JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF

Nature: Petition for certiorari and prohibition arising from the proceedings initiated by the
Preparatory Recall Assembly of Pasay City (PRA) in the Commission on Elections in E.M. No. 99-
005 entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 01, S-
1999 ADOPTED ON 29 MAY 1999 FOR THE RECALL OF MAYOR JOVITO CLAUDIO OF PASAY CITY.
The petition seeks to nullify the resolution, dated October 18, 1999, of the COMELEC giving due
course to the petition for the recall of petitioner Jovito O. Claudio as mayor of Pasay City.

Facts: Jovito O. Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections.
He assumed office on July 1, 1998.

Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City
gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of
confidence. Thereafter, they formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the PRA.
1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan
chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE
RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. A
formal submission of it was made to the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999
accompanied by an affidavit of service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor. Pursuant to
the rules of the COMELEC, copies of the petition were posted on different areas of Pasay City.
Subsequently, a verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the resolution was
conducted.

Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and
Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the
signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting;
(2) most of the signatories were only representatives of the parties concerned who were sent
there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA took place within the
one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case, filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court,
seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should
first be decided before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall
resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA since it included double
entries, those not duly accredited members of the barangays, officials who had withdrawn their
support, as well as those who executed affidavits of retraction.

COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the oppositions. On the issue of whether
the PRA was constituted by a majority of its members, the COMELEC held that the 1,073
members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the
PRA. Its records showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while 1,876 members
was on the record of DILG. In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the
PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of the recall resolution. On whether the
pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of petitioner was a prejudicial question which
must first be decided before any recall election could be held, the COMELEC ruled that it was not
and that petitioner was merely using the pendency of the case to delay the recall proceedings.
Finally, on whether the petition for recall violated the bar on recall within one year from the
elective official's assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the negative, holding that recall is a
process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July
2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, it was held
that the petition was filed on time.

Issues:
1. Does the word "recall" in Sec. 74(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 cover a
process which includes the convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval
of the recall resolution?

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 2. Does the term "regular local election" in the last clause of Sec. 74(b) include the election
period for a regular election or simply the date of such election?

Ruling: WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 140560 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Ratio:

1. The Supreme Court agrees that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the
preparatory recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the
registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall
resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, the
fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled
date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of §74, "recall" refers to the election itself by
means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his
replacement. Several reasons can be cited in support of this conclusion:

(a) Because §74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to §69, is a power
which shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since
the voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the
initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period
provided in paragraph (b). In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b)
refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing
of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at
least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall;

(b) Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a
sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done
until the day of the election. For to allow recall proceedings to be initiated before
the official concerned has been in office for one-year would be to allow him to be
judged without sufficient basis; and

(c) Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of
recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly
guaranteed in the Constitution.

2. The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this
limitation to refer to the campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election
Code, it could have expressly said so. Actually, because no recall election may be held
until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on
June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the
following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only
nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph
(b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months, which
would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government units
"more responsive and accountable."

To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, §74 imposes limitations on the holding of
recall elections. First, paragraph (a) prohibits the holding of such election more than once
during the term of office of an elective local official. Second, paragraph (b) prohibits the
holding of such election within one year from the date the official assumed office. And
third, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of a recall election within one year immediately
preceding a regular local election. As succinctly stated in Paras v. COMELEC, "[p]aragraph
(b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such
elective local official may be subject to recall election, that is, during the second year of
office."

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