Professional Documents
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Matrix Cases Constirev - Modes of Acquisition To Sovereignty
Matrix Cases Constirev - Modes of Acquisition To Sovereignty
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REPUBLIC v. ONG Respondent Ong, then 38 years old, filed a Petition Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside.
for Naturalization. Ong alleged in his petition that he Ong has proved that he has
has been a "businessman/business manager" since some known lucrative trade, The courts must always be mindful that naturalization
1989, earning an average annual income of profession or lawful occupation proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.
P150,000.00. When he testified, however, he said in accordance with Section 2, Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
that he has been a businessman since he graduated fourth paragraph of the Revised strictly construed in favor of the government and
from college in 1978. Moreover, Ong did not specify Naturalization Law? against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon
or describe the nature of his business. the applicant to show full and complete compliance
with the requirements of law.
As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax
returns for the years 1994 to 1997. Based on these Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some
returns, Ongs gross annual income was P60,000.00 known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation"
for 1994; P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for means "not only that the person having the
1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997. On November 23, employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in
2001, the trial court granted Ongs petition. life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an
income such that there is an appreciable margin of his
The Republic, through the Solicitor General, income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an
appealed to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial adequate support in the event of unemployment,
court for granting Ong's petition despite his failure sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones
to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, becoming the object of charity or a public charge." His
profession or lawful occupation as required under income should permit "him and the members of his
Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance
Naturalization Law. with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently
with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our
The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial civilization."
courts finding, respondent Ong did not prove his
allegation that he is a businessman/business It has been held that in determining the existence of a
manager earning an average income of P150,000.00 lucrative income, the courts should consider only the
since 1989. His income tax returns belie the value of applicant's income; his or her spouses income should
his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence not be included in the assessment. The spouses
on the nature of his profession or trade, which is the additional income is immaterial "for under the law the
source of his income. Considering that he has four petitioner should be the one to possess some known
minor children (all attending exclusive private lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to
schools), he has declared no other property and/or qualify him to become a Filipino citizen." Lastly, the
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bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a Court has consistently held that the applicant's
family home, his alleged income cannot be qualifications must be determined as of the time of the
considered lucrative. Under the circumstances, the filing of his petition.
Republic maintained that respondent Ong is not
qualified as he does not possess a definite and A review of the decisions involving petitions for
existing business or trade. naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded
from reviewing the factual existence of the applicant's
qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the
entire records of the naturalization case are open for
consideration in an appeal to this Court. Indeed, "[a]
naturalization proceeding is so infused with public
interest that it has been differently categorized and
given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial
contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization
does not preclude the reopening of that case and giving
the government another opportunity to present new
evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will
not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason
supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the
certification of naturalization already granted, on the
ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently
procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised
in the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the
matters brought to the attention of this Court x x x
involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the
lower court and admitted by the parties in their
pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered
adequate for the purpose of determining the
correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light
of the law and extant jurisprudence." In the case at bar,
there is even no need to present new evidence. A
careful review of the extant records suffices to hold that
respondent Ong has not proven his possession of a
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"known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation"
to qualify for naturalization.
REPUBLIC v. KARBASI
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Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application.
However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of
the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s
husband is a Filipino citizen, as only their marriage
certificate was presented to establish his citizenship. As
the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino
citizenship has been adequately proven. Under judicial
proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate
indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos.
He also submitted voter’s registration, land titles, and
business registrations/licenses, all of which are public
records.
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parents Con Boon Peng and Lourdes Vhong K. Tba are account of the naturalization of mandated to prove the ff material allegations in the
Chinese citizens. their Father Co Boon Peng? petition:
Co Boon Peng filed an application for his 1. That they are legitimate children;
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the 2. They were born in the Philippines
Special Committee on naturalization under Letter of 3. That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng
Instruction no. 270. His application was granted and was naturalized as a Filipino citizen
he was conferred Philippine citizenship under
PD1055. He was issued a certificate of naturalization
and consequently took an oath as Philippine citizen
on February 15, 1977.
JUDICIAL NATURALIZATION
GO v. REPUBLIC Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under Whether or not Go’s petition for No. Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization,
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, the Revised naturalization should be the application must show substantial and formal
Naturalization Law. Aside from his presentation of all granted. compliance with C.A. No. 473. In other words, an
other requirements, petitioner presented, as applicant must comply with the jurisdictional
witnesses, Dr. Anlacan, Dr. Tordesillas, Silvino Ong, requirements, establish his or her possession of the
Teresita Go, and Juan Go. qualifications and none of the disqualifications
enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2)
Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the psychiatric
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examination he conducted on petitioner, he had no character witnesses to support his allegations.
psychiatric abnormality at the time of the test. Dr.
Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported that In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court listed the
petitioner’s medical examination results were requirements for character witnesses, namely:
normal. Ong, a friend of petitioner’s family, said that
he had known petitioner since childhood through his 1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;
association with the family in times of celebration. 2. That they are “credible persons”;
Teresita described him as a peace-loving person who
participated in activities sponsored by his school and 3. That they personally know the petitioner;
the barangay. Lastly, Juan, a businessman by 4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the
profession, also claimed that he knew petitioner Philippines for the period of time required by
personally. law;
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warranty of the worthiness of petitioner.”
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After all the jurisdictional requirements "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to
mandated by Section 9 of CA 473had been a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be
complied with, the Office of the Solicitor lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
General (OSG) filed its Motion to Philippines."
Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed
to allege that she is engaged in a lawful Under this provision, foreign women who are married to
occupation or in some known lucrative Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine
trade. citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove
that they possess other qualifications for naturalization
at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from
similar laws in the United States which has since been
amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15
of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to confer
Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative
naturalization.
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disqualified by the cited section from becoming
naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter
promulgates its order or decision granting or denying
the petition.( NOTE: in this case, Ascuzena followed such
procedure but it was denied [by ministry of justice] so
she filed the petition for naturalization)
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This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration
of Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial
naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner
believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare
or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second,
the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks
judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a
Philippine citizen based on requirements required under
CA 473.Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial
scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that
privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of
making her a part of a truly Filipino family
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not those set forth in C.A. No. 473. Is the contention
correct? Why?
ANS: No. The qualifications and disqualifications of an
applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in
Sections 2 and 4 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand,
Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the
qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for
naturalization by administrative act.
ANS: No. First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are
separate and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-born
aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who
never saw any other country and all along thought that
they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and
loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and
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traditions. To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in
enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less
technical and more encouraging which is administrative
rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the
legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the
naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing
from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was
intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139.
What the legislature had in mind was merely to
prescribed another mode of acquiring Philippine
citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens.
The only implication is that, a native born alien has the
choice to apply for judicial or administrative
naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications
and disqualifications.
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application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we
maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two
laws, an alien who is not qualified under R.A. No. 9139
may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.
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ANS: Yes. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein
does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of
naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently
discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading
the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence
even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of
naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising
subsequent to the granting of the certificate. If the
government can challenge a final grant of citizenship,
with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC
within the reglementary period despite its failure to
oppose the petition before the lower court.
Note:
It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of
the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines
can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not
be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it,
and upon strict compliance with the law.
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all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor
does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship.
REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP
TECSON v. COMELEC Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition Whether or not FPJ is a natural Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as
before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due born Filipino citizen?; Whether taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon or not the Supreme Court have benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation jurisdiction over the the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a qualifications of presidential assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according candidates? parental authority and had the duty to support her
to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, or discriminate against him.
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner The fact of the matter –perhaps the most significant
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, consideration –is that the 1935 Constitution, the
he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year
to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions,
illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - the Constitution states that among the citizens of the
first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to
Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year are none provided.
after the birth of respondent.
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IN RE CHING BAR In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Whether or not he has elected No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino
MATTER NO. 914 Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually Philippine citizenship within "a citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree with the
passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to reasonable time" recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen
show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be years had lapsed and it’s way beyond the allowable 7
allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the
was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years.
citizen. His parents were married before he was born (It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s
in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not
child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino;
foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving
maintained that he has always considered himself as this country. The rules for citizenship are in place.
a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he
profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess
as a councilor in a municipality in La Union. it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not
until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly
saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required
Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
upon reaching the age of majority; that under Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with
prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and
majority” is construed as within 7 years after reaching unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because simply glossed over.
he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was
in place).
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TABASA v. COURT OF Petitioner Joevanie Tabasa was a natural-born citizen Does petitioner Tabasa qualify He does not. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that
APPEALS of the Philippines. When he was seven years old, as a natural-born Filipino who petitioner was a Filipino at birth and that he acquired
petitioner acquired American citizenship after his had lost his Philippine American citizenship when he was still a minor. He
father became a naturalized citizen of the United citizenship by reason of political cannot claim that he is entitled to automatic repatriation
States. or economic necessity under RA as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country
8171? due to political or economic necessity.
