respectively by C and D.
formed expectations for everyone at the very A characteristic C is a specific status charac-
outset, before any interaction takes place. In teristic ≡
fact, that is what happens. People use socially
evaluated characteristics to infer performance 1. C has two or more states that are differentially
expectations. Then expectations determine evaluated in the culture; and
interaction patterns and the group’s power and 2. Each state of C (C+ and C−), is associated
prestige structure, as we have already seen. The with the similarly valued state of specific
inequality in the outside society is “imported” expectations.
A specific status characteristic has limited be a status characteristic. That depends on social
scope. It conveys advantages and disadvantages definitions, how the culture defines characteris-
in certain situations and only in those situations. tics. What the theory says is that if something is a
Being a champion or an incompetent weight specific or diffuse status characteristic in a par-
lifter, winning a spelling bee or being unable to ticular culture, then certain power and prestige
spell most three-syllable words, and being an ace consequences follow. Societies differ in just
or a beginner at Sudoku are specific status char- which characteristics they ascribe status beliefs
acteristics. It is preferable to have one state than to, and characteristics can acquire or lose status
the other; that is, the states have esteem associ- value as times change. Some of the further devel-
ated with them; this fulfills part (1) of the defini- opments that we review below describe processes
tion. And (2) people expect that someone by which an initially unevaluated characteristic
possessing the high state of the characteristic can can gain status value, how status beliefs diffuse in
do something better than someone else who has a society, and how a characteristic can lose status
the low state. But not everything. We do not ordi- value.
narily expect a champion weight lifter to excel at Now we can develop a theoretical explanation
Sudoku, or vice-versa. that covers what happens in heterogeneous
A characteristic D is a diffuse status charac- groups where one or more status characteristics
teristic ≡ are salient. The theory uses the same scope con-
ditions as did the theory of expectations and
1. D has two or more states that are differentially behavior: task focus and collectively orientation.
evaluated in the culture; and It adds the definitions of specific and diffuse sta-
2. Each state of D (D+ and D−), is associated tus characteristics. The full theoretical explana-
with the similarly valued state of specific tion uses five general propositions, shown in
expectations; and Table 16.1.
3. Each state of D is associated with the simi-
larly valued state of general expectations of
unknown or unspecified limits. 16.3.2 Theoretical Propositions
Diffuse status characteristics are much broader Assuming a task group of people who are differ-
than specific characteristics because of part (3) of entiated by one or more diffuse or specific status
their definition. They can create expectations for characteristics, group inequality is created by the
virtually any task, with one limitation that we following process.
will note below. If, for instance, we live in a soci-
ety in which people believe that (1) it is advanta- 1. Salience. All differentiating status informa-
geous, preferable, better to be male than female; tion, and any status information that is already
(2) that males are better at doing math problems linked to the task by cultural beliefs, becomes
than are females; and (3) that males are stronger, salient.
more rational, more logical, better at gambling, 2. Burden of Proof. Unless interactants believe
more mechanical, better programmers, etc., than for certain that a salient status characteristic is
women, then gender is a diffuse status character- irrelevant to the task, they will treat it as rele-
istic in our society. It is the “etc.” in part (3) of the vant and will form task-specific expectations
definition that makes gender a diffuse status char- consistent with the states of the characteristic.
acteristic. Race, age, educational level, and other 3. Sequencing. If interactants enter or leave the
characteristics also meet the definition in our group, or if the task changes, expectations
society. already created by processes in (1) and (2)
Notice that this theory does not predict that will transfer, with attenuation, to the new task
gender, race, age, or any other characteristic will situation.
16 The Theories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 329
Table 16.1 Status characteristics and expectation states 5. Power and Prestige. Once aggregate expecta-
Assumption 1 (Salience). Any specific or diffuse tions form for all interactants, every person’s
status characteristic that differentiates actors, and any relative position in the group power and pres-
characteristic already believed to be relevant to the
tige structure is a direct function of their
group task will become salient; that is, it will become
a significant social fact that affects interaction expectation advantages and disadvantages.
Assumption 2 (Burden of Proof). Unless an interactant
believes that a particular status element is irrelevant to This completes the development of the core
the task, he or she will treat it as relevant for theory.
performance expectations for every actor. All salient
characteristics will affect performance expectations, as
follows
Diffuse characteristics will become linked to states 16.4 Some Instances of Status
of Γ (general performance expectations) having the Generalization
same + or − sign as the characteristic. States of Γ
will link to similarly signed states of C*, the
specific ability to complete the task. States of C*
16.4.1 Juries and Sports Teams
will link to similarly signed states of T, task success
(T+) and task failure (T−) Before considering further theoretical develop-
Specific characteristics will become linked to states ments, we pause to study some cases that illus-
of τ (specific performance expectations) having the trate the basic process of status generalization.
same + or − sign as the characteristic. States of τ
will link to similarly signed states of Υ (general task
All of these illustrate how the status inequalities
ability). States of Υ will link to similarly signed in a society get “imported” to small task groups,
states of T, task success (T+) or task failure (T−) where they organize the group’s power and pres-
Assumption 3 (Sequencing). The status generalization tige structure and interaction patterns among
process will continue as described in Assumptions 1 group members.
and 2 until all interactants are linked to states of T by
all possible paths. If a new actor enters the situation, In our society (and in many others), all of the
the salience and burden of proof processes will following carry status information: gender, race
connect that actor to paths of T in the same manner. If and ethnicity, age, educational level, and
an actor leaves the situation after paths have formed, occupation. The basic process of status general-
existing connections will remain
ization, illustrated in Fig. 16.2 above, is that sta-
Assumption 4 (Combining Status Information). All
salient status information functions to connect all tus information becomes salient when interactants
actors to states of C*, the specific task ability. notice that they possess different states of a status
Aggregate expectations form according to these characteristic. Remember also that status gener-
functions: alization occurs when certain scope conditions
ë ( )
ep+ = é1 – (1 – f ( i ) )¼(1 – f ( n ) ) ù ;
û
obtain; both task focus and collective orientation
are crucial before status generalization is likely
ë ( û)
ep- = - é1 – (1 – f ( i ) )¼(1 – f ( n ) ) ù ; to take place.
and ep = ep+ + ep- . A very common instance of status generaliza-
ep is aggregate expectations for actor p, f(i) is a
tion can be seen in mixed-gender groups. In our
function of the length of path i connecting an society, males have status advantages. The status
interactant to outcome states of the task T through inequality produces differential performance
intervening status elements expectations; group members form higher expec-
The expectation advantage of actor p, which may be tations for males than for females, whether or not
positive or negative, is:
the group task is related to gender. The differenti-
ep–eo.
ated performance expectations affect all elements
of power and prestige in the group. Men get to
4. Combining. All salient status information participate more and are more influential; they
functions in the status generalization process; are thought to be “doing better” at the group task
none is ignored. and to be more valuable group members, and are
330 M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker
more likely to be chosen for leadership tions from status generalization, and then select
positions.6 as leader the person with a status and expectation
As we noted, a jury is a 12-person or a advantage. The foreperson not only speaks more
6-person task focused, collectively oriented dis- than others, but he or she also is more influential
cussion group quite similar to the Bales groups over the verdict.
described above. While it is usually impossible to What about the effect of experience?
study actual jury deliberations (juries work in Experience is a specific status characteristic indi-
seclusion), we can see some status effects from cating some skill at working on a jury. Status
public data and other effects from conducting generalization works with both diffuse and spe-
simulated juries and observing them. cific status characteristics, in both instances
Feller (2010) reported that a foreperson is affecting performance expectations.
most often: A striking fact about foreperson selection is
that it takes place before any actual deliberation.
Male. Only about 20 % of women are chosen In other words, jurors are asked to select a leader
as foreperson (despite the gender neutral term before they have any evidence about skill, knowl-
that replaced “foreman” some years ago). edge, interest, or anything else. They have very
Old. Only about half of jurors age 18–35 little basis for choosing their leader other than
become foreperson; a person between 45 and that provided by status generalization.
65 is about twice as likely to become foreper- A sports team is very different from a jury in
son compared to the number of jurors in that terms of concrete details such as what they do
age group. and what their goal is; interaction is physical
Educated. Two-year and 4-year college gradu- rather than verbal, and the main goal is to win
ates are over-represented as foreperson; peo- games. A team definitely is a task focused col-
ple whose education ended before college are lectively oriented group, and thus see status
under-represented. effects appear in interaction processes.
Experienced. Someone who has previously Some years ago, two scholars in Israel
served as a foreperson is more likely to be (Yuchtman-Yaar and Semyonov 1976) studied
selected again than someone without jury effects of status generalization from ethnicity—
experience. Sephardic or Ashkenazi ancestry—among Israeli
soccer teams. This case is interesting because the
Once deliberation begins, the foreperson usually ethnicity characteristic studied here is one that
is the highest interactor, controlling about most Americans wouldn’t recognize, although it
25–31 % of the time in the group. (If participation is important and easily recognized in Israel. This
were equally distributed in a 12-person jury, each illustrates the point above that what constitutes a
member would speak about 8 % of the time.) status characteristic is determined by the society,
All of those findings are accounted for when what that society invests with advantages and
we note that gender, age, and education are dif- disadvantages.
fuse status characteristics in our society. The The finding is that, as players progress through
theoretical process is that jurors form expecta- the ranks, the proportions of players from the two
ethnicities changes dramatically. Table 16.2
shows the proportions.
6
Remember that this theory does not justify gender The challenge is to account for the changing
inequality or any other sort of inequality. The theory
proportions of Sephardic and Ashkenazi players.
describes how things work, not how they ought to work,
what we might wish, or even what is natural. To the con- At the outset, in high school, 46 % of players are
trary, if you want to promote gender equality in task Sephardic; at the highest level National Team,
groups, the first step is to understand what’s producing the fewer than 10 % are Sephardic. This cannot be
inequality—performance expectations formed from status
accounted for by players’ wishes, for twice as
generalization—and then use that analysis to design inter-
ventions. We will mention some effective interventions many Sephardic players said they had “a strong
later in this chapter. desire” to become professional.
16 The Theories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 331
Table 16.2 Proportions of Sephardic and Ashkenazi soc- common arguments. A coach is fundamentally
cer players, and desire to become professional
concerned with winning games. Whether he likes
Group % Sephardic % Ashkenazi a particular player or wants to favor an ethnicity
All high school boys 46 54 is virtually out of the picture. A coach will choose
Junior league players 69 31 and promote any player who seems to perform
Senior league players 59 41 highly. But the status generalization process is
Among senior league 68 32
quite subtle and mostly unconscious; it makes the
players, having “a
strong desire” to Ashkenazi players just seem to be performing a
become a professional little better, on average.
Promotion to second 71 32
league (professional)
player
16.4.2 Using the Theory
Promotion to first 19 31
league (professional)
player Could someone use the theoretical understanding
Promotion to national 9.4 37.2 of status processes to make himself or herself
team (professional) leader of a task group? The answer is yes, but a
player more interesting question is: Do people want to
From Yuchtman-Yaar and Semyonov (1979) occupy high status positions? Certainly there are
pleasant aspects. One is listened to and influential
To understand how status generalization can and enjoys enhanced evaluations from others.
produce that effect, think about how players What is sometimes overlooked, however, is that
progress through the ranks. Being picked for a group leaders bear more responsibility for group
promotion in level depends on coaches’ unit eval- actions than do ordinary members. Not everyone
uations of performances. Coaches see players would want to be foreperson of a jury in a murder
making a very large number of performance out- case. That might entail dooming a defendant—or
puts, attempts to help their teams attain success: it might entail blocking justice for a victim. Being
kicking, passing, blocking, and all the other kinds team leader in a business organization certainly
of action. Coaches evaluate those performances, carries some perks, but if the team does not suc-
and those evaluations generalize into perfor- ceed, the leader is going to get much of the blame.
mance expectations that coaches attach to play- Power and prestige usually bring responsibility,
ers. When it comes time to recommend a player and each person has to decide whether to strive to
for promotion to the next rank, those expecta- be leader.
tions are very influential; coaches recommend
promotion for players for whom they have come
to hold high performance expectations. 16.4.3 Status or Dominance?
Status generalization will affect unit evalua-
tions of performances, which will (probably very It is important to understand that processes of sta-
slightly) bias evaluations upwards for Ashkenazi tus generalization are consensual. In a jury, men
players and downwards for Sephardic. The bias are elected foreperson by both women and men;
can be small because there will be so many per- it is not as though the men seize control or sup-
formances and evaluations. The cumulative effect press the women. Status generalization processes
makes Ashkenazi players seem a little better than affect everyone, both those who are advantaged
they would by a purely objective measure, and by it and those who are disadvantaged. Power
Sephardic players seem a little worse. and prestige inequality, when it is produced by
Notice that we are NOT saying that the status generalization, is usually peacefully
coaches favor Ashkenazi players because of arrived at. The ordering seems right to the
“prejudice” or liking them better, or any of the interactants.
332 M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker
Dominance processes are quite different. They settings dominance sometimes works. The
create inequality through intimidation, threats, answer seems to be that we are dealing here with
and bullying, and they are conflictual rather than highly task focused groups and dominance usu-
consensual. Someone can seize control to his or ally threatens successful task completion. The
her advantage, but others will probably resent members really want to do a good job of what-
that and when an opportunity presents itself, they ever their task is, so they want influence and
will retaliate. Many years ago, Max Weber group structure to help further that goal. If people
(Chap. 3) distinguished power from authority. are not task focused, dominance attempts might
Authority marks legitimate inequality, whereas well be successful, and if the threat is sufficiently
inequality based on raw power is not seen as large, bystander intervention also may be
legitimate. If a structure of inequality is not legit- inhibited.
imate, it will be unstable.
$QH[SHULPHQWDOVWXG\E\&HFLOLD/5LGJHZD\
(1987) composed three-person groups of women 16.4.4 Complexity and Simplification
in which one person was instructed to display
either status cues (evidence of task skill) or domi- The theory of status characteristics and expecta-
nance cues (giving commands, interrupting, tion states in Table 16.1, like all sound theories, is
pointing, or shouting). There were four condi- stated precisely. Consider Assumption 4, which
tions, defined by how the pre-instructed person contains functions describing how multiple items
acted: high task, low task, high dominance, low of status function to affect expectations. This
dominance. Results showed that high task behav- assumption is needed to describe expectations
ior made the focal person quite influential in the attached to someone when multiple status char-
group, and low task behavior reduced her influ- acteristics are salient—including gender, age,
ence. She also was seen as more competent on educational level, race, and others that may func-
post-session questionnaires. However when she tion in a particular case.
displayed high dominance behaviors, she was no Assumption 4 claims that status information
more influential and seen as no more competent will be separated into positive and negative sets.
than when she displayed low dominance. She The first contains all items of status that advan-
was, however, more disliked. tage a person, and the second contains all items
A second experiment (Ridgeway and Diekema that disadvantage the person. Within sets, items
1989) studied effects of dominance behaviors in are combined with declining importance. For
four-person groups of either men or women. instance, the first positive item gives a large boost
Here, two members of each group were pre- to expectations for that person. A second positive
instructed how to act. One displayed either domi- item will increase expectations, but not so much
nance attempts (threatening behavior) or neutral as the first status item. And so on. The same pro-
behavior towards the second, who did not react to cess applies to items of negative status informa-
either kind of behavior. Again, dominance tion. Finally, the positive and negative sets are
attempts were unsuccessful at increasing the per- added together to yield aggregate or overall
son’s influence or perceived competence, and in expectations for a person.
these groups, the two bystander members usually If status items were combined consciously,
intervened to support the person who was the tar- nobody would be able to perform the operations
get of the dominance attempts. All-female and in those functions in his or her head. What the
all-male groups displayed the same effects, theory claims is that they act as if they did that. In
though the level of retaliatory behaviors was other words, the theorist’s job is to predict how
higher in the male groups. people will act. We do not believe that people
We might ask why the dominance attempts perform advanced numerical calculations before
were so unsuccessful at achieving a high position acting, only that we can predict behavior accu-
in the groups’ inequality structures, since in other rately using those functions. The theory presumes
16 The Theories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 333
more complicated calculations than are apparent tioned—as so important that they make any other
to people whose behavior we want to predict. status information irrelevant. Or perhaps people
In another way, the theory simplifies reality in simply add up all the positive and negative sta-
describing status positions. It treats status charac- tuses rather than combine them according to the
teristics as dichotomous, either positive or nega- functions in Assumption 4.
tive, without degrees. This means, for instance, Berger et al. (1992) conducted an elaborate
that if a college student interacts with a high experimental test of alternate models of status
school student or with a middle school student, processing. Results of all those experimental
the college student will treat either of them as tests were much closer to predictions from the
giving him or her the same status advantage on theory as stated than they were to any of the alter-
education. The theory does not distinguish grades nate models. The evidence shows that under the
of status characteristics. It predicts that a college conditions of task focus and collective orienta-
student treats a high school student or a middle tion, this theory describes behavior very well and
school student equivalently when it comes to better than alternatives that have been
power and prestige. considered.
Of course we know that is a simplification and
reality is more comple16. But the question is not
whether people could make fine status distinc- 16.5 Two Prominent Status
tions; of course they could. The question is Characteristics
whether they do make fine distinctions when
interacting in task focused groups. The evidence 16.5.1 Beauty
shows that they do not. Balkwell (2001) analyzed
a large amount of data relevant to the issue of Folklore and reality television tell us it is fortu-
graded characteristics. He found that the basic nate to be beautiful and unfortunate to be ugly.
theory of status characteristics better predicted Almost a century ago, Perrin (1921) showed that
behavior than any alternate theory using graded attractiveness was important for popularity
characteristics. He noted that in task groups, peo- among college students, and numerous studies
ple’s primary interest is in solving the group’s since then have documented many positive con-
problem, not in assessing fine distinctions of sta- sequences of physical attractiveness. Many,
tus. “It may be comforting to believe that people though not all, of those studies involve perfor-
process finely graded social information so as to mance skills. Essays said to have been written by
use its full richness, but this assumption consis- attractive students received better grades than did
tently has been shown wanting (2001: 112).” the same essays when the purported authors were
Furthermore, the theory treats all status char- XQDWWUDFWLYH/DQG\DQG6LJDOO1974), and many
acteristics as equal in effect on expectations; no subsequent studies have found that attractive stu-
status is more important than another, all carry dents of all ages are judged more favorably by
equal weight. This means that age, gender, race, teachers (e.g., Ritts et al. 1992). Attractive defen-
and all other characteristics contribute equally to dants in swindling cases are seen as more danger-
performance expectations; no salient characteris- ous and given longer sentences (Sigall and
tic is ignored, and no characteristic is so impor- Ostrove 1975). So whether the task is admirable
tant that it overwhelms everything else. This (doing well in school) or despicable (swindling),
theoretical view is much simpler than some alter- attractive people are thought to be better at it.
nate views of how people use status information. Frevert and Walker (2014) reviewed a large num-
For instance, some might think that people attend ber of studies that show advantages include: hir-
mostly to status characteristics on which they ing and promotions in organizations, wages,
have an advantage and ignore or downplay those success in civil lawsuits, and marketing. Those
on which they do not. Or perhaps people treat findings are all explained by the theory of status
certain statuses—gender and race are often men- characteristics and expectation states if beauty
334 M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker
fits the definition of a status characteristic, At the same time, Correll et al. (2007) found
given above. what might be called a “fatherhood premium,”
Webster and Driskell (1983) showed respon- though that effect is less pronounced. In the
dents photos of college students previously rated experiments, men who were described as fathers
as highly attractive or highly unattractive by were seen as more competent and committed,
other students. To measure general expectations, and were recommended for higher starting sala-
they asked respondents to estimate, among other ries. Audit studies here did not show a difference
things, reading ability, grade point average, and in callbacks, perhaps due to a weaker effect or to
ability at “things that you think count in this having fairly small sample sizes. Killewald
world.” To measure specific expectations, respon- (2013) analyzed other data to show that father-
dents estimated success of the targets at the FAA hood seems to be an advantage when the man is
exam for private pilots. Results showed, as pre- in a “standard situation;” that is, married, the bio-
dicted, that respondents estimated higher specific logical parent, and living with the children.
and general expectations for the attractive people Without that situation, Killewald found no father-
pictured. An additional finding is that gender of hood premium. Overall, motherhood carries sta-
raters did not affect their judgments. In other tus disadvantages, while fatherhood does not.
words, they were responding to status rather than
to sexual or romantic attraction.
16.6 Status Interventions
given child will offer a performance output, and uted action opportunities—telling each person
that any future performance will receive a positive when to participate—and raised the number of
evaluation in class and on a grade sheet. action opportunities given the African American
Entwisle and Webster (1978) conducted sev- women. This change in participation rates, sim-
eral experimental studies in classrooms in which ply inviting them to speak more often, equalized
they showed that giving children positive evalua- their influence over group decisions. This inter-
tions would indeed raise their self-expectations, vention is potentially quite useful, for it can occur
and those raised expectations led to a change in unobtrusively and is at least partly under control
behavior known to affect learning, participation of the interactants.
rates.
Entwisle et al. (1997) studied effects of par-
ents’ expectations for their children. On the first 16.6.3 Task Definition
day of first grade, the researchers asked parents to
tell their most realistic expectations for their chil- Status generalization works most powerfully in
dren’s school performance. Parents’ expectations simple situations. Any sort of complexity is likely
were positively associated with desirable out- to increase variability and add additional sources
comes later—teachers’ marks and standardized of information to expectation formation. Another
test scores—and were negatively associated with LQWHUYHQWLRQ GHYHORSHG E\ &RKHQ DQG /RWDQ
negative outcomes—bad conduct reports, being (1997) and used with groups of children of differ-
held back a year. Most impressively, those effects ent ethnicities, stressed task definition. These
persisted through fifth grade. While parents’ studies counteracted a common misconception
reported expectations probably are connected to among children (and some adults) that school
many different ways that parents interact with ability is unitary; either one is good at school or
their children, this research shows the importance one is not. But a more accurate representation is
of expectations in school settings. that school and most tasks in life require multiple
abilities and that most of the time someone who
is good at one part of the task is less skillful at
16.6.2 Using Assumptions 3 and 4 other parts of the task. This is what Cohen and
/RWDQ VKRZHG WKH VWXGHQWV 7KH\ GHVFULEHG D
(OL]DEHWK * &RKHQ DQG 5DFKHO /RWDQ 1997) group task that required multiple abilities—
modified expectation effects by assigning roles. defining the task, making suggestions, organizing
They selected children with a visible ethnic status ideas, synthesizing ideas to a useful action,
disadvantage (Hispanic children in majority- implementation, evaluation, etc. They told chil-
Anglo classes), showed them how to make dren that success required many different abili-
objects (e.g., a simple radio receiver) and then ties, and that it is reasonable to expect that some
gave them the role of “teacher” to show other people will be good at one part, and others, at
children, “learners,” how to do it. This approach other parts. In technical terms, they defined the
overcomes the ethnic status disadvantage and task as complex, not unitary. Thus expectations
equalizes interaction by adding status advantages for each part of the task are likely to be
based on knowledge and role. different.
/LVD:DONHUHWDO2014) conducted laboratory $PRQJ WKH TXHVWLRQV IRU &RKHQ DQG /RWDQ
studies of groups of three adult women, one was whether task complexity would lead students
African American and two white. In the control to conclude that, on average, each person is likely
condition, without any experimental treatment, to contribute about the same to group success.
white women participated more in discussion and They did. The task complexity instruction equal-
exerted greater influence over the group decision. ized interaction and influence among the children
In an experimental condition, a computer distrib- in mixed-ethnic groups.
336 M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker
Carla Goar and Jane Sell (2005) adapted the 16.7.1 Creating Status
task complexity intervention for use among Characteristics
adults. They composed three-person groups of
college women, one African American and two If certain diffuse status characteristics, including
white, and asked them to develop a group deci- gender and race, simply named groups without
sion. (This is the situation that Walker et al. implying evaluative beliefs and ideas of abilities,
(2014) later adapted for the interaction study many societal problems would disappear. Recall
described above.) In the control condition, status that whether a characteristic is a status character-
generalization created expectation advantages istic depends on cultural beliefs and there is no
from race and the white women participated inherent reason why any particular characteristic
more and exerted greater influence. In the experi- must carry those beliefs. But once the beliefs
mental condition, Goar and Sell’s instructions spread in a society, they can have profound con-
emphasized the complexity of the group task, as sequences for interaction, social structure, and
&RKHQ DQG /RWDQ KDG GRQH 5HVXOWV ZHUH YHU\ people’s lives. Where did those beliefs come
similar. Goar and Sell succeeded in equalizing from? Two recent theoretical extensions explain
interaction and influence using this simple ways in which an unevaluated nominal character-
intervention. istic can acquire status beliefs making it into a
In summary, the theory gives many ways to diffuse status characteristic.
intervene in situations where it is desirable to
affect status generalization processes. New ways 16.7.1.1 The Theory of Status
suggested by the theory await implementation. Construction
Most of the intervention studies to date have In this theory, status construction proceeds from
aimed at reducing unwanted status generaliza- other types of inequality, particularly of posses-
tion, such as that from gender or race/ethnicity. sions or other resources (Ridgeway 1991;
However there are other instances where one Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). First, two (or
might wish to enhance effects of status general- more) groups may control different amounts of
ization. For instance, if status accurately reflects wealth and other status-valued objects. Suppose,
task ability (as in a well-functioning bureaucracy for instance, that an observer notices that the
such as a business organization or the military), group “male” controls more wealth or more
and if prompt acceptance of influence is needed, social esteem than the group “female.” If the dif-
it would be desirable to enhance status and inter- ference between the groups is regular so that
action advantages. Interventions to strengthen someone is more likely to encounter a rich male
status effects would use the same theoretical than a rich female, there is a tendency to reason
principles as interventions to lessen or overcome that “there must be a reason for it.” Then it is a
those effects, but of course with direction of the short step to granting more social esteem and to
influence reversed. inferring differential competence. This is the cre-
ation of status beliefs and attaching them to dif-
ferent states of the characteristic gender. For that
16.7 Theoretical Extensions observer, gender has become a status
characteristic.
Extensions build on a core theory to address new The second condition is interaction of the
questions. In this section we consider two recent observer with members of the two groups; this
extensions that explain how descriptive terms can will spread the beliefs among a society. Suppose
be transformed into diffuse status characteristics. the observer is male and encounters a woman
Following those theories, we briefly describe who at this point does not hold any status beliefs
other theoretical extensions, with references for for gender. The man, however, sees a status dif-
additional information. ference between them, and so he acts as a status
16 The Theories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 337
superior towards her: he interacts at a high rate, well produce conditions for the decline of status
tries to exert influence, etc. Since people tend to value of certain characteristics. Equal opportu-
align their actions, the woman adopts comple- nity programs and laws and regulations might
mentary low status behaviors. If that happens break up the regular association of wealth and
repeatedly, she begins to associate low status some characteristics. Changing status value of an
with being female; interaction includes “train- existing characteristic will require overcoming
ing” for status beliefs. And of course a compara- existing status beliefs and then replacing them
ble process can train new men into status beliefs with beliefs in equality.
regarding gender.
lence. The double standards process has greatest words, conscious processes—in this case, choos-
effect when the objective performance scores are ing the more qualified candidate—take over and
intermediate; their operation is harder to see the subconscious effects of double standards
when objective performance is extremely high or become less significant. Introducing a require-
extremely low. ment of justification is a simple change in proce-
A typical application of this theory is to hiring dure, but one with important consequences.
recommendations. Suppose that members of a
hiring committee review folders of two candi-
dates for a job. Both are recent college graduates 16.7.3 Emotions, Sentiments,
and they have comparable GPAs in relevant and Status Processes
courses—not outstanding grades, but above the
threshold set for hiring. If the candidates differ on Emotions are generally defined as temporary
gender status (one is female and one is male), the feeling states, subject to social conditions. They
status difference is sufficient to trigger the double are only partly under one’s control (e.g., it usu-
standards process. The woman is judged by a ally doesn’t do much good to tell someone “Don’t
more stringent standard and so the man is more be angry.), and while an emotion exists it affects
likely to receive hiring recommendations. Foschi both thoughts and behavior.
and her collaborators have conducted a large A theoretical paper by Ridgeway and Johnson
number of studies that repeatedly demonstrate (1990) describes some effects of one’s position in
the basic process, and also have studied addi- a group structure on emotions. Suppose two peo-
tional processes, one of which we describe below, ple, one in a high status position and the other in
that affect double standards. low status, disagree about something they both
consider important. That is likely to generate dif-
16.7.2.2 Race and Interaction ferent emotions for the two of them, such as
All of Foschi’s work to date has studied gender anger and guilt or depression. The high status
status. Sharon Doerer (2013) studied the same individual is more likely to attribute the emotion
processes, but with a different status characteris- to the other person (“He is annoying me”), while
tics, race. In Doerer’s study, both job candidates the low status person is likely to attribute it to
were identified as male, but one was African himself (“I may have done something wrong.”).
American and the other was white. The same pro- Besides the experience of emotion, the social
cess took place; the white candidate was more structure also affects the likelihood of expressing
often recommended for hiring, despite the equal it. Norms generally discourage expressing nega-
qualifications of the two candidates. tive emotions and encourage expressing positive.
Both Foschi and Doerer also studied the effect However high status individuals are freer to
of responsibility, having to write justifications for express anger, and thus negative expressions tend
the hiring recommendations. (In the basic studies, to move downwards in the structure, while posi-
respondents only had to recommend a candidate, tive expressions tend to move upwards.
without explaining their choices.) Simply adding Despite popular beliefs about inherent differ-
a requirement for responsibility greatly reduced ences between males and females in emotional-
the use of double standards, both for gender and ity, most research shows a more complex
for race. Why should that be the case? Because relationship. Gender, of course, is a diffuse status
status processes operate below the level of con- characteristic, so in mixed-gender groups, it is a
scious awareness. They alter specified types of marker of status inequality. Two studies on emo-
behavior, but generally without awareness that is tions help fill in the picture of how gender and
occurring, at least during the interaction situation. emotion interrelate. Simon and Nath (2004) ana-
Having to justify hiring recommendations appar- lyzed a nationally representative sample of adults
ently focuses respondents more sharply on what and found no difference in the frequency of expe-
they are doing and the job requirements. In other riencing emotion between men and women.
16 The Theories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 339
However status advantages (being male and/or success to increase the value of good problem
earning more money) is associated with experi- solution. With payment, effect of disliking was
encing more positive emotions. For the often- greatly reduced; participants attended mostly to
studied emotion anger, again women and men expectations for the partner, as they did in condi-
experience it about equally often, though their tion 1. This experiment showed that sentiment is
ways of dealing with it differ. Women are more a separate social process from status and expecta-
likely to talk about it with friends or co-workers tions. Bianchi (2004) replicated that experiment
and to pray, and men are more likely to mask it with better controls and results showed the same
with alcohol and other psychoactive drugs. conclusion.
Overall, this study and many others (described in In discussion groups, sentiment has an indi-
greater detail in Webster and Walker 2014) show rect effect on expectations. Shelly (1993, 2001),
the importance of social structures in generating Shelly and Webster (1997 DQG /RYDJOLD DQG
emotions and in people’s expression of them. Houser (1996) discovered how sentiment can
Sentiments, enduring positive and negative indirectly affect expectations. Sentiment affects
emotions, are extremely common in interper- the interaction process in open interaction. For
sonal situations. Do they affect expectations? For instance, liking someone can make us more likely
instance, if I dislike someone, does that lower my to give that person action opportunities, leading
performance expectations for that person? to his or her greater participation. Also, liking
Perhaps a more familiar case is positive senti- makes us less likely to express negative unit eval-
ment. When a parent strongly loves a child, does uations even if we believe the person is wrong,
that love bias the parent’s view of how capable and more likely to express any positive evalua-
the child is? Casual observation in both instances tions. That too will affect the target person’s self-
might make it seem that sentiments do affect expectations, and of course those expectations
expectations, but some careful experimental will affect interaction process and the group’s
studies disconfirm that. The relations of senti- power and prestige structure.
ment and status are a bit more complex than they Other elaborations apply ideas of status and
might appear at first. expectations to understand fairness, how certain
The first question, whether sentiments affect kinds of relations between individual characteris-
expectations, was addressed in a four-condition tics and outcomes can come to seem fair. For
experiment by Driskell and Webster (1997). In instance, it is widely thought that it is “fair” for a
condition 1 of the experiment they created a sta- college graduate to be paid more than a high
tus difference, showing participants that their school graduate, even for jobs that do not need
partners were highly skillful at the group task, abilities beyond those that a high school graduate
and measured the partner’s influence during has. The same process operates for undesirable
interaction. As expected, influence of the highly outcomes: we form beliefs about how much pun-
skilled partner was quite high. In condition 2, ishment is “fair” for different sorts of crimes.
they added dislike, showing participants that the These theories and some empirical tests are avail-
partner disagreed with their values on several sig- able in Berger et al. (1972), Webster (1984), and
nificant issues. That lowered the influence of the Webster and Smith (1978), among other places.
partner, which of course would also happen if
expectations for the partner were lowered.
However, if liking and disliking are a separate 16.7.4 Creating Legitimate Authority
process from status and expectations, then as the Structures
task becomes more important, the effect of liking
will decrease. If sentiment affects expectations, Legitimation, the process by which a group
task importance will have no effect. Conditions 3 inequality structure comes to be seen as right and
and 4 of the experiment were comparable to con- proper, is crucial to authority structures in busi-
ditions 1 and 2, but with payment added for task nesses and in the military. If the structure is seen
340 M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker
as legitimate, authority is accepted, its members Status generalization is neither good nor bad by
are satisfied, and the organization functions effi- itself; that depends on other features of situations
ciently. Of course when authority is not seen as in which it occurs. The important thing is to
legitimate, significant problems follow. (Readers understand conditions under which it is likely to
who are conversant with classical theory will rec- occur and its effects when it does.
ognize that a concern with how structures gain In this entry we have reviewed status pro-
and lose legitimacy was a main concern for Max cesses as related to some everyday characteris-
Weber. It is an enduring, highly important topic.) tics. We also considered interventions,
Status and legitimacy are dealt with in papers by deliberately using theoretical knowledge about
Berger et al. (1998), Kalkhoff (2005), Ridgeway status processes to advance desirable outcomes.
and Berger (1986), and others. This research program has developed a great deal
of information on the operation of expectation
state and status processes in the past 50 years.
16.8 Summary There are currently more than a dozen research
traditions under this large classification, and new
Task groups of all sorts, including discussion theory and evidence are accumulating rapidly.
groups, juries, athletic teams, and work groups in Taken as a whole, the theories in this chap-
organizations generate performance expectations ter demonstrate powerful effects of small dif-
or accept them from outside the group or from ferences in face-to-face interaction in
status generalization. Those expectations then producing social inequality. Once characteris-
determine most features of inequality in interac- tics have acquired status value, they serve to
tion and group structure. Understanding the drive much of what happens when interactants
sources and consequences of performance expec- work together on tasks. Many arenas of social
tations is crucial for understanding how groups life, from the criminal justice system to the
structure themselves and how individuals act in classroom to the work team, illustrate the
such groups. importance of having a clear theoretical under-
Status generalization is a process of forming standing of the inequalities that occur in our
performance expectations, not from observations day-to-day lives.
of performance, but rather from importing soci-
ety’s inequalities and thus allowing them to affect
task group structures and interaction patterns. In References
many cases, but not all, status generalization can
produce undesirable effects, such as: unfairly Andreas, H. (2013). Theoretical terms in science. In E. N.
Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy
reducing a low status individual’s chances to per- (Summer 2013 Edition). Palo Alto: Stanford
form, depriving the group of contributions from University Press.
low status but competent individuals, making less Bales, R. F. (1950). Interaction process analysis. Reading:
than optimal choices for leadership positions, and Addison-Wesley.
Bales, R. F. (1999). Social interaction systems: Theory
generally distributing power and prestige on and measurement. New Brunswick: Transaction.
basis other than merit. Bales, R. F., & Strodtbeck, F. (1951). Phases in group
In many other situations, status generalization problem solving. Journal of Abnormal and Social
produces desirable effects, augmenting the influ- Psychology, 46, 485–495.
%DOHV 5 ) 6WURGWEHFN ) / 0LOOV 7 0
ence and authority of a leader who actually does Roseborough, M. E. (1951). Channels of communica-
possess high ability. Dangerous situations such as tion in small groups. American Sociological Review,
can occur during widespread fires or in the mili- 16, 461–468.
tary, may require quick obedience to commands. Balkwell, J. W. (2001). How do actors in task-oriented
situations process finely graded differences in ability?
When a group leader truly does have high com- Sociological Focus, 34, 97–115.
petence, dangerous situations make quick follow- Berger, J. (1958). Relations between performance,
ing of orders important and even life preserving. rewards, and action-opportunities in small groups.
16 The Theories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 341
will highlight the way that categoric units influ- 17.2 Conceptualizing the Self
ence the self through corporate groups.
Self in Society and Cross-Culturally discusses 17.2.1 The Early Thinkers
the self at the macro level by examining how the
organization of society facilitates the develop- William James (1890) is credited as the first per-
ment of particular selves, beginning with the dis- son who provided a serious treatment on the self.
tinction between institutional and impulsive He conceptualized the self as the sum total of all
selves (Turner 1976). The distinction between that individuals could lay claim to or call their
one’s real self as having an institutional locus own. He discussed four kinds of self: the mate-
(the real self is revealed in adherence to norma- rial self, the spiritual self, the social self, and the
tive standards and is in control of his/her behav- pure ego. His social self has been central to the
iors) or impulsive locus (the real self is something development of contemporary symbolic interac-
to be discovered and is revealed when inhibitions tionism (Stryker 2002 [1980]). Through his anal-
are lowered) has facilitated an analysis of the role ysis of the social self, we learn that individuals
of modernity in theorizing about the self. We are complex, having as many social selves as
briefly will discuss how modernity has influenced there are individuals who recognize them and
conceptualizations of self. carry an image of them in their heads. For
More generally, society and culture help con- instance, an individual might be known to her
struct particular kinds of selves, and cross- children as “mom,” to her husband as “wife,” to
cultural research reveals this. Indeed, in Western her peers as “friend,” and to her employees as
societies, the self is defined as more independent “boss.” Each image has a set of meanings and
and autonomous while in Eastern societies, it is expectations that individuals internalize, and
defined as more interdependent and relational which guide their behavior. Thus, the self is
(Markus and Kitayama 1991). Thus, we discuss located in the minds of others, and among the
the different self-orientations that have appeared multiple selves that exist, each reflects a different
in cross-cultural work. Finally, we identify how a image others have of the self.
society’s particular morals and values shape the Not long after James’s seminal work, Charles
self. Here we address emerging research on the Horton Cooley (1902) extended James’ ideas on
moral identity (Stets and Carter 2012). the social self in his now classic looking glass
We conclude the chapter with some thoughts self. As in a mirror, people see themselves, but
about future directions in the study of the self they also see the reactions of others reflected
from the micro, meso, and macro levels. At the back to themselves. As Cooley indicated, indi-
micro level, an area that has been garnering atten- viduals imagine how they appear to others, they
tion is the self in neuroscience. Early neuroscien- imagine how others judge that appearance of
tists (Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996) created a them, and they have an emotional reaction to that
good foundation in which sociological social judgment that is either positive, in form of pride,
psychologists are now thinking about the self or negative, in the form of shame.1 A person
(Franks 2010). At the meso level, there is a grow- might think that others see her as intelligent, she
ing interest in investigating how the self is expe- might think that others will judge intelligence as
rienced differently when individuals stand at the good or positive given that being intelligent is
intersection of different groups in society. The valued in our society, and she will feel proud as a
way in which a white, middle class, heterosexual result.
man experiences his work or home life is likely
to be very different from a nonwhite, lower class,
1
lesbian woman. At the macro level, we see glo- Our reflection as to the reactions others’ have to us, in
contemporary terms, are called reflected appraisals.
balization as impacting the self as reflected in
Reflected appraisals or how we think others see us is one
wider social networks and increasing exposure to of the main ways we come to understand who we are in
different cultures. identity theory (Burke and Stets 2009).
17 The Self 345
Like Cooley, George Herbert Mead emphasized Aside from developing the social aspect of the
the social self, underscoring the intimate connec- self, Mead also develops the cognitive aspect of
tion because self and society in a series of lec- the self. In Cooley’s looking-glass self, we see
tures that were eventually published in Mind, how thinking about how others see oneself influ-
Self, and Society (Mead 1934). Similarly to ences the way the person feels. But Mead is more
Cooley, Mead envisioned the self as a product of explicit about minded activity. In Mind, Self, and
society. As Cooley conceptualized individuals’ Society, he opens with a discussion of the mind.
views of themselves as a series of imaginations For Mead, the self originates in the mind of indi-
about how individuals believed others saw them, viduals. The mind develops and arises out of
Mead saw the social self as derived from indi- social interaction. Mentality comes when indi-
viduals getting outside of themselves and taking viduals are able to point out to themselves and to
the standpoint or role of the other and seeing who others objects in situations and the meanings
they were through the lens of others. Through associated with those objects. These meanings
repetition and over time, individuals would come are communicated through signs and symbols
to share others’ understanding as to who they (language). Identifying these meanings gives
were, they would anticipate the reactions of oth- humans some control in the situation and allows
ers to their actions, and the meaning of the self for the coordination of activity.
would become a shared meaning. To the extent that the self is an object like any
For Mead, the social self was revealed when other object that humans point out in situations,
individuals engaged in reflexivity. Indeed, reflex- individuals attempt to control the meanings that
ivity is the hallmark of selfhood; humans have are associated with who they are in order to sus-
the ability to reflect back on themselves and take tain themselves. The control of self-meanings is
themselves as an object. Reflexivity, selfhood, social: how individuals see themselves comes
and the development of a social self is seen in from the standpoint of others. Individuals respond
Mead’s classic discussion of the internal conver- to themselves as others would respond to them,
sation between the I and the Me that emerges the meanings of the self are shared, and there is a
within individuals and in and across situations. merger of perspectives of the self and others
The I is the self-as-subject. It is the self that becoming one.
initiates action in a situation to bring about a par-
ticular outcome. It represents that part of the self
that is responsible for agency and creativity. The 17.2.2 Contemporary Thinkers
Me is the self-as-object. It is the self that looks at
the action (of the I), the environment, and the Over time, as individuals point out who they are
relationship between the two in order to guide the to themselves and to others, they come to develop
I to its intended outcome. The Me also contains an understanding of who they are; this is their
the views of society or culture or what Mead self-concept. The self-concept is the sum total of
labeled the generalized other. The Me acquires individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and imaginations
this perspective through the process of role- on themselves (Rosenberg 1979). Following
taking where individuals attempt to perceive the Mead’s approach to understanding the self in
situation from the view of others. Thus, the Me is terms of the mind, researchers during the twenti-
the self that is social because it embodies the per- eth century expanded on the cognitive aspect of
ceptions and understandings from the standpoint the self by studying the content and the structure
of others. However, the Me is also individual of the self, that is, one’s self-concept. The content
because it attempts to help the I satisfy its goal. In of the self is understood as having cognitive
this way, the Me is reflexive because it is able to components such as one’s identities and emo-
take the self into account that is distinct from oth- tional components such as one’s self-esteem.
ers, while at the same time it locates the self in a The cognitive component of one’s identity
community of others. refers to the set of meanings about the self that
346 A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets
defines him/her as a particular kind of person the degree to which individuals feel that they are
(person identities), as a role occupant (role iden- valued, accepted, and respected (Rosenberg et al.
tities), or as a member of a group/category 1995). However, recently, it is argued that there
(group/social identities) (Burke and Stets 2009). may be two other components of self-esteem:
Meanings are individuals’ responses when then being efficacious and being authentic (Stets and
reflect upon themselves in a person, role, or Burke 2014b). We will have more to say about
group/social identity. More specifically, they are this later.
the way people describe or characterize them-
selves in an identity. For instance, one may have
the meaning of being “caring” when she thinks of 17.2.3 Self as Cognitive
how moral she is, “hardworking” when she thinks and Emotional
of herself as a student, and “cooperative” when
she thinks of herself as a member of her neigh- Historically, the cognitive and emotional aspects
borhood watch group. Caring, hardworking, and of the self were seen as opposing forces with cog-
cooperative, help define her in her moral person nition synonymous with rationality and emotion
identity, student role identity, and neighborhood synonymous with irrationality (Turner and Stets
group identity, respectively. 2005). Cooley more than Mead incorporated
Identities guide one’s behavior in interaction. emotions into his analysis of the self in social
Looked at another way, individuals should interaction given his looking glass self and indi-
behave in ways consistent, in meaning, with the viduals’ emotional reactions of pride or mortifi-
meanings in their identities. Thus, if a person saw cation to how they thought others evaluated
herself as hardworking in the student role iden- them. Mead did not ignore emotions altogether,
tity, then we could expect that in the student role, but he was less interested in the emotion, itself,
she would be highly motivated to attend her and he was more interested in the display of emo-
classes, participate in class discussion, do her tions such as moving one’s top lip upward to
homework, and take her exams. In this way, peo- show disgust or shedding tears to show sadness
ple’s behavior is a window into the self-meanings or grief (Ward and Throop 1992). What was
tied to their identities. important was that the emotional display called
The emotional component of self-esteem is forth a response in others, operating as a social
the degree to which individuals evaluate them- cue. The display of disgust would cue to others to
selves in positive or negative terms. Individuals stay away from whatever was the object of the
are taking themselves as an object and reflecting person’s attention; the tears might signal that the
upon who they are in evaluative terms of good- person needed comfort thereby activating social
ness or badness. Self-esteem can be traced back support from others.
to the early writing of James (1890) who under- It wasn’t until the latter part of the twentieth
stood it to be a function of achievements as well century that the self as an emotional entity
as aspirations as expressed in the formula: self- became the focus of attention for sociological
esteem = successes/pretensions. How individuals research (Turner and Stets 2005). We now have a
feel about themselves is the result of their accom- wide array of theories that help us understand
plishments (successes) relative to their goals why and when individuals will experience par-
(pretensions). Thus, individuals could have low ticular emotions. We know that the culture influ-
self-esteem even if their accomplishments were ences whether these emotions will be expressed,
high because their goals could be higher. or whether individuals will engage in emotion
Alternatively, persons could have high self- management. And, we know that one’s position
esteem if their successes were modest and their in the status structure encourages the expression
goals were even more modest. of some emotions over others.
Contemporary thinkers have had a tendency Advances in neuroscience have made it clear
to see self-esteem in terms of self-worth, that is, that cognition and emotion should no longer be
17 The Self 347
seen as polar opposites. The early work of structural arrangements, interaction may become
Damasio (1994) was critical in showing the inti- disrupted and destabilize existing structures.
mate connection between emotions and reason. As a social product, the self is shaped by the
He revealed how, when the cortical region of the social structure through interactions with others.
brain (where cognitive functioning occurs) is dis- This begins at birth and continues throughout the
connected from the subcortical region of the life cycle. While social structures impose con-
brain (where emotions are located), individuals straints on individuals in terms of their actions, it
have difficulty making good decisions; in fact, also provides resources and opportunity struc-
their decisions are irrational. Emotions serve as tures for the self. For example, while we see the
an important guide for choosing between alterna- intergenerational transmission of class position,
tives, and the choices that are made have conse- the unexpected also occurs as when we witness
quences for the emotions that are experienced. upwardly mobile actors. Considering the influ-
Today, the cognitive and emotional aspects of the ence of the social structure makes one aware that
self are seen as inextricably connected. a person’s outcomes are not completely orches-
trated by his/her own or even others’ actions.
Structural arrangements persist according to their
17.2.4 Self and Social Structure own principles and intrude into interaction, con-
straining the actions of individuals. Indeed, every
A hallmark of a sociological approach to the self situation has an implicit status hierarchy, a distri-
is to recognize that self and society mutually bution of resources, and a set of norms that shape
influence each other (Stryker 2002 [1980]). and guide interaction, and this may constrain
Society creates opportunities for the develop- what individuals can accomplish.
ment and organization of the self, and it provides Another way to conceptualize the self and
a set of meanings through language that allows society interplay is to view the self as embedded
for the self to interact with others. In turn, when in social networks (Stryker 2002 [1980]).
individuals interact in groups and within institu- Embeddedness both reflects the number of social
tions using shared meanings, they recreate the ties within a network (referred to as extensive
very social structures that are represented by commitment) and the emotional ties to the net-
those meanings. Thus, social structure arises work (referred to as affective commitment).
from the actions of individuals. However, Therefore, we can think of a social network as
because of the reflexive nature of the self, there is embedding individuals in a circle of others to
always the potential for creativity and a change to whom one feels connected. Access to particular
the social structure. networks is based on people’s positions in the
Recognizing the influence of the self on soci- social structure and the roles they enact, with ties
ety and society on the self is expressed in the idea to others based on self and others enacting the
that the self is a social force as well as a social same roles. A student, for instance, will be more
product (Rosenberg 1981). As a social force, the likely to have a network of others comprised of
self can be seen as motivated to bring about par- students than non-students. When people’s ties to
ticular outcomes or accomplish specific goals. others depend upon them enacting a particular
Action is intentional, monitored, and regulated identity, then that identity will be salient to them.
with the commitment to bring about one’s goals Increasing commitment to that identity is based
despite disturbances in the environment. If one’s on being emotionally close to others in the social
goals are consistent with structural arrangements, network based on that identity and having a large
they reinforce not only the person, but also the compared to small social network that is based on
interaction within which the action emerged, and that identity. The greater the commitment to an
the structure within which the interaction is identity, the higher the salience of the identity
embedded. If the goals are in opposition to social (Stryker and Serpe 1982). Thus, we see how the
348 A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets
self is understood in terms of its embeddedness in performed. This is the professor identity. The
the social structure. professor identity may carry meanings of being
Recently, researchers have gone beyond the intelligent and critical, and these meanings will
role of social networks in characterizing the correspond to the meanings that are “given off”
social structure, and they have differentiated when the professor lectures, answers students’
large, intermediate, and proximate social struc- queries, and provides grades at the end of the
tures (Stryker et al. 2005). Large social structures term. Corresponding to the professor is a counter-
reflect the stratification system along such lines position, counter-role, and counter-identity to
as race, class, and gender. Ties to the social struc- which the professor is related and that character-
ture along these lines provide individuals with izes another person in the situation. This counter-
different social identities that reflect their mem- position would be student, the role expectations
bership in these groups. Intermediate social might include listening attentively, taking notes,
structures are more local networks such as an asking questions, and taking exams, and the iden-
organization or neighborhood that provides tity meanings implied by the role expectations
social boundaries for the probability of particular and that may be associated with the student iden-
social relationships forming. Proximate social tity may include being logical, hard-working, and
structures are those associations and interactions curious.
that are more personal to individuals such as ties Notice that in the above illustration, what gets
to one’s family, one’s school, or one’s immediate activated for each set of actors is only one aspect
department in an organization (Serpe and Stryker of who they are (either professor or student).
2011; Stryker et al. 2005). In proximate social Clearly a professor has other positions/roles/
structures, role identities and person identities identities that could be claimed such as friend,
have the opportunity to be developed. Taken spouse, and or parent. Similarly, the student has
together, social structures both influence and other aspects that characterize who s/he is such
constrain the development of a particular kind of as son/daughter, boyfriend/girlfriend, and/or
self and the corresponding identities associated worker. Each person in the situation does not
with it. have immediate access to all other aspects of
another in the situation, but one does not have to
have access to know that these other aspects exist.
17.3 Self in Interaction
Role-taking may be conceptualized along the taking the role of the generalized other or imagining
dimensions of accuracy, range, and depth what they think society demands of them when
(Schwalbe 1988). Accuracy is correctly identify- they act. As children age, they increasingly take
ing how another sees oneself. More sensitive the role of the generalized other, internalizing the
individuals may be better at accurately reading expectations of society. This helps them abide by
the views of others than less sensitive persons. the norms of society.
Range is the degree to which one can identify Some have suggested that rather than individ-
various different views on oneself. Those who uals taking the perspective of society at large
have contact with a diverse set of others may be when acting, they take into account the views of
exposed to more varying views of oneself. Depth significant others such as family and friends
is how much one can see the full range or total (Rosenberg 1990) or reference groups (Shibutani
view that another has on oneself. More intimate, 1955). Therefore, individuals are likely to have a
long-term relationships reveal a more in-depth sense not only of what the members of society at
view as to how another sees oneself. large expect but also what specific individuals
Individuals are born with the capacity to role- expect. More generally, the ability to take the role
take, and it develops over time through their of the other is what makes a biological being into
interactions with others (Mead 1934). Mead’s a truly social being. By individuals taking the
distinction between the play and game stage is an views of others into account when they act, coor-
account of how individuals develop this ability. dinated activity is possible. Without the ability to
The initial development occurs through children anticipate the reactions of others, actors are
acting out the role of specific actors that they unable to fit their actions to the actions of others.
encounter such as “mom,” “the store cashier,” It is what makes group life possible.
“the mail carrier,” and “the daycare teacher.” Role-taking would appear to be inherently
While the child role-takes the position of specific conformist given that individuals adopt the per-
others, the child has not yet developed an under- spective of others and behave accordingly.
standing that these specific others have others However, individuals also role-make in interac-
who they relate to in the form of counter-roles tion (Turner 1962). They not only imagine the
such as the store cashier responding to the perspective of others and take that into account,
requests of the store manager. The child also does but they also creatively construct their own role
not understand that these specific others occupy given their goals. A conception of interaction as
several other positions within society; mom having a certain amount of role-taking and role-
might also be a doctor at the hospital, and a friend making means that individuals both conform to
to another. others’ expectations as well as create some of
It is not until children enter team sports, their own expectations.
Mead’s game stage, that children learn about Some have questioned how central role-taking
roles and counter-roles, and how individuals take is for self-development since individuals’ self-
on the perspective of several other viewpoints concept is not highly correlated with how others
simultaneously when they act. In the same way actually see them. Instead, the self-concept
that a pitcher on a baseball team plays his/her appears to be filtered through perceptions and
position effectively by coordinating his/her resembles how people think that others see them
actions with all other players in the infield and (Shrauger and Schoeneman 1979). Thus, indi-
outfield, children come to learn how roles in soci- viduals may not be very accurate in judging what
ety are related to counter-roles, and how goals are others think of them. This inaccuracy may be
reached through cooperation. Through repetitive partly due to others being reticent in revealing
involvement in organized activities, children their views, or if they reveal their views, they
learn that organized groups expect certain things may reveal primarily favorable views rather than
of them. When children take these expectations both favorable and unfavorable views (Felson
into account in team sports, they are rehearsing 1993).
350 A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets
When sociologists have empirically investigated are consistent with how they see themselves.
role-taking in interaction, they have studied how From the former has developed self-enhancement
one’s membership in the stratification system theory; from the latter has developed self-
influences who is more likely to shape their view verification theory (Kwang and Swann 2010).
of themselves and who is more likely to role- Self-presentation is a central process within
take. We find, for example, that in newly married Goffman’s dramaturgical approach (Goffman
couples, spouses with higher status (more educa- 1959). Using the analogy of a theater’s front and
tion, a higher occupation, and more income) in back stage, self-presentations are carried out in
the marriage are more likely to not only influence the front region or “on stage,” and individuals
their partner’s self-views but also the partner’s may employ a variety of behaviors, props, words,
views of these higher status spouses (Cast et al. and gestures to convey a particular person in the
1999). Lower status spouses have less influence situation. The back region or “off stage” is largely
on the self-views’ of their higher status counter- inaccessible to audience members, so individuals
parts, or on how their higher status counterparts can behave in ways that contradict front stage
view them. performances.
Those of lower status appear to role-take more Performances must be believable otherwise
than those of higher status (Thomas et al. 1972). they risk being negatively sanctioned (Goffman
Powerful, higher status individuals, given their 1959). While people may exaggerate their abili-
greater influence, may see no reason to be sensi- ties or accomplishments, this is more likely to
tive to others’ views in a situation and take those occur if their claims cannot be verified. When
views into account. Their structurally advantaged their claims can be verified, and if negative infor-
position is enough to maintain control over oth- mation is revealed as to who they are, they may
ers. Alternatively, given the structurally disad- exaggerate abilities or accomplishments on
vantaged position of less powerful individuals, dimensions that reflect more positively about
role-taking is a way to meet the needs of the more themselves (Schlenker 2012). Sometimes, indi-
powerful. Research reveals that women are more viduals may discredit their own self-presentations
likely to role-take and role-take more accurately as when they fail to show evidence of a skill they
(Love and Davis 2014). However, since women claim to have. Embarrassment is experienced,
have lower status in society, gender is confounded which is the uncomfortable feeling of being
with status. When the two are disentangled, we exposed (Goffman 1959). To restore face, one
find that status rather than gender predicts role- may apologize or provide an excuse. If that is
taking accuracy (Love and Davis 2014). ineffective, audience members may help to
restore a person’s face by ignoring the misstep or
providing an account that the person had not
17.3.2 Self-Presentation offered.
The proliferation of social media communica-
Self-presentation refers to a set of activities peo- tion such as Facebook and Twitter provides new
ple use to control an image as to who they are in venues for self-presentation. While some people
the eyes of others. While self-presentation often tend to create a self-image that is positive and
evokes the image of people conveying a positive flattering online, it could be discredited to the
view that advantages them in terms of obtaining extent that viewers see these self-images as con-
power, wealth, friends, and/or self-esteem, self- tradicting offline performances. Others, however,
presentation may also involve an image that seek to present an authentic view as to who they
accurately or authentically represents them are. Interestingly, psychological well-being both
(Schlenker 2012). These different goals are anal- predicts authentic self-presentations on social
ogous to the different self-motives that underlie media, and well-being is enhanced when one is
human behavior. Either people want to be seen authentic. However, this is especially the case
favorably, or they want to be seen in ways that when it is a positive authentic self-presentation
17 The Self 351
or people present a positive but honest view of a faux pas emerging and creating embarrassment,
themselves (Reinecke and Trepte 2014). The pos- although embarrassment can arise when one’s
itivity norm of social media thus creates some social network members present images on one-
tension between the motive to verify the self and self that were not authorized for viewing.
the motive to enhance the self. More generally, as communication with others
The front and back stage regions of social increasingly becomes digitally mediated,
media are somewhat different than Goffman’s researchers need to examine how social actors’
stage metaphor where individuals are directly performances take a new form so that they can
communicating with their audience. In one sense, continue to be positively viewed and verified.
the front stage in social media is akin to the per- People are networked in ways they have never
formances given off when television captures a been before, and the overlapping networks create
person’s performance, or when film follows one’s challenges to successful self-presentations to
daily activities such as a reality show. The viewer diverse networks. As the self becomes connected
can return to this performance by revisiting the to more and more individuals and groups, there is
archive, or in social media, return to the original an increasing number of people to whom the self
posting. The presenter does not see the audience, is held accountable for successful self-
and the audience can be broad in scope. And, presentations (Gergen 1991).
because as discussed earlier, individuals have as
many social selves as there are individuals who
recognize them and carry an image of them in 17.3.3 Identity Verification
their heads, a self-presentation may confirm one
social self but disconfirm another social self Aside from role-taking and self-presentation,
because the social networks that were ordinarily identity verification is a third process in interac-
distinct in interaction now overlap. tion that we want to highlight. Identity verifica-
But, there are some differences between the tion occurs when individuals perceive that others
self that is presented in interaction or in televi- in an interaction see them in the same way that
sion and the self that is presented over social they see themselves (Burke and Stets 2009).
media. The self-presentations over social media Essentially, people observe the feedback that
may be frequent as one posts daily accounts of they receive from others, and they interpret this
experiences and events. Others may help in a per- feedback in terms of how they think that others
son’s presentation as they post to a person’s site see them.
through “tagged” information. Audience mem- More specifically, individuals enter an interac-
bers can provide feedback on a person’s presen- tion with self-meanings, that is, characterizations
tation through text and images of their own, or descriptions as to who they are, for example,
which can be easily transmitted to other audience “I am caring and fair,” “I am strong-willed and
members. And, that feedback can be immediate, confident,” or “I am competitive and unemo-
or it can be delayed. Such audience involvement tional” that are associated with the different
suggests that they have a closer hand in the identities that they claim. These self-meanings
creation of a person’s self-presentation than is comprise the identity standard for each of their
ordinarily the case in other communication identities: “caring and fair” may be the identity
channels. standard for the moral identity, “strong-willed
The back stage region of social media involves and confident” may be the standard for the con-
the preparation of content that eventually gets trol identity, and “competitive and unemotional”
posted over social media (the front stage region) may be the standard for the gender identity. A
such as carefully composing one’s thoughts, particular set of identity meanings gets activated
crafting status updates, and fine-tuning photos for in a situation to the extent that the identity mean-
one’s audience (Davis 2016). This careful craft- ings are aligned with the meanings in the situa-
ing of one’s self-image reduces the likelihood of tion, making the identity relevant in the situation
352 A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets
(Stets and Burke 2014a; Stets and Carter 2012). While group identities are the self-meanings that
It is this relevant identity that is important in the emerge in interaction with a specific set of others
identity verification process. For instance, if the such as family or work group, social identities
meanings in the situation call forth moral behav- are the meanings associated with an individual’s
ior such as helping an elderly person cross an identification with a social category such as one’s
intersection, the moral identity (as opposed to gender, race, or social class. When individual’s
some other identity such as the identity of “artist” group and social identities are verified, they
or “golfer”) will be activated to guide the proso- experience a sense of social belongingness and
cial act. If the person thinks that given her helpful integration including being accepted and valued.
act, others see her as moral in a way that matches This is the self-worth dimension of self-esteem.
her self-view as a moral person, identity verifica- Role identities are the self-meanings associ-
tion has occurred. ated with a role that individuals play out such as
While situational meanings can “activate” a the role of student, worker, friend, or spouse. The
particular identity that corresponds to the situa- roles require specific performances that should
tional meanings, it is also possible for people to be consistent with one’s role identity meanings.
call up or activate a salient identity regardless of As an illustration, if one perceives another play-
situational meanings. Here, the individual would ing out the role of friend by routinely coming to
construct a set of meanings in the situation that the aid of friends when they are upset or need
would correspond to the meanings in the salient financial help, we might assume that for this per-
identity. If the parent identity, for example, is par- son, the friend identity involves self-meanings of
ticularly salient for individuals, they may call up being “reliable” and “supportive.” Enacting per-
this identity at work and construct meanings that formances in accordance with one’s role identity
correspond to it such as talking about their chil- is about agency and accomplishing one’s goals.
dren to their co-workers, showing pictures of Thus, when people experience verification of role
their children, texting their children at work, and identity, it increases feelings of self-efficacy, a
bringing their children to work. Identity verifica- second dimension of self-esteem.
tion of the parent identity would occur to the Finally, person identities are the meanings that
extent that co-workers evaluate the person in the individuals attribute to themselves as unique
parent identity in the same way that the individ- individuals that set them apart from others. These
ual evaluates herself in this identity with all of self-meanings may be core to the individual and
this taking place in the workplace rather than the include one’s values (Hitlin 2003) or morals
home setting. (Stets and Carter 2012), but they also include
The outcome of identity verification is posi- characterizations of individuals such as the
tive feelings for the individual (Burke and Harrod degree to which they are controlling (Stets 1995)
2005; Stets and Burke 2014a; Stets and Carter or outgoing (Stets and Cast 2007). Since the per-
2011, 2012; Stets and Harrod 2004). Individuals son identity identifies what is central to the per-
feel good when they experience identity verifica- son, when person identities are verified, people
tion because it helps foster the view that their should see that their “real” self is being affirmed.
world is predictable and controllable. It also pro- This is the authenticity dimension of self-esteem.
vides a feeling of support: that others know who Thus, while group/social identities are about
one is. These positive feelings may be revealed in social acceptance (self-worth esteem), role iden-
positive emotions such as happiness or positive tities are about whether one’s roles performance
self-evaluations such as increased self-esteem. is effective (self-efficacy esteem), and person
Recent research theorizes and finds that the identities are about whether one’s true self is
verification of different bases of identities revealed (authenticity self-esteem).
(group/social, role, and person identities) influ- While identity verification fosters good feel-
ence different self-esteem outcomes (self-worth, ings, identity non-verification leads to negative
self-efficacy, and authenticity, respectively) feelings. These negative feelings emerge not only
(Burke and Stets 2009; Stets and Burke 2014b). when individuals think that others see them more
17 The Self 353
negatively than how they see ourselves, but also such as the car they drive, the home they live in,
when they think that others see them more posi- or the artwork that hangs on their walls to signal
tively than how they see themselves (Burke and specific self-meanings. This appearance
Stets 2009). Further, there is a stronger negative announces to others how they anticipate they will
response as the magnitude of the discrepancy be seen and treated. Second, people may selec-
increases. Either a positive or negative direction tively interact with those who they know will
in the discrepancy is upsetting because it is not verify them and avoid those who they know will
verifying. Even when individuals think that oth- not verify them. Finally, people may use interper-
ers are over-rating them, it is still upsetting sonal prompts to get others to see them in a way
because it may set up expectations to meet a that they see themselves. This is done partly
higher standard – a standard they are not pre- through appearance as suggested above. However,
pared to meet. it also occurs by behaving in a particular manner
When identity non-verification occurs, the that is consistent with one’s identity or, alterna-
negative emotion creates a pressure or drive tively, treating others is a manner that facilitates
within individuals to reduce the discrepancy verification of one’s own identity. The latter is
between how they see themselves and how they what has been otherwise labeled altercasting
think others view them. They may reduce this (Weinstein and Deutschberger 1963). Individuals
discrepancy through behavioral strategies such as cast others into particular roles or identities such
doing something different in the situation so that that it encourages them to think and act in ways
the behavior signals different meanings that oth- that verifies those who do the casting. For exam-
ers may see as more consistent with their identity ple, if a person seeks verification of the parent
standard meanings. Alternatively, cognitive strat- identity, the individual might treat another as a
egies may be enacted such as ignoring the dis- child, casting the other into a dependent role.
crepant views of others or seeing more Identity verification takes two people: one
consistency in others’ views than actually exists. who needs verification and one who does the
Still yet, individuals could slowly change the verifying. However, in interaction, individuals
self-meanings associated with their identity so can build a mutually verifying set of behaviors
that they are more consistent with others’ mean- and identity standards such that what emerges is
ings of them. In extreme circumstances, individ- a mutual verification context (Burke and Stets
uals might simply abandon interactions with 1999). This is a situation where two or more indi-
non-verifying others. Regardless of the strategy viduals mutually support each other by not only
chosen, individuals strive to move from a state of verifying their own identities, but in doing so,
non-verification to a state of verification. support the verification of others’ identities in the
To avoid the work associated with responding situation. This is common in close relationships.
to non-verifying situations, it would be easier to Research shows that when this occurs, it can cre-
reside in situations where the discrepancies ate a stable relationship where positive feelings
between self and others’ views are small or non- are felt, and trust and commitment is experienced
existent and positive feelings are typical. Indeed, between individuals (Burke and Stets 1999).
some may gravitate to family and friends because
they provide a verifying context. Support is felt.
When this is not possible, individuals may 17.4 Self in Groups and Social
actively construct such contexts, which have Categories
been labeled opportunity structures (Swann
1983). Swann indicates three ways that individu- The self is not only involved in different interac-
als create their own opportunity structures. tional processes as discussed above, but it is also
First, individuals may “give off” a particular a product of interactions within proximate groups
appearance that conveys meanings as to who they of varying sizes and organizational structures.
are. They may dress a certain way or use objects Here, the self is a member of corporate and
354 A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets
categoric units (Turner 2010a). The categoric to take place in primary groups and is focused on
unit is a social distinction that places individuals teaching children broad principles for behavior.
into distinct social categories such as gender or Socialization during adulthood involves interac-
race/ethnicity. Being defined as a member of a tion in primary and especially secondary groups
categorical unit results in a distinctive set of where individuals adopt positions within the
socialization experiences and outcomes such as workplace and broader community and learn the
the development of one’s identity, self-esteem, roles associated with these positions (Preves and
and self-efficacy in families, schools, and work Mortimer 2013). Since socialization in childhood
organizations. Furthermore, categorization car- serves as the foundation for self-development,
ries with it the implication that some groups are we discuss gender, race/ethnicity, and class
more valuable and have more power than others socialization during childhood.
(Callero 2014).
Due to space limitations, we will be brief in
our discussion of the role of corporate groups in 17.4.1 Gender
understanding the self. We will primarily focus
on the categoric units of gender, race, and class, Research on gender socialization reveals that
but we will also illustrate how categoric units boys and girls are treated differently from birth
shape and are shaped by interactions within cor- given the stereotypes associated with sex and
porate groups. First, we briefly discuss the mech- gender categories. Gender socialization occurs
anism that fosters internalization of categoric with a variety of different agents and in a variety
unit meanings: the socialization process. of contexts. Families tend to be the primary con-
Through socialization, individuals learn the text, but gender socialization also occurs at
“norms, values, beliefs, attitudes, language char- school and with peers. Through social learning,
acteristics, and roles appropriate to their social boys and girls learn the norms for femininity and
groups” (Lutfey and Mortimer 2003). Through masculinity. These norms become internalized in
interaction in groups such as the family, school, the form of one’s gender identity, which is the set
one’s peer group, religious group, and work of meanings individuals associate with them-
group, individuals learn the positions they occupy selves as male or female in society (Burke and
in the social structure and the expectations asso- Stets 2009).
ciated with those positions. In the process, the Most children develop the ability to label
self takes shape. Cooley (1909) alluded to the themselves and others with the label of “boy” or
importance of primary groups such as the family “girl” by the age of 2 (Zosuls et al. 2009). They
in self-formation. In primary groups where there are first labeled by others who tend to respond to
is intimate and frequent face-to-face interaction them in sex-typed ways, shaping children’s
and individuals are valued and seen as unique understanding of gender and of themselves as
and irreplaceable actors, Cooley suggested a “gendered selves” (Howard and Hollandar 2000).
