15 LG Foods V Pagapong Agraviador
15 LG Foods V Pagapong Agraviador
FACTS
FEBRUARY 26, 1996: Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa
Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident. In time, an Information for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Bacolod City.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by
conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal
case.
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against
the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise
due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the petitioners as defendants denied liability for the death of the
Vallejeras’ 7-year old son, claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in the selection and supervision
of their employees, including the deceased driver. They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera couple.
In an Order dated September 4, 2001, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for
pre-trial. With their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court, the petitioners then went on
certiorari to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in
refusing to dismiss the basic complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845.
April 25, 2003, the CA denied the petition and upheld the trial court averring that the complaint neither represents nor
implies that the responsibility charged was the petitioner’s subsidiary liability under Art. 103, Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, it was held that responsibility for fault or negligence under Art. 2176, Civil Code, which is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore,
the liability under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate, and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee or prior showing of the latter’s insolvency.”
ISSUE/S
RULING
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein petitioners are being
made to account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The
complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal case
filed against him nor his insolvency.
Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of
remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault
and negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise
due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of
their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family
in the selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented
the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7year old son.
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities
on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto; and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as
those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law; the intentional torts; and culpa aquiliana); or (b) where the injured
party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either of
these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of
such employee.
DETAILS THAT ARE NOT RELEVANT BUT MIGHT GET ASKED ANYWAY
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of
their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)