When Petitioner came to the Philippines as a
“balikbayan”, he was arrested and detained by an Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171
agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID) and thereafter, investigated. It was found out as To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation
reported by the US embassy that petitioner’s under RA 8171 are the following:
passport has been revoked because he is the subject
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by
of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest. He was
marriage to aliens; and
subsequently ordered to be deported back to the US.
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children
Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that
who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
he had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in
political or economic necessity.
accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171),
and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of
cannot be deported or detained by the respondent law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It
Bureau. was his father who could have been motivated by
economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for
naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not his.
The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended
directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove
that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to
political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly
to the minor children at the time of repatriation.
ALTAJEROS v. Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to Whether or not the registration Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the
COMELEC disqualify and deny due course or cancel the of petitioner’s repatriation with proper local civil registry and with the Bureau of
certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the the proper civil registry and with Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.
ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he the Bureau of Immigration a Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation
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made a false representation in his COC that he was prerequisite in effecting only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a
not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San repatriation. mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioner’s
Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his
in the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a
that he was already issued a Certificate of mayoralty position in the government in the May 10,
Repatriation by the Special Committee on 2004 elections.
Naturalization in December 17, 1997.
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The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then
petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine still a Canadian citizen.
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which
was void ab initio. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was
naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
An information for Falsification of Public Document foreign country was among those ways by which a
was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While
issued against the petitioner. he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six
months later, the falsification was already a
Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was consummated act, the said law having no retroactive
alleged and admitted to have been committed before effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned.
he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause
concluded that petitioner was at that time still a for falsification of public document under Article 172,
Canadian citizen. paragraph 1.
Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was
denied.
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The editorial is about the appointment of rascal the term government is defined as “the institution or
natives (Filipinos) to important Government positions aggregate of institutions by which an independent
by the Civil Commission (CC for brevity). society makes and carries out those rules…xxx…the
government is the aggregation of authorities which rule
a society (administration)”.
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Albeit the NCC performs governmental functions for the
people’s welfare, however, it was given a corporate
power separate and distinct from our government, for it
was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation
Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers
that it may exercise are concerned.
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Commonwealth, including executive and judicial Japanese military occupation The Court stated the three kinds of a de facto
institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time were de facto government? government.
being as in the past…and a;; public officials shall
remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully First, a government that gets possession and
their duties as before”. control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of
majority;
Subsequently, it created the Phil. Executive Second, that which established and maintained
Commission (PEC) and the Republic of the Philippines by military forces who invade and occupy a
(RP). territory of the enemy in the course of war and
which is denominated a government of
But in 1944, Gen. Douglas McArthur landed in Leyte, paramount force; and
consequently, proclaimed the “Government of the Third, that established as an independent
Commonwealth of the Philippines”, subject to the government by the inhabitants of a country
authority of the US Government, will be the sole who rise in insurrection against the parent
authority to govern the Philippines free from state.
occupation of enemy state and that all the laws,
rules, proceedings will be in accordance with the The court said that, the RP apparently established and
laws of the Commonwealth government. organized as a sovereign state independent from any
other government by the Filipino people, was, In truth
Petitioner filed this complaint because the and reality, a government established by the belligerent
respondent judge refused to continue the judicial occupation or the Japanese forces. It is the same as PEC
proceedings of a civil case involving the petitioner, and the ultimate source of its authority is the Japanese
on the ground that proceedings and judgments of forces.
the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission (PEC) and the Republic of the Being a de facto government, all the laws, acts and
Philippines (RP) established during the Japanese judicial proceedings established during the Japanese
occupation are nullified. occupation are still good and valid, although after the
liberation of Manila. Therefore, the civil case of the
petitioner must be acted upon by the respondent judge.
The Respondent, however, contends that the
government established in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation were no de facto governments,
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hence, all their laws, rules and processes are
considered null and void.
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO Joseph “Erap” Estrada alleges that he is the President Whether or not Arroyo is a The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be
on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is legitimate (de jure) president. doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.
the President. From the beginning of Erap’s term, he
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and
was plagued by problems that slowly but surely
solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power presidency. The press release was petitioner’s
started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is
friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did
Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately President on leave on the ground that he is merely
ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid
from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal
that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. Court.
January 20 turned to be the day of Erap’s surrender.