“fusion” of the individual with the group result- Because initial categorization and internalization
ing in a feeling of “we-ness.” begins so early, gender identity becomes an
Secondary groups are less influential in self- important component of the self-concept. Some
formation. Here, individuals are largely under- argue that it is the first category that children
stood in terms of the position they occupy in learn and thus the first identity they recognize in
organizations, and these positions can have inter- themselves and in others (Ridgeway 2011).
changeable actors such as a teacher in a school, a While socialization occurs throughout the life
leader of a congregation, or a CEO of a company. course, we focus on gender socialization in fami-
The distinction between socialization in primary lies because it is here that a gendered self is
and secondary groups reflects somewhat the dis- established.
tinction between socialization during childhood There are several learning mechanisms that
and adulthood. Socialization in childhood tends facilitate the development of a child’s gender
17 The Self 355
identity: imitation, praise and discouragement, that one of the ways to increasing women’s par-
and self-socialization (Maccoby and Jacklin ticipation in STEM fields would entail “closing
1974). Parents treat boys and girls differently, the gaps between gendered self-concepts and
and children imitate their parents thereby repro- perceptions of SME disciplines.”
ducing gender differences in thought, feeling,
and action. For example, mothers see girls as
more delicate, passive, and cooperative com- 17.4.2 Race
pared to the view of boys as more sturdy, active,
and competitive. Mothers are more attentive and Some of the earliest work on racial socialization
responsive to girls than boys, and they foster the was conducted by two psychologists who became
development of girls’ emotional worlds and the concerned about Black self-hatred when they
expression of it compared to boys. Mothers also found that Black children showed a preference
encourage girls to stay in close proximity while for white dolls (Clark and Clark 1947). This led
boys are encouraged to be adventurous and to extensive work on Black children’s self-image,
explore. Gender differences persist in how girls identity adjustment, self-esteem and more. The
and boys are clothed, what toys are appropriate idea was that because Black children were vic-
for them, what home chores are expected of tims of prejudice, exhibited poor performance in
them, and the décor of their bedrooms. Essentially, school relative to their White peers, and inter-
we impose a “gendered lens” on the world that preted their low status as reflecting a personal
presumes difference, ignoring the role of stereo- failure, they internalized the prejudice, and it led
types as the source of many differences (Bem to negative self-views such as low self-esteem
1993). The result is that girls and boys develop in (Rosenberg 1981).
ways that help sustain a gendered social order. Over the ensuing decades, little support was
Gendered expectations extend to school activ- found for these expectations. Researchers antici-
ity. One area of concern in recent years is the dif- pated Black children would use the broader soci-
ferential involvement of males and females in ety and its racist views to define them without
science, technology, engineering, and mathemat- considering children’s reliance on proximal inter-
ics (STEM) because these fields offer compara- actions with individuals of their own race
tively higher salaries and prestige than others (Rosenberg 1981). Specifically, the source of
fields. As early as elementary school, children one’s self-views were most likely to come from
have internalized the gender stereotype that math those in one’s immediate social environment
is for boys and not girls (Cvencek et al. 2011). By such as one’s parents, teachers, and friends, all of
high school, girls have significantly less motiva- whom were more likely to be Black than White.
tion to pursue both mathematics and science Similarly, when considering school performance,
compared to boys (Catsambis 1994). black children were more likely to compare
In a study of talented high school students themselves to those with whom they were pri-
enrolled in a science, mathematics, and engineer- marily interacting – other Black children. Finally,
ing (SME) summer camp, Lee (1998) examined since one’s status was ascribed rather than
students’ internalized meanings, and their inter- achieved, children were less inclined to attribute
est in science-related fields. He found that girls their position to personal failure. Together, these
tended to see themselves as more different than findings led to the idea that Black children’s self-
other science students compared to the boys esteem was not as vulnerable as previously
enrolled in the program. Girls whose self-views anticipated.
were similar to those they associated with the Parents can play an important role in offset-
career of engineer, physicist, and mathematician ting many of the harmful effects of prejudice and
expressed greater interest in those careers than discrimination and foster a positive identity.
did girls whose self-views differed from those Toward this end, they may adopt different strate-
with such careers. Lee (1998: 214) concluded gies such as teaching children about their racial/
356 A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets
ethnic heritage and customs, and promoting In more contemporary work, Lareau (2002)
pride; creating an awareness of discrimination studied social class and childrearing in middle
and the ways to cope; teaching children to be and working-class white and black families.
cautious and distrustful of interracial interac- Similar to Kohn’s argument, she argued that par-
tions; and encouraging children to value their ents differed in their childrearing practices.
individual characteristics over their group mem- Middle-class parents tended to employ a “cul-
bership and avoid discussions on race (Hughes tural logic” of what she referred to as “concerted
et al. 2006). Such studies illustrate how macro- cultivation” (Lareau 2002: 748). This involved
level systems of inequality influence micro-levels engaging children in activities such as music and
interactions that, in turn, reproduce macro-level dance lessons, sports, scouts, and other cultural
structures of inequality. activities. Discipline involved reasoning and
talking with their children, and as a result, chil-
dren spent a great deal of time in the company of
17.4.3 Social Class adults. This produced an emerging sense of enti-
tlement when interacting with others in various
Kohn (1977) was one of the first to emphasize institutional contexts such as educational and
how one’s social class as reflected in one’s occu- medical systems.
pation shaped individuals’ values. He argued that Lower class parents tended to adopt what
occupations varied according to how much self- Lareau referred to as “the accomplishment of
direction, complexity, and autonomy was natural growth” (Lareau 2002: 748). Children
required on the job. High status occupations were were involved in fewer activities, and parents
more self-directed, complex, and autonomous believed that if they provided the basic necessi-
compared to low status occupations where there ties, their children would thrive. Discipline was
was more conformity to authority, jobs were sim- less likely to involve reasoning and more likely
ple, routinized and repetitive, and there was a to involve an authoritarian, punishing style.
great deal of supervision. When individuals were Interactions with institutions tended to be charac-
rewarded for behaviors consistent with the level terized by distrust and fear. Similar to Kohn’s
of self-direction or conformity expected in the work, Lareau’s two cultural logics related to par-
workplace, they came to value these qualities and ents’ occupational experiences. Middle-class par-
foster them at home through their parenting style. ents found their work to be challenging and
The consequence of the above is that children exciting and wanted to develop in their children
from different classes are reared in different ways the skills necessary to be successful in the work-
given their parents’ work experiences. Children force. Working class parents tended to find their
from higher classes are taught such values as work lives as drudgery, and they wanted to pro-
independence and creativity, and children from tect their children from life’s pains by just letting
lower classes are taught obedience to authority “kids be kids.”
and following societal norms. As they mature and In later work, Weininger and Lareau (2009)
choose careers of their own, they have a tendency found support for Kohn’s assertion that middle
to select occupations in which they are expected class parents valued self-direction in their chil-
to behave in ways consistent with how they were dren more than lower class parents. However, the
raised. Thus, children come to value what their value of self-direction was not well represented
parents’ value, and they gravitate toward occupa- in their actual parenting behavior. Middle class
tions similar to those chosen by their parents, parents often employed practices that reduced the
facilitating the intergenerational transmission of amount of self-direction in their children. For
class values and jobs. A provocative amount of example, in the interest of developing valuable
work over the years and cross-culturally has sup- skills and interests in their children, middle class
ported the reciprocal relationship between occu- parents asserted high levels of control over their
pation and personal values. activities. In contrast, the parenting practices of
17 The Self 357
lower class parents who presumably valued more part, from the political process during his time as
conformity than middle-class parents actually revealed in social movements such as the student
allowed children to assert a great deal of control demonstration movement and the women’s
over their activities given that much of their time movement of the 1960s. Additionally, he noted a
was spent away from the physical presence of greater acceptance of expressing one’s impulses –
adults. Thus, while adult occupational experi- one’s spontaneous thoughts and feelings – in lit-
ences shaped parental values, the strategies by erary writings (e.g. Nietzsche), psychology, (e.g.
which they instilled these values in their children Freud), and child-rearing. But Turner took a step
seemed less direct. back from these more recent patterns to indicate
some general trends over time that might provide
an explanation as to the shift from an institutional
17.5 Self in Society anchorage to an impulsive anchorage.
and Cross-Culturally One trend he discussed was the cultural
changes that occurred in the nineteenth and twen-
17.5.1 Self in Society tieth centuries where cultural diversity chal-
lenged a consensual world view such that
The idea that there is an intimate connection institutional frameworks were seen as relativistic
between self and society, that the self reflects rather than absolute, thereby weakening institu-
society and vice versa, can be traced to the early tional allegiances. Another trend was the move-
thinkers such as Mead and Cooley as well as ment from a producing society to a consuming
more contemporary theorists such as Stryker and society where group life and disciplined work
Rosenberg. In this section, we broadly examine habits became more tenuous, and achievement
how the organization of society and its culture and interpersonal bonds appeared as less credible
shape the particular kinds of selves that are pos- clues to a real person. Still another trend was the
sible and available to individuals. It is at the Freudian dynamic that inhibiting one’s impulse
macro level that fundamental connections caused a preoccupation with the blocked ten-
between social organization, culture, and self can dency, making it more real and important.
be seen. To a certain extent, postmodernist scholars also
One issue is how the self has responded to have commented on a general shift away from
postmodern times. Early theorizing on this comes defining the self in institutional terms. Essentially,
from Turner’s (1976) distinction between the self societal advancement influences a destabilization
as anchored in institutions and the self as of institutional practices and cultural assumptions.
anchored in impulse. A stronger adherence to Giddens (1991) argues that in the postmodern
social norms and conventions is expected of indi- world, increasing individualism and the growing
viduals with institutionally defined selves. In complexity of society creates the possibility and
contrast, impulsive selves are defined more in potential for any number of “selves” to be con-
terms of individual preferences and self- structed by the individual. Gergen (1991: 61) dis-
discovery. Here, the “true self” is discovered and cusses how technological advances have “saturated
achieved rather than prescribed by the institution. the self.” Our ability to communicate instantly
The immediate access to multiple worlds created through a variety of different technologies any-
by technological advances only intensifies this where in the world creates a “swirling set of social
movement towards an impulsive self by weaken- relations” such that individuals come to have the
ing bonds to traditional institutions such as the potential to possess a variety of different identities
family and other immediate communities within an ever-increasing number of social rela-
(Gergen 1991). tionships. This creates challenges for constructing
Writing in the mid-1970s, Turner speculated a coherent self.
on a shift in the self from an institutional to an Others emphasize the self as a site of political
impulsive emphasis. He saw this as emerging, in controversy; through the specific historical systems
358 A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets
of discourse, individuals are controlled and dom- are socialized into different cultures (and in
inated (Thomas et al. 1972). Agency is an illu- different positions within those cultures), thus
sion. While some have argued that within such they have different selves or self-construals.
historically specific systems of domination the Self-construal is “how individuals define and
possession of a true self is not possible (Love and make meaning of the self” (Cross et al. 2011:
Davis 2014), others have argued that the central- 143). Cross and her colleagues point out that
ity of reflexivity within symbolic interactionst self-construal has become synonymous with the
theorizing allows for the retention of a self that is distinction between independence and interde-
constructed and constituted within systems of pendence or how people see themselves in rela-
power while still retaining the possibility of tion to others. This distinction was originally
emancipation (Schlenker 2012). identified by Markus and Kitayama (1991) who
Other evidence of a movement away from the found Westerners (Europeans and Americans)
self in institutional terms has emerged in the and Easterners (Japanese) showed differences in
argument of a loss of the communal self and a self orientations. Westerners construe the self as
focus on the individual as revealed in the work of separate from others. The question “Who am I?”
Bellah and his colleagues (1985) and Putnam is answered in terms of internal traits that set the
(2000). Analyses such as these are not without person apart from others.2 Interpersonal relation-
controversy including the recent analysis by ships are important to the extent that they benefit
Fischer (2011) that reveals that the bonds with the self in terms of providing support or esteem.
family and friends are alive and strong. In contrast, Easterners construe the self as con-
Individuals adjust to a changing society, but it is nected to others. “Who am I?” is answered with
not at the sacrifice of personal relationships. reference to important relationships (such as
being a wife/husband, or a parent/son or daugh-
ter) or group memberships (church member or
17.5.2 Self Cross-Culturally Latino). Fitting in is an important basis of self-
esteem. Social comparisons are used to deter-
Culture is characterized by a set of shared values mine whether individuals are fulfilling their
and ideas that are revealed in institutional prac- obligations within their relationships, and there is
tices, customs, and artifacts within a particular a concern with how they benefit the groups to
community. Individuals may not always endorse which they belong (Cross et al. 2011).
the values and ideas, but they generally are aware While individuals possess both independent
of their existence, and they often inform their and interdependent characteristics, culture influ-
behavior. Culture is both internal and external to ences the development of one self-construal more
the individual. Internally, it may be seen in indi- than the other. Independent self-construals
viduals’ understandings of how they appear to generally correspond to individualistic cultures
others in their community (the reflected apprais- and interdependent self-construals correspond to
als process); externally, it may be seen in the pat- collectivistic cultures. In individualistic cultures,
terns of individuals’ interactions in groups and priority is given to personal goals over collective
organizations and in the underlying logic of goals; in collectivistic cultures, the emphasis is
social institutions (Reinecke and Trepte 2014). A on collective goals (Miyamoto and Eggen
view of culture that emphasizes both the internal 2013). While the dimension of individualism-
and external components is analogous to our con- collectivism describes cultures (Triandis et al.
ceptualization of the self at the micro, meso, and 1989), independent-interdependent self-construals
macro levels. Culture not only shapes the internal
dynamics of the self but also the identities enacted 2
Early research in this area began by simply asking indi-
within proximal and larger social institutions.
viduals to list their identities using the Twenty-Statements
Cross-cultural research on the self conceptual- Test (TST) that asked the question “Who am I?” (Kuhn
izes the self as a social construction. Individuals and McPartland 1954).
17 The Self 359
describe individuals, thus the two refer to associated with greater negative emotions. Part
different levels of analysis (Cross et al. 2011). of this difference may be due to the mediating
Independent and interdependent self-construals role of social anxiety, which interdependent per-
are only one dimension of individualistic and sons are more likely to feel than independent per-
collectivistic cultures. Another dimension of sons as they are more concerned with appropriate
such cultures is the degree to which behavior is behavior in relationships. Indeed, when social
guided by individual attitudes (more so in indi- anxiety is controlled for in analyses, the differ-
vidualistic cultures) compared to social norms ence in depression disappears.
(more likely in collectivistic cultures) (Triandis Still another distinction is how individuals
1995). exercise control over themselves to attain their
More recently, a third type of self-construal goals. Two self-regulatory foci have been identi-
has been distinguished: the relational self- fied: a focus on promotion or the motivation to
construal (Kashima et al. 1995). This is a self that approach one’s goal state, and a focus on preven-
is defined in terms of close relationships (e.g. tion or the motivation to avoid undesired goals
family and friends) rather than a self that is con- (Higgins 1999). Those with an independent self-
nected to others through proximal social groups construal are more inclined to engage in promo-
as characterized by an interdependent self- tion as they seek to reach their desired end state.
construal. Kashima and colleagues were not only Because those with an interdependent self-
the first to identify relational self-construal as construal want to fit in, maintain harmony in their
distinct from an interdependent self-construal, relationships, and fulfill others’ expectations,
but they also argued that this relational dimen- they are more sensitive to the harm that potential
sion could distinguish between men and women failures could create. Thus, they are more ori-
across cultures. ented to preventive self-regulation. Consistent
Others went on to use the relational self- with these patterns, we also find that those with
construal dimension to differentiate men and an independent self-construal are more likely to
women in Western cultures (Cross and Madson engage in primary control (manipulate the envi-
1997). Women were more likely to create self- ronment to meet their needs), while those with an
views that focused on connection in social rela- interdependent self-construal are more likely to
tionships, and men were more likely to see rely on secondary control (modify their own
themselves as independent and distinct from thoughts and feelings to fit into the environment).
social relationships. However, other research It is assumed that individuals possess all three
revealed that while women were more likely to (and possibly other) self-construals but to vary-
see themselves in relational terms, men were ing degrees. For our purposes, we see much affin-
more likely to see themselves in terms of the ity between conceptions of the self at the micro,
group or the collective (Gabriel and Gardner meso, and macro levels with these three domi-
1999). Thus, interdependence had relational and nant self-construals. As identity theorists note,
collective aspects. Essentially, being connected individuals define themselves as unique individu-
to others is core to human existence. It just gets als in terms of individual characteristics (person
expressed differently for men and women. identities); this is similar to the individual self-
Most research has investigated the conse- construal. Individuals also define themselves as
quences of having an independent compared to members of larger social groups (group/social
interdependent self-construal. A useful review of identities), and this is similar to having an inter-
this research reveals some of the following pat- dependent self-construal in that the self is defined
terns (Cross et al. 2011). An independent self- in relation to larger collectivities. Finally, indi-
construal is associated with greater positive viduals define themselves in terms of role identi-
emotions such as happiness and less negative ties and the counter role identities to which they
emotions such as unhappiness, depression, and are related as in the parent role identity and child
social anxiety; an interdependent self-construal is counter-role identity, teacher role identity and
360 A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets
student counter-role identity, and the employer Additionally, it is consistent with Western com-
role identity and the employee counter-role iden- pared to Eastern conceptions of morality in which
tity. This shares an affinity to the relational self- the fundamental unit of moral value is the indi-
construal. Sociological research on the self could vidual, and the person’s autonomy and welfare
benefit from understanding both intra-cultural are to be protected (Haidt and Graham 2009).
and inter-cultural contexts that make different The individualizing approach to morality that
self-construals and the identities potentially characterizes Western countries does omit a bind-
attached to them more or less relevant in particu- ing approach that may describe many non-
lar situations. Western countries (Haidt 2008). For example, an
in-depth analysis of India revealed that there are
three bases of morality: an ethic of autonomy,
17.5.3 Morals and Values community, and divinity (Shweder et al. 1997).
Cross-Culturally The emphasis on community highlights the col-
lective, and the emphasis on the divine incorpo-
Another important area where cross-cultural rates societal members focus on the sacred.
studies have been important is in the study of Others have developed Shweder and his col-
people’s morals and values. Here, we examine leagues work further by offering not three but
the degree to which individuals are oriented to five bases of morality cross-culturally (Graham
the “good” and the “desirable,” and how this var- et al. 2011). These include the individualizing
ies across the globe. A shared sense of morality foundations of fairness/reciprocity and harm/
and values within a given culture creates social care, and three communal foundations: in-group/
integration and cohesion among members while loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity.
simultaneously creating the potential for conflict Values are beliefs about what is desirable that
between cultures. guides behavior and transcend situations (Gecas
As defined elsewhere, morality is the “evalua- 2000; Hitlin and Piliavin 2004). Some see values
tive cultural codes that specify what is right or as core to one’s personal identity (Hitlin 2003).
wrong, good or bad, acceptable to unacceptable” More specifically, Hitlin sees the personal iden-
in a society (Turner and Stets 2006: 544). At the tity as “produced through value commitments”
level of the self, individuals internalize meanings (Hitlin 2003: 121). Identity theorists would agree
as to who they are along the good-bad dimension. that values may be meanings that make up the
This is their moral identity. While many psychol- person identity, but there also are other meanings
ogists argue that having a moral identity means that make up the person identity and that charac-
that being moral is at the core of the self, it is the terize one as distinctive or unique compared to
essence of who they are, sociologists would others, which is a defining feature of person iden-
argue that having a moral identity does not neces- tities (Burke and Stets 2009). Empirical work
sarily mean that it is core to the self, but rather would be needed to examine whether values are
that it is one among a host of identities that indi- more likely to be linked to person identities then
viduals may claim (Stets 2010). What psycholo- role identities or group/social identities.
gists and sociologists agree on is that self-views In a slightly different conceptualization,
along the moral dimension, the moral identity, Gecas (2000) maintains that people have value-
influence behavior in situations. identities, that is, they define themselves in terms
When the moral identity has been studied, two of the values they hold. Value identities can refer
underlying meaning dimensions typically have to desired personal qualities such being honest or
been operationalized: a justice and rights dimen- brave as compared to value identities that refer to
sion and a care and relationship dimension (e.g. social conditions such as freedom or equality
Stets and Carter 2011, 2012). This is consistent (Gecas 2000). Values that refer to personal qual-
with earlier discussions regarding the basis of ities Gecas labels one’s “character identity.”
morality (Gilligan 1982; Kohlberg 1981). Here, we begin to see an overlap with the moral
17 The Self 361
identity as discussed above. Gecas discusses the ciated with the activation of particular regions in
relationship between values and morality by the brain including but not limited to self-
maintaining that the relationship is tighter when reflection and taking the role of the other. In this
one’s moral orientation is justice-oriented vs. regard, two functionally related areas of the brain
care-oriented. In the former, values and princi- are important: the default mode network (DMN)
ples are more likely to guide moral behavior and the mirror neuron system (MNS) (Molnar-
compared to the latter, which is more likely to be Szakacs and Uddin 2013). The DMN is associ-
guided by situational circumstances and interper- ated with the processing of self-related
sonal concerns. This is analogous to the indepen- information such as how individuals think about
dent vs. interdependent self-construals discussed themselves, while the MNS is associated with
earlier. Those with an independent self-construal taking the role of the other and reflecting on the
are more likely to have their value identities behaviors and emotions of others, reproducing
guide their moral behavior compared to those those same actions and feelings within the per-
with an interdependent self-construal. son. Because the MNS is activated when indi-
How values are represented cross-culturally is viduals act as well as when they observe the
evidenced in Schwartz’s (1992, 1994) research, actions of others, the MNS apparently facilitates
although the findings primarily exists in literate the development of shared meanings in interac-
or developed countries. He reveals that individu- tion (Molnar-Szakacs and Uddin 2013). Further,
als across societies endorse ten values that have while the DMN and MNS have different func-
two broader value dimensions. One dimension is tions, they are interrelated. In the same way that
openness to change vs. conservation, which when the self is formed, it is always in relation to
includes the values of self-direction, stimulation, others, the DMN and MNS interact to allow for
and hedonism vs. tradition, conformity and secu- an integrated self-representation, reminding us of
rity. A second dimension is self-transcendence Cooley’s dictum that self and society are “twin
vs. self-enhancement, which includes the values born.”
of universalism and benevolence vs. achieve- The potential for resolving issues in the area
ment and power. Generally, those who endorse of self and identity using neurosociology is a rich
one dimension, such as openness to change, have and fruitful line of further work. For example,
a tendency not to endorse its opposite – conserva- given the centrality of role-taking in understand-
tion. Interestingly, a recent cross-cultural analy- ing the self, and given that lower status actors are
sis reveals that Schwartz’s model of values does more likely to role-take than higher status actors,
a better job of predicting value priorities across neuroimaging might be able to map changes in
countries than within countries, thereby refuting the flow of blood to particular areas of the brain
the strong claim that culture determines individ- in response to situational shifts in status and
ual values (Fischer and Schwartz 2011). Only the power (Franks 2013).
value of conformity such as honoring one’s par- As another illustration, because activating dif-
ents, politeness, and obedience appear to garner ferent kinds of memory (episodic, semantic, and
within country consensus. Recently, the ten val- semantic autobiographical) stimulates different
ues have been expanded to 19 values with data parts of the brain, linking the conventional and
from ten countries (Schwatz et al. 2012). idiosyncratic self-meanings of an identity to
semantic and episodic memories, respectively,
would allow us to study how individuals employ
17.6 Future Micro, Meso conventional and idiosyncratic identity meanings
and Macro Directions in different situations (Niemeyer 2013).
Situations that are informed by cultural norms
At the micro level, in the last 20 years, research may activate more conventional meanings of an
in neurosociology has generated important identity, thereby linking identities and normative
insights into how self-related processes are asso- behavior. Conversely, situations that are less
362 A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets
controlled by normative imperatives may stimulate reconstructed in a way that traditional roles dis-
idiosyncratic identity meanings, allowing for appear, are redefined, and novel roles potentially
more novel ways in which an identity is enacted. emerge that are inconsistent with traditional
At the meso level, future research on the self cultural practices but consistent with global
could more systematically address issues of economic conglomerates.
intersectionality that are pervasive in feminist lit- One new shape that the self may take is in the
eratures. James’ early idea that people possess as development of a new identity given the mixing
many selves as there are individuals to whom of cultures. Another is the development of a mul-
they relate to shores up the idea of intersectional- ticultural identity in which individuals adopt
ity in contemporary work. Individuals are mem- multiple identities that represent identification
bers of multiple social categories and multiple with a variety of cultures. Alternatively, people
groups, creating a unique set of experiences. might develop a defensive stance toward
Research on the self can be advanced by examin- encroaching cultural influences.
ing how intersectionality provides insights into Finally, Callero suggests that globalization can
how to understand multiple identities that indi- create the potential for radical social change. The
viduals claim within and across situations. For rapid-fire communication networks that on the
instance, in the family group identity, there are one hand have the potential to constrain the self to
certain expectations attached to the parent role hegemonic cultural ideals also have the potential
identity that vary across the categorical identities to resist cultural hegemony. One example of this
of being male and female, white and non-white, is the use of Facebook to organize protests locally
and heterosexual and homosexual. Further, as and globally on a variety of social issues includ-
meanings in one identity change, they create the ing climate change and human rights.
potential for a change in meanings in other iden- Globalization carries with it the potential to
tities (Burke and Cast 1997). Thus, the unique not only allow for greater individual choice in the
experiences associated with any one intersec- construction of the self but also constrain the self
tional profile may be rooted in compromises that (Callero 2008). One fruitful line of research
are made along the way to reach a set of non- would seek to understand the conditions that
conflicting meanings that individuals can manage allow for multicultural identities to emerge and
in interaction. the conditions that limit their development.
At the macro level, researchers may want to Another possible line of research would be to
study the self in relation to globalization. The examine the different cultural contexts in which
process of globalization and the increasing con- identities are managed. Are multicultural identi-
nectedness in the world includes but is not lim- ties easier to claim and maintain in culturally
ited to transnational migrations, international diverse than culturally homogenous contexts?
business interests, world tourism, and the exis- More generally, increasing exposure to different
tence of technology and media, all of which cre- cultures can broaden the self, perhaps leading to
ate the potential for individuals to have instant greater adaptability across space and time.
access to information from around the world. The
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Part IV
Constraints on Experience
Microsociologies: Social Exchange,
Trust, Justice, and Legitimacy 18
Michael J. Carter
18.1 Introduction ences as just or unjust, and how they endorse (or
do not endorse) power differentials between self
The past decades have witnessed the growth and and others.
development of various sociological theories that The plan of this chapter is as follows: I first
address micro-level social phenomena. The discuss how social exchange, trust, justice, and
“micro realm” of social reality encompasses legitimacy operate as specific dimensions of
intra- and interpersonal processes that influence social comparison. I then address each process
social interaction. Microsociological theories individually, summarizing their basic elements
address dyads, triads, and small groups—the and illustrating each. In each summary section I
everyday social structures that influence (and survey the recent literature that has advanced our
constrain) experience (Turner 2010). understanding of how the processes operate to
This chapter surveys contemporary sociologi- influence interactions in social life. Finally, I dis-
cal theories and research that address four micro- cuss recent research that has examined interrela-
level processes: social exchange, trust, justice, tions of exchange, trust, justice, and
and legitimacy. These four processes are central legitimacy—work that has addressed some com-
in social life; they are common themes that are bination of these processes.
diffuse and active in virtually all social interac- In the literature, social exchange, trust, jus-
tions. Whether experiences are novel or routine, tice, and legitimacy are often treated as analyti-
attitudes and behaviors are greatly influenced by cally distinct. Across the social sciences, there
social norms that represent what is right and are thoroughly developed research programs that
proper. Knowing how individuals (and groups) address each—to some degree—in relative isola-
determine what is right and proper—and why tion. Examining them together makes sense how-
social interactions often go smoothly—requires ever, as each is a specific dimension of a greater
an understanding of how actors exchange abstract process: social comparison.
resources, how they come to trust (and distrust) Comparisons are central in social life. There is
others, how they attribute actions and experi- ample evidence that individuals compare them-
selves to others in the social structure on multiple
dimensions, beginning early in the life-course
and continuing throughout life (Jensen et al.
M.J. Carter (*)
2015; Hoorens and Van Damme 2012; Boissicat
Sociology Department, California State University,
Northridge, Northridge, CA, USA et al. 2012). For instance, from early on we com-
e-mail: [email protected] pare what we look like to what others look like,
and what we have to what others have. We also accounts for variations in real-life situations such
compare how we are treated, and what we receive as this? For instance, why do some people com-
compared to what others receive. Perceptions ply in such situations, listening to and following
based on social comparisons influence many the orders of the police officer as the situation
important behavioral and emotional outcomes, unfolds, whereas others do not comply, arguing
such as motivation, self-esteem, and self-efficacy. with the police officer, becoming disruptive and
Theories that examine how social exchange, uncooperative? How do some people persuade
trust, justice, and legitimacy operate as compari- authority figures to give them a warning rather
son processes attempt to understand how indi- than a ticket in such situations? And why do
viduals make evaluative determinations about the some people attribute the situation of being
relative status, power, dependability, entitlement, stopped for a traffic infraction as caused by exter-
and properness of others in society (and oneself), nal factors (e.g., the perception that the law
and how individuals act based on those regarding the speed limit is unfairly slow) rather
determinations. than due to their own actions (e.g., speeding
To illustrate how social exchange, trust, jus- because one wanted to get a good parking spot at
tice, and legitimacy operate in social life let us work)? How can we understand these different
consider the example of an individual who is courses of action, none of which are uncommon?
stopped by a police officer for speeding on a free- Answers to these questions require us to under-
way. Such occurrences are relatively common, stand basic social processes that commonly occur
especially in metropolitan areas, and the interac- in social situations, such as the how individuals
tion between the police officer and the individual exchange resources, defer to authority, trust and
caught speeding in this example might be consid- predict courses of action, and strive to behave in
ered somewhat predictable: The police officer expected, normative ways.
would likely approach the perpetrator from In the above example, it is evident that social
behind, flash the lights of her police car to signify exchange, trust, justice, and legitimacy are all in
that the speeder should pull to the side of the operation. The police officer is depending on the
road, and approach the individual on foot after speeder to respect her authority, and comply with
both cars had come to a stop. The interchange her demands; the respect of authority is a legiti-
between the police officer and the speeder may mation process. The interaction between the offi-
then take various forms, depending on a variety cer and the speeder is also influenced by
of factors, such as the prevailing cultural norms procedural justice processes; the speeder per-
that define acceptable behavior, personality traits/ ceives whether the officer acts within the bounds
dispositions of each actor in the situation, each of what is fair (and lawful), and in line with how
actor’s experience in previous situations that are an authority figure should behave. Trust is evi-
similar to the present situation, meanings of the dent as well (or the lack of trust); because if the
present context (time of day, others present in the police officer is unfamiliar with the perpetrator
situation, etc.), and each actor’s personal biogra- she would likely approach the car cautiously, per-
phy. A predictable script in this example would haps with her hand on her gun in case something
be the police officer informing the driver that goes awry during the interaction. Without a pre-
they were speeding, the police officer asking the vious history of interactions neither the officer
driver for their license and proof of insurance, a nor the speeder will have high feelings of trust for
ticket being written and administered, and both one another, and such perceptions will likely
actors going on with their day. affect the manner in which each talk to one
The situation described above seems com- another, and what each expects the other to do.
monplace and not particularly novel, but what And, if the speeder tries to talk the officer out of
makes such an example so commonplace? What receiving a ticket it is likely that some form of
basic social processes are active in the situation social exchange process would be invoked, e.g.,
that account for the behavior of each actor? What either an ingratiation tactic or perhaps even
18 Microsociologies: Social Exchange, Trust, Justice, and Legitimacy 371
monetary bribery. It is clear that even in the most exchange), his five propositions of social
routine micro-level encounters, social compari- exchange still resonate and apply to contempo-
son processes such as exchange, trust, justice, rary exchange theories. Based on the notion that
and legitimacy can operate to influence how peo- all social behavior is influenced by perceived
ple interact. rewards and punishments that one receives while
There are myriad theories in sociology that interacting with others, Homans’ (1961) proposi-
address the manner in which individuals compare tions for social exchange include: (1) The stimu-
themselves to others. Let us now examine con- lus proposition (the idea that past behavior that
temporary theoretical frameworks that have has been rewarded is likely to be performed in
developed regarding social exchange, trust, jus- future encounters), (2) the success proposition
tice, and legitimacy. (the idea that behavior that leads to positive out-
comes is likely to be enacted in future encoun-
ters), (3) the value proposition (the idea that the
18.2 Social Exchange Theory more valuable an outcome of an action is, the
more likely the action will be performed in the
Of all the processes that involve social compari- future), (4) the deprivation-satiation proposition
sons, social exchange has been a central focus in (the idea that accumulated rewards have a utility
sociology and psychology (see Cook et al. of diminished marginal returns—the more of a
(2013), Emerson (1981) and Molm and Cook resource one receives, the less valuable addi-
(1995) for detailed summaries of exchange the- tional units become), and (5) the frustration-
ory as an evolving, cumulative research pro- aggression proposition (the idea that actors
gram). Classic ideas on the nature of social become agitated when they are withheld a
exchange were developed by George C. Homans resource in which they anticipate receiving or
(1958, 1961), John Thibaut and Harold Kelley feel entitled to have).
(1959), and Peter Blau (1964). Richard Emerson Generally, social exchange theory examines
(1962, 1976) then furthered understanding of the benefits people gain from interacting with
social exchange by incorporating power and others and the opportunity structures and interde-
dependence in classic models of social exchange, pendencies that influence and constrain those
providing a more complete understand of exchanges (Emerson 1981; Molm 2006; Molm
exchange relations (see Chap. 15 in this volume and Cook 1995). Let us examine the relationship
for a detailed discussion of Emerson’s power- between benefits and opportunity structures by
dependence theory). The work of Homans, summarizing the basic concepts of social
Thibaut and Kelley, Blau, and Emerson have exchange, to better understand how individuals
inspired many contemporary sociologists, who exchange resources in social life.
together have established a strong and thorough
research program over the past half-century
(Molm 1997; Chesire et al. 2010; Cook and 18.2.1 Elements of Social Exchange
Emerson 1978).
The exchange tradition in sociology began Social exchange involves the “exchange of activ-
with Homans’ (1961) belief that all social behav- ity, tangible or intangible, and more or less
ior is exchange behavior: it involves two actors rewarding or costly, between at least two per-
who exchange some resource, and all social sons” (Homans 1961). All forms of social
behavior involves the reinforcement or punish- exchange contain three elements: actors,
ment of one individual upon the other. This basic resources, and exchange structures (Molm 2006).
orientation to social life provided the foundation An “actor” in an exchange relation is a general
for all future work on social exchange. While term that can represent various entities, including
many now see Homans’ work as simplistic and both individuals and groups (i.e., when group
reductionist (he focused mostly on dyadic members behave in solidarity as a singular unit).
372 M.J. Carter
“Resources” are skills or things one possesses on a football team work together, exchanging
that have value for others. Resources can be individual efforts to the team concept (i.e., every-
material (i.e., tangible) such as money or goods, one role-plays) so that the team can win. All
or immaterial (i.e., intangible), such as love or members of the team realize that in order for
affection. everyone to accomplish the common goal, all
Exchanges between actors do not occur out- must exchange and sacrifice individually; the
side a specific social context; various factors reward (winning) is accomplished through pro-
influence and determine the nature of an ductive exchange.
exchange, such as the number of actors involved
in an exchange, and the setting in which an
exchange occurs. These varying factors are 18.2.2 The Exchange Process
known as exchange structures (Emerson 1972),
which can take the form of direct, generalized, or In addition to defining the elements of social
productive exchange (Molm 2006). A direct exchange, exchange theory also addresses the
exchange is a situation where (usually) two actors’ process by which exchanges occur within
outcome in an exchange relation is directly depen- exchange structures. The process of social
dent on one another’s actions. For example, pur- exchange involves four components: exchange
chasing an iPod from the Apple Store is an opportunities, initiations, transactions, and
example of direct exchange; a customer pays a exchange relations. An exchange opportunity
specific amount of money to a clerk for the refers to an actor’s opportunity to initiate an
good—the transaction is singular (though direct exchange. When an initiated exchange is recipro-
exchanges can also be repeated over time), imme- cated by another it is called a transaction.
diate, and direct between the exchanging units. Transactions are mutual exchanges of benefits
A generalized exchange is an exchange among between two or more actors. When multiple
three or more actors, where the reciprocal depen- transactions occur between or among actors, it is
dence among all actors in the exchange is indirect known as an exchange relation (Molm 2006).
rather than direct. For instance, in a generalized When actors develop an exchange relation-
exchange actor A provides actor B with some ship, the relationship takes the form of being a
resource, but actor B does not reciprocate and negotiated exchange relation or a reciprocal
provide A with a resource in return. After A pro- exchange relation (Emerson 1981; Molm et al.
vides the resource to B, B in turn provides some 1999, 2000; Lawler 2001). Negotiated exchanges
resource to actor C, and actor C then provides occur when actors engage in a joint decision
some resource to A. Generalized exchange is cir- making process and reach an agreement about
cular rather than direct. Universities provide a the terms of the exchange. Negotiated exchanges
good example of generalized exchange. Students are discrete and singular; generally, actors
pay tuition to take classes from professors; pro- involved in negotiated exchanges are not consid-
fessors are paid for their expertise and teaching ering the effect of the exchange relation on future
service. However, students and professors are not interactions or exchanges. An example of negoti-
directly involved in an exchange relation. Rather, ated exchange would be the purchasing of a
a student (actor A) pays tuition to a university home. Both the buyer (actor A) and the seller
(Actor B); the university then pays the professor (actor B) negotiate an acceptable price and then
(actor C), and the then professor renders their complete the transaction, in a one-time deal.
service to the student (by teaching the student). Reciprocal exchanges, on the other hand,
In a productive exchange two or more actors occur when an actor provides a resource to
work together to produce some valued commod- another actor without the expectation that a
ity or outcome that benefits all members in the resource will be immediately returned (or with-
exchange. Team sports provide good examples of out the absolute knowledge that a resource indeed
productive exchange. For instance, all members will be returned at a future date). Reciprocal
18 Microsociologies: Social Exchange, Trust, Justice, and Legitimacy 373
transactions are generally the most interesting to tively value, (3) actors engage in recurring,
sociologists. While negotiated exchanges are mutually contingent exchanges with specific
often economic transactions, reciprocal partners over time, and (4) all outcomes of value
exchanges are inherently social (and not eco- obey a principle of satiation (in psychological
nomic). Reciprocal exchanges imply that terms) or diminishing marginal utility (in eco-
exchange behaviors between actors are multiple nomic terms) (Molm and Cook 1995).
rather than singular; the exchange carries forth
across transactions, not solely within a single
transaction. Therefore, exchange theorists treat 18.2.4 Recent Research on Social
the sequence or series of transactions between Exchange
actors as the unit of analysis in reciprocal
exchange, rather than one specific exchange Recent applications of exchange theory have
transaction. The classic example of a common addressed a wide variety of processes. For
reciprocal exchange is that of helping a friend instance, some have addressed the structure of
move. In helping a friend move one provides a reciprocity—the giving of benefits to another in
service to another without knowing when (or return for something received—arguing that reci-
even if) the friend will reciprocate the favor. procity is structured and variable across different
Reciprocal exchanges involve a complex set of forms of exchange, and that variations in the
psychological and sociological processes, includ- structure of reciprocity have profound effects on
ing social integration and trust. The crucial dif- the emergence of integrative bonds of trust and
ference between negotiated and reciprocal solidarity (Molm 2010).
exchanges are that in negotiated exchange actor A network exchange approach has also been
A’s benefits to actor B are contingent on B’s ben- employed to understand social exchange. Some
efits to A, where as in reciprocal exchange bene- have examined how exchange patterns of com-
fits provided and received in previous exchanges mitment and inequality are affected when negoti-
between actor A and actor B affect A’s future ated exchanges are combined with reciprocal
behavior toward actor B (Molm 2006). exchanges in more complex relationships of
embeddedness (Molm et al. 2013), showing that
embedding negotiated exchanges in a relation-
18.2.3 General Assumptions ship of reciprocal exchange increases the strength
and Propositions of Social of behavioral commitments and reduces the
Exchange effects of structural power differences on
inequality.
While theories of social exchange have different Others have examined the development of
emphases, all share a few common assumptions commitments in structurally enabled and struc-
and make similar predictions. Exchange theory turally induced (constraining) exchange rela-
makes assumptions about the structure in which tions, revealing that a structurally enabled
exchange relations occur, the manner in which relation generates a greater sense of control, more
actors will behave in social structures, the way positive emotions, greater perceived cohesion,
that actors will interact within social structures, and more commitment behavior than a structur-
and the classes (or types) of resources exchanged ally induced relation (Lawler et al. 2006). Studies
between actors in social structures (Molm and such as these show the importance for under-
Cook 1995). More specifically, exchange theory standing both enabling and constraining features
involves four core assumptions: (1) Exchange of network structures and how they impact cohe-
relations develop within existing structures of sion and commitment in relations within such
mutual dependence between actors, (2) actors structures.
behave in ways to increase outcomes they posi- And, some have examined how groups form in
tively value and decrease outcomes they nega- competitive exchange networks, specifically how
374 M.J. Carter
and when small networks of self-interested on trust that are centered on ultimate causation
agents generate group ties at the network level, focus on evolutionary and cultural origins of
revealing that group affiliations are formed when traits that are associated with trusting behavior;
actors perceive themselves as members of a theories of trust centered on ontogeny address
group and share resources with each other environmental, experiential, and socialization
(despite an underlying competitive structure in factors that influence how trusting behavior
which actors may be embedded) (Thye et al. 2011). becomes a valued orientation for individuals in
society; theories that address proximate causal
mechanisms of trust examine stimuli or events
18.3 Theories on Trust that activate, maintain, or regulate trusting behav-
ior in populations. Let us examine these three
Theory and research on trust is found in both theoretical perspectives on trust more closely.
sociology and psychology (Lewis and Weigert
2012). In sociology, most scientific investigations
of trust as a social process are found in the social 18.3.1 Ultimate Causal Theories
exchange literature (Cook et al. 2009). Work in of Trust
this vein examines how trust and confidence in
others influences social exchange relationships, Ultimate causal theories of trust cite a plethora of
specifically how uncertainty affects cooperative historical factors that together provide evidence
relationships. Similar to social psychological for trust evolving in the human species as a sur-
examinations of trust in sociology, research in vival mechanism (Cosmides and Tooby 1992;
economics has examined how trust and the fear Brewer and Caporael 1990). For instance, some
of betrayal motivate individuals when they par- theorists conceive trust (and altruistic behavior)
ticipate in negotiated (economic) exchanges as an evolutionary byproduct that emerged in
(Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004). Regardless of human civilizations due to the need for humans
disciplinary emphasis, most contemporary per- to hunt cooperatively (Kurzban 2003). Popular
spectives on trust see it as a foundational inter- theoretical orientations on trust in this tradition
personal process that involves cognition, link the emergence of trust in humans to their ten-
behavior, and emotions (Weber and Carter 2002). dency and ability to mutually sanction one
Much of the work on trust is found in psychol- another for transgressions; the idea being that
ogy, influenced by the work of Morton Deutsch, without mutual sanctioning, trust in the norms
who defines trust as the confidence that an indi- and social institutions of contemporary society—
vidual will find what is desired from another and the tendency for individuals to regulate trust-
rather than what is feared (Deutsch 1973). While worthiness in one another—would not have
work on trust is often psychological in nature, evolved as it has (Simpson 2007; Henrich and
most contemporary scholars believe that trust is Boyd 2001; Gintis 2003).
an objective social reality, not reducible to psy- Ultimate causal theories of trust often cite
chological factors alone (Lewis and Weigert genetics as determinants of trusting behavior,
2012; Kasperson et al. 2005). Research has emphasizing that trust is a trait that was selected
shown that trust plays a central role in social life, during evolution. Here, gene-centered evolution-
not only in maintaining successful interpersonal ary models of selection such as inclusive fitness
relationships, but in developing as a healthy theory (Hamilton 1964) and reciprocal altruism
human being over time (Miller and Rempel 2004; theory (Trivers 1971) have been applied to under-
Cook and Cooper 2003). stand the development of trust. These models see
Theories on trust are generally classified three trust as an evolutionary trait that is passed down
ways, addressing either ultimate causation, through generations; altruistic behavior emerged
ontogeny, or proximate causation (Sherman when individuals showed preferences toward
1988; Tinbergen 1963; Simpson 2007). Theories helping biological relatives. These early, mostly
18 Microsociologies: Social Exchange, Trust, Justice, and Legitimacy 375
biological explanations for the development of and independence allows for individuals to trust
trust evolved to more sociological perspectives, others and rely on them in times of need while
which noted that altruistic behavior is not rooted not over-identifying with others and relying
solely in primary groups or in-groups—that trust- solely on them.
ing and self-sacrificial behavior is extended out- More recent ontogenetic, life-history theories
ward among inhabitants of a community, as a of trust state that early childhood experiences
mechanism of social integration and social con- provide children with diagnostic information
trol. More recent, gene-cultural co-evolutionary about the situations and environments they are
models emphasize that humans developed trust likely to experience as adults. For example,
via their tendency toward “strong reciprocity,” stressful situations and family dissension in early
which occurs when individuals enforce social childhood can influence children to develop neg-
norms and keep others in check to ensure that ative conceptions of themselves and others,
cheaters do not destroy the cooperative mecha- which leads a child to have more insecure attach-
nisms that exist within groups (Fehr and ment patterns later in life (Belsky et al. 1991;
Fischbacher 2003). Chisolm 1993). Early life experiences such as
these can lead one to adopt short-term expecta-
tions for future relationships, based on a level of
18.3.2 Ontogenetic Theories of Trust distrust and belief that such relationships are
ephemeral rather than long-lasting.
Early ontogenetic theories of trust were influ-
enced by Erikson (1963), who emphasized that
trust develops early in life-course socialization, 18.3.3 Proximate Causal Theories
from conflicts that children must deal with as of Trust
they mature across stages of development
(Simpson 2007). Erikson noted that trust vs. mis- Many of the proximate causal theories of trust
trust is one of the first conflicts for children. have emerged in the past few decades, in the
Feelings of trust toward others are influenced by work of Kelley et al. (2003), Holmes and Rempel
how attentive or neglectful primary group mem- (1989), and Wieselquist et al. (1999). Deutsch
bers are regarding early psycho-social needs. (1973) provided one of the original proximate
Children who have needs met by significant care- causal theories of trust. These theories emphasize
givers come to expect—and trust—that such situational factors that influence the development
needs will be met in the future, while children of trust between individuals. For instance, Kelley
whose needs are not met come to doubt and dis- et al. (2003; Kelley and Thibaut 1978) and others
trust that their needs will be met. see trust emerging when high levels of interde-
Subsequent ontogenetic theories of trust were pendence exist between social units, when indi-
developed by Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980), whose viduals need to coordinate activities to achieve
attachment theory showed that children develop goals, and when individuals are involved in
trust when they learn that they can turn to support exchange relationships where positive outcomes
systems in times of distress, and by Bowen are needed for one or both exchanging partners.
(1978), whose family systems theory links trust The model of trust proposed by Kelley et al. sees
to the development of a differentiated self- interdependence, coordination, and exchange
concept, representing an individual’s ability to being largely influenced by fear (Simpson 2007).
feel both attachment to and independence from Additional proximate theories of trust focus
others. Bowlby and Bowen’s ontogenetic theo- on the normative development of relationships,
ries show that those with differentiated self- specifically how trust develops based on predict-
concepts find it easier to develop trusting ability and uncertainty reduction (Holmes and
relationships with others as they progress through Rempel 1989). Trust emerges between individu-
their life-course; the differentiation in attachment als when they come to expect and predict others’
376 M.J. Carter
behavior. For instance, two individuals who meet Classical sociological ideas on trust has been
likely have idealized expectations for what the revisited as well; Frederiksen (2012) has applied
other is and should be. These idealized expecta- Simmel (1971) to better understand how trust
tions are vague and generalized in the initial operates differently in various types of social
stages of a relationship, but become more spe- relations. Contemporary research on trust spans
cific as interdependency forms between the indi- various disciplines and is both qualitative and
viduals over time. As individuals form a quantitative in nature. Recent qualitative studies
dependency, doubt, fear, and concern of rejection on trust have examined the distrust people feel
can emerge, causing anxiety. Actors diminish toward healthcare systems (Meyer 2015) and
their anxiety by reciprocating trusting actions how trust influences doctor-patient relationships
toward one another. This “reciprocal assurance” (Skirbekk et al. 2011). Recent quantitative stud-
reveals that each individual remains attached and ies have shown that the possession of high status
committed to the other. Trust elevates when such leads individuals to trust others more (Lount and
reciprocated action takes the form of making sac- Petit 2012). Game-theory has also been used to
rifices, taking risks, or placing oneself in a vul- understand how trust influences investments and
nerable position in relation to the other (Simpson returns in social networks (Frey et al. 2015).
2007; Pruitt 1965).
(Hegtvedt 2006). Perceivers are individuals who over-rewarded, and that people tend to perceive
assess the outcome of some procedure or distrib- situations as more just when attributions of injus-
uted resource. Receivers are recipients of out- tice are internal rather than external (Utne and
comes or targets of a procedure. Justice evaluations Kidd 1980). Social comparison processes operate
are determinations made regarding expected out- to determine one’s evaluation of justice as well,
comes or procedures, or whether a distributed illustrated by Adams’ (1965) formula of justice
resource or procedure was properly conducted. determination:
Three personal factors influence how a per-
OA / I A = OB / I B
ceiver assesses whether an outcome or procedure
is just: The first regards an individual’s charac- Where “O” represents an actor’s outcomes, “I”
teristics, such as status (e.g., one’s gender or age) indicates an actor’s inputs, and “A” and “B” rep-
(Hegtvedt and Cook 2001) and identity meanings resent two different individuals in a situation.
(based on in-group favoritism and the tendency The comparison equation reveals an unjust situa-
for individuals to devalue out-groups) (Clay- tion when actor A or B believe that their out-
Warner 2001). Second, one’s beliefs can influ- comes compared to their inputs are not
ence perceptions of justice. For example, if one commensurate with one another. Drawing on
believes that gambling is immoral one would cognitive dissonance theory, Adams noted that an
likely not feel as sympathetic for someone who imbalance in the formula of justice determination
lost money gambling. Third, personal motiva- causes distress in an actor whose outputs do not
tions can influence whether one sees an outcome equate their inputs, in comparison to another. In
as just or unjust (for example, if one behaves these situations actors will seek to reduce their
altruistically toward another they may not expect discomfort and restore balance to the equation,
resources in return, whereas if one’s motivations by either: (1) Altering inputs, (2) altering out-
were self-interested a resource may be expected comes, (3) cognitively distorting inputs or out-
after some helping behavior). comes, (4) exiting the situation, (5) cognitively
In addition to personal factors, situational fac- distorting inputs or outcomes of the other, or (6)
tors are also important to consider in justice eval- changing the object of comparison (Hegtvedt and
uations. Generally, individuals will behave more Markovsky 1995; Adams 1965).
justly when they are in situations that increase When an individual determines that some-
their level of self-awareness; also, decisions thing is unjust, it causes a reaction, taking the
made in groups are often perceived as more just form of an emotion, cognition, or behavior
than decisions made by individuals alone (Hegtvedt 2006). Regarding emotional outcomes
(Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995). Additionally, of justice evaluations, individuals often feel guilt
justice outcomes can be interpreted differently when they assess that they are over-rewarded
depending on whether such outcomes exist some resource or when a procedure or outcome
between friends or strangers (individuals gener- goes in their favor unfairly, and they feel anger
ally prefer more equitable distributions between when they are under-rewarded or when proce-
friends than with strangers) (Hegtvedt and Cook dures or outcomes are deemed unfair. Regarding
2001; Tyler and Dawes 1993). cognitive outcomes of justice evaluations, indi-
Justice evaluations are determined based on viduals are likely to alter their attitude or belief
the previous personal and situational factors, and about another who has contributed to their injus-
are influenced by both cognitive (Cohen 1982; tice. And, individuals are likely to behave toward
Van den Bos et al. 1999) and comparison pro- another differently based on whether one attri-
cesses (Hegtvedt 2006). Social cognition comes butes a justice evaluation as contingent on anoth-
into play when an individual makes an attribution er’s motives or actions. For example, one may
regarding a source of injustice. For instance, behave aggressively toward another if one per-
research has shown that being under-rewarded is ceives that the other person is responsible for an
likely to be perceived as more unjust than being outcome that is unjust.
378 M.J. Carter
(1) Generally, an authority’s claim to legitimacy Legitimacy theory has also been used to
will not be successful unless a consensus exists understand identity verification processes, spe-
between authority figures and subordinates cifically how individuals verify their “leader
regarding norms, values, beliefs, purposes, identity” in a task-oriented group (Burke et al.
practices, or and procedures that are aligned with 2007). Findings of this work revealed that
the use of power, (2) additionally, authority will verification of one’s leader identity is influenced
not be considered legitimate unless it is fair and by both gender and legitimation processes:
impartial—that benefits gained by the authority Legitimated female leaders and non-legitimated
figure benefit the common good or have some males find it easier to verify identities in task-
universal applicability, (3) beliefs in which an oriented groups. In addition, legitimated male
authority figure appeals must be based on objec- leaders tend to be over-evaluated in the amount of
tive facts, and (4) there must be an agreement their leadership relative to their own identity
between values, norms, beliefs, purposes, or pro- standards, while non-legitimated female leaders’
cedures, and the nature, conditions, and conse- leadership behavior tends to be under-evaluated
quences of the structure of the authority that is relative to their own identity standards.
legitimated (Zelditch 2006). Myriad empirical Legitimacy theory has also been expanded
studies have validated these prior conditions of and applied to marketing research. A recent study
legitimacy as central to the process of authority by Wang et al. (2014) has shown that individuals
and subordinate relationships (Massey et al. perceive the worth and legitimacy of products
1997; Zelditch and Floyd 1998; Zelditch and differently depending on the country in which the
Walker 2000). product is produced. And, some have examined
how annual reports and financial statements of
organizations create a sense of legitimacy, show-
18.5.2 Recent Research ing how fledging companies carve out legitimate
on Legitimacy reputations over time in a competitive market
(Irvine and Fortune 2015, forthcoming). A review
One of the most common applications of legiti- of the literature that incorporates some facet of
macy theory is to law enforcement. Scholars have legitimacy theory shows how central notions of
used legitimacy theory to understand how police authority and subordination are in social
and civilians interact, and how power is wielded interactions.
by those in positions of authority. One example
of such research is provided by Long et al. (2013),
who examined how legitimacy and fairness pro- 18.6 Interrelations Among Social
cesses influence whether or not police officers Exchange, Trust, Justice,
report acts of misconduct perpetrated by fellow and Legitimacy
officers. This research found that the perceived
seriousness of an offense and legitimacy So far we have covered four main areas of inquiry
(endorsement) are consistently strong predictors in microsociological theory: social exchange,
of officers’ intentions to report misconduct. trust, justice, and legitimacy. While these sub-
Legitimacy theory has also been applied to jects have been presented in discrete sections, it
understand how modern sexist viewpoints are is important that their commonalities be
endorsed (legitimized) by men and women, addressed. After all, these social processes do not
showing that females are relatively disinclined to operate in isolation; each operates reflexively,
recognize expressions of modern sexism as often simultaneously with corresponding
prejudicial, and positing that modern forms of processes. For example, trust, justice, and legiti-
prejudice may be perilous because they remain macy often influence how individuals exchange
unchallenged (Barreto and Ellemers 2005). resources with one another. When an individual
18 Microsociologies: Social Exchange, Trust, Justice, and Legitimacy 381
makes a justice assessment regarding how sidered to understand legitimacy processes in the
resources are allocated, the legitimacy of the criminal justice field. This work advances previ-
involved actors often influences perceptions of ous work that focuses mostly on compliance to
equity and fairness. And, an individual’s feelings the law to address justifications of the claims to
of trust toward another are sometimes affected by legitimacy made by power-holders, and how
the perception that they abuse a position of legitimacy changes over time. In a similar vein,
authority, or do not treat others in a just manner. Murphy (2005) examined relationships among
It is more likely that these processes operate in procedural justice, legitimacy, and tax non-
concert rather than in isolation. With that notion compliance, showing that attempts to coerce and
in mind, let us investigate recent research that has threaten taxpayers into compliance can under-
examined interconnections among social mine the legitimacy of a tax office’s authority,
exchange, trust, justice, and legitimacy. which in turn can affect taxpayers’ subsequent
Past research applied knowledge of social compliance behavior.
exchange and trust to understand what affects Some have applied theories of justice and
individuals’ trust toward managers in organiza- legitimacy and examined the collectivity-
tional settings (Whitener et al. 1998). More generated legitimacy of reward procedures and
recent work has examined the reciprocal relations individual-level justice perceptions about reward
between trust and perceived justice, using neuro- distributions, finding that collectivity sources of
scientific evidence that suggests that trust can validity (authorization and endorsement) exert
develop between actors without conscious delib- positive effects on individual-level justice per-
eration; this shows that contrary to previous ceptions (as predicted by Hegtvedt and Johnson
notions that trust develops slowly between work- (2000)), but that the influence is entirely indirect
ers and management, trust can also form rapidly, through an individual’s perception of procedural
exerting a significant influence on employee per- justice (Mueller and Landsman 2004).
ceptions of justice (Holtz 2013). Exchange the- Trust has also been examined in the context of
ory and theories of procedural justice have been social exchange. For instance, the relationship
applied to management, specifically to under- between uncertainty and trust in exogenous shifts
stand how firms are managed differently depend- in modes of social exchange has been addressed
ing on whether firms are populated by family or (exchanges that are not initiated by individuals in
non-family managers (Barnett et al. 2012). a given exchange system) (Colquitt et al. 2012).
Using a more sociological lens, Hegdvedt Results in these studies have shown that trust
(2015) summarized the interrelated roles of jus- declines when the uncertainty created by the
tice and trust, showing how social identity-models mode of exchange decreases, if cooperation rates
and resource-based models of justice processes between exchange partners are high before and
facilitate the creation of legitimacy, and revealing after a change occurs in the mode of exchange
how justice and trust are influenced by power and (Chesire et al. 2010). Others have examined how
leadership, intergroup processes, situational fac- power, trust, and social exchange combine to
tors, and emotions. In addition, Max Weber’s con- determine how a community supports tourism,
ceptions of legitimate and charismatic authority finding that communities are more likely to sup-
have been applied to understand how trust devel- port tourism when residents trust in their govern-
ops in online worlds, when people collaborate to ment officials and when they trust that that
accomplish a task together (O’Neil 2014). benefits will be realized by increased tourism
In research examining the relationship (Nunkoo 2012).
between justice and legitimacy, Bottoms and There are many other examples of recent
Tankebe (2012) examined how legitimacy oper- research that has examined some relationship
ates in the criminal justice system, proposing that among exchange, trust, justice, and legitimacy
a dialogic model that includes both power-holder (Gillham and Edwards 2011; Schilke et al. 2015;
legitimacy and audience legitimacy must be con- Mazerolle et al. 2013). One can see how broadly
382 M.J. Carter
these four processes have been applied in recent provides confidence that their respective research
years. While most work on each originated in programs will be carried forward. Social scien-
sociology or psychology, scholars from across tists will also continue to investigate the interre-
the disciplines have applied theories of exchange, lations among exchange, trust, justice, and
trust, justice, and legitimacy to understand areas legitimacy, and even more work will be aimed
of social life. toward revealing how each process connects to
other core social processes, such as self and iden-
tity, status, and deviance.
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Ethnomethodology and Social
Phenomenology 19
Jason Turowetz, Matthew M. Hollander,
and Douglas W. Maynard
ethnomethodology. Therefore, when referring to things in the world are generally as they appear—
recent developments in social phenomenology, reveals how acts of consciousness are ceaselessly
we are not dealing with a coherent paradigm per producing the apparent naturalness of the world.
se, but rather a syncretic hybrid of which phe- Husserl’s goal was to ground knowledge in
nomenology forms a more or less prominent part. general, and scientific knowledge in particular, in
Finally, we evaluate ethnomethodology’s posi- propositions about consciousness that were
tion in the contemporary field of sociological necessarily and certainly true. He thought of the
theories and propose avenues for dialogue with history of the sciences in terms of perennial
other paradigms, while also proposing future crisis, a situation in which what was required
research agendas. was a systematic transcendental philosophy.
Phenomenology would establish indubitable
truths about the conditions of the possibility of
19.2 Phenomenology: Origins our everyday experience and knowledge of ordi-
of Social Phenomenology nary worldly objects, which would then provide a
and Ethnomethodology universal basis for the more specific knowledge
claims of the sciences.1
Phenomenology is a philosophical tradition with Starting in the 1910s, Husserl’s program was
origins in systematic efforts to anchor classical taken up and developed by a series of students,
Western claims about knowledge and reality, par- some of whom departed in brilliant and original
ticularly those of natural science, logic, and ways from his own developing vision of phenom-
mathematics, in universal structures of human enology. Those of his disciples with the most rel-
consciousness. Founded by German philosopher evance to ethnomethodology and social
Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), phenomenology phenomenology include Martin Heidegger, Aron
sought to methodically investigate and lay bare Gurwitsch, and (although not personally working
the most basic elements of conscious perception. with him) Alfred Schütz and Maurice Merleau-
In Husserl’s philosophy, this took the form of Ponty. Heidegger, generally regarded as Husserl’s
establishing the relationship between noesis—the single most influential student, also has the dis-
act by which consciousness constitutes reality— tinction of being his most radical critic. Trained
and noema, the reality so constituted. As in in medieval philosophy, Heidegger was primarily
Kant’s transcendental idealism (a major influence concerned with the history of ontology and how
on Husserl), perception of objects is regarded as it had seemingly trivialized “the question of
an activity with distinct stages, and their exis- being” (Heidegger 1996: 1). He thus combined
tence for an ego-subject is “an accomplishment an awareness of modern philosophy with the
of consciousness” (Moran 2005: 53). Mediating ontological concerns of medieval Scholastic and
this fundamental relationship is intentionality, ancient Greek philosophers. In his lecture courses
“the manner in which objects disclose themselves of the 1920s, culminating in the classic treatise
to awareness as transcending the act of awareness Being and Time (1927), he transformed Husserl’s
itself” (ibid). Put differently, for Husserl con- epistemological and Kantian understanding of
sciousness is always consciousness of something. intentionality (consciousness is always correlated
The method of phenomenological analysis, with an object of consciousness) into an original
accordingly, entailed describing how the inten- ontological view (being is always the being of
tionality of consciousness constitutes objects of something). The distinctive way of existing of
perception and experience. Phenomenological
description requires the “bracketing” of our ordi- 1
Husserl was initially a student of mathematics, and his
nary experience of the world via a series of phe- concern for system and certain knowledge reflects this
background. Though a “continental” philosopher, his
nomenological “reductions.” This disciplined
ideas stemmed from some of the same sources (e.g.,
and rigorous suspension of the natural attitude of Frege) that inspired Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, and the
everyday life—which takes for granted that first generation of “analytic” philosophers in Britain.
19 Ethnomethodology and Social Phenomenology 389
human beings (Dasein: literally “being there”) is Another of Husserl’s students, Aron
seen as necessarily situated and engaged with Gurwitsch, took his philosophy in a different
worldly activities, with theoretical consciousness direction, producing a phenomenological psy-
emerging as only one among many ways of chology. Gurwitsch was critical of Husserl’s
human “being-in-the-world” (Dreyfus 1991). notion that consciousness constitutes objects out
The contrast of Husserl and Heidegger is par- of discrete, unconnected elements, arguing
ticularly instructive for our later discussion of instead that we always confront objects in the
Garfinkel’s relationship with much of the sociol- world that are already constituted as wholes, or
ogy of his time (see below). Whereas Husserl gestalts. Rather than asking how consciousness
held that conscious, intentional mental states pro- unifies discrete elements of experience into
vide a primordial foundation for our engagement coherent objects, Gurwitsch’s gestalt theory pos-
with the world, Heidegger developed a “phenom- its the pre-intentional appearing of phenomena as
enology of ‘mindless’ everyday coping skills” cohesive totalities. Objects appear to us as
(Dreyfus 1991: 3), or pre-conceptual practices by wholes, rather than collections of parts; indeed,
which people make themselves at home in the the parts that comprise an object appear as indi-
world, rendering worldly phenomena intelligible vidual parts only secondarily, against the back-
and familiar. Such commonsensical practices ground of the whole. This would suggest, pace
both precede and make possible the adoption of Husserl, that a complete reduction of the ele-
various theoretical perspectives on the world, ments of reality to atomistic elements (as consti-
including Husserlian phenomenological analysis. tuted by individual acts of consciousness) is
Consider, for example, the ordinary, everyday impossible.
activity of opening a door. It is not necessary to A third student, the French phenomenologist
perceive or understand doors theoretically—as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, also begins from the
wooden artifacts with certain colors, textures, premise that a complete reduction of the phe-
and geometric dimensions—in order to compe- nomenal world to individual acts of conscious-
tently interact with them. Rather, opening doors ness is impossible; also, like Gurwitsch, he had a
is a commonsensical cultural skill that we acquire keen interest in psychology, and held that phi-
during socialization as young children; only later losophy can make crucial contributions to that
do we come to regard doors as possible objects of science. In contrast with Gurwitsch, however,
theoretical inquiry. Indeed, Heidegger argues that Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of perception is
this intellectual stance typically only arises when grounded more in embodiment than cognition.
our normal non-conceptual relationships to More precisely, he insists on the irreducible role
worldly objects is disrupted in some way.2 The of the body in cognition, and refuses to consider
door as an “ontological” entity embedded in the mental processes apart from their embodiment.
flow of lived experience then shows up for us in a In this, he is closer to Heidegger, whose work
different mode, as an “ontic” one with abstract influenced Merleau-Ponty’s classic study
attributes that can be contemplated independently Phenomenology of Perception (1962)—although,
of any particular door. By conflating ontic and in contrast to Heidegger, he explicitly accords
ontological modes of being, argues Heidegger, the body a central place in his analysis of
the Western philosophical tradition has over- being-in-the-world.
looked the transcendental conditions of the pos- Merleau-Ponty thus challenges the assump-
sibility of any determinate way of human tions of traditional European philosophies, and
being-in-the-world. the psychologies that arose from them, that mind
and body are distinct kinds of reality; that mind is
the seat of human volition and takes ontological
2 precedence over body; and that the body is a
Heidegger’s view of mind and thinking is thus broadly
parallel with that of the classical pragmatists Dewey and mere instrument through which mind acquires
Mead. impressions of the world, which it then
390 J. Turowetz et al.
synthesizes independently of the body—a posi- cal grounding in what Husserl termed the
tion that received its classic statement in Lebenswelt (“life-world”); without such founda-
Descartes’ dictum cogito ergo sum (I think, tions, the findings of any sociological theory of
therefore I am). In effect, Merleau-Ponty turns social action will perforce be incomplete (Schütz
the cogito on its head, reformulating it as “I am, 1962). Especially after his emigration to
therefore I think” (Dreyfus 1991). As in New York in the 1930s, Schütz was in dialogue
Heidegger, being-in-the-world precedes, and with other influential philosophers of science
makes possible, any conceptual reflections that such as John Dewey and Carl Hempel, and with
take the world as an object of inquiry. In place of sociological theorists such as Talcott Parsons
the Cartesian intellectualized body, Merleau- (and, starting in the late 1940s, with Garfinkel,
Ponty posits the “phenomenal body” whose pri- who was Parsons’ student at Harvard).
mordial, pre-representational practices disclose In his mature statement of social phenomenol-
the existential horizons that make rational thought ogy, Schütz highlights the role of common sense
and action possible. thinking and knowledge in social action and
The work of these classical phenomenologists, social scientific theorizing. Following Weber,
particularly as interpreted by Alfred Schütz (see Schütz posited that we act with awareness that
below), laid the groundwork for interpretivist others are acting; from this precept, he developed
and interactionist phenomenological variants of a theory of how mutually coordinated social
sociological theory. As we will see, the earliest action is possible.3 To this end, he argues that by
formulations of social phenomenology followed way of socialization, we assimilate idealizations
Husserl in according primacy to mental that structure our perception of the world. Central
constructs—most notably the idealizations and among these idealizations are (1) the reciprocity
typifying schemas posited by Schütz—in their of perspectives, which assumes that standpoints
analyses of the social world. Early social phe- are interchangeable, such that if person A stands
nomenology, in turn, inspired Garfinkel in his in person B’s position, they’ll see the same object,
creation of ethnomethodology, which originated X, in the same way; and (2) the congruency of
in part as a critique of Schütz’s emphasis on con- relevances, or that any way of perceiving X stem-
cepts at the expense of actual bodily practices. ming from biographical differences will not
Garfinkel’s relationship to Schütz, then, paral- affect its objective empirical identity. Further, A
leled that of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to assumes B imputes these idealizations to her, and
Husserl. In both cases, dissatisfaction with the assumes B assumes that A does the same.
cognitivist aspects of the work of an influential Together, (1) and (2) illustrate “the general thesis
mentor led to an original and non-cognitivist of reciprocal perspectives.” This allows us to
vision of the structures of experience and how (re)-construct the other’s subjective point of view
people make sense of the world.
3
Schütz follows Weber in defining social action in terms
of (actual or intended) interaction with other persons.
19.2.1 Social Phenomenology According to Weber, “Social action…can be oriented to
the past, present, or future anticipated behavior of others”
In the 1920s, Alfred Schütz (1899–1959) was (Whimster 2004: 327). The stipulation that action is social
one of the first (with Max Scheler) to make con- “only when one’s own behavior is sensibly oriented to
that of others” (ibid: 328) implies that conduct oriented to
nections between sociological theory, particu-
non-human objects is asocial, “a mere event” or occur-
larly that of Max Weber, and Husserlian rence (ibid). As we argue later in the chapter, this concep-
phenomenology. His reasons for doing this were tion of the social is unnecessarily narrow, and recent
analogous to those of Husserl, but in the context developments in ethnomethodology (anticipated to some
degree in the philosophical phenomenology of Merleau-
of the social sciences rather than of philosophy.
Ponty and others) point to “acting alone” (i.e., with non-
Specifically, Schütz held that, like the natural sci- human entities) as a viable domain for sociological
ences, the social sciences need a phenomenologi- analysis.
19 Ethnomethodology and Social Phenomenology 391
in an intelligible way. It is on this foundation that (circa 1843–1844). It was in this intellectual
the typified constructs of common sense are context of the late 1960s that ethnomethodology
based (Schütz 1962: 12–13). Typifications, in first became a household word among sociologists.
turn, are formulated preeminently through the
medium of language, enabling the transmission
of knowledge within and between generations. 19.3 Garfinkel
Although prominent American philosophers and the Development
of science knew of Schütz, his work being pub- of Ethnomethodology
lished in prestigious academic journals, he did
not achieve wide recognition as a sociological Like social phenomenology, ethnomethodology
theorist until after his death in 1959. Two of his was significantly influenced by classical phe-
former students at the New School, Peter Berger nomenology. Born in 1917, Garfinkel developed
and Thomas Luckmann, went on to develop and a strong interest in sociology as a young man,
popularize his ideas in their highly influential attending the University of North Carolina, where
book The Social Construction of Reality (1966). he received his Master’s degree in 1942, and then
This classic statement of social phenomenology Harvard, where he earned a PhD in 1951.
launched numerous sociological variants of what Although it is well known that he was a student
soon became known as “social constructionism.” of Talcott Parsons, whose concern with the prob-
Though conducting original and important stud- lem of social order and theory of social action
ies of their own, their basic philosophy of social became central to Garfinkel’s own project, it is
science derived from Schütz. For example, they less often noted that during his time in North
argue that it is only in and through human inter- Carolina, he closely studied (under Howard
action that social reality emerges, such that the Odum) the works of the early Chicago School
social world is continually produced and enacted ethnographers, especially Florian Znaniecki
through social interaction. More specifically, (Rawls 2002). As Emirbayer and Maynard (2011)
building on a scheme Berger also articulated in have noted, this represents an early engagement
an influential study of religion (1967), he and on Garfinkel’s part with classical American prag-
Luckmann posit that social reality consists of matism, although the writings of the pragmatists
three dialectically interrelated moments: (1) had less of a direct influence on his formative
externalization, whereby subjective attitudes are ideas than those of the phenomenologists, par-
made available to other members of a society, ticularly Husserl and, several years later, Schütz
primarily through the medium of language, (2) and Gurwitsch.
objectivation, or the concretization of external- Like his teacher Parsons, Garfinkel’s touch-
ized phenomena in the form of routines and insti- stone question (sometimes referred to as the
tutions, and (3) internalization, whereby “Hobbesian problem of order”) was, “How is
individuals are socialized into the norms and social order possible?” But rather than pursuing
practices embedded in these structures. This phe- this question by moving away from the details of
nomenological conception of social reality con- life as it is lived and experienced, as Parsons did
trasted with the positivist orthodoxy pervading in the 1940s and 1950s, Garfinkel followed both
the philosophy of social science in the 1960s, and the Chicago school ethnographers and the phe-
for this reason was regarded as revolutionary. nomenologists in striving to keep the details of
Social constructionism especially resonated with concrete action in the forefront of his sociologi-
symbolic interactionists, resulting in an alliance cal lens. During his years in Cambridge, he also
that reinvigorated that paradigm (Fine 1993). It began reading, and then personally meeting with,
also influenced sociologists with a Marxist bent, Schütz, periodically taking the train to New York
who saw parallels between social phenomenology to discuss phenomenology and sociology with
and the humanistic philosophy of the young Marx him. He also had fruitful discussions with
392 J. Turowetz et al.
Gurwitsch, who was also living in Cambridge as reportable activities in and by which social actors
a lecturer at Harvard (Rawls 2006). produce a shared, mutually intelligible world.
