Case Digests Criminal Law 1
Case Digests Criminal Law 1
Garcia Valdez
Facts:
The defendant is the editor of “Miau,” a periodical published and
circulated in Manila, and that an article containing the alleged
injurious matter was published in the issue of that periodical of
September 15, 1901. The article is couched throughout in grossly
abusive language, and in terms not capable of being
misunderstood; charges the private prosecutor, who had been then
recently appointed a member of the United States Philippine
Commission, with having displayed cowardice at the time of the
murder of his mother and sister and with having subsequently
entered into intimate political relations with the assassin. The
article contains other statements and imputations of a derogatory
character.
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the commission of the crime should be charged
separately?
Held:
The Facts:
The appellate court ruled that the subject land had been acquired
by respondent by virtue of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27.This
law prohibits the transfer of the land except by hereditary
succession to the heirs or by other legal modes to the government.
Hence, the transfer of the subject land to petitioner is void; it
should be returned to respondent.
FACTS:
Sometime in the later part of 1997, the CDA received from certain
members of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI for brevity), an agrarian reform
cooperative that owns 8,860 hectares of land in Polomolok, South
Cotabato, several complaints alleging mismanagement and/or
misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the then incumbent
officers and members of the board of directors of the cooperative,
some of whom are herein private respondents.
The complaints led the CDA to act according to its function and
issued a freeze order on the DARBCI funds and creating
management committee to manage the affairs of the said
cooperative.
ISSUE:
HELD:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
No pronouncement as to costs.
Issue: WON the denials of the accused are sufficient to rebut the
incriminating circumstances testified to by the prosecution
witnesses.
Held:
The paragraph to wit:
IN VIEW THEREOF, the court finds that the
prosecution has duly established the guilt of accused
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of a Violation of a)
Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, in Criminal
Case No. 1233, b) PD 1866, as amended, in Criminal Case
No. 123[4], and c) Section 15, Article III of RA 6425, as
amended, in Criminal Case No. 1235 without having been
permitted by law.
WHEREFORE judgment is hereby rendered
sentencing accused Rolando Almeida y Calvin @ Tata
Rolly as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 1233
1. to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. pay a fine of P500,000; and
3. to pay costs of suit.
In Criminal Case No. 1234
1. to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of from four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correctional as
minimum to six (6) years of prision correctional
as maximum; and
2. to pay costs of suit.
In Criminal Case No. 1235
1. to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of from six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to four (4) years of prision
correctional as maximum; and
2. to pay costs of suit.
Ruling: Ah Chong was not held liable for the death of his
roommate. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s
conviction of homicide, saying that Ah Chong committed a
mistake of fact. He would not have stabbed his roommate had he
known the identity of the person who entered the room. If the
person who opened the door had really been a robber instead of
his roommate, he would not be criminally liable if he had stabbed
that person in self-defense.
FACTS:
1. On June 16, 1996, the accused-appellant Wilson Antonio,
Jr. alias “Instik” was carrying a gun and went to the victim’s
house Sergio Mella;
2. That the accused-appellant was seen by her sister Wife who
followed and pleaded to stop him but the latter ignored her
and continued walking towards the house of the victim;
3. That the accused-appellant kicked open the door to the
bedroom where the victim was sleeping with his seven years
old son Kevin Paul Mella;
4. That the accused-appellant aimed and fire the gun towards
the sleeping victim hitting the chest, shoulder and back that
killed the latter;
5. That the victim’s son who witnessed the incident was also
hit at the left thigh;
6. Immediately after firing his gun, the accused-appellant left
the room eluded the arrest for more than (1) year or until
October 23, 1997.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant’s defense of insanity
is valid to exempt him from criminal liability.
RATIONALE:
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing an act. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be so
insane as to be incapable of entertaining criminal intent. He must
be deprived of reason and acting without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a
total deprivation of freedom of the will.
HELD:
When insanity is allege to free a person from criminal
liability, it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence which
must refer to the time immediately preceding the act or to the
moment of its execution which the defense failed to convince the
appellate court. The decision of court a quo finding accused-
appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery imposing a death
penalty was modified considering that there is one mitigating
circumstance of mental illness of the offender. Accused
ISSUES:
Whether or not the presence of aggravating circumstance of the
use of weapon can be appreciated for the purposed of fixing a
heavier penalty.
Held:
The aggravating circumstance in question cannot be appreciated
for the purpose of fixing the a heavier penalty because they were
not alleged in the information as mandated by Rule 110, sections 8
& 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure however this can
be considered as basis to award exemplary damages in favor of the
victim, conformably to current jurisprudence.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the lower was affirmed
with modification. The appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of rape and was sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua for each count . The appellant was ordered to pay the
victim, the amounts of Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php
50,000.00 as moral damages; and Php 25,000.00 exemplary
damages for each count.
Issue: W/N penal laws provide for not only penalty but also
prescription.