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,
Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and
duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the
pedestal of power, Erap’s legal problems appeared in
clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in
the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
REPUBLIC v. Pres. Cory Aquino created the PCGG to investigate Whether the revolutionary NO. The Court ruled that the Revolutionary Government
SANDIGANBAYAN the ill gotten wealth of personalities involved with government is bound by the Bill was not bound by the provisions of the 1973
the Marcoses. of Rights (and/or provisions) of Constitution during the interregnum because during
the 1973 Constitution during the such phase, the directives and orders of the
Along with this, the PCGG created the AFP Graft
revolutionary government were the supreme law since
Board specifically for the corrupt AFP officials during interregnum?
there is no constitution limiting its scope and extent of
the Marcos administration.
authority.
Respondent is one of the first people to be
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investigated by the AFP-GB. Therefore, the private respondent cannot invoke his
rights under the 1973 Constitution; the AFPGB did not
Respondent's properties and monies, which were
commit ay violation of his rights.
alleged to be ill gotten, were forfeited and seized by
the AFPGB.
PARENS PATRIAE
GOVERNMENT v. In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in Whether or not the Philippine Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute
MONTE DE PIEDAD the Philippines. The Spanish Government then government is competent to file action against Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance
provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was a complaint against the with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government
received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the said respondent bank. being the protector of the rights of the people has the
amount, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will
invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn promote the public interest. No other party has been
invested the amount in jewelries. But when the entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the
Philippine government later tried to withdraw the people the government has the right to take back the
said amount, the bank cannot provide for the money intended for the people.
amount. The government then filed a complaint. The
bank argued that the Philippine government is not an
affected party hence has no right to institute a
complaint. The bank argues that the government was
not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.
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DELA CRUZ v. GARCIA For several months in 2005, then 21-year old Jenie Whether or not the minor child Yes. It is thus the policy of the Family Code to liberalize
San Juan dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old can bear the surname of the the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation
Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) deceased? of children, especially of illegitimate children. The State
lived together as husband and wife without the as parens patriae affords special protection to children
benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial
Dominique's parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel to their development. In the eyes of society, a child with
Sto. Tomas Aquino at Teresa, Rizal. On September 4, an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to
2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, petitioner minor child's best interests to allow him to
Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique's bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and
parents, gave birth to her minor child Christian dela enter it in his birth certificate.
Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital,
Antipolo City. Jenie applied for registration of the
child's birth, using Dominique's surname Aquino, with
the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in
support of which she submitted the child's Certificate
of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the
Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed,
and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by
Dominique's father Domingo Butch Aquino. Both
affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime
of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his
yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never
been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a
document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which
Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own
handwriting.
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province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances
punished by imprisonment if they escaped. may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the
Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions
made to that end and for purposes of cultivation of executive departments of subordinate official thereof,
under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non- to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts,
Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very final on questions of fact.
low culture”.
was challenged.
AGUSTIN v. EDU Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He Whether or not the said is EO is The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the
is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 valid? exercise of the police power. That is conceded by
which requires all motor vehicles to have early petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is
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warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair the submission of the former, however, that while
of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. embraced in such a category, it has offended against the
Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, due process and equal protection safeguards of the
harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned
public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights only in passing.
which is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin,
to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is compounded by the fact that the particular police power
redundant and would only make manufacturers and measure challenged was clearly intended to promote
dealers instant millionaires. public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for
this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of
that character. None has been called to our attention, an
indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in
point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view.
Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe
transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets
designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the
first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with
petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by
the imperative demands of public safety.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative Whether or not the LOI No. 1465 Yes. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent
v. FERTIPHIL CORP powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among is an invalid exercise of the powers of the state but distinct and have different tests
others, for the imposition of a capital recovery power of taxation rather the for validity. Police power is the power of the state to
component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades police power? enact the legislation that may interfere with personal
of fertilizers. liberty on property in order to promote general welfare.
While, the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes as
FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of
Company who applies to the payment of corporate police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct,
debts of Planters Products Inc. (PPI) while taxation is revenue generation. The lawful subjects
29 | P a g e
After the Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped and lawful means tests are used to determine the validity
the imposition of the P10 levy. Upon return of of a law enacted under the police power. The power of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund but PPI taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent
refused. and constitutional limitations.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages In this case, it is for purpose of revenue. But it is a
against FPA and PPI with the RTC on the ground that robbery for the State to tax the citizen and use the funds
LOI No. 1465 is unjust, unreasonable oppressive, generation for a private purpose. Public purpose does
invalid and unlawful resulting to denial of due process NOT only pertain to those purpose which are traditionally
of law. viewed as essentially governmental function such as
building roads and delivery of basic services, but also
includes those purposes designed to promote social
justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the
relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban
or agrarian reform.