By the early 1950s, Schütz had developed a According to Garfinkel, these practices, which he
mature version of his social phenomenology and came to call “ethnomethods,” were not located
was publishing his ideas in leading American primarily in the private cognitions of actors—the
sociology journals (e.g. Schütz 1945). In many contents of their minds—but rather in the lived,
ways, Garfinkel’s work began at the point at recognizable, and accountable actions that indi-
which Schütz’s ended. Although a kindred spirit viduals concertedly exhibited in interaction. It
in many respects, even at this early stage of his was not that consciousness and intentionality do
development Garfinkel differed from Schütz (as not matter for ethnomethodology; but rather, that
noted earlier) in his interest in the empirical these features of human life are always already
observation of people acting in actual, everyday embedded in shared practices, which precede
situations. For Garfinkel, this is the sine qua non them and provide for their intelligibility.
of any adequate theory of social action: it must Garfinkel was not the first to have this overall
do justice to actual human activities in their con- insight: G.H. Mead (1934), for example, had
crete and detailed orderliness (Heritage 1984; argued that mental activity was a phase of social
Garfinkel and Rawls 2006). In contrast, Schütz interaction, rather than its antecedent (see also
remained a philosopher to the end, content to Joas 1996; Emirbayer and Maynard (2011). And
theorize about action in the abstract without as we saw above, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty
observing it in real time (also characteristic of criticized Husserl’s privileging of conscious
Berger and Luckmann). It is perhaps ironic that, intentionality, instead emphasizing the back-
despite their many differences, Schütz shared a ground conditions for its emergence. However,
number of traits with Parsons and other positivis- Garfinkel went farther than these predecessors in
tic theorists of action and philosophers of sci- his efforts to empirically demonstrate and specify
ence. Both sought to model the foundation of the practices that constituted the seen-but-
society with conceptual structures, thereby rely- unnoticed background against which social
ing on unexamined assumptions—unscientific, action becomes visible and possible. Thus, in his
commonsensical notions—of what common- early work (see below), Garfinkel offered experi-
sense knowledge actually consists of. Whereas mental demonstrations of Schütz’s abstract the-
for Parsons this approach culminated in formalis- ses (e.g. about the thesis of reciprocal
tic typologies (e.g., AGIL diagrams), for Schütz perspectives) and, in the process, detailed how
it led to universal structures of common-sense the natural attitude—the mundane, common-
knowledge (e.g., “in-order-to-” and “because- sense perception of the life-world—is in fact an
motives,” “stocks of knowledge,” and “we- ongoing preconceptual achievement of social
orientations” that collectively comprised the actors.
fabric of the life-world).4 In their overview of the varieties of ethno-
Garfinkel, however, was dissatisfied with methodology, Maynard and Clayman (1991)
abstract sociological typologies of any sort, suggest three basic concerns shared by ethno-
whether those of Parsons or of Schütz. Though methodology and phenomenology. First, they
Schütz came closer to the domain of human share a focus on gestalt contextures, or the con-
beings’ actual sense-making practices, he never- stitutive features of everyday settings that make
theless stopped short of the observable and up the life-world. To explain how these contex-
tures are achieved in interaction, Garfinkel pro-
posed that people make use of the documentary
4
Both thinkers also drew extensively on empirical psy- method of interpretation, an ethno-method by
chology to explain the motives shaping social action.
which underlying patterns are ascribed to local
Whereas Parsons drew on Freud, Schütz drew on William
James and phenomenological psychologists such as phenomena. As Garfinkel puts it, “The method
Gurwitsch. consists of treating an actual appearance as a ‘the
19 Ethnomethodology and Social Phenomenology 393
document of’, as ‘pointing to’, as ‘standing on activities, in their details. This, in turn, led to a
behalf of’, a presupposed underlying pattern. Not reciprocal engagement between his analytical
only is the underlying pattern derived from its vocabulary for documenting members’ practices
individual documentary evidences, but the indi- (ethnomethods) on the one hand, and his empiri-
vidual documentary evidences, in their turn, are cal findings, on the other. The best-known, and
interpreted on the basis of ‘what is known’ about arguably most important, concepts in this vocab-
the underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate ulary are (1) indexical expressions, (2) account-
the other” (Garfinkel 1967: 78). Second, ethno- ability, and (3) reflexivity.
methodology treats rules as resources that actors
use to accomplish situated activities, rather than 1. Indexical expressions are utterances that are
abstract algorithms that predetermine behavior. understood according to their deep embedded-
That is, a rule is not an exogenous force that ness in the social context of their production
causes us to act in one way or another; nor does it and understanding. Such expressions have
have a determinate sense apart from the occa- posed problems for traditional linguists and
sions of its use. Rather, members use rules as philosophers, who have spent much effort
resources in performing various actions, such as incorporating certain classes of statements
justifying, exculpating, sanctioning, categorizing, (e.g. deictic references, performative speech
etc. Moreover, since no rule can ever exhaustively acts, etc.) into formal theories of language use.
specify all conditions of its application, members To paraphrase Garfinkel and Sacks (1970), the
must continually manage the discrepancy mission of the social sciences, traditionally
between rules and their referents; we continually speaking, has involved repeated attempts to
bring our actions into alignment with rules, which substitute objective expressions, which are
requires practical competences not encoded in putatively context-independent, for indexical
the rules themselves. Just as contracts have a ones, which are susceptible to endless (re)-
non-contractual basis, per Durkheim’s (1964 specifications relative to their spatio-temporal
[1893]) well-known formulation, so too do rule location in particular situations. Rather than
following and usage have a basis that is not stated trying to tame indexical expressions in the
in the contents per se. Third, ethnomethodology sense of regarding them as targets of remedy or
highlights the accomplished character of the repair, Garfinkel effectively radicalizes them
world, delineating the idealizations that support by making them subject to inquiry, and positing
our shared belief in and orientation to an objec- that all speech (and embodied action) is irre-
tive reality. Rather than presuppose the existence mediably and inherently indexical—including
of the natural attitude, or ascribe it to a vague any and all formal treatments of such expres-
mechanism such as “socialization,” Garfinkel sions, as in social scientific theorizing.
treats it as a topic of inquiry in its own right and Garfinkel’s famous breaching experiments
demonstrates how, through mutual adherence to (1963, 1967), wherein his confederates
the basic constitutive rules of daily life, we con- (mostly students) intentionally violated social
tinually (re)-produce the commonsensical fabric expectations to reveal their taken-for-granted
of the everyday world. features, illustrate the pervasiveness of indexi-
A reading of Garfinkel’s classic Studies in cal expressions. For example, Garfinkel
Ethnomethodology (1967), which constituted the describes an episode where a wife continually
culmination of his thinking by the late 1960s, asks her husband to elaborate on what he
reveals all of these convergences between ethno- means by the statement “I’m tired” (1967:
methodology and phenomenology. At the same 43), asking if he means “physically, mentally,
time, it indicates some crucial differences. As or just bored”; thus, when he replies “physi-
intimated earlier, the most basic difference was cally, mainly” she requests further clarification
Garfinkel’s insistence that theories of social (“You mean your muscles ache or your
action be empirically grounded in people’s actual bones?”). The fact that endless clarification/
394 J. Turowetz et al.
elaboration like this is not requested in ordi- tion, after further prompts for clarification
nary conversation is due to the use of tacit (“What do you mean”), he lashes out, saying
practices whereby members “fill in the gaps” “You know what I mean! Drop dead!” (1967:
surrounding such expressions and hold one 43). Here, the husband’s directives (don’t be
another accountable for doing so (see below). technical) and subsequent expletive treat his
2. Accountability: The accountable character of wife as deliberately violating social expecta-
situated social life has two dimensions. First, tions. In other cases, a member may decide
when participants or members are engaged the other party is joking around, being eva-
with one another, there are accounting prac- sive, or even showing signs of mental illness.
tices used to make their remarks to one another As Garfinkel puts it, “…activities whereby
both intelligible and warranted. Those prac- members produce and manage settings of
tices are constantly, and without remediation organized everyday affairs are identical with
or time out, conferring meaning on what we members’ procedures for making those set-
say and do. For example, participants accord tings account-able” (1967: 1). That is, acting
meaning to deictic terms in talk (such as pro- accountably is a ubiquitous concern of soci-
nouns) by way of practices for relating such ety’s members; it is a condition of displaying
terms to some referent in previous talk, the one’s competence.
person using the expression, or an aspect of 3. Reflexivity: since its introduction into the
the environment in which it is spoken. vocabulary of the social sciences, reflexivity
Garfinkel’s fundamental insight was that all has taken on varied, and sometimes incom-
expressions are like deictic ones in that they mensurable, meanings. When Garfinkel
acquire their meaning through participants’ coined the term, he had in mind a very specific
methods of contextualizing them. Second, meaning: that everything members say and do
members use of practices and methods have is a constitutive feature of the setting in which
an inherently moral dimension in the sense it’s said or done, and that each next-action
that we take it for granted, and assume others feeds back into the intelligibility of that set-
take for granted, that practices and methods ting. To concretize this, consider again the
indeed will be conjoined with our talk to ren- wife-husband conversation above: the hus-
der what we say meaningful. Garfinkel refers band’s directive (don’t be so technical) treats
to this mutuality of assumptions as a kind of the wife’s actions as pedantic, and thereby
trust. In other words, we ordinarily do not constitutes the situation as one where she is
have to explain ourselves in so many words being difficult; by continuing to solicit clarifi-
and do not hold others to such a requirement, cations, she may be seen to not comply with
which would only result in the chaos of an the directive, which would in turn reinforce
infinite regress of such explanations if we did. the husband’s definition of the situation.
When that kind of trust is violated, i.e. we Suppose, though, that the husband were to
encounter someone acting in culturally inept laugh at his wife, treating the whole matter as
ways, that causes a breakdown in our sense of a joke. This would result in a very different
reality unless we can rationalize it, for exam- understanding by the participants of “what’s
ple by coming to regard the person as incom- going on here.” The situation is now (re)-
petent (Garfinkel 1963). As shown by the defined as humorous; a definition which the
breaching experiments, people do not simply wife could then affirm or challenge in her next
let breaches stand, but take swift action to turn at talk. The point is that each one of the
restore a sense of normality and predictability. participants’ actions evinces an understanding
For instance, in the discussion between wife of what’s currently happening, such that each
and husband described above, the husband next-action does not simply respond to the
reprimands his wife, admonishing her, “Don’t situation, but continually (re)-constitutes it.
be so technical”; indeed, later in the conversa- Further, there is “no time out” (Garfinkel)
19 Ethnomethodology and Social Phenomenology 395
from this process; even if one were to leave particular attention to how they investigated and
the situation entirely, that, too, would occa- developed key concepts originated by Garfinkel.5
sion an account (“did you leave because you Bittner’s (1967a, b) investigations of policing
were angry?” “Was it because you were on skid row have become classic examples of
bored?” “Did you have to go to the wash- how members use rules as resources to solve
room?” etc.), that would then reflexively feed practical problems. In contrast with traditional
back into the situation’s definition. approaches to law and social action, which treat
laws as exogenous rules that structure conduct in
In addition to the aforementioned breaching a deterministic way, Bittner examines how they
experiments (also known as “tutorial demonstra- are drawn upon in specific situations to accom-
tions”), Garfinkel empirically illustrates and ana- plish local tasks. One of his central findings con-
lyzes indexical expressions, accountability, cerns the amount of discretion police display in
reflexivity, documentary method, and other phe- applying the letter of the law to particular cases.
nomena (“ad hocing,” “the etcetera clause”) in For example, police use laws to achieve objec-
studies of jury deliberations, determining causes- tives like “keeping the peace,” the definition of
of-death (at a suicide prevention center), data which depends on what is considered normal or
coding, clinical record making (and keeping), routine for a given setting. A panhandler on a
patient selection at a psychiatric clinic, and the street corner who is part of the routine goings-on
ongoing accomplishment and demonstration of in that context may not be cited or arrested, as the
femininity by an inter-sexed person (in his law may prescribe; however, were that same pan-
famous investigation of “Agnes”). Garfinkel’s handler discovered in a different (atypical) loca-
early followers supplied further investigations of tion, he could face legal consequences. This is
ethnomethodological themes, to which we now one way of further specifying what Garfinkel’s
briefly turn. notion of commonsense knowledge of social
structures could mean in the context of policing.
In addition to rules-as-resources, the analysis
19.3.1 Other Classic also illustrates the phenomena of indexical
Ethnomethodological expressions, in that the panhandler’s actions take
Investigations on different meanings and significances depend-
ing on their context, to which they are reflexively
Garfinkel’s early ideas and writings inspired a connected.
number of colleagues and students to investigate Another classic demonstration of rules-as-
ethnomethodology’s topics by undertaking their resources is Zimmerman (1969a, b) study of how
own research. These scholars collectively co- welfare officers apply bureaucratic regulations.
created the genre of ethnomethodological eth- Previous studies of bureaucratic organizations
nography, which pays particular attention to the largely accepted the Weberian model of
details of members’ practices for achieving the bureaucracy, whereby formal, codified rules pre-
intelligibility of their actions. Their studies show scribe best practices for most efficiently achieving
how the precepts central to Garfinkel’s program
are operative in a range of everyday and institu-
5
tional settings. Classic exponents of this form of Other classic studies include Sudnow’s (1965) ethnogra-
phy of a public defender’s office, in which he documents
ethnography include Egon Bittner (1967a, b),
how a range of criminal acts are (re)-interpreted as “nor-
Lawrence Wieder (1974), Don Zimmerman mal crimes” committed in usual ways for reasons typical
(1969a, b), David Sudnow (1965, 1967), and of a given class of offenders; Cicourel’s (1964) critical
Aaron Cicourel (1964). In what follows, we analysis of measurement in the social sciences; Pollner’s
(1975) explication of “reality disjunctures”; and Harvey
review three now-canonical contributions from
Sacks’ (1963) early research on descriptive categories that
this early group of ethnomethodologists—those eventually evolved into conversation analysis, which will
of Bittner, Zimmerman, and Wieder—paying be addressed later in the chapter.
396 J. Turowetz et al.
organizational ends. The more closely members terms of the code, the resident also frames the
of the organization adhere to these rules (the situation as one in which the staff person is fish-
more they conform to the ideal-type of legal ing for information; he thereby reflexively consti-
rationality), the more effectively they perform tutes the ongoing conversation as one where staff
their work. What Zimmerman found, in contrast, are trying to make him slip up. By invoking the
is that in many instances, welfare officers han- code to make sense of situations and motives,
dled difficult situations in ways not prescribed by residents and staff simultaneously constitute
the rules in order to make the agency function these as instances to which the code applies;
smoothly. That is, there is a gap between blue- indeed, the code receives its definiteness solely in
prints for how the organization is to run and the terms of such instances. Accordingly, though
actual situations encountered by members; mem- staff and residents oriented to the code as an
bers’ practices and routines are indispensible for external, objective constraint on their behavior—
bridging that gap and rendering it unproblematic a social fact—this objectivity was only achieved
(and perhaps even “uninteresting” per Garfinkel in and through the work of applying it—work
1967). that quickly becomes invisible even as it is being
A third classic study in this tradition is done.
Wieder’s (1974) ethnomethodological ethnogra-
phy of a halfway house for paroled drug offend-
ers, which has become a classic example of 19.4 The Evolution
ethnomethodology’s take on the relation between of Ethnomethodology
rules and action. The first half of the study pres- (Post-1967)
ents a fairly traditional ethnography of Wieder’s
experiences learning about the “convict code,” a Like Husserl, Garfinkel was a thinker in constant
name given to the informal rules of conduct by motion; he regularly revised, and occasionally
which residents regulated their own and others’ even rejected, his own previous analyses
behavior. For example, the rules prohibited (Lieberman 2013). Accordingly, despite its over-
snitching on fellow residents and “copping out” all continuity, any sharply drawn characterization
(i.e., confessing to illegal activities) and sharing of his work will be somewhat misleading.
information with staff members. He also showed Nonetheless, for expository purposes a useful
how staff and residents accounted for the overall distinction may be drawn between his earlier
failure of the reform program in terms of the thinking through 1967, and his later output.
code—for instance, residents would invoke it to Reviewing Garfinkel’s work in the 1970s and
justify not sharing information with staff, who beyond, two key developments can be identified:
then used it, in turn, to account for why the (1) the emergence of a clearer, more program-
reform program was failing (the majority of resi- matic commitment to non-cognitivism, or the
dents were rearrested or jumped parole). rejection of theories that accord causal primacy
The second half of the study is an ethnometh- to private mental states in explaining human
odological “re-specification” of the ethnographic behavior; and (2) an increasing interest in what
first half. Wieder argues that the reflexive, Garfinkel termed “ethnomethodology’s topics”:
accountable, and indexical features or properties particularly studies of science and work, as well
of the code are exemplified in the setting of the as natural language (Garfinkel and Sacks 1970).
halfway house. The code was not merely a nor- During this period there was also confusion and
mative guide to conduct; instead, it constituted debate about ethnomethodology’s relationship to
the very conduct that it regulated. Wieder (1974: other types of sociology, a matter which Garfinkel
169–70) presents the example of a resident refus- and his students made numerous attempts to clar-
ing to answer a staff member’s question, saying, ify. Their efforts would result in ongoing and
“I can’t answer that; you know I won’t snitch.” occasionally polemical exchanges between
Besides accounting for his refusal to answer in ethnomethodologists and their critics. In what
19 Ethnomethodology and Social Phenomenology 397
follows, we first discuss these exchanges, and toward the world, transforming it into an object of
then turn to the two aforementioned develop- disinterested inquiry. This attitude is characteristic
ments in Garfinkel’s post-1967 work. of conventional social science, and of the academic
disciplines more broadly. Ethnomethodology, by
contrast, is concerned with the very conditions
19.4.1 Controversy and Clarification under which worldly phenomena can be made
into research objects in the first place. EM and FA
When ethnomethodology entered the common are asymmetric alternates because a precondition
vocabulary of sociology in the 1960s, there was for doing formal analysis is glossing over, or con-
uncertainty about its aims. To some, it seemed cealing, the practices through which theoretical
like a radical critique of the very possibility of objects are produced; one cannot do both simul-
producing sociological knowledge. Accordingly, taneously, though one (FA) begets the other
it appeared to some that Garfinkel was trying to (EM). Accordingly, the EM-FA relationship is
subvert the discipline, replacing it with a relativ- not one of antagonism or subversion, but comple-
isitic, “anything goes” ethos (Coser 1975).6 mentarity, in the sense that all attempts at FA
Others were more sympathetic, but appropriated invariably conceal their preconditions, which
ethnomethodology in ways that Garfinkel would then become EM’s topics.
come to take issue with. In this group we can Thus, in response to critics who accused him
place Aaron Cicourel (1964) and Dorothy Smith of undermining the discipline, Garfinkel made it
(1987), as well as certain figures in symbolic clear that he intended no such thing. Rather, his
interaction (e.g. Denzin 1969). As a result, intention was, and always had been, to ground
Garfinkel increasingly lost control over the mean- the formal analytic claims of sociology in an
ing of “ethnomethodology”; these proliferating understanding of the preconditions for their artic-
interpretations continue to influence the way ulation. Inspired by the phenomenologists who
many non-specialists understand ethnomethodol- influenced him in his formative years, particu-
ogy to this day (e.g. Collins 2004). larly Husserl, Garfinkel sought to delineate the
How, then, did Garfinkel conceive of ethno- taken-for-granted background procedures and
methodology’s relationship to sociology? In a practices that give rise to the phenomena of the
paper with Harvey Sacks (Garfinkel and Sacks social sciences (see Psathas 1989). That is, just as
1970), Garfinkel distinguishes between construc- Husserl sought to “ground” the particular sci-
tive analysis and ethnomethodology. This early ences by means of phenomenological analysis
distinction later evolved into one between Formal without thereby claiming to criticize or revise
Analysis (FA) and ethnomethodology (EM), or their findings, so Garfinkel sought to discover the
what Garfinkel would come to call ethnometh- roots of the various topics studied by sociologists
odology’s “asymmetric alternates” (Garfinkel in actual human activities.
2002). Formal analysis adopts a theoretical stance Garfinkel would later frame the FA-EM dis-
tinction in terms of “Durkheim’s aphorism,” or
6
As Maynard (1986) observed, from its outset, ethno- the dictum that, “The objective reality of social
methodology was regularly characterized in starkly con- facts is sociology’s fundamental principle”
trasting ways: methodologically, as a method without (Garfinkel 1991, 2002). Whereas FA is concerned
substance vs. lacking any methodology whatsoever; theo- to enumerate, categorize, and analyze objective
retically, too subjective and embedded in philosophical
idealism vs. radically empirical and neo-positivistic; social facts, EM seeks to understand how these
politically conservative (with its seeming avoidance of facts are generated in and as the concerted actions
history and social structure), vs. liberal because of its of social actors. In order to accomplish this, EM
focus on freedom of action and intention, vs. radical in needs to remain separate from FA; for, otherwise,
uncovering the tacit procedures for reproducing reality
and its capacity to demystify social reifications, vs. apo- EM would just become another branch of FA and
litical because any political perspective could “use” it. treat its phenomena as given, rather than being
398 J. Turowetz et al.
constituted in and through the practices of ordi- itself a phenomenon for members (Coulter 1989).
nary members of society.7 In other words, they Mind does not cause actions, but rather emerges
are and must remain “asymmetric.” This, then, is in the course of action, particularly when a prob-
Garfinkel’s mature response to sympathetic lematic or perplexing (Dewey 1910) situation
thinkers who appropriated EM to do construc- arises—e.g., when our habitual ways of acting
tive/formal analysis, namely, that they reduced encounter obstacles or aporia. Accordingly, men-
EM to just another variant of FA. tality is not an omnipresent feature of social
action, but rather is a special feature of certain of
its cases.
19.4.2 Ethnomethodology For many thinkers of the 1960s and 1970s, the
and Non-cognitivism only alternative to cognitivism was behaviorism,
as classically articulated by John Watson and
To return to the new directions in Garfinkel’s B.F. Skinner. Cognitivism, having become ascen-
thinking, during the 1970s and 1980s, he became dant in the 1960s with Noam Chomsky’s revolu-
increasingly critical of cognitivism and con- tionary work on computational linguistics and
cerned to argue that ethnomethodology had generative grammar, posited mental activity as
always been a non-cognitivist enterprise. the basis for our relationship to the world. To this
Although there are many different varieties of extent, it drew on established Western philosoph-
“cognitivism,” it is a general theoretical approach ical traditions in prioritizing the theoretical and
taken by many social scientific, psychological, mental. Any human activity should be under-
and philosophical explanations of mentality, lan- stood as caused by the mind, or our rational men-
guage, and behavior. Cognitivist explanations tal faculties. Regardless of what we’re doing, our
tend to share the view that mental states play a mind is always engaged. Behaviorism, by con-
paramount role in explaining human behavior. trast, treats mind as an epiphenomenon that has
The relationship is typically presented as causal: no scientific validity, as it is not directly observ-
antecedent mental states cause social actions, able. Thus, the focus should be entirely on visible
such that in order to explain actions, we must behavior, and all descriptions ought to be in
determine the intention behind them. By contrast, behavioral terms.
non-cognitivist approaches, represented in phi- Ethnomethodology, with its unique concep-
losophy by Ludwig Wittgenstein (2010) and tion of mentality-in-action, and as it evolved in
Gilbert Ryle (1984 [1949]), as well as certain the hands of Garfinkel and a younger generation
strains in phenomenology (e.g. Merleau-Ponty that he influenced—especially Jeff Coulter
and Heidegger; see Dreyfus 1991) and pragma- (1979)—represented a third way that pointed
tism (see Emirbayer and Maynard 2011) view beyond the impasse between cognitivism and
mental states, along with rules and norms, not as behaviorism. Coulter worked out a coherent
causal forces, but resources with which to account social philosophy of mind that combines ethno-
for and describe actions. Minded action, then, is methodology with the later philosophy of
Wittgenstein, terming the resultant approach
“epistemic sociology” (Coulter 1979). Coulter
7
Garfinkel’s position on this matter recalls Heidegger’s conceives of mind as a publically observable fea-
(1996) insistence on the fundamental, radical distinction ture of certain human activities; it follows that we
between beings, or empirical entities and objects in the
world, and Being (Dasein), as the irreducible, ineffable commit a “category mistake” (Ryle 1949) when
background against which beings appear. Any attempt to we reify mind and treat it as a distinct type of
articulate a formal analytic conception of Being reduces it reality. Mind is a way of doing things, and is not
to a particular being, thereby concealing what it meant to located in either a spatio-temporal locus (i.e. a
reveal. By the same token, efforts to translate EM into
formal analytic terms would reduce it to another branch of module(s) in the brain, as argued by cognitive
FA, and thereby lose the phenomena that are EM’s topics. scientists and philosophers [e.g. Fodor 1983]) or
19 Ethnomethodology and Social Phenomenology 399
a second type of immaterial reality. Beyond is constituted through shared actions and prac-
philosophical materialism and dualism, third tices, or what Wittgenstein called shared “forms
ways of understanding mentality are possible. of life.” Accordingly, the attitude ethnomethodol-
Many of the discussions and debates over the ogy takes up, beyond a “suspension of belief,” is
relationship of ethnomethodology to the rest of one that highlights what Garfinkel (1967) called
sociology, including social phenomenology, the “seen-but-unnoticed” features of human
hinge on the question of cognition, and its place actions.
in an analysis of members’ methods for constitut-
ing social phenomena. Husserl’s phenomenology
was decidedly concerned with cognition, con- 19.4.3 Ethnomethodological Studies
sciousness, and the role of intentionality in con- of Work
stituting phenomena. As we saw, this was the
version of phenomenology that Schütz trans- The second of Garfinkel’s post-1967 preoccupa-
formed into a social phenomenology that was tions was with “work,” particularly scientific
developed and popularized by Berger and work, and the uniquely adequate procedures
Luckmann. It was also the version to which cer- needed to accomplish it. Early reflections of this
tain scholars tried to assimilate ethnomethodol- interest can be found in Garfinkel’s studies of
ogy in the 1970s and 1980s, including Denzin jury deliberations, outpatient psychiatric clinics,
(1969) and Psathas (1989). and suicide prevention centers (1967). Later, in a
Psathas in particular sought to articulate a dis- paper written with Michael Lynch and Eric
tinctively phenomenological ethnomethodology, Livingston, he examined the discovery of a scien-
which involved arguing that the two enterprises tific object—a pulsar—by workers in an astro-
were basically pursing the same objectives, such nomical observatory (Garfinkel, Lynch, and
that ethnomethodology provided an empirical Livingston 1981). Garfinkel and his collaborators
extension and grounding of phenomenology’s treat the discovered object as inextricably bound
theoretical concepts. Thus, Psathas compares the up with the process of its discovery; it is consti-
phenomenologist’s eidetic reduction, or suspen- tuted through the very embodied practices, or
sion of belief in the natural attitude in order to members’ methods, that provide for its manifes-
study its preconditions, to the “ethnomethod- tation, rather that somehow existing outside of or
ological attitude” which similarly “suspends apart from them. That is, they were interested in
belief in society as an objective reality, except as the “particular occasions as of which the object’s
it appears and is ‘accomplished’ in and through production—the object—consists, only and
the ordinary everyday activities of members entirely” (ibid: 139, italics in original).
themselves. That is, [it] does not suspend belief Already in 1967, Garfinkel had challenged the
in members’ beliefs or in their practices as being conventional distinction between scientific and
themselves in the world of everyday life” (Psathas everyday (“lay”) rationalities. Rather than posit a
1989: 82–3). sharp difference between the disciplined inquiry
Psathas rightly points out that ethnomethodol- of the scientist and the undisciplined reasoning of
ogy involves transcending and bracketing the the layperson, Garfinkel instead proposes that, in
natural attitude to investigate its essential con- fact, scientific activities depend on and adapt
stituents. At the same time, however, Psathas’ practices of commonsense reasoning to the con-
formulation proposes that our fundamental rela- stitution and investigation of scientific objects.
tion to society is one of belief. Here, he runs into As he developed his thinking about work and
the same difficulties that Merleau-Ponty and the professions, Garfinkel (1986) conceived of
Heidegger identified in Husserl. In particular, the “hybrid studies” in which researchers immerse
most basic relation of humans to each other and themselves in a work setting—the classroom,
the world is not a matter of consciousness or con- factory, laboratory, etc.—and learn the practices
scious states like believing or knowing; rather, it necessary to become competent practitioners
400 J. Turowetz et al.
there. In the process, students of the workplace to those of ethnomethodology.8 These include,
become hybrid worker-researchers who can but are not limited to, preserving the phenome-
reflexively articulate the just-thisness, and phe- non being analyzed; warranting analyses of talk-
nomenal properties, of professional practice. in-interaction through members’ own displayed
Working on this level of detail provides fine- orientations and actions (rather than those of the
grained insights into the shop floor problem, analyst); and a reflexive sense that concrete social
which essentially concerns the actual making of interaction is “a primordial site” of human social-
coherent, worldly things (Garfinkel 2002: 109). ity (Schegloff 1986).9
Like his earlier demonstrations of the inexhaust- CA, emerging from the collaborative work of
ibility of descriptions, which are indefinitely Harvey Sacks with Emanuel Schegloff and Gail
extendible (i.e. indexical), the shop floor problem Jefferson in the 1960s and 1970s, examines natu-
denotes the ever-present discrepancy between rally occurring talk and embodied conduct in
blueprints and the practices through which they interaction, with the aim of identifying proce-
are realized; or, as Suchman (1987) puts it, dures that members deploy to co-produce the
between “plans and situated actions.” intelligibility of everyday and institutional
In addition to his own research (Garfinkel actions. CA works with audio and, more recently,
1986, 2002), Garfinkel’s students and colleagues video data, which the analyst transcribes accord-
published a number of influential hybrid studies. ing to a set of conventions developed by Jefferson
Among the better known of these are Lynch’s (1974) that are meant to capture the details of
(1985) investigation of neurobiological labora- speech and gesture in social conduct. While CA
tory work—which, along with Latour and as an autonomous research tradition is outside
Woolgar (1979) and Knorr-Cetina (1981), was the scope of this paper (see Clayman and Gill
among the earliest and most influential lab eth- (2004), for a comprehensive overview, and
nographies in the field of science and technology Maynard (2013) for CA’s relationship to EM and
studies; Suchman’s (1987) research on human- cognate disciplines), many of the scholars who
machine interaction, and its implications for cog- advanced both ethnomethodology and conversa-
nitive science (1988); and Livingston’s (1987) tion analysis work in both traditions, effectively
analysis of mathematical reasoning. doing ethnomethodological CA. Accordingly,
their work will be presented below.
stereotyped behaviors. No biomarkers have been of situational variables, some of which dramati-
established for autism, and clinicians rely on a cally raised or lowered rates of obedience to the
combination observation, interviewing, testing, psychologist (e.g., proximity to the man receiv-
and third-party reports to make a diagnosis. ing shocks, placement in a chain of command,
Recent studies by Turowetz (2015a, b) examine proximity of the authority figure). Despite the
how clinicians identify children’s potentially seeming importance of these findings (the ques-
symptomatic behaviors, particularly in the con- tion of Milgram’s research ethics notwithstand-
text of reporting on their interactions with a par- ing), social psychologists have experienced great
ticular child to colleagues during diagnostic difficulty over the years in arriving at a consensus
discussions. For example, key figures in the as to how they are best interpreted. In “obedience
assessment process, including the child, clini- to authority,” did Milgram discover a coherent
cian, and test instrument, are represented in ways social psychological process at work in a wide
that foreground the child’s conduct—by way of a variety of real-world situations, ranging from
practice called citation—while eliding the inter- everyday authority-subordinate relations at work
actional context where it appeared (2015a). and school to cases of genocide such as the
While this practice comports with the require- Holocaust? Is “obedience to authority” in fact the
ment of standardized assessment that other agents process at work in the experiments, or is some
(clinician, test instrument) not contribute to the other description of action more apt?
child’s performance, it has the effect of individu- Recently, Hollander (2015) has addressed
alizing children’s symptoms, which it locates such questions from the perspective of ethno-
primarily inside the child, rather than the envi- methodology and conversation analysis, re-
ronment in which s/he is embedded. In so doing, specifying “obedience to authority” in terms of
it reproduces reductionist tenets of modern bio- directive-response conversational sequences.
medicine, which tends to treat patients as self- Whereas most literature on Milgram has focused
contained monads divorced from the social on obedience, Hollander highlights the role resis-
world. Further, it encourages interventions aimed tance to continuation played in the experiments.
principally at the child, leaving the environment Specifically, he finds that resistance to the
largely unchanged. Experimenter’s directives to continue shocking
By fitting their reports to standardized assess- the Learner is a typologically and sequentially
ment protocols, clinicians demonstrate that organized phenomenon of social interaction. By
results were achieved in a warrantable and “typologically,” he means that six types of resis-
accountable way. Indeed, such reports do not tance to the directives recur amongst both out-
simply document standardization, but help con- come groups (the “obedient” research participants
stitute it as an established fact. In the process, who fully complied, and the “defiant” ones who
however, clinicians also reproduce the medico- successfully stopped the experiment). By
cultural assumptions that standardized protocols “sequentially,” he indicates that resistance takes
encode. place against a background of organized conver-
A second example concerns the negotiation of sational sequencing. Conversation analysis can
legitimate authority in the Milgram “Obedience” show how Milgram’s research participants find
Experiment of 1961–1962. In one of the most themselves in a situation of competing and
famous and controversial series of experiments in opposed relevant next actions—whereas the
twentieth century social psychology, Stanley Experimenter directs them to continue (directive-
Milgram (1933–1984) found that randomly response sequencing), the Learner complains
selected residents in Connecticut would deliver about the shocks and demands for the experiment
what they thought were increasingly powerful to be discontinued (complaint-remedy sequenc-
electroshocks to another ordinary citizen, simply ing). This research thus takes a classic topic of
on the say-so of a research psychologist. In 24 social psychology—obedience to authority—and
experimental conditions, Milgram tested a variety rethinks it, examining the Milgramesque situation
19 Ethnomethodology and Social Phenomenology 403
at the level of detailed structures of social interrogated the socio-logic of moral concepts
interaction. (Coulter 1989) as well as their use-in-practice
(Turowetz and Maynard 2010). Moral reasoning
19.5.1.2 Morality and accountability are observable, reportable,
Some of the liveliest debates about cognition and and analyzable in such everyday activities as
practice have concerned morality and moral agreeing and disagreeing with others’ assess-
behavior. On one side of this debate are scholars ments (Pomerantz 1984), aligning and/or affiliat-
like Vaisey, who view (implicit) values as causes ing with others’ actions (Heritage and Stivers
of action; on the other are those who, like Swidler, 2013), turn-taking (Sacks et al. 1974), complain-
defend a version of Mills’ pragmatist conception ing (Drew 1998), blaming (Pomerantz 1978),
of values, construing them as tools for justifying arguing (Antaki 1994; Reynolds 2011), or deliv-
and accounting for actions (for another classic ering or receiving bad or good news (Maynard
statement of this perspective, see Scott and 2003), as well institutional activities that proceed
Lyman 1968). in such venues as courtrooms (Atkinson and
On the territory of this debate, ethnomethod- Drew 1979; Maynard 1984), doctor’s offices
ology is certainly closer to Mills’ side of the ter- (Heritage and Maynard 2006), and social scien-
rain. However, whereas those in the Millsian tific experiments (Hollander 2015). Accordingly,
tradition have conventionally used actors’ any attempt to predict moral behavior would first
responses to interview and survey questions (or need to specify just what that behavior is, in its
vignettes; see Swidler 2013) to investigate their details, and how it looks in practice. Among other
moral orientations, ethnomethodologists exam- things, such specifications have the potential to
ine their situated practices, increasingly with the open a fruitful dialogue between EMCA and
assistance of video technology (see below), to other approaches to moral praxis.
identify morality-in-action. As Rawls (2006)
points out, interviews and surveys are different
from the social contexts in which the asked-about 19.5.2 Embodied Action
behavior actually occurs (also Jerolmack and
Khan 2014); at best, they provide ex post facto Recent research in ethnomethodology and con-
accounts of actions from the perspective of an versation analysis has stressed the embodied,
interviewee, rather than the situated rationalities multimodal character of social action.
evinced as these actions were performed. Since Multimodality refers to the synchronized use of
an action’s meaning is inseparable from the speech, gesture, gaze, and bodily comportment to
sequence of talk-based and embodied moves in coordinate and accomplish everyday activities.
which it’s located, it is to that sequential context This line of work has been greatly enhanced by
that ethnomethodologists would recommend the use of video recordings (Vom Lehn 2014),
turning our attention.10 which allow researchers to repeatedly examine
In many ways, morality is at the center of the the concerted, moment-by-moment performance
ethnomethodological perspective (Turowetz and of social actions at a level of detail and granular-
Maynard 2010). Garfinkel always stressed that ity that would otherwise be unavailable. Social
the social order was a moral order founded on phenomenologists, too, have begun to make use
mutual trust that others will act as expected. of video technology to analyze the lived, embod-
Following his lead, Garfinkel’s students have ied production of social actions. Katz (1996,
2001), for example, analyzes video-recordings of
10
For a different take for ethnomethodology’s relation to fun-house visitors, demonstrating how patrons
the survey interview—wherein the interview is treated as combine various practices to construct fractured
an interactional domain for investigation along the lines (and sometimes grotesque) mirror images of
of studies of work, see Maynard and Schaeffer (2000). On
ethnomethodological studies of work, see below. themselves and others as humorous.
404 J. Turowetz et al.
in particular (see Kendon et al. 1988). Indeed, the whereas White Americans prioritize information
procedures for concertedly producing recogniz- seeking by way of category-questions (e.g. about
able social actions, including turn-taking, repair, occupation, residence, etc.), African Americans
preference organization, etc., identified by con- tend to focus on displaying solidarity—which,
versation analysts can be viewed as invariant fea- among other things, involves not placing inter-
tures of the interaction order of society. These locutors in hierarchical categories; further, where
practices have their roots in ordinary conversa- African Americans generally prefer to volunteer
tion; when modified, however, they can be personal information, whites expect to be asked
adapted to more circumscribed interaction (249). These conflicting expectations can lead to
orders—for example, courtrooms prescribe spe- misunderstandings and resentment, with African
cific rules for the allocation of turns, repairing Americans viewing whites as prying and intru-
misunderstandings, question-answer sequences, sive and whites perceiving African Americans as
etc. (Atkinson and Drew 1979); doctor’s offices rude or ignorant (255).
have their characteristic interactional structures Another recent investigation of race and
(Heritage and Maynard 2006); and so forth. inequality that takes an ethnomethodological
Rawls (1987) has written extensively on the approach to interaction orders is Duck’s (2015)
interaction order from an ethnomethodological ethnographic study of a poor, predominantly
perspective, particularly with regard to how it African American neighborhood in an urban
organizes and sustains self-presentation, and its area. In the tradition of ethnomethodological eth-
attendant obligations and entitlements, in every- nography pioneered by Garfinkel, Wieder, and
day interactions. The interaction order is both a Bittner (see above), Duck documents the prac-
social and moral order, in that it forms the basis tices and expectations whereby residents consti-
for mutual intelligibility and self-presentation. tute their neighborhood as a community. Whereas
Different expectations about the interaction order outsiders view the neighborhood as chaotic and
can reflect and (re)-produce divisions among disorderly, and plagued by drugs and violence,
groups, effectively creating separate interaction Duck demonstrates that for residents, the com-
orders with disparate moral commitments and munity is both orderly and organized; and, to the
values (Rawls 2000: 247). This, in turn, can cre- extent that outsiders—from the media to policy-
ate conflict. For example, Rawls (2000) finds that makers—misconstrue the neighborhood as a dis-
interactional troubles between white and black organized space, this is due to a failure to
Americans result from the two groups’ divergent understand the dynamics of the local interaction
expectations about social conduct and communi- order and how it provides for the intelligibility
cation, such that “persons are not able to recog- and accountability of everyday happenings.
nize one another’s conversational moves” (2000: The work of Rawls and Duck represents, and
241). Members treat these perceived breaches as exemplifies, the potential of the interaction order,
accountable, and the accounts they produce often specified in terms of members’ concerted practices
draw upon and reproduce racial stereotypes, and perspectives, to illuminate the interactional
which in turn contributes to the perpetuation of bases of phenomena ranging from micro-
social inequality.11 aggression and conversational misunderstandings
Rawls provides an empirical illustration of her to large-scale social-structural inequalities.
argument by analyzing differences in the greeting
and introductory talk practices of African
Americans and White Americans. She shows that 19.6 Concluding Remarks
chapter have been to expound ethnomethodology’s cal theory. Further, given its grounding in an
core precepts, as Garfinkel conceived of them; to empirical program of research, EM is constantly
enumerate key points of convergence and diver- confronted with novel phenomena which, in turn,
gence between Garfinkelian ethnomethodology provide for its ongoing evolution, and continued
and other theoretical traditions, particularly relevance, as a theoretical approach. Indeed, as
social phenomenology, and thereby encourage advances in audio and video technology make the
dialogue among exponents of these perspectives; accomplishment of social life available for analy-
and to give some indication of how ongoing sis at ever-finer levels of detail, and as EM
scholarship in EM and CA continues to address explores new domains of action (e.g. acting
prominent themes, topics, and challenges in con- alone), it promises to continue to discover the
temporary sociological theory. “what more” of social order, yielding novel
As we have shown, ethnomethodologists insights while also providing a constant reminder
remain committed to the basic impulse behind of the near-infinite richness of what Garfinkel
both classical and social phenomenology. Like memorably termed “Immortal Ordinary Society”
phenomenology, ethnomethodology is concerned (Garfinkel 2002).
with the ways in which members concertedly cre-
ate a shared, mutually intelligible reality that, in
turn, serves as a foundation for the various proj-
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Theory in Sociology of Emotions
20
Emi A. Weed and Lynn Smith-Lovin
review the latter, more structural, approach, generally lays out abstract understandings of how
because it contains many important develop- emotions are used in social interaction, focusing
ments in sociological understanding of emotion. less on how emotional arousal is experienced.
Though researchers in these two theoretical tradi- Work in this tradition is largely qualitative,
tions use very different approaches, as we detail exploring emotions across a wide variety of con-
below, they occasionally share a vocabulary, and texts. Dramaturgical researchers have developed
regularly arrive at findings that are consistent new ways to classify emotion by studying it as a
with one another. tool used to perform roles and manage others’
Both literatures on emotion within sociology impressions.
use a variety of terms to refer to their phenomena
of study – emotion, affect, sentiment, mood, etc.
These terms have different meanings within dif- 20.2.1 Erving Goffman’s Dramaturgy
ferent theoretical traditions and have evolved
over time even within specific strands of research. The dramaturgical approach developed out of the
Rather than try to define the terms in general insights put forth by Erving Goffman in his semi-
here, we discuss specific definitions that are rel- nal work The Presentation of Self in Everyday
evant to the traditions that we describe below. Life (1959). Goffman’s work was among the first
However, we will concentrate this review on to study the sociological importance of face–to–
what are typically called feelings and emotions. face interaction. He proposed that social scien-
Feelings are physical sensations that are subject tists could gain a better understanding of society
to cognitive interpretation. Emotions are states of and social structure by imagining individuals as
feeling that can include the initial physical sensa- actors on a stage, wearing masks and putting on
tion, the cognitive appraisal of that sensation, the performances to manage the expectations and
continued rumination on that feeling as it passes impressions of valued others. The focus of dra-
through consciousness, and the physical manifes- maturgical analysis, then, is not on an individu-
tation of that cognitive appraisal or the display. al’s personal thoughts or feelings, but rather on
We treat more trans-situational, long-term phe- their performance, and how it is perceived.
nomena like moods, affect, sentiments, and so Goffman’s work provided a foundation for
on, only as they are relevant for theoretical tradi- important research into emotional display, begin-
tions that also involve feelings and emotions. In ning with Arlie Hochschild’s work in emotion
this chapter, we selectively review the contribu- management in the early 1980s, and continuing
tions of three traditions in sociology – the drama- through the present day with Candace Clark’s
turgical approach, symbolic interactionism, and sympathy margins.
group processes – to current theory in sociology In keeping with Goffman’s metaphor of the
of emotion. Along the way, we recount the evolu- actor on a stage, researchers in the dramaturgical
tion of the field, tying the development of theory tradition generally share his original language,
to recent empirical research and method. We end examining and labeling social life in terms of
by providing our hopes for the future of emotion frontstage and backstage, scripts, roles, scenes,
theory in sociology. acts, and audience. Individuals perform on the
frontstage, where they display and interact. While
in the frontstage, people perform their roles by
20.2 Dramaturgy and Culture communicating in scripts and performing acts
that consist of sequences of behavior and interac-
Our first section centers around dramaturgical tion. All performances unfold in a particular con-
theory, as first stated by Erving Goffman, and text or setting, the scene, for a particular audience.
developed by many others since, including Arlie Of course, no individual can present their public
Hochschild, Peggy Thoits, and Candace Clark. face every moment of every day. Following a per-
Emotion theory in the dramaturgical tradition formance, the actors retire once again to the
20 Theory in Sociology of Emotions 413
backstage to relax, evaluate the success of their these rules are often quite explicit, such as “Big
performance, and prepare for their next public boys don’t cry.” In adulthood, these may take
appearance. This extensive metaphor forms the more nuanced forms, and may be instead dis-
common language with which dramaturgical guised as statements of shared assumptions or as
researchers analyze the social world. questions, such as “Aren’t you psyched to ride
that new roller coaster!?” In this case, it is entirely
possible that you are terrified of roller coasters
20.2.2 Arlie Hochschild’s Emotion and would rather fight a bear than be anywhere
Management near one, but your social interaction will be much
smoother if you embrace and share your friend’s
The rise of emotion studies within sociology rep- understanding that riding roller coasters is cause
resents a divergence from previous research for happiness and excitement.
emphasizing the rational concerns and appraisals If you decide to manage your fear of roller
that motivate human action. The limited theoriz- coasters, you have two options: deep acting and
ing on emotion that existed prior to the 1970s surface acting. In surface acting, you maintain
generally contrasted the affective with the ratio- your emotion, but display another. You take your
nal. This distinction has since been disproved; in place as an actor on the stage and don a mask of
fact, rationality without emotion is now thought excitement while internally, your fear is unabated.
to be impossible (Damasio 1995). However, in In deep acting, you work to turn the socially
1983, Arlie Hochschild broke new ground in problematic emotion into something more appro-
sociological theory and emotion research by priate. You might, for example, work to slow
combining rational, culturally–informed action your breathing, or tell yourself that very few peo-
with automatic emotional response in her work ple die on rollercoasters and think about the
The Managed Heart: The Commercialization of whole experience as a fun adventure instead of a
Human Feeling (1983). ride to your inevitable death. No matter what
In The Managed Heart, Hochschild studies strategy you use, your aim in employing deep
the day–to–day interaction of Delta flight atten- acting is to change the underlying emotion in
dants with their superiors, peers, and passengers. order to change your performance or display to
She finds that the flight attendants perform emo- match shared emotion norms.
tion management, also called emotion work, to Consider this passage from The Managed
bend their emotional responses to fit their context Heart where a flight attendant describes how she
and smooth the rough edges in social interactions deals with problem passengers:
that occur at 30,000 feet. She further notes that If I pretend I’m feeling really up, sometimes I actu-
their emotions are managed in one of three ways: ally get into it. The passenger responds to me as
cognitively, bodily, and expressively. Because though I were friendly, and then more of me
emotion management is a mandatory part of the responds back. [surface acting] Sometimes I pur-
posely take some deep breaths. I try to relax my
attendants’ jobs, Hochschild terms this work neck muscles. [deep acting with the body] . . . I try
emotional labor. Hochschild theorized that to remember that if he’s drinking too much, he’s
through emotion management, individuals bring probably scared of flying. I think to myself, “he’s
their emotional responses into line with cultur- like a little child.” [cognition] Really, that’s what
he is. And when I see him that way, I don’t get mad
ally–shared emotional ideologies, feeling rules, that he’s yelling at me. He’s like a child yelling at
and display rules by engaging in either surface me then. [deep acting]1
acting or deep acting.
In Hochschild’s framework, emotion manage- This interaction demonstrates Hochschild’s
ment and emotional labor are guided by feeling core concepts, and makes clear use of the
rules, prescriptions of what we ought to feel and
how we ought to show it (1979). We all learn 1
Descriptions in brackets altered from original
feeling rules throughout our lives. In childhood, (Hochschild 1983, p. 55)
414 E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin
dramaturgical analogy. The scene is an airplane and is angrily and loudly rebuked by his older,
cabin. This setting and her employment limits the white, male supervisor. In this case, the supervi-
attendant’s ability to leave a difficult situation. sor will probably not be censured for his behav-
Instead, she must stay on the frontstage and in ior – he has enough status to overcome this
character as the flight attendant for the majority inappropriate display. Lastly, imagine that instead
of the long flight. Her role as flight attendant, of being older, white, and male, the angry super-
hired by an airline that does little to protect its visor is young, black, and female. Instead of
employees from angry passengers, severely lim- accepting her criticism, the intern may report her
its her personal agency. In fact, during training, for inappropriate behavior, evaluate her more
she has been taught several scripted methods for poorly as a supervisor, or she may be labeled in
dealing with passengers. These scripts ensure the office as “the angry black woman.” People
that all employees will be successful in managing experience different rules and different conse-
their emotions. Here, the attendant describes a quences for violating the rules based on their
successful performance for a particularly tough roles, their relative status in the context of the
audience. Through surface and deep acting, she interaction, and personal characteristics that are
successfully maintains the interaction and han- tied to stereotypes or shared beliefs about what
dles the drunken passenger without displaying kind of person they are. For this reason, as
any of her own negative emotions. Though not Hochschild found, even within the same role as
described here, she is supported by the cast of flight attendants, men and women can have very
other flight attendants, who assist her in her different experiences of emotional labor because
efforts at emotion management, and may even of different status and the different expectations
intervene to allow her to recover backstage before for social engagement that are tied to their gen-
heading back to the frontstage to perform some der. Hochschild does not develop her discussion
more. of the effect of social position on emotion into an
Although managing her own emotions and the explicit framework. Still, her discussion is
emotions of others may make the interaction eas- strongly consistent with Kemper’s theorization of
ier for the attendant, there is significant emotional status and power as part of his social interactional
cost to being frontstage for so long (see a similar theory of emotion (1978), outlined in the final
point by Wharton 2009). Further, because she is section of this chapter on group processes.
hired and directed by the airline, most of the
value of her acting accrues to her employer. Her 20.2.2.1 Advances in Emotion
emotion management, then, has a paid value, and Management Theory:
is more appropriately referred to as emotional The Intersection of Race
labor. and Gender
Importantly, the kinds of feeling rules to Consistent with Hochschild’s early findings,
which people are subject depend on the social work in the emotion management tradition shares
position they occupy. Imagine you are watching a a focus on the inequalities inherent in emotion
football game and one of the wide receivers fum- management, and how the gendered, classed, and
bles the ball and the opposing team runs it back. racialized socialization of emotion can reaffirm
Angrily, he stamps his feet and throws his helmet differences in status and contribute to overarch-
on the ground shouting expletives. Now imagine ing inequality. Roxanna Harlow investigated the
you are in an office meeting and the new intern impact of occupying an intersectional minority
flubs his presentation and begins throwing a simi- status on emotion management and emotion
lar tantrum. While we expect impassioned dis- labor in her (2003) article “‘Race Doesn’t Matter,
play from athletes on the field, we do not expect But…’: The Effect of Race on Professors’
the same from the office intern – to display Experiences and Emotion Management in the
intense anger would be inconsistent with his role. Undergraduate College Classroom.” Because
Next, imagine the intern flubs his presentation black professors are seen by students as lower
20 Theory in Sociology of Emotions 415
status, and even out of place in the classroom ous stereotypes: the angry black woman, and the
environment, they are not afforded the same overly–emotional, nurturing, matronly, obedient
respect and deference as their white colleagues. mammy (2003, p. 360). In the words of one black
Of Harlow’s interviewees, just 7 % of the white female faculty member:
professors felt that students called their qualifica- I’m just so aware of this whole black woman as,
tions into question, compared with 76 % of black you know, angry person kind of myth. Somehow
professors (2003, p. 353), and a greater propor- that we’re like 70 percent attitude [. . .] I think they
tion of black professors felt as if their authority in don’t allow me the room to be serious, and I really
do think that’s about the “angry black woman with
the classroom had been challenged. Their subor- so much attitude” myth, you know? … I do feel
dinate social position requires black professors to like some students expect that I’m gonna be more
engage in more emotion management and to maternal, and if I don’t live up to that, then the only
more strictly enact the perfect professor role than place that’s familiar to them that they can go in
terms of judgments is “Oh, then she must have an
white professors, in order to be taken seriously attitude.” So I’m not like “Oh come here, honey, let
and to be considered good at their jobs. me hug you, feel my bosom” kind of thing, right …
Harlow combines emotional labor and man- but I really do feel like I don’t have options. That
agement with approaches from identity theory there are these sort of two caricatures of black
womanhood that they’re familiar with, and that
and affect control theory (both presented in somehow I have to work within those.2
greater detail later). Harlow draws on work by
Stryker, Burke, and Heise, among others, and By not being overly nurturing in ways that would
argues that while individuals have multiple not be expected of white male professors, black
important identities, the more salient or relevant women are cast as the angry black woman; their
identity for her interviewees in the classroom is teaching is evaluated negatively as a result. Thus,
that of professor. When black professors enact for these women, like Hochschild’s flight atten-
the professor identity by teaching, they are met dants, emotional labor is required for them to be
by students who instead treat them as if their good at their jobs, while it is not required of white
most salient identity were their race. Black pro- men.
fessors must then do emotion work to manage Through her work, Harlow demonstrates how
their negative feelings in response to these racialized culture and structure shape individu-
macro– and micro–aggressions, and do identity als’ experiences of emotion management and
work to reaffirm their identity as professors by emotional labor. Although most black professors
going to extra lengths to successfully enact their in her sample were cognizant of the impact of
professor roles, despite doubt and criticism. Here, race, it was only by devaluing and ignoring the
identity, emotion work, and emotional labor are salience of race that they were able to manage
intimately tied. their emotions. They had to prevent negative
In response to doubt about their ability and classroom experiences from negatively affecting
more blatant disrespect, black professors work to their self–identities and their effectiveness as
reassert their identity in the professor role while professors. Others have since investigated differ-
downplaying the importance of race as a factor. ences in black/white feeling rules in professional
To remain professional and successfully enact environments (Wingfield 2010), and for black
the professor role, they must manage the negative women (Durr and Wingfield 2011).
emotions that result from any disrespect, such as As the study of emotion management has
anger, frustration, annoyance, and hurt or sad- expanded, research on emotional labor has grown
ness. Black women, Harlow notes, must negoti- into a vast literature in its own right. In the
ate a dually devalued status in terms of both race absence of a clear, testable theoretical frame-
and gender. Black female professors were more work, many researchers have contributed to the
likely to be officially evaluated by students as literature on emotional labor by cataloguing
mean, cold, or intimidating. This is because black
women face the overlap of two potentially injuri- 2
Shortened from original length (Harlow 2003, p. 357)
416 E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin
unique workplaces and the differences between clear with their directions… They held me tight
and made me feel safe… (Lois 2003, p. 126)
them (e.g., Kang 2010; Smith 2008; Smith and
Kleinman 1989). As a result of this tendency to
emphasize difference, most articles in this theo- Here, the rescuer asserts control over the victim’s
retical tradition replicate Hochschild’s original feelings, telling her she cannot cry, in order to
findings with a twist, but do not contribute to ensure that she can be evacuated safely. By
theory or to a clearer model of emotion in the changing her body sensation and reorienting the
workplace. focus of the interaction, the rescuer manages the
victim’s fear, doing the deep acting for her,
20.2.2.2 Advances in Emotion replacing the petrifying fear with emotions more
Management Theory: conducive to her rescue. Because male rescue
Interpersonal Emotion workers tended to be on the frontlines and in
Management charge, tight emotion management more com-
One notable exception to this tendency is Jennifer monly fell to the men.
Lois’ (2003) book, Heroic Efforts: The Emotional Rescue workers employed loose emotion
Culture of Search and Rescue Workers. In this management to manage victim’s families’ emo-
book, Lois spends 6 years volunteering as part of tions. As families struggled to come to terms
a search and rescue team, documenting her own with the possible and, in some cases, eventual
experience of the emotional culture. Through in– loss of a loved one, rescue volunteers worked
depth interviews and participant observation, with them, empathizing, expressing sympathy,
Lois finds evidence for separating out two new and practicing active listening. This task was pri-
types of emotion management: tight and loose. marily assigned to women, who were said to have
Although most of the discussion up to now has better skill in handling delicate emotions. Lois
primarily focused on how individuals manage described these interactions as compressed inti-
their own emotions as part of successful interac- macy. Through this process of being managed by
tion, emotion management can also be interper- the rescue workers, many of the families devel-
sonal: that is, individuals can manage others’ oped deep bonds with the members of the rescue
emotions, aiding others in their performance team assigned to be family liaisons, though these
(Thoits 1995), also called “collaborative emotion bonds varied in strength after the rescue effort
management” (Staske 1996). Building on the was complete. With few exceptions, these deep
idea of interpersonal emotion management, Lois bonds ended just after the rescue effort did, often
differentiated between “tight” and “loose” inter- with a letter of thanks or a donation.
personal emotion management. Like other emotion management researchers,
Rescue workers employed tight emotion man- Lois details the status and gender differences
agement when they needed victims to quickly associated with different types of emotion man-
follow directions that might be emotionally dif- agement. In doing so, however, she also contrib-
ficult for them. Lois recalls the story of a woman utes to a more refined typology of emotion
who fell into the water and was badly beaten by management and sociological understanding of
the river. When she finally made it to a small the ongoing social construction of personally
island in the middle of the river, her rescuers experienced emotion.
decided to evacuate her back through the water to
safety, but the woman was terrified of going back
into the water. She described her experience 20.2.3 Peggy Thoits’ Emotional
after: Deviance
When I began to cry, he took me gently by the
shoulders and told me I could not do that right now, While work in emotion management has shed
he needed me there with him… They were very light on the social process of emotion manage-
ment, it has generally given less attention to the
20 Theory in Sociology of Emotions 417
question “How is emotion management ents inform their children that roads are not fun,
achieved?” Studies in emotion management often but rather dangerous and deadly, relabeling the
provide deep descriptions of the cognitive strate- situation to inspire fear that keeps their children
gies that people use, such as Harlow’s conclusion from running out into traffic.
that black professors downplay the importance of Both Hochschild and Thoits have contributed
race in order to manage their emotions and iden- to our understanding of what happens when there
tity. They frequently fall short, however, of sys- is discrepancy between felt emotions and feeling
tematically addressing how individuals go about rules that define what is appropriate in a given
changing the emotion itself. In 1984, Peggy situation. However, where the literature on emo-
Thoits expanded Schacter’s two–factor theory of tion management has tended to focus primarily
emotion, which described emotion as having two on how individuals successfully manage their
components: bodily sensation or arousal, and emotions, Thoits’ contribution to emotion theory
situational cues that prompt a cognitive appraisal has been more focused on emotional deviance
of the arousal (Schachter and Singer 1962). and what happens when individuals are unable to
Thoits called instead for a four–factor theory of manage their own emotions and thus behave in
emotion, including: physiological arousal, cogni- ways that are considered abnormal or inappropri-
tion, labeling the experience, and expression of ate by the other people in the interaction.
the emotion (1984). In 1990, Thoits further Thoits suggests that individuals engage in
developed her four–factor model to include emo- more noticeable emotional deviance when they:
tion management techniques. This model (1) occupy multiple, generally contradictory,
includes four foci: situation, emotion and physi- roles; (2) belong to two or more competing or
ology, gesture and expression, and label. contradictory subcultures; (3) undergo a major
Individuals can use either behavioral or cognitive role transition due to personal or structural fac-
strategies to change any of these focuses. For tors; or (4) are subject to especially rigid emo-
example, one might change the situation by either tional constraints (1990). Individuals who
leaving it (behavioral) or reinterpreting it (cogni- publicly engage in deviant emotion risk being
tive), but either strategy would change the associ- labeled deviant and/or mentally ill, either by
ated emotion. themselves or others. Thoits’ explicit discussion
Thoits argued that individuals could intervene of emotional deviance and its ties to labeling the-
to alter their own emotions or the emotions of ory has been widely used in the literature on
others at any of these key points. These four fac- mental health and stigmatized identities.
tors are also interdependent, so a change in one Martha Copp’s (1998) article “When Emotion
can prompt a change in the others. Recall the Work is Doomed to Fail: Ideological and
experience of the young woman trapped on the Structural Constraints on Emotion Management”
island in the middle of the cold river in Lois’ ties together Hochschild’s emotion management
Heroic Efforts. Being physically held by the res- with Thoits’ work in emotional deviance and
cuer changes her physiological experience – she labeling theory. In this work, Copp investigates
may feel warmer and stop shaking – and this the constraints placed on workers’ emotion man-
causes her to feel safe, mitigating her fear. At the agement and emotional labor by examining the
same time, her rescuer works on her cognition by experiences of instructors and managers at a
refocusing her attention, and relabels the situa- social service agency that provides vocational
tion as safe. With her emotion managed, she is training and ‘sheltered employment’ to people
able to successfully keep herself together long with developmental disabilities. Though instruc-
enough to get across the river to safety. People tors aspire to cultivate a friendly, supportive envi-
naturally rely on this interdependence of factors ronment in which to teach developmentally
to change their experience of the world. Athletes disabled people how to work, the work environ-
breathe quickly and hop from foot to foot to ment is difficult and repetitive, and the job doesn’t
psych themselves up before a big race, and par- pay well. Under these conditions, Copp asserts,
418 E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin
instructors move from gentle, cooperative inter- expressed. Despite this, sociology of emotions
personal emotion management to coercion and scholars have generally taken an “I’ll know it
confrontation, often losing control all together. when I see it” approach, addressing particular
As described by Hochschild (1983) and Thoits feeling rules that become obvious in the course of
(1984, 1990), Copp’s instructors engaged in cog- research, but putting little effort toward develop-
nitive emotion management strategies to manage ing a comprehensive theory of how feeling rules
their emotions, reframing their experiences in a function or what the content of these feeling rules
positive light and working to find the positive is. One exception to this gap in emotion theory is
parts of their work and to emphasize these expe- Candace Clark’s work on sympathy margin (see
riences (1998). Instructors often had help in this Clark 1997 for an overview).
management from their peers, who engaged in Clark’s theory of sympathy margin integrates
backstage teamwork, validating and managing past work on social margin with emotion theory.
each other’s emotions on breaks away from the Consistent with research in emotional deviance,
disabled employees, relaxing together after long very few singular acts of emotional deviance are
shifts on the frontstage. As Hochschild found, severe enough to result in the person being
however, the relief provided by these backstage labeled as deviant. Instead, most transgressions
support sessions was only temporary. Too much are slight and pass quickly. This is because most
time in the job resulted in burnout, and instruc- people possess enough social margin (i.e. social
tors became largely unsuccessful at continuing to ties, material resources, and an established iden-
manage their own emotions and those of their tity) to overcome slight slips. Clark’s work draws
disabled employees. When the amount of emo- on our understanding of social margin to illus-
tion management and emotional labor are unreal- trate how sympathy, a social emotion, is negoti-
istic, employees have little choice but to breach ated through interaction.Clark argues that there
the norms or to leave the situation. Instructors’ are four general rules of sympathy etiquette.
breaching of the emotion norms of their work-
place is an important example of emotional devi- 1. Do not make unwarranted claims to
ance as described by Thoits (1990). Copp sympathy.
contributes to emotion theory by differentiating 2. Do not claim too much sympathy or accept it
emotional deviance by domain – occupational too readily.
and personal – similar to Hochschild’s distinction 3. Claim and accept some sympathy to keep
between emotion management and emotional sympathy accounts open.
labor. Copp’s work also shows just how inter- 4. Repay sympathy with gratitude, sympathy, or
twined emotion management and emotional both.
deviance are. Both the emotion management and (Clark 1987, p. 290)
emotional deviance traditions rely heavily on the These rules are always in place, and people draw
idea of feeling rules, but there is relatively little on the same sympathy margin across time. Thus
theory around feeling rules in and of themselves. someone who in the past claimed sympathy when
Candace Clark’s work, presented in the next sec- others judged them underserving of it (a fraudu-
tion, is an exception. lent claim) may find it harder to claim sympathy
in the future, even if a new circumstance might
have drawn sympathy otherwise (a valid claim).
20.2.4 Candace Clark’s Theory Clark describes people who follow these rules
of Sympathy Margins well enough as having acceptable sympathy
biographies: they are likely to be able to draw
The work of emotions scholars relies heavily on upon their sympathy margin and exercise their
the concept of feeling rules, or shared under- right to sympathy should an appropriate situation
standings of what emotions are appropriate for arise.
certain settings and how they ought to be
20 Theory in Sociology of Emotions 419
Clark argues that sympathy, then, is traded sympathy margins can result in censure, exclu-
through micro-interaction, resulting in a kind of sion, and further decreased margins. As a result,
relationship politics. When an individual is pro- these people may choose to manage their own
vided sympathy, she or she is in a lower status negative emotions without the help of a support-
position compared to the provider of the sympa- ive cast of interaction partners. This can prove
thy, who occupies a higher status position. This is exceedingly difficult and emotionally
because sympathy both benefits the recipient and exhausting.
obligates him or her to repay it. By offering sym- Clark’s work on the rules of sympathy is inti-
pathy, individuals can knowingly or unknowingly mately tied to emotion management theory and
place the recipient of the sympathy in a lower research on identity work (presented in the next
social position. As such, attempts to offer sympa- section). Kenneth Kolb ties these themes together
thy to higher status individuals by lower status in his recent article “Sympathy Work: Identity
group members may cause the high status mem- and Emotion Management Among Victim–
ber to refuse the offer of sympathy. At the same Advocates and Counselors” (2011). In this work,
time, those who always refuse sympathy and Kolb describes how victim–advocates use emo-
always avoid the lower status position may be tion management to muster up sympathy for
seen as not playing fair and not valuing the rela- those who have violated sympathy rules.
tionship. To maintain balance, individuals gener- Although many clients are cooperative and enjoy-
ally must swap sympathy. Relationships in which able to work with, a few clients continually
one person gives all the sympathy are unbal- engage in problematic behaviors – illegal drug
anced, and this imbalance may complicate social use, returning to abusers, accusing advocates of
interaction, even to the point of moving one per- coercion – that interfere with advocates’ abilities
son to dissolve the relationship. to feel sympathy for them. By turning anger and
As an emotion, sympathy can also be subject frustration into sympathy, advocates reinforce
to emotion management. As Clark notes, their identities as good, kindhearted helpers and
Hochschild’s flight attendants sometimes culti- are more successful in their jobs providing sup-
vated sympathy for their passengers to counteract port for victims.
feelings of anger. Clark further argues that sym- Goffman’s metaphor of the actor on a stage
pathy can be manipulated to counter fear, hatred, provided fertile ground for a wide variety of work
and anger. Feeling sorry for someone may feel that has shed light on the nature of emotion.
like a much stronger position than being angry at While the dramaturgical metaphor has allowed
someone, especially when a display of anger new understandings of how people cognitively
would be unacceptable. Emotion management manage their emotions in response to social pres-
also becomes necessary for those who have sure, this literature focuses more on general cul-
exhausted their sympathy margins. Clark notes tural rules for emotion and behavior that shape
that people recognize these limitations on others’ individuals’ lives. The individual as a person with
sympathy, as demonstrated in her interview with a singular self that enacts roles or identities is dis-
this middle–aged man: cussed primarily as the recipient of these cultural
That month when I had three deaths in the family rules. The next section focuses on work that ties
and my car broke down and my mother–in–law emotion to interaction and identity, consisting
needed constant care and the kids were sick, well, largely of theories that lay out blueprints for test-
it was too unbelievable. I was embarrassed to even ing hypotheses about the emotional and social
tell people what was happening. I didn’t bring up
the details. (Clark 1987, p. 306) world. In contrast to dramaturgical theories, then,
interactionist theories tend to use quantitative
Those who have no sympathy margin left must analysis and survey or experimental methods to
limit their display of negative emotion, avoiding provide insight into how emotions are personally
drawing attention to their negative feelings and experienced and the role they play in interaction.
unpleasant circumstances. Drawing on depleted
420 E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin
20.3 Symbolic Interactionism might smile at a friend to indicate that you are
and Identity happy with them, assuming that they will under-
stand your smile as a sign of warmth and good-
Our second section centers around research on will because that is what you think when someone
identity, in the tradition of symbolic interaction- smiles at you. While there is a possibility that
ists such as Cooley, Mead, and Blumer. Though they will not understand your smile in the same
emotion is not their focus, identity theories devel- way that you do, this possibility is remote. As
oped in this tradition by Stryker, Burke, and members of the same culture, you generally share
Heise, among others, have significantly influ- the same meanings of the significant symbols
enced how emotion is understood today. Similar that constitute everyday interaction.
to the dramaturgical tradition, emotion theory in Mead reasserted the importance of the gener-
the symbolic interactionist tradition generally alized other – the people an individual imagines
centers around the experience of emotion in when thinking about how they appear to others.
interaction, but differs in its attention to self- He argued that the generalized other is funda-
structure and internalized identities. Symbolic mental to social control because it causes indi-
interactionism focuses on how people form their viduals to police their own thoughts, emotions,
identities, label their world, and reflect on the and actions (1934). Shame, for example, stems
judgments of themselves and others. Identity the- from the perception that one’s group members
ories address identity from either an individual or are disappointed in, angry with, or disgusted by
a structural perspective, keeping the role of cul- the individual’s self. This negative emotion
ture in mind throughout. Work in this tradition is serves as an impetus to stop or make amends for
largely quantitative, using hypothetical-deductive behaviors that are deemed inappropriate by the
theories to create predictions about the social group. In the reverse, an individual feels pride
world, and statistical analyses to test them. when he or she takes the role of the other interac-
tion partners and perceives positive evaluations
of the self (also see Cooley 1964).
20.3.1 Cooley and Mead Much research in the symbolic interactionist
tradition points to the centrality of emotion in
Symbolic interactionism in the twentieth century shaping how people understand the world, the
begins with Charles Horton Cooley and his con- kinds of behaviors in which they choose to
cept of the looking–glass self. The looking–glass engage, and even how they think about them-
self is the process by which individuals imagine selves. Like research in the dramaturgical tradi-
how they appear to others, then how those others tion, symbolic interactionist research relies, often
judge or perceive them. They then experience an implicitly, on the notion of feeling rules, the
affective response to that imagined judgment social guidelines for how we ought to feel in a
(1902). Cooley noted that very powerful emo- given situation. While research in the dramaturgi-
tions are attached to an individual’s sense of self. cal tradition has focused more on how individu-
Further, emotions themselves are not only made als navigate emotion, however, for symbolic
up of physical responses; they are socially con- interactionists, the social act is the primary unit
structed through the process of reflexivity (1964). of analysis, as it is through repeated interaction
George Herbert Mead expanded on this idea that individuals become human and a society is
of the self as formed through interaction. He formed. As a result, researchers and theorists in
stressed the importance of significant symbols – this tradition tend to use statistical research to
words, gestures, and actions that people use to aggregate people’s definitions of situations and
call forth in others the same meanings that they circumstances.
themselves understand (1934). For example, you
20 Theory in Sociology of Emotions 421
20.3.2 Identity Theory and not emotion. In keeping with the work of
Cooley, however, Stryker recognizes the impor-
The term identity is so widely used that it has tance of emotion as a force that shapes and moti-
developed many different meanings within soci- vates behavioral choices, believing as Hochschild
ology. For the purpose of discussing identity in does, that emotions act as a liaison between the
the context of the two identity theories presented self and the outside world (Hochschild 1983;
in this section, identity refers to the meanings Stryker 2004).
attached to the roles that people play. In identity Stryker argues that the strength of emotional
theories, each individual can be said to have mul- reactions helps to signal the importance of a par-
tiple selves, each tied to a group of people with ticular identity, ordering and reordering identities
whom they interact and a role that they play. You in an individual’s salience hierarchy, and affect-
may be a graduate student at school, a musician ing their commitment to different identities
when you play an instrument in a band, and a (2004). Imagine you enroll in graduate school,
tutor or mentor when you teach someone else to and you expect to enact the role of graduate stu-
play like you do. Each of these roles – graduate dent. Instead, you find upon starting your new
student, musician, and tutor – and the meanings career as a graduate student, you are treated more
and social ties attached to them are identities. like a gofer, and you have very few opportunities
Together, these overlapping and different identi- to properly enact your graduate student role and
ties make up your self. You learn, develop, con- receive praise for doing so. This is likely to cause
firm, and legitimize your identities through an intensely negative emotional response, and it
interaction with others, who provide affirmation may lead you to reevaluate whether you really are
for successful performances and censure for mis- a graduate student and how important it is to you
takes. Identities theories seek to understand why, to be a graduate student. Having been consis-
when people have agency and freedom to choose, tently disconfirmed, and feeling very negatively
people behave in one way instead of another. about your ability to enact the graduate student
Identity theories explain why people make the role, you are likely to change your self and take
decisions they do by tying the behaviors in which on a new identity that you can enact. You might,
people engage to the roles they occupy. for example, prioritize a new identity – perhaps
that of gofer – or move to a new network and take
20.3.2.1 Sheldon Stryker’s Identity on a new identity – perhaps that of a researcher in
Theory industry. In either case, you will experience more
Sheldon Stryker’s work comes from the tradition positive, less intense emotion once you are able
of structural symbolic interactionism, focusing to successfully enact your most valued
on how social structure affects the organization identities.
and content of the self, and how this self in turn Stryker’s instincts about the centrality of emo-
affects social behavior (2000). In Stryker’s con- tion are made more concrete in Peter Burke’s
ception, similar to that of identity theories as a work in identity control theory, and even more so
whole and drawing directly on the work of Mead, in David Heise’s affect control theory. Because of
identities are the internalized meanings attached its ambiguity surrounding the integration of emo-
to roles. The self is made up of multiple identi- tion, cognition, and interaction, few researchers
ties, which are organized in a salience hierarchy, use Stryker’s theory of emotion and identity in
some identities being more important and enacted isolation. Instead, it is frequently paired with
more frequently than others (2004). The ordering work by Peter Burke and Jan Stets..
of identities is based on what Stryker calls com-
mitment: how strong a person’s social ties are to 20.3.2.2 Burke’s Identity Control
the network that activates a particular role and its Theory
associated identity (2001, 2004). Clearly, then Where Stryker’s identity theory focuses on how
Stryker’s theory is primarily a theory of identity structure influences identity (Stryker and Burke
422 E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin
2000), Burke’s identity control theory, first delin- their partner. The discrepancy between a person’s
eated in the early 1990s, focuses on how individ- own rating and their partner’s rating of them was
uals process their roles in relation to their context, used as a measure of self-evaluation discrepancy.
and how this process shapes their social behavior One issue to note is that identity control theory
(Burke 1991). Identity in identity control theory makes predictions about one’s self and one’s per-
has four components: identity standard – what it ception of how others see the self, while this
means to be oneself in a particular situation; study design collects information on how one
input – how one sees oneself in the situation sees oneself and how one’s partner sees oneself.
based on feedback from others; comparator – a To equate a partner’s evaluation with input is to
comparison between the input and the standard; assume perfect information and interpretation,
and output – the difference between the ideal unlikely under even the best conditions.
identity enactment and the individual’s percep- Therefore, self-evaluation discrepancy is not
tion of others’ judgment of their identity enact- equal to the theoretical concept of output. Despite
ment (Burke and Stets 2009). When the this, Burke and Harrod find that people feel worse
discrepancy between ideal and perceived is small about themselves, in terms of their self-worth,
or decreasing, identity control theory predicts self-efficacy, and experience more depression,
people will feel positive emotions. When the dis- anger, and distress when their partners over- or
crepancy is large or increasing, they will feel under-evaluate them.
negative emotions. In accordance with these Two issues are worth noting, however. Firstly,
emotional prompts, individuals will make efforts depression, self-worth, and self-efficacy are not
to decrease this discrepancy and avoid the associ- emotions as defined by most sociologists of emo-
ated negative emotions (Burke and Harrod 2005). tion. Secondly, most people feel pretty good
In 2004, Stryker expanded his theory, presenting about themselves. Those who rate themselves
several hypotheses, most of which are consistent poorly enough that their spouses can rate them
with Burke’s earlier discussion. A few articles higher than they do themselves are likely to be
have attempted to demonstrate the validity of the more negative in general than their positively-
theoretical prediction that discrepancy between rating counterparts. As a result, they may be more
identity standard and input, or output, predicts likely to evaluate their self-worth and -efficacy
emotional experience. The most commonly cited negatively and to experience more negative emo-
of these articles is by Burke and Michael Harrod, tions than those who rate themselves more posi-
entitled “Too Much of a Good Thing?” (2005). tively. Most research studying identity control
In their paper, Burke and Harrod compare two theory and emotion has been done using this
types of identity theories: self-discrepancy theo- same data set, rendering the findings about emo-
ries and self-enhancement theories (2005). Self- tion similarly inconclusive. More research is
discrepancy theories, like identity control theory, needed to ascertain whether over-evaluation
assert that people experience negative emotions leads to positive or negative emotion. This debate
when they are either over- or under-evaluated, is taken up by the affect control theory literature,
and that they are motivated to avoid either case. which makes very different predictions about
Self-enhancement theories assert instead that emotion.
people seek out, and respond positively to, over-
evaluations but negatively toward under-
evaluations. Burke and Harrod test these 20.3.3 Heise’s Affect Control Theory
conflicting predictions using longitudinal data of
married couples, from newly-wed to their third An alternative model of identity and emotion is
year of marriage. Each participant was asked to provided by David Heise, developed in the 1970s
rate themselves on intelligence, physical appear- (see Heise 2007 for a complete overview). Affect
ance, likeability, friendliness, and how under- control theory is tied more concretely to emotion
standing they are. They were then asked to rate than either Stryker’s work before or Burke’s work
20 Theory in Sociology of Emotions 423
after. Under affect control theory, members of a or positively deflected, as when someone refers
culture share meanings about roles, objects, and to the graduate student as a genius.
behaviors. Members of the same culture share Affect control theory is situated in between
these understandings, whether they agree with self-enhancement and self-discrepancy theories,
them or not. In affect control theory, actors, in that it predicts that (1) individuals will feel
behaviors, and objects are conceptualized in positive emotions when positively deflected and
three dimensions: evaluation – good to bad; negative emotions when negatively deflected
potency – powerful to powerless, or big to little; (self-enhancement consistent), but (2) individu-
and activity – slow to fast, quiet to noisy, or inac- als are driven to confirm their identities and con-
tive to active (EPA, hereafter). Every identity form to culturally shared understandings in order
(mother, banker, prisoner) and behavior (run, talk to facilitate social interaction, and (3) when indi-
to, hit) has an EPA value, a point in a three- viduals confirm their identities, they feel emo-
dimensional space that describes how good, pow- tions fitting with that identity (Heise 2007;
erful, and active that concept is. Emotions are MacKinnon 1994). Picture a funeral. As suits the
also rated on the same EPA scales. setting, most of the people there are probably
Affect control theory asserts that members of mourners. In one corner, two people are convers-
a culture share these understandings. For exam- ing, and one laughs loudly at a joke that was told.
ple, most Americans think of mothers as quite They both probably feel happy, an emotion with
good, somewhat powerful, and somewhat active. a similar EPA rating to the identity of friend.
Even if our own mother is not this way, or we see Unfortunately, while the conversing pair was
a mother behaving badly in the news, we share an probably defining themselves as friend talks to
understanding of what the prototypical mother friend and friend laughs with friend, the other
ought to be. Thus, when we see a mother doing mourners probably expected the pair to be a
something relatively good and powerful like hug- mourner whispering to a mourner. The laugh dis-
ging another good but less powerful actor, like a rupted the understanding of the situation as
baby, we feel that things are as they should be. mourner whispers to mourner, causing a great
On the other hand, when we hear news of a deal of deflection: mourners are very different
mother abusing a baby, we probably think this is from friends and whispering is very different
a very surprising and disconcerting event. Affect from laughing. This difference between expecta-
control theory uses a mathematical model to ana- tion and perceived reality may cause the mourn-
lyze these events, made up of an actor (role/iden- ers to shush the pair or glare at them. In response,
tity), behavior (action), and an object (role/ the chastened pair may make a gesture to restore
identity). When people interact, they may have their identities to something close to mourner and
different conceptions of the situation. Returning socially appropriate, perhaps by apologizing or
to an earlier example, as a graduate student in beseeching the other attendees for their forgive-
conversation with your professor, you might cog- ness and feeling ashamed. Once the people are
nitively label the situation graduate student talks firmly back in the identity of mourner, affect con-
with professor. If the professor instead sees the trol theory predicts that they will feel emotions
situation as gofer talks with professor, then there consistent with being a mourner, including sad-
is a calculable discrepancy between the EPA val- ness and anguish.
ues for graduate student and gofer. Gofers are Importantly, though these examples make
less good (lower E) and less powerful (lower P) intuitive sense, they actually originate from the
than graduate students. Affect control theory pre- formal math of the model, which uses EPA rat-
dicts that this discrepancy, called deflection, will ings and a set of equations that calculate deflec-
cause an emotion, and push you to action or tion between events to predict what emotions
cause you to re-label part of the situation. people will feel as a result of participating in an
Individuals can be negatively deflected, as when event, how people can cognitively re-label parts
someone refers to the graduate student as a gofer, of events, and how people act to change events.
424 E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin
In this way, affect control theory is consistent tions between pairs of emotions in order to create
with Hochschild’s research in emotion manage- a measure of relative distance between emotions.
ment and Thoits’ four-factor theory of emotion. The authors demonstrate that the distance
Affect control theory independently predicts that between distress and tranquility can be reduced
Hochschild’s stewardesses would relabel a bel- by segueing through anger and fear.
ligerent man as a fearful child because fearful As described previously, in affect control the-
child yells at stewardess is a lower deflection ory, emotions are tied to consonant identities:
event than man yells at stewardess. Affect control when confirmed in their identities, mourners feel
theory is also consistent with other emotion the- sad and friends feel happy. As such, individuals
ory. Like Thoits’ work in labeling theory, affect should be able to change their emotions by tran-
control theory relies on the assumption that labels sitioning to new identities, and vice versa. This
have significant implications for our orientations model is consistent with qualitative research in
and actions. Recent research using affect control the dramaturgical tradition on emotions in ther-
theory has also found support for the symbolic apy, in which mental health care providers have
interactionist assumption that labels have real been found to redefine patients’ identities in
effects on how people think about, feel about, and order to manage their emotions (Francis 1997).
act toward, situations (for example, see Boyle By transitioning bereaved spouses from victims
and McKinzie 2015). to mourners to widow[er]s to survivors, mental
Despite this strength, the emotion predictions health professionals change their patients’ emo-
of the affect control theory model are its weakest tions from sad and distressed to happy and tran-
part. It is currently unclear what exactly the emo- quil. Lively later expanded on this model in
tions predicted by the mathematical model indi- examining how men and women experience
cate. As an example, consider the event mother emotional transitions differently, finding that
hits baby. Affect control theory predicts that the women tend to have a longer, more complicated
mother feels angry and the baby feels sad. series of emotional segues than do men, with
Though the math is the same for calculating the more positive and less powerful emotions than
appropriate emotion for the mother (actor) and their male counterparts (2008).
the baby (object), the model appears to predict Though not initially focused on emotion,
emotions that prompt actors to action, while pre- identity theories have provided new models of
dicting emotions that objects of actions feel fol- describing individuals’ emotional experience.
lowing the event. In this case, an angry mother While identity theories have made great strides in
would hit a baby, but a baby would feel sad only situating the individual in a cultural context, con-
once he or she has been hit. The emotions pre- crete theory in this tradition focuses on dyadic
dicted, then, have different meanings depending interactions. In its focus on individual identities,
on where a person is in the sequence of the event. identity theory has largely neglected empathetic
More research is needed to clarify and test the and sympathetic emotion. The next section
emotional hypotheses of affect control theory. focuses on work that investigates emotion in the
One recent advance in emotion theory comes context of the group, particularly as emotion is
directly from affect control theory. In their (2004) used to negotiate and affirm social hierarchies. In
analysis, Sociological Realms of Emotional contrast to interactionist theories, then, work in
Experience, Kathryn Lively and David Heise group processes seeks more information about
developed a model of emotional experience that how individuals interact to negotiate status and
integrates work in affect control theory and emo- power, and theorizes the impact of exchange
tion management, explicitly and clearly tying interactions on larger group order. Group pro-
identity to emotional transitions. Using EPA rat- cesses researchers generally rely on experiments
ings of emotions collected for work in affect con- to describe the creation and reification of power
trol theory as their starting point, Lively and and status differences on a broad scale.
Heise applied shortest path analysis to correla-
20 Theory in Sociology of Emotions 425
20.4 Group Processes: Social laid out in Joseph Berger and colleagues’ 1974
Exchange, Status, Legitimacy, treatise, Expectation States Theory: A Theoretical
and Justice Research Program (Berger et al. 1974). Drawing
on Robert Bales’ work on affect and behavior in
Our third and final section centers around small groups (1950), Berger asserted that much
research on status, power, and justice in social of small group behavior can be explained in
exchange, in the tradition of Bales and Kemper. terms of power and prestige (1974). Under expec-
Exchange theories developed in this tradition by tation states theory, members of a group develop
Berger, Ridgeway, Lawler, and others have con- expectations for their own and others’ behavior in
tributed greatly to sociology of emotions by call- comparison with other group members. These
ing attention to how emotions shape, and are performance expectations are an individual’s
shaped by, social and structural arrangement. best guess for how others expect them to behave,
Social structure, in the form of status and power and are generally unspoken and may be uncon-
hierarchies, is the focus of analysis. Despite this scious. Much like Burke’s identity control theory
dramatic difference in focus, emotion theory in model, individuals form these expectations
the group processes tradition shares several through interaction with others, interpreting other
assumptions with the literature in both the dra- group member’s actions to situate themselves
maturgical and symbolic interactionist traditions. appropriately within the group. Research using
Work in this tradition is largely quantitative, the status characteristics branch of this theory has
using primarily experimental methods, though emphasized the importance of differences in
the use of survey measures has grown in recent salient social and demographic attributes – such
years. as age, race, and gender – that influence the
expectations a group has for an individual’s pres-
tige, participation, and influence in a group (for a
20.4.1 Kemper’s Social Interactional review, see Ridgeway 2001).
Theory of Emotion
20.4.2.1 Joseph Berger’s Affect
In the late 1970s, Theodore Kemper established Expectation Theory
status and power as two important features of In 1988, Berger expanded on expectation states
social interaction (1978). For the purposes of dis- theory to develop the closely-related affect
cussing his work and the work of others who expectation theory (1988). In a chapter about the
have come after, status refers to voluntary defer- future of expectation states theory, Berger
ence, while power refers to deference gained by describes four stages of emotional reaction. In
coercion. Kemper suggested that emotions the first stage, some stimulus leads an individual
emerged from these two key aspects of interac- to experience affect. In the second, this affect is
tion. Under his paradigm, different emotions are exchanged between the individuals of the group.
associated with different levels of power and sta- This exchange process prompts individuals to
tus, and changes in power or status cause corre- form or reform their expectations for affect in the
spondent changes in emotion. Kemper’s work group. In the third stage, the affect becomes more
served as a foundation for later scholars in this stable and more consistently influences group
tradition, who relied on his conjectures on the members’ behavior and orientations toward each
importance of status and power. other. In the fourth and final stage, affect becomes
a part of personality, and expectations for affect
are made more concrete.
20.4.2 Expectation States Theories To place these stages in the context of a real
life situation, imagine you are running late to a
Expectation states theory is a research program lunch meeting when you join your colleagues at
for the study of status hierarchies, most concisely the table. Although lunch was promised, there
426 E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin
were not quite enough meals, and since you were (Ridgeway 2006). Empirical tests of this theory
late, there is no lunch for you. You might feel have shown that low-status individuals are
frustrated and angry about this, and make your expected to manage their negative emotions in
displeasure known by speaking harshly to the interaction with higher-status individuals. High-
person who ordered lunch. They, in turn, calmly status individuals do not face the same constraints
and evenly rebut your criticism, making you even (Ridgeway and Johnson 1990).
angrier as you sit there watching everyone else To return to the example of voicing anger in an
eat with your stomach growling. As you continue office meeting, some people have more social
through the meeting with a gruff tone, a furrowed leeway to voice their negative emotions, like
brow, and red face, other members of the group anger, without facing harsh sanctions or social
may decide that anger is a stable characteristic of rebuke. If you were an older, white, male with a
yours. As a result, they act toward you expecting seat on the board, for example, few would argue
you to respond negatively and angrily in return. If when you began yelling. Indeed, your lower-
this happens enough, your anger may be seen as status group members would probably defer to
part of who you are. Unfortunately, your anger you and look properly guilty and ashamed for not
may not end with you. If, at this meeting, you are saving a lunch for you. If, however, you are a
representing social psychologists and enacting young, black, female who has just started at the
the role of social psychologist as your primary company, for you to voice your anger to your
role, others at the meeting may come to believe higher-status group members would be seen as an
that all social psychologists are angry – applying affront, and rather than being met with ashamed
your personality trait to the entire group you rep- faces, other group members might instead sanc-
resent (Ridgeway 1991). tion you for failing to follow the emotion norms
commensurate with your status and discredit
20.4.2.2 Cecelia Ridgeway’s Theory your emotions by attributing your anger to your
of Socioemotional Behavior characteristics. This insight from group processes
and Status literature parallels findings by Harlow (2003) and
Cecelia Ridgeway, in collaboration with Cathryn other researchers (Durr and Wingfield 2011;
Johnson, drew upon Kemper and Berger’s theo- Wingfield 2010) in the dramaturgical literature.
ries to develop a new theory that ties together the In Harlow’s case, black, female professors were
dramaturgical tradition with work in group pro- constrained in their behavior and emotional dis-
cesses (for a review, see Ridgeway 2006). play for fear of being labeled the stereotypical
Ridgeway’s theory of socioemotional behavior angry black woman. These often unspoken
and status is founded on the understanding that assumptions about what emotions are appropriate
every situation has norms for behavior that are for different people reaffirm stereotypes and rein-
shared among members of the group, called blue- force status hierarchies. Enforcing these norms
print rules (Ridgeway and Johnson 1990). can amount to symbolic violence, as the enforce-
Ridgeway and Johnson argue that these blueprint ment of status-based emotion norms acts is a
rules include feeling rules, consistent with work form of social and cultural domination (Bourdieu
by Hochschild in the emotion management litera- 1979).
ture (Hochschild 1979). Thus, in an extension of Further research has expanded on this theory
Berger’s model (1974), Ridgeway and Johnson to demonstrate that, consistent with affect control
draw on Kemper’s insights into status and power theory, members of the same culture have a
(1978) to argue that the flow of affect within a shared understanding of certain emotions (Lively
group is affected by the status of the members in and Heise 2004) as being more or less acceptable
the group (1990). Emotion is structured by status for low- or high-status individuals (Tiedens et al.
hierarchies in that individuals are subject to dif- 2000). In their article, “Sentimental Stereotypes:
ferent blueprint rules, and more specifically, feel- Emotional Expectations for High- and Low-
ing rules, based on their status in the group Status Group Members,” Tiedens et al. conduct a
20 Theory in Sociology of Emotions 427
series of vignette studies to examine emotional responses directed at specific others (Lawler
stereotypes of high and low status individuals 2001). Under this theory, then, the object of a
(2000). They find that in negative situations, par- sentiment can be used to predict the type of emo-
ticipants expect high-status individuals to feel tion. In Lawler’s paradigm, emotions can be
angry, in contrast to low-status individuals, who attributed to the task at hand, the self, another
are expected to feel more sad and guilty. In posi- social actor, or the social unit as a whole. When
tive situations, high-status individuals were emotions are attributed to each of these four
expected to feel more pride, while low-status social objects, the following is expected.
individuals were expected to feel appreciation.
In an extension of Berger and Ridgeway’s 1. The positive emotion felt toward a task is
work, Tiedens and colleagues used another pleasantness; the negative is unpleasantness.
vignette to test whether emotions could be used 2. The positive emotion felt toward the self is
to infer social status: a reversal of most previous pride; the negative is shame.
literature (Tiedens et al. 2000). In the vignette, 3. The positive emotion felt toward another
the authors present two characters: “X” and “Y.” social actor is gratitude; the negative is anger.
They varied which of the two characters – X or 4. The positive emotion felt toward the social
Y – was described as sad and guilty, or angry, and unit as a whole is affective attachment; the
then asked which of the characters was an execu- negative is affective detachment.
tive and which was an assistant. The authors (Lawler 2001, p. 332)
found that when Y was described as feeling Lawler notes, however, that based on work by
angry, and X was described as feeling sad and Bernard Weiner (1986), individuals are more
guilty, respondents more frequently inferred that likely to attribute positive feelings to themselves
Y was the executive and X was the assistant. That and negative feelings to outside factors (Lawler
is, people may use information about others’ 2001). To better understand how individuals
emotions to infer social status. A similar pattern move past this bias in order to attribute positive
was found by Robinson et al. in the context of emotion toward outside factors, Lawler looks to
affect control theory (1994). While these vignette two key factors of social exchange: the type of
studies contribute greatly to furthering the litera- exchange, and the extent to which a person’s con-
ture, they leave open the question of interactions tribution to the task can be isolated from the con-
between status and emotion, and race and gender. tributions of others.
Future research in this literature may have impor- While Lawler’s affect theory of social
tant implications for understanding how inequal- exchange is the most emotion-focused, there are
ity develops and persists in small groups and several variations of exchange theory that pro-
larger society. vide predictions or make assumptions about the
role of emotion in social exchange or interaction.
Taken together, the affect theory of social
20.4.3 Edward Lawler’s Affect Theory exchange (Lawler 2001), relational cohesion the-
of Social Exchange ory (Lawler and Yoon 1996), and the theory of
social commitments (Lawler et al. 2009) all pre-
Researchers in the Bales and Kemper traditions dict or assume that people who believe they are in
have primarily focused on theorizing specific equal and just social exchanges experience more
emotions and distinguishing between positive positive emotion, which can increase their affec-
and negative emotional situations, rather than tive commitment to, and participation in, the
developing general theories of emotion. In his group.
affect theory of social exchange, Edward Lawler
distinguishes between emotions as more global
feelings toward a situation, in comparison with
sentiments, which in his paradigm are affective
428 E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin
20.4.4 Justice and Equity Theory when people get less than they believe they
should, if they believe that the way the decision
Like other group processes theories, the litera- was made was fair (Hegtvedt and Killian 1999),
tures of equity and justice have detailed the recip- or that the person who made the decision had the
rocal relationship between emotion and social right to do so (Clay-Warner 2006), they will feel
structure. These parallel literatures theorize emo- less negative emotion than if both distribution
tion primarily as a response to inequity and injus- and procedure were perceived to be unjust. While
tice. Although there are many possible objective most justice literature continues to focus on the
ways to measure how fair a situation is from the direction (positive or negative) and intensity of
outside, understanding objective fairness is not a emotion, as opposed to the theorization of dis-
focus of either literature. As noted to varying crete emotions, such as anger, joy, or sadness (see
degrees by other theories previously discussed – Guillermina 2007 for examples), equity literature
including affect control theory, identity control has recently moved toward more distinct classifi-
theory and emotion management – emotion is a cations of emotion.
personal response to a stimulus as that stimulus is
perceived by an individual. Further, perception is 20.4.4.2 Equity Theory
consistently more predictive of behavior and Exchange interactions are equitable not when all
emotional response than more objective mea- individuals contribute or gain equally from the
sures (Merton 1995). What is fair to one person is interaction, but rather when all individuals
not always fair to another. Thus, these literatures involved in the group or task have roughly the
generally evaluate perceptions of equality and same ratio of perceived contributions to benefits.
justice in relation to emotions. Under equity theory, negative emotions follow
inequity while positive emotions follow equity.
20.4.4.1 Justice Theory As a result, individuals are motivated to maintain
Justice theory study of emotion generally centers equitable situations. Notably, both over-
around two types of justice: distributive and pro- benefiting and over-contributing are predicted to
cedural. Distributive justice assesses the extent to cause negative emotions for all individuals
which outcomes are allocated according to equity involved (Adams 1965). Over time, this relatively
or equality (Hegtvedt 2006). If everyone gets the uniform notion of negative emotion or distress
same thing, then the distribution is equal. If was differentiated into more specific emotions.
everyone is given enough to have the same out- Tests of the theory showed that anger is more
come, then the distribution is less equal, but more likely when individuals over-contribute, while
equitable, since it is based on need. Procedural guilt or shame is more likely when individuals
justice, by contrast, is concerned with the process over-benefit (Walster et al. 1975). Research in
by which outcomes are distributed (2006). this literature has investigated many contexts in
Members of a group can agree that a process (e.g. which people may experience inequity [e.g. stem
pulling names from a hat) is agreed-upon and cell transplants (Beattie and Lebel 2011), expres-
procedurally just, even when the distributive out- sion of white privilege (Branscombe et al. 2007),
come (only one person is selected) is quite unjust. impression management in communication with
Generally, people feel more positive emotions journalists (Westphal et al. 2012)]. Although
when both procedural justice and distributive jus- most equity researchers who focus on emotion
tice are high, and experience more negative emo- have used experiments, a few have approached
tions when procedures and outcomes are the issue through surveys to investigate longer-
perceived as unfair (Hegtvedt and Parris 2014). term inequity than can be simulated in
This is true whether a person is thinking about experiments.
what is just for his or herself or another. Because In their 2010 article, “Equity, Emotion, and
justice has at least two parts, there is an interac- Household Division of Labor,” Kathryn Lively,
tion between distribution and procedure. Even Lala Carr Steelman, and Brian Powell use the
20 Theory in Sociology of Emotions 429
General Social Survey and the National Survey individual’s emotion, dyadic interaction, group-
of Family and Households to examine inequity in level emotions, and widespread inequalities,
the household division of labor and its impact on more work is needed to test this theoretical
emotions within couples. Lively and colleagues framework.
start with the equity theory finding that over-
benefiting and over-contributing lead to guilt and
anger, respectively (Walster et al. 1975). The 20.4.5 Ritual Theories
authors then draw on Kemper’s social interac-
tional theory and his notions of power and status A similar process to that described in the group
(1978), as well as research from affect control processes literature is ritual. In the early 1900s,
theory on role-consistent emotions (Heise 2007) Durkheim theorized that culture exerts a common
to further develop how emotions interact with pull on individual people through emotionally
consistent inequalities in long-term relationships arousing rituals (Durkheim 2001). He described
(Lively et al. 2010). Lively and colleagues find the result of shared rituals as effervescence, in
that, in the case of household labor, men are more which emotions are heightened and group mem-
likely to report feeling anger or rage when they bership becomes more central.
perceive that they are under-benefitting, while
women are more likely than men to report feeling 20.4.5.1 Interaction Ritual Chains
fear and mild guilt/shame when they perceive and Emotional Energy
they have under-contributed. Randall Collins developed Durkheim’s initial
As the authors point out, their findings suggest theorization about rituals to describe interaction
that women may be willing to do more house- ritual chains. According to Collins, emotions are
work than their male partners, both to minimize aroused when individuals meet and interact, as
their own guilt and their partner’s anger. well as throughout the course of interaction
Consistent with work in emotion management by (2004). When individuals reference their group,
Hochschild (1979) and Thoits (1990), doing positive feelings are aroused, and this phenome-
more housework may allow women to manage non reinforces group culture. Individuals move
their own emotions and their partners’ emotions. through many single rituals, making ritual chains.
This inequality in household labor and emotion Emotional energy is positive when these rituals
work is exacerbated by the fact that men overes- succeed, and negative when they do not. Collins’
timate their work in the household to a greater draws on Kemper’s notions of status and power
extent than do women, meaning that male part- to suggest that individuals with high power and
ners are quicker to perceive that they are over- status have a greater capacity to create positive
contributing and to respond with anger (Coltrane emotional energy and are motivated to reaffirm
1996). While emotion management may help group culture (1990). As a result, positive emo-
couples cooperate and maintain their relation- tional energy lifts high status individuals and
ships, it does little to change the conditions that helps them retain their higher status. This under-
underlie perceptions of inequity, and may even standing of the important of differential social
operate to disguise what inequity does exist. position in interaction ritual is in accordance with
Work in group processes has demonstrated findings in the literatures on emotion manage-
quite conclusively the importance of emotion in ment, expectation states, and equity theory,
the negotiation of power and status. This litera- reviewed above.
ture has also made the greatest contribution to Erika Summers-Effler’s work offers an exten-
theorizing emotions beyond the individual level, sion of ritual theory. Summers-Effler has theo-
developing new models that describe how emo- rized that when circumstances prevent individuals
tion is involved in the creation of society-wide from leaving an interaction or group, they develop
inequalities and stereotypes. Because of the com- strategies to minimize negative emotional energy
plexity of establishing a mechanism between (2004b). Her recent research represents an
430 E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin
important start to integrating theory of self and definitions in the dramaturgical tradition and the
identity into ritual theory (Summers-Effler literature in psychological social psychology,
2004a), but more work is needed to concretely tie none of these states is an emotion. Instead, they
emotional experience to ritual. represent moods, and even behavioral impulses
or identity labels, but not emotions or variants
thereof. Emotion research is still ongoing, but it
20.5 Avenues for Future Research may be most useful for scholars who seek to dis-
and Concluding Thoughts cuss and theorize emotion to start with the four
emotions that are shared between sociology and
Theory in sociology of emotions seeks to under- psychology: happiness/joy, anger, fear, and sad-
stand an experience that is often ephemeral, fleet- ness/upset. These emotions are experienced and
ing, and deeply personal, as a shared, social displayed in similar ways across cultures (see
phenomenon. In this chapter, we have detailed Turner 2000 for an overview) and could represent
the contributions of three traditions within soci- a common point of departure for emotions
ology of emotion: dramaturgical, symbolic inter- scholars.
actionist, and group processes. In 40 years, Having established commonality around what
sociology has moved the concept of emotion an emotion is, the issue of theory remains.
from an unfortunate complication of rationality Hochschild’s work provided a unique look at
to a fundamental, shared experience that shapes emotion and valuable insight into the workings of
and is shaped by society at every level of interac- emotion management. Her central concepts –
tion. Despite these advances, however, there is emotion management, feeling rules, and surface
much room for further growth. Though there are and deep acting – have served as a foundation for
areas of almost perfect overlap, emotion theory much of the work in emotion since. Unfortunately,
in the dramaturgical tradition remains quite dis- she neglected to enumerate a testable framework,
tinct from work in symbolic interactionism and and the research that has followed has done the
group processes, creating parallel literatures that same. The literature of emotion management has
fail to draw on each other’s successes, though remained a collection of examples, with each
they reside in the same academic discipline. Two new piece of research offering little new theoreti-
points of disagreement make integration difficult. cal insight. At the same time, researchers in the
These are: what an emotion is, and what a useful identity theory and group processes literatures
theory of emotion contains. have advanced theories of emotion, but these
There are over 20 typologies of emotion theories are either underspecified, or largely
within sociology (Turner 2000). Despite this vast untested. For example, Burke’s identity control
array from which to choose, most emotion schol- theory lays out specific hypotheses about emo-
ars neglect to pick one, instead settling for their tion, but the theory focuses on the simplified con-
own typology of emotion that fits a particular trast between positive and negative emotions, and
study or dataset. This practice has resulted in research remains mixed, especially about the
almost as many conceptualizations of emotion as effects of over-reward. Similarly, Heise’s affect
there are sociological emotion scholars. Scholars control theory leaves emotion relatively under-
in the dramaturgical tradition generally focus on theorized, in stark contrast with the rest of the
one of four emotions or their variants: happiness, model.
fear, anger, and sadness. Identity theory, by con- Thoits’ 1984 work on her four-factor model of
trast, considers a broad array of concepts in test- emotion offers insight into a possible common
ing their hypotheses about emotion. This array approach. In developing her theory, Thoits draws
includes these four emotions, but also includes on previous work across disciplines to present a
states such as depression, general distress (Burke clear, testable hypothesis about what makes up an
and Harrod 2005), apathy, compassion, lustful- emotion, and tests these hypotheses across sev-
ness, regret, and grief (Heise 1997). By most eral case studies in mental health and gender. Her
20 Theory in Sociology of Emotions 431
theory is also testable using experimental and Berger, J., Conner, T. L., & Fisek, M. H. (Eds.). (1974).
Expectation states theory: A theoretical research pro-
survey methods, and has clear implications for
gram. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers.
work in identity and group processes that have Bourdieu, P. (1979). Distinction: A social critique of the
yet to be picked up. judgement of taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
The integration of emotion management theo- University Press.
Boyle, K. M., & McKinzie, A. E. (2015). Resolving nega-
ries with identity and group processes theories is
tive affect and restoring meaning: Responses to deflec-
still under development, but represents a unique tion produced by unwanted sexual experiences. Social
opportunity to unite three essentially separate tra- Psychology Quarterly, 10(5), 1–22.
ditions – dramaturgy and culture, symbolic inter- Branscombe, N. R., Schmitt, M. T., & Schiffhauer, K.
(2007). Racial attitudes in response to thoughts of
actionist, and group processes – over their
white privilege. European Journal of Social
common interest: sociology of emotion. One par- Psychology, 37(2), 203–215.
ticularly salient place of commonality across Burke, P. J. (1991). Identity processes and social stress.
theories appears to be the importance of status American Sociological Review, 56(6), 836–849.
Burke, P. J., & Harrod, M. M. (2005). Too much of a good
and power in shaping emotional responses, and
thing…. Social Psychology Quarterly, 68(4),
the reciprocal significance of emotion as a marker 359–374.
of differences in social position. Adopting status Burke, P. J., & Stets, J. E. (2009). Identity theory.
and power as common intellectual ground may New York: Oxford University Press.
Clark, C. (1987). Sympathy biography and sympathy
help to prevent scholars from talking past and
margin. American Journal of Sociology, 93(2),
around each other. Alongside a common topic, 290–321.
the best way to integrate these theories is to Clark, C. (1997). Misery and company: Sympathy in
develop a language that is common to emotion everyday life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Clay-Warner, J. (2006). Procedural justice and legitimacy:
theorists. Individual researchers can work toward
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sociology of emotions (pp. 27–57). Albany: State
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empirical research available within the entire Princeton University Press.
Coltrane, S. (1996). Family man: Fatherhood, housework,
sociology of emotions subfield and across disci-
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Sociology as the Study of Morality
21
Kevin McCaffree
ously describing an element of the nature of that searching for mechanisms of stability, and
act (cruelness is a certain way of acting/behaving, between studying zoologically universal or cul-
in addition to being wrong or bad). Courage, on turally relative aspects of morality. I think these
the other hand, is a moral good, in most cases. conflicts are inherent to sociological inquiry, but
But, in addition to being good, courage is also a I think they can be satisfyingly addressed. I will
certain kind of behavior. In this way, judging show this as the essay progresses, but next I
something as courageous both describes an act describe the current state of scientific knowledge
(as a certain type of behavior—courageous in the sociology of morality.
behavior) and evaluates that act (as morally good)
simultaneously. Abend argues that thick moral-
ity, moreso than thin morality, is culturally 21.3 Social Psychological Aspects
embedded. Thick morality is therefore more in of Morality
the purview of sociology than of neuroscience or
cognitive psychology. From a social-psychological standpoint, emo-
Abend, in his more recent work, argues for tions (e.g., anger, guilt and shame), reputational
three levels of analysis within the sociology of concerns, and self-conceptions (or identities)
morality (Abend 2011). He suggests we should drive moral behavior. Emotions motivate us to
consider (a) the behavior and practices that people conform to normative expectations and to con-
call “moral,” (b) the moralistic judgments, atti- demn normative transgressions, reputational con-
tudes and beliefs that people hold and, lastly, (c) cerns direct our attention to how others perceive
what he calls the “moral background,” or cultural our behaviors, and our moral identities guide our
milieu, that frames behavior and cognition gener- actions in morally relevant situations. In this sec-
ally. The moral background of a culture defines tion, I will briefly review research in the areas of
the behaviors and attitudes of individuals in terms moral emotions, reputational concern and the
of thick morality. That is, the moral background moral identity.
of a culture provides definitions of behaviors and
attitudes as cruel, rude, hospitable, perverse,
chaste and so on. These three levels of analysis 21.3.1 Moral Emotions
interact and reciprocally form one another—they
are the constitutive, substantive “stuff” of moral- Emotion research has a long and storied pedigree
ity that sociologists should consider. within the sociology of morality (Harkness and
The closest approximation I can make to a Hitlin 2014). Recognition for the importance of
current substantive sociological definition of a emotions in social solidarity and social coordina-
“morality” would be something like, the univer- tion goes back at least to Durkheim in France,
sal mechanisms of social bonding (i.e., emotion, and no doubt even earlier to Islamic sociologist
entrainment, exchange relationships, etc.) as Ibn Kaldun in the fourteenth century. In
shaped by localized, cultural bonding Durkheim’s ([1912] 1976) understanding, posi-
styles/patterns (i.e., normative behaviors, atti- tive emotional energy circulated between people
tudes, identities, values and worldviews). This when they had self and group-affirming interac-
definition is overbearing, perhaps, and may not tions. When people congregate, ritualistically
be quite exhaustive. Nevertheless, it captures the and habitually, a sort of energy builds up which
tensions as well as the topics, of the current state feels externally pressuring due to the crystalliza-
of the discipline. tion of expectations into norms and rules. This
Substantive definitions of morality are bound congregating originally happened in large tribal
to be complex, but the contemporary sociology of festivals among hunter gatherers, but the interac-
morality has something of an identity crisis—a tional accumulation of emotional energy can, in
crisis of priority between description and expla- principle, be measured within and compared
nation, between effecting social change and across a variety of more modern institutional
438 K. McCaffree
negative emotions is directed towards self, butions they make regarding the negative emo-
shame, guilt and embarrassment result, but when tional states they experience.
blame for negative emotions is attributed to the
actions of another, anger and disgust result. Thus,
could it be that higher status individuals are more 21.3.2 Reputational Maintenance
likely to experience and express anger because
they are more likely to blame others for their fail- In addition to the emotional dimensions of moral-
ures and indiscretions? Or, alternatively, are ity, concerns over reputation also influence how
higher status individuals less likely to experience individuals act towards one another. Historically,
and express anger precisely because of their high foraging bands of hunter-gatherers maintained a
status (i.e., relatively greater access to power and pluralistic social cohesion by constantly scruti-
resources)? After all, low-status parties are, by nizing one another’s reputation. Foragers make
definition, in a power and resource-disadvantaged and maintain strong, emotionally rich social ties
position. People who are perceived as low status, with under 150 people, and usually fewer than 50
in numerous areas of their life, may actually be (Turner and Maryanski 2008; Apicella et al.
the ones accumulating anger, frustration and neg- 2012). These “families” of genetic and fictive kin
ative emotionality more generally (Turner hunt, play, worship, gather materials, raise chil-
2010a). dren and go to war together. One’s reputation is
Collett and Lizardo (2010) show that both their greatest resource—their greatest form of
hypotheses can be supported, with scope condi- capital—because of the dense, supervisory net-
tions. That is, lower status individuals do, indeed, works that foragers depend on for survival.
feel more anger associated with the sense of a Cooperators choose to interact with others who
“loss of control” that results from occupying cooperate, so that both achieve collective goals
resource and power-disadvantaged positions in (food, shelter, protection) more quickly.
society. However, under certain circumstances, Anthropologist Christopher Boehm (2012)
high status actors are also likely to experience has drawn on the work of evolutionary biologist
and express anger—specifically, when they begin Richard Alexander, in addition to his own ethno-
blaming unfamiliar, lower-status others in formal graphic work on contemporary hunter-gather
settings such as the workplace. Lower-status societies, in order to craft a theory of social cohe-
individuals, however, tend to make more self- sion in hunter-gatherer bands. Reputation, he
attributions for personal failures, are more likely concludes, is a primary force driving the earliest
to experience a sense of losing control in their of humanity’s moral bonds—small supervisory
lives, and consequently, are more likely to feel networks do a lot of gossiping and, as a result,
guilt and shame (Turner 2010a). When lower- have a lot of power to rescind tribal membership
status individuals do express anger, it tends to be to deviant individuals. Tribal deviants and bul-
anger directed towards the self, which may be lies—say, those who put in little effort during the
experienced as shame (Turner 2007). Higher- hunt, sleep with someone else’s partner, repeat-
status actors appear to disproportionately use edly lie about something or arbitrarily instigate
their positions of power to externalize anger (and someone—are often dealt with ruthlessly, though
blame) for frustrations onto subordinate others, typically democratically. Social ostracism is a
while lower-status parties may be more likely to typical punishment pluralistically agreed upon by
internalize their anger and feel a sense of shame. other band members. Repeat and chronic offend-
It appears, then, that moral emotions like ers, however, are sometimes abandoned entirely.
anger, shame and guilt may be differentially Given that foragers depend on their tribe—
experienced by individuals depending on the sta- their society—for their clothes, shelter, food
tus positions they occupy vis a vis others across (hunting success is mercurial), and protection,
institutional domains, due to the patterns of attri- abandonment by the tribe is tantamount to death.
Establishing a good reputation, therefore, is every
440 K. McCaffree
bit as important as avoiding a negative one. The pological record on foraging societies described
notion that one might strive for and maintain a above, it appears that kindness is socially advan-
good reputation—that is, a form of social capital tageous, even if one already occupies a position
accrued merely by virtue of the kindness and of power, as perceptions of power legitimacy
helpfulness one offers—provided emotional/ appear to covary with visible displays of kind-
motivational encouragement to follow rules and ness and fairness.
contribute fairly to the maintenance of the band, This is a general principle of morality that is
while simultaneously providing the social legiti- now underscored by numerous lines of separate
macy to force others to do so as well. research from different scientific fields. In a
Sociologists Brent Simpson and Robb Willer recent summarization of the social science litera-
have contributed critical insights into the moral ture, Simpson and Willer conclude that those
dynamics of reputations (e.g., Simpson and with good (that is, pro-social) reputations, “are
Willer 2008, 2015; Willer et al. 2012). Among trusted more, are respected more, are cooperated
other things, their laboratory research has with more, have more influence, and are dispro-
revealed that self-interested actors behave altruis- portionately selected as exchange partners and
tically (i.e., contribute more resources in a public group leaders,” (Simpson and Willer 2015,
goods game) when others have the opportunity to pp 10.7).
witness their actions and form judgments about
their behaviors. When individuals motivated by
self-interest conduct their affairs in private, or are 21.3.3 The Moral Identity
somehow obscured from full transparency, they
begin to behave much less altruistically. Public In addition to research on the moral dynamics of
perceptions of reputation-relevant behavior emotions and reputations, research on moral self-
therefore, appear to turn self-interested psycho- perceptions or “identities,” continues to grow in
logical motivations into socially cooperative sociology. The central dynamic here involves the
behaviors. degree to which some people view themselves as
Most everyone should have a motivation to moral (vs immoral) and the influence that this
forge and maintain a positive reputation to the self-conception has on behavior. It is not only the
degree that they perceive themselves to be desire for a good reputation that is morally moti-
socially/emotionally or financially dependent on vating, but also a desire for cognitive consistency.
co-present others. However, when avenues for Thus, if an individual understands themselves to
the creation of a reputation are blocked (as when be an “honest, “fair” or “helpful” person, let’s
one acts anonymously or in a context of low say, than this individual will generally behave in
supervision), selfish motivations become more a way consistent with this self-understanding, all
powerful. To be a bit blunt, “watched people are else equal, in order to achieve a comforting sense
nice people,” (Norenzayan 2013). of psychological stability and control (Carver
Once individuals are visible and accountable and Scheier 1982). Though one’s identity as a
to others, positive reputations accrue, in part, certain type of moral actor will change through-
from acts of deference and kindness. This is out the life-course, the psychological desire to
especially true when an individual occupies a perceive trans-situational stability within the self
position of power—Robb Willer and colleagues will be a constant motivator of behavior.
(2012) find in a study that powerful individuals As for what counts as a moral identity, Jan
(i.e., those with greater degrees of material Stets and Michael Carter (2012), have argued that
resources) are perceived as having better reputa- the most substantive meanings that comprise the
tions by observers to the degree that they with- moral identity include meanings related to justice
hold from accepting maximal rewards during and care as these meanings are regarded as moral
exchange opportunities, or elect to donate to universals in human and primate societies (e.g.,
charity. Confirming the research from the anthro- Newman 1976; Brown 1991, 2004; Shweder
21 Sociology as the Study of Morality 441
et al. 1997; Boehm 1999; De Waal 2009; Haidt Research into environmentalism has been
2012). Stets and Carter subsequently specify— equally intriguing. Stets and Biga (2003) find that
and factor load—a number of self-meanings that views about oneself as being part of, in coopera-
might reasonably be associated with holding a tion with, or dependent on, the environment bet-
view of oneself as a just or caring person. These ter predict participants’ self-reported
meanings included perceiving oneself as honest, environmentalist behavior than political attitudes
kind, fair, helpful, generous, compassionate, about social policy and environmental protection.
truthful, hardworking, friendly, selfless, or prin- Put another way, self-meanings, moreso than atti-
cipled. They find that study participants with tudes about objects (i.e., the environment, in this
higher moral meanings within their moral iden- case) better predict self-reported behaviors.
tity—that is, with higher scores (1–5) on mean- Further research has underscored this finding. A
ings measures like fair, helpful or generous—acted recent study showed that participants who identi-
more ethically than those with lower average fied themselves as environmentalist were also
scores. In Stets and Carter’s study, ethical behav- more likely to have donated money to or volun-
iors involved not copying on tests, not driving teer with an environmentalist organization
drunk, not stealing, and other behaviors of spe- (Farrell 2014). Moreover, holding a self-
cific relevance to college students who, of course, conception as an “environmentalist” predicted
comprised the study sample. charity donations and volunteered time before
Theoretically, the moral identity should drive and after the BP gulf oil spill better than prior
the objective display of moralistic behaviors, due civic engagement or political affiliation.
to an emotional motivation to maintain cognitive Before concluding, I would like to point out a
consistency. It is not only identities that drive very important caveat. Typically, in studies of the
behaviors, of course, behaviors also drive iden- moral identity, respondents report high levels
tity processes. Research shows that making mor- (consistently above the midpoint on a given
alistic judgments about others, or even just response scale) of moral self-views. This ten-
watching others engaging in moralistic judging dency to self-enhance is well documented in psy-
behaviors, may increase the strength of meanings chology—people tend to think they are more
within peoples’ own moral identities (Simpson trustworthy, more honest, more responsible,
et al. 2013). more kind and more fair than the average person
Research into moral identities has proven to (Gilovich 1991). A problem, however, arises
be practically useful. Consider a pair of recent when theorists also assume a tendency towards
examples in criminology and environmentalism. cognitive consistency among respondents. If peo-
Drawing on Wikstrom’s (2010) Situated Action ple tend to see themselves as more moral than the
Theory, Hitlin and Kramer (2014) suggest a path average person, and people also strive to main-
to identity change for delinquent adolescents. In tain consistent self-views (i.e., as a moral per-
their model, they show that arrest and conviction, son), than how can identity dynamics explain
to the degree that it produces shame in the indi- immorality? Why would anyone ever act unethi-
vidual (i.e., a self-attribution regarding felt nega- cally if they view themselves as moral and seek—
tive emotions), provides an emotional opportunity always—to gain confirming feedback from
for a re-appraisal of self. This re-appraisal of self others? Clearly, there is a theoretical gap here.
might involve changing the strength of the mean- The solution to this conundrum, which requires
ings within the moral identity. Assuming the copious future research, is that attentional alloca-
individual holds some degree of legitimacy for tion can be diverted based on situational dynam-
the criminal justice system, and assuming the ics. Thus, people may tend to view themselves as
individual has a remaining reservoir of self- more moral than the average person, and they
esteem, experiencing shame may provide an may also seek cognitive consistency, but certain
emotional and psychological incentive for iden- situational characteristics (e.g., a person is under
tity change. pressure to perform, as when business leaders
442 K. McCaffree
engage in price-fixing in order to meet profit donated after Hurricane Katrina (only 4 million
goals) may reduce individuals’ allocation of dollars 42 days after the spill compared to 580
attention to moralistic self-views. million dollars only 8 days after Hurricane
Katrina).
Market-driven corporate competition may
21.4 Structure and Culture drive certain organizations to avoid, for example,
addressing regulatory increases, or consistent
Comte, Durkheim, Marx, and Weber all feared, maintenance. Regardless of the reasons for cor-
in their own ways, the encroachment of a market- porate malfeasance and corporate crime, it may
based, differentiated, metropolitan, irreligious be harder for individuals to perceive corporate
modernity (Hodgkiss 2013). Comte and deviance because it is (a) more likely to occur in
Durkheim worried about how and whether athe- remote areas, (b) oftentimes not immediately
ists could create a secular, civil form of social physically visible in its damaging effects and (c)
solidarity, while Weber and Marx concerned responsibility for action is distributed among
themselves with how power relationships in capi- hundreds, if not thousands, of employees. It is
talist culture and economy were driving people to possible that, for the above reasons, corporate
form exploitive, disenchanted relationships and crime is also less likely to be reported on in
ideologies. This section addresses these, still rel- media. These, and other, perceptual barriers may
evant, moral concerns about modernity. prevent individuals from experiencing the same
Specifically, I review here some of the central kinds of emotional responses as they often do
debates surrounding the moral significance of with more perceptually proximate street crimes
religion and capitalist economies, before discuss- like robbery, burglary, and murder. Perhaps as a
ing the moral import of cultural values more result of these obstructions to public perception,
generally. government estimates of the cost in dollars and
human lives of corporate crimes are 50–100
times greater than street crime (Iadicola 2014).
21.4.1 Capitalism Capitalism, as a general economic system, has
also been critiqued as distributively and contribu-
The above mentioned study by Justin Farrell tively unjust (e.g., Sayer 2011). At least since the
(2014) on environmentalism and self-identity work of Marx and Engels, the ruthless side of
also highlights an interesting point about disas- capitalism has been a major focus of sociologists
ters—corporate-caused human disasters may be who study moral problems (e.g., Marx [1857]
harder for people to understand compared to 2008; Anderson 1999; Wright 2010). The sense
other forms of deviance (like street crime), and in which capitalist economies are considered to
therefore, may be harder to address from a be distributively unjust is the sense in which
humanitarian and financial standpoint. Corporate- occupational prestige hierarchies (rooted in cul-
caused human disasters may not be concentrated tural practice and tradition) unfairly (that is,
in any specific geographical/community location, extremely inequitably) distribute valued social
and may cause harm over long stretches of time, (i.e., respect, influence, power) and material (i.e.,
leading to relatively few immediate deaths. income, healthcare and retirement programs)
Unlike a murder or a natural disaster, where death resources. The sense in which capitalist econo-
follows immediately from a localized behavior or mies are considered to be contributively unjust is
meteorological event, violations of laws on fossil the sense in which under-employment and micro-
fuel emissions, for example, may elevate cancer management in the workforce prevent people
rates in an area over 30 years. Farrell cites each of from realizing their own personal potential as
these reasons in noting how comparatively little creative contributors to the economic system
money Americans donated to the BP relief fund (Sayer 2011).
after the oil spill compared to how much was
21 Sociology as the Study of Morality 443
Women (and especially non-white women), based societies (i.e., harsh working conditions,
for example, are both more likely to work in jobs exploitation, workaholism, overscheduling,
low in the occupational prestige hierarchy (e.g., divorce, debt, tax loopholes, lobbying and so
hospice care, childcare, secretarial office work, on—see e.g., Brueggemann 2014), other studies
nannies) and paid less income over their lifetimes address the comparative benefits of capitalist
compared to white men (Ridgeway 2007, 2009, societies compared to agrarian or horticultural
2011). Black and Hispanic men, meanwhile, are societies and their respective feudalistic and
both more likely to be arrested (or even contacted monarchical economies (e.g., Lenski 2005;
by the criminal justice system) and more likely to Turner and Maryanski 2008). Still others dissect
be unemployed and live in poverty compared to the variation within capitalist economies. A
the rates for white men (Rios 2009; Peterson and recent study, for example, found that people in
Krivo 2010; Krivo et al. 2013; Wagmiller and the “professional” class who make over 125,000
Lee 2014). dollars per year (in the US) were more generous
Work by others has also established a strong, (using a dictator game experimental paradigm)
empirically verified, connection between social when their perceptions of income inequality were
class and health (Link and Phelan 1995; Phelan lower. Perceptions of higher income inequality
et al. 2004, 2010). Poverty is not often thought of actually reduced the generosity of donors (Côté
as a health risk, but it is. Prolonged poverty may et al. 2015).
lead to depression and a lack of social support Critique and analysis of capitalist democra-
that, combined with chronic stress and uncer- cies is crucial and important both practically and
tainty, leads to a higher rate of disease. Bruce theoretically. However, such critique and analysis
Link and other researchers have disentangled the cannot therefore conclude that capitalist democ-
complicated empirical web of when poor health racies are the worst possible form of economy/
leads to poverty and vice versa. Subsequent government.
research confirms some pretty horrific conclu- This would be very, very difficult to show,
sions. Rates of infant morality, heart disease, dia- let alone defend. And, if capitalist democracies
betes, obesity, cancer and other diseases are all are not the worst possible form of societal econ-
higher among racial minorities in the United omy/governance, then some subset of scholars
States, and especially among African Americans should also focus on the relative improvements or
(Schnittker and Mcleod 2005). Poverty, un/ benefits that have accrued to human beings by
under-employment, healthcare and housing dis- virtue of shifts from widespread slavery or
crimination have mutually conspired to produce monarchal/ideological dictatorship to a (rela-
these outcomes (see also Marmot 2006). tively) more open, democratic, market economy.
Empirical observations like these motivate This research on the benefits of capitalism (i.e.,
many sociologists to take a critical stance towards higher per capita income) should occur along-
capitalist economies, and this is a rich literature side, and in dialogue with, those revealing the
that sociologists of morality will need to engage inequalities and injustices of capitalist
with more directly moving forward. The moral democracies.
consequences of market-driven corporate mal-
feasance, or of class structure and health are sig-
nificantly more complicated than I can do justice 21.4.2 Religion
to here. I only wish to point out that moral cri-
tique of market competition among corporations, Many sociologists of morality have considered
and the economic system of capitalism more gen- the importance of religion and religious belong-
erally, continues to be a central focus of many ing for human values and social solidarity
sociologists. (Durkheim [1912] 1976; Weber ([1920] 2002),
Although some studies simply involve nar- Emerson and Smith 2000; Bader and Finke 2010;
rated counts of the immoral aspects of market- Lee 2014). Research in this vein often discusses
444 K. McCaffree
the social psychology of belonging to a religious expectations for moral behavior. These studies
community, and about the ways in which religion suggest that the socio-cultural development of
can motivate altruism or compassion. individuals in the US contains numerous narra-
There does appear to be some good data on tives about the supposed link between religious
religion and charitable donation that shows reli- belief and morality.
gious individuals to be more giving (e.g., Brooks It is possible, but incredibly unlikely, that
2006). This work is often criticized, however, as moral beliefs and values come from (that is, have
it is typically based upon self-reported giving their ultimate origin in) religious beliefs. There
behavior, and religious individuals often self- are mountains of ethnographic and laboratory
report being more generous than they actually are examples of mammals (with, of course, no reli-
in laboratory studies of their behavior gion) displaying ethical behavior, and there are
(Norenzayan and Shariff 2008; Galen 2012). good theoretical and empirical reasons to believe
Also, to the degree that religious individuals that the neural mechanisms that underlie parent-
donate to charities which promote their specific infant bonding, in general, are the ultimate, phy-
religion, it is unclear how this constitutes “char- logenetic, origins of moral concern (e.g., De
ity.” Political psychologists have, moreover, Waal 2009; Churchland 2011; Preston 2013;
shown religious fundamentalism to correlate McCaffree 2015).
strongly with political conservatism, and both Even if religions cannot be considered the ori-
have been positively associated with racial (and gin of human values, religious commitments and
general out-group) prejudice, authoritarianism, religious beliefs do, of course, influence the
generalized perceptions of threat, death anxiety, moral beliefs and behaviors that people express
and intolerance of ambiguity (Jost et al. 2003; during the course of their practical, everyday life.
Jost 2006; Amodio et al. 2007; Carney et al. For example, religious institutions tend to address
2008; Johnson et al. 2010, 2012). Even more sexual behavior and drug use, moreso than other
damning for the religion-compassion thesis, the institutions in Western society, and as a result,
most secular (that is, least religious) nations on sociologists have speculated that moral attitudes
Earth are also the greatest disseminators of social about these issues are most likely to be influenced
welfare and assistance to the poor, elderly, and by religious commitment (e.g., Desmond and
those struggling with drug addiction and other Kraus 2014). However, as other scholars have
health problems (Paul 2005; Zuckerman 2008). insisted, most prominently, Rodney Stark, any
There nevertheless appears to be a pop-culture influence religion has on behavior will only hold
equivocation of religion with moral behavior, at for those who truly believe in the holy doctrine
least in the United States (Edgell et al. 2006; and the strength of god, and who have friends
Gervais et al. 2011). This equivocation of reli- that do as well (Bainbridge 1992). Casual, “caf-
gion and morality in popular culture seems to be eteria Christians,” who self-identify as Christian
processed at a subliminal level for many (or whatever religion) but who engage in few
Americans. Priming studies, for example, have religious behaviors and rituals (e.g., church atten-
shown that when participants are subliminally dance, prayer, fasting, volunteering) will likely
flashed with religious concepts on a computer not be influenced by the moral proscriptions
screen, asked to unscramble words denoting reli- advocated by religious institutions (Bruce 2011).
gious terminology, or even just asked to write
down religious rules (e.g., the Ten
Commandments), they subsequently act more 21.4.3 Values
pro-socially. This pro-sociality ranges widely,
from cheating less on tests to donating more Several prominent sociologists of morality have
money to charity (see Bloom 2012, for a review). recently followed social psychologists Shalom
People appear to make subliminal associations Schwartz and Jonathan Haidt in operationalizing
between religious terminology and situational the term “values” (e.g., Hitlin and Pinkston 2013;
21 Sociology as the Study of Morality 445
Vaisey and Miles 2014). Values, for Schwartz are This emerging literature on values within the
a list of ten “concepts or beliefs, about desirable sociology of morality has its true roots in the
end states or behaviors, that transcend specific work of Alan Fiske (1992), Fiske and Haslam
situations, guide selection or evaluation of behav- (2005), Richard Shweder et al. (1997), Robert
ior or events and are ordered by relative impor- Bellah and colleagues ([1985] 2008), Ronald
tance,” (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987:551 quoted Inglehart (1977, 1997), and James Hunter (1992).
from Hitlin and Pinkston 2013). Schwartz’s ten Shweder and Fiske both argue in favor of their
universal values included conformity, tradition, respective cross-cultural typologies of values.
benevolence, achievement, hedonism, security, Bellah, Inglehart and Hunter, on the other hand,
universalism, self-direction, stimulation, and focus on the modernization of values in terms of
power. people in the West becoming more expressive,
Jonathan Haidt’s (2001, 2012; Haidt and progressive and individualistic. Though not every
Bjorklund 2007) work has been even more influ- theorist mentioned above expressly uses the term
ential within the contemporary sociology of “values,” for their inquiry, a discussion of their
morality. Haidt cites anthropology and philoso- approaches is relevant to this subject matter.
phy in formulating his five moral foundations Anthropologists Shweder and Fiske both pre-
that, he says, explain and underlie all of the varia- sented summarized “ideal-type” models of the
tion in human value systems. Morality for Haidt cross-cultural variation in human value systems.
is “intuitionist” in that we are rarely aware of the For Shweder, human values can be organized into
emotional influences behind our moral judg- three basic types—values relating to autonomy,
ments. We can, and often do, however, use our community and divinity. Roughly, these three
education and reflection in order to justify the “ethics” represent the universal cultural tenden-
moral judgments we come to for emotional rea- cies of individuals to find value in the integrity of
sons. Haidt uses the metaphor of the rational the individual, the importance of the family and
mind as the rider of an unruly elephant. The collective, and the purity/sacredness of the soul/
erratic elephant, who no doubt dictates when and heart/mind/god. What is interesting about
where the rider goes despite the rider’s rational Shweder’s scheme is that each of his three ethical
protestations, represents our emotions and feel- value sets can be emphasized differently depend-
ings in any given context. For Haidt, our emo- ing on the society in which they are found. This
tional intuitions drive our moral judgments and therefore constitutes an example of moral univer-
these emotional intuitions have five manifesta- salism with relativist scope conditions relating to
tions—concerns for care, fairness, loyalty, the idiosyncratic history and traditions of each
respect for authority, and purity/sanctity.2 society.
Using these definitions of moral values, Miles Fiske takes a similar approach to crafting
(2014) in an analysis of a sample of over 2,000 broad ideal-types of value categories from his-
Americans, finds that, for example, women are torical and anthropological data. He refers to his
more likely to emphasize the value of benevo- categories of values as the “relational models” of
lence, and of having a moral identity, whereas “communal sharing, “authority ranking,” “equal-
men were more likely to value power and achieve- ity matching,” and “market pricing” (Fiske 1992).
ment. Also of interest is his finding that, com- Each of Fiske’s four basic relational models of
pared to those with no religious identity, those values has their own logic of materialism, work,
who were religiously affiliated had a stronger distribution, reciprocation, decision making,
moral identity and were more likely to value con- motivation, aggression and so on.
formity and tradition. “Community sharing” includes a set of values
oriented towards treating every member (of the
2 ingroup) of society fairly and integratively.
Elsewhere, Haidt has flirted with adding additional moral
foundations to his list. Here I discuss only his original Secondly, “authority ranking” involves values
“foundations”. associated with people loyally, dutifully, and
446 K. McCaffree
honorably serving in their roles as workers, pro- text lack the avenues for political visibility and
testors, parents, religious adherents, students and support, and so they cling—orderly and dogmati-
so on. cally—to the modicum of living and self-
Thirdly, Fiske defines the relational model of actualization that is available.
“equality matching” as a set of values about bal- Thus, it is not that citizens of Western democ-
anced fairness and reciprocity. Values related to racies are somehow more innately individualistic
equality matching are values that deal with bal- or self-expressive—rather, it is that market sys-
ancing the allocation of contributions and tems, in concert with technological sophistica-
rewards, and just desserts. Lastly, values in the tion and dissemination, have provided political,
“market pricing” category include highly ratio- occupational and educational outlets for self-
nalized, utilitarian moral calculations. Market expression and self-improvement. In further con-
pricing values are those that are invoked by large sonance, James Hunter suggests that peoples’
multinational corporations that wish to create value structures in the US (and in the West) are
actuaries of the risk of death and illness in order becoming more progressive (relativistic, local,
to make decisions about whether to recall defi- skeptical, individually tailored, non-traditional)
cient car models, or offer healthcare or life insur- and less orthodox (universal, transcendental,
ance plans to people. Though these business pious, communally embedded, traditional).
decisions may appear cold and calculated, they Amidst all of this interesting work into the
are, for Fiske, merely more rationalized, abstract, shifting nature of moral values, Jonathan Haidt’s
and financialized moral values compared to those “Moral Foundation Theory” stands as the most
values underlying other relational models. Other, currently influential. Haidt (2012) and Haidt and
more altruistic examples of the market pricing set Kesebir (2010) argues that all humans experience
of values might be given—consider the values of intuitive emotional states that result from adapta-
entrepreneurialism, thrift, efficiency, managerial tions to social situations that are common to
compassion, and attention to financial detail that mammals in general, primates in particular and
would be required to make a non-profit philan- humans especially. Mammals, primates and peo-
thropic organization thrive. ple care for their young, hunt cooperatively,
Bellah and colleagues ([1985] 2008), Inglehart maintain fairly strict status hierarchies, and try to
(1977, 1997), and Hunter (1992), moreso than avoid biological pathogens (i.e., viruses and bac-
Shweder and Fiske, focus on the recent trends of teria) and social threats (ostracization, gossip).
the last 50 or so years of cultural change. Bellah The result of long-term adaptations to these com-
and colleagues rely largely on analyses of quali- mon social problems, is that human beings, the
tative interviews and ideal-typical social general- world over, supposedly emphasize (more or less,
izations in order to conclude that American depending on the person and social context):
values are shifting slowly away from biblical and care, fairness, loyalty, respect for authority, and
nationalist concerns and increasingly more purity/sanctity (of the body or of ideology).
toward individual achievement and individual Haidt has argued that social science has his-
expression. This trend is analogous to Inglehart’s torically used too narrow a definition of morality.
contention that, as societies increase their wealth Though eighteenth and nineteenth century liberal
through market capitalism, people will increas- enlightenment philosophers may have empha-
ingly assert the value of human rights, equality sized care and fairness in their critiques of mon-
and self-expression primarily because they have archy and religion, according to Haidt, they failed
the material resources to access the educational to pay equally good attention to the moral values
and political avenues necessary to do so. Where of loyalty, respect and purity. As a result, accord-
poverty is extreme and political instability or cor- ing to Haidt, the largely liberal academic social
ruption is very high, individuals tend to endorse science tradition over-emphasizes the largely lib-
values that emphasize order, safety and stability. eral moral values of harm and care. This bias in
This is because individuals in this deprived con- academia has not only produced inadequate
21 Sociology as the Study of Morality 447
research into the group-binding values of loyalty, in order to do so. At least one study has shown
respect for authority and purity/sanctity, it has that when conservatives are tired from engaging
also discriminated against conservative students in self-regulation, or fatigued from using their
and scholars (Haidt 2012). working memory, they begin to self-report moral
Haidt’s theory has widely been used to explain values similarly to liberals (Wright and Baril
differences between political liberals (who value 2011).
care and fairness especially) and political conser- Recent research by Florian van Leeuwen and
vatives (who tend to value loyalty, respect and Park (2009, 2012) and van Leeuwen et al. (2014)
purity moreso). Statistical models that control for establishes a robust empirical and theoretical
all five of Haidt’s moral foundations—not just relationship between historical and cross-
harm and care—are good predictors of political sectional perceptions of biological and social
affiliations, as well as voting behavior and atti- threats and endorsement of collectivist moral val-
tudes toward contentious social issues like gun ues in general, including Haidt’s binding values.
control, stem cell research, immigration, or In an analysis of over 100,000 respondents from
same-sex marriage (Graham et al. 2009; Koleva over 65 countries, historical and contemporary
et al. 2012; Johnson et al. 2014). It appears levels of global pathogen and parasite stress lev-
descriptively true that political liberals and con- els positively predicted Haidt’s binding values of
servatives emphasize different value systems or loyalty, authority and purity. Further research has
“moral foundations”, and that these different confirmed this relationship between perceptions
foundations further predict peoples’ individual of social or biological threat and moral values
social attitudes. emphasizing tradition, respect for authority, and
In a piece of theory that unifies the work of purity/sanctity (e.g., Oxley et al. 2008; Dodd
Haidt with the cultural predictions of Bellah et al. et al. 2012; Hibbing et al. 2014, 2015).
([1985] 2008), Eriksson and Strimling (2015) The reason, of course, why values that under-
suggest that liberals will canalize the political lie group-bonding become more prevalent in a
nature of future cultural trends because they population when perceptions of threat rise is
emphasize fewer moral foundations. Since both because in-groups can protect people from the
conservatives and liberals emphasize values fatal consequences of disease and social persecu-
related to care and fairness, but only conserva- tion. Perceptually, people assume that pathogen
tives tend to also emphasize respect, loyalty and and parasite transmission can be reduced to the
purity/sanctity, liberal arguments will seem more degree that they become discriminatory about
persuasive to conservatives, over time, than the who they interact with, and to the degree that they
alternative. Put differently, it is easier to win over follow old, familiar rituals and behaviors, as
a conservative, than it is a liberal, because con- opposed to new, less understood ones. The same
servatives have a broader base of moral values or is true for individuals who desire to reduce the
foundations. The implication is that, since 1950, perception of social threats emanating from rapid
conservatives have been changing their minds to technological, cultural, or political changes.
embrace liberal positions at a faster rate than lib- Sticking with the old ways of behaving, and the
erals have been changing their mind to embrace old hierarchies of leadership, appear safer than
conservative positions. adopting new behaviors and new hierarchies that
There is more to the story of Haidt’s moral are both less understood and, by definition, less
foundations than this, however. The values/foun- experienced. This is why individual and group
dations of loyalty, respect for authority and sanc- differences in the perception of stress and threat
tity/purity may be a result of motivated cognition. appear related to the endorsement of more con-
Cultural liberals and conservatives may only servative, collectivist value-orientations.
appear different because those who are empha-
sizing loyalty, respect and purity are actively
recruiting psychological and emotional resources
448 K. McCaffree
21.5 Contemporary Debates colleagues (2009), for example, show that coop-
in the Field erative exchange contexts, and other forms of
exchange with a high rate and duration of interac-
Almost no general theory exists in the modern tion and mutuality of attentional focus, produce,
sociology of morality (with some exceptions, over time, shared goals, identities and values.
e.g., Black (2011). I contend that this is because Moral identities and attitudes are produced by
of the persistence of several unresolved theoreti- structures of interaction and exchange, while
cal issues. These issues are various, but they con- simultaneously serving as the basis for the for-
spire to make the sociology of morality a very mation of shared beliefs and the adoption of
treacherous and exciting field to navigate. These shared behaviors. Once these shared moral
issues are: disagreements about the primacy of beliefs and behaviors emerge, they now serve as
structure over culture, dual-process models of their own, higher-order, dynamic influencing
culture-in-action, and whether moral realism or individual selection of future network ties and
moral relativism is the proper meta-theoretical future exchange relationships. The generation of
position for sociologists of morality to take. Let culture may have its origins in networks and
me say just a bit about each. exchange structures, but culture becomes caus-
ally autonomous once it emerges. Structure pro-
duces culture and this emergent culture
21.5.1 Structure Versus Culture subsequently canalizes future structures.
All of this is to say that there is no inherent
There are countless thorny debates in sociology conflict between the structure and culture of
and anthropology about the relationship between morality. Cross-sectionally and longitudinally,
social structure and culture that I will not have researchers are free to either study (a) how shared
time to address here (e.g., Durkheim and Mauss conceptions of moral values, attitudes and identi-
[1903] 1963; Levi-Strauss 1966; Giddens 1984; ties lead to new network ties and the adoption of
Harris 1989). More recently, sociologists of new behaviors or (b) how extant network ties and
morality have insisted theoretically and demon- shared behaviors enable and constrain the devel-
strated empirically that moral values and beliefs opment of new moral values, attitudes or
are better predictors of behavior than network identities.
structure, previous behavior or demographic cat-
egory membership alone (Vaisey 2007; Vaisey
and Lizardo 2010; Miles and Vaisey 2015). 21.5.2 Cognition and Culture as Dual
Location in social structure—as, say, a woman, Processes
Muslim, student or homosexual—actually tells
researchers less about who people will interact The second issue facing the sociology of morality
with or about how they will behave than does an is the need to integrate dual-process models of
examination of who shares and does not share culture into current theory and research. In an
moral identities, values and attitudes. Individuals influential article, Vaisey (2009) integrates recent
who share their moralities in common, according research from cognitive neuroscience and sug-
to this view, are more likely to interact with one gests that people enact culture in two ways—as
another and to share behaviors. subliminally habituated behavior (one’s day-to-
The sociology of morality has recently tended day routines—see Bourdieu 1990; Ignatow 2009)
to emphasize the importance of this shared moral or by employing various, highly cognitive, ideo-
culture in rates of interaction and subsequent logical “tools” or strategies (when confronting
behavioral outcomes. Researchers might, just as especially complex or novel problems). He calls
easily, however, study how the structure of inter- these the “practice” and “culture-as-toolkit”
actions influence the formation of shared moral models of culture.
identities, values and attitudes. Ed Lawler and
21 Sociology as the Study of Morality 449
The advantage of Vaisey’s approach is that it self-relevant, less emotional or more typical, situ-
updates sociological theory to be current and ational attentional allocation is lower, and avail-
consistent with neuroscientific data showing the able cognitive resources can be recruited for
brain to be, at times, a rapid, habituated, sublimi- more reflective/abstract thought and behavior.
nal processor of information and, at other times, These remain, largely, theoretical speculations
a deliberative, reflective, effortful processor. in need of further research. That the brain is a
Oftentimes, according to Haidt’s (2001) “social dual processor, responding in both habitual and
intuitionism,” people cannot be expected to artic- reflective ways, is beyond dispute. However, the
ulate or understand the subliminal emotional situational dynamics driving more habitual ver-
motivations underlying their moral beliefs and sus more reflective responses remain empirically
behaviors. Consistent with this view, Vaisey under-explored.
(2009) finds that individuals’ moral worldviews
(part of their “cultural toolkit”), regardless of
their ability to articulate them, later predict 21.5.3 The Ontology of Morality
behavior.