30 | P a g e
sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special
the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring agent, in the sense in which these words are employed,
suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his
to appear in said suit). The lower court then office if he is a special official) so that in representation
determined the amount of damages and ordered the of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof,
government to pay the same. he executes the trust confided to him.
VIGILAR v. AQUINO Aquino was invited by DPWH to a bidding for the Was the doctrine of sovereign No. The Supreme Court said that the doctrine of
construction of a dike by bulldozing a part of the immunity properly invoked? governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
Porac River at Barangay Ascomo-Pulungmasle, instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
Guagua, Pampanga. Aquino was subsequently Citing their decision in EPG Construction (G.R. No.
awarded the “Contract of Agreement” by the said 131544, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 566), the court said
government agency. that it would be the apex of injustice and highly
inequitable if the respondent is not duly compensated for
By 9 July 1992, the project was duly completed by actual work performed and services rendered, where
respondent, who was then issued a Certificate of both the government and the public have received
Project Completion dated 16 July 1992. However, benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of
claimed that PhP1,262,696.20 was still due him, but respondent’s honest toil and labor. The Court further said
petitioners refused to pay the amount. He thus filed a that the no government agency or agent can
Complaint for the collection of sum of money with conveniently hide under the State’s cloak of invincibility
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, against suit, because this principle has limitations
Pampanga. Petitioners, for their part, set up the especially when that the ends of justice would be
defense that the Complaint was a suit against the subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular
state; that respondent failed to exhaust
31 | P a g e
administrative remedies; and that the “Contract of instance, the State’s immunity from suit. The Court finally
Agreement” covering the project was void for said that in this case, it can’t be an instrument of injustice
violating Presidential Decree No. 1445, absent the by upholding the immunity from suit principle and
proper appropriation and the Certificate of affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Availability of Funds.
APPLICATION
GATC v. CA The Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Whether or not GTZ enjoys NO. The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a
the Philippines ratified andagreement which lead to immunity from suit? local state or a foreign state, is reflected in Section 9,
the Social Health Insurance !etwor"ing and Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that "the
#mpowerment $SHI!#% program wherein the State may not be sued without its consent."
program see"s to pro&ide health care to Filipino
families' especially the poor( The Republic of Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign
Germany assigned the GT) as the implementing state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test.
corporation for the program' while the Philippines Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
designated the Department of Health and the logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged
Philippine HealthInsurance Corporation( Pri&ate in the activity in the regular course of business. If the
respondents' as employed by GT) for the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or
implementation of theSHI!#' had a misunderstanding trade, the particular act or transaction must then be
with the Pro*ect +anager of SHI!#( This lead to an tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign
e,changeof letters which was interpreted to be the activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
resignation of the pri&ate respondents(
32 | P a g e
Pri&aterespondents then filed a complaint for illegal imperii (imperial authority), especially when it is not
dismissal to the labor arbiter( GT) contends that itis undertaken for gain or profit.
immune from suit as it is the accredited agency of the
Federal Republic of Germany If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is
found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable if
its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the
functions it is performing.
33 | P a g e
conducted by it per its Indorsement dated March 23,
2000.”
WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
CHINA NATIONAL CNMEG and NorthRail entered into Memorandum of Whether CNMEG is entitled to Constitutional Law; Immunity from Suit; Restrictive
MACHINERY v. STA Understanding for the feasibility study on apossible immunity precluding it from Theory; Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive
MARIA railway line from Manila to La Union ( NorthRail being sued before a local court theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the
Project). CNMEG and NorthRail executed a Contract act involved—whether the entity claiming immunity
of Agreement for the construction of the Phase 1 of performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary,
Northrail. The respondents filed a Complaint for functions.—In JUSMAG v. National Labor Relations
Annulment of Contract and Injunction in the RTC of Commission, 239 SCRA 224 (1994), this Court affirmed
Makati. CNMEG filed a motion to dismiss. CNMEG the Philippines’ adherence to the restrictive theory as
filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the Trial Court follows: The doctrine of state immunity from suit has
did not have jurisdiction over its person as it was an undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved
agent of the Chinese government making it immune that the existence of a contract does not, per se, mean
from suit, and the subject matter as the Northrail was that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local
product of an executive agreement. courts. The complexity of relationships between
sovereign states, brought about by their increasing
commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive
application of the doctrine. xxx xxx xxx As it stands
now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from
34 | P a g e
suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental
activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity
cannot be extended to commercial, private and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Since the Philippines
adheres to the restrictive [China National Machinery &
Equipment Corp. (Group) vs. Santamaria, 665 SCRA
189(2012)] theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal
nature of the act involved—whether the entity claiming
immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, functions. As held in United States of
America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985). The restrictive
application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. [China National Machinery & Equipment Corp.