An important emerging area of research for A final disciplinary debate within the sociology
the sociology of morality involves specifying of morality that I wish to highlight involves a
what practical, daily aspects of morality occur metatheoretical debate. The debate over moral
relatively effortlessly, ritualistically and subcon- realism and moral relativism is a debate over
sciously and what practical, daily, aspects of what morality, itself, is. Is morality an objective
morality require more directed attention and phenomenon, something that individuals and cul-
focus. Preliminary research suggests that people tures can have more or less of? Or, is morality
will be more likely to effortfully/consciously/ entirely a social construction—just the arbitrary
reflectively use their cultural ideologies when cultural expression of status hierarchies, reli-
addressing moral issues where (a) self- gions, legal systems and traditions?
presentational concerns are not especially salient In principle, this is a very important issue for
in the situation, (b) the self is not very emotion- sociologists of morality to resolve. In practice,
ally invested, (c) the self perceives the moral however, sociologists of morality have mostly
identity, attitude or value at issue to be common- ignored it. Most sociologists are methodologi-
place, typical or banal (Hitlin and Pinkston 2013). cally relativist and philosophically and ontologi-
That is, when situational concerns with self- cally agnostic about morality (Lukes 2008;
presentation are greater, emotional arousal is Abend 2008, 2010; Goode and Ben-Yehuda
higher, or the context is uncomfortable/unfamil- [1994] 2009; Black 2013; Smith 2013).
iar, people may respond more habitually/sublimi- Tavory’s (2011) effort to theorize moral action
nally. When the brain is taxed with higher is a representative example of such meta-
processing burdens (i.e., greater situational atten- theoretical moral agnosticism. He claims that
tional allocation), fewer cognitive resources (i.e., moral realism is false because it supposes, a pri-
circulating blood glucose levels in the brain) ori, that morality is a universal human phenome-
remain to suppress habitual responding (see non and not a culturally-relative one, and that, in
Baumeister et al. 2007). Individuals, thus, are essence, this presumptuous claim is presumptu-
most capable of responding carefully, reflectively ous. Moral relativist arguments, he adds, are
and abstractly when they are in situations that equally problematic because they preclude com-
require lower levels of situational attentional parisons of moral dynamics between societies
allocation. As situations become more self- and between historical epochs. His solution is to
relevant, more emotional, or more atypical, the suggest that the moral relevancy of a subject mat-
neural resources recruited to increase attentional ter should be determined by whether or not indi-
allocation prevents the suppression of habituated vidual and collective self-conceptions are
responses. Conversely, when situations are less emotionally impacted by the behavior of others,
450 K. McCaffree
trans-situationally and over-time. This is an ing treatment. The sociology of morality is there-
incredibly broad, albeit ingenious, attempt to fore intrinsically evaluative. Though descriptive
characterize what should count as “moral” to accounts of the societal distribution of moral
scholars in this area. Still, it teeters on being too identities, attitudes and values are critically
broad to satisfyingly be called morality. And, as I important, so too are empirically supported, clin-
want to suggest, sociologists of morality would ical, evaluations of how formal policy and infor-
be far more substantively satisfied with an inter- mal tradition impact the wellbeing of individuals.
disciplinary, moral realist definition of morality. Andrew Sayer (2011) argues,
If sociologists will generally admit that facts [There is] the common idea that social scientific
are value-laden, why won’t they admit that values discourses regarding what is are simply incom-
are also fact-laden (Gorski 2013)? Moral relativ- mensurable with normative discourse regarding
ism is a flawed metatheoretical position because what ought to be…However, this is an unhelpful
polarization…Critique is…implicit in our descrip-
certain objective states of consciousness are uni- tions of social life, rather than a separate activity
versally better than/preferable to others (Harris involving stepping into a separate realm of ‘val-
2010). Consequently, some social policies and ues’….If one doesn’t know that suffering or racism
aspects of traditions will be—empirically—more are bad, then one doesn’t understand what they are
…a description of an abused child which did not
or less conducive to the moment to moment well- acknowledge that it was suffering would fail not
being of individuals.3 For example, high rates of merely as an evaluation but as an adequate descrip-
poverty and chronic stress are objectively harm- tion of its state of being, (Sayer 2011, pp 8–9, ital-
ful to health and psychological efficacy. Social ics in original).
policies that produce lower rates of poverty and
chronic stress (invariably concentrated among
women and minorities) are universally, cross- 21.6 A Proposed Theoretical
culturally, objectively, better than policies that Unification
contribute to higher rates. Social structures and
contexts of interaction can be substantively cri- I have recently advanced a synthetic theory of
tiqued with regard to their capacity to contribute morality that integrates the work of Emile
to the resources and opportunities that individu- Durkheim ([1912] 1976, [1893] 1997), Jonathan
als need to build communities and express Turner (2010b), Turner and Maryanski (2008),
themselves. Turner (2014), Jan Stets and Peter Burke (Stets
Moral relativism is mistaken because it makes and Carter 2012; Stets and McCaffree 2014), and
the old Weberian assumption that people differ Randall Collins (1981, 2004), in addition to large
irrationally and endlessly in their moral needs bodies of work in psychology, zoology and biol-
and expectations for treatment. On the contrary, ogy (e.g., Epley and Gilovich 2006; Panksepp
humans are united by phylogenetically mamma- and Panksepp 2013; Decety 2011; Decety and
lian concerns for group belonging, care for Svetlova 2012; Decety 2014). By way of con-
infants, fairness in the distribution of resources cluding, I will briefly show how this synthetic
and loyalty in exchange for protection (Turner theory of morality (McCaffree 2015) may be
2014; McCaffree 2015). Peoples’ behaviors and helpful to integrating the diverse and divergent
attitudes are structured by their preferences and issues discussed throughout this chapter.
their preferences share an ancient, mammalian Moral beliefs and behaviors, in this scheme,
set of expectations for fairly re-distributive, car- are conceived of as resulting from perceptual
overlap, or the degree to which two animals or
groups of animals view themselves as physically
3
I am defining wellbeing in a psychological and social similar, familiar or competent. The physiological
sense—wellbeing involves cognition that is not overly
mechanisms of perceptual overlap include mirror
taxed with stress and fear, and it also involves the net-
works, opportunities and resources (power, respect, influ- neurons and executive cognitive functioning at
ence, capital) people need to pursue valued cultural goals. the neural level and oxytocin, dopamine and
21 Sociology as the Study of Morality 451
serotonin at the hormonal level. From an evolu- hand, are not necessarily oriented toward a shared
tionary standpoint, these physiological mecha- goal, though each party is obligated to provide
nisms evolved alongside mammalian reproductive some form of service or resource to other parties
strategies emphasizing mother-offspring social in the exchange. Each form of exchange is impor-
bonds (Churchland 2011). The cognitive and hor- tant for determining the rate, duration, and degree
monal hardware that enables mammalian moth- of shared intentionality among interacting par-
ers to extensively care for their infants, also ties. When the rate and duration of interaction,
underlies the pro-social motivations unrelated, along with shared intentionality, are low among
but familiar or similar conspecifics have for each interacting parties, perceptual overlap between
other. interacting parties will lessen and displays of
Perceptual overlap—that is, perceptions of empathy will be less common.
familiarity, physical similarity and competence— Proximity contexts include where people are
is created through long and frequent bouts of co- arranged in geographic and cultural space. When
presence. During such bouts of co-presence, individuals or groups are separated by geographic
individuals will spontaneously begin mimicking distance, the expected rate and duration of inter-
(i.e., matching) the posture and emotional expres- action will obviously be lower than in contexts
sions of others, in addition to synchronizing (i.e., where people live close in proximity. However,
coordinating) vocalizations, heart rates, breath- cultural distance also critically influences the
ing rates, gestures and other behaviors. When this likelihood of interaction. People with shared cul-
physiological and emotional entrainment occurs tural characteristics are more likely to interact
between human beings, as opposed to non-human regardless of geographic distance, a phenomenon
animals, peoples’ identities bubble up to the sur- known as the “homophily bias,” (McPherson and
face via symbolic language. Once people have an Ranger-Moore 1991; McPherson et al. 2001).
understanding of one another’s identities, they Someone living next door to a person of a differ-
can begin searching for symbolic (in addition to ent religion or ethnicity might, despite being in
purely physical) similarities to self. close geographic proximity, avoid interaction due
Co-presence does not necessarily lead to per- to lower perceived physical or symbolic similar-
ceptual overlap, of course. Theoretically, there ity. Thus, geographic proximity is important for
are three mediating variables that threaten to predicting co-presence and perceptual overlap,
reduce the flow of perceptual overlap between but so too is cultural proximity or “social dis-
individuals: (1) exchange contexts, (2) proximity tance,” (Park 1924).
contexts, and (3) status contexts. These three Status contexts, lastly, influence perceptual
contexts harbor the causes of immorality. overlap between individuals and groups by cast-
Exchange contexts influence the absolute rate ing some parties as more competent than others.
and duration of co-presence, in addition to the Research from both zoology and psychology
distribution of resources. Within sociological indicates that mammals, including human chil-
exchange theory (e.g., Molm 2003; Lawler et al. dren and adults, preferentially mimic and syn-
2009), four ideal-typical forms of exchange rela- chronize body language, emotion and
tionships are outlined: cooperative exchange, vocalizations with higher-status others (Over and
negotiated exchange, reciprocal exchange and Carpenter 2012; see also McCaffree 2015). Status
generalized exchange. Each of these exchange considerations canalize entrainment because per-
relationships differ by their characteristic rate ceived competence is a general source of prestige
and duration of interaction, along with their in mammalian hierarchies. Even when perceived
degree of shared intentionality. status is illegitimately rooted in historical dis-
Cooperative exchanges, for example, are char- crimination—as when men are, on average,
acterized by a high rate and duration of interac- assumed to be more competent as task leaders
tion oriented toward the accomplishment of a than women (see Ridgeway 2011)—this status
shared goal. Negotiated exchanges, on the other
452 K. McCaffree
may still serve to direct the situational mimicry higher status parties may canalize entrainment
and synchrony of behaviors and emotion. initially, unfair or malicious behavior (when per-
This theory of perceptual overlap—that physi- ceived by lower status others) may reduce lower
ological entrainment and perceptions of symbolic status actors’ perceptions of physical or symbolic
(i.e., identity) similarity drive empathy and that similarity or familiarity with higher status actors.
this entrainment and perceived symbolic similar- In order to maintain status, then, individuals must
ity is mediated by exchange, proximity and status concern themselves with their reputations as fair
contexts—is sufficiently robust to explain many or caring. As a corollary, when individuals use
of the above-mentioned empirical observations their status to greedily accrue resources and
within the sociology of morality. Consider, as an power, perceptual overlap with surrounding oth-
example, how the forces of perceptual overlap ers will begin to decline—to the degree that their
might be used to theoretically interpret some of malevolent behaviors are perceived—and rebel-
the empirical findings on the moral significance lion or revolt becomes more probable in that spe-
of reputations. cific exchange relationship.
In short, social status increases empathy in an
exchange network to the degree that it hierarchi-
21.6.1 Applying the Principles cally directs entrainment from low to high status
of Perceptual Overlap: actors, but social status will also decrease empa-
The Example of Reputational thy to the degree that accumulated status pro-
Maintenance duces perceptions of dissimilarity or unfamiliarity
among interacting parties. An appreciation of the
To demonstrate the usefulness of this theory of principles of perceptual overlap shows the phe-
morality, allow me to discuss the forces of per- nomenon of “reputation maintenance,” as just
ceptual overlap in the context of the research on one example, to be rooted in the status dynamics
reputation discussed above. Reputational con- that potentially enhance or degrade entrainment.
cerns might be theoretically understood as
attempts to mitigate the perceptual partitioning
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Forgetting to Remember:
The Present Neglect and Future 22
Prospects of Collective Memory
in Sociological Theory
Christina Simko
1
C. Simko (*) Halbwachs was not the first to use the term “collective
Department of Anthropology and Sociology, memory,” but he imbued it with “a theoretical weight pre-
Williams College, Williamstown, MA, USA viously unknown” and outlined a set of ideas that con-
e-mail: [email protected] tinue to be remarkably generative (Olick et al. 2011:16).
individual’s memories take on shape and ship on memory can move forward two major
meaning. projects in contemporary theory: first, the proj-
In a similar vein, Halbwachs argued that the ect of theorizing the nature of the epoch in
act of remembering is not fundamentally ‘about’ which we live—making sense of the moment
recalling the past as it happened or somehow that theorists have termed “late,” “high,”
recovering history ‘intact.’ Instead, it is oriented “reflexive,” “liquid,” or “post” modernity (e.g.,
toward the needs of the present, the demands of Giddens 1990; Beck 1992; Bauman 2000)—and
our immediate social milieu: “collective mem- second, the project of theorizing the meaning of
ory,” he argued, “adapts the image of ancient “culture,” a term that has simultaneously capti-
facts to the beliefs and spiritual needs of the pres- vated and perplexed recent generations of
ent” (quoted in Schwartz 1982:376). Writing in a sociologists.
different context, George Herbert Mead advanced Today, as I alluded above, the study of collec-
a remarkably similar argument. Much like tive memory is a vibrant interdisciplinary enter-
Halbwachs, he understood the past as a tool for prise.2 Especially for scholars well versed in this
addressing present dilemmas: “reality,” Mead enterprise, it is worth clarifying my purposes
wrote, “is always that of a present,” and “the here. There are now numerous review essays
past…is as hypothetical as the future” (1932:235, (e.g., Olick and Robbins 1998; Conway 2010b),
12). Again, memory is a social phenomenon, survey texts (e.g., Misztal 2003; Erll 2011), hand-
amenable to continuous reconstruction, and must books (e.g., Erll and Nünning 2008), and readers
therefore be understood using distinctively socio- (e.g., Olick et al. 2011) that synthesize the field,
logical tools. often taking into account—and even thematiz-
Over the past few decades, the insights these ing—the conversations and tensions that exist
figures have bequeathed to us have been brought between and across disciplines. Here, my focus is
to bear in reviving a vibrant discourse on collec- more delimited: to provide a broad sense for the
tive memory, within sociology and beyond. In relationship between sociological work on mem-
sociology, however, this revival has had a rela- ory in particular and some of the overriding con-
tively delimited impact. At present, the sociol- cerns in contemporary theory. My aim, then, is
ogy of memory is largely understood not as a not to provide a comprehensive review of the
broad concern for sociological theory, but as a memory literature, but to highlight the themes
special interest—a sub-subfield within cultural most pertinent to sociological theorizing, and to
sociology, composed of scholars with particular sensitize a broader community of theorists to the
interests in history or commemoration. Yet this (perhaps surprising) relevance that collective
assumption obscures the profound ways in memory might hold in addressing their concerns.
which the sociology of memory addresses cen- First, however, I set the stage with a brief account
tral questions in contemporary theory. For as of collective memory’s reemergence as an
Durkheim, Halbwachs, and Mead all recognized
in their own ways, memory belongs at the core
2
of our understanding of the social. It is the tissue Indeed, the classic sociological texts on memory have
that binds collectivities—from families to reli- become core references in the interdisciplinary field of
“memory studies,” which has—over the past few
gions to nations—together. It is not merely a decades—brought together scholars from across the
way of preserving bygone history, but a source humanities and social sciences in a vigorous dialogue
of both power and meaning in the present. In the about the nature of memory and its place in human social
pages that follow, then, I argue for re-centering life (for recent overviews, see Erll 2011; Olick et al.
2011). The field now has its own journals (e.g., Memory
the sociology of memory, for moving it from the Studies), book series (e.g., Palgrave Macmillian’s
periphery to the core of pressing theoretical “Memory Studies” and Stanford’s “Cultural Memory in
debates. Specifically, I argue that the scholar- the Present”), and conference circuit, among other mark-
ers of its institutionalization.
22 Forgetting to Remember: The Present Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective… 459
explicit analytic framework in sociology during conditions for a renewed concern with the past,
the 1980s and 1990s. including such issues as memory, tradition, and
heritage. Reflecting on the reemergence of col-
lective memory from the vantage of the mid-
22.2 Recovering “Collective 1990s, Barry Schwartz (ibid.:277–278)—who
Memory” was perhaps the preeminent architect behind the
contemporary sociology of memory—pointed to
For several decades following his death, the rise of multiculturalism, postmodernism, and
Halbwachs had little influence in the English- hegemony theory as the links between the 1960s
speaking world. The concern with memory did and 1970s “cultural revolution” and the scholarly
not disappear—perhaps most notably, W. Lloyd interest in the (re)construction of the past that
Warner’s (1959:278) The Living and the Dead solidified throughout the 1980s. Specifically, all
turned a Durkheimian lens on the commemora- three of these perspectives challenged taken-for-
tive rituals of “Yankee City,” highlighting the granted images of, and narratives about, the past,
integrative powers of Memorial Day rites and underscoring how they excluded women, minori-
arguing that they constituted “a modern cult of ties, and working classes. They thus heightened
the dead” that conformed “to Durkheim’s defini- both sensitivity to and interest in the social con-
tion of sacred collective representations.” Yet the struction—and the possibilities for reconstruc-
specific language of collective memory remained tion—of the past.
notably absent from Warner’s discussions. By the The reemergence of “collective memory” as
early 1980s, however, sociologists had begun to an organizing principle for a field of inquiry thus
revive Halbwachs’ legacy and renovate his idea resonated with wider intellectual currents that
of collective memory for contemporary sociol- sensitized sociologists to the role of the past in
ogy, creating an organized field of inquiry around the present. On the one hand, scholars high-
the concept.3 lighted, and even celebrated, the continued power
The first English translation of selections from of the past in providing meaning and orientation
Halbwachs’ writings on collective memory—a in the late modern world: Edward Shils’ (1981)
series of programmatic essays that his admirers Tradition argued that the sharp boundaries the
had published 30 years prior—appeared in 1980 classical theorists drew between tradition and
under the title The Collective Memory, with an modernity in fact obscured the enduring rele-
introduction by Mary Douglas. Though the book vance of the past in providing moral guidance; in
quickly went out of print, Lewis Coser’s transla- Habits of the Heart, Robert Bellah and his col-
tion of key selections from Halbwachs’ 1925 leagues ([1985] 1996:152–155) wrote powerfully
work The Social Frameworks of Memory as well about “communities of memory,” bound together
as a brief excerpt from his 1941 work The by a sense of shared history. On the other hand,
Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983) dis-
Land appeared in 1992, and has had much greater mantled and desacralized the “invented tradi-
staying power. Influential as it would be, how- tions” that modern nation-states elaborated in the
ever, Halbwachs’ work “did not cause the present effort to shore up their legitimacy, uncovering the
current of collective memory research” but was centrality of the past—or rather, highly fabricated
“rather swept into it” (Schwartz 1996a:276). images of the past—in securing and maintaining
Indeed, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, broad political power. Here, in keeping with the cultural
intellectual, cultural, and political factors created transformations mentioned above, memory was
less a source of solidarity and group identity and
3
more a tool for elites to manipulate the masses.
For a discussion of other relevant scholarship in the years
Ultimately, the language of collective memory
between Halbwachs’ death in 1945 and the revival of his
work in the Anglophone world during the 1980s, see provided a rubric for synthesizing these kinds of
Olick et al. (2011:25–29). concerns—for systematically examining the
460 C. Simko
interplay between past and present and for mak- on the commemorative symbolism displayed in
ing this relationship an explicit object of concern the U.S. Capitol: prior to the Civil War, Capitol
for social theory. iconography featured “founding heroes” whose
A series of works by Schwartz re- memory underwrote unity for the fledgling
appropriating, renovating, and reformulating the nation. Following the Civil War—with the fed-
concept of collective memory paved the way for eral union secured—the commemorative sym-
a vibrant sociological discourse on the subject— bolism in the Capitol expanded significantly.
one whose theoretical relevance is still underap- American leaders rediscovered post-revolutionary
preciated today. Schwartz’s early work situated events that once would have provoked conflict;
collective memory squarely within the they established the National Statuary Hall as a
Durkheimian tradition. In a 1982 article examin- forum for commemorating regional heroes whose
ing the events and persons commemorated in the inclusion would have been too threatening when
United States Capitol—a study that can retro- national unity was still problematic; and they
spectively be understood as the starting point for began to commission busts and portraits accord-
this new tradition of inquiry—Schwartz ing to incumbency rather than perceived achieve-
(1982:374) pointed out that “[f]ew contemporary ment—honoring individuals for their offices
sociologists have systematically studied how the rather than their personal qualities. In short, as
past, as a ‘collective representation,’ is affected the nation’s needs transformed, so, too, did its
by the organization and needs of social groups.” commemorative symbolism—just as Halbwachs
Yet this, he pointed out, was precisely Halbwachs’ would have anticipated.
concern in his writings on collective memory: Yet Schwartz qualified Halbwachs’ presentism
Halbwachs, Schwartz (ibid.:375) explained, con- in important ways, and in doing so established the
cluded “that changes in our knowledge of the foundation for the broad debate about the mallea-
past correspond to changing organization needs bility of memory. Certainly, Schwartz acknowl-
and to transformations in the structure of soci- edged, recollections are called forth and shaped by
ety.” Grappling with this conclusion, Schwartz present circumstances. But even as circumstances
simultaneously introduced Halbwachs to change, the new symbolism that emerges to
American sociologists and laid the groundwork address them does not supplant earlier commemo-
for the theoretical debate that would propel the rations; it is instead superimposed upon them
contemporary sociology of memory into being: (1982:396).4 Earlier symbolism thus endures—
namely, the debate over the malleability of and presumably confers its legacy—within the
memory. ever-shifting present, apart from (and perhaps
even in spite of) the exigencies of the moment.
The revived tradition of collective memory
22.2.1 The Malleability of Memory research took up the questions Schwartz opened
in this study. To what extent can the past be rei-
As I noted above, one of the core claims in magined and reformulated to suit present inter-
Halbwachs’ sociology of memory—a claim that ests? Is the past more of a mechanism for gaining
also found support in Mead—was that our under- and sustaining power, or a source of collective
standing of the past is the product of our interests identity, solidarity, and moral guidance? When
and needs in the present. Indeed, Halbwachs and how does the past constrain social actors in
went so far as to claim that “a knowledge of the the present, limiting what they can do or say?
origin of these facts [about the past] must be sec- Presentism, as Jeffrey Olick and Joyce Robbins
ondary, if not altogether useless, for the reality of
the past is no longer in the past” (quoted in 4
Schwartz (1982:396) argues that this “pattern conforms
Schwartz 1982:376). In keeping with this “pre-
to Durkheim’s observations that organic solidarity does
sentist” view, Schwartz (1982:395–396) found not negate the mechanical kind but rather presupposes it
that the demands of the present bore powerfully and is welded on to it.”
22 Forgetting to Remember: The Present Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective… 461
(1998:128) point out, can “emphasize either constraints are “[m]oral, constitutive, endoge-
instrumental or meaning dimensions of memory.” nous, projective, [and] definitional,” and take the
For instance, while Hobsbawm and Ranger’s form of either taboos (proscriptions) or duties
(1983) landmark work stressed the instrumental (prescriptions), while rational constraints are “[c]
dimensions of tradition, Schwartz and his col- alculative, interested, exogenously caused, mun-
leagues’ study on the recovery of Masada among dane, [and] strategic,” taking the form of either
Palestinian Jews—which drew heavily on Mead’s prohibitions (proscriptions) or requirements (pre-
legacy as well as Halbwachs’—stressed the role scriptions) (ibid.:925). The prevailing logic
of the past in fulfilling a subsequent desire for applied to a particular past, however, can change
meaning and orientation: Masada’s function, they over time. For instance, successful appeals to
explained, was “not instrumental…but semiotic,” rationality can, at times, transform a taboo into a
and it provided “a symbolic structure in which the prohibition that can be dealt with calmly and cal-
reality of the community’s inner life could be ren- culatively, having lost its mythic power
dered more explicit and more comprehensible (ibid.:931–933).
than it would have been otherwise” (Schwartz Observing such transformations, Olick and
et al. 1986:160). The past can serve present needs Levy (ibid.:934) go one step further to outline a
not only by feeding the quest for power or domi- processual approach to collective memory that
nation, but also by filling an existential void. overcomes the dichotomy between presentist and
By and large, however, memory sociologists objectivist views of the past: collective memory,
worked to forge via media between presentist they argue, is itself the “continuous negotiation
views—whether instrumentalist or cultural—and between past and present…rather than pure con-
a more objectivist view of the past as durable and straint by, or contemporary strategic manipula-
unchanging. Arising alongside the “cultural turn” tion of, the past.” Collective memory, in other
and now integral to cultural sociology, the early words, is a dynamic process, not a static thing—
discourse on collective memory was particularly “an active process of sense-making through time”
concerned with countering strictly instrumental- (ibid.:922)—and conceptualizing it as such cap-
ist views of the past. Building on Schwartz’s tures the constant tension between malleability
argument that fresh reconstructions of the past and constraint. Subsequently, Olick (1999b,
are superimposed upon their predecessors, other forthcoming) specified the mechanism for this
scholars elaborated the specific factors that limit ongoing negotiation: namely, dialogue. Fresh
or constrain the malleability of the past. Michael representations of the past, he argues, are not just
Schudson (1989) identified three such limita- superimposed upon earlier images—discrete
tions: the structure of pasts available in a given moments in a series of representations—but
social context, the structure of individual choice, instead emerge in conversation with them; the
and the structure of social conflicts over the past. memory of commemoration thus intervenes in the
Actors thus cannot simply “invent” pasts out of interplay between past and present.
thin air to serve their needs in the present, but Though there of course remain tensions over
instead must work with the materials available to the malleability of memory, the prevailing wis-
them, and within a structure imposed by their dom is that the relationship between past and
social and historical context. And importantly, present is a complex and variable one. Largely
these materials and structure may or may not embracing these via media, recent scholarship
serve their present desires and aspirations—an has continued the effort to specify the mecha-
insight brought vividly to life in Schudson’s nisms of path-dependency (e.g., Saito 2006;
(1992) study of Watergate in American memory. Jansen 2007), or to clarify the nexus of cultural
In a similar vein, Olick and Daniel Levy and institutional factors that shape commemora-
(1997) argue that the past constrains present tive trajectories (e.g., Vinitzky-Seroussi 2002;
actors in different ways depending on the cultural Simko 2012; Steidl 2013), refining the concep-
logic attached to it: mythic or rational. Mythic tual toolkit for grasping mnemonic processes.
462 C. Simko
shift in the subjects of memory research. The ing these questions takes us to the very heart of
shift identified in the collective memory litera- sociology’s effort to theorize the modern.
ture—from heroism and triumph to victimhood
and atrocity—is not merely about the subjects of
commemoration, however. Rather, the subjects of 22.3.1 Collective Identity
commemoration embody broad epochal transfor- in a Melancholic Age
mations that we can understand when we afford
memory a more central place in our theories of Once again, the founding questions for this line
modernity. Here, the sociology of memory inter- of inquiry emerged out of a dialogue with
sects with, and speaks to, much more general Durkheim. As Robin Wagner-Pacifici and
concerns. Schwartz (1991:379) summarize—and as I noted
above—for Durkheim, commemorative rituals
“preserve and celebrate traditional beliefs,” inte-
22.3 Memory, Melancholy, grating “the glory of a society’s past into its pres-
and Modernity ent concerns and aspirations.” Accordingly, a
strict Durkheimian perspective assumes that “the
On the face of it, the transformation that now pre- events or individuals selected for commemora-
occupies many sociologists of memory is decep- tion are necessarily heroic, or at least untainted,”
tively simple. Collective memory once centered allowing for “a unified, positive image of the
upon the heroic: national celebrations (e.g., past” (ibid.). Even the piacular rites that
Spillman 1997), national idols (e.g., Schwartz Durkheim ([1912] 1915:494) described—“rites
1991b, 1998, 2000, 2008), and the stuff of tri- which are celebrated by those in a state of uneasi-
umph. Today, commemorative symbolism is ness or sadness”—arouse common emotions and
increasingly preoccupied with much darker sub- in doing so reconstitute the social body. Here,
jects, including both suffering inflicted upon col- too, “collective sentiments are renewed
lectivities and the atrocities perpetrated by them. which then lead men to seek one another and to
For one, “victims assume the position that, assemble together,” and indeed “[s]ince they
before, was the place of heroes” at the center of weep together…the group is not weakened, in
collective identities (Giesen 2004:3). For another, spite of the blow which has fallen upon it”
political legitimacy increasingly hinges on (ibid.:507, 510).6
acknowledging and atoning for misdeeds rather Yet modern commemorations take shape in
than celebrating past glories and present great- deeply pluralistic contexts, and frequently under
ness (Olick 2007b:122). Not surprisingly, this the shadow of divisive debates over the meaning
transformation has shaped the core questions of of the past. How, then, do collectivities construct
contemporary memory research. How do collec- representations of episodes that evoke conflict
tivities come to terms with “difficult pasts” and and dissensus rather than unity, shame and regret
find languages for memorializing suffering, mis- rather than pride? Examining the development of
deeds, and/or dissent, and how do these differ the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the
from the languages used to memorialize triumph, U.S. National Mall in Washington, D.C.,
heroism, and unity? Perhaps even more pro- Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz (1991) argue that
foundly, why have victims supplanted heroes as Maya Lin’s design addressed this powerful com-
the linchpin of collective narratives, and why is it memorative dilemma through its multivocality:
now incumbent upon collectivities to grapple
explicitly and publicly with pasts that are diffi- 6
Putting Durkheim in conversation with more contempo-
cult, ugly, and shameful? Suffering and atrocity rary treatments of emotion, Schwartz argues that piacular
rites impose “feeling rules” (Hochschild 1979) indicating
are themselves nothing new, but their centrality
“what sort of affect is to be displayed on a given occasion”
to the political agenda certainly is. And answer- (Schwartz 1991a:354); common emotion thus regenerates
the group’s sense of solidarity.
464 C. Simko
the black granite walls, inscribed with the names boundary): the Nazi past in postwar Germany
of over 58,000 dead, allow people to project their (Olick 2005, forthcoming); the atomic bombing
own sentiments and interpretations onto the of Hiroshima and its legacies in both the United
memorial, providing contemplative space that States (Zolberg 1998) and Japan (Saito 2006);
visitors can share even in the absence of a com- apartheid in South Africa (Teeger and Vinitzky-
mon narrative. Seroussi 2007; Teeger 2014); and Bloody Sunday
Building on this foundational case study, soci- in Northern Ireland (Conway 2010a), among
ologists have theorized how collectivities com- many others. More broadly, others have addressed
memorate difficult pasts under varying social the array of mnemonic practices that have devel-
conditions. Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi (2002) iden- oped to deal with these weighty legacies, includ-
tifies factors that support multivocal commemora- ing political apologies (Celermajer 2009),
tions such as the Vietnam Veterans Memorial: a reparations politics (Torpey 2006), and truth
relatively consensual political culture, a past that commissions (Jelin 2003; Posel 2008), as well as
is not highly relevant to the contemporary politi- the phenomena of silence and denial (Cohen
cal agenda, and a circumstance where nonstate 2001; Zerubavel 2006; Vinitzky-Seroussi and
agents of memory possess relatively little power. Teeger 2010) that—even in an era of acknowl-
The commemorations of Yitzhak Rabin in Israel, edgment—are often integral in the trajectory of
she argues, took shape under very different cir- difficult pasts.7 Our age is different from
cumstances: the political culture was deeply con- Durkheim’s, and—while there is still crucial
flictual; the past remained highly relevant; and guidance to be found in his treatment of com-
nonstate agents of memory possessed significant memoration—grasping the sources of collective
power. Here, commemorations assumed a frag- identity and social solidarity in contemporary
mented form: they took place across multiple society also requires new theoretical tools.8
(separate) spaces, each with its own distinct com-
memorative discourse and audience. And examin-
ing the memory of the May 4, 1970, shootings at 22.3.2 Memory and the Modern
Kent State University, Christina Steidl (2013:19)
traces how commemorations can shift dynami- Even more, understanding this transformation
cally between forms, theorizing a third, integrated can provide a window onto modernity itself.
commemorative type that “allows for the expres- What does the preoccupation with these darker
sion of divergent narratives and the maintenance
of separate commemorative spaces (like a frag-
7
As Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger (2010) point out, how-
mented memorial) and enhances social solidarity
ever, silence can be a vehicle for memory and commemo-
through shared meta-narratives stressing over- ration, not only for forgetting: for instance, the “moments
arching values” like a multivocal memorial. of silence” that are now a ubiquitous part of commemora-
This strand of research and theorizing has tive rituals interrupt the ordinary flow of time to provide
space for contemplating the past, facilitating memory
wide implications, examining the complex sym-
rather than undermining it.
bolism that emerges in commemorative rituals 8
In a related line of theorizing, Gary Alan Fine has exam-
Durkheim could not have anticipated—com- ined “difficult” or “negative” reputations. While memo-
memorations that not only center on painful epi- ries of evil and villainy (e.g., Ducharme and Fine
sodes, but also grapple overtly with mnemonic 1995)—like the memories of greatness that Schwartz
emphasizes—serve to reinforce a society’s moral bound-
conflict and its ramifications for collective iden-
aries (and thus underwrite consensus), memories of fail-
tity. With this transformation in the core subjects ure and incompetence are generated through “discursive
of collective memory has come a steady stream rivalry,” tension and debate among competing “reputa-
of books and articles addressing how “difficult tional entrepreneur[s]” (Fine 1996:1160, 1162). Fine’s
approach thus expands upon the Durkheimian view of
pasts” have reverberated among both “victims”
memory, emphasizing the “intense battle for control” that
and “perpetrators” (while also illuminating the often takes place before a symbol comes to represent soci-
contestation that often emerges over this very ety for its members (ibid.:1160).
22 Forgetting to Remember: The Present Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective… 465
narratives say about the epoch in which we live? the tissue connecting past and present”—are in
Can a focus on memory illuminate modernity in his view “benign conditions to be maintained, not
new ways? For a number of sociologists, the pathologies to be deplored and abolished”
answer is yes, and sites of memory become win- (Schwartz 2008:218), he also argues that some-
dows onto the conditions of late modern thing has been lost in the process. Equality and
life broadly conceived. Here, I consider four per- inclusivity are bound up with “the fraying fabric
spectives arising out of or in dialogue with the of American nationhood and self-esteem”
sociology of memory that offer particularly rich (ibid.:267), leaving citizens without the sources
insights for this line of inquiry. of inspiration and orientation that once sustained
their predecessors. Whatever one thinks of
22.3.2.1 The Post-Heroic Era Schwartz’s normative take on these develop-
Schwartz (2008), for one, theorizes an inverse ments—and many contemporary sociologists no
relationship between a society’s investment in doubt view them through a different ideological
equality and its reverence for heroes. The very lens—Schwartz maps a profound transformation
developments that fueled renewed intellectual in the relationship between past and present, with
interest in collective memory—multiculturalism, significant implications for collective life: cer-
postmodernism, hegemony theory, and the like— tainly, the declining power of heroes contributes
have also given rise to a cultural moment in to the sense of unmooring captured in the dis-
which the power of the past to orient and inspire course on “liquid” (Bauman 2000) or “reflexive”
has severely diminished. Focusing particularly (Beck 1992) modernity.
on the U.S. case, but also drawing comparisons
(e.g., Schwartz and Heinrich 2004), Schwartz 22.3.2.2 The Politics of Regret
(2008:187) argues that ours is “a post-heroic” Even more explicit in its contribution to epochal
era, in which “the very notion of greatness has theories is Olick’s account of the contemporary
eroded.” Figures such as Abraham Lincoln and “politics of regret.” Though they have long been
George Washington, once perceived as godlike, omitted from this tradition of theorizing, Olick
are now understood in more complicated terms, (2007b:130) argues that “memory and regret” in
as a mélange of good and evil, strength and weak- fact belong “at the center” of our “sociological
ness. As the boundary between ordinary people account of modernity.” Observing that political
and their heroes has eroded, the qualities associ- legitimation increasingly relies on “‘learning the
ated with each are visible in the other. lessons’ of history more than…fulfilling its
For Schwartz, this is part of the disenchant- promises or remaining faithful to its legacy”
ment process outlined by Max Weber—though (ibid.:122), he shows that attention to temporality
he is careful to note that the transformation is not can illuminate the contemporary preoccupation
total; reverence for heroes diminishes rather than with regret and indeed the very emergence and
disappearing altogether. In this way, Schwartz development of the modern.
challenges postmodernist theories that posit a Familiar theories of modernity capture crucial
more radical disintegration of the national mem- background factors that help explain the contem-
ories that once provided a sense of collective porary preoccupation with regret. Durkheim
identity (e.g., Nora 1989): the post-heroic age is ([1893] 1984) and, subsequently, Elias ([1939]
not a fundamentally new epoch, but a shift that— 2000) captured the process of differentiation that
in keeping with his earlier accounts of commem- creates conditions for regret: collective memory
oration—is superimposed upon what came itself arises to fill the gap that opens between
before. With this assessment, Schwartz seeks to individual and collective experience in increas-
draw attention to what he perceives as the trad- ingly complex urban environments, while “the
eoffs that come with equality and inclusivity. dense networks of relations” that emerge “give
While he makes clear that “[e]quality and distrust any single action a wide and unforeseeable circle
of authority”—which “[lead] to the rupturing of of implication” (Olick 2007b:131), generating an
466 C. Simko
intensified sense of both personal and collective demand to be reckoned with, interpreted, and
responsibility. Rationalization, as Weber understood, even as they resist narrativization.
described it, produces the conditions of possibil-
ity for an ethic of responsibility (Weber [1919] 22.3.2.3 Cultural Trauma
1946), which presumes both a sense that values Within this context has also arisen an influential
are relative—and thus that value conflicts are sociological discourse on “cultural trauma.”
ultimately inescapable—and an ability to distin- Bringing it into conversation with reflections on
guish means from ends.9 And the emergence of regret and temporality can enhance our under-
universalistic principles of justice that Jürgen standing of the present epoch in productive ways.
Habermas (1996) traces also paves the way for A trauma is precisely an interruption to progres-
the contemporary politics of regret. According to sive temporality (Olick 2007b:164): an event is
Olick (2007b:136), however, these standard so painful that it cannot be absorbed into existing
accounts miss “the most important…feature of narratives—and so it does not pass away, but
modernity’s trajectory”—namely, temporality. instead returns, as if of its own accord, against the
In this view, the transformation in our experi- sufferer’s will (Caruth 1995:4–5). While the psy-
ence of time is the hallmark of modernity: as chological discourse on trauma refers to pasts
Reinhardt Koselleck (1985), Lutz Niethammer that cannot be assimilated at the individual
(1992), and Benedict Anderson (1991) have level—ultimately codified in the diagnosis of
argued, cyclical temporality—supported by both “post-traumatic stress disorder” (Hacking 1995;
the rhythms of rural life and church eschatol- Young 1995)—the more recent sociological theo-
ogy—gave way to progressive linear temporality. rizing on cultural trauma refers to a breach in a
And the “historical consciousness” that arose as a collective narrative.10 Cultural traumas—Jeffrey
result is the primary force behind modern regret Alexander, Ron Eyerman, and their colleagues
(Olick 2007b:136). With the rise of linear tempo- argue—are events that create “wounds to social
rality came the grand narratives of modernity— identity” (Alexander 2012:2), setting off “a deep-
narratives of ascent and progress, with the going public discourse” that questions and inter-
nation-state as their “dominant purveyor” rogates the very foundations of that identity
(ibid.:188). Uninterrupted progress, however, (Eyerman 2011:xv). Ultimately, cultural trau-
never materialized in the way these narratives mas—like psychological traumas—are under-
anticipated: instead, the triumphant march for- stood as leaving indelible wounds, “marking [a
ward was interrupted by a series of atrocities, cul- collectivity’s] memories forever and changing
minating in a century that some observers (e.g., [its] future identity in fundamental and irrevoca-
Hobsbawm 1994) have characterized as unprec- ble ways” (Alexander 2004:1).
edented in its brutality. And because these violent Countering “naturalistic” perspectives,
interruptions cannot be assimilated into a narra- Alexander and his colleagues emphasize that cul-
tive that moves inexorably forward, they under- tural trauma inheres not in an event itself, but in
mine linear temporality. In doing so, they alter its interpretation: “cultural traumas are for the
our relationship to the past, to history. No longer most part historically made, not born” (Smelser
is the past strictly a source of glorious triumphs 2004:37), and they come into being when
that foreshadow an even more promising future. “[c]ollective actors ‘decide’ to represent social
It is also a source of painful episodes that haunt pain as a fundamental threat to their sense of who
us in the present—episodes that in some sense
10
The psychological understanding of trauma is itself a
9
Weber ([1919] 1946), of course, contrasted this ethic of metaphor. Originally, trauma referred to a physical
responsibility with an ethic of conviction, which pursues wound, and indeed the term still carries that meaning—as
“ultimate ends”—general ethical principles—without in the “trauma center” of a hospital. The concept of cul-
regard for their consequences. tural trauma, then, takes the metaphor one step further.
22 Forgetting to Remember: The Present Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective… 467
they are, where they came from, and where they and in some cases continue to sustain—memory
want to go” (Alexander 2004:10). It is carrier and community.11
groups—in Weber’s sense of the term—who con- Though the trauma metaphor has been fruit-
struct events as traumatic, as indelible wounds to fully extended beyond the modern epoch as an
a social group or body politic. Indeed, this con- analytic tool, it is also worth noting that the lan-
structivist approach to cultural trauma has been guage of trauma itself emerged and gained trac-
applied across a vast—and ever-growing—array tion under the peculiar set of social and cultural
of cases, from slavery in the United States conditions outlined above. And trauma’s emer-
(Eyerman 2001), to World War II in Germany gence as a rubric for coming to terms with mod-
(Giesen 2004) and Japan (Hashimoto 2015), to ern suffering, whether individual or collective, is
political assassinations in the United States, no accident. To be traumatized, again, is to be
Sweden, and the Netherlands (Eyerman 2011). unable to move forward in a narrative, to be
Contemporary approaches to cultural trauma caught unwillingly in a past that will not pass
explicitly revive the link between emotions and away. The experience of trauma, then, interrupts
memory evident in Durkheim’s foundational the modern sense of time as linear, the assump-
treatments of commemoration and piacular rites. tion that one will move continuously ahead
As Hiro Saito (2006:358) points out, cultural (Olick 2007b). Cultural trauma thus not only
trauma “has an emotional and therefore psycho- involves the stories that carrier groups actively
logical dimension, which cannot be reduced to construct out of the troublesome past, but also the
discursive construction.” In Japan, he argues, the force of “what the past does to us” (Olick
atomic bombing of Hiroshima came to be under- 2007a:21)—an interplay between an event (that
stood as a cultural trauma only after the fallout disrupts or undermines a received narrative) and
from a hydrogen bomb test near Bikini Atoll a broad historical context (that arguably makes
struck a Japanese fishing boat in March 1954. the very experience of trauma possible, or at least
Almost a decade after Hiroshima, the overarch- increasingly probable). Indeed, the concept of
ing “structure of feeling” (see Williams 1977) trauma resonates powerfully in the present
transformed from “pity” for “distant suffering” to moment; it is not only a psychiatric diagnosis and
“sympathy” and an understanding of the Japanese a cultural metaphor, but it has also “infiltrate[d]
nation as “a community of wounded actors” social discourse” (Fassin and Rechtman 2009:22)
(Saito 2006:354) affected profoundly by the suf- and become a pervasive frame for characterizing
fering in Hiroshima. More recently, Seth Abrutyn the confrontation with suffering (see also Davis
(2015) has both expanded the historical reach of 2005; Illouz 2007). Transformations in the expe-
the trauma concept and further illuminated the rience of time heighten the potential for trauma,
intricate relationship between memory and emo- and help to explain why it has become such a
tion. Collective traumas, he suggests, were “the hallmark feature of the present age.
core framework and motivating force undergird-
ing the evolution of Israelite religion and contem-
porary Judaism’s adaptive success” (ibid.:131). 11
As the anthropologist Paul Connerton (1989:102)—a
Interpreting communal suffering through a pollu- seminal figure in the interdisciplinary field of memory
studies—underscores, collective memory is not only
tion narrative (see Alexander 1988), elite entre-
inscribed through language, but also incorporated in the
preneurs “impos[ed] daily, weekly and annual body: “the past,” he writes, “can be kept in mind by habit-
purification rituals” that served as a “true shield ual memory sedimented in the body.” Expanding on this
against the outside,” resulting in “a strongly soli- argument, Rafael Narvaez (2006:52, 56, 57) points out
that the past is carried forward through “practices that
darious community, anchored socioemotionally
work ‘below’ and beyond consciousness”—an idea with
and morally to a multilayered center that had to roots in Durkheim’s accounts of “effervescent—thus
be protected” (Abrutyn 2015:125). Collective highly bodily—collective rituals” that lead to “the social
suffering thus generated rituals that sustained— construction of affect and the affective construction of
social meaning.”
468 C. Simko
22.4.1 Cultural Claims with the toxic legacies of the Nazi past. This is
in the Sociology of Memory not necessarily because speakers are explicitly
referencing earlier commemorations, as were
Schwartz’s body of work has been duly recog- those who held up Abraham Lincoln as a symbol
nized for bringing memory back into sociological during World War II. But because their responses
discourse. What is less commonly noticed, how- to enduring commemorative dilemmas are
ever, is that these works address not only memory moments in an ongoing dialogue, they are part of
specifically, but also culture writ large, and the memory genres that inevitably contain residues
crucial place of memory within it. In his series of of earlier claims and frames. Here, memory is not
books and articles on Abraham Lincoln, Schwartz exactly a lamp, but it nevertheless remains a pow-
(1996b, 2000, 2008) develops the twin concepts erful cultural structure, often operating beneath
of “keying” and “framing” to capture how mem- the level of conscious awareness.
ory serves as both a model of society—a “mirror” Indeed, it is perhaps because memory’s influ-
of what we are—and a model for society—a ence is often so subtle that it has largely been
“lamp” for what we might become. For Schwartz omitted from our broad theories of culture.
(2000:252), memory’s primary function is “semi- Certainly, even in a post-heroic age, there are still
otic”—it illuminates the values that undergird moments when the past once again becomes a
and motivate collective action. It does so by link- lamp, a source of guidance and a wellspring for
ing past with present—not merely through analo- social solidarity. In the days following September
gies, but through the more profound mechanism 11, 2001, for instance, memories of Abraham
of keying, which places the present “against the Lincoln once again provided consolation, orien-
background of an appropriate symbol” from the tation, and hope—and memories of Franklin
past (Schwartz 2008:xi) that then provides a Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and World War II
frame “for the perception and comprehension of more generally took their place alongside these
current events” (Schwartz 1996b:911). For references to Lincoln (Simko 2015). Even when
instance, in the U.S., the suffering and bloodshed the past is not overtly on the agenda, however, the
of World War II took on shape and meaning with symbolic materials we deploy to come to terms
reference to Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War. with the unfolding present are “historical accre-
In the 1940s, it was memory that provided orien- tions,” containing “memory traces” of what came
tation and hope. Following Clifford Geertz before (Olick 1999b:383). In this sense, “[a]ll
(1973), then, memory is a cultural system, “an memory is cultural, and all culture is historical”
organization of symbolic patterns on which peo- (Olick 2008:16).
ple rely to make sense of their experience”
(Schwartz 1996b:909).
Schwartz (ibid.:924–925) suggests that, in the 22.4.2 Cultural Memory
present post-heroic age, memory’s power as a
cultural system is in decline: “Americans,” he Capturing the fullest implications of this perspec-
observes, “now look less often to the past as a tive requires a brief detour outside sociology,
model for the present than ever before,” recogniz- though we remain in direct dialogue with the
ing “that their nation’s history can be seen as a sociological tradition. Indeed, this detour brings
source of shame rather than direction and inspira- us back full circle to Halbwachs. We turn, specifi-
tion.” Yet we should not be too quick to dismiss cally, to the German Egyptologist Jan Assmann,
the power of memory as a cultural system even whose critical reading of Halbwachs led him to
when it does not serve as an explicit source of coin the term cultural memory.12 Assmann
inspiration. As Olick’s (1999b, 2005, forthcom- (2006:8) praises Halbwachs for overcoming
ing) work on postwar German memory demon-
strates, the past powerfully structures what can 12
See also Olick’s (2007a, 2008) discussions of Assmann
be said in the present as public officials grapple and cultural memory, to which I am indebted here.
470 C. Simko
solipsism, for leading the study of memory out- adapt when the past is especially problematic,
side “the internal world of the subject.” Yet he conflictual, or burdensome? Second, premedia-
argues that Halbwachs failed to elaborate the tion captures how symbolic frameworks inherited
most radical implications of the collective mem- from the past impinge upon our understanding of
ory concept: much as he recognized “the social the present even as it unfolds. “[E]xistent media
and emotional preconditions of memory,” which circulate in a given society,” Erll (ibid.:111)
Assmann (ibid.) claims that Halbwachs “refused explains, “provide schemata for new experience
to go so far as to accept the need for symbolic and and its representation,” giving shape and mean-
cultural frameworks.”13 Halbwachs, that is, ing to fresh events from the first. In many ways,
focused on what Assmann (ibid.) terms commu- this conceptual pair resembles Schwartz’s keying
nicative memory—“lived, embodied memory” and framing: when the present is linked to the
that spans about three generations. Yet Assmann past, the past provides orientation, a framework
(1995:132) points out that collective memory is through which new experience is filtered and
transmitted more subtly, and over much longer understood. Yet Erll (ibid.:114) stresses the
timespans, through “that body of reusable texts, implicit and even unconscious dimensions of this
images, and rituals specific to each society in process: her discussion of premediation under-
each epoch, whose ‘cultivation’ serves to stabi- scores the ways in which the past infuses and
lize and convey that society’s self-image.” This is structures the present “inconspicuously,” as we
what Assmann refers to as cultural memory—the turn reflexively to familiar frames to impose
signs and symbols inherited from the past to order upon fresh events.
which we turn, often implicitly and unthinkingly, So, we may indeed turn less and less to heroic
for meaning in the present. The signs and sym- ideals as the idols of the past—the Washingtons
bols that comprise cultural memory inevitably and Lincolns—diminish in prestige. But the past
contain residues from the past—including the is no less influential in the present, because cul-
very distant and largely forgotten past that is no tural memory—that storehouse of symbols—
longer part of “communicative” memory. Such confers the only tools we possess in making sense
residues of the past influence the present even if of our world, even as we transform these tools in
those who deploy these symbols are unaware of turn. As Philip Abrams (1982:8) put it, “the past
their trajectories. is not just the womb of the present but the only
Building on Assmann, Astrid Erll (2009) raw material out of which the present can be con-
develops a pair of sensitizing concepts that help structed.” Again, culture is laden with memory,
to capture the dynamics of cultural memory: and memory is the lifeblood of culture (see also
remediation and premediation. First, remediation Olick 2008:16). And theories of cultural memory
captures how the past is re-presented, and thus in offer analytic tools for capturing the construction
some sense reconstructed or reinterpreted, in of the present out of the past.
new, and sometimes quite disparate, contexts. To illustrate, consider one brief anecdote from
Remediation is perhaps the dominant subject in my own work. When I began a project on the
the sociology of memory: how is the past refash- political discourse surrounding the events of
ioned in the present, how much can it be trans- September 11, 2001, in the United States, I was
formed to serve present purposes, and how do we struck by the presence of the past: references to
Lincoln and Roosevelt, Valley Forge and
13 Gettysburg, Pearl Harbor and Iwo Jima—both
As Olick and his colleagues point out, Assmann’s inter-
pretation understates the extent to which Halbwachs in implicit and explicit—provided consolation and
fact acknowledged the power of collective representations meaning in the midst of collective suffering and
in his discussion of historical memory, which he under- uncertainty about the future. But one reference to
stood as “residues of events by virtue of which groups
the past was more subtle and perplexing—
claim a continuous identity through time,” even if none of
their members have autobiographical memories of these namely, the term “ground zero,” which was
events (Olick et al. 2011:19). quickly adopted as the nomenclature for the site
22 Forgetting to Remember: The Present Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective… 471
in lower Manhattan where the Twin Towers once stituent of the tools and tropes, repertoires and
stood. Today, this usage is so widely accepted schemas, signs and symbols that cultural analysts
that it is often rendered as a proper noun: “Ground identify. It influences our interpretation of new
Zero.” Politicians, journalists, and even scholars events even when we do not turn to it explicitly,
have readily adopted it. What perplexed me was because it infuses the only frameworks available
that the term “ground zero” originally referred to to us to find orientation, to gain a foothold in the
the site directly beneath a detonated atomic face of the unfolding present. And the specific
bomb. It was initially used in the U.S. Strategic case of “ground zero” illuminates the payoff of
Bombing Survey, commissioned by the Truman this historical understanding of culture—the
administration to assess the impact of the atomic view of symbols as containing residues of the
weapons that U.S. forces dropped on the Japanese past—in a particularly powerful way. The con-
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. How, nection between Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
then, did this term that originated to describe an 1945 and lower Manhattan in 2001 is rarely rec-
act of American violence come to stand for ognized and articulated, let alone discussed or
American victimhood, and indeed even American grappled with explicitly. But what would it mean
nationhood? for Americans to understand that the ground zero
Theories of cultural memory provide a lan- designation—which now evokes sorrow, respect,
guage for understanding the connection between and even reverence—is a borrowed term? And
these two disparate events. In some subtle and even more, that it originally referred to a site
implicit way, Hiroshima and Nagasaki premedi- where American forces unleashed an unprece-
ated the events of September 11, 2001: they pro- dented act of violence, ushering in a new era in
vided one of the key symbols through which this global politics? Understanding the power of the
disorienting series of occurrences was under- past—especially when it remains implicit, even
stood from the first. But why was this symbolism invisible to most observers—is a crucial part of
so readily available? In fact, there is a long tradi- grasping the constitutive force of culture. As
tion of envisioning an “American ground zero” meanings exert their influence in larger social
that emerged quite rapidly in the months and and political processes, they carry with them the
years following the August 1945 bombings. The weight of the past, residues that ideas of “collec-
U.S. Strategic Bombing survey itself contem- tive” and “cultural” memory enable us to identify
plated this possibility, calculating the damage and illuminate in new ways.
that an atomic explosion would cause in American
city centers, including Washington, D.C. and
New York. What would an American “ground 22.5 The Future Prospects
zero” look like? Subsequently, popular maga- of Collective Memory
zines and national newspapers published detailed
descriptions of the suffering and devastation an Despite the revitalization of collective memory in
atomic attack on American soil could cause, sociology, much of the discipline has neverthe-
often accompanied by vivid visual images that less forgotten to remember. Not only have we
depicted these imagined attacks. Again, these failed to integrate collective memory into our
projections frequently focused on the very spaces theories, however. We have also in many ways
where the violence of September 11, 2001, forgotten the guiding questions that captivated
unfolded, selecting landmarks in Manhattan and the classical figures whose meditations on the
Washington as the epicenter—“ground zero.” modern gave birth to the tradition we have inher-
At a theoretical level, the transformation of ited. Yet the answers to these questions have been
ground zero reveals that culture is indeed magnificently generative. Classical theorists’
memory-laden. Memory, therefore, is not only efforts to come to terms with industrial moder-
the stuff of commemorations and memorials. It is nity, to comprehend a new epoch even as it came
not a special interest but instead the central con- into being, bequeathed to us concepts and
472 C. Simko
frames—from anomie and alienation, to rational- reverberates, how it shapes the tools and tropes
ization and legitimation, to differentiation and available to us for making sense of our world,
disenchantment—that continue to illuminate and how it implicitly infuses every act of meaning.
enlighten, that guide us as we work make sense Even if the world we inhabit is profoundly dif-
of our own milieu. And thus it seems that recon- ferent from the one that Durkheim observed,
necting with these questions is an especially memory is no less critical in our ongoing effort
worthwhile endeavor for contemporary theorists. to understand it.
The vibrant conversations taking place around
collective memory provide a powerful frame-
work for rejuvenating this tradition of theorizing. References
For the core questions of collective memory aim
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Intersectionality
23
Zandria Felice Robinson
until nearly a century later. The chapter then con- tion, race, and the woman question. Beyond these
siders intersectionality’s quarter century in the narratives of women who had more access to the
discipline of sociology, beginning with the publi- public sphere than most enslaved women, black
cation of Patricia Hill Collins’ Black Feminist feminist historians have uncovered the lived
Thought in 1990, assessing the methodological experiences of enslaved black women to under-
and theoretical challenges of the theory and the stand more about these women’s everyday lives
field’s transformation of the theory into a scien- and how they theorized labor, capital, and resis-
tific enterprise. Finally, this chapter discusses the tance in antebellum America (Davis 1983; Hine
implications of continued black feminist theoriz- and Thompson 1999; White 1999). These histori-
ing that calls for fresh theoretical language with ans’ research demonstrates how the lived experi-
which to describe interlocking systems of oppres- ences of enslaved women gave them a distinct
sion for the discipline of sociology. space through which to evaluate and critique the
structure and hierarchies of race, gender, and
capital as they were being shaped by a shifting
23.2 Intersectionality, Inequality, slavery context. Enslaved women recognized that
and the Black Feminist they were a source of capital as childbearers, as
Tradition laborers, and as reproductive laborers in the plan-
tation economy. They also were aware that their
From slavery to the present, the black feminist status as black and property relegated them to
tradition in the U.S. has concerned itself with particular kinds of labor that would not have been
highlighting the importance of an intersectional fitting for a “woman” or a “lady,” including field-
perspective, variously situating intersectionality work and cooking (Fox-Genovese 1988). Women
as a moral claim, then as a claim for political and ladies were free, white, and often wealthy
equality, and more recently as an epistemological and slave holding, circumscribed in a sphere of
claim and a claim for inclusion and social justice. power and domesticity to which enslaved women
Although the tradition is often communicated did not have access. Further, enslaved women
through the writings of formally educated were especially aware of how their status as black
women, black feminist academics recognize that women and property rendered them vulnerable to
most black feminist theorizing, and therefore sexual violence that regulated and constrained
most of the black feminist tradition, occurs out- their economic choices as well as contributed
side of the academy in the intellectual culture directly to the plantation economy. Using their
work of black women comedians, singers, artists, critical understanding of the intersecting systems
and other kinds of culture workers taking up of gender and race inequality in the plantation
questions of race, class, gender, and sexuality. At economy, these women developed resistance
the center of the tradition is a critique of the spe- strategies to protect themselves and undermine
cific arrangements of inequality that dispropor- the power structure. It is in these women’s resis-
tionately affect black women in U.S. society and tance strategies, in addition to the arguments
a call for an epistemic shift in how we conceptu- made by enslaved and formerly enslaved women
alize both race and gender as interlocking in slave narratives, that the origins of black femi-
oppressions. nist theorizing can be found.
The narratives of women who had been
enslaved, like Harriet Jacobs’ ([1861] 2009)
23.2.1 Black Women, Enslavement, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, plainly delin-
and Theory eated the perils of being both enslaved and a
woman. Like Sojourner Truth’s ([1851] 1995)
Intersectionality is rooted in theorizations of U.S. famous “ain’t I a woman?,” Jacobs’ narrative is
nineteenth century enslaved and free women in indicative of black women’s use of intersectional
speeches and writings they generated on aboli- epistemologies as a moral claim, appealing to
480 Z.F. Robinson
white women and abolitionists to understand how (Higginbotham 1993; Giddings 2009). During
enslavement, as a function of race, prevented the struggle for suffrage, black women made both
enslaved women having agency over moral moral and political intersectional claims to suf-
choices about sexual behavior and domestic frage, drawing on still prevalent discourses about
power over childrearing. Indeed, this was a rhe- the role of women in elevating the race as well as
torical strategy meant to appeal to the milieu, but discourses of political equality and representa-
it is an important strategy in that it rests on the tion for all citizens, regardless of their place in
intended audiences’ acknowledgement of the the social structure. Advocating for black women
uniquely disadvantaging intersection of race and as central political agents in a bourgeoning post-
gender in the lives of enslaved women. Using this slavery American democracy, theorist Anna Julia
argument, enslaved and free women advocated Cooper argued that “only the BLACK WOMAN
for the abolition of slavery, presuming that the can say when and where I enter, in the quiet,
absence of an unequal structural context—the undisputed dignity of my womanhood, without
plantation economy—would decrease the power violence and without suing or special patronage,
of race as a determinant of black women’s lives. then and there the whole Negro race enters with
As such, black women would have access to the me” (Cooper 1892: 31). However, this discursive
moral and social protections of womanhood. epistemological strategy did not overcome
However, this kind of discursive appeal also entrenched white supremacy. In fact, in the fol-
required its intended audiences to believe that lowing years, black women’s status as non-
black women were, in fact, women and therefore women and non-citizens as a result of their race
deserving of the protections afforded wealthy and gender positions was reinforced by the sys-
white women. Although this moral argument tematic lack of response to crimes committed
about the intersection of race and gender gained against them by whites.
some traction in abolitionist discourse, it was After the outcome of the suffrage battle solidi-
ultimately broader considerations of morality fied black women’s political place as partial citi-
that overshadowed these in the push for freedom. zens and non-women because of their race and
Still, the groundwork had been laid for organiz- gender, racialized and gendered Jim Crow vio-
ing around a disadvantaged social location, epis- lence reinforced black women’s status on the out-
temic position, and set of lived experiences. side of the legal protections of the law and the
social protections of womanhood. Throughout
the South, as well as other regions of the country,
23.2.2 Intersectionality and Feminist including the Midwest, white men raped black
Fissures from Suffrage women with impunity, often arguing that the vic-
to Jim Crow tim was a prostitute or otherwise enticed the men
into sex (Hine 1989; McGuire 2011). Even in
The battle for suffrage was the first national polit- cases where victims were not accused of being
ical moment when black women were discur- paid for sex, black women’s unequal race, gen-
sively trapped between the “woman question” der, and citizen statuses meant that investigations
and the “Negro problem.” White women actively and prosecutions were rare. Still, organizing
campaigned against black suffrage, which would around moral and political claims as women and
have only been extended to men, but women’s citizens, black women demanded their griev-
suffrage would ultimately have only been ances be recognized on both fronts. The denial of
extended to white women given the nature of race black women’s womanhood on the basis of race
prejudice in the South. Black women, including became a point of organizing and resistance for
Ida B. Wells-Barnett in Chicago, established black communities, and public spaces where
their own suffrage organizations, again recogniz- black women were most vulnerable, like buses,
ing that their status as both women and black became targets for boycotts. Thus, drawing on a
situated them outside of the political discourse moral claim to the protections of womanhood
23 Intersectionality 481
and a political claim to the protections of citizen- group of black women thinkers and organizers,
ship, black women led the charge to disrupt the argued that they were “actively committed to
workings of capital in order to bolster their claims struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual,
to protection. Here, both race and gender are cen- and class oppression and see as our particular
tered in black women’s lived experiences of task the development of integrated analysis and
inequality and strategies of resistance. The strug- practice based upon the fact that the major sys-
gle against sexual assault reflected black femi- tems of oppression are interlocking” (CRC 1977:
nists’ refusal to put either race or gender first, but 232). In concert with black feminist thinkers that
to instead lay moral and political claim to the came before them, they offered sophisticated
privileges afforded both (white) women and institutional critiques of the social structures that
(black and white) men by situating their strategy contributed to black women’s labor, sexual, and
firmly within the theoretical and epistemic prem- race oppression. The Combahee River
ise of intersectionality. Collective’s statement is foundational for modern
In addition to critiquing and resisting the gen- intersectionality because of its deliberate and
dered and racialized sexual violence that they centering integration of black women’s sexuality
experienced, black women critiqued the labor into black feminist analyses. Consisting of black
conditions to which they were relegated in the lesbian thinkers, the CRC represented a break
South, and domestic labor in particular. They from moral appeals—which often applied to
wrote to public officials, and even to sitting presi- married women, black women who could be con-
dents, asking for relief from the low wages, the sidered “ladies” in black communities because of
lack of work protections, and the lack of access to their education or access to capital—to defini-
a variety of employment opportunities they faced tively political and social justice-based demands
(Sharpless 2010). Again, here, black women for reprieve from oppression.
understood that it was intersection of race and As the Combahee River Collective was meet-
gender that was disadvantaging them, tying labor ing, organizing, and preparing to craft its founda-
discrimination to the sexual violence they experi- tional statement, black women workers at General
enced and appealing to the government for their Motors were suing the company for discrimina-
rights as women, citizens, and mothers to work tion on the basis of race and gender. The gender
for decent wages, control their work conditions, and race division of labor opportunities at General
and support their families without the threat of Motors excluded black women entirely from par-
violence (Jones 1949). ticipation—only men, which included black men,
were allowed to work on the factory floor; and
only whites, which included white women, were
23.2.3 Movement Politics allowed to work administrative positions. Thus,
and the Emergence of Modern all the jobs were for black men or white women,
Black Feminist Thought but not black women. As Kimberlé Crenshaw
(1989) points out in her analysis of the case as a
Modern intersectional thought is built on the galvanizing moment for the importance of inter-
acknowledgement of this legacy of resistance at sectionality in the modern moment, the court’s
the nexus of interlocking systems of oppression. ruling—that the black women could only claim
It is also a response to the continued ignoring of discrimination based on one of their statuses,
intersectionality in movement politics by black race or gender, and not on the intersection of
men in the civil rights and Black Power move- both—was a legal dismissal of the lived experi-
ments and by white women in the women’s lib- ences of black women whose lives occurred at
eration movement (Hull et al. 1982). In their the nexus of multiple oppressions. Reflecting on
April 1977 declarative, “A Black Feminist how this case led to her articulation of intersec-
Statement,” the Combahee River Collective, a tionality, Crenshaw (2015) writes,
482 Z.F. Robinson
I wanted to define this profound invisibility in rela- the excising of intersectionality from these ori-
tion to the law. Racial and gender discrimination
gins has also created methodological, theoretical,
overlapped not only in the workplace but in other
arenas of life; equally significant, these burdens and epistemological challenges (McCall 2005;
were almost completely absent from feminist and Davis 2008). In social scientific and popular
anti-racist advocacy. Intersectionality, then, was deployments of intersectionality, the fundamen-
my attempt to make feminist, anti-racist activism,
tal aspects of black women’s arguments are
and anti-discrimination law do what I thought they
should—highlight the multiple avenues through obscured, compromising the scientific enterprise
which racial and gender oppression were experi- and our ability to understand how institutions
enced so that the problems would be easier to dis- work together to disadvantage specific groups.
cuss and understand.
Wright 2016). Yet, to understand the sociological A Voice from the South is the first book-length
origins of intersectionality, these thinkers must text to explicitly advocate for black women’s
be situated as contributing to a distinct early unique epistemological perspectives as both a
black sociology that challenged the racist under- moral and political imperative for American
tones of the emerging field of American sociol- democracy, and to analyze black women’s rela-
ogy while producing theoretical, methodological, tionship to the nation’s growing global
and empirical innovations (Young and Deskins sensibility.
2001). These thinkers took up and shaped the cul- Class was a central, though sometimes
ture/structure dualism with attention to how implicit, feature in Cooper’s analysis of black
social institutions reinforced inequality and dis- women’s position vis-à-vis social institutions.
advantaged black populations at multiple She was aware, however, like many of her ante-
intersections. bellum abolitionist predecessors, of the distinct
Anna Julia Cooper’s work is pioneering in economic disadvantages that black women expe-
both black feminism and sociology. Earning the rienced as a result of their intersecting race and
PhD from the Sorbonne, Cooper’s work spoke class positions. She advocated for black women
fundamentally to questions of race, gender, and to have access to education and other economic
region that were central to early American socio- resources and frequently criticized black men on
logical thought and research. Her book, A Voice this account, declaring that on questions of other
from the South, By a Black Woman of the South matters pertinent to the race they were especially
(1892), is the first black feminist text that theo- vocal but were strangely silent on issues that
rizes the intersections of race and gender simulta- would improve the status of women. She was
neously in the lives of black women. Writing on also especially critical of the institution of mar-
the eve of the Chicago World’s Columbian riage as a site in and through which women were
Exhibition, Cooper (1892) said, “The colored economically subjugated and unable to reach
woman of to-day occupies, one may say, a unique their full potential as contributors to improving
position in this country. In a period of itself tran- the nation. As such, Cooper brought forth an
sitional and unsettled, her status seems one of the analysis of race, class, and gender in a moment
least ascertainable and definitive of all the forces where class for African Americans had transi-
which make for our civilization. She is con- tioned from the dichotomous categories of
fronted by both a woman question and a race enslaved or free.
problem, and is as yet an unknown or an unac- Whereas Cooper’s work shaped sociological
knowledged factor in both” (Cooper, 45). Cooper theory through a focus on the lived experiences
here acknowledges the distinctiveness of black and epistemology of black women, Du Bois’s
women in American democracy, and in this case work on the simultaneity of institutions of oppres-
formerly enslaved women as well as women sion were largely a critique of structure. As such,
coming of age in the early years of freedom. She although Du Bois rarely considered the simulta-
quickly points out their social location as central neity of race and class and gender, like Cooper
to both the “race problem” and the “woman ques- and other black women writers did, race and class
tion” has not been sufficiently theorized. Still, or race and gender were central to his under-
she highlights the important role black women standing of the racialized structure of American
were already playing in American politics inequality. As Du Bois scholar Ange-Marie
through their organizations and through the shap- Hancock (2005) notes, Du Bois’s work contains
ing of men’s political behavior. Further, she con- allusions to either a “theory of multiple yet mutu-
siders the special knowledge that black women ally exclusive identities and oppressions, or
bring to multiple institutions—education, poli- toward a theory of intersecting and mutually con-
tics, criminal justice, and healthcare—and calls stitutive identities and oppressions” (2005:74).
in particular on black men to recognize black Writing about the experiences of black women,
women’s import in reforming those institutions. Du Bois, like Cooper, is concerned with how the
484 Z.F. Robinson
woman question and the Negro question can be actual, perpetrated by black men against white
simultaneously considered. Similarly, writing women. Here, then, Wells-Barnett uses method-
about the experiences of poor black people in ological innovations—content and statistical
Philadelphia’s Seventh Ward, Du Bois (1899) analyses—to substantiate her epistemological
actively considers how racial disadvantage co- claims about anti-black racism, lynching, eco-
occurs and intersects with economic disadvan- nomic inequality, and sexual violence in the
tage, theorizing the two as mutually constitutive South and beyond (Royster 1997).
and reinforcing forms of oppression that uniquely In addition to these contributions on the inter-
affected black people in an anti-black society. Du section of race, labor, and capital as explanatory
Bois, thus, applies theories of intersecting oppres- factors in lynchings, Wells-Barnett made signifi-
sions to his findings in the field, and it is this cant theoretical contributions to how black femi-
theoretical perspective that undergirds his analy- nism would later more explicitly incorporate sex
ses in the studies produced through the Atlanta and sexuality into analyses of economic and
Sociological Laboratory (Wright 2016). racial inequality. Offering up a discursive analy-
Journalist Ida B. Wells-Barnett is also central sis of what Patricia Hill Collins would call “con-
to founding theories of intersectionality in early trolling images,” Wells-Barnett critiqued the
black sociology, applying intersecting theories of myth of the black male rapist and the black
race, class, and gender to her analyses of lynch- female prostitute, both narratives constructed in
ings in the South (Wells-Barnett 1959). Wells- the public discourse and media as justifications
Barnett’s analysis is rooted in lived in experiences for lynching. She deconstructed these narratives
but is simultaneously critical of the social struc- and demonstrated their relationship to economic
tures that shape lived experience. As such, Wells- competition in a South where whites were deter-
Barnett’s work is perhaps the most similar to mined to maintain complete political and eco-
modern black feminist analyses. It takes on a par- nomic control through whatever means. It was
ticular problem—the national problem of lynch- this plain deconstructive analysis that led to the
ing—and examines the phenomenon from burning of her paper, The Free Speech and
multiple institutional perspectives, uncovering Headlight of Memphis, and her inability to return
the economic, sexual, and social control motiva- to the city. In an editorial she wrote in the paper
tions for the persistent and unpunished violence. on May 21, 1892, a couple of months after three
She roundly critiques a criminal justice system of her friends were murdered by a lynch mob for
that gestured towards civility but was, in fact, running an economically profitable grocery,
overtaken by a spirit of lawlessness and an Wells-Barnett declared: “Nobody in this section
“unwritten law” of lynching. Engaging in one of of the country believes the old threadbare lie that
the first known uses of content analysis in sociol- Negro men rape white women. If Southern white
ogy, Wells combed newspaper accounts of lynch- men are not careful, they will over-reach them-
ings, creating a statistical record of lynching and selves and public sentiment will have a reaction;
what she called its “alleged causes,” which she a conclusion will then be reached which will be
compiled in the pamphlet A Red Record, pub- very damaging to the moral reputation of their
lished in 1895 with a preface from Frederick women.” Here, Wells-Barnett provides a sophis-
Douglass. In a 1900 follow-up essay to her origi- ticated analysis of the discourse about race and
nal analysis, Wells writes, “instead of lynchings moral superiority that supported the institution of
being caused by assaults upon women, the statis- lynch law in the American South in the late nine-
tics show that not one-third of the victims of teenth and early twentieth century. Later, schol-
lynchings are even charged with such crimes” ars working in the black feminist tradition would
(Wells-Barnett, 73). She highlights, instead, the apply similar discursive analyses to constructions
significant number of unpunished rapes endured of “welfare queens” and “baby mamas,” decon-
by black women at the hands of white men com- structing how these discourses were designed to
pared to the dearth of such crimes, alleged or obscure unequal economic relationships.
23 Intersectionality 485
Intersectionality was central to these thinkers’ frage struggle underscored the identity, analytic,
critical analyses of the social world as they and epistemological fissures that excluded black
worked to bridge empiricism and epistemology. women from visions of freedom in a changing
For Cooper in particular, the experiences of black nation, black women increasingly formed spaces
women were a starting point from which to assess to theorize their particular experiences, whether
the political landscape and theorize new possi- in the Jim Crow South or in Diasporic contexts.
bilities for freedom with black women at the Some of the most significant work that served as
helm of addressing society’s ills. For Wells and the basis for intersectional theory and practice
Du Bois, the experiences of black people in their emerged from the organizing work of black
interactions with the social structure, particularly women in the anti-imperialist, civil rights, and
the economy, were the beginning point of theory- women’s rights movements in postwar era.
generation about the intersections of race and Imperialist expansion, sexual violence against
class or race and gender. Wells and Cooper black women, degenerating conditions in black
offered epistemological critiques that privileged communities, an oppressive welfare state that
black women’s unique standpoint, while Du Bois frustrated black women’s ability to choose how
uncovered how economic inequality and racial and when they formed families, lack of access to
inequality created structurally unequal outcomes. equal healthcare, and persistent racial inequality
Wells and Du Bois provided important method- were among the many manifestations of oppres-
ological interventions based on their understand- sion that black women’s consciousness raising
ing of intersectionality, and from these methods and liberation groups organized to address.
discovered new ways of thinking about how the
intersection of social locations and social institu-
tions worked together to disadvantage black peo- 23.4.1 Black Feminist Theorizing
ple in general and black women in particular. on the Margins of Movements
Although they were working firmly within the
structure of a discipline that, as Young and As with the classical period, black women’s post-
Deskins (2001) argue, drew on “the same para- suffrage organizing is central to understanding
digms, language, and logic employed by the cre- the development of black feminist thought in
ators of not just racialist, but racist American general and theorizations of intersectionality in
social thought,” they nonetheless improved upon particular. Although black feminist theorizing
and created new theory and methods that prefig- vis-à-vis communism and radicalism in the inter-
ure the institutionalization of intersectionality. war and immediate postwar periods is understud-
Their work is indeed the groundwork of socio- ied, black women’s analyses of communist texts
logical theories of intersectionality, foreshadow- and ideologies shaped The Left and the African
ing how black feminist epistemologies are central American intellectual enterprise. In one of her
to the development of methodological innovation most widely cited essays, “An End to the Neglect
in intersectionality research. of the Problems of the Negro Woman!” promi-
nent radical thinker Claudia Jones (1949)
implores labor unions to take up the cause of
23.4 Black Feminist Organizing advocating for domestic workers to have the
and Modern Black Feminism same labor protections as other workers to relieve
their economic disenfranchisement. Highlighting
Black feminist work, rooted in activist responses what she dubbed the “double exploitation” of
to conditions specific to black women’s lives in women as gender and class minorities, Jones
the context of American inequality, continued contended that “negro women—as workers, as
after this classical period, still carving out space Negroes, and as women—are the most oppressed
in the public discourse for black women to author stratum of the whole population” (109). She
and theorize their own experiences. After the suf- described what she called the “superexploitation”
486 Z.F. Robinson
of black working class women, and drawing on riences of inequality. For instance, advocating for
U.S. Department of Labor statistics, she con- reprieve from and punishment for domestic vio-
nected black women’s economic status to their lence meant relying on police who were often
place in movement politics and ideology. Perhaps hostile to the interests of black men and women.
most significant to one of the key interventions of Also, while some white women advocated for the
black feminism, Jones analyzed how the denial right to control their fertility, including the right
of labor and property rights affected black wom- to be sterilized whenever they chose without the
en’s ability to protect their bodies from white consent of their partners or physicians’ restric-
sexual violence. She calls out white women’s tions, black women and other women of color
complicity in a system that lynched black men to were still facing forced sterilizations, performed
avenge white women’s allegedly violated wom- without their knowledge and often at the behest
anhood while simultaneously subjecting black of government organizations. These women, who
women to “daily insults…in public places, no were forming the basis for the reproductive jus-
matter what their class, status, or position” (119). tice movement, were excluded from consider-
Sexual violence affected black women across ations and protections for which white women,
class, but also was a result of their broad eco- and white middle class women especially, were
nomic marginalization, rooted in an institutional- striving. Socialist and other anti-capitalist move-
ized anti-black misogyny that imagined all black ments too often subsumed practices of inequality
women as disposable laborers and disposable that disproportionately affected certain groups
bodies. Although Jones’ political biographer under an umbrella that would supposedly resolve
(Davies 2007) notes that she frequently returned itself when labor triumphed over capital. At every
to the party line—that an anti-capitalist and anti- turn, the dominant narratives of most large-scale
imperialist victory would alleviate if not eradi- movement organizations ignored, or at least
cate black women’s marginalization—Jones’ downplayed, the experiences of black women
theorizations of sexual violence against black and the histories of anti-black misogyny that
women indicate her understanding of the specific undergirded all systems of oppression. Yet, out of
intersections of oppression for black women. this praxis came further refinement and expan-
They also underscore some of black people’s, sion of black feminist theorizing on race, gender,
and black women’s in particular, frustrations and class oppression as systems, as well as spe-
with the radical Left in this particular historical cific intersectional analyses of social institu-
moment. tions—family, health, the labor market and
In the height of the civil rights and Black economy, religion, politics, and education.
Power eras, black women worked diligently in a The intersection of race and gender, and spe-
wide range of organizations, from civil rights cifically disadvantaged positions in those two
organizations like the Southern Christian systems, remained central to black feminist con-
Leadership Conference to the Black Panther ceptions of the structure of inequality in America.
Party to the National Organization for Women. Analyzing black women’s economic lives as
Some prominent black feminists straddled mul- enslaved and later as relegated to the worst pay-
tiple organizations, like attorney Florynce ing jobs in the labor force, intersectionality theo-
Kennedy who helped found NOW and worked rists carefully delineated how black women’s
diligently in the Black Power Movement distinct economic subjugation was rooted in anti-
(Kennedy 1976; Randolph 2015). These wom- black misogyny. Writing in 1970, lawyer and
en’s labor often went unseen and exploited in scholar Pauli Murray argued that “the economic
these organizational contexts, and their experi- disabilities of women generally are aggravated in
ences were often marginalized in movement the case of black women,” highlighting how a
goals. In organizing for their liberation, black significant proportion of working women of color
women found themselves again trapped by a dis- were then employed as domestic laborers with no
cursive and policy erasure of their lives and expe- labor protections (195). The denial of labor
23 Intersectionality 487
protections for this class of workers was an protect themselves, helped win broad victories
explicit denial of labor rights to black women. for women in general.
Black feminist historians have noted how domes- Black feminist theorists saw sexual violence
tic labor was framed as black women’s work, as tied to reproductive oppression, writing elo-
continuing slavery-era discourse about black quently about practices of forced birth control
women’s “special talents” as wet nurses, nannies, and sterilization of people of color in the U.S.
and cooks during slavery (Sharpless 2010; and abroad. Because access to welfare benefits
Wallace-Sanders 2009). These discourses was often predicated upon visits to specific clin-
reflected and reinforced black women’s eco- ics or doctors, women of color were forced to
nomic disempowerment but also underscored exchange their reproductive liberty, usually with-
their particular vulnerability as unprotected and out their knowledge, for meager economic
undervalued laborers. Their working conditions resources in a society that designed and profited
rendered them subject to sexual violence and from their impoverishment and low wages. After
physical abuse while earning low wages that surgical sterilizations abated, long-acting revers-
were often withheld by employers. Black femi- ible contraception was often forced on black
nist theorists connected this subjugation to the women, especially when those women were
maintenance of white racial supremacy and capi- receiving welfare benefits. Yet, in cases where
talism domestically and internationally. women wanted to access birth control, costs were
often prohibitively high to enable them to do so.
In addition to bodily reproductive oppression
23.4.2 Theorizing Sexual Violence through forced sterilization, black women orga-
nized in concert with several other movements,
Black women also organized against sexual, including the environmental movement, to high-
reproductive, and heterosexist oppression in the light how the conditions in which black women
United States and in the communities of color in found themselves were often not conducive to
the developing world. These systems were con- reproduction. Government disinvestment in black
ceptualized as intersecting and were analyzed for communities, lack of protection from violence,
how they contributed to economic disadvantage environmental hazards, and low wages all created
while simultaneously compounding racial disad- circumstances in which black women could not
vantage. While all women—across class and choose to give life.
marital status—were disadvantaged by patriar- In their critique of the system of patriarchy
chal power that governed sex, black women that enabled sexual violence against black women
experienced a racialized sexual oppression that and the restriction of their reproductive choices
meant that anyone could lay claim to their bodies based on their economic status, black women—
and they would have little to no recourse. and black lesbian women in particular (CRC
Constant assaults against black women con- 1977; Lorde 1984a, b)—also launched a critique
strained their labor choices, further exposing of heterosexism, which they argued was integral
them to economic disadvantage. Thus, their orga- to the deployment of racial, economic, and gen-
nizing also recognized the economic underpin- der inequality. Writing in This Bridge Called My
nings of unchecked sexual violence. This work Back, published on the Kitchen Table: Women of
laid the foundation for Joan Little, a woman tried Color Press started by Barbara Smith, Cheryl
for defending herself against an assailant, to be Clarke (1983 [1995]) contended that, “while the
acquitted in 1974 (McGuire 2011). This verdict, black man may consider racism his primary
widely seen as a victory of a multiracial move- oppression, he is hard put to recognize that sex-
ment coalition, helped change how the law ism is inextricably bound up with the racism the
treated rape and opened the door for marital rape black woman must suffer, nor can he see that no
to be punished. Black women’s decades of resis- women (or men for that matter) will be liberated
tance to sexual violence, and their strivings to from the original “master-slave” relationship,
488 Z.F. Robinson
viz., that between men and women, until we are another to produce differential outcomes based
all liberated from the false premise of heterosex- on one’s position in the structure of power. Rather
ual superiority” (246). Black lesbian women than “twin evils,” then, racism and sexism were
struggled against heterosexism in movement increasingly theorized as interdependent and
organizations and dismal economic outcomes mutually constitutive systems of oppression.
that were a product of their intersecting race, Building on previous generations’ analyses of the
gender, and sexuality statuses. They were also “double slavery” or “double burden” of the
central to a radical broadening of the foci of black woman question and the Negro question, black
feminist praxis to more definitively include atten- feminists in the 1960s increasingly began elabo-
tion to global oppressions, sexuality oppressions, rating on the simultaneous outcomes of racism
trans* oppression, and the intersection of race, and sexism in mathematical terms. Drawing on
gender, and disability studies. Marxist critiques of women’s place in a capitalist
society, activists like Frances Beale focused on
how black women, as “the slave of slaves,” were
23.4.3 From Parallels to Intersections exposed to “double jeopardy” as they were
exploited in labor markets that constrained them
As part of the turn towards new language in the both on the basis of race and gender. But this
theorization of black women’s experience, black double jeopardy implied more than the addition
feminist intellectuals began to more explicitly of one system to another (and therefore the abil-
resist the parallelism in the juxtaposition of anal- ity to subtract one system from the other and alto-
yses of racism and sexism. Whereas aligning the gether absent its effects from existence); rather it
two had been a moral and rhetorical strategy used signified a multiplying and reinforcing condition
by women abolitionists to advocate for the end of in which these respective systems do not exist
slavery, describing slavery’s ills as something without, and in fact enable, one another.
that burdened black enslaved women and white It is this theorization of the gendered and
mistresses equally was neither accurate or aligned racialized exploitation of black women, rooted in
with achieving justice. After slavery, describing black feminist economic analyses since slavery,
the race problem as akin to the problem of wom- that heightened differences between black wom-
en’s suffrage or other forms of inequality yielded en’s and white women’s respective movements
friction between black and white women suffrag- for liberation. Beale (1970) argued that, “if the
ists. Black women’s employment in dangerous white groups do not realize that they are in fact
and grossly underpaid domestic labor in the fighting capitalism and racism, we do not have
homes of white women, even those white women common bonds” (153), therefore requiring an
who were not wealthy, further highlighted the anti-racist struggle that also recognized economic
distinctions in outcomes between black and white inequities and an anti-capitalist struggle that
women. Further, these inequities could not be understood how eradicating racism was neces-
explained away with merely an analysis of class sary for eliminating capitalism. In tandem with
inequality. Black feminist theorists therefore these analyses, black feminist activists elaborated
emphasized that sexism and racism were inextri- on how sexism functioned to disadvantage black
cably linked with the mechanisms of capitalism, women in and outside of black communities, as
rather than operating as mere derivative outcomes well as how sexism and heterosexism within
of capitalism. black communities reflected and reinforced both
Although a few theorists continued to analyze racism and capitalism. They critiqued the ten-
the parallels between racism and sexism in the dency to place the restoration of black men’s
1960s and into the 1970s, this kind of theorizing masculinity via patriarchy ahead of race and gen-
fell out of favor as black women intellectuals der liberation for black women. They also decon-
worked to more accurately articulate how multi- structed resurgent discourses about black
ple systems of oppression interacted with one people’s unfitness for the middle class family
23 Intersectionality 489
model, including notions of “pathology,” black As part of this expansion, and in tandem with
“matriarchy,” and the supposed inferiority of movement organizing, black women scholars in
woman-headed households. and outside of the academy wrote corrective,
Black women’s organizing in resistance to descriptive, and theoretical scholarship about
rape, economic oppression, sexual and reproduc- their experiences and the structure of inequality
tive oppression, and racism forms the fundamen- in the U.S. and globally. They fundamentally re-
tal backbone of intersectionality theorizing. It is wrote American history, recovering the role black
in and through mobilization for self-preservation women played in shaping not only race, gender,
and survival that this aspect of black feminist and sexuality politics but also national politics.
theorizing emerged as a significant marker of Highlighting the “racist, sexist, and class biases
black women’s experiences. This organizing, and [that] are perpetuated in American historiogra-
the hard-fought gains won from black feminist phy” (Scott 1982:87), they emphasized the
activism since WWII, co-occurred with theory- importance of an intersectional focus in the grand
building and the institutionalization that contrib- narrative of American history, from slavery, to
uted to the expansion of black feminist theory in suffrage, to labor, to anti-war activism, to the
the academy beginning in the 1980s. civil rights, women’s rights, and LGBT move-
ments. Just as movement activists had done in the
1960s and 1970s, black feminist scholar-activists
23.5 Black Feminist Theory theorized race, class, gender, sexuality, gender
and the Expansion presentation, ability, and nationality as part of a
of Intersectionality structural system of domination that influenced
individual and group outcomes, privileging those
The expansion of racial, ethnic, and women’s on the chosen end of those status spectra and dis-
studies departments in American institutions in advantaging those on the oppressed end. They
the 1960s and 1970s provided the first broad- consistently emphasized that the contemporary
scale opportunity for the institutionalization of arrangement and structure of inequality was
black women’s studies, and by the 1980s, black rooted in America’s capital origins in slavery.
feminist intellectuals had formed a recognizable Yet, rather than recast slavery as solely an eco-
field, historiographical practice, and theoretical nomic system that simply arranged an unequal
enterprise (Guy-Sheftall 1992). This field com- system in service of itself, black feminists con-
pelled a reimagining of black studies and wom- tended that in fact racism, anti-black misogyny,
en’s studies, in addition to the core of various and suppression of labor worked in tandem to
humanities and social science disciplines. maintain white supremacy and capitalism simul-
Documenting and archiving of black women’s taneously. Proceeding from slavery, black femi-
work as central to the American intellectual and nist scholars critiqued the epistemic
activist enterprise, black women academics, underpinnings of much work about black women,
intellectuals, and activists aimed to rewrite which towards the end of the civil rights era was
American history and the history of contempo- influenced by the arguments of the Moynihan
rary movements—women’s liberation and civil report and notions of a pathological black
rights. This task included the development of “matriarchy.”
new language to capture and theorize black wom- Black feminists also began intensive projects
en’s experiences, a reformulation of coalition of anthologizing and canonizing black women’s
politics to maximize the possibilities for justice, work. Beginning with Hull et al. (1982) But Some
and the recovery of a range of black women’s of Us Are Brave, anthologies of black feminist
experiences into formally recognized aspects of writing, either by a sole author or a collection of
the black feminist movement and black feminist writers, increasingly defined the field and the
thought. theoretical grounds on which intersectionality
490 Z.F. Robinson
would take hold. Brave was, at its core, a black W. E. B. Du Bois’ “double consciousness” of the
feminist disciplinary intervention, covering turn of the century and Frances Beale’s (1970)
women’s studies, black studies, and the humani- “double jeopardy” nearly two decades previous,
ties and social sciences. Angela Davis antholo- sociologist Deborah King (1988) offered “multi-
gized a set of her previously published essays in ple jeopardy” and “multiple consciousness” to
Women, Race, and Class in 1983. That same describe the context of black feminist theorizing
year, Barbara Smith’s edited volume, Home and organizing, as well as the structure of inequal-
Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology, was pub- ity. Recognizing that the widespread use of race-
lished on Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press. sex parallelism in social theory was largely due to
Smith’s volume was disciplinarily expansive, its legibility and portability—“the race-sex cor-
including humanistic, social scientific, and aes- respondence has been used successfully because
thetic works, and was also the most explicitly the race model was a well-established and effec-
dedicated to highlighting the distinctive voices of tive pedagogical tool for both the theoretical con-
black lesbian feminists in movement politics and ceptualization of and the political resistance to
aesthetic practice. In 1984, black feminist scholar sexual inequality” (44)—King contended that
bell hooks published a collection of essays on this “race-sex correspondence” could not stand
feminist theory. Ultimately, these and other because within it, “all the women are white and
anthologies and edited volumes rendered the all the blacks are men.” Further, in underscoring
contours of black feminist theorizing visible in the limits of “double” and “triple” jeopardy, King
academic contexts. highlights that “racism, sexism, and classism
Major theoretical formulations emerged from constitute three, interdependent control systems”
this work, as black feminists reflexively assessed (emphasis added, 47) for which an “interactive
their positions in the radical, women’s liberation, model” (Smith and Stewart 1983) is necessary.
and civil rights movements as well as assessed Importantly, King uses historical and contempo-
their current economic positions. For black rary instances of movement organizing to elabo-
women scholars and activists, gender and sexual- rate this interactive model, demonstrating the
ity oppression were not secondary forms of continued significance of experiences of organiz-
inequality that would fall away after capitalism ing against oppression to developing and refining
or racism. In a discursive shift, Smith (1985) black feminist theory in general, and intersec-
writes that “a black feminist perspective has no tionality in particular.
use for ranking oppressions, but instead demon- Other language emerged to capture the move
strates the simultaneity of oppressions as they beyond additive models of oppression. In addi-
affect Third World women’s lives” (6, emphasis tion to multiple jeopardy/consciousness, Smith
added). This notion of a “simultaneity” of oppres- and Stewart’s (1983) notion of a “contextual
sion reflected a shift in movement politics from interactive model/perspective” and Jeffries and
single-issue to multi-issue organizing in some of Ransford’s (1980) “ethnogender” were exem-
the mainstream organizations. Although black plary of language shifts intended to recognize the
women had always been compelled to, in many multiplicity, simultaneity, and interdependence
ways, serve two or more movements, this new of systems of inequality. Yet, Kimberlé
emphasis on coalition building, spurred on by Crenshaw’s (1989) “intersectionality”—which
Third World and indigenous feminist theorizing stood for ideas that had been theorized for more
and activism, held major groups accountable for than a century under different names and through
rethinking movement action. different forms—became canonical language and
Simultaneity was inherently more complex later shorthand for difference, diversity, and
than double-ness; even though the latter required inclusion. Crenshaw elaborated the concept in
a sense of simultaneity, it did not necessarily two practical cases: a legal case of black women
encapsulate the multiple oppressions black against General Motors (1989) and the case of
women were organizing against. Building on women’s organizing against gendered violence
23 Intersectionality 491
(1991). These two works exemplified the idea of create, in riddles and proverbs, in the play with
an intersecting, interactive model of oppression language, since dynamic rather than fixed ideas
that was interested in how interdependent sys- seem more to our liking” (52). How to reconcile
tems of oppression operated to erase the experi- the knowledge that arose from lived experiences,
ences of certain groups. Moreover, these papers, one’s standpoint, as it were, with the knowledge
like other black feminist work emerging in the that came from assessing categorical aggregate
1980s, argued for a recognition of the vast intr- distributions of privilege and disadvantage
aracial diversity amongst black people and black became central to the course of intersectionality’s
women. This language was taken up in the work reassertion in sociology.
of critical race theorists and critical legal theo-
rists, in some black feminist scholarly and activ-
ist circles, and later would become common 23.6 Sociology and the Science
language in feminist movement politics. of Intersectionality
It was in this expansion period of intersection-
ality theory in the 1980s that two disciplinary fis- 23.6.1 Black Feminist Thought
sures—one epistemological and one and the Institutionalization
methodological—emerged. Social science, in the of Intersectionality
inherently racist and sexist biases in its language,
was often times ill-equipped to appropriately The sociologist Patricia Hill Collins is the black
theorize about black women’s lives, experiences, feminist scholar most frequently tied to the
and outcomes. Black social scientists in the advent of intersectionality in the field. Her semi-
1970s and 1980s, like the classical black sociolo- nal monograph in this area, Black Feminist
gists, found themselves up against a set of meth- Thought ([1990] 2000), chronicled and built
ods that were based on faulty assumptions upon black women’s studies across disciplines,
(Ladner 1973; Aldridge 2008). They conse- representing the first historiography of U.S. black
quently attempted to both build on these methods feminist theory. It offered important new lan-
and devise new ones to appropriately address guage to solidify the turn from parallelism to
black women’s lives. While the humanities pro- simultaneity and multiplicity. Describing how
vided a more expansive lens through which to intersectionality related to the work she sought to
conceptualize black women’s experiences, this undertake in Black Feminist Thought, Collins
created an empirical conundrum in enumerating wrote: “Intersectional paradigms remind us that
inequality. Further, the rise of critical theory and oppression cannot be reduced to one fundamental
post-structural and post-modern theories pushed type, and that oppressions work together in pro-
scholars to move further from their subjects, an ducing injustice. In contrast, the matrix of domi-
epistemic position anathema to the organizing- nation refers to how these intersecting oppressions
bases of black feminist theory. Black feminist are actually organized. Regardless of the particu-
theorists, notably Barbara Christian, were critical lar intersections involved, structural, disciplinary,
of this particular theoretical turn because of how hegemonic, and interpersonal domains of power
it functioned to devalue, erase, and exclude black reappear across quite different forms of oppres-
women’s work just as the process of formalizing sion” (18). Collins retools standpoint theory via a
black feminist theory was underway in the acad- black feminist lens, and thus creates a threefold
emy. On the rise of theory as commodity in the approach to black feminist theory and methodol-
1980s, Christian (1987) argued that “people of ogy. (1) Intersectionality, in her analysis, oper-
color have always theorized—but in forms quite ated on a meta-level to capture the simultaneity
different from the Western form of abstract logic. of oppressions in the lives of groups and individ-
And I am inclined to say that our theorizing (and uals; (2) standpoint theory was the individual,
I intentionally use the verb rather than the noun) epistemic ground on which black feminist
is often in narrative forms, in the stories we thought was built and conceived on the micro-
492 Z.F. Robinson
level, as it had been since slavery; and (3) the shaped both the institutionalization of intersec-
matrix of domination was a macro-structural tionality and how the theory would be expressed
description of how these multiple oppressions in the discipline. These priorities reflected the
were organized. These levels were at once co- disciplinary rift evidenced in the 1980s between
occuring and interacting, as were the multiple humanities and social scientific approaches to
systems of oppression. This sociological inter- theorizing about inequality and black women’s
vention, then, accounted for a long history of experiences in particular.
black feminist theorizing in the U.S., developed
and refine language with which to better research
inequality in the U.S., and highlighted the impor- 23.6.2 The Rise of Intersectionality
tance of black feminist epistemologies to theoriz- Research in Sociology
ing about a range of institutional inequities—family,
labor, religion, politics, and education amongst The 1990s marked the beginning of an explosion
others. of intersectionality and intersectionality-inspired
After the initial publication of Black Feminist research—that is research that used the word
Thought, black feminist theory and language “intersectionality” to describe its methods, the-
were rapidly integrated into analyses of stratifica- ory, or epistemology; that explicitly drew on a
tion. Rather than assuming gender meant white race, class, gender paradigm to account for
women and race meant black men, inequality inequality; that analyzed race, gender, class, and
scholars began to more consistently examine the another system of oppression or difference, like
“four categories”—black men, white men, black sexuality; and/or that acknowledged the research-
women, white women. While these categories er’s location in the matrix of domination to con-
continued to be extraordinarily limited in their textualize the research and its findings. This
recognition of intragroup diversity or racial and proliferation occurred simultaneously with inter-
ethnic groups beyond black and white, the main- sectionality’s institutionalization in the disci-
stream move from two categories of analysis to pline, the rise of the reflexive turn in postmodern
four or more significantly expanded the rigor and theory, and sociology’s reinvigorated commit-
usefulness of inequality research, illuminating ment to documenting inequality as a distin-
precisely how inequality affected groups in mul- guishing disciplinary feature. The theory’s
tiple locations in the matrix of domination. institutionalization yielded a large and broad
Black feminist theory was also institutional- field of work unified chiefly by its insistence on
ized in the discipline in various ways, including considering the simultaneity of oppressions, both
the founding of Race, Gender, and Class journal as experienced by individuals and groups and as
in 19931 and the establishment of the Race, arranged in the matrix of domination. This expan-
Gender, and Class section of the American sive and diverse field yielded some of the most
Sociological Association in 1996. These formal important sociological work on the nature of
academic channels, established by people who inequality in the post-civil rights era. However,
had been working in the bourgeoning field of its breadth yielded methodological and theoreti-
“race, class, gender studies” for several years, cal challenges in the field.
provided a space for intersectional scholarship to This work can be divided analytically into
be published, debated, and recognized. Still, three distinct but interrelated branches: (1)
competing ideas about what constituted race, empirical, (2) theoretical, and (3) methodologi-
class, and gender research, particularly in the cal. The empirical branch of this work was inter-
context of which research was taken up and rec- ested in how race, class, and gender interacted to
ognized beyond the boundaries of the section, affect a number of outcomes, from family forma-
tion, maintenance, and parenting strategies (Dill
1
The journal’s original title was Race, Sex, and Class and 1988; Jacobs 1994; McDonald 1997; Battle
was changed to Race, Gender, and Class in 1995. 1999; Dillaway and Broman 2001), hiring prac-
23 Intersectionality 493
tices (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Pager power and oppression for the language of “doing”
and Quillian 2005), occupational segregation difference. In her response, Collins (1995)
(Glenn 1992, 2009; Romero 1995; Wingfield offered a classic critique of postmodernism, con-
2009), housing (Massey and Lundy 2001), orga- tending that social constructions of “difference”
nizations (Acker 2000), political ideologies had erased the very real systems of racism, patri-
(Simien 2005), policy (Deitch 1993; Haney 1996; archy, and capitalism. She reviewed the field of
Roberts 1996; Mink 1999; Mink et al. 2003; race, class, and gender studies up to that point to
Lovell 2002) and education (Bettie 2002; Stoll rearticulate some of the key theoretical claims in
2013). This research also more explicitly treated her work and the work of activists and theorists
sexuality as a category of analysis and lived working in the black feminist tradition.
experience, bringing theories of sexuality and Describing the existing language, Collins wrote,
queer theory into intersectional research (Gamson “…the notion of interlocking oppressions refers
and Moon 2004; Moore 2008; Hunter 2010). to the macro level connections linking systems of
The theoretical and methodological branches oppression such as race, class, and gender. This is
of this work both built on empirical intersection- the model describing the social structures that
ality research by assessing and refining its meth- create social positions. Second, the notion of
ods and theoretical assumptions as well as intersectionality describes micro level pro-
continued in theory-building in ways somewhat cesses—namely how each individual and group
separate from the developing body of empirical occupies a social position within interlocking
research. In an early sociological evaluation of structures of oppression described by the meta-
the relationship of Marxist and neo-Marxist theo- phor of intersectionality. Together they shape
ries to the claims of intersectionality theory, oppression” (492). This response and other simi-
Belkhir (1996) carefully analyzes the respective lar responses revealed the theoretical tensions in
relationships between Marxism and feminism the postmodern turn in critical theory and the
and Marxism and race theory, concluding that lived experiences of people of color and other
Marxist theory nor class analysis alone are useful marginalized groups and their theorizations of
to understanding the fractured, rather than strictly those experiences.
hierarchical, nature of domination in the U.S. and The West and Fenstermaker symposium also
globally. As with most theoretical analyses of underscored ongoing epistemological concerns
intersectionality, Belkhir utilized a theoretical in intersectionality research, both as a result of
case study—hers was the case of domestic labor- the erasure of black feminist activism and theory
ers and their employers—to demonstrate how as well as exogenous forces, like the rise of post-
and intersectional perspective might be used and modern theory, from outside of the discipline.
why it, to the exclusion of other forms of analysis Still, working in the tradition of black feminist
that did not take these intersections into account, thought, several race, class, and gender sociolo-
should be used. gists highlighted the importance of the scholar-
Scholars consistently acknowledged the com- ship in black women’s studies and moreover the
plexity of theorizing, researching, and writing voices of black women as key to understanding
about these interactive systems of domination. inequality and to theoretical innovations in soci-
West and Fenstermaker (1995) proposed “doing ology (Barnett et al. 1999). Jewish, Latina, and
difference” as a new way to think about these Asian women scholars also contributed to theo-
systems, contending that the mathematical meta- rizing on intersectionality, drawing on standpoint
phors that had been used and critiqued since early theory and the history of women of color orga-
black feminist thought—double, triple, intersect- nizing separately and in coalitions with black
ing, simultaneous, multiplicative, additive. In a women (Chow 1987; Blea 1992; Martinez 1996;
symposium of responses to West and Greenebaum 1999; Bettie 2002; Wilkins 2004).
Fenstermaker’s article, several scholars expressed If the epistemological question, a source of
reservations with the authors’ apparent elision of tension in the evolution of intersectionality, was
494 Z.F. Robinson
not fully addressed during this period in application of methods” (1774)—as they are
intersectionality’s development in sociology, the about precisely how scholars investigate their
related questions of methodology were ampli- subjects. Imagining these approaches on a con-
fied. Sociologists working in the area of race, tinuum of the conceptualization of categories,
class, and gender and in adjacent areas of inquiry McCall describes the (1) “anticategorical”
have been chiefly concerned with how to deploy approach, which rejects categories given the flu-
intersectionality methodologically (Cuadraz and idity of social identities and structures and resem-
Uttal 1999; McCall 2005; Bowleg 2008; Choo bles the ethnomethodological approach of “doing
and Ferree 2010). The wide emphasis on issues difference”; (2) the “intracategorical” approach,
of method could at once be seen as the disciplin- which recognizes the slippage of categorical
ary requirements for sound and precise method- boundaries while also holding those categories
ology and as an attempt to nullify or at least constant, particularly in terms of structures of
muddy the findings of intersectionality research. oppression; and (3) the intercategorical approach,
Critics expressed concern about the lack of a uni- which accepts categories based largely on how
form method and skepticism about measuring the they are created by hegemonic structures in order
interactive effects of discrete systems of power to measure and assess inequalities, while implic-
on individual and group outcomes. Moreover, itly recognizing (outside of the context of the
assessing and measuring such complex dynamics research) the shifting nature of these boundaries.
so that findings might be considered definitive, The intercategorical approach is one McCall
authoritative, or significant often necessitated described as applicable to her own research on
leaving certain variables or categories out alto- the structural intersections of race, class, and
gether. Researchers thus needed to account meth- gender inequality across social institutions, and
odologically for these absences, even as it was employment in particular. Although these kinds
evident that these absences mattered for of large-scale quantitative analysis that account
outcomes. for inequities between groups at multiple inter-
sections were and are sometimes cast as irrevoca-
bly complex, they nevertheless have, in the years
23.6.3 Intersectionality’s since the publication of McCall’s work, increased
Methodological significantly.
and Epistemological Developing along quantitative and qualitative
Complexities lines within the discipline, intersectionality
research described the precise nature of inequal-
After over a decade of increased intersectionality ity across groups, space, and place; illustrated
research in sociology, sociologist Leslie McCall how categories of race, class, gender, and sexual-
(2005), writing primarily about women’s studies ity were made and re-made by state and individ-
but implicitly to sociology as well, surveyed the ual actors (Moore 2008; Hunter 2010); accounted
methodological approaches of intersectional for how individuals and groups made sense of
research. Providing a typology of intersectional categories of identity and instances of domina-
research that is now widely used across humani- tion within place and space contexts (Garcia
ties and social science disciplines, McCall 2012; Robinson 2014); and attended to unac-
attempts to construct a bridge between interdisci- counted for social locations (Chun 2011; Moore
plinary fields, like gender and sexuality studies, 2011). This scholarship both generated empirical
and disciplinary fields, like sociology. The dis- research and built on existing research, expand-
tinctions she draws between typologies are as ing intersectionality’s scope to include a wide
much about the theoretical assumptions that range of study types that were focused on uncov-
undergird scholars’ methodologies—“the philo- ering the relational nature of social inequality
sophical underpinnings of methods and the kinds and oppression, how groups navigated equality
of substantive knowledge that are produced in the vis-à-vis their social locations, and how
23 Intersectionality 495
overarching social structures reinforced the has become increasingly influential in how
inequality order. non-profit organizations, philanthropic groups,
Through this scholarship, the discipline carved and public policy scholars think about inequality.
out the scientific boundaries of intersectionality Yet, as part of a broader range of black femi-
research in sociology, even as approaches to and nist theorizing, intersectionality has not yet been
uses of intersectionality in the field remained var- fully integrated into sociological knowledge pro-
ied. On the whole, sociology bracketed the more duction practices. There is a disjuncture between
“complicated” aspects of theory, particularly as the black feminist origins of intersectionality and
they had been articulated by black feminist and the deployment of intersectionality in sociology.
black queer theorists, in favor of a theoretical Sociology tacitly recognizes that people experi-
approach that could be more easily integrated ence the world as their simultaneous embodi-
into existing paradigms in stratification and ments and social locations in the matrix of
inequality research. Intersectionality’s main the- domination, and therefore and cannot be neatly
oretical assumptions were widely portable—sys- subdivided into categories. Yet, by taking catego-
tems of oppression are interlocking and the ries as the enduring unit of analysis, even solely
effects of this should be assessed at micro, meso, for purposes of creating a general narrative about
and macro levels. In the process, methodological inequality, the specific mechanisms of inequality
consistency and replicability became essential to for people at the most marginalized social loca-
transforming intersectionality into a discipli- tions are obscured. Further, the workings of
narily legible science. Because methodology and oppression—the fundamental questions of
theory are often created and refined in a dialecti- power—are often inadvertently obscured in
cal process, this methodological work of trim- social scientific research. Conversely, black femi-
ming intersectionality into a sociological science nist theorists strove tirelessly to interrogate and
simply demonstrated the various conceptions of make visible these systems of power, and not
science and approaches to analyses that under- solely how the systems manifested in people’s
gird sociological scholarship. lives. The discipline thus lacks a key historio-
graphical consciousness about the development
of intersectionality within the context of a long
23.7 Black Feminist Theorizing history of black feminist theorizing and black
and the Legacy women’s organizing and activism. As a result, its
of Intersectionality epistemological blindspots and insistence on a
certain kind of empiricism continue to ensure
As a robust and diverse assessment of interlock- that most new intersectionality theorizing hap-
ing systems of oppression with attention to pens outside of the discipline.
empirical data, sociology’s engagement with With the popularization of intersectionality in
intersectionality has transformed sociological the academy and the public discourse, there have
research on stratification. Through the use of been multiple calls for scholars to “move beyond”
qualitative and quantitative empirical data, and the concept, even as it has been divorced from its
theorizing that has emerged from these research epistemic origins and thus shorn of its original
findings, sociologists have been able to empiri- potential as a methodological and theoretical
cally confirm and theoretically complement the intervention in traditional disciplinary forms of
major tenets of intersectionality that black femi- knowledge. Collins (2015) acknowledges this
nist scholars have articulated since slavery. This shift, arguing that “intersectionality now garners
work theorizes the mechanisms of inequality its share of self-proclaimed experts and critics of
largely as they affect groups at different social its ideas and potential, many of whom demon-
locations, e.g., black lesbian women or working strate unsettling degrees of amnesia and/or igno-
class white men, as well as how social structures rance concerning the scope of intersectional
of inequality interlock to create disadvantage. It knowledge projects writ large” (11). In her
496 Z.F. Robinson
assessment of black feminist theorizing and the with organizing work. Increased attention to the
function of shorthand concepts like “the politics radical potential of conversations about organiz-
of respectability,” “standpoint,” and “intersec- ing and scholarship might theoretically inform
tionality,” black feminist historian Brittney more than just the inequality literature, but also
Cooper (2015) encouraged black feminist theo- the social movements literature as well (Cohen
rists across disciplines to finish covering the the- 2004). From its inception, black feminist theory
oretical ground of black feminist thought. This has suggested that inquiry should begin with
pushback against intersectionality in and beyond lived experience and help refine and drive theory-
the discipline reflects a broad fatigue with the building and empirical investigations. Black fem-
idea and its prominence, our various disciplinary inist scholars have continued to hold this
needs to be in constant search of new theories, theoretical tenet as central to their intersectional
and an unwillingness to reckon how the theoreti- investigations, recognizing the dialectical rela-
cal shortcuts we have taken to arrive at our tionship between theory and practice. By engag-
respective versions of intersectionality have com- ing more directly with black feminist theories of
promised our ability to fully appreciate the intersectionality outside of the discipline, as well
concept. as the intersectionality theory developed within
The popularity of intersectionality in the the field of sociology since the classical period,
2010s grew as a result of a proliferation of black sociologists can strengthen the robustness of
feminist work on social media (Jarmon 2013), a intersectionality by not avoiding or bracketing
reinvigoration of feminist movement politics in some of its more reflexive and critical theoretical
response to America’s rape culture, an expanded histories. This more comprehensive engagement
recognition of the experience of trans* people, would illuminate how the macro-structural con-
and increased constraints on women’s reproduc- tours of the matrix of domination, the lived expe-
tive rights. Further, in response to the murder of riences of identity at multiple social locations,
Michael Brown in August 2014, the founding of and coalition-based social movements function
Black Lives Matter by community organizers simultaneously to shape outcomes, theory, meth-
Patrisse Cullors, Alicia Garza, and Opal Tometi ods, and practice.
also thrust intersectionality into the public dis-
course. Black feminist activists in particular have
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Part V
Modes of Change
Social Evolution
24
Richard Machalek and Michael W. Martin
changes can occur either within or across vated prospects for survival and reproduction by
generations. individuals (and sometimes, kin groups) and are
Both organic and sociocultural evolution summarized by the expressions “fitness” or
depend upon the influence of informational “reproductive success.” Accordingly, the mea-
media that produce evolved adaptations (pheno- sure of evolutionary success is not captured by a
typic traits). In organic evolution, the informa- literal interpretation of the phrase survival of the
tional medium is genetic. In sociocultural fittest. Instead, survival matters only if it yields
evolution the medium is culture. However, cul- the consequence of reproductive success of either
ture can also be conceptualized as an environ- individuals, which is labeled individual or
ment that interacts with genes to produce evolved Darwinian fitness, or the reproductive success of
adaptations. The study of how genes and culture members of kin groups, which is labeled inclu-
interact to produce traits at both the individual sive fitness (Hamilton 1964). In sociocultural
and collective level is called gene-culture coevo- evolution, the notion that evolutionary change
lution (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Lumsden and confers advantages extends beyond the survival
Wilson 1981). Evolutionary changes in the distri- and reproductive success of individuals. Instead,
bution of either individual or societal traits are fitness (success in sociocultural evolution) is
understood to represent adjustments to condi- commonly construed to mean “the ability of
tions presented by environments. Such adjust- sociocultural units to sustain themselves in their
ments may constitute modifications that are environments” (Turner 2010:30). Thus, fitness in
responses to stable features of environments, or sociocultural evolution (the enhanced ability of a
they may entail modifications that are responses society or a corporate structure to persist) may or
to changing environmental conditions. may not contribute to biological fitness (repro-
In classical organic evolutionary theory, phe- ductive success of individuals). In fact, the main-
notypic changes produced by the interaction tenance of a sociocultural system that is stressed
between genes and their environments are the in terms of resources needed to sustain its popu-
result of random, non-purposive (non- lation may be enhanced by reduced biological fit-
teleological) changes in genes whose products ness (fertility rates) among members of that
are subject to non-random, but equally non- population, because this will reduce demand for
purposive environmental forces of selection. That resources such as food. While sociocultural fit-
is, organic evolution is not directed by goals or ness and biological fitness may be mutually
informed by foresight. It is a purely mechanical enhancing in certain environmental contexts,
process entailing gene-environment interaction they may work at cross-purposes in others.
that has been described metaphorically as the Among evolutionary theorists, a long debated
work of a “blind watchmaker” (Dawkins 1986). question is the level at which adaptations evolve.
By way of contrast, sociocultural evolution can, Does natural selection produce traits that enhance
but need not be, powered by purposive, goal- the survival and reproductive success of individu-
oriented human conduct that is informed by fore- als alone, or does it produce traits that are fitness-
sight and directed by planning. In other words, enhancing for groups, populations, or even
sociocultural evolution can be shaped by teleo- species as well? This is commonly discussed as
logical processes while, simultaneously, remain- the “group selection” (or “levels of selection”)
ing subject to purely mechanical, non-purposive problem. Most of the discussion pertains to
forces as well. behavior that is mediated by genes rather than
Almost all versions of evolutionary explana- culture. Accordingly, the levels of selection
tion imply that either individual or collective debate is more contentious among biologists
adjustments to features of environments confer studying organic evolution than it has been
advantages of some sort. In classical organic evo- among sociologists studying sociocultural evolu-
lutionary theory, such advantages constitute ele- tion. In simplified terms, the basic question is
506 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin
this: Does natural selection produce traits for the explains how “institutional entrepreneurs” acting
“good of the individual” or for the “good of the over long periods of historical time crafted “cul-
group?” tural assemblages” that contributed significantly
Though sociocultural evolution arguably to the survival of Israelite religion and the popu-
entails phenomena of greater complexity than lation that bore it (2015b). Particularly significant
does organic evolution, the question of group were pollution-purification rituals that were per-
selection is, ironically, more easily resolved in formed annually, weekly, and even daily, and
the minds of sociologists rather than biologists. these rituals integrated the salvation of the indi-
In conventional organic evolutionary theory, the vidual with the well-being and endurance of the
forces of selection act directly on individuals and community, thereby functioning as a group-
indirectly on the genes that produce them. Since selection mechanism that helps explain the sur-
only individual bodies, not groups, actually house vival of the Jewish people and their religion for
genes and transmit them to individual offspring, over two millennia (Abrutyn 2014, 2015b).
the “target of selection” is the individual. As conceptualized by evolutionary sociolo-
However, when describing and analyzing pat- gists such as Lenski (2005), Turner (2010), Blute
terns of sociocultural evolution, sociologists view (2010), and Abrutyn (2014), the history of socio-
various sorts of collectivities as “superorgan- cultural evolution presents unassailable evidence
isms” that are also “potential units subject to of the existence of group selection, a complex set
selection,” and such superorganisms include of processes by means of which diverse sociocul-
groups, organizations, communities, institutional tural phenotypes evolve among different groups
domains, entire societies, or even intersocietal and populations. Consequently, in the view of at
systems (Turner and Maryanski 2015:103). Like least two evolutionary sociologists, “it is so obvi-
the physical phenotypes of individual organisms, ous that selection is working on social structures
“sociocultural phenotypes” are seen as “survivor and their cultures organizing individual organ-
(sic) machines” that buffer the forces of selection isms that it is difficult to see what the controversy
which emanate from the environments in which (about group selection) is all about in biology”
populations of individuals live (Turner and (Turner and Maryanski 2015:104). The question
Maryanski 2015:103–106). In sociocultural evo- of why the issue of group selection is more hotly
lution, the targets of selection are complex and disputed among evolutionary biologists than
multi-layered forms of culture and social struc- among evolutionary sociologists becomes clearer
ture, not merely the physical phenotypic traits of when differences in the way group selection is
individual organisms. Over time, some sociocul- viewed by these “two cultures” of evolutionary
tural phenotypes succumb to various forces of thinkers are understood.
selection, while others exhibit higher “fitness,” In simplest terms, evolutionary biologists
which is defined in terms of length of time that a approach the levels of selection (including group
sociocultural system exists or its ability to exist selection) issue in terms of the genetic, not cul-
and endure in a range of environments (Turner tural, forces that underpin social evolution. In
and Maryanski 2015:95). mainstream, evolutionary biological theory, natu-
An example of this sort of thinking about ral selection favors any genetically-based trait
sociocultural evolution and group selection is that increases the survival and reproductive suc-
available in historical analyses of the survival of cess of an individual bearing that trait, not other
a sociocultural system that has been targeted by members of groups to which that individual
some of the most severe selection forces to which might belong. In organic evolutionary theory, the
any human population has been subjected, the idea of group selection means that natural selec-
people of Israel and their religion (Abrutyn tion would somehow favor genes that would
2015a, b). By integrating elements of cultural reduce the survival and reproductive chances of
sociological analysis with principles derived any individual that bore them, but simultane-
from theories of sociocultural evolution, Abrutyn ously, increase the survival and reproductive suc-
24 Social Evolution 507
cess of the population of the group as a whole. this” (West et al. 2011:248). As is clear from this
Put casually, group selection would mean that brief discussion of group selection, the levels of
natural selection would favor genes that are selection issue is complex and multifaceted in the
“good for the group” at the expense of genes that context of both organic and sociocultural evolu-
are “good for the individual.” In this conception tion, and it does not resolve itself easily to the
of group selection, the adaptive consequences of satisfaction of all participants. As more dialogue
a trait are always measured using the metric of develops between social scientists and evolution-
“gene-counting,” not the persistence or demise of ary biologists, prospects increase for the advance-
a collectivity organized and regulated by the ment of scientific understanding of this important
“sociocultural phenotypes.” Thus, the case of the aspect of social evolution.
variable success and failure of automobile com- In summary, the very existence of sociocul-
panies as an example of group selection in socio- tural systems and sociocultural evolution depends
cultural evolution fails to address the central ultimately on processes of organic evolution,
issue around which the debate over group selec- because the existence of culture depends on the
tion in organic evolution revolves (Turner and evolved cognitive capabilities of a species that
Maryanski 2015:104). Unless, and only unless, has a brain that can produce and process sym-
the survival or demise of automobile companies bols. The trajectory of organic evolution, how-
could be shown to be linked somehow to genetic ever, can be and is shaped by processes of
variability among individuals who comprise the sociocultural evolution, as is illustrated by bio-
populations of those companies, the issue of logical fitness-reducing meanings (e.g., celibacy
group selection as conceptualized in organic evo- norms in certain religious groups) and technolo-
lution is not even addressed in this example. gies (effective contraceptive technologies). Thus,
It is not surprising that confusion persists the relationship between organic evolution and
about what is at issue in notions of group selec- sociocultural evolution represents an important
tion in sociocultural evolution versus organic topic in evolutionary inquiry in general.
evolution. In fact, debate about the levels of
selection issue is even more extensive, and prob-
ably rancorous, among evolutionary biologists 24.3 Evolutionary Sociological
than it is between social scientists and biologists. Theory Before the Second
A recent article written by three evolutionary Darwinian Revolution
biologists identifying 16 misconceptions about
the evolution of cooperation among humans pro- In the broad, most general sense of the term, evo-
vides insight into the complexity of this issue lution in traditional sociological thought com-
(West et al. 2011). Of the 16 misconceptions, monly referred to long-term, gradual changes in
almost one-third (five) pertain to the issue of the overall organization of society or certain parts
group selection. Efforts to determine if group of it. Evolutionary change was frequently charac-
selection actually occurs in organic evolution are terized as entailing a sequence of stages. In
made more challenging by the fact that the con- almost all such conceptions of evolutionary
cept of group selection has at least four different change, each stage was viewed as an “advance-
meanings (West et al. 2011:246–249). Though ment” of some sort, and the overall course of evo-
most of their discussion pertains to group selec- lution was commonly understood to represent
tion in organic evolution alone, the authors briefly “progress” (Blute 2010:3–7, 183). Eventually,
address “cultural group selection,” and conclude Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection
that “while it is often argued that the group is a largely replaced teleological and orthogenetic
fundamental unit of cultural evolution, or that conceptions of change in which evolution was
cultural evolution is a group-level process (Boyd viewed as a process directed toward a predeter-
and Richerson 1985), there is no formal basis for mined outcome.
508 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin
contended that societies tend to evolve. Spencer, Durkheim’s work was highly influential
Foreshadowing the kind of thinking that eventu- both in stimulating subsequent stage-model
ally developed into the full-blown theoretical thinking among sociological theorists and in lay-
school known as “functionalism,” Spencer con- ing a foundation for the development of
tended that, as populations grow, they evolve functionalism.
increasingly specialized structures that achieve Though less fully developed than the work of
the societal mandates of operation, regulation, Spencer and even Durkheim as a distinct theo-
and distribution. Some of this growth occurs by retical perspective, evolutionary ideas populate
means of amalgamation, whereby previously dis- aspects of the writings of other classical socio-
tinct societies become conjoined, while normal logical theorists as well. Like Spencer and
demographic processes of migration and fertility Durkheim, Georg Simmel attributed consider-
contribute further to larger population sizes. able sociological significance to increasing struc-
Spencer used the term “compounding” to denote tural differentiation (Turner 2013:172–176,
the trend toward greater differentiation within 192–203). Similarly, by tracing the rise of capi-
societies, and this, in turn, led to his designating talism through a sequence of eras distinguished
stages of societal evolution as comprising simple by their modes of production, Marx’s writing
(with and without heads) societies, compound provided another stage model of societal evolu-
societies, doubly compound societies, and trebly tion, one which later became influential in
compound societies (Spencer 1885). Informed by informing the more explicitly evolutionary the-
systematic, detailed cross-cultural data sets, ory of Gerhard Lenski (2005). Adopting L. H.
Spencer’s scheme for classifying societies at dif- Morgan’s labels of “savagery,” “barbarism,” and
ferent stages of evolution was the most sophisti- “civilization, Thorstein Veblen described and
cated and empirically informed of his time analyzed long-term changes in human societies.
(Turner 1985, 2013). The characteristics of his societal stages corre-
Though far-less conceptually and theoreti- spond surprisingly closely to contemporary mod-
cally detailed than Spencer’s scheme, Durkheim els which feature hunting-gathering, horticultural,
also contributed to a stage-model conceptualiza- agricultural, and industrial stages of societal evo-
tion of societal evolution which, in many ways, lution found commonly in contemporary anthro-
closely parallels that of Spencer (Durkheim pological and sociological analyses. And though
1947). Like Spencer, Durkheim tried to explain most closely associated with his contributions to
the nature and course of the long-term trend of the development of micro-sociology and social
increasing structural complexity commonly evi- psychology, evolutionary insights constituted
dent in human societies. And like Spencer, foundational principles on the basis of which
Durkheim focused on increasing population size George Herbert Mead constructed his theory of
as the driving force behind this trend. For self and society.
Durkheim, greater structural differentiation was The work of the sociological theorists dis-
most sociologically significant in the form of the cussed above represented attempts to character-
division of labor and its consequences for the ize and explain societal-level changes in social
mechanisms by means of which societies structure in evolutionary terms. Another group of
achieved (or failed to achieve) solidarity, or inte- classical sociologists, some of whom were asso-
gration. In Durkheim’s view, the evolution of ciated with the intellectual misadventure of
increasingly complex societies constituted a Social Darwinism, focused more directly on the
long-term evolutionary trend that could be evolution of human nature. Interestingly, how-
described in terms of a transition from a form of ever, they were not all of one mind. While some
societal cohesion based on shared culture contributed directly to the development of Social
(mechanical solidarity) to a form of cohesion Darwinism, including racist conceptions of
based on specialization and the interdependence human variation, others explicitly rejected ideas
that it necessitated (organic solidarity). Like on which Social Darwinism was based. For
510 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin
example, eschewing the notion that the idea of of human societies from the hunting-gathering
the survival of the fittest necessarily led to the era to the industrial and post-industrial eras. They
conclusion that natural selection is driven by a placed primary emphasis on the role of subsis-
ruthless war of “all against all,” both L. F. Ward tence technologies as the primary driving force of
and E. A. Ross attributed to evolution the exis- societal evolution, and they mapped the conse-
tence of “social instincts” that make humans con- quences of changes in subsistence technology on
cerned with the welfare of others and in economic activity, the development of surplus,
possession of both “human sympathies” and a and the evolution of systems of social stratifica-
sense of “the corporate self” (Degler 1991:12– tion (Lenski 1966; Lenski and Lenski 1970;
14). Ward, in fact, viewed evolution as a power- Nolan and Lenski 2015). As did Spencer and
ful, progressive force that installed extraordinary, Durkheim before them, Lenski and his colleagues
innate potential in human nature that was all-too- emphasized the long-term trend toward greater
often thwarted by environmental circumstances. structural differentiation within societies and
Nevertheless, both racist and sexist concep- accompanying developments in both societies’
tions of human nature that prevailed in the late institutions and corporate structures. Societal
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries clearly evolution was characterized as consisting of pro-
helped shape the thought and writings of other cess of variation and selection within environ-
sociologists as well as anthropologists, econo- mental contexts, including the contexts created
mists, and psychologists (Degler 1991:13–31). by other societies. The analogue to genetic varia-
As the twentieth century progressed, however, tion in their models was cultural innovation, and
hereditarian conceptions of human nature waned, the social structural products of cultural informa-
and the concept of culture became the primary tion were patterns of social structure, the socio-
notion informing explanations of human behav- cultural analogue to phenotypes in organic
ior in both the social and behavioral sciences. It evolution. Subsistence technology was the fea-
was not until the mid- to latter part of the twenti- ture of culture to which Lenski and his colleagues
eth century that ideas and information from evo- attributed greatest influence in shaping societal
lutionary biology prompted a re-examination of evolution.
the possibility that an evolved human nature About the same time that Lenski (1966) was
manifests itself in human social behavior. developing his “ecological-evolutionary” model
of societal evolution, Parsons also produced a
theory of societal evolution (1966). As did
24.3.2 Evolutionary Thought Spencer and Durkheim before him, Parsons
in Sociological Theory focused on the long-term evolutionary trends
Before 1975 toward increasing societal size and greater cul-
tural and social structural differentiation. Framing
The survival and development of evolutionary his evolutionary thinking in functionalist terms,
thinking in sociology during most of the second Parsons addressed the question of how increasing
half of the twentieth century was limited largely societal complexity affects the problem of “inte-
to the further development of stage-models of gration” and yields “adaptive upgrading” which
evolution represented by the work of theorists better enables societies to cope both with new,
such as Talcott Parsons, Gerhard and Jean Lenski, internal societal developments as well as novel
Patrick Nolan, and Jonathan H. Turner, among environmental conditions.
others. Prior to the onset of the second Darwinian Sociologists often equate evolution and devel-
revolution, roughly 1975, Lenski (1966) and opment, but biologists distinguish between these
Parsons (1966) produced the most influential two processes. Development occurs in individu-
stage models in evolutionary sociological theory. als, while evolution occurs in populations.
Like Spencer and Durkheim before them, Lenski Reflecting on this distinction, Marion Blute
and his colleagues traced the long-term evolution explains that stage models of societal change are
24 Social Evolution 511
better regarded as developmental than evolution- parative psychology, sociobiology coalesced into
ary in nature (2010:3–7). Blute concludes that the a new and distinct branch of behavioral biology
theories of social change produced by Spencer, in 1975 with the publication of Wilson’s tome.
Durkheim, and even Parsons better characterize As Wilson describes it, sociobiology is simply
processes of biological development than they do the study of how social behavior and societies
evolution. And since the process of development evolve by natural selection. The explanatory
can be described as a sequence of stages that ends logic of sociobiology was developed for the study
in a largely predetermined outcome (e.g., and of non-human animals, but Wilson expanded it to
infant matures into an adult), early social thinkers include the study of human social behavior and
tended to think about change as representing societies as well.
“progress” (Blute 2010). As will become evident In evolutionary theory, if a trait produced by
later, contemporary stage-theories of evolution natural selection contributes to an organism’s
rarely imply developmental trajectories that are chances of survival and reproductive success, it is
somehow predetermined in the process of social called an adaptation. Adaptations consist of mor-
change itself. Though stage-model thinking can phological (anatomical) traits, physiological
still be found in sociological theory, this tradition traits, and behavioral traits, including social
of sociological thought is being succeeded by behaviors. Sociobiological research entails
newer versions of evolutionary theory, which will efforts to identify and analyze patterns of social
be discussed later. behavior as possible evolved adaptations. For
During the 1960s and 1970s, significant devel- example, sociobiologists are interested in explor-
opments occurred in evolutionary biology which ing how the allocation of parenting responsibili-
eventually led to the threshold of what is now ties, which they call “parental investment,” might
called the “second Darwinian revolution” entail evolved adaptations for assuring that off-
(Machalek and Martin 2004). The most influen- spring survive to reproductive age (Trivers 1972).
tial of those developments was the publication of Categories of social behavior that sociobiologists
Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Wilson 1975), have identified as possibly influenced by evolved
and it launched a new era of evolutionary think- adaptations include parenting, mating and mate
ing not only in behavioral biology (ethology, selection, cooperation, competition, conflict,
behavioral ecology), but eventually, in the social communication, altruism, reciprocity and
and behavioral sciences as well. The remainder exchange, aggression and violence, parent-
of this chapter reviews key developments within offspring conflict, sibling competition, and status
sociobiology and associated fields of evolution- competition, among others.
ary inquiry and their eventual impact on the rise Natural selection favors traits which, within
of a new “evolutionary sociology.” the environmental contexts in which they exist,
maximize an individual’s fitness, or its genetic
representation in the next generation.
24.4 Evolutionary Sociological Sociobiological theory distinguishes between
Theory After the Second individual fitness (also called “Darwinian” fit-
Darwinian Revolution ness), and inclusive fitness. Individual fitness
refers to the success of an individual in contribut-
24.4.1 The Rise and Influence ing its genes to the next generation by reproduc-
of Sociobiology tion, and inclusive fitness refers to the sum of an
individual’s fitness plus that individual’s contri-
Sociobiology is a branch of evolutionary biology bution to the fitness of its relatives other than
devoted to the scientific study of the biological direct descendants. Inclusive fitness is increased
bases of social behavior among animals, includ- by the process of kin selection, whereby social
ing humans. Preceded by older branches of behaviors have adaptive consequences for mem-
behavioral biology such as ethology and com- bers of kin groups, not just individuals.
512 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin
Sociobiological theory traces the evolution of studying a non-human species and then extrapo-
basic forms of cooperation among individuals in lating to humans what has been first learned
groups to the processes of kin selection, which about the non-human species. For example, a
can be supplemented by other evolutionary sociobiologist would never claim that the exis-
mechanisms such as “mutualism” (interaction tence of “altruistic suicide” among bees and ants
with consequences that benefit all participants, explains “altruistic suicide” among human sol-
regardless of their degree or relatedness) or diers. Rather, sociobiological research on non-
“reciprocal altruism” (reciprocity among human animals can lead to the discovery of
non-kin). general evolutionary processes and mechanisms
The idea that genetic kinship is the foundation that can inform explanations of social behavior
on which cooperative social life first evolved was across species lines. Simply put, though general
influenced strongly by research on the eusocial evolutionary processes such as kin selection are
insects, which are ants, bees, wasps and termites. expressed among many social species, this does
Ants, bees, and wasps (but not termites) feature not mean that a particular behavior found in two
an unusual genetic system known as “haplodip- species means that the behavior was inherited by
loidy” whereby sisters within a colony are more one species from the other. Consequently, early
closely genetically related to each other than they objections by critics of sociobiology that it is
are to their mothers. The genetic “hyper- futile to try to explain the causes of human social
relatedness” among full sisters means that they behavior by studying ants (or, for that matter, any
share, on average, 75 % of their genes with each other non-human species) reveals a failure to
other in contrast to full siblings in diploid spe- understand the logic of evolutionary theory in
cies, which share, on average, only 50 % of their general and sociobiological theory in particular.
genes. Consequently, kin selection favors high Efforts to explain human social behavior on
levels of cooperation among the eusocial insects, the basis of what has been learned by studying
commonly giving rise to colonies with very large non-human social species precede the emergence
populations and colony-level complex systems of of sociobiology. The anthropologists Lionel
social organization (Hölldobler and Wilson Tiger and Robin Fox advocated the adoption of a
1990). One of the most notable features of such zoological perspective in social science almost a
colonies is the phenomenon of “reproductive decade before the publication of Sociobiology
altruism” whereby as few as one female (the (Tiger and Fox 1966). Similarly, the sociologist
“queen”) in the colony monopolizes all egg- Pierre van den Berghe’s advocacy of the develop-
laying activity and is supported by all of the other ment of a “biosocial” approach to the study of
females. It might be said that the queen occupies human social behavior also preceded the publica-
the status of “designated reproducer” for the tion of Wilson’s tome (van den Berghe 1973,
entire colony, and all of the other females labor in 1974). Not long after the publication of
support of her reproductive effort. The colony Sociobiology, another sociologist, Joseph
itself, sometimes described as a “superorgan- Lopreato, was pioneering the application of
ism,” is like an individual, a reproductive unit, sociobiological theory to the study of human
and the extraordinary degree of cooperation and society and social behavior (Lopreato 1984). The
sacrifice exhibited by colony members inspired work of van den Berghe and Lopreato represent
evolutionary biologists to investigate the extent early, “first-generation” sociological efforts to
to which genetic kinship comprises the founda- apply sociobiological principles to the study of
tion of cooperative social life among other taxa as human social behavior.
well, including vertebrates, thereby launching a Though all organisms have kin, only humans
now 50-year long program of sociobiological clearly have a concept of kinship. Accordingly, it
research (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009). is plausible in terms of sociobiological theory to
It is important to understand that sociobiol- hypothesize that evolved psychological mecha-
ogy, when applied to humans, does not entail nisms that support nepotism (favoritism directed
24 Social Evolution 513
toward kin-group members) could also constitute of human mating strategies represents evolved
a platform upon which kin-like groups could be sensitivities to the opportunities and threats posed
constructed. Van den Berghe takes the idea that by variation of dimensions of environments in
preferential association and cooperation among which humans live and strive (almost always
kin group members could be extended somehow unconsciously) to maximize inclusive fitness.
to non-kin and become the basis of group affilia- About the same time that van den Berghe was
tion among individuals who are not close kin and developing new sociological explanations of kin-
uses it to explain the existence of and cooperation ship and ethnic relations based on sociobiologi-
within ethnic groups (van den Berghe 1981). In cal theory and research, Lopreato was re-framing
van den Berghe’s view, ethnic groups can be established topics of sociological research in
thought of as “fictive” kin groups, the members sociobiological terms and exploring the compat-
of which are united not by genetic kinship but by ibility between sociobiological theory and strains
cultural identity. Van den Berghe coined the term of classical sociological theory (1984). Lopreato
“ethny” for such groups, and he analyzes rela- contended that sociobiology provides sociolo-
tions within and between ethnys using concepts gists with an opportunity to develop new and
derived from sociobiology, including kin selec- more powerful explanations of numerous topics
tion, inclusive fitness, and reciprocal altruism of traditional sociological interest including
(van den Berghe 1981). Though true genetic incest, gender relations, marriage and family pat-
relatedness among members of an ethnic group terns, relations of domination and subordination,
dissipates as group size increases, processes of cultural evolution, relations of reciprocity and
reciprocity and mutualism and cultural labels can exchange, and even fertility-mortality patterns
create a sense of kinship among group members (Lopreato 1984, 1989; Carey and Lopreato
who are “genetic strangers” to each other. Thus, 1995). Lopreato argued that sociology had close
psychological mechanisms that evolved in sup- ties to evolutionary thinking in classical socio-
port of cooperation based on genetic kinship can logical theory, especially in theoretical work of
be extended to enable the formation and mainte- Vilfredo Pareto (Lopreato 1984). Lopreato also
nance of cooperative groups based on cultural proposed a modified “maximization principle”
“kinship.” on the basis of which sociobiological theory
In addition to his analysis of ethnic groups, could be used to guide sociological inquiry.
van den Berghe also uses sociobiological con- While embracing the sociobiological premise
cepts and theory in analyzing patterns of mar- that organisms evolve traits that maximize their
riage and mating among humans (1990). inclusive fitness, Lopreato argued that the maxi-
Specifically, like sociobiologists, van den Berghe mization principle must be modified somewhat to
looks at variation in systems of marriage (monog- accommodate the unique evolved attributes of
amy, polygamy, polygyny, hypergamy, etc.) as Homo sapiens (Lopreato 1989). Specifically,
evolved strategies for maximizing fitness. As has Lopreato contended that an evolved human
long-been observed, human mating systems nature manifests a tendency to maximize inclu-
(marriage) are highly variable and thus might not sive fitness, but some elements of this nature are
seem tractable to sociobiological interpretation far from fitness-maximizing, and there is signifi-
because of their variability. However, following cant variation among individuals with regard to
sociobiological reasoning, van den Berghe inter- the extent to which they adopt fitness-enhancing,
prets such variability as adaptive variation to much less maximizing, behaviors. Furthermore,
variable environmental contexts, variation that culture, itself a product of natural selection, often
has been designed by natural selection to be produces fitness-reducing behaviors, such as con-
fitness-maximizing for its participants. For van traceptive technology, and humans appear predis-
den Berghe, instead of constituting evidence for posed to try to satisfy their needs and wants in a
the lack of biological influence on patterns of manner that may or may not yield fitness-
human mate-selection and mating, the variability enhancing results. Thus, culture and evolved
514 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin
psychological attributes of human nature may genome to account for the almost infinite vari-
work at cross-purpose to adaptations that evolved ability within and among human cultures, (3)
in archaic environments to maximize human learning, not instinct, determines human behav-
inclusive fitness. ior, and (4) the human mind is, at birth, virtually
Sociobiology places primary emphasis on try- devoid of content that specifies behavior, espe-
ing to determine if, and to what extent, patterns cially social behavior, and such content must be
of social behavior constitute evolved adaptations acquired by experience, including social learning
for maximizing inclusive fitness. By the late (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). The fourth notion is
1980s, an emerging cadre of psychologists was commonly characterized as the tabula rasa, or
developing an alternative approach for analyzing blank slate, assumption about the nature of the
human behavior in evolutionary terms. Instead of human brain and mind (Pinker 2002).
trying to determine if currently observable pat- By the mid- to late-1980s, a growing number
terns of human behavior are adaptive in contem- of psychologists were questioning the blank slate
porary environments, the new evolutionary assumption about human nature, and they had
psychologists pursued research designed to dis- begun to pursue inquiries that were guided by
cover evidence of evolved mental mechanisms theory and research derived from evolutionary
that may have produced adaptive behaviors in the biology. One of the earliest and most influential
archaic environments in which they evolved, of such efforts was the work of Martin Daly and
especially the Pleistocene era (Barkow et al. Margo Wilson on homicide (1988). Guided by
1992), but may or may not be adaptive in contem- the sociobiological principle that the expression
porary environments. Furthermore, evolutionary of violence among humans will be influenced by
psychologists place little, if any, emphasis in try- the degree of genetic relatedness between attack-
ing to ascertain the fitness consequences of con- ers and victims, Daly and Wilson reviewed data
temporary human behavior, including social about patterns of homicide to see if they con-
behavior. Thus, evolutionary psychology devel- formed to predictions derived from sociobiologi-
oped primarily as an effort to identify and explain cal theory. They were successful in demonstrating
the nature and origins of evolved human “cogni- that sociobiological principles, especially kin
tive algorithms,” the sum of which might be seen selection, provided predictions about the inci-
as constituting a universal, species-specific dence of homicide that could not be derived from
human nature that is the product of 2 million other theoretical perspectives in the behavioral
years of hominin evolution. and social sciences. Consequently, their work
helped launch a rapidly growing branch of psy-
chology now known as “evolutionary psychol-
24.4.2 The Rise and Influence ogy” (Buss 2008).
of Evolutionary Psychology Evolutionary psychologists replaced the blank
slate conception of the human mind with a new
By about 1940 or so, biological explanations of model that they called the “adapted mind”
human social behavior had all but disappeared in (Barkow et al. 1992). The adapted mind is said to
the western social science canon, and the concept have evolved during the Pleistocene era, and it
of culture became central to virtually all social consists of specialized “cognitive algorithms”
science analysis. A new orthodoxy about human that represent mental adaptations for solving the
nature and behavior emerged which later came to challenges posed routinely by the environments
be described as the “Standard Social Science in which humans evolved. These cognitive algo-
Model” (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Key ele- rithms resemble closely what sociobiologists
ments of this model include the basic notions that have called “epigenetic rules” (Lumsden and
(1) environmental factors and experience, not Wilson 1981) and sociologists have called
heritable traits, determine human behavior, (2) “behavioral predispositions” (Lopreato 1984;
there is insufficient variability in the human Lopreato and Crippen 1999) or “behavioral
24 Social Evolution 515
propensities” (Turner 2015). The full comple- A defining sociological feature of group life
ment of evolved cognitive algorithms that consti- among humans, in both ancestral and contempo-
tute the adapted mind are said to have evolved in rary contexts, is the existence of systems of reci-
the “environment of evolutionary adaptedness” procity and exchange. The development of
(the EEA) and can be thought of as the defining exchange theory within sociology testifies to the
components of a universal, species-specific fundamental importance of these processes (e.g.,
human nature (Bowlby 1969; Tooby and Homans 1961; Blau 1964; Emerson 1972). To
Cosmides 1990). the extent that a social relationship depends on
It is erroneous to think of the adapted mind as reliable and stable reciprocity among participants
the “nature” version of a “nature versus nurture” in a system of exchange, instances wherein one
model of the human brain and mind. In the clas- party fails to uphold a contractual obligation to
sical, stereotypic “nature” conception of the another party constitute a threat to the durability
human mind, learning is absent, and heritable, of the relationship. Conceptualized as “defec-
inalterable “instincts” govern human behavior. tion” or “cheating” by evolutionary game theo-
By way of contrast, the adapted mind model rists (Axelrod 1984; Maynard Smith 1982), such
incorporates what psychologists call “prepared” behavior threatens participants who might fail to
or “biased” learning (Garcia and Koelling 1966; detect such contractual violations. Accordingly,
Seligman 1971; Seligman and Hager 1972). In Cosmides and Tooby conducted a series of con-
this view, the human brain features learning trolled experiments designed to determine if
biases that enable humans to learn more quickly, humans have an innate aptitude for detecting
easily, and reliably from experiences that are instances of non-reciprocity in relations of social
adaptively relevant. Put differently, the adapted exchange (Cosmides and Tooby 1992). Their
mind is said to possess innate “aptitudes” for experiments provided evidence of the existence
acquiring information and behavioral strategies of an innate “cheating-detection mechanism”
for coping with circumstances that are highly which Cosmides and Tooby interpret as an
salient to prospects for survival and reproductive evolved, mental adaptation for coping with the
success. For example, Wilson asserts that the threat of non-reciprocity in social relations com-
human mind is likely to possess a special learn- prising cooperation based on social exchange.
ing bias regarding the threat posed by snakes, an Following the lead provided by Cosmides and
archaic and near-universal threat to humans in Tooby, evolutionary psychologists are now
environments the world-over (Wilson 1998:79). engaged in systematic searches for other cogni-
An innate propensity to be especially vigilant for tive algorithms that may have evolved to enable
serpentine forms and a behavioral inclination to the establishment and maintenance of stable pat-
behave very cautiously when they are detected terns of cooperation on the basis of which soci-
represents a highly adaptive learning bias from etal life is made possible. Consequently, the
which ancestral (as well as many contemporary) tabula rasa assumption about human nature has
humans have benefitted. been discarded by sociological theorists whose
The notion of the adapted mind is most rele- work is informed by contemporary evolutionary
vant to sociological theorists when considering sciences, including sociobiology and evolution-
the possibility that humans may possess innate ary psychology. And though, as will be discussed
cognitive algorithms for coping with threats and later, some evolutionary sociologists take excep-
opportunities created by social living. In that tion to the model of the adapted mind proposed
regard, a number of pioneering experiments con- by Cosmides and Tooby and other evolutionary
ducted by John Tooby and Leda Cosmides pro- psychologists, none embrace the tabula rasa
vide an example of one such mental adaptation model which has dominated the social sciences
that appears designed specifically for group life. for most of the twentieth century.
516 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin
rejects the premise that fields such as sociobiol- “Durkheimian selection” refers to competition
ogy or evolutionary psychology alone are ade- among actors that drives them to find resources in
quate for analyzing and explaining patterns of new niches, and “Spencerian selection” refers to
sociocultural evolution (Turner and Maryanski the process by means of which actors innovate
2015). Rather, emergent properties of human and produce entirely new adaptations for coping
societies that derive from the production and use with selection pressures (2010:24–27).
of symbols (and culture) require additional, as Spencerian selection acknowledges the almost-
well as novel, concepts and principles for explain- certainly unique human trait of foresight, the
ing the evolution of human sociocultural systems. ability to imagine future conditions, envision
Accordingly, Turner sets about to resurrect the novel ways of behaving in response to future con-
tradition of “grand theory” in sociology based on ditions, and adopt novel strategies in an effort to
well-established (as well as novel) principles in cope with these conditions. In Turner’s theory,
evolutionary theory. In Turner’s view, contempo- changes in five fundamental properties of human
rary sociological theory is remiss in its neglect of societies can act as selection forces, and they are
macro-level phenomena including stratification population, production, regulation, distribution,
systems and societies themselves as distinctive and reproduction (2010:41–103). Like numerous
macro-level units of analysis (2013:434–435). evolutionary theorists before him, Turner identi-
Similarly, Abrutyn (2014) and Abrutyn and fies integration as a basic focal point of his analy-
Turner (2011) point to the surprising irony that, sis. Specifically, Turner asks how social structure
despite its centrality and pervasiveness in con- and culture are integrated by means of both cul-
ventional sociological thought, sociological tural and structural mechanisms that operate in
explication of the macrodynamics of societal response to various selection pressures. Only by
institutions suffers surprising vagueness and resurrecting the project of grand theory and fram-
neglect. Both Abrutyn and Turner contend that ing it in evolutionary terms does Turner believe
the full potential and analytical value of the long- that sociological theorists can produce macro-
venerated but surprisingly under-theorized socio- level theories that are adequate to the task of
logical concept of institutions can best be realized explaining the behavior of entire societies.
by subjecting it to evolutionary theoretical Other contemporary sociologists have adopted
scrutiny. evolutionary thinking to explain fundamental
Turner built his theory from information processes of sociocultural change and stability.
derived from stage-models of societal evolution, For example, Marion Blute distinguishes among
and his goal is to identify the common social gene-based, social learning (meme-based), and
dynamics that operate at “any stage” of societal dual inheritance (coevolutionary) Darwinian the-
evolution and in all types of societies (2010). ories of change (2010:7). Like Turner, Blute con-
Toward that end, he develops a theory comprising tends that a satisfactory explanation of
23 abstract propositions about the macrodynam- sociocultural evolution is not available in socio-
ics of human society that can be used to analyze biological or evolutionary psychological theory
any human social system (Turner 2010:323–344). alone. Rather, in order to explain processes of
Turner contends that focusing on selection pro- sociocultural evolution, attention must be devoted
cesses in sociocultural evolution can revive the to (1) the unique properties of culture and social
project of grand theorizing that characterized learning, (2) memes as units of cultural inheri-
structural-functionalism but avoid the shortcom- tance and transmission, (3) the role of human
ings of functional analysis that eventually led to agency in producing and guiding human social
its near-total abandonment by sociologists. behavior, (4) human subjectivity and the pro-
In order to extend evolutionary thinking cesses by means of which humans construct and
beyond its biological origins, Turner identifies are constructed by niches, and (5) the role of both
two forms of selection besides Darwinian selec- ecological complexity (more kinds) and individ-
tion that operate in sociocultural systems: ual complexity (more complex kinds) in
518 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin
sociocultural evolution (Blute 2010). While Blute dispositions for producing complex behaviors,
acknowledges and appreciates both gene-based including social behaviors. Rather, the brain is
and dual inheritance evolutionary theories, she typically viewed as a powerful, complex infor-
makes the case for the necessity of developing a mation processing machine that captures, stores,
Darwinian theory of sociocultural evolution that organizes, and expresses information that is
places primary emphasis on processes of human acquired by personal experience or cultural trans-
social learning and meme-based information mission. And it is by means of symbolic media
systems. that such information is processed. The emer-
Though, as Turner notes, macro-level theoriz- gence of sociobiology and later, evolutionary
ing declined significantly with the demise of psychology, has posed a direct and formidable
grand theory in general and functionalism in par- threat to this traditional view of human mental
ticular, contemporary sociology has exhibited life and social behavior.
high levels of activity about global or “world- In Sociobiology, Wilson identified a range of
system” level societal change (2013:434). social behaviors displayed by numerous taxa that
Recently, theorists of sociocultural evolution he analyzed as genetically-based, evolved adap-
have contributed to these efforts at global-level, tations produced by natural selection (1975).
intersocietal analysis (Lenski 2005; Chase-Dunn However, Wilson said little in Sociobiology about
2015). Lenski’s ecological-evolutionary theory is mental processes by means of which such adap-
designed to provide a framework for understand- tations might be organized and operate in the
ing the nature of the “global system of societies,” human mind. In response to those who criticized
how it came into existence, and its sociocultural him for this omission, he and Charles Lumsden
evolution (2005:111–124). In a recent effort to published Genes, Mind, and Culture: The
account for the emergence of global level, socio- Coevolutionary Process (1981) in an effort to
cultural complexity, Chase-Dunn has integrated identify and explicate the psychological pro-
world-systems theory with ideas derived from cesses that comprise the “ontogenetic develop-
evolutionary theory (2015). In his analysis of the ment of mental activity and behavior” and how
sociocultural evolution of world-systems, Chase- such processes evolved by natural selection
Dunn assigns primary significance to phenomena (1981:ix). The development of various mental
such as semiperipheral development, waves of activities and the behaviors they produce are
trade globalization and deglobalization, and cri- described by Lumsden and Wilson as entailing
ses of the contemporary world-system and its “epigenetic rules,” especially “secondary epigen-
possible futures (2015:270–282). etic rules” (1981:53–98). Epigenetic rules chan-
nel and direct the development of anatomical,
24.4.3.2 The Adapted Mind physiological, and cognitive traits. They can be
Most contemporary sociological theory is based thought of as “rules of thumb” that provide
on the tabula rasa assumption about the human responses to environmental stimuli so as to yield
brain and mind, a core component of the Standard adaptive outcomes. Thus, a brain supplied with a
Social Science model. At best, most sociologists repertoire of epigenetic rules is far from a blank
will concede only that the newborn human infant slate, but rather, a complex information process-
is in possession of a few inborn “reflexes,” such ing machine that is richly supplied with
as rooting and suckling, swallowing, the Moro adaptively-relevant information for producing
(startle) reflex, the Palmar grasp (grasping an adaptive behavior in response to environmental
object placed in the palm of the hand), and the challenges and opportunities.