(Group) vs. Santamaria, 665 SCRA 189(2012)]
35 | P a g e
precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether
GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to
be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce
evidence that it has not consented to be sued under
Chinese law. Thus, following this Court’s ruling in
Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-
owned and -controlled corporation without an original
charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued
under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
FORMS OF CONSENT
HEIRS OF MENDOZA The case stemmed from an action for specific Whether the Court of Appeals The doctrine of immunity from suit is anchored on
v. DPWH performance and damages, with prayer for committed a reversible error in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which
preliminary injunction, filed by Diosdado M. Mendoza ruling that the DPWH has no provides:
(Mendoza), doing business under the name and style juridical personality of its own
of D’ Superior Builders (Superior Builders) against the and that Mendoza’s action was a Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
defendants Department of Public Works and suit against the State?
The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it
Highways (DPWH), et al.
may be the subject of a suit if it consents to be sued,
Mendoza was the winning bidder for the construction either expressly or impliedly. There is express consent
of the 15-kilometer Madaymen Masala Amsuling when a law so provides, while there is implied consent
Road in Benguet. He was also the winning bidder for when the State enters into a contract or it itself
the construction of the 15-kilometer barangay roads commences litigation. This Court explained that in order
(Sinipsip-Akiki, SinipsipMaalad, and Madaymen) in to determine implied waiver when the State or its agency
Benguet, designated as Package IX of the HADP, with entered into a contract, there is a need to distinguish
a bid of ₱10,527,192.14. whether the contract was entered into in its
governmental or proprietary capacity, thus:
During the pre-construction survey, Mendoza alleged
that he discovered that the whole stretch of the 15- x x x. However, it must be clarified that when a state
kilometer project had no right-of-way, in violation of enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean
Ministry Order No. 65. He brought the matter to the that it has waived its non-suability. The State "will be
attention of the DPWH and UTI but according to him, deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only]
it was only resolved on 29 November 1989 when the if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or
36 | P a g e
affected landowners and farmers allowed passage at private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves
Mendoza’s risk. Mendoza alleged that the its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] x x x no such
defendants, conspired to make it appear that waiver may be implied." Statutory provisions waiving
Superior Builders incurred negative slippage of 29% [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For,
and recommended the forfeiture of the contract. waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.
The DPWH recommended the rebidding of Package The functions of the DPWH is of governmental functions.
IX. Package IX was, in effect, canceled together with Section 5(d) states that it has the power to "[i]dentify,
the forfeiture of the contract for Package VI. The plan, secure funding for, program, design, construct or
DPWH blacklisted the Superior Builders from undertake prequalification, bidding, and award of
participating in any bidding or entering into any contracts of public works projects x x x" while Section 5(e)
contract with it for a period of one year. states that it shall "[p]rovide the works supervision
function for all public works construction and ensure that
On 2 August 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, actual construction is done in accordance with approved
Branch 36 (trial court) issued a Temporary Restraining government plans and specifications."
Order enjoining the defendants from rebidding
Package VI and from awarding Package IX to another The contracts that the DPWH entered into with Mendoza
contractor, and to cease and desist from withholding for the construction of Packages VI and IX of the HADP
the equipment of Superior Builders. were done in the exercise of its governmental functions.
Hence, petitioners cannot claim that there was an
implied waiver by the DPWH simply by entering into a
contract.1âwphi1 Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that the DPWH enjoys immunity from suit and may
not be sued without its consent.