Babinski reflex (extension of the big toe and fan- Evolutionary theorists have used additional
ning of other toes). It is very uncommon to find in terms to characterize epigenetic rules including
contemporary sociological theory a view of the “behavioral predispositions” (Lopreato 1984),
human brain and mind as instantiated, at birth, “cognitive algorithms” (Cosmides and Tooby
with an extensive suite of innate behavioral pre- 1992) and “behavioral propensities” (Turner
24 Social Evolution 519
2015). A growing number of sociologists have nological, cultural, and sociological traits.
begun exploring the possibility that the human According to Kanazawa, we can expect more
mind contains specialized, evolved cognitive variability among humans in terms of their gener-
mechanisms that constitute the platform on which alized intelligence, and less variability in their
behavioral adaptations can develop. For example, specialized mental adaptations for coping with
rejecting the long-standing orthodoxy that the the archaic and near-universal challenges con-
human mind is a tabula rasa, generalized fronted by ancestral humans in the EEA (2010).
information-processing machine, Rosemary An important concept on the basis of which
Hopcroft proposes, instead, the notion of an the notion of the adapted human mind rests is the
“evolved actor” that is in possession of an entire psychological phenomenon of “prepared” or
suite of evolved, innate behavioral predisposi- “biased” or “directed” learning (Garcia and
tions including an innate aptitude for learning Koelling 1966; Rachman and Seligman 1976;
social norms above other kinds of rules, an innate Seligman 1971, 1993; Seligman and Hager
preoccupation with fairness and altruism when 1972). The idea of prepared learning stands in
interacting with genetic strangers, behavioral contrast to the long-standing misconception that
predispositions toward religious sentiments, a a behavior must be the consequence of either
predisposition to form social hierarchies, and a instinct or learning. The Standard Social Science
predisposition to be preferentially loyal to close Model represents the human brain as a general,
kin (2009b). Hopcroft also applies the notion of equipotential, all-purpose information process-
behavioral predispositions in her analyses of ing machine, and almost all behavior is attributed
evolved gender differences (2009a, 2002, 2006). to learning and not instinct (Tooby and Cosmides
The sociologist (and evolutionary psycholo- 1992). In contrast, evolutionary theory suggests
gist) Satoshi Kanazawa also offers evolutionary that the brain is predisposed to learn and retain
explanations of evolved cognitive adaptations certain types of information over others, and that
possessed by humans regarding phenomena such the adaptive relevance of the information is what
as intelligence (2004a, 2010), risk-taking and causes the brain to preferentially acquire and pro-
crime (Kanazawa and Still 2000), gender differ- cess it.
ences in preferences for different types of social An example of how biased learning occurs is
capital (Savage and Kanazawa 2002), and human provided by what psychologists call “ophidio-
decision-making in the context of prisoner’s phobia,” the development of an extreme fear of
dilemma and public choice contexts (2004a). snakes (Wilson 1998:79). Snakes have long rep-
Much of Kanazawa’s theorizing about these and resented a serious source of mortality in many
other phenomena is informed by his “Savanna-IQ human populations, so evolutionary reasoning
Interaction Hypothesis” which states that the would predict that natural selection would favor
human mind is equipped with both specialized, the evolution of a cognitive algorithm in the brain
domain-specific algorithms for coping with that makes humans highly vigilant about possible
archaic and recurrent challenges that all humans encounters with snakes. A fear of snakes must be
confront, as well as a second, “generalized intel- learned, but the brain appears to learn to fear
ligence” that enables humans to reason about and snakes much more easily than it learns to fear
cope with problems that are adaptively relevant novel and more recent threats such as fast-moving
but appear only in novel environments (2010). automobiles, which are currently a much greater
Thus, the human brain and mind enable humans source of human mortality. Automobiles, how-
to cope quickly, and largely unreflectively, with ever, were not a feature of ancestral human envi-
challenges that have been present in virtually all ronments. Accordingly, automobiles, however
environments in which humans have evolved and deadly, are rarely the target of phobias. The
currently live, as well as with unprecedented notion of prepared learning means that it is theo-
challenges presented by newly-developed envi- retically plausible that natural selection would
ronments that feature novel demographic, tech- have supplied the human brain with suites of
520 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin
cognitive algorithms for coping with highly One of the most interesting lines of inquiry
adaptively relevant threats and opportunities that that has been prompted by theory-building and
were presented by the environments in which empirical research about the adapted mind is the
humans evolved. Part of those environments are possibility that the human brain/mind may be
social environments, thus, social structures and densely supplied with specialized cognitive algo-
processes themselves are likely to have func- rithms that represent evolved adaptations to
tioned as selection forces, equipping the human selection forces presented by the structures and
mind with learning biases that enable them to processes of group life itself. In short, it is now
recognize and process effectively any informa- plausible to use evolutionary theory to pursue
tion about social scenarios that is highly adap- new avenues inquiry that might lead to the dis-
tively relevant. covery of other types of cognitive adaptations
One such scenario that has been the investi- that evolved to enable humans to cope with the
gated by experimental research is the work of challenges and opportunities presented by the
Cosmides and Tooby on cognitive adaptations for social environments in which they live and have
social exchange (1992). Well over a century of evolved.
sociological theorizing and research has docu-
mented the importance of relations of reciprocity 24.4.3.3 Neurosocial Evolution
and exchange in human social systems (e.g., Until recently, it would not have been indefensi-
Smith 1776 [1805]; Lévi-Strauss 1969; Homans ble to describe sociology as an “acerebral sci-
1961; Blau 1964; Emerson 1972). More recently, ence.” To most sociologists, the brain is relevant
sociobiologists have also explored the nature and to sociological explanation only as a recorder and
incidence of systems of reciprocity in non-human processor of personal experience and culture. In
societies (Trivers 1971; Clutton-Brock 2009). A terms of specifying and generating social behav-
serious threat to any participant in an exchange ior, the brain is viewed as virtually empty of
relationship is that alter will fail to provide a informational content. Put more casually, sociol-
resource that s/he owes ego in repayment for a ogists commonly regard the human brain as
resource that s/he received from ego. In the game devoid of “social instincts,” therefore, there is
theoretic model of the prisoner’s dilemma, this is little if anything to be learned about the nature,
known as the threat of defection. If ego is unable causes, or consequences of social behavior by
to recognize and respond effectively to acts of studying the brain itself. Contemporary evolu-
defection by alter, then s/he faces a serious, tionary theory and research make this an increas-
adaptively-relevant threat within this system of ingly untenable position for sociologists to
reciprocity and exchange. Thus, evolutionary embrace.
reasoning would lead to the hypothesis that One of the earliest, and most thorough, theo-
humans may possess an evolved, specialized cog- retical developments in evolutionary sociology to
nitive algorithm to protect against this selection focus attention on the evolved properties of the
force. human brain is the work of Turner on the evolu-
In a series of ingenious controlled experi- tion of human emotions and their role in social
ments designed to determine how competent behavior (1996, 1999, 2000, 2007). In Turner’s
humans are at detecting instances of non- view, the adapted mind consists of complex
reciprocity in a prisoner’s dilemma scenario, arrays of neural systems that are “diffuse and
Cosmides and Tooby adduced evidence in sup- complex sub-assemblages” which are distributed
port of their hypothesis that humans appear to across the neo-cortex and sub-cortex and func-
have a strong aptitude for detecting instances of tion as “bioprogrammers for group living”
cheating in relations of social exchange, and they (2015:177). Disproportionately large, even for a
characterize this specialized aptitude, or cogni- primate, the neo-cortex has been regarded as
tive algorithm, as a “cheating detection mecha- especially important in explaining complex
nism” (1992). behavior because of its ability to support
24 Social Evolution 521
reasoning and other sophisticated cognitive activ- grating neuroscientific and sociological thinking
ities. Turner, however, credits the limbic systems can shed new light on the scientific study of
of the brain, also disproportionately large, with morality and its bearing on the formation of
comparable significance in promoting the evolu- groups and interactional dynamics among them
tion of human sociality (2000). The limbic sys- (2012). Finally, and perhaps surprisingly to tradi-
tems enhance the emotional repertoire of humans, tional sociological theorists, the phenomenon of
thereby enabling the formation of strong social intersubjectivity, a concept central to theoretical
ties and complex patterns of social interaction perspectives in sociology such as phenomenol-
(Turner and Maryanski (2008). The work of ogy, may be tractable to neurosociological analy-
Turner and Maryanski represents an important sis. Franks and Davis review neuroscientific
new direction in an effort to synthesize the neuro- studies of “mirror neurons,” and they conclude
sciences with sociological, ecological, anthropo- that their activity may be foundational to key
logical, and psychological perspectives toward social interactive processes like imitation, role-
the development of a comprehensive, evolution- taking, ritual, cooperation, self-control, and other
ary theory of the evolution of human societies. sociological phenomena that generate social
Another recent contribution to the develop- cohesion (solidarity) which, in the words of
ment of a neurosociology is the work of David Franks and Davis, constitutes the “glue” of social
Franks (2010, 2015) and Franks and his col- life (2012).
league Jeff Davis (2012). Franks provides an
account of the phylogeny of the human brain 24.4.3.4 Cross-Species Analyses
and the ecological and evolutionary forces that Historically, sociology has been a “single-species
shaped its development into an organ with spe- science,” devoted almost exclusively to the study
cialized features that support the existence of of human social behavior alone. The uniqueness
complex patterns of social organization and of human beings, attributed basically to the
interaction. Reviewing hominin phylogeny, human capacity for symbol production and use
Franks explains how changing ecological forces (culture), has justified in the minds of many soci-
led to selection for brain structures that favored ologists an assumption that humans are essen-
a shift from olfaction to vision as a primary sen- tially exempt from most of the biological forces
sory modality, enhanced memory, and enhanced that shape the social behavior of other species.
capabilities for abstract thought which, in turn, This is a position that has come under direct criti-
strongly predisposed the evolution of human cism recently by evolutionary behavioral and
language (2015). Reviewing the evolution of social scientists (e.g., Kanazawa 2004b).
these neural systems, Franks concludes that the However, a number of sociologists see value in
human brain is highly social by nature, a deter- extending the scope of sociological theory and
mination that has significant implications for research beyond humans to include some of the
the future development of sociological theory thousands of other social species as well. Two
(2015:294). rationales are advanced to justify this extension
Other developments in the nascent area of in the scope of sociological analysis: (1) integrat-
neurosociology provide additional examples of ing biological methodologies like cladistics anal-
how the integration of sociological inquiry with ysis with sociological approaches like social
the neurosciences can promote the development network analysis can provide insight about the
of a robust evolutionary sociology. For example, origins of human nature and how it shapes group
Leveto and Kalkhoff show how a neurosociologi- life among humans, and (2) comparing basic
cal perspective can provide insight about how forms of social organization, like dominance
brain function pertaining to the processing of hierarchies or macrosocieties, across species
paralanguage and biosocial interaction are impli- lines can help identify and explain the fundamen-
cated in Autism Spectrum Disorders (2012). tal processes by means of which all societies are
Similarly, Firat and Hitlin demonstrate how inte- assembled and function.
522 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin
The work of Maryanski (and Maryanski and ment of a “new comparative sociology” that
Turner) provides a good example of how com- explores how forms of social organization evolve
parisons between humans and other primates can among diverse social species and how these
provide insights about how natural selection has forms are expressed by animals as different as
shaped the constitutive elements of human nature eusocial insects (ants, bees, wasps, and termites)
and how this nature has influenced the evolution and humans (Machalek 1992). Noting that a
of human social life (Maryanski 1992; Maryanski “form of sociation” that he calls “macrosociality”
and Turner 1992; Turner and Maryanski 2008). occurs only among modern humans (10,000 years
By comparing the phylogenies of humans to ago to present) and the eusocial insects, Machalek
other apes and to monkeys, Maryanski has pro- identifies the organismic, ecological, cost-benefit,
vided new theoretical insights and empirical evi- and sociological constraints that have to be over-
dence in support of her claim that humans are, by come if macrosociality is to evolve in any species
nature, less highly-social than long-believed (1992:39–59). A macrosociety consists of a very
(Maryanski 1992; Maryanski and Turner 1992). large population that is organized into a complex
Like other apes, early humans were unlikely to division of labor executed by members of distinct
have been predisposed to forming strong social social categories. Only the eusocial insects and
ties, and it was only when natural selection modi- modern humans have overcome these constraints
fied the human brain to expand the palette of to produce and live in macrosocities, and theo-
emotions that humans now possess that they retical principles developed for a cross-species
became a “strong tie” primate (Maryanski 1992). version of comparative sociology offer promise
In fact, Maryanski concludes that natural selec- for explaining how and why this occurs
tion has produced a human nature that is predis- (Machalek 1992:59–61). Finally, another exam-
posed in part toward sociality, but equally ple of how evolutionary thinking makes possible
predisposed toward individuality, and these two cross-species analyses of sociological phenom-
propensities co-exist in a sort of uneasy tension ena is provided by the work of Cohen and
that is evident in human group life. Machalek on “expropriative crime” (1988).
An early example of extending the sociologi- Using basic concepts and explanatory principles
cal study of social structure and social dynamics derived from sociobiology and behavioral ecol-
to include nonhuman animals is the work of Ivan ogy, Cohen and Machalek offer an account of
Chase (1974, 1980; Chase et al. 2002). Chase how the incidence of expropriative behaviors
reviews two models designed to explain the devel- (called “social parasitism” by behavioral biolo-
opment of dominance hierarchies among both gists), is either enabled or inhibited by routine
human and nonhuman social species. The first patterns of social organization and processes of
model predicts position in dominance hierarchies social interaction. When expropriative behaviors
on the basis of individual trait differences, and the violate laws, as occurs only in humans, they are
second predicts dominance position as the prod- called crimes. However, forms of expropriation
uct of iterated social interactions. Experimental occur in nonhuman societies as well, and Cohen
work he conducted on how dominance hierarchies and Machalek identify properties of any social
develop in chickens supports the social interac- system, human or nonhuman, that are conducive
tion explanation (1980). In this regard, Chase’s to the incidence of expropriation.
work suggests that there is merit in pursuing a
Simmelian-type analysis of “social forms” across
species lines. That is, regardless of the species in 24.5 Conclusion: A Future
which a particular social form is found, there may for Evolutionary Theory
be features that are common to that form and the in Sociology
processes by which it develops and operates,
whatever the species that expresses it. Evolutionary thinking flourished in much of the
More recently, Machalek (1992) and Cohen work of the founders of sociology. However, the
and Machalek (1988) also advocate the develop- misadventure of Social Darwinism and the rise of
24 Social Evolution 523
cultural explanations of human social behavior Segerstråle 2000). Many expressed apprehension
eventually consigned evolutionary thought to about what they perceived as an imperial intel-
obscurity for much of the twentieth century. By lectual agenda in Wilson’s work. Four decades
the mid-1960s, new variants of stage models of later, however, these fears and apprehensions
social change were being developed, but it was have not been realized. Even in light of the “tri-
not until the 1970s that a new wave of evolution- umph of sociobiology,” as Alcock puts it (2001),
ary analysis began to proliferate in the social and and the increasing colonization of the social and
behavioral sciences. The major impetus behind behavioral sciences by evolutionary ideas, none
this newly resurgent interest in evolutionary anal- of these disciplines, including sociology, have
yses of human social behavior was the publica- been dissolved in the corrosive solvents of bio-
tion of Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis logical reductionism or genetic determinism. In
(1975). fact, as some sociologists have become knowl-
Despite initial and widespread fears of a reap- edgeable about the evolutionary life-sciences,
pearance of Social Darwinism and a reintroduc- they have discovered opportunities to apply fun-
tion of long-discredited positions of naïve damental sociological principles in the study of
reductionism, genetic determinism, and new ide- nonhuman social species and their patterns of
ological agendas designed to support sexism and social interaction. For example, the emergent
racism, more and more social and behavioral sci- nature of group structures and even societal-level
entists became drawn to the evolutionary life- social organization has been documented in soci-
sciences. Eventually, the growing receptivity ological analyses of species ranging from ants
among social scientists to evolutionary theory (Machalek 1992, 1999) to chickens (Chase 1974,
and research led to the development of new fields 1980). Thus, instead of posing a threat to conven-
such as evolutionary anthropology, evolutionary tional sociological analysis, a dialogue between
economics, evolutionary psychology, and evolu- sociologists and evolutionary biologists can
tionary sociology. All of these new ventures share result in potentially fertile and mutually enrich-
a common premise: the tabula rasa model of the ing relations of intellectual reciprocity.
human brain and mind is no longer tenable, and it As has been discussed, a four decades-long
must be replaced by a conception of an adapted dialogue between evolutionary biologists and a
mind that is the product of evolution by natural growing number of sociologists has led to the
selection. As previously discussed, evolutionary development of new areas of theoretical inquiry
social and behavioral scientists are not of one in sociology. New theories of sociocultural evo-
mind about the nature of the adapted mind and lution have emerged which are informed by neo-
how it functions. However, they all share a com- Darwinian theory and research but are not
mon interest in exploring its features and how burdened by indefensible assumptions or prem-
they influence complex processes such as the ises of a dogmatic reductionist or determinist
generation and transmission of culture, the role nature. Instead, these new theories of sociocul-
of prepared learning in the development of social tural evolution can build on an increasingly
behaviors, the manner in which genetic and sophisticated understanding of the adapted mind
memetic (cultural) information interact, and the and, simultaneously, provide new insight about
influences of an evolved mind on the develop- the emergent structures and processes by means
ment of the emergent properties of human groups of which social systems function within the eco-
and societies. systems in which they develop. Similarly, as the
When Wilson speculated about how sociol- nascent field of neurosociology provides greater
ogy, and the other social sciences, appeared des- depth of understanding about the evolved proper-
tined to be transformed by new developments in ties of the social mind, sociological theorists will
sociobiology, behavioral ecology, and the neuro- be in a better position to understand the forces by
sciences, many social and behavioral scientists means of which phenomena such as social soli-
reacted with alarm (Wilson 1975:574–575; darity develop and function. And as the scope of
524 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin
sociological inquiry expands beyond the study of Chase, I. D. (1974). Models of hierarchy formation in ani-
mal societies. Behavioral Science, 19(6), 374–382.
Homo sapiens alone to include any of the tens of
Chase, I. D. (1980). Social process and hierarchy forma-
thousands of nonhuman social species, entirely tion in small groups: A comparative perspective.
new kinds of opportunities for the development American Sociological Review, 45(6), 905–924.
of sociological theory and research will emerge. Chase, I. D., Tovey, C., Spangler-Martin, D., &
Manfredonia, M. (2002). Individual differences versus
Twenty-first century sociological theory
social dynamics in the formation of animal dominance
appears poised to be energized by the develop- hierarchies. Proceedings of the National Academy of
ment of a stronger and closer association with the Sciences of the United States of America, 99(8),
evolutionary life sciences. And, in turn, it offers 5744–5749.
Chase-Dunn, C. (2015). The sociocultural evolution of
promise to stimulate new types of theoretical
world-systems. In J. H. Turner, R. Machalek, &
inquiry and empirical research among behavioral A. Maryanski (Eds.), Handbook on evolution and
scientists who study nonhuman social species society: Toward an evolutionary social science
and their social lives. (pp. 267–284). Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
Clutton-Brock, T. (2009). Cooperation between non-kin
in animal societies. Nature, 462, 51–57.
Cohen, L. E., & Machalek, R. (1988). A general theory of
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Reimagining Collective Behavior
25
Justin Van Ness and Erika Summers-Effler
rationalist’s turn away from early theory. Next, tive tend to use “collective action” interchange-
we revisit the prematurely dismissed theories in ably with collective behavior to attempt to
light of recent advances in cognitive social sci- emphasize rationality and purpose behind
ence with an emphasis on emotion, cognition, actions. This change-oriented perspective
and action. Finally, we end the chapter with fruit- emerges when “usual conventions cease to guide
ful paths for the future of collective behavior. social action and people collectively transcend…
This includes not only a suggestion for where our established institutional patterns and structures”
theoretical attention can be focused but also a (Turner and Killian 1987). Snow and Oliver
methodological approach which we believe (1995) define this as “extrainstitutional” behavior
affords great potential for creativity and theoreti- aimed at problem solving. Broadly conceived,
cal innovation. these events tend to be temporary gatherings and
less organizationally based than social movement
campaigns and protest events. They tend to arise
25.2 Defining Collective Behavior during moments of newly available opportunities
or when established conventions cease to guide
The study of collective behavior has referred to action. Scholars contributing to this perspective
wide ranging phenomena. Some scholars have often heavily contribute to the field of social
used the term for the study of crowds, mobs, pan- movements as well.
ics. Crazes, fads, manias and other spontaneous American sociology often fuses collective
acts also fall within this scope. Others have used behavior and social movements together.
the term for the study of riots and behavior dur- McCarthy (1991) states “scholars…have insisted
ing crises. Collective behavior can also describe on wedding the study of crowds and social move-
rather mundane events that take place when two ments…A distinctively American marriage, it
or more people come together in time and space. was one not consummated in Europe” (xii).
These may include waiting in line, marching, While all social movements are a form of collec-
singing in church, rooting for sports teams, vic- tive behavior, not all collective behavior takes the
tory celebrations, or mosh-pits at a concert. To form of an organizationally based social move-
account for such a wide range, Clark McPhail ment. Despite this, the distinction has been less
defines collective behavior as “two or more per- defined because most developments in the study
sons engaged in one or more behaviors (e.g., of collective behavior have come from the study
locomotion, orientation, vocalization, verbaliza- of protest events or from disaster research.
tion, gesticulation, and/or manipulation) judged Consequently, the breadth of cases with system-
common or concerted on one or more dimensions atic research is rather limited. Additionally, what
(e.g., direction, velocity, tempo, or substantive contributions have come from these two special-
content)” (1991: 159). As if McPhail’s definition izations have also been hindered by their own
wasn’t all encompassing, Park and Burgress methodological biases. Protest event research,
(1921) even went so far as to claim the entire for instance, largely relies on newspaper records
field of sociology as “the science of collective which limit the ability to record and theorize the
behavior”. To a fault, when theories begin to individual and interactional processes in natural-
“explain” everything, they lose their power to istic contexts (e.g., Amenta et al. 2009; Andrews
anticipate specific dynamics. This is part of the and Caren 2010; Earl et al. 2004; Oliver and
reason the theoretical baby was thrown out with Meyer 1999).
the underspecified empirical bath water. Generally, early collective behavior devel-
Another approach to the study of collective oped with an explicit attention to psychological
behavior focuses on a collectivity creating social, processes, both through psychological and socio-
political, and cultural change (e.g., Blumer 1969 logical standpoints. The former tended to focus
[1939]; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Marx and on the influence of crowds and group behavior on
Wood 1975; Oliver 1989). Many in this perspec- the individual’s cognition, behavior, and
25 Reimagining Collective Behavior 529
emotions. The sociological approach tends to section, we review the major theoretical strands
focus on processes facilitating the emergence of in the field of collective behavior.
collective behavior, the interactional processes,
and the consequences of action. These two
approaches should be viewed as complementary 25.3.1 Transformation
rather than contrasting. The distinctions are less
visible than they were during the developments Arguably, LeBon’s The Crowd has been the most
of early collective behavior theory and sociolo- influential work in the early study of collective
gists often integrate psychological research into behavior. LeBon believed that when people came
their work (Thoits 1995). together, no matter their individual characteris-
Increasingly, scholars are integrating theories tics, the nature of being together transforms indi-
across specializations and disciplines in order to viduals into a crowd and induces within them a
provide the most well-informed explanations of collective mind (1895). A “mental unity” is born.
behavior (e.g., Abrutyn and Mueller 2015; Collett This new state of mind leads individuals to feel,
and Lizardo 2014; Summers-Effler et al. 2015). think, and act differently than they would if they
The field of collective behavior is particularly were in isolation. Consequently, he argued, this
well suited for integration; Marx and McAdam transformation lead to the disappearance of criti-
agree, stating “the eclectic nature of the field of cal reasoning skills, placing the crowd in a posi-
collective behavior…is an ideal area within tion “perpetually hovering on the borderland of
which to examine basic, and unfortunately often unconsciousness” (LeBon 1895: 14). He also
unrelated, theoretical perspectives” (1994: 4). believed that the anonymity of the crowd would
Thus, whether one chooses to focus on the emo- lead one to believe that they were unaccountable
tions of crowds, the potential for change, emerg- for their behaviors; that is, there is a sense of
ing interaction orders, stability through crises, or “invincibility” when acting within a crowd.
the conditions and consequences of collective Together, this would lead to otherwise normal
action, the field of collective behavior is ripe with individuals acting in extraordinary ways. This
potential for theoretical innovation (see transformation became all the more dangerous as
Summers-Effler 2007). the crowd increases “suggestibility” in individu-
als, making them more vulnerable to the influ-
ence and potential manipulations of leaders.
25.3 Collective Behavior Theory LeBon’s ideas were most directly introduced
to American sociology through Robert E. Park
Eighteenth and nineteenth century crowd psy- (1904; Park and Burgess 1921), while also influ-
chology birthed early collective behavior theory. encing French sociologists (e.g., Tarde 1901) and
During this time period, scholars were trying to American psychologists (e.g., Freud 1921;
explain the radical social, economic, and political Martin 1920). Park is often credited with found-
upheaval of urban Europe. Violent strikes, riots, ing the field of collective behavior within sociol-
conflicts, and repression painted the social scene. ogy (Turner and Killian 1987: 2). He argued that
Society was rapidly changing. Attempting to crowds and collective behavior played pivotal
explain this assault upon the status quo, scholars roles in social change. They were “forces which
honed their attention onto crowds. Many believed dealt the final blow to old existing institutions…
that by understanding the mechanisms and pro- and introduced the new spirit of new ones” (Park
cesses of crowds, they could better educate and 1972: 48). Park added that the crowd transforma-
assist the government’s ability to control the tion takes place within the context of “social
masses. This historical period, perspective, and unrest”. During these tense moments of unrest, a
intent filtered the theoretical lens through which mutual contagion – what he called “circular reac-
early theory developed (see Borch 2012). In this tion” – creates a shared mood and a common
530 J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effler
impulse to act. Interaction, communication, and withstood empirical scrutiny (Allport 1924b;
circular reaction then create unanimity within the McPhail 1991; Norris 1988). Interestingly
crowd and afford the potential to achieve com- enough, emerging work is supporting of some
mon ends. LeBon, Park, and Blumer’s theories which had
Herbert Blumer, a student of Robert Park and been dismissed long ago. We will return to this
George Herbert Mead, continued with an empha- later in the chapter.
sis on interaction and the communication pro-
cesses through which people construct and share
worldviews. Blumer argued that “social unrest” 25.3.2 Predisposition
emerges from the disruption of routine activities and Deprivation
or the onslaught of new impulses or dispositions
which the social order cannot accommodate. Another thesis views crowds as composed of
People respond to this lack of accommodation individuals with common predispositions, inner
with a feeling of restlessness act aimlessly, errati- impulses, and unmet needs (Hoffer 1951;
cally, excited, and are vulnerable to rumors. Lasswell 1930; Martin 1920). The predisposition
Blumer argued that crowds come to act explanation argues there is nothing unique about
through five steps. First, an exciting event cap- crowds or crowd behavior. There is no “transfor-
tures the attention of the crowd. People then mation” or “mob mentality” when people come
begin milling about by walking around, exchang- together. Rather, behavior is simply the result of
ing rumors, and focusing on the event. This is actors converging with similar interests towards
when circular reactions “make the individuals releasing tension. Some in this perspective even
more sensitive and responsible to one another” believed crowd participants converge to act out
(Blumer 1969 [1939]: 174). The crowd becomes narcissism and latent homosexuality (cf. Lasswell
more cohesive as a group. Third, a common 1930).
object of attention gives the group a shared orien- Floyd Allport (1924a, b), one of the first major
tation and mutual excitement. This furthers con- critics of the transformation hypothesis, argued
formity. As the group shares a common that innate and learned tendencies predispose
heightened mood and orientation, the fourth step people to crowd participation. These tendencies
is the stimulation of shared impulses. Finally, the compelled people to converge in common loca-
crowd acts upon impulse in a way they would not tions in order to satisfy drives or overcome barri-
have acted if alone. ers to rewards; any action would be the result of
The transformation hypothesis developed shared predispositions being triggered by a situa-
through LeBon, Park, and Blumer portrays crowd tional stimulus. This activation could come from a
behavior as irrational and strongly influenced by leader’s suggestion or from the crowd modeling
group emotions. From a distance, the crowd is behavior. To the extent that individuals influence
treated as a collective whole with universal char- one another, they are intensifying and activating
acteristics. Some argue that this is an oversimpli- latent impulses rather than generating new ones.
fication for the potential diversity of emotions, Allport continued the assumption that crowd
motives, roles, and actions within groups. Couch behaviors are driven by strong emotional
(1968) argues that behaviors such as protesting responses with tendencies towards violence
and rioting become described as irrational (1924b). In contrast to crowds, “common group
because they challenge the normative expecta- behaviors” were non-emotional and means-ends
tions from the analyst’s cultural expectations – oriented. Similar to Blumer’s “circular reaction,”
not because they are actually irrational. The Allport’s “social facilitation” was a reciprocal
transformation thesis remained the dominant col- process wherein actors model, suggest, and acti-
lective behavior theory into the 1960s. The idea vate behaviors within one another. The circular
of a “group mentality” was especially influential process may strengthen when spatial arrange-
in popular culture, though some claim it has not ments and other mediating ecological factors
25 Reimagining Collective Behavior 531
increase crowd density, thus bringing nearness to The more extreme the negative affect, the greater
potential activating stimuli. the intensity of relative deprivation. Gurr states
This thesis has been critiqued as a sleight of “one innate response to perceived deprivation is
hand, simply taking the transformation view discontent or anger, and the anger is a motivation
from the group level and positioning it at the state for which aggression is an inherently satis-
individual level (McPhail 1991). Questions of fying response” (1968: 1105). Others have argued
motivation also became problematic as actions that absolute deprivation is also a precipitating
were used post-hoc to explain driving factors. factor for collective behavior (e.g., Toch 1965).
For instance, those participating in dancing For instance, Rude (1964) argues rising food
manias were believed to be victims of devil pos- prices and worsening conditions threatening min-
session and people in lynch mobs were argued to imum human survival motivated France’s revolu-
be driven by religious fanaticism. These assump- tionary crowds.
tions lie beyond the limits of our knowledge;
thus, this speculation is often a better reflection
of the theorist than the phenomena which being 25.3.3 Emergent Norms
studied. However, there are benefits to breaking
down types of emergent crowd behavior; we can Ralph H. Turner and Lewis Killian, both students
think of the differentiation as analogous to differ- of Herbert Blumer, posited the emergent norm
ent types of individual behavior. Cognitively, we theory of collective behavior. This interactionist
can see this as sometimes acting out of the highly approach diverged from the early work of LeBon,
reflexive cerebral cortex, other times the emo- Park, and Blumer by rejecting the “illusion of
tional amygdala, and other times the fight, flight, unanimity” premise. In contrast, Turner and
or freeze of the brain stem. Killian believed that crowds were composed of
Miller and Dollard (1941) developed the individuals with varying motives, emotions, and
deprivation thesis through the use of learning behaviors. Wherein day-to-day life is governed
theory which views behaviors as a result of by routine social norms, Turner and Kilian
learned tendencies in response to rewards. An described collective behavior as “extraordinary
inability to attain rewards through behaviors social behavior” which operates outside of habit-
which have previously been successful creates a ual norms and is the product of a negotiated
sense of frustration. This eventually leads to emergent norm particular to that situation in time
action in order to remove what is perceived as the and space. In these moments, an opening emerges
blockade when previous behavior-reward path- where actors within the situation have greater
ways become problematic. Thus, they argued that ability to shape the attitudes of others.
aggressive action always indicates the existence Crowds and gatherings emerge in response to
of prior frustration and collective behavior a condition or event that generates extraordinary
emerges as a solution to overcome circumstances. These circumstances may emerge
reward-barriers. from the physical world, such as tsunamis, earth-
Ted Gurr (1970) built on the deprivation thesis quakes, and wildfires, or from chemical spills or
by arguing that relative deprivation emerges with nuclear accidents. Events may also emerge from
an actor’s perception of the discrepancy between social problems in the normative order, social
what one deserves and what one is capable of structure, or communication channels. For
attaining and keeping. A point of reference may instance, sudden repression and censorship may
come from history, an abstract ideal, a leader’s motivate collective behavior. Alternatively, in
vision, or a comparison group. The relative depri- conditions that were previously repressive, new
vation thesis was largely used to explain urban opportunities for free speech and assembly may
riots of the 1960s and 1970s. Arguments were also facilitate gatherings. Across situations, peo-
made about perceived injustice, anger, and frus- ple utilize existing channels of communication to
tration because of the rioters’ position in society. exchange rumor in response to the changing
532 J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effler
conditions; the growing literature on social net- and shared symbols may also facilitate or inhibit
works has broadened our understanding and collective behavior. While still a theoretically
increased our ability to predict and explain these and empirically underdeveloped insight, more
mechanisms and processes (e.g., Beyerlein and recently, ecology is central to Zhao’s (1998)
Hipp 2006; Beyerlein and Sikkink 2008; Gould research on the 1989 Beijing student movement.
1991; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Snow et al. He argues the university campuses had a unique
1980). spatial distribution with high density of students
Unlike previous conceptions of rumor, Turner in small areas which nurtured close knit student
and Killian did not assume that rumor was the networks. The layout of the dorms facilitated
perpetuation of inaccurate information. Rather, quick transmission of dissident ideas, created
in alignment with the symbolic interactionist predictable patterns of interactions, and made
perspective, it was a form of communication to communication between campuses easy. The
construct a definition of the problematic situa- campus density also directly exposed students to
tion in order to guide future lines of action. This a collective action environment once crowds
information could be spread through face-to-face formed, thus facilitating recruitment. Since the
interactions or various forms of mass media. It campuses were surrounded by a brick wall, stu-
may also precede or emerge concomitantly with dents were afforded protection from social con-
convergence in a common location. Rumor tends trol agents, creating a low-risk mobilization
to develop in reaction to the exciting event. In environment.
different degrees, actors provide suggestions for Exposure to emotionally powerful cultural
what has happened, what is happening, and what symbols can also facilitate the rumor and milling
should happen next. Others may be concerned process as people seek to construct a definition of
with leadership and who is going to act first. the situation. For example, in 2009, when anti-
After an exciting event and the rumoring and abortion activists protested President Barack
milling process, a common mood and imagery Obama’s commencement speech by flying a
emerges as the new definition of the situation plane with a banner in tow of an aborted fetus
and lines of action develop (Turner and Killian over the University of Notre Dame, they were
1987: 4). inciting a rumor and milling process. It was an
Questions of motivation lead Turner and attempt to make salient the supposed conflict in
Killian to posit five roles in collective behavior values between President Obama’s pro-choice
situations. The first were “ego-involved” who stance and the Catholic Church’s anti-choice
tended to have direct relationships to the extraor- position. Other examples may be more reactive
dinary event. “Concerned” participants were situations where culturally powerful symbols are
those with personal relationships but a lesser introduced less consciously into situations where
degree of involvement. “Insecure” persons they are not expected. That is, crowds may
sought out crowds for the direct satisfaction of emerge in reaction to a cultural symbol which
participation and security that stems from the may have conflicting meanings or has been inte-
emergence of definitions that make sense of grated into a situation where it is deemed
extraordinary conditions. “Spectators” can also inappropriate.
be found, motivated by curiosity and intrigue.
Lastly, “exploiters” are present to capitalize on
the concentration of people in a common location 25.3.4 Life Course
for self-interested gains. Breaking down crowds
into types is generally a useful theoretical move. Clark McPhail contends that too often scholars
In addition to arguing for a variation in conflate the study of crowds with the study of
motives and emerging norms in crowd situations, collective behavior (McPhail 1991; McPhail and
Turner and Killian’s second edition of Collective Miller 1973). This leads to an overemphasis on
Behavior (1972) argues ecology, social control, theories being developed about what happens
25 Reimagining Collective Behavior 533
when a large group of people are already congre- ment downplaying an organizational role because
gated. He argues that not only does an emphasis of the “odd cultural belief” that spontaneous
on the crowd narrow the range of sociological crowds are more legitimate than calculated and
phenomena within the study of collective behav- organized crowd events. Some of these organiza-
ior, but the notion of crowds implies homogene- tional decisions may be choosing the time and
ity of motivations and behaviors. To counter, place and even planning for social control mea-
McPhail (1991) draws from Goffman (1963), sures to prevent “true” spontaneous crowd
suggesting collective behavior be studied in a formation.
life-course perspective with an analytic focus on Spontaneity has also returned to the study of
gatherings. collective behavior and social movements. An
When two or more people come together, a insight present in Turner and Killian’s Collective
gathering is created which creates the opportu- Behavior (1987), Snow and Moss (2014) revisit
nity for collective behavior, though it does not the concept and posit conditions when spontane-
guarantee it (Goffman 1963; McPhail 1991). ity becomes likely to emerge and consequential
Gatherings tend to be temporary and undergo to organization and collective action outcomes.
three stages: the assembling process, the assem- They argue nonhierarchical movements encour-
bled gathering, and the dispersal process. The age openness, innovation, and experimental
assembling process refers to the forces which forms of collective action. These dynamics
bring groups of people together, such as exciting increase the likelihood for unplanned action and
events. The assembled gathering is the moment spontaneity. They also argue that behavioral and
when people are in a similar space and time with emotional priming creates sensitivity to stimuli
the potential for collective action.1 Dispersals are prior to experiences and increases the probability
often unproblematic though they can also take of directing future emotions and lines of actions.
the form of emergency dispersals, such as exiting Priming becomes particularly influential during
a burning building, or through coercion, as when moments of ambiguity and situational break-
the police intervene. By differentiating the vari- down. Finally, they too argue spontaneity is influ-
ous stages of collective behavior, theories can be enced by the ecological arrangements in
developed with greater specificity and not mis- situations. Not only can ecology facilitate crowd
step by creating too general of arguments. Similar formation and mobilization, but it also may
to Turner and Killian’s move to differentiate roles increase the likelihood of unplanned action and
within collective behavior situations, differenti- confrontation from social control agents and
ating stages in time is also a useful move. exacerbate effects of ambiguity and priming.
Oliver (1989) argues that prior to assembling McPhail and Miller (1973) differentiate the
processes there are often “occasions” where assembling process between periodic assembly
actors engage in calculation and planning. During and non-periodic assembly. Periodic assemblies
occasions, people communicate and signal to one tend to have recurring participants who establish
another their intentions to act or not under future schedules to converge at the same time-space
conditions. Feelings of injustice and indignation locations. For instance, churches, which have
motivate future action and future successes build services at the same time and place every week,
a sense of efficacy in collective action. Through or classes, which announce their schedules
occasions, tactics become loosely structured and semesters at a time. Non-periodic assemblies sel-
are open to modification when they are deployed dom have completely sustained membership
in collective action situations. Oliver also argues across events and often have differing motivating
that behind some crowd events is a social move- forces. Communication channels can also lead to
differing assembly processes and can be distin-
1 guished between short range communication
For a complete discussion on how to systematically
record data during collective gatherings see The Collective (e.g., face-to-face interaction) and long range
Action Observation Primer (McPhail et al. 1997). communication (e.g., social media). Nearness to
534 J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effler
events, such as a fire or a protest, may explain of coercion to suppress resistance, he says it
variation in who enters into non-periodic assem- allows insight into various strategies used by the
blies. Thus, for non-routine gatherings, theories state. Of the 14 forms of repression measured, all
about ecology, population density, communica- forms of repression increased collective action
tion, and afforded interactions, can be theorized except for one: home searches. This implies that
in distinctly different ways than those that are generally repression reinforces resistance regard-
more deeply rooted in personal and institutional less of costs (also see: De Nardo 1985; McAdam
histories. Non-routine dispersals, such as those [1982] 1999). However, this also suggests that
coerced by social control agents, also focus on repression at the group or crowd level (e.g., cur-
similar intervening variables. fews) may create mixed results compared to
repression at the individual level (e.g., invading a
family’s home).
25.3.5 Repression In addition to motivating increased resistance,
Khawaja argues repression can also strengthen
Research on the effects of social control on col- collective identity, provide a sense of belonging
lective behavior has produced mixed and even to a group, and can operate as a symbolic
contradictory findings. Rational choice explana- reminder of a group’s shared circumstances vis-
tions argue that repression depresses resistance à-vis authorities. Perhaps one of Khawaja’s most
because it increases the costs of participation interesting, yet arguably under-theorized, find-
(e.g., Opp and Roehl 1990; Snyder and Tilly ings is the notion that during acts of repression,
1972; Tilly 1978), while others argue the oppo- authorities are likely to violate moral standards
site claiming repression increases mobilization which may further draw in bystanders who were
(Khwaja 1993; Rasler 1996). Gurr (1970) argues previously unengaged. This insight can be inte-
the greatest magnitude of violence and resistance grated with Thomas Scheff’s theory shame/rage
emerges at medium levels of repression. Some spirals (1990). Scheff argues for a dynamic
argue for a various non-linear relationship understanding of shame and anger which can rise
between repression and resistance (De Nardo both between interactants and within actors,
1985; Muller and Weede 1990). manifesting as explosive outbursts or enduring
Zimmermann (1980) claims there to be argu- tones, and may operate at varying levels along
ments for all conceivable relationships between the micro-macro continuum. Enduring tones of
repression and mobilization, except for the claim shame and rage can give way to outbursts through
that there is no relationship. Indeed, this seems to group conflict. A historical and cultural analysis
be the case. Koopmans (1997) states this dis- of the group’s histories, with a particular atten-
agreement exists because of poor methodology, tion to emotions of shame and rage, can help
data, and theory. Most models use static, cross- explain reactions to particular triggers of
sectional data, despite the fact that repression is conflict.
dynamic (see Maher 2010) and varies across situ- Koopmans (1997) finds a lack of consistency
ations and time. Snyder (1976) has similarly cri- by repressive forces may also generate moral
tiqued the field for a lack of differentiation outrage among public sympathizers; that is, toler-
between forms and timing of coercion. ating a protest tactic 1 day and then repressing it
Despite the mixed findings, the field is ripe the next is likely to anger and motivate participa-
with case studies that afford potential for innova- tion. From violation of consistency, repression
tion. One such article is Khwaja (1993) response comes to “embod[y] the very message that [pro-
to Snyder’s critique. He uses data from the testors] seek to convey…a repressive political
Palestinian West Bank from 1976 to 1985 to system that is in need of revolutionary change”
address both shifts in form and level of repres- (Koopmans 1995: 32). Differentiating between
sion and the effects on collective action. Because institutional repression (e.g., bans, trials, raids)
the Israeli military uses various countermeasures and situational repression (e.g., tear gas, arrests),
25 Reimagining Collective Behavior 535
he finds situational repression escalating tensions ing social cohesion. Consequently, these strains
while institutional repression comparatively less- in the sociopolitical order incite frustration which
ening levels of protests. In Smith’s (1996) motivates collective action. To a fault, this
research with the Central America Peace approach perpetuates the assumption that society
Movement, the government used institutional can actually achieve a harmonious, perfectly
repression by relabeling Nicargua as a high-risk integrated and regulated state. Like strain theory,
destination, consequently making travel difficult, it has not fared well to empirical tests. Tilly et al.
while also requiring burdensome tax audits, tap- (1975) found little support for the breakdown
ping protestors phones, and going to great lengths thesis. Rather, they found it was new forms of
to intimidate and discredit protestors, sympa- organization, with new bonds of solidarity, which
thetic journalists, and academics. He finds vary- incited collective action. Thus, they posited the
ing effects on mobilization from discouragement, “solidaristic” approach as opposed to supporting
ineffectiveness, and even re-motivating protes- breakdown theories. Broadly conceived, these
tors. Generally, he argues when repression gener- theories can be viewed as push and pull theories
ates fear activism tends to be lessened; feelings of collective action whereas breakdown pushes
of anger, however, tended to increase commit- and solidarity pulls. One of the main tenets in the
ment and investment. With a similar attention to “push” hypothesis from strain theory which
perception and emotions, Maher (2010) finds that social movement research has rejected is the
in highly repressive environments, collective notion that collective behavior is incited by
action may emerge when the absence of group socially isolated actors. In fact, one of the most
action is perceived as posing a greater threat than well supported findings in the study of social
the potential response to resistance. movements confirms that participants are often
embedded in social networks and organizations
which draw one into participation (Gould 1991,
25.3.6 Structure 1993; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Snow et al.
1980).
Three main macro concepts have received the Useem’s (1985) research on the 1980 New
most theoretical attention and development: Mexico prison riots suggests that breakdown pro-
strain, breakdown, and, quotidian-disruption. cesses can contribute to at least some instances of
Neil Smelser, a student of Talcott Parsons, argues collective action. The brutal prison riots were a
that collective behavior emerges in response to product of the termination of inmate programs,
“strain” in the social structure (Smelser 1962). crowding, idleness, poor administration, and bad
This strain emerges when environmental condi- living conditions. Over the course of 5 years, liv-
tions create impairments in the structural rela- ing conditions in the prison gradually worsened.
tions among components of society. As structure This incited feelings of deprivation and frustra-
breaks down, actors begin to feel tension and a tion which eventually amounted into a bloody
feeling of uncertainty. In a post-hoc explanation, prison riot. Useem’s findings challenge both the
Smelser argues that the nature of collective action Tilly’s (1975) solidaristic model and social
is proof of the existence of structural strain. movement theory’s resource mobilization thesis.
While some advocated for the merit of strain Collective action did not arise because of an
theory (Marx and Wood 1975), the Tilly’s (1975) increase in solidarity amongst inmates nor the
supplanted the strain metaphor with a distinction infusion of new resources – quite the opposite, in
between “breakdown” and “solidaristic” theories fact. The processes of disorganization and the
of collective action. The central tenet of break- fragmenting of bonds among inmates contributed
down theories is that underlying all forms of col- to the weak and chaotic leadership structures.
lective action is rapid social change and Even though inmates were in prison, prisoners
disintegration. Crises weaken the regulative and set standards by which how much deprivation
integrative functions in society, thereby threaten- can be tolerated. It was the violation of these
536 J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effler
standards that created the frustration which on rationality is also present in much social
fueled the response. movement research, particularly within the ratio-
Another perspective focuses on the routine in nalist and resource mobilization tradition
day-to-day life. Snow et al. (1998) utilize cogni- (Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McCarthy and
tive psychology’s prospect theory to argue the Zald 1977; Walsh and Warland 1983). Many the-
key relationship between breakdown and collec- orists who have made this move continue to per-
tive action emergence resides in the “quotidian” petuate the false dichotomy between emotionality
and its actual or threatened disruption. Prospect and rationality. As we explain in the next section
theory argues that actors will be more likely of this chapter, this contrast is no longer empiri-
endure risk in order to protect what they already cally supportable. Thus, theorizing which
have rather than take on the same level of risk in assumes that action driven through emotions is
order to gain something new. Thus, when one’s reflective of a “cognitive deficiency” is inher-
everyday life – their quotidian – is disrupted, ently problematic.
actors are more likely to respond in order to In addition to research challenging the “irra-
restore life conditions than they are to attempt to tionality” of actors, the myth of the anonymous
improve them. Quotidian’s can become disrupted and violent crowd has also been critiqued with
by: (1) an increase in claimants or demand for much greater success. Despite popular concep-
resources, yet no change in resource availability; tions, crowds are not typically violent (Collins
(2) a decrease in available resources but constant 2009; Eisinger 1973; McPhail 1994). Violence is
claimants and demand; (3) crises which disrupt often carried out by small groups within a crowd
or threaten a community’s daily routines; (4) or by state authorities (Couch 1968; Marx and
actual or threatened intrusions on privacy and McAdam 1994; Stott and Reicher 1998). Collins
safety. The quotidian-disruption approach (2009) provides a thorough account of processes
appears most useful as it gives attention to indi- and pathways creating violent situations. By all
vidual perception, resource disparities, popula- measures, violence is a rare phenomenon and it is
tion pressures, and other structural phenomena a more useful theoretical move to consider the
which may threaten the true or perceived condi- conditions when situations become violent,
tions in one’s daily life. It also demonstrates how rather than emphasizing violent individuals.
the politically rich get richer and other forms of Collins argues violent situations create an emo-
inequality become exacerbated in addition to tional field of tension and fear. Within these
why resistance does not emerge despite condi- fields, actual violence happens when one side of
tions which one would expect to motivate action the confrontation turns emotional tension into
(see Della Fave 1980). emotional energy, becomes more attuned to the
situation’s audience in order to assert dominance,
or when one side has a fracture in solidarity and
25.3.7 Testing the Myths shows weakness.
The evolving histories of collective behavior
Some empirical research claims to have dispelled theories suggests not that some are completely
many of the early collective behavior “myths” wrong and others are right, but that it would
(see McPhail 1991). Disaster research, for behoove us to understand how and when differ-
instance, has argued that even in moments of cri- ent causes and conditions create variation in out-
sis, people in crowds do not suffer from irratio- comes. Certainly, the history of collective
nality or cognitive deficiencies (Bryan 1982; behavior has provided important pieces of the
Cantor 1980; Johnston and Johnson 1989). For puzzle. The most pressing work is finding a com-
example, Tierney (2002) describes the emer- mon foundation and putting them all together. In
gency evacuations in the World Trade Center on the next section, we work towards this endeavor
September 11th, 2001 as prosocial, orderly, and by drawing from interdisciplinary cognitive
“with a virtual absence of panic”. This emphasis social science to begin to salvage theories which
25 Reimagining Collective Behavior 537
were prematurely dismissed in order to recover and Moss 2014; Van Dyke and Soule 2002).
some of our puzzle pieces. Recent research returning to the first movement
reveals that the early theorists had more right
than what the rationalist turn gave credit for.
25.4 Collective Behavior Theory
Redux
25.4.1 Dual Process
Thus far, we have covered the first two move-
ments within the field of collective behavior. The Research in cognitive science, neuropsychology,
first movement focused on theories of how indi- and social psychology have uncovered that
viduals are changed by a result of their participa- humans possess two memory systems which has
tion in crowds, as well as the nature, causes, and been developed under the “dual process frame-
consequences of collective behavior. The second work” (Brewer 1988; Gawronksi and
movement was marked by the emergence of the Bodenhausen 2006; Haidt 2001; Smith and
social movement field (see Chap. 26) and coin- DeCoster 2000). Within the dual process frame-
ciding rationalist turn in collective behavior work, there are dual process models which
(McPhail 1991; McPhail and Miller 1973; describe the implications for the enculturation
McPhail et al. 1997). The rationalist turn quickly process, culture in thinking, storage, and culture
became the dominant approach to collective in action (see Lizardo et al. unpublished). Of the
behavior and often scholars continue to set up varying models, those focused on culture in stor-
their contributions in reaction to the theories of age and action differentiate between schematic,
LeBon, Blumer, and Turner and Killian. associative memory processes and symbolically-
If one were to ignore developments outside of mediated, rule-based processes (see Kahneman
sociology, or work from the more recent emo- 2011; Smith and DeCoster 2000). Research in
tions turn within sociology, one would likely be this area has uncovered how and under what con-
content with where the field of collective behav- ditions actors tend to use one type of memory
ior and social movements is currently positioned over another. Both memory systems influence
vis-à-vis the early theories. However, when one perception, judgments, affective states, and lines
looks outside of sociology and into the interdisci- of action in distinct ways (e.g., Hunzaker 2014;
plinary field of cognitive social science, as many Lizardo and Strand 2010; Vaisey 2009).
in the emotions turn tend to do (Collins 2001; Schematic memory records information
Gould 2009; Jasper 2011; Summers-Effler 2010), through a slow, incremental patterning of experi-
one would likely be surprised by recent finding’s ences which develop into general, stable expecta-
resemblance to early collective behavior tions. Once created, schemas help “fill in”
theories. missing information pre-consciously in day-to-
In this section, we draw from recent advance- day life by automatically relating the current situ-
ments in interdisciplinary field of cognitive social ation to expected information and affective
science to discuss the implications for collective reactions from similar situation’s in one’s history
behavior theory with a specific focus on how (Strauss and Quinn 1997). When situations are
emotions and cognitions influence and are influ- predictable and stable, actions tend to flow auto-
enced by collective behavior. Specifically, we matically (Strack and Deustch 2004). Fast-
utilize research on dual process models, mirror binding, symbolically-mediated “rule-based”
neurons, and embodied cognition to re-center the processes encode episodic experiences and con-
body and to revisit theories of emotionality, cog- texts. This system constructs new representations
nition, and action. In so doing, we contribute to which bind together disparate information from
the revitalization of collective behavior now an immediate context and can often be con-
emerging with, what we believe, is the third structed, directed, and controlled strategically by
movement within collective behavior (e.g., Snow others within the situation (Smith and DeCoster
538 J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effler
2000: 112). Fast learning systems particularly Blumer of “susceptibility to rumor,” their con-
attend to details of events which are novel and cepts emphasize where an actor’s attention lies
interesting, with a specific focus on the unex- and the potential the situation affords.
pected and unpredicted. That is, one is more Susceptibility to rumors can be understood as
likely to encode and act through rule-based pro- susceptibility to prioritizing emerging under-
cesses in atypical moments as opposed to relying standings over historical ones because they are
on deeply engrained schemas and habits. utilizing symbolically mediated rule-based pro-
Understanding that conditions influence which cessing instead of schematic associations. One
type of cognitive processes drive action reveals does not have increased suggestibility because
why some theorists see situations of radical they are a “dope,” but rather because in unex-
moments full of creativity while others see situa- pected situations actors hone their attention
tions of “rationality,” stability, and habit. towards processes in the immediate present and
LeBon, Park, and Blumer all centered their are more open for the construction of novel lines
analyses within conditions of social unrest. of action.
Turner and Killian described collective behavior LeBon’s fixation with the unequal influence of
as being precipitated by an “exciting event” and leaders during “suggestible” situations can be
“extraordinary circumstances”. All agreed these understood as an actor’s ability to influence the
were atypical moments which afforded potential emerging definition of the situation and lines of
for creativity and significant change. Specifying action. Inequality of attention within situations is
the context for the behavior being theorized is not a contested notion; the unequal distribution
important because humans utilize differing mem- of attention and emotional resources is a struc-
ory systems depending upon the novelty, stabil- tural property of situations, not a property of
ity, or predictability of a situation (also see individuals (Collins 2004). Thus, when certain
Harvey 2010). Thus, to understand variation in situational conditions encourage rule-based pro-
lines of action, we must make the microsocio- cessing, there is an increased opportunity for the
logical move towards the situation (Collins 2004, transmission of emergent meanings and lines of
2009; Goffman 1974). By doing this, the analyst action which may be influenced in unequal ways
observes how the situation evokes varying emo- dependent upon the distribution of attention
tions, motives, and actions rather than presuming within the situation.
that individuals are constant across situations. It Turner and Killian’s theory of emergent norms
is problematic to assume that theories of action in has also found its support from the dual process
abnormal situations can be “disproven” by devel- framework. In situations where emergent mean-
oping theories in mundane situations because ings are in tension with one’s historical under-
variation in the situation evokes variation in cog- standing, conformity towards the emergent
nitive and emotive processes. develops through the perception of situational
Here we discover the importance of specify- group consensus (Smolensky 1988). When lines
ing situational conditions. Atypical situations are of action are articulated through explicit, con-
likely to shift one out of associative, schematic scious thought, actors are more likely to assume
processing and into rule-based symbolically- proposals are valid (Mackie and Skelly 1994).
mediated processing and action (Smith and Once perceived as valid, actors are more likely to
DeCoster 2000). Conditions of social unrest attribute emergent meanings as objectively true
evoke cognitive and emotive processes qualita- and become less likely to assume they are an arti-
tively different than those evoked during com- fact of possible interpretive errors or misrepre-
paratively stable conditions. Such situational sentations (Smith and DeCoster 2000: 112). The
conditions afford opportunities for the creative notion that actors may align themselves to emer-
development of lines of action not afforded in gent meanings, despite the possibility that they
comparatively stable, predictable situations. may be in conflict with one’s historic understand-
Thus, when LeBon spoke of “suggestibility” and ings, aligns with Turner and Killian’s suggestion
25 Reimagining Collective Behavior 539
that norms may emerge within situations and bodily and emotional states in the perceiver, cre-
align actions even though co-present actors may ating a “resonance” which “is the functional out-
hold varying motives and dispositions. Such an come of attunement that allows us to feel what is
attention to situational conditions, and the corre- felt by another person” (Siegel 2007: 166).
sponding perceptual, emotive, and cognitive Co-presence initiates this attunement as mirror
effects, also reveals the power of a skilled frame neurons are particularly receptive to face-to-face
articulator and a successful frame alignment pro- interactions, responding to even the most micro
cess; alignment processes are more complex and of gestures such as facial expressions (Christakis
situationally contingent than simply broadening, and Fowler 2009; Iacoboni 2008), in addition to
bridging, or transforming symbolically-mediated other synchronization processes which respond
meanings – an insight underdeveloped within the to body posturing (Bernieri et al. 1988) and voice
extensive framing literature (see Snow et al. tones (Hatfield et al. 1995). Importantly, mirror
2014). neuron activation does not require explicit, delib-
erate recognition of the information being simu-
lated; rather, it is an “effortless, automatic, and
25.4.2 Contagion unconscious inner mirroring” (Iacoboni 2008:
120).
Many early collective behavior theorists Research within the dual process framework
described processes of conformity. LeBon also finds that moods can influence the types of
described a “mental unity,” both Park and Blumer memory systems driving action. Actors are more
spoke of a “circular reaction,” and Allport empha- likely to rely on schematic processes during posi-
sized “social facilitation”. While Allport might tive moods, while negative moods tend to
disagree with how LeBon, Park, and Blumer increase a reliance on emergent meanings (Smith
chose to emphasize the circular nature to conta- and Decoster 2000: 117). Aligning this insight
gion, even Allport argued that co-presence facili- with mirror neuron research, we know that emo-
tates the activation of inner impulses. These tions can spread contagiously, often in pre-
insights can broadly be referred to as contagion. conscious ways when co-present. The tone of the
Contagion is the process where members imitate emotions being spread influences whether greater
the emotions, action states, and behaviors of oth- weight is placed on the present situation or on
ers. Interestingly enough, and perhaps to the sur- historical meanings. When co-presence facili-
prise of many, neuropsychology has decades of tates the contagion of negative emotions, actors
research supporting contagion theories (Gallese are more likely to rely on symbolically-mediated
and Sinigaglia 2011; Hatfield et al. 1994, 2009; rule based processing, just as they are when
Knoblich and Flach 2003; Rizzolatti and embedded within novel situations. In addition to
Sinigaglia 2007). Indeed, actors do influence the the interactional contagion of negative moods, an
emotions and readiness for action in other indi- inability to rely on historical dispositions may
viduals in pre-conscious ways (for a list of conta- also give rise to a sense of frustration. This insight
gion mechanisms, see Hatfield et al. 2009). is shared with the pragmatists who suggest that
One major mechanism facilitating contagion engaging in an unpredictable and novel situation
is through the activation of mirror neurons. may force attention towards the immediate pres-
Research has found that human brains are bio- ent because of the inability to rely on historical
logically wired to be social. Mirror neurons link understandings (Dewey 1922; James 1890
perception and motor action directly, affording [2007]; Mead 1934). Contagion research sup-
the potential for perceived sights and sounds to ports the insights of the early theorists who
activate embodied simulation (Gallese and believed there to be emergent processes which
Sinigaglia 2011; Iacoboni 2008; Rizzolatti and arise when groups of people come together in
Sinigaglia 2007). This simulation alters the time and space.
540 J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effler
25.4.3 Rationality and Emotionality potential for revisiting and rebuilding emotional
dynamics in collective behavior.
Finally, the fallacy that emotionality and rational-
ity are at odds has long been dispelled – though
this belief unfortunately continues to linger in 25.5 Future Directions
Sociology. Frequently, sociologists perpetuate
this misconception because of the false assump- In this section, we focus primarily on three areas
tion that individual reflexive thought is the seat of where we believe collective behavior theory can
all rationality. As discussed, reflexive thought is develop. First, we emphasize a methodological
only a portion of cognition and much which approach which re-centers the body. Second, we
drives action happens through pre-conscious believe questions of time and space should be
habitual associations linking situations to revisited with the methodological approach
expected cognitions and affective states. When advocated, particularly with an attention towards
emotions are accounted for, they’re often associ- emotional dynamics. Finally, we argue that ques-
ated with intuition, as if emotions do not influ- tions of motivation, which are rising to the sur-
ence both reflexive reasoning and intuition (Haidt face in recent theories of collective action, should
2001). Turning this misconception on its head, be developed with an awareness of cognitive
research in neuroscience suggests rational think- social science’s contributions.
ing requires emotional attunement (Damasio
1994). The human amygdala, for instance, has
been found to link emotional cues to other cogni- 25.5.1 Re-centering the Body
tive systems underlying cognition and action (see
Phelps 2006; Whalen 1998). In fact, when the The eclectic nature of collective behavior is
prefrontal lobe becomes separated from the sub- reflected in the diversity of methods scholars
cortical emotion stem, individuals have a diffi- have employed. Despite wide variation and the
cult time making decisions and often engage in creative combination of multiple approaches
actions which one may classify as irrational (e.g., Collins 2009), detailed ethnographic
(Damasio 2003). Again, this demonstrates that accounts of collective behavior are in short sup-
emotionality is a requisite for rational thinking. ply. With some exceptions, much of what is clas-
Early collective behavior theory was well sified as ethnographic research is simply a form
attuned to emotional dynamics in group situa- of interviewing in naturalistic contexts. This cre-
tions. Granted, many of these theorists relied on ates a tendency to privilege discourse over emo-
the perception of emotionality as an indication of tive processes and habitual behaviors which may
a group’s irrationality. Despite this, it is surpris- fall outside of discursive awareness (see
ing that it took decades for the study of emotions Summers-Effler et al. 2015). It also makes theo-
to return to theories of collective behavior (Jasper rizing processes of time and space more difficult
2011). The decades-long extraction of all emo- when the researcher’s data is limited by the cog-
tional dynamics from theories of collective nitive constraints of the interviewee (see
behavior and social movements actually perpetu- Baddeley 1986).
ated this antagonism between emotionality and A particularly fruitful method which may help
rationality rather than challenge and critique such address this bias in data collection comes from
an assumption. Fortunately, those who treat emo- Summers-Effler’s (2010) comparative ethnogra-
tions seriously have begun to rebuild theories of phy. Her multisensory approach utilizes the Self
collective action and a growing body of literature as a form of social propioception in order to
has emerged (e.g., Collins 2009; Goodwin et al. account for how one’s social position and the role
2001; Gould 2009; Summers-Effler 2002, 2010; of the body, timing, and emotions influence pro-
Turner and Stets 2005). Among other salvageable cesses of social organization (see Summers-
components of early theories, there is still great Effler 2010: 203–212). This approach affords
25 Reimagining Collective Behavior 541
researchers the potential to purposefully align should situate themselves within collective
oneself in relational fields so as to take up vary- behavior situations and record how material and
ing positions in order to develop a multidimen- social conditions constrain or encourage particu-
sional theory. It also encourages reflexivity of lar meanings, emotions, and actions. In this
one’s research role in relation to the phenomena respect, J.J. Gibson’s (1979) theory of affor-
being explained which helps reveal why some dances becomes particularly useful and can be
scholars distant from the field tend towards view- integrated with the pragmatists emphasis on his-
ing action as rooted in more rational motivations tory in order to understand how and when history
while those more embedded tend to see the emo- enables or constrains moments of change (Dewey
tional and cultural motivations. Ethnographers 1922; James 1912; Mead 1934). Situations afford
who adopt an active research role have produced particular emotions, meanings, and interactions
compelling ethnographic research (e.g., Desmond which may become constrained or enabled by
2007; Pagis 2009; Tavory 2009; Wacquant 2004) perceptual and material conditions. An embed-
and Summers-Effler’s approach lends itself well ded analyst can purposefully problematize com-
for creative theorizing of collective behavior. ponents of situations in order to theorize variation
in affordances (e.g., McDonnell 2016). This may
include an attention towards potential cultural,
25.5.2 Space and Time political, and emotional meanings of places (e.g.,
Fuss 2004; Gieryn 2000, 2002; Mukerji 1994),
By re-centering the body, dynamics of space and ecological conditions facilitating or inhibiting
time can be more directly and creatively theo- group formation (e.g., Haffner 2013; Lefebvre
rized. Indeed, spatial and temporal dynamics are 1991; Scott 1998; Zhao 1998), or the way mate-
often implicit and, in some cases, explicit, in both rial conditions interact with an actor’s perceptual
early and contemporary collect behavior theo- capabilities (e.g., Griswold et al. 2013; Klett
ries. At its core, collective behavior developed as 2014; McDonnell 2010).
a way to make sense of radical change. Thus,
when an analyst seeks to make sense of how
change evolves through space and time, she finds 25.5.3 Motivation
herself in the realm of rhythmanalysis (Lefebvre
2014 [2004]). Such theorizing fits well with Finally, in light of recent advancements in cogni-
Summers-Effler’s approach to ethnography, as tive science and the study of emotions, questions
Lefebvre states “the theory of rhythms is founded of motivation and theories of action are rising to
on the experience and knowledge of the body… the surface in studies of social movements and
the rhythmnanalyst calls on all of his [sic] senses” collective behavior (Jasper 2010). More often
(Lefebvre 2014 [2004]: 31). With the Self as a than not, scholars leave implicit their assump-
resource, rhythm becomes a tool for analysis tions about human motivation or they simply fall
rather than simply an object of study. As a novel back on utilitarian rational-choice assumptions.
way of seeing, the analyst unveils that which It is important to realize that the rationalist
rhythms make apparent and that which they con- approach is an assumption of motivation – but it
ceal. For instance, one may make perceptible pat- is not the only perspective. Future research can
terns of stability and change by varying temporal intentionally cycle through alternative theories of
constraints or positions of perception. By doing motivation to uncover novel insights. For
so, analysts will reveal how collective action instance, one could substitute utilitarian
leaves imprints on the social, cultural, and politi- approaches for assumptions of self-consistency
cal fabric of an era. (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1992), solidarity
To aid future research, the microsociological (Durkheim 1912), or self-expansion (Summers-
unit of analysis – situations – is due resurgence in Effler 2004). Creativity will emerge as theorists
the field of collective behavior. Researchers combat seemingly incompatible findings by
542 J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effler
engaging in theoretical and methodological inno- Amenta, E., Caren, N., Olasky, S. J., & Stobaugh, J. E.
(2009). All the movements fit to print: Who, what,
vations (Summers-Effler 2007).
when, where, and why SMO families appeared in the
“New York Times” in the twentieth century. American
Sociological Review, 74(4), 636–656.
25.6 Conclusion Andrews, K. T., & Caren, N. (2010). Making the news:
Movement organizations, media attention, and the
public agenda. American Sociological Review, 75(6),
In this chapter, we revisited and reimagined early 841–866.
collective behavior theories through the lens of Baddeley, A. (1986). Working memory. New York: Oxford
recent cognitive social science. We began by University Press.
Bernieri, F. J., Reznick, J. S., & Rosenthal, R. (1988).
illustrating the wide variation in how scholars
Synchrony, psuedosynchrony, and dissynchrony:
conceptualize collective behavior and then we Measuring the entrainment process in mother-infant
focused on the major theoretical contributions to interactions. Journal of Personality and Social
the field. Following, we revisited major theories Psychology, 54, 243–253.
Beyerlein, K., & Hipp, J. R. (2006). A two-stage model
with a renewed understanding of emotion and
for a two-stage process: How biographical availability
cognition. We then suggested areas where the matters for social movement mobilization.
future of collective behavior can continue to Mobilization, 11(3), 219–240.
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ity: Why Americans volunteered for 9/11 relief efforts.