37 | P a g e
including the antibiotic ―Penicillin G Benzathine. rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of
Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. x x
procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G x [A] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
regarding Pharmawealth‘s request for inclusion of and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
additional items in its list of accredited products, the against the authority that makes the law on which the
latter submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine right depends. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is
contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view, derisively called the royal prerogative of dishonesty
however, of the non- accreditation of respondent‘s because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any
Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its
awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories‘ (YSS). nonsuability. We have had occasion to explain in its
Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for defense, however, that a continued adherence to the
injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial performance of its multifarious functions would be far
praying, inter alia, that the trial court ―nullify the greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be
award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to
Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH et al. to be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is
declare Pharmawealth as the lowest complying not to be accordingly restricted.
responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and
that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not
company‖ and ―adjudge defendants Romualdez, say that the state may not be sued under any
Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the
plaintiff. doctrine only conveys, the state may not be sued without
its consent; it's clear import then is that the State may at
times be sued. The State consent may be given either
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made
through a general law or a special law. x xx Implied
consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State
itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this
situation, the government is deemed to have descended
to the level of the other contracting party and to have
38 | P a g e
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, x x x is
not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts
entered into by the government operate as a waiver of
its non-suability; distinction must still be made between
one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
function and another which is done in its proprietary
capacity.
39 | P a g e
BANAHAW This case involves Respondents, employees of DXWG- Whether BBC is exempt from GOCCs NOT EXEMPT FROM POSTING BOND
BROADCASTING v. Iligan City, a radio station which is owned by posting an appeal bond?
PACANA petitioner Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Generally, the government and all the attached agencies
a corporation managed by Intercontinental with no legal personality distinct from the former are
Broadcasting Corporation (IBC). exempt from posting appeal bonds, whereas
government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs)
The DXWG personnel filed a complaint for illegal are not similarly exempted except if it is sued in relation
dismissal, unfair labor practice, reimbursement of to its governmental functions. Here, BBC was organized
unpaid Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) as a private corporation, sequestered in the 1980s and
benefits, and attorneys fees against IBC and BBC. the ownership of which was subsequently transferred to
the government. Its primary function is to engage in
Later on, a Motion to Dismiss, Release, Waiver and commercial radio and television broadcasting. It is
Quitclaim, was jointly filed by IBC and the DXWG therefore clear that BBCs function is commercial or
personnel based on the latter's admission that IBC is proprietary and not governmental.As such, BBC is not
not their employer as it does not own DXWG-Iligan entitled to an exemption from the posting of an appeal
City. The NLRC granted the Motion with respect to bond.
IBC. BBC filed an MR. The NLRC thereafter issued an
Order for monetary award to which BBC filed a
Motion for recomputation.
LANDBANK v. RIVERA Whether or not the Court of NO. The Court held:
Appeals correctly adjudged LBP
liable to pay the cost of suit? Rule 142 - Costs
40 | P a g e
Section 1. Costs ordinarily follow results of suit. Unless
otherwise provided in these rules, costs shall be allowed
to the prevailing party as a matter of course but the court
shall have power, for special reasons adjudge that either
party shall pay the costs of an action, or that the same be
divided, as may be equitable. No costs shall be allowed
against the Republic of the Philippines unless otherwise
provided by law.
41 | P a g e
establishing the compensable amount, there would be
no amount "to be established by the government" as
required in Sec. 6, EO 229.
SUABILITY v. LIABILITY
LOCKHEED v. UP Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Having a charter with which it We agree with UP that there was no point for Lockheed
Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered into a contract for can sue and be sued, can UP in discussing the doctrine of state immunity from suit as
security services with respondent UP. In 1998, several funds be garnished? this was never an issue in this case. Clearly, UP consented
security guards assigned to UP filed separate to be sued when it participated in the proceedings below.
complaints against Lockheed and UP for payment of What UP questions is the hasty garnishment of its funds
underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay in its PNB account. This Court finds that the CA correctly
for rest days and special holidays, holiday pay, service applied the NEA case. Like NEA, UP is a juridical
incentive leave pay, night shift differentials, 13th personality separate and distinct from the government
month pay, refund of cash bond, refund of deductions and has the capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like
42 | P a g e
for the Mutual Benefits Aids System (MBAS), unpaid NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds may be
wages from December 16-31, 1998, and attorney’s subject to garnishment or levy. However, before
fees. execution may be had, a claim for payment of the
judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
UP v. DIZON University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a Whether or not the UPs funds POLITICAL LAW: garnishment of public funds; suability
General Construction Agreement with respondent can be validly garnished? vs. liability of the State
Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the
construction and renovation of the buildings in the Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP
campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a
first and second billing. However, the third billing legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a
worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its government instrumentality, performing the States
disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). constitutional mandate of promoting quality and
Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid accessible education. As a government instrumentality,
balance. the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees
and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly
ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by
16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No.
The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP,
motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco including any interest accruing from the deposit of such
(Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special
2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be
record of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City. aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should
always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, the UP are government funds that are public in character.
2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the They include the income accruing from the use of real
notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the
October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the attainment of its institutional objectives.
RTC issued the writ of execution.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated in
UPs petition. The denial became final and executory. Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A
Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for distinction should first be made between suability and
43 | P a g e
execution despite their previous motion having liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to
already been granted and despite the writ of be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable
the RTC granted another motion for execution filed does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other
on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent
the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that
Consequently, the sheriff served notices of the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state
garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
ordered the release of the funds. plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant
is liable.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA
sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition. The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." The execution of the
monetary judgment against the UP was within the
primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that
a final and executory decision already validated the claim
against the UP.
MONEY CLAIMS
STAR SPECIAL Petitioners, SSWDA Inc., Celso and Manuel were the Is mandamus a proper remedy Mandamus is NOT the proper remedy to compel the
WATCHMEN v. owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Puerto to compel the respondents to respondents to pay the just compensation. Mandamus is
PUERTO PRINCESA Princesa City. Before Puerto Princesa became a city, pay the just compensation? a command issuing from a court of law of competent
the national government established a military camp jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign,
in Puerto Princesa, known as the Western Command. directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to
In building the command’s facilities and road some corporation or person requiring the performance
network, encroachment on several properties of of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results
petitioners resulted. Petitioners’ property was used from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
as a road right-of-way leading to the military camp. directed or from operation of law. This definition
This road was named the "Wescom Road." Soon after, recognizes the public character of the remedy, and
the City of Puerto Princesa decided to develop the clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for
"Wescom Road" because local residents started to the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in
build their houses alongside it. which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper
44 | P a g e
In view of the encroachment, petitioners filed an recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right
action for Payment of Just Compensation against the and to compel the performance of a public duty, most
respondents Puerto Princesa City, Mayor Hagedorn especially when the public right involved is mandated by
and the City Council of Puerto Princesa City before the the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs,
RTC of Quezon City. The RTC rendered a decision in mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board,
favor of petitioners. officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
After the RTC Decision became final and executory, a office, trust or station.
writ of execution was issued. The money judgment
amounted was reduced to P12,000,000.00, subject to The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to
the condition agreed by the parties. Petitioners compel an official to do anything which is not his duty
claimed that respondents paid the initial to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the
P2,000,000.00 but failed to give further payments applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.
after. However, records show that the total Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
negotiated amount of P12 million was already fully substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt
paid and received by petitioners on the basis of the exists, although objection raising a mere technical
certification issued by then City Treasurer of Puerto question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the
Princesa. case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in
the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the
Nevertheless, petitioners filed a complaint before the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action
RTC-Br. 223 against respondents for collection of is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
unpaid just compensation, including interests and which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
rentals, in accordance with the RTC-Br. 78 Decision. If office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer,
also filed complaints before the COA, Ombudsman board, or person has unlawfully excluded
and DILG to compel the respondents to pay the petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right
judgment but COA countered that it does not have or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator,
jurisdiction over the matter. it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that
he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded
The petitioners filed the present petition for
and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to
mandamus seeking to direct, command and compel
perform the act required.
the respondents to enforce, implement or pay the
petitioners the judgment award of the Decision of the Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle
Quezon City RTC that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual
45 | P a g e
obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce
purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an
individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public
or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not
appropriate to enforce a private right against an
individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be
obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to
the public and to the government; hence, it is called a
prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character,
mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs,
but only in matters relating to the public.
46 | P a g e
jurisdiction to adjudicate money claim, petitioners
should have filed a petition for certiorari with this Court
pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the COA's
refusal to act did not leave the petitioners without any
remedy at all.
SOVEREIGNTY
TANADA v. ANGARA On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government Whether or not the Resolution The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not
represented by its Secretary of the Department of No. 97 ratifying the WTO unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias
Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Agreement is unconstitutional in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
Philippine Government to submit to its respective at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
competent authorities the WTO (World Trade exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was interests only against foreign competition and trade
adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution
Agreement. did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy.
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-reliant
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the and independent national economy” does not
WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II, necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
providing for the development of a self reliant and goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic
independent national economy, and Sections 10 and seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy. community.”
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on the parties. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make its legislations
such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
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