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Theorizing Social Movements
26
Dana M. Moss and David A. Snow
and tactics. Because social movements challenge (Katzenstein 1990; Kucinskas 2014). In addition,
powerholders on unequal terms, a guiding con- as we discuss further below, movements may also
cern driving theories of mobilization is how launch challenges by exiting from institutions
movements lacking the authority, legitimacy, and by withdrawing from society more generally
capacity, and the means of social control pos- (Hirschman 1970; see Snow and Soule 2010).
sessed by states come into being, sustain their Whether movements are conceptualized as
campaigns, and sometimes win in spite of their being opposed to states or to other kinds of
systemic disadvantages. authorities, both views are mutually conducive to
Social movements are not only those collec- understanding the course and character of move-
tivities seeking to challenge, reform, or replace ments and their outcomes. As such, we define
state authorities, however. Instead, they may also social movements broadly as collectivities that
be conceived more broadly as collective chal- seek to challenge or defend institutional and/or
lenges to systems or structures of authority writ cultural systems of authority and their associated
large (Snow 2004b). An authority is any center of practices and representatives in order to account
decision-making, regulation, or procedure that for the fact that social movements take a range of
influences the lives of individuals and social forms, employ a variety of more- or less-
groups. This perspective recognizes that the rel- transgressive tactics, may last for a matter of days
evance and targets of social movements extend or decades, and may be embedded in the social
beyond the state to other types of institutions, structures they seek to challenge to varying
systems of beliefs, socio-cultural practices, iden- degrees, such as state institutions. They can also
tities, and social groups. Collective actors may, arise in opposition to other movements and col-
for example, call the values, beliefs, and interpre- lectivities, elites, and objects that are perceived as
tations that undergird and legitimate social struc- representing unwanted systems of authority, such
tures into question and aim to reconfigure as other social movements, the display of the Ten
relationships of entities within those structures. Commandments in public places, or Muslim
Social movements sometimes seek to change the women’s headscarves.
cultural and legal relations between persons in Importantly, we also distinguish between what
everyday life—such as those between children social movements are and what social movement
and adults, husbands and wives, or persons of dif- theory can help to explain. Though social move-
ferent racial or ethnic categories—or the relation- ments are often defined as extra-institutional to
ship of persons to non-persons, such as that of some degree, this does not mean that theories
people to animals or the environment. Movements explaining their emergence, dynamics, and out-
may also challenge socio-cultural and legal sys- comes are limited to cases of protest movements
tems of authority by working to bestow recogni- or radical groups. On the contrary, theories of
tion and dignity on subordinated groups, from collective action may be useful in explaining the
slave-caste groups to the transgendered; appro- mobilization of institutional group dynamics,
priate and reconfigure social institutions, such as such as those occurring within and between polit-
marriage; and define actions and behaviors as ical parties, the various institutions comprising
more or less moral and legitimate, from littering the military, religious organizations, and interest
to abortion. Social movements also arise in oppo- groups, as well as changes in organizational
sition to other extra-institutional actors and the fields, such as those that take place among
causes and authorities that they represent, pro- domestic and international non-governmental
ducing counter-movements. Furthermore, rather organizations or educational systems.
than emerging outside of a given authority struc- Furthermore, in societies in which demonstra-
ture, members of organizations often challenge tions and civic organizing are permitted and not
normative cultural practices and meanings within inherently transgressive, the distinction between
hierarchical or patriarchal institutions through extra-institutional mobilization and institutional-
more or less obtrusive means of contention ized politics has become increasingly fuzzy
26 Theorizing Social Movements 549
(Meyer and Tarrow 1998). We therefore submit respondingly deviant behavior. In addition, Karl
that social movement theory may be applied to a Marx and Friedrich Engels argue in the Manifesto
wide variety of cases and collective actions of the Communist Party that capitalism produces
across different venues, historical periods, and and depends on the increased exploitation and
places. alienation of the proletariat, which in turn pro-
duce shared interests among workers and lead to
the mobilization of class-based social move-
26.2 Theorizing the Emergence ments. Additionally, theorists writing in the years
of Social Movements following the genocidal violence and disruptions
of World War II likewise argued that mobilizing
The factors and conditions producing social grievances arise from the disintegration of social
movements’ emergence are arguably at the core life (Kornhauser 1959), and that structural strains
of the study of social movements and associated are one of several necessary conditions for indi-
collective actions, such as demonstrations, viduals to participate in collective protest
strikes, sit-ins, boycotts, and rebellions. Indeed, (Smelser 1962).
few topics in the field have generated such a Subsequent studies published in the 1970s
range of theorization and research, with the pos- argued against strain theory, finding little evi-
sible exception of the study of recruitment and dence of breakdown as a precipitating factor of
participation in collective action.1 As we outline protest and rebellions (Tilly et al. 1975; Rule and
below, a range of theories are currently employed Tilly 1972). These studies also refuted earlier
by social scientists to explain how, why, where, social psychological and functionalist approaches
and when individuals come together and the con- to protest that viewed rebellion as anomic or irra-
ditions prompting and sustaining their tional (see Hoffer 1951; LeBon 1897). In
mobilization. response to the emergence of the Civil Rights
Movement and other rights-oriented movements
taking place across the U.S. in the 1960s, social
26.2.1 Social Strain and Breakdown movements came to be understood as rational
responses to injustice by educated individuals
Theories of mobilization were first derived by and integrated social groups (McAdam [1982]
classical theorists who emphasized the role of 1999). Furthermore, rather than viewing action-
social strains in the emergence of collective driving grievances as the outcome of acute socio-
action. Strains are the conditions, trends, or economic downturns or political upheavals,
events—such as economic hardship or vio- scholars instead argued that grievances arising
lence—that create the mobilizing grievances from structural conditions are often long-term,
motivating disruptive collective action. Emile ubiquitous phenomena. Because African
Durkheim, for example, argues that because soci- Americans had been facing systemic repression
ety is characterized by social integration, strains and violence for decades after emancipation in
that disrupt the functioning and integration of the U.S., the existence of strain-induced griev-
normative social life produce grievances and cor- ances did little to explain why the movement for
civil and political rights emerged where and
1
Since the topics of differential recruitment and participa- when it did. In order to address these shortcom-
tion have received considerable attention in recent years ings, subsequent perspectives began to theorize
(see, for example, Corrigall-Brown et al. 2009; Diani alternatives, and social strain was largely dis-
2004; Klandermans 2004; Rohlinger and Snow 2003;
Snow and Soule 2010), we devote less attention to the
carded in the theoretical canon for several
topic throughout the chapter. decades (see Buechler 2004).
550 D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow
that of political opportunity. The second has been attitudes of everyday life. Such breakdowns in
to expand explanations of emergence by bringing the normative social order include: (1) accidents
in neglected concepts, such as emotions, net- that disrupt routines and threaten a community’s
works, ecological factors, and culture and iden- survival; (2) an actual or threatened intrusion that
tity to its theorization. We elaborate on these in decreases the collective sense of safety, privacy
turn below. or sense of control; (3) alterations in subsistence
routines, such as the means by which people
26.2.4.1 Revitalizing Theories attain food and shelter; and (4) dramatic changes
of Strain and Breakdown in the structures and implementation of social
Recent studies have reintroduced social strain control. These factors have been at play in collec-
into the discussion of emergence by demonstrat- tive movements ranging from prison riots (Useem
ing how structural conditions, such as relatively 1985), to “Not In My Backyard” movements
high levels of inequality and economic decline, (Snow and Anderson 1983), to women’s activism
generate oppositional frameworks that can pro- in Argentina (Borland and Sutton 2007). Because
duce high levels of extra-institutional behavior individuals are adverse to loss, as argued by pros-
(McVeigh 2006). For instance, the emergence of pect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), they
protests by homeless populations has been shown are more likely to engage in collective action in
to be more likely in cities experiencing a rising order to preserve what they already have, as
cost of living and a decline in manufacturing jobs opposed to mobilizing in order to gain something
(Snow et al. 2005). Van Dyke and Soule (2002) new. This finding complements studies of the
also explain the emergence of radical movements effects of state repression on mobilization.
by showing that economic restructuring, indi- Violent quotidian disruptions instigated by
cated by the loss of manufacturing jobs and fam- authorities often spur a backlash because severe
ily farms, are highly correlated with white patriot escalations in violence violate normative expec-
and militia organizing. Furthermore, while the tations about how authorities should act, whether
causes of the Arab Spring revolutions that swept inside of prisons or in authoritarian states
across the Middle East in 2011 will remain the (Almeida 2003; Einwohner 2003; Goodwin
subject of heated debate in the years to come, the 2001; Hess and Martin 2006; Kurzman 2004;
rising disparity between the number of university- Loveman 1998; Moss 2014; Moore 1978; Useem
educated youths and unemployment in places and Kimball 1989; White 1989). As such,
such as Tunisia and Egypt is a probable factor in changes in the quotidian can spur mobilization
creating the grievances necessary for high-risk and participation under repressive conditions.
collective action (see Goldstone 2014). As such,
social strains can play a role in movement emer- 26.2.4.2 Refining Political
gence and may be a necessary condition, albeit Opportunity
not a sufficient one, for mobilization—particu- Scholars have also refined theories of political
larly for movements that form despite significant opportunities by testing its assumptions against
resource shortages and a relative lack of political alternative cases and specifying how opportuni-
opportunities. ties should be delimited (Meyer 2004). For exam-
In an effort to better specify the effects of ple, Eisinger’s (1973) curvilinear model of
social disruptions on mobilization, Snow and his movement emergence has been challenged by
colleagues (1998) also argue that breakdown, an studies analyzing non-Western movements in
acute variant of social strain, can also play an authoritarian or democratizing states. De la Luz
important role in the emergence of movements, Inclán’s (2008) study of Zapatista mobilization in
but in a different way than classically theorized. Mexico finds that protest activity emerged
They argue that collective action is often the in localities that were closed and repressive and
product of actual or threatened disruption of the decreased in more democratic zones. Almeida
“quotidian,” or the taken-for-granted routines and (2003) also demonstrates that strains and threats
552 D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow
prompted heightened protest waves in El Salvador McAdam 2003; Fernandez and McAdam 1988;
by examining the effects of economic strains, Gould 1991; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Passy
land access, bank closures, and the general ero- 2003). As Diani (2013) writes, social movements
sion of rights and state repression on public dis- may draw in prospective participants through
sent. Other scholars have also called for increased both recruitment efforts and personal networks,
attention as to how collective actors’ perceptions neither of which are mutually exclusive (Snow
of political opportunities and threats shape their et al. 1980). Participation in movements is depen-
mobilization dynamics, since grievances and cor- dent, at least in part, on the absence of blockages
responding actions are dependent on subjectively- (Kitts 2000). The anchoring effects of immediate
understood and interpretive processes (Kurzman family, for example, significantly shape the like-
1996; see also Khadivar 2013). lihood of participation in protest and high-risk
activism (Viterna 2006). Potential participants
26.2.4.3 The Role of Emotions also consider the reactions of people with whom
Relatedly, scholars have also brought renewed they have strong ties when deciding to participate
attention to the role of emotions in movement in risky collective actions (McAdam 1986). But
emergence (Goodwin et al. 2001; Jasper 2011), further complicating these dynamics is the fact
as when feelings anger and shock produce collec- that individuals are embedded in multiple rela-
tive responses that impact the course and charac- tionships that expose her or him to conflicting
ter of mobilization. Smith (1996), for example, pressures (McAdam and Paulsen 1993: 641).
argues that moral outrage prompted mobilization Relationships are “multivalent” in that they can
against the Reagan administration’s deportation exert positive and negative effects (Kitts 2000),
of refugees from Central America in the 1980s. and the effects of social ties may change over the
In an analysis of the emergence of the course of a conflict, rather than be static forces
Montgomery Bus Boycott, Shultziner (2013) that either block or facilitate mobilization
demonstrates that this landmark civil rights-era (Viterna 2006).
protest movement emerged as a result of the esca-
lation in the abuse and humiliation of African- 26.2.4.5 Ecological Factors
American passengers by white bus drivers. The focus on relations between individuals has
Furthermore, movements are often produced and also brought attention to the importance of eco-
sustained by sentiments of altruism, compassion, logical factors in shaping possibilities for protest
and empathy. As Randal Collins’ (2004) theory (Sewell 2001). Such theories harken back to the
of interaction ritual chains argues, emotional arguments of Tilly et al. (1975) that capitalists
energies can produce and reinforce solidarities “unwittingly afforded the proletariat ideal set-
necessary for collective action (see also Fantasia tings within which to mobilize” by concentrating
1988). Activists therefore often work strategi- workers in urban dwellings (McAdam and
cally to amplify and sustain outrage or empathy Boudet 2012: 19). Ecological structures can also
among members and to foster sympathy among foster spontaneous protest events, which refer to
observers to bolster their campaigns (Nepstad actions not planned or organized in advance, such
2004; Summers-Effler 2010). as riots and sit-in movements (Snow and Moss
2014). For example, Zhao’s (2001) study of
26.2.4.4 Networks movement emergence during the 1989 “Beijing
Scholars have also paid increased attention to Spring” demonstrates that the unique spatial dis-
how networks facilitate the emergence of, and tribution of students on university campuses cre-
members’ participation in, social movements. ated the conditions necessary for the occupation
This line of research demonstrates how actors’ of Tiananmen Square. Important ecological fac-
embeddedness in particular social arrangements tors prompting the emergence of the student
and relationships make individuals more or less movement included the closeness of various uni-
susceptible to collective action (Diani and versity campuses to one another; the separation
26 Theorizing Social Movements 553
and protection of students by campus security spark changes in collective consciousness. Such
and high walls; the dense living conditions; the resources may be “out there,” but must be har-
“total institution” characteristics of the cam- nessed and framed to motivate participation, as is
puses; and the walking and biking routes taken discussed later in this chapter (Snow et al. 1986,
by students. 2013). Movements focused on “identity politics,”
Free spaces, or small-scale settings insulated for example, seek recognition for their identities
from the repressive intrusion of authorities, are and lifestyles in ways that overlap with politically-
also important incubators of mobilizing ideas and oriented goals, such as with gay, lesbian, bi-
plans for action (Snow and Soule 2010). Free sexual, and transgender rights movements
spaces do more than provide a physical structure (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Taylor et al. 2009).
for nascent collective action; they also foster
relationships that produce oppositional ideas and
cultures (Polletta 1999). Morris’ (1981) study of 26.2.5 Challenges to Understanding
Black colleges and churches, for example, argues Emergence
that these institutions served as important
resources, both ecologically and culturally, for While all of the aforementioned perspectives
dissident ideas and emergent solidarities in the have done a great deal to refine theories of emer-
Civil Rights Movement. Futrell and Simi (2004) gence, we note that identifying when and how
further demonstrate how white power activism movements are born is conceptually tricky. As
requires different types of ecological spaces in Taylor (1989) argues, literatures tend to assume
order to facilitate networks and solidarity and to that movements are “birthed,” rather than the out-
shield the Aryan movement from repression. come of continuous mobilization processes that
Likewise, Johnston and Snow (1998) find that in may be less visible to researchers. Further com-
Estonia under Soviet rule, accommodative sub- plicating matters is that movements give rise to
cultures emerged that hid dissident opinions other movements, particularly within the context
within adversarial talk, songs and poetry. These of a “social movement society” where protest has
cultures were an important factor in prompting become a routine feature of civic life (Meyer and
above-ground resistance and nationalist solidar- Tarrow 1998). As we discuss in more detail
ity when the political context changed and mobi- below, movements may diffuse through spillover
lization broke above-ground. effects (Meyer and Whittier 1994), in reaction to
other movements (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996),
26.2.4.6 Culture and Identity and as later generations of founding movements,
Relatedly, scholars have also increasingly turned such as the various “generations” of feminist
to cultural explanations in examining emergence thought and activism. The Civil Rights
processes, which has shed light on how beliefs, Movement, for example, had mobilizing effects
identities, and solidarities emerge and motivate and influences on women’s, environmental, eth-
collective action. The role of culture in move- nic, and peace movements, but was itself also
ment emergence draws attention to how collec- influenced by independence movements against
tive behavior is contingent upon how events and colonialism and preceded by abolitionist move-
environments take on meanings that are not ments, the formation of the National Association
inherent to them, but are instead “assigned or for the Advancement of Colored People, and
imputed through interpretive processes” (Snow lesser known forms of collective resistance by
2003: 818). Collective actors may be inspired by African Americans. Furthermore, the eruption of
more than the prospect of some utilitarian gain, transgression and protest in the streets is not
mobilizing instead to assert a particular way of always a reliable marker of movement emer-
life, a set of values, and the production of culture gence. As Johnston (2006) argues, protest is
and knowledge. Moral and cultural resources are often just one tactic that signifies the presence of
also important for emergence processes and may a new or revitalized movement and may be the
554 D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow
end result of mobilization processes, rather than depends on the degree of change demanded, the
marking the beginning of a new social movement status quo at play, and the interpretive or labeling
or set of collective actors. powers of the institutionalized authorities or tar-
gets. While movements can exhibit a combina-
tion of radical and reformist tendencies and lie on
26.3 Theorizing Movements’ a continuum between these two ideal types, revo-
Dynamics lutionary and reformist views are not easily rec-
onciled. As such, disagreement over how
Theories of social movement dynamics draw revolutionary or reform-oriented a social move-
attention to what movements do and how they ment should be among participants is likely to be
change over time in light of their revolutionary or a source of factionalization within and between
reform-oriented goals. Explanations take into movement groups. Additionally, the conditions
account movements’ tactics and strategies; their under which movements transform from one type
claims-making processes; their organizational to the other, as when reformers become radical-
forms and the cultures that undergird activist col- ized, or when insurgents become institutional-
lectivities; and the relational processes taking ized, remains an important topic of study in
place within movements and with their allies or understanding mobilization and social conflict.
opponents, including counter-movements. As we discuss below, the potential efficacy of
reformers and revolutionaries in achieving social
change goals informs much of the debate over
26.3.1 Revolutionary Versus Reform- movements’ strategies and tactics, forms, and
Oriented Movements ideologies.
respond favorably by intervening on behalf of, or Radical movements sometimes also target other
negotiating with, social movements (see also non-state actors that threaten their worldview and
Schattschneider 1960). In certain times and systems of belief, as in the case of Taliban attacks
places, disruptive tactics characterize insurgen- against women’s rights organizations and activ-
cies and revolutionary movement goals (Jenkins ists in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Jafar 2007).
and Eckert 1986). Yet, no tactic is inherently Movements are dynamic social entities, how-
transgressive. How disruptive a given protest or ever, and are likely to draw on a range of tactics
boycott is, for example, depends on a number of to pursue their goals. As Snow (2003: 817)
factors, including the socio-historical context in writes, a social movement is “engaged in a highly
which movements operate, local and national- interactive relationship with various publics and
level laws regulating the expression of dissent, collectivities that constitute its environment of
the relations of movements to existing institu- operation, and this ongoing dialectic” prompts
tions and political entities, and the degree of movements to engage in a range of “anticipatory
repression wielded by authorities against chal- strategic action[s].” Relatedly, McAdam’s (1983)
lengers. That said, even when public demonstra- study of the tactical interactions between the
tions are not transgressive, they can still serve to Civil Rights Movement and repressive authori-
demonstrate movements’ worthiness, unity, num- ties highlights how movements are engaged in a
bers, and solidarity to authorities and the public dynamic process of contention with their oppo-
(Tilly and Tarrow 2007). nents. Movements work to innovate their tactics
While public rallies, marches, protests, and in order to evade repression or create leverage,
violence largely dominate the study of move- and movement opponents engage in tactical
ments’ tactics, often because these events are adaptations that seek to neutralize the effects of
easier to count in data sources such as newspa- movements’ innovations and reassert social con-
pers, movements may engage in a variety of other trol. As a result, challengers involved in resis-
tactics to promote or prevent social change. As tance against highly repressive state systems
mentioned above, members may seek to with- must continuously engage in a process of tactical
draw or exit from authority structures as a form modification and change in order to be effective.
of protest (Tierney 2013). Commune and “cult” And yet, movements do not innovate their tactics
movements of the 1960s and 1970s, for example, out of thin air. Instead, they rely on tactical reper-
were initiated as a result of dissatisfaction with toires that are shaped and constrained, at least in
larger and more amorphous authority structures part, by broader social structures (Tilly 1995). As
perceived as illegitimate or harmful, including Snow and Soule (2010: 179) posit, “the occur-
mainstream religions and capitalism. Movements rence of peasant revolts and food riots in agrarian
may also seek to exit from authorities by contest- society, labor strikes in capitalist societies, and
ing powerholders’ monopoly and jurisdiction public demonstrations in democratic societies”
over territory, violence, or the means of economic suggest that dominant political and economic
production. This includes labor movements that arrangements shape and constrain the tactical
have reinstated jobs and instituted boss-less sys- repertoires of challengers and their opponents.
tems of production by reclaiming shuttered facto- Movements’ tactical choices are also shaped by
ries through nonviolence resistance, for example. their worldviews and ideologies, such as princi-
Secessionist movements seek to withdraw from ples of nonviolence, and best practices are typi-
existing authority structures by claiming territory cally the subject of great debate within
and establishing their own states. Violent tactics, movements. A change in tactics is likely when
such as mass murders and suicide bombings, also activists view that the costs of a given tactic out-
serve to target states indirectly by attacking sym- weigh prospective gains, when they perceive that
bols of state power or illegitimate institutions, bargaining or negotiating with authorities is no
punishing bystanders, and bringing international longer a viable option, or when they gain access
attention to movements’ grievances and demands. to new resources or technological innovations
556 D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow
(Snow and Soule 2010; see also Colomy 1998 on processes (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al.
organizational entrepreneurs). 1986, 2014). Framing calls attention to how
The literature on movement dynamics has also grievances are understood and strategically trans-
pointed to the importance of understanding the formed by collective actors into injustices that
conditions under which movements engage in warrant mobilization, as well as how collective
strategic accommodations in response to their actors serve as signifying agents by bringing cer-
broader environments. In order to shore up legiti- tain issues in frame while discarding others.
macy and respectability in the eyes of the com- Frames diagnose social problems, describe what
munities in which they are embedded, movement is to be done through prognostic frames, and
actors may deploy specific strategies to try to “fit motivate participation. They are derived in part
in” and achieve a degree of acceptance while from the culture in which social movements are
simultaneously pursuing social change goals and embedded, but may also challenge that culture
enacting alternative or non-normative rituals and and frame the status quo as contestable (Snow
lifestyles (Snow 1979). Strategies of accommo- 2004a). This perspective differentiates frames
dation by movements’ targets are also an impor- from ideologies, which are typically conceptual-
tant part of the tactical interactions that unfold ized as a relatively stable set of values or beliefs.
between collective actors and their opponents, as While frames and ideologies may overlap, frames
when movements gain concessions and are per- do not just stem automatically from ideology, but
mitted to demonstrate in public spaces, for exam- are debated, negotiated, and deployed strategi-
ple, or have a portion of their demands granted by cally by collective actors (see Oliver and Johnston
authorities. Though strategies of accommodation 2000; Snow 2004a).
on either side may be perceived as giving in or a
form of cooptation, how movements strive to
accommodate external audiences, as well as how 26.3.4 Organizational Forms
they are accommodated at times by their oppo-
nents, is an important aspect of understanding In addition to understanding what movements do,
how tactical interactions unfold in a dynamic scholars have also paid a great deal of attention to
fashion, as well as how both sides attempt to movements’ organizational forms, which range
accrue legitimacy in the eyes of broader publics. from “loosely networked groups… to highly
bureaucratic and formal social movement organi-
zations” (Snow and Soule 2010: 150–151). The
26.3.3 Cultural and Discursive benefits and drawbacks of various organizational
Dynamics types comprise a longstanding theoretical debate
in the literature. The bureaucratization and pro-
In addition to more radical and visible forms of fessionalization of movements has been contro-
resistance, movements are also characterized by versial because, as argued by Michels’ ([1915]
their cultural and discursive dynamics, including 1962) “iron law of oligarchy,” organizations
everyday forms of resistance (Scott 1985) and often come to value their own survival and inter-
contentious talk and oppositional speech ests over those of their members and conservatize
(Johnston 2005, 2006; Johnston and Mueller the movement’s tactics. The very process of orga-
2001). These include meaning-making activities nization, Michels argues, enforces a separation
that David Snow and his colleagues brought to between leaders and their members and an aban-
the fore with the introduction of the framing pro- donment of revolutionary or radical social change
cesses perspective of collective action. Building goals. The fact that professionalized SMOs tend
from Goffman’s 1974 essay on Frame Analysis, to be run by members of the middle class and are
their theory argues that meanings do not auto- funded by resourced patrons, often without mem-
matically arise in a given situation, but instead bers, has been interpreted as an elitist shift in
come about through interactive and interpretive advocacy more generally (Skocpol 2003).
26 Theorizing Social Movements 557
Institutionalized movements have also been gate capacity to lobby on a behalf of a given
accused of forfeiting the ability to utilize extra- cause (Walker et al. 2011). Nor do formal organi-
institutional and disruptive tactics on behalf of zations always trade in their radical methods for
society’s most marginalized members (Piven and moderate and non-disruptive approaches (Rucht
Cloward 1979). For example, Jenkins and 1999). Movement organizations thought to be
Eckhert’s study of the Civil Rights Movement hopelessly ineffective and oligarchical may also
(1986) argues that the most effective branch of experience revitalizations. As Voss and Sherman’s
the Black insurgency acted as an indigenous (2000) study of labor unions demonstrates, move-
organization, relying primarily on volunteer labor ments may break out of bureaucratic conserva-
by the intended beneficiaries of the movement. tism under certain conditions in spite of
After the movement was “channeled” by elite contracting political opportunities and resources.
patrons into professionalized SMOs with a paid Important addendums to these organizational
staff and a formalized leadership, the movement debates have further demonstrated that “bottom-
lost its leverage. Private foundations, Jenkins and up” grassroots and deliberative movements have
Eckhert (1986: 819) argue, are “institutionalized their own sets of limitations. While informal and
agencies of the capitalist class and, as such, will leaderless organizations may seek to practice
generally be politically cautious in their support what they preach by working to equalize rela-
for social reform.” Elite patrons, including gov- tions between members and defending their orga-
ernment agencies and private foundations, tend nizations from elite cooptation, no movement is
to support moderates, and in so doing, they fully egalitarian (Robnett 1996). In addition,
undermine the “radical flank” (Haines 2013). In organizations seeking to remain separated, both
this view, social movements require sustained pragmatically and ideologically, from institution-
indigenous and disruptive mobilization in order alized politics may limit their influence and input
to produce meaningful change, whereas reform- on policy (see Blee and Currier 2006).
ist organizations are a hindrance to that change. Participatory democratic organizations are inher-
In response to the bifurcation of movements ently fragile and susceptible to internal conflicts
into coopted/reformist/institutionalized versus (Blee 2012; della Porta 2005; Polletta 2012).
militant/radical/volunteerist variations, subse- Leaderless movements also face hurdles to mobi-
quent scholarship has painted a more complex lization when their members come to be more
picture of movements’ organizational forms and focused on democratic deliberation than on
their effects (Clemens and Minkoff 2004). For implementing strategies through collective action
example, Meyer’s (1990) study on the nuclear (Polletta 2005). For example, while participants
freeze movement demonstrates that the institu- in the Occupy Movement that emerged across
tionalization of anti-nuclear proliferation move- U.S. cities in 2011 engaged in reflexive rituals to
ments left behind an extensive advocacy network, promote inclusiveness and egalitarianism, the
making anti-nuclear advocacy a relatively stable movement as a whole may have been subsumed
fixture of the political landscape. Professionalized more by its focus on internal inclusion and self-
movements may also provide a foundation for expression than by concrete, outward-looking
future incarnations of protest and sustain activ- change-oriented goals. While future studies are
ism during periods of abeyance (Taylor 1989) likely to find that Occupy movements had vary-
when political opportunities for protest diminish. ing dynamics and consequences by city, this
It is therefore useful to conceptualize profession- example highlights the limitations of deliberative
alization and institutionalization as more than a democracy in action. In sum, no one organiza-
process of self-interested, inefficient bureaucrati- tional form can or should be uniformly equated
zation. In addition, having both member and non- with efficacy or “true” social change.
member advocacy organizations work on a
particular issue may foster a productive division
of labor that helps to strengthen activists’ aggre-
558 D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow
processes effective in promoting grassroots and resources, whether for the movement itself or
mobilization hindered access to and influence for its beneficiary groups, and relief are also
over presidential candidates in the 1924 election. important outcomes sought by movements
As such, tactics that produce favorable outcomes (Amenta 2006; Cress and Snow 2000). Another
in a given context may not translate effectively to related outcome is that SMO actors in a given
other arenas, thus potentially contributing to “policy monopoly” field may come to be per-
movement decline. Furthermore, unintended ceived as legitimate representatives of a wider
movement outcomes may include schisms and constituency (Meyer 2005). This is likely to
civil wars, as well as repression and counter- determine which social movements will incur
mobilization by third-parties (Snow and Soule attention and resources in a given field, as well as
2010: 208). As such, the actions of social move- what issues are deemed to be worthy recipients of
ments may draw in third parties into their spheres governmental attention, access, and influence.
of contention that subvert movements’ aims. For The institutionalization of a given issue may also
example, when the Egyptian military defected on comprise an important consequence of social
behalf of protesters calling for the end to Hosni movement activity. Baumgartner and Mahoney
Mubarak’s autocratic reign in 2011, this was ini- (2005), for example, demonstrate that there is a
tially viewed as a movement success. However, growing correlation over time between congres-
the Supreme Council of Armed Forces later sional hearings and particular interest issues after
launched a coup in 2013 against president-elect the emergence and growth of a movement family.
Mohamed Morsi and subsequently assumed the However, while governmental attention to an
governance of Egypt. To date, this has produced issue of relevance to social movements may grow
a retrenchment of the military elite in the execu- over time, such attention may also court the
tive branch of government, the release of deposed efforts of counter-movements. An increase in
dictator Hosni Mubarak from prison, the impris- congressional hearings on women’s issues, for
onment and court-ordered death sentence of example, could have as much to do with some
Morsi, and severe violent repression against movements’ mobilization against women’s use
Muslim Brotherhood members and leftists alike. of contraception as it does with their access to
Cycles of contention, therefore, can produce a legal abortions.
variety of gains and setbacks for social How tightly the grievances and demands of
movements. social movements “fit” with the agenda of elites
also matters for their outcomes (Skocpol 1992).
If the frames espoused by the movement mirror
26.4.3 Clarifying Movement the agendas of bureaucracies or the political
Outcomes regime, then their movement is more likely to be
accommodated by state actors, and less assertive
Because social movement consequences can vary action will be required (Amenta 2006). This pro-
dramatically, scholars have increasingly called cess is not solely the result of coincidental
for clarification of their outcomes by level of movement-state compatibility. Movements can
analysis and over time. At the macro-level, for improve the fit between their demands and the
example, SMO action could lead to the extension agendas of elites through strategic action and
of democratic and civil rights. At the intermedi- framing and accommodative tactics, referenced
ate level, movements may push for policy cre- above (McCammon et al. 2008). However, the fit
ation, modification, extension, or enforcement. of movement frames at one level may foster
They may also spur the establishment or institu- adversarial conditions at another (McVeigh et al.
tionalization of new collective identities that fos- 2004). The outcome of movements’ tactical
ter the labeling of certain social groups as worthy interactions with counter-mobilized groups and
of concessions or as moral and deserving social political elites have also been shown to produce
groups (Skrentny 2006). Political representation specific outcomes. In his study on the civil rights
560 D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow
movement, for example, Andrews (2004) exam- ers and organizations serve as cultural brokers
ines how SMO infrastructures and strategies, in with other audiences and movements (Diani
combination with the degree of white counter- 1997; McAdam 1994). Snow and his colleagues
mobilization and federal intervention, produced a (2013) suggest, for example, that movements can
localized legacy of civil rights activism in spur cultural revitalization and fabrication
Mississippi. More attention is needed to under- through framing mechanisms that connect and
stand how conflict is patterned by these interac- accent specific events and ideas in a strategic
tions and what the enduring consequences of fashion. Movements may, for instance, select
those conflicts are in history. artifacts of history, including written materials,
identities, and symbols, to legitimize their ideas
and to promote their worldviews and agendas.
26.4.4 Cultural and Biographical The use of the swastika by the Nazi regime or the
Outcomes appropriation of Nordic iconography by contem-
porary white supremacists, for example, illus-
Social movements also matter in shaping culture trates how movements use culture and revitalize
and biography. As Earl (2004) describes, cultural cultural elements selectively for their purposes
outcomes may include changes in values, opin- (Snow et al. 2013), but also change what cultural
ions, and beliefs; cultural production and prac- symbols and artifacts come to mean. While more
tices, including language and fashion; and research is needed to link the actions of social
broader, more encompassing worldviews and movements to cultural outcomes, we again cau-
beliefs that lie outside of what is in people’s tion scholars from drawing too fine a line between
heads, such as the rise of an international human political and cultural consequences. Amenta’s
rights regime. While tying the actions of specific (2006) study of the Townsend Plan, for example,
social movements and their organizations to addresses both how the movement influenced
sweeping changes in public opinion or practice is welfare policy and cultural understandings of the
empirically challenging, Earl (2004) suggests “aged” as an identity group warranting rights and
that scholars consider the cultural impact of protections (see also Skocpol 1992). When move-
movements as a matter of degree, rather than as a ments produce long-term changes in identity and
zero-sum dependent variable. For example, even behavior, such as political party affiliation
if movements fail to achieve policy change, the (McVeigh et al. 2014), or changes in how people
act of participating in a movement may have perceive and respond to injustice (McVeigh et al.
notable consequences on the belief systems and 2003), these outcomes also signify normative
practices of its members. Studies of movements’ changes in society-wide practices and values as
biographical consequences have shown that par- much as in the political realm.
ticipation in collective action may shape mem-
bers’ worldviews and actions in important ways
over the life course (Fernandez and McAdam 26.5 Developing Theory
1988; Klatch 1999; Giugni 2004; Corrigall-
Brown 2012). Likewise, outcomes for partici- The study and theorization of social movements
pants in religious movements can include has produced an expansive research agenda in
significant changes in lifestyle and beliefs, as sociology that will continue to shed light on criti-
well as a radical configuration of everyday life cal historical and contemporary social problems,
and activists’ orientations toward authority, their events, and conflicts. As outlined above, young
family members, and fellow participants. scholars of today are likely to acknowledge that a
Cultural consequences may be influenced by multitude of factors, including political contexts,
movement action through a variety of mecha- resources and mobilizing structures, framing pro-
nisms, such as through framing processes, their cesses, social networks and ecological structures,
networks, and the ways in which movement lead- culture, emotions, and identities, all impact
26 Theorizing Social Movements 561
mobilization processes. As Snow (2013: 1201) ics of mobilization and how contention unfolds
writes, “one does not have to choose one empha- over time.
sis or focus over another so long as it is recog-
nized that each conceptualization accents a
particular dimension or aspect of social move- 26.5.2 Analyzing Movements
ments, much like the case of the storied descrip- Within Their Fields
tion of an elephant rendered by six blind men on of Contention
the basis of the part they touched: all parts were
important features of the elephant but alone could Second, we support recent calls by McAdam and
not provide a complete picture.” So where is the Boudet (2012) and Fligstein and McAdam (2012)
discipline to go from here? In closing, we draw for scholars to better understand how social
on recent innovations in the field and suggest movements emerge and mobilize within broader
ways to refine, elaborate, and expand the existing fields of contention. As McAdam and Boudet
theoretical repertoire. argue (2012: 21), social movement theorists
should not be limited to investigating processes
and dynamics internal to those of social move-
26.5.1 Collective Behavior and Social ments. In order to remedy what some scholars
Psychology perceive as a narrowing of social movement the-
ory and its application, scholars may find it use-
First, we suggest that scholars incorporate theo- ful to adopt a wider lens to understanding
ries of collective behavior and social psychology movements’ embeddedness in and relation to
in the study of movements (Oliver 1989). While larger social systems (see also Goldstone 2004).
older theories associating collective protest with This includes, for example, how episodes of con-
irrationality certainly warranted criticism and tention are impacted by political economies, such
reformulation, scholars should attend to the rela- as capitalist systems of production (Paige 1975),
tively unplanned, uncoordinated, and spontane- the crises and recessions produced within the
ous dynamics that take place in crowds and world system (Smith and Weist 2012), and the
during organized or SMO-sponsored protest relations between social movements and global
events (Snow and Moss 2014). While social conflicts and wars (Chaudhary and Guarnizo
movements are largely rational enterprises, not 2016; Tarrow 2015). Furthermore, additional
all social movement-related occurrences are pre- theorization is needed as to how cases of “domes-
planned or strategized in advance of their occur- tic” mobilization are impacted by extra-national
rence. Drawing on theories of breakdown, events, transnational cultural and ideational
ecological factors, and emotions, this perspective trends, and foreign regimes. This includes, for
accounts for the fact that spontaneous interac- example, relationship between the American
tions and occurrences can shape the course and civil rights movement and anti-colonialist move-
character of social movements and related protest ments (see McAdam 1998) and the repression or
events. Such occurrences may also produce the sponsorship of domestic collective actors by for-
riots and violence that inspired the study of col- eign states (Moss 2015). Further theorization is
lective behavior in the first place. Social move- needed as to how social movements become
ments’ trajectories or collective revolts often transnational (Tarrow 2005), including the condi-
evolve in ways that appear puzzling or irrational tions under which movements scale up and across
if scholars only look at “objective” criteria, such borders to link with extra-national actors and
as changes in fungible resources or political institutions (Ayoub 2013; Bob 2005; Smith 2004;
opportunities. By taking into account the per- von Bülow 2010). A comparative, transnational
spectives, emotions, and relational dynamics of perspective will help scholars to understand why
social movements and protest events, we can bet- movements with similar goals and tactics have
ter understand the conditions shaping the dynam- arisen simultaneously across the globe and the
562 D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow
trends in movements’ political orientations in and Burns 2004). Despite the fact that religious
history (Mannheim [1936] 2013; Turner 1969; movements were at the forefront of classical the-
Walder 2009). ories of society and change (Wuthnow 1986),
Third, while we know a great deal about the their study has been more recently neglected in
factors producing movement emergence, case studies of social movements and in the theo-
increased attention is needed as to understanding retical development of the field (Snow 2015).
their trajectories and transformations over time Additionally, studies rarely incorporate social
(Zald and Ash 1966). How and why movements movement theory into the study of collective
succumb to infighting and factionalization, action that produces political violence, mass kill-
repression, or end up purging their own con- ings, and genocide (see della Porta 2008; Luft
stituents matters greatly for understanding the 2015; Olzak 2004; Owens et al. 2013). Movement
rise and demise of movements and their related theorists also neglect to address how religion and
forms (Davenport 2014; Kretschmer 2013). violence intersect, despite the prominence of vio-
Additionally, greater specification of the lent religious movements in some of the most
actors operating in a given field is needed. contentious and consequential events in recent
Disaggregating the state, for example, is theo- memory (Almond et al. 2003; Hall 2000, 2003;
retically necessary in order to understand its Juergensmeyer 2000). For reasons unclear to us,
varying methods of social control, the state’s the study of these movements has been largely
varying capacities for accommodation and relegated to the field of international relations,
repression, and officials’ differential relations despite the pervasive existence and threat of
with activists (Loveman 1998; Moss 2014; Su domestic violent extremism and the transnational
and He 2010). This calls attention to the operation and effects of extra-national radical
importance of understanding regime types as movements.
existing on a range between democratic and Relatedly, we lack theorization as to what role
authoritarian, and variations in the degrees to religion plays in such movements. Questions
which state authority and coercion are applied remain about whether violent non-state actors,
by social movement, population, and place such as the so-called “Islamic State” (ISIS) or
(Cunningham 2004). Extra-institutional and Christian anti-abortion activists, are “really” reli-
revolutionary activists may, for example, gious and represent permutations of that religion,
engage in routine interactions and dialogues or are just “using” religion. In either case, far
with state officials or work to persuade state insti- more empirically-grounded theorization is
tutions, such as militaries or foreign regimes, to needed as to how waves of religious extremism
take the movement’s side. The benefits of prob- arise across different belief systems and how reli-
lematizing the people-versus-the-regime arche- gious authorities incite collective action and vio-
type will undoubtedly lead to innovation in lence. Furthermore, understanding how extremist
theorizing processes of contention. movements are produced and supported by
broader communities of sympathy—or are not
supported (Acevedo and Chaudhary 2015)—will
26.5.3 Attending to Neglected enhance our understanding of how cultural and
Movement Types political conditions shape social movements, and
in turn, how those movements shape broader con-
Fourth, we suggest that scholars attend to certain flicts in history (Jurgensmeyer 2000). This line of
types of social movements that remain on the inquiry complements the work of resource mobi-
periphery of movement studies despite their cen- lization and framing scholars in that it draws
trality and importance in history and contempo- attention to how religion is used as an ideological
rary social life, such as formative pre-modern and material resource by movements, as well as
movements and the study of religious move- how movements can shape religious ideas, off-
ments, including sects and cults (but see Kniss shoots, and organizations (Williams 1996).
26 Theorizing Social Movements 563
26.5.4 Changes in Activists’ Tools ian settings. American Journal of Sociology, 109(2),
345–400.
Almond, G. A., Scott Appleby, R., & Sivan, E. (2003).
Lastly, because theoretical trends in any disci- Strong religion: The rise of fundamentalism around
pline are themselves embedded in the historical the world. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
contexts in which scientists work, it will be use- Amenta, E. (2006). When movements matter: The
Townsend Plan and the rise of social security.
ful for scholars to consider how protest and
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
counter-protest has changed by venue and Amenta, E., Carruthers, B. G., & Zyland, Y. (1992). A
medium over time. This includes what the rise hero for the aged? The Townsend movement, the polit-
and evolution of information communication ical mediation model, and U.S. old-age policy, 1934–
1950. American Journal of Sociology, 98(2),
technologies mean for social movements, such as
308–339.
those made available through the internet and on Amenta, E., Caren, N., & Olasky, S. J. (2005). Age for
cell phones. As Jennifer Earl, Katrina Kimport, leisure? Political mediation and the impact of the pen-
and their colleagues have demonstrated, social sion movement on U.S. old-age policy. American
Sociological Review, 70(3), 516–538.
movements use the internet as a means of sharing
Andrews, K. T. (2004). Freedom is a constant struggle:
information, garnering support and participation, The Mississippi civil rights movement and its legacy.
and as a medium to organize protests (Earl and Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kimport 2011). While the role of internet-based Ayoub, P. M. (2013). Cooperative transnationalism in
contemporary Europe: Europeanization and political
technologies and their importance varies by case,
opportunities for LGBT mobilization in the European
the potential for activists to connect—as well as Union. European Political Science Review, 5(2),
for countermovements and regimes to repress— 279–310.
through these relational networks have real-life Baumgartner, F. R., & Mahoney, C. (2005). Social move-
ments, the rise of new issues, and the public agenda. In
consequences for social movements, as activist
D. S. Meyer, V. Jenness, & H. Ingram (Eds.), Routing
bloggers, “Tweeps”, and journalists end up in the opposition: Social movements, public policy, and
prison or experience worse fates across the globe. democracy (pp. 65–86). Minneapolis: University of
At the same time, while states’ increased used of Minnesota Press.
Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes
surveillance technologies may signify growth in
and social movements: An overview and assessment.
the means of social control, activists are also Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639.
savvy and inventive in their use of those technol- Blee, K. M. (2012). Democracy in the making: How activ-
ogies as a way to document abuses, pursue their ist groups form. New York: Oxford University Press.
Blee, K. M., & Currier, A. (2006). How local social move-
claims, and shed light into dark places. Whether
ment groups handle a presidential election. Qualitative
internet-based activism is merely a form of Sociology, 29(3), 261–280.
“clicktivism” or something more remains an Bob, C. (2005). The marketing of rebellion: Insurgents,
important topic of debate and further empirical media, and international activism. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
inquiry (Carty 2015), but we submit that scholars
Borland, E., & Sutton, B. (2007). Quotidian disruption
would do well to understand whether what hap- and women’s activism in times of crisis, Argentina
pens online facilitates or hinders the face-to-face 2002–2003. Gender & Society, 21(5), 700–722.
interactions between movements and their par- Buechler, S. M. (2004). The strange career of strain and
breakdown theories of collective action. In D. A.
ticipants and the potential for social change.
Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), The Blackwell
companion to social movements (pp. 47–66). Malden:
Blackwell.
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movements in North America. In J. A. Beckford (Ed.),
Index
A Bases of identity
Abbott, A., 167 group, 352
Abrutyn, S., 1–13, 23, 28, 31, 45, 46, 127, person, 352
128, 130, 132, 207–226, 467, role, 352
506, 517, 527, 529 Bearman, P., 5, 181, 271
Accommodation, social movements, 530, 556, 562 Behavioral predispositions, 514, 518, 519
Accountability, 274, 276, 393–395, 403, 406 Behavioral propensities, 125, 126, 150, 518
Acting alone, 390, 401, 405, 407 Bentley, A., 172, 173
Activism, 482, 489, 490, 493, 495, 551–553, Bioprogrammers, 520
557, 560, 563 Black feminism, 483–486
Activity concept, 65–67, 69–77, 80, 81 Blau, P., 24, 26, 45, 47, 56, 136, 163, 181, 225, 269, 272,
Actor, 3, 23, 25, 45, 46, 63–65, 85, 88–90, 101, 299, 371, 515, 520
128, 130, 152, 156, 167, 185, 207, 210, Bourdieu, P., 6, 8, 10, 45, 46, 68, 73, 74, 79, 91, 101,
263, 273, 299, 324, 347, 369, 392, 412, 118, 186, 188, 189, 192–197, 200, 201, 216,
438, 460, 517, 530, 547 218, 221, 236, 401, 426, 448
Adapted mind, 514–516, 518–520, 523 Bourdieu, P. (and field theory). See Field theory,
Affect, 11, 12, 20, 44, 47, 74, 91, 125, 128, 170, 190, Bourdieu, P.
193, 221, 229, 269, 296, 323, 370, 390, 412, Breakdown, Theory of Movement Emergence, 550, 551
463, 478, 510, 531 Brokerage, 48, 174, 177, 282
Althusser, L., 168 Bureaucracy, 22, 43, 45, 50, 53, 55, 58, 135, 222, 272,
Asymmetric alternates, 397 273, 278, 279, 336, 395, 559
Authoritative justice, 378 Burke, P.J., 8, 76, 80, 86, 140, 163, 217, 225, 293, 306,
Authority, 22, 24, 28, 43, 46, 49, 50, 52, 54–56, 58, 59, 307, 313, 344, 346, 351–354, 360, 362, 380,
64, 67, 106, 111, 134, 137, 138, 142, 144, 415, 420–422, 425, 430, 438, 450
150, 190, 192, 200, 210, 211, 215–217, Burt, R., 48, 173, 177, 271, 282, 313
222, 242, 255, 275, 277, 301, 311, 332,
339–340, 356, 360, 370, 378–381, 401,
402, 415, 445–447, 462, 465, 534, 536, C
548, 550, 551, 553–556, 558, Callero, P.L., 305, 354, 362
560, 562 Capacity, 31, 33, 36, 46, 47, 49, 68, 71, 77, 85, 92, 94,
Authority structures, 144, 339–340, 379, 113, 117, 126, 127, 131, 140, 145, 146, 150,
548, 554, 555 158, 161, 162, 164, 170, 187, 189, 194, 212,
Authorization, 55, 379, 381 229, 237, 240, 265, 299, 349, 397, 429, 450,
Autonomy, 43, 64, 67, 69, 144, 153–155, 158–162, 521, 548, 557, 562
164, 207, 209–212, 214, 215, 217, 218, Capitalism, 38, 59, 91, 103, 131, 168, 208, 221, 231,
226, 249, 250, 253–255, 259, 263, 276, 235, 237, 241, 242, 258, 259, 438, 442–443,
356, 360, 438, 445 446, 487–490, 493, 509, 549, 555
Cheating detection mechanism, 515, 520
Civil rights movement, 139, 198, 307, 490, 549, 553,
B 555, 557, 561
Bales group, 322–324, 326, 327, 330 Class, 2, 3, 20, 23, 45, 51, 72, 96, 103, 125, 133, 156,
Bales, R.F., 11, 294–296, 322–324, 326, 425, 427 162, 177, 186, 223, 229, 275, 302, 335, 343,
Bargaining, 47, 56, 235, 242, 554, 555 372, 435, 443, 457, 459, 478, 479, 533, 547
biographical, 560 Closure, 174, 210, 404, 552
Coercion, 19, 25, 36, 44, 53, 80, 197, 230, 277, 379, 418, Direct exchange, 372
419, 425, 533, 534, 562 Discourse/speech/talk, 1, 9, 11, 28, 32, 33, 57, 76, 78–80,
Cognitive algorithms, 514, 515, 518–520 91, 93, 101, 103, 117, 130, 131, 173, 182, 197,
Cognitivism, 398 207, 209, 220, 221, 223, 225, 247, 276,
Coleman, J., 9, 48, 50, 54, 79, 150, 169–171, 176, 401 322–325, 339, 358, 370, 393, 394, 400, 401,
Collective behavior, 12, 13, 157, 527–542, 550, 553, 561 403, 404, 406, 423, 450, 458, 460, 461,
Collective orientation (defined), 296, 323, 329, 333 464–467, 469, 470, 479, 480, 484, 485, 487,
Commitment, 8, 23, 24, 28–30, 34–36, 48, 52, 56, 488, 495, 496, 531, 532, 540, 553, 556
68, 81, 103, 105, 111, 113, 131, 141–143, Discretion, 53, 56, 59, 274, 277, 395
145, 146, 149–165, 220, 221, 225, 263, Distributive justice, 378, 428
273, 276, 294, 299, 300, 304, 334, 347, Division of labor, 4, 5, 26, 34, 43, 49, 52, 54, 58, 59, 73,
353, 360, 373, 378, 396, 400, 406, 421, 125, 130, 134, 136–139, 225, 254, 257, 258,
427, 444, 492, 535 322, 428, 481, 509, 522, 557
extensive and affective, 152, 155, 158–162, Double standards research, 337–338
220, 347, 427, 467 Dramaturgy, 412–419, 431
Communalism, 69 Dual process, 115, 448–449, 537–539
Consequent processualism, 79 Durkheim, E., 3, 5–10, 12, 19, 21, 22, 43, 44, 59, 69–71,
Constructive analysis, 397 73, 104–107, 110, 111, 118, 167, 208,
Conventions, 57, 169, 172, 174, 179, 197, 229, 255, 357, 211–213, 222, 248, 250, 251, 253–256, 263,
400, 404, 528 302, 311, 322, 429, 435, 437, 438, 442, 443,
Conversation analysis, 178, 395, 400, 402–404, 406 448, 450, 457, 458, 463–465, 472, 503,
Cooley, C.H., 3, 86, 250, 251, 255, 256, 263, 508–511, 541, 549
305, 344–346, 354, 357, 361,
420, 421, 503
Coordination, 7, 24, 28, 45, 52, 66, 73, 127, 131, 132, E
149, 150, 174, 176, 178, 181, 242, 278–280, Ecological-evolutionary theory, 516, 518
345, 375, 404, 437, 508 Ecological factors, role in movement emergence,
Counter-mobilization, counter-movements, 26, 114, 548, 551–552
550, 554, 559, 560 Ecology, 10, 35–36, 139–140, 201, 210, 216–220, 225,
cultural, 114 256–259, 264, 275, 504, 511, 522, 523,
Cross-species analysis, 516 532–534
Culture Eisenstadt, S.N., 7, 46, 47, 209, 215, 216, 222, 223
properties of, 128, 517 Embedding, 23, 24, 27, 29, 31, 125, 132, 133, 135–137,
role in movement emergence, 553 142, 144, 145, 158, 347, 373
Culture and the self, 357 successive nature of, 31, 135–136, 142, 144
Embodied action, 393, 401, 403–405, 407
Emergence
D social movement, 537, 549–550
Dahl, R., 47, 49 theory of, 538
Deliberative movements, 557 Emergent properties, 8, 71, 170, 516, 517, 523
Dependence, 47, 48, 54, 143, 173, 192, 242, 299–301, Emerson, Richard, 47, 48, 56, 143, 156, 299–301, 371,
311, 371–373 372, 443, 515, 520
Depersonalization of power, 54, 59 Emotions, 5, 7, 24, 25, 75, 86, 132, 150, 210, 248, 254,
Dewey, J., 73, 76, 172, 173, 305, 389, 390, 398, 405, 301, 338–339, 346, 373, 411–431, 437, 463,
539, 541 520, 527, 551
Dialogue, 12, 75, 77, 182, 225, 387, 388, 390, 400, role in movement emergence, 551
403, 407, 435, 443, 458, 461, 463, 465, sentiment and status, 339
469, 507, 523, 562 Empiricism, 63, 73, 171, 485, 495
Differentiation Encounters, 8–10, 19–21, 27, 29–35, 37, 52, 72, 86, 124,
physical space, 12, 217, 224 125, 130, 132–146, 154–156, 159–161, 165,
properties of, 22 172, 188, 207, 209, 211, 217, 220, 221, 224,
social space, 225 225, 237, 263, 278, 336, 337, 343, 349, 371,
symbolic space, 213, 218 382, 394, 396, 398, 404, 519
temporal space, 216, 218 transactional needs in, 32–34, 140–142, 144
DiMaggio, P., 8, 35, 52, 57, 59, 99, 113, 114, Endorsement, 55, 379–381, 447
185, 188, 190, 193, 195, 197, 208, Environment of evolutionary adaptedness
216, 222, 275, 314 (EEA), 515, 519
DiMaggio, P. (and field theory). See Field theory, Epigenetic rules, 514, 518
DiMaggio, P. Epistemology, 1, 67, 76, 213, 478, 479, 483, 485, 492
Index 573
Identity J
role in movement emergence, 551 James, W., 46, 50, 51, 73, 170, 344, 346, 362, 392, 445,
standard, 351, 353, 380, 422 446, 539, 541
verification, 163, 343, 351–353, 380 Justice, 28, 33, 67, 68, 131, 144, 179, 214, 215, 218, 219,
Ideology/Ideologies, 4, 21, 22, 24–29, 31, 34, 37–39, 57, 221, 223, 331, 340, 360, 369–382, 392, 411,
65, 93, 102, 103, 113, 114, 129–136, 142, 146, 425–431, 436, 440, 441, 443, 466, 478, 479,
159, 168, 221, 236, 238, 251, 257, 259, 264, 481, 483, 484, 486, 488, 489
285, 413, 436, 442, 446, 454, 485, 486, 493,
554–556
Impulse, 66, 357, 407, 430, 472, 530, 539 K
Inclusive fitness, 374, 505, 511, 513, 514 Kin selection, 511–514
Indexical expressions, 393, 395, 407 Kohn, M.L., 356
Individual (Darwinian) fitness, 505, 511
Individualism, 67–69, 71, 167–171, 182, 248, 250, 252,
254, 255, 259, 260, 357, 358, 435 L
Inequity, 235, 274, 428, 429, 442, 488, 492, 494 Lareau, A., 99, 311, 356
Information communication technologies, 563 Legitimacy, 51, 53, 55, 59, 146, 187, 190, 191, 195,
internet, 563 196, 198, 200, 201, 214, 222, 276, 277, 340,
Initiations, 324, 326, 372 369–382, 401, 425–430, 440, 441, 459, 463,
Institutional analysis, 44, 79, 208, 224, 228 468, 548, 554, 556
Institutional autonomy, 217, 218 Legitimacy and authority, 401
Institutional entrepreneurs, 193–195, 211, 215, 506 Legitimation, 7, 10–12, 142, 188, 339, 370, 379,
Institutionalization/institution formation, 380, 465, 472
46, 77–79, 92, 188, 190, 193, 198, Level of analysis, 77, 78, 273, 343, 559
202, 208, 215, 271, 275, 285, 458, Loadability, emic of theories, 65
485, 489, 491–492, 557, 559 Looking glass self, 86, 344–346, 420
Institutional logic, 46, 185, 198, 201, 202, Luhmann, N., 25, 36, 131, 139, 209, 210, 216, 220,
209, 221, 225 223–225
Institutional sphere
definition of, 57, 207
evolution of, 208–211 M
institutional core, 207, 215, 217–220 Macro
institutional environment, 222 cultural properties of, 128
Institutions, 6, 10, 11, 24, 28, 44–47, 51, 54, 57–59, structural properties of, 138–140
66, 70, 71, 73, 77–81, 107, 114, 128, 132, Macrosociety, 521, 522
134, 151, 159, 160, 168, 186, 190, 193, Mann, M., 25, 44–46, 198
195, 196, 198, 207–212, 214, 216, 217, Marx, K., 3, 4, 6–8, 12, 43, 44, 59, 68, 72, 73, 96,
220, 221, 224, 225, 230–232, 235, 238, 100–103, 106, 118, 125, 167, 168, 211, 229,
240–243, 255, 258–260, 270, 275, 287, 231, 236, 248, 254, 255, 258, 263, 391, 442,
311, 347, 356–358, 374, 391, 444, 478, 508, 509, 528, 529, 535, 536, 547, 549
482–486, 489, 494, 503, 504, 508, 510, Maximization principle, 513
517, 529, 548, 553, 555, 561, 562 McAdam, D. (and field theory). See Field theory,
Institutiosis, 79 McAdam, D.
Integration Mead, G.H., 3, 11, 68, 75, 85–87, 94, 167, 170, 188,
cultural mechanisms of, 21 195, 301, 302, 305, 311, 345, 346, 348,
definition of, 19 349, 357, 389, 392, 405, 420, 421, 458,
macrodynamics of, 20–29 460, 461, 509, 530, 539, 541
mesodynamics of, 34–39 Meaning, 5, 6, 28, 44, 46, 67, 85–97, 101, 139, 151, 179,
microdynamics of, 29–34 187, 210, 248, 275, 297, 344, 370, 394, 412,
structural mechanisms of, 21–29 436, 458, 507, 532, 548
Intentionality, 65, 388, 392, 399, 451 Media and the self, 351
Interaction Merleau-Ponty, M., 168, 170, 172, 188, 388–390,
order, 401, 405–407, 529 392, 398, 399, 405
regularities, 323–324, 326 Merton, R., 4–6, 25, 76, 168, 177, 213, 225, 269,
Interdependence, 43, 59, 171, 173, 254, 256, 258, 358, 273, 305, 306, 428
359, 375, 417, 490, 509 Meso
Intersections, 21, 24, 26–27, 31, 35, 36, 39, 76, 91, cultural beliefs in, 134
136–138, 223, 229, 344, 352, 414–416, structural properties of, 132–134
478, 480, 481, 484–486, 488–489, Meso-level (and field theory). See Field theory,
491, 493, 494 meso-level
Index 575
Metaphor, theories as, 6, 65, 66, 70, 71, 74, 76, Organizing, 7, 8, 20, 35, 69, 71, 125, 127–129, 131,
110, 188, 189, 212, 217, 293, 351, 143, 190, 253, 254, 258, 265, 294–296,
412, 413, 419, 445, 466, 467, 493, 335, 459, 478, 480–482, 485–491, 493,
505, 508, 535 495, 496, 506, 508, 548, 551
Methodological individualsim, 171 Outcomes, social movements, 559–560
Methods, 1, 2, 53, 70, 86, 87, 157, 167, 224, 247, 271, policy, 559, 560
300, 313, 387, 411, 540, 554, 557
Michels, R., 50, 51, 53, 80, 222, 269, 556
Micro P
cultural expectations in, 137–138 Parsons, T., 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 19, 76, 77, 96, 100, 102,
structural properties of, 138 104, 106–113, 115–117, 124, 129, 131, 152,
Micro/macro, 1, 7, 19, 43–59, 91, 123–146, 168, 185, 168, 169, 207, 209, 211–213, 216, 220, 225,
210, 229, 255, 276, 293, 322, 343, 369, 411, 322, 390–392, 510, 511, 535
442, 462, 491, 534 Perceivers, 376, 377, 539
Milgram, 181, 401, 402 Perceptual overlap, 450–452
Mische, A, 8, 167, 172, 179 Performance, 58, 75–77, 80, 96, 97, 131, 150, 217, 221,
Modernity and the self, 344 224, 225, 260, 269, 273, 274, 276, 277, 279,
institutional vs. impulsive selves, 344 281, 286, 296, 297, 323–327, 329–331,
Moral 333–335, 337–340, 348, 350–352, 355,
emotions, 437–439 401–403, 412–414, 416, 421, 438
identity, 337, 344, 351, 352, 360, 440–442, Performance expectation states (defined), 324, 325
445, 448–450 Performativity, 76, 77
Motives, motivation, 32, 54, 63, 64, 67, 75, 78, 104, Person identities, 346, 348, 352, 359, 360
114, 145, 163, 188, 194, 197, 239, 249, Phenomenology, 71, 118, 185, 187, 188, 190, 261,
252, 270, 297, 298, 351, 355, 359, 370, 264, 387–407, 521
377, 392, 396, 400, 401, 440, 441, 445, Political fecundity of theories, 68
527, 530–532, 538–542 Political opportunity theory, 550–552, 557, 561
Political process theory, 240, 263, 357, 468,
471, 550, 558
N Politics, 36, 43, 65, 169, 237, 240, 250, 252, 286, 419,
Negotiated exchange, 372, 373, 451 436, 464, 478, 547
Neoinstitutional theory (and field theory). See Field Popper, K., 168
theory, Neoinstitutional theory Positions and ranks, 53
Networks, 3, 9, 22, 48, 153, 167, 185, 198, Powell, W.W. (and field theory). See Field theory,
209, 236, 258, 270, 271, 300, 344, Powell, W.W.
347, 373, 405, 421, 439, 465, 516, Power, 2, 4, 23, 43–59, 63, 91, 112, 127, 153, 156, 169,
532, 535, 551–553 185, 210, 229, 251, 258, 269, 293, 324, 350,
Networks, role in movement emergence, 552 369, 401, 414, 436, 457, 477, 528, 547
Neurosocial evolution, 516, 520–521 Power and authority, 211, 222
Neurosociology, 361, 521, 523 Power balance, 50, 173
Niches, 35–39, 212, 218, 236, 239, 517 Practice, 1, 2, 7, 46, 51, 52, 63, 68, 72–74, 76, 77,
80, 94, 103, 114, 133, 139, 169, 171,
174, 186, 188–191, 196, 198, 207, 210,
O 217, 221, 222, 225, 237, 241, 243, 260–262,
Ontic fecundity of theories, 66 269, 270, 273–277, 279–282, 285, 309,
Opportunity structures, 347, 353, 371, 550 310, 356–358, 362, 380, 387, 389–407,
Oppression, 240, 241, 264, 436, 478, 479, 481–495 430, 437, 442, 448, 449, 464, 467, 477,
Organic evolution, 504–508, 510 481, 485–487, 489, 490, 495, 496, 548,
Organizational fields (and field theory). See Field theory, 555, 557, 558, 560
organizational fields Praxis, 72–74, 76, 401–403, 407, 478, 482, 486, 488
Organizational forms, social movements, 10, 13, 51, 57, Prepared (biased, directed) learning, 519, 523
99, 133, 143, 146, 164, 180, 195, 198, 201, Procedural justice, 370, 378, 381, 428
208, 264, 265, 270, 272, 277, 278, 280, 283, Productive exchange, 144, 372
284, 357, 496, 527, 528, 533, 535–537, 540, Propositions, theoretical, 328–329
541, 547–563 Propriety, 379
Organizations, 2, 6, 19, 20, 43, 69, 70, 91, 114, 123, 125,
149, 177, 180, 186, 187, 207, 208, 236, 247,
269–287, 321, 343, 378, 395, 421, 441, 460, Q
469, 480, 504, 533, 547 Quotidian disruption, 535, 536, 551
576 Index
R Rules, 5, 25, 44, 46, 49, 50, 53–56, 59, 68, 74, 76, 93,
Race, 3, 11, 34, 58, 90, 177, 181, 229, 230, 126, 137, 139, 185, 187, 189–193, 195–199,
275, 286, 294, 323, 343, 406, 208, 217, 218, 220, 222, 252, 270, 272, 274,
415–416, 435, 478, 547 278, 279, 302, 303, 309, 312, 378, 393, 395,
Radcliffe-Brown, A., 108, 168 396, 398, 405, 406, 413–415, 417–420, 426,
Radical social movements, 164, 362, 529, 556 430, 437, 438, 440, 444, 463, 514, 518, 519,
reform-oriented social movements, 554 539, 549, 550, 553
Rational action, 63–65, 67–69, 71 Rules as resources, 393, 395
Receivers, 335, 376, 377, 414 Ryle, G., 115, 169, 398
Reciprocal exchange, 372, 373, 451
Reflexes, 518
Reflexivity, 68, 85, 194, 345, 358, 393–395, S
407, 420, 541 Salience, 3, 39, 136–142, 156, 215, 220, 305, 328, 329,
Regulation, 5, 7, 8, 10–12, 23, 44, 53, 59, 127, 128, 150, 347, 415, 421
213, 241, 270, 278, 286, 337, 379, 382, 395, Sanctions/sanctioning, 30–34, 47, 51, 139, 141–143, 145,
508, 509, 517, 548 146, 156, 190, 220, 223, 374, 393, 426
Relational sociology, 167–182 Scott, W. Richard, 44, 49, 190, 208, 269, 270,
Relations, 5, 20, 43, 68, 69, 86, 99, 125, 153, 167, 187, 276, 279, 379
188, 208, 209, 231, 248, 270, 339, 371, 396, Second Darwinian revolution, 503, 504, 507–522
422, 465, 482, 513, 535, 547 Self-concept, 305, 345, 349, 354, 355, 375
Religion, 10, 19, 22, 25, 29, 38, 43, 44, 46, 70, 99, 103, Self-construals
104, 128, 130–133, 135, 207, 208, 210, 214, independent, 358, 359, 361
215, 217, 221, 223–226, 250, 391, 442–444, interdependent, 358, 359, 361
446, 449, 451, 457, 458, 467, 486, 492, 506, relational, 359, 360
527, 547, 555, 562 Self-esteem
Religious movements, 560, 562 authenticity, 352
repertoires, 6, 94, 172, 275, 279, 468, 471, self-efficacy, 164, 352, 354, 370, 422
518, 521, 555, 561 self-worth, 346, 352, 422
Representations, 67, 104–106, 110, 111, 114, Self-presentation, 310, 322, 350–351, 406, 449
262, 335, 459–463, 468, 470, 478, Serpe, R.T., 306, 347, 348
480, 511, 537, 559 Sexuality, 240, 478, 479, 481, 482, 484,
Reputation, 48, 55, 57, 285, 310, 380, 439, 440, 452, 488–490, 492–494
463, 464, 484 Sexual violence, 479, 481, 484–488
Resource mobilization, theory of movement emergence, Shils, E., 76, 106, 109, 113, 209, 216, 217, 459
535, 536, 550, 562 Shop floor problem, 400
revolutionary movements, 554, 555 Simmel, G., 3, 9, 23, 48, 69, 74, 75, 86, 131, 167, 173,
Resources, 3, 20, 46, 47, 68, 79, 94, 99, 100, 127, 151, 220, 225, 248, 255, 256, 307–309, 312, 322,
169, 173, 185, 186, 210, 211, 229, 237, 248, 376, 508, 509
277, 298, 336, 347, 369, 393, 418, 438, 483, Slavery, 238, 443, 467, 479–489, 492, 495
487, 505, 535, 536, 550 SNA. See Social network analysis (SNA)
Respecification, 393, 396, 401, 405, 407 Social action, 1, 8, 50, 71, 75–77, 94, 104, 106, 117, 171,
Revolutions, 43, 55, 64, 67, 72, 73, 78, 197, 222, 185, 186, 188, 208, 255, 263, 265, 269–287,
229–231, 277, 312, 459, 503, 504, 507–522, 390–393, 395, 398, 400, 401, 403, 405, 406,
527, 531, 547, 551 468, 528, 554
Rituals, 5, 8, 12, 20, 25, 40, 43, 70, 78, 139–141, 144, Social class, 15, 20, 31, 39, 135–137, 177, 186, 236, 278,
209, 213, 218, 221, 225, 311, 401, 429–430, 286, 311, 352, 356–357, 435, 443, 457
444, 447, 457, 459, 463, 464, 467, 470, 506, Social comparison, 358, 369–371, 376, 377, 379, 382
521, 552, 556, 557 Social dilemmas, 149–151, 153, 162, 303
Role, 2, 6, 33, 48, 50, 63, 64, 85, 101, 103, 138, 152, Social exchange, 152, 156–158, 221, 299, 369–382,
156, 168, 186, 209, 232, 236, 248, 274, 299, 425–430, 515, 520
305, 335, 344, 372, 389, 411, 412, 446, 459, Social force, 11, 255, 258, 259, 261, 264, 274,
480, 508, 529, 549 347, 382, 411
Role identities, 33, 140, 220, 225, 305, 306, 308, 346, Social movement society, 553
348, 352, 359, 360, 362 Social network analysis (SNA), 168, 171, 174, 175,
Role-taking, 345, 348–351, 361, 521 177–182, 521
Rosenberg, Morris, 345–347, 349, 355, 357 Social networks, 48, 167–182, 236, 239, 279, 282,
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, 53, 54, 59, 222 300, 312, 313, 344, 347, 348, 351, 376,
Rule of proximity, 218, 220 521, 532, 535, 560
Index 577
Social order, 43, 44, 63, 64, 73, 99, 111, 123–146, Status processes
149–165, 180, 185–187, 189, 191, 192, adult task groups, 335, 336
195, 196, 199, 200, 202, 209, 236, 250, distinct from dominance, 331–332
264, 273, 275, 277, 355, 391, 403, in juries, 329–331
407, 530, 551 in schools, 334–335
Social phenomenology, 387–407 in soccer teams, 308, 323, 330
Social product, 259, 347 Status value, spread of, 337
Social psychology and social movements, 7, 10, 47, 86, Stets, J.E., 8, 11, 12, 86, 140, 163, 306, 313,
99, 104, 133, 134, 164, 180, 188, 195, 209, 343–362, 379, 421, 422, 438, 440,
264, 270, 294, 357, 402, 411, 444, 496, 509, 441, 450, 540
527, 537, 547–563 Stinchcombe, A., 50, 51, 53, 274, 275, 285
Social Science, 13, 65–68, 70, 76, 80, 81, 99, 107, Strategic action fields (and field theory).
180, 187, 239, 248, 253, 369, 376, 390, See Field theory, strategic action fields
391, 393–395, 397, 401, 411, 440, 446, Strategies, social movements, 554–556
447, 458, 477, 478, 489–491, 494, 496, tactical interactions, 555, 556, 559
503, 512, 514–516, 518, 519, 523, 527, Stratification, 2, 6, 10–12, 19–21, 25–29, 31, 34–38,
528, 536, 537, 540, 542 124, 125, 128, 130–138, 141, 142, 145,
Social solidarity, 437, 442, 443, 457, 464, 468, 469, 523 146, 211, 213, 225, 229–243, 261, 262,
Social strain, theory of movement emergence, 549–551 272, 285, 287, 311, 348, 350, 477, 478,
Social structure, 9, 19, 24–26, 31, 34, 37, 49–51, 77, 492, 495, 504, 510, 517
90, 96, 99, 110, 117, 126, 127, 129, 132, 138, Structure and agency, 79, 178–179, 182, 192
140, 142, 144, 154, 157, 181, 189, 192, 202, Stryker, S., 8, 94, 220, 294, 305–308, 344, 347, 348,
208, 222, 224, 236, 240, 248, 275, 281, 357, 415, 420–422, 438
293–314, 336–339, 347–348, 354, 369, 373, Superorganism, 506, 508, 512
379, 382, 395, 397, 401, 412, 421, 425, 428, Symbolic interaction, 188, 397
448, 450, 477, 480–482, 484, 485, 493, 495, Symbols, 25, 109, 110, 126, 131, 133, 210, 219, 261,
503, 506, 508–510, 517, 520, 522, 531, 535, 309, 311, 345, 420, 468, 470, 471, 507, 517,
548, 554, 555 532, 555, 560
Social ties, 70, 151, 172, 173, 273, 278, 281, 285, 306, Systems
347, 418, 421, 439, 521, 522 behavioral, 76
Social worlds, 6–9, 11, 58, 70, 81, 90, 91, 93, cultural, 27, 29, 37, 38, 76, 101, 107, 109,
95–97, 114, 123, 149, 151, 167, 169–172, 111, 113, 115–117, 127, 129, 210,
174, 180, 181, 188, 189, 192, 194, 196, 220, 250, 469, 548
202, 207, 214, 226, 312, 314, 390, 391, personality, 76, 107, 109, 116
402, 413, 419, 420, 485 social, 76, 106, 107, 109, 110, 116, 168, 200,
Societal organization, levels of, 20, 129, 523 247, 254, 261, 312, 321, 322, 503, 517,
Sociobiology, 503, 511–518, 520, 522, 523 520, 522, 523
Sociocultural evolution, 211–213, 504–508,
516–518, 523
Sociological methods, 247 T
Sociology of morality, 12, 435–438, 445, Tactics, social movements
448–450, 452 transgressive, 55, 547, 548
Spillover, social movements, 11, 553, 558 unintended, 558–559
SSSM. See Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) Task focus (defined), 323
Stage models, 211, 212, 509–511, 517, 523 Thatcher, M., 169
Standard Social Science Model (SSSM), Thick and thin morality, 436, 437
514, 516, 518, 519 Transactions, 48, 50, 55–57, 172, 173, 270, 282,
State, modern, 240 372, 373, 376
Status Trust
in encounters, 336, 337 ontogenetic theories, 375
nature of, 138 proximate causation theories, 374
transactional needs in, 140–142 ultimate causation theories, 374
Status characteristics Turner, J.H., 1, 6, 7, 9, 10, 19–40, 57, 123–146, 150, 151,
beauty, 333–334 154–156, 159–163, 165, 207, 209–213, 216,
diffuse (defined), 138, 328 220, 308, 343, 344, 346, 348, 354, 357, 360,
and expectation states, 326–329 430, 435, 438, 439, 443, 450, 504–510,
motherhood and fatherhood, 334 515–518, 520–522
specific (defined), 327–328 Turner, R.H., 220, 348, 349, 357, 528, 529,
Status construction, 298, 336–337 531–533, 537, 538
578 Index
U Values, 3, 6, 21, 43, 44, 68, 69, 106, 129, 149, 173, 175,
Uncertainty, 46, 48, 54–57, 151, 156, 190, 195, 190, 210, 232, 252, 273, 298, 321, 344, 371,
276, 300, 374, 375, 381, 397, 443, 401, 414, 437, 464, 517, 532, 548
468, 470, 535 Veblen, T., 51, 321, 322, 508, 509
Understanding Verification, 33, 40, 140, 163, 177, 343, 351–353, 380
discursive, 75, 78, 93, 467, 480
emotive, 75, 78, 538–540
sensory, 78 W
Universal human concerns, 211, 213–215 Weber, M., 2, 3, 6–8, 12, 22, 23, 25, 38, 43, 44, 46, 47,
50, 53, 55, 64, 66, 68, 75, 76, 79, 80, 99–104,
106, 107, 110, 111, 116, 118, 152, 170, 185,
V 187, 188, 209, 215, 216, 222, 226, 229, 231,
Validation, 78, 79 248, 255, 269, 272, 287, 332, 340, 374, 379,
Validity, 6, 47, 79, 110, 111, 186, 379, 381, 390, 405, 438, 442, 443, 465–467, 547
381, 398, 422 White, H., 154, 172, 180, 185, 190, 551