Decision: Yes.
penalty, for the length of time for prescription depends upon the
gravity of the
offense. Penal laws not only provide for penalties but also
prescriptions.
Facts:
Held: In rape cases, this Court has been guided by three well-
entrenched principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 23
Conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie
heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court. Accordingly, in
the appreciation of the evidence, the appellate court accords due
deference to the trial court's views on who should be given
credence since the latter is in a better position to decide the
question of the credibility of witnesses, having seen and heard
these witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. The trial court's findings concerning the
credibility of witnesses carry great weight and respect and will be
sustained by the appellate court unless the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which would have affected the result of the
case. 24
After a careful examination of the records and the evidence, we are
unable to find any cogent reason to disturb the finding of the trial
court that the accused raped his daughter, Chanda, on 26
November 1983 and 12 February 1991.
title, once registered is a notice to the world. All persons must take
notice.
Considering the lapse of more than 20 years, the crimes charges
already
prescribed.
Held: Under sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters,
in response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one
occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the accidental
circumstance that the article unlawfully belonged to two distinct
persons. There is no series of acts here for the accomplishment of
different purposes, but only one of which was consummated, and
which determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking
the roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot
give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their
own, because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two
intentions that characterize two separate crimes.
Facts:
The case is an appeal of the defendants Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo
Suyo, and Franco Brillantes from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Ilo-ilo which convicted the accused of robbery and
with homicide, and sentenced each of them to Reclusion Perpetua
and ordered the accused to pay solidarily the sum of six thousand
pesos to the heirs of Ramonito Jabatan and the sum of five
hundred pesos to Valentin Baylon as the value of five fighting
cocks.
It should also be noted that the accsued, Elias Jaranilla, has escaped
from the provincial jail and no record shows that he has been
appreheanded.
Issue:
Held:
Hence, only the accused, Elias Jaranilla, who perpetrated the killing
is responsible and liable for robbery and homicide. The co-accused,
Suyo and Brillantes, are convicted of theft. Therefore, the decision
of the lower court is reversed and sentenced the accused, Ricardo
Suyo and Franco Brillantes, as co-principals in the crime of theft.
Issue:
Whether or not the argument of counsel de oficio that the
appellants are guilty of one crime only is tenable.
Ruling:
Counsel de oficio argues that the appellants are guilty of one crime
only citing in support of his contention the case of People vs. de
Leon, 49 Phil., 437. The contention is without merit. In the case
cited by counsel the defendant entered the yard of a house where
he found two fighting this case, after committing the first crime of
robbery in band the appellants went to another house where they
committed the second and after committing it they proceeded to
another house where they committed the third. Obviously, the rule
in the case cited cannot be invoked and applied to the present.
Issue :
On or about February 1, 1989 at Sitio Tampa-on, Barangay
Banawe, Pamplona, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring together and mutually helping each
other, with treachery and intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and
stab one Elfonio Adelantar, inflicting upon the latter multiple
injuries, which directly caused the death of said Elfonio
Adelantar. The key prosecution witness, Cirilo Manaban who
was then only fourteen years old, witnessed the killing of his
brother-in-law, Elfonio Adelantar.
Issues:
1.) The appellant’s asserts that their respective pleas of self-
defense and denial should have been favorably appreciated
by the trial court, considering the inconsistencies and
consequent unreliability of the testimony of the prosecution’s
principal eyewitness, hence their guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. ) WON the passage of Republic Act No. 7659 has
transformed the indivisible nature of reclusion perpetua into
a divisible one because of its “defined duration” ranging from
20 years and 1 day to 40 years.
Decision :
Far from being corrosive of the testimony of Cirilo Manaban,
those inconsistencies are merely minor lapses and clearly of
no consequence, especially when viewed against his
narration of the events before the trial court. The essential
test is that the testimony of the witness is disencumbered,
credible, and in accord with human experience.
After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the
legislative history of R.A. No. 7659, the Court concludes that
although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the
duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and
one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative
intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible
penalty.
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
On the other hand, the alibi of the accused, is at its best, a weak
defense and easy of fabrication. It cannot prevail over a positive
identification of a prosecution witness.
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case
to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the
RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation
with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension.
The law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been
perfected.
FACTS:
On April 10, 1987, Bennett Ll. Thelmo filed an affidavit-
complainant with the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal
for libel against Raul, Locsin - editor and publisher of the
newspaper, Business Day; Leticia Locsin and Salvador Lacson –
managing editor and columnist for defamatory statements against
the petitioner – Thelmo in an article in the newspaper entitled
“Insurance Monopoly” where it stated there the the respondent
was a grafter and a bribe-giver.
8 February 1988, the Prosecutor issued a resolution
recommending the filing of three (3) separate criminal cases for
libel against the three private respondents.
18 October 1988, respondent Salvador Lacson filed a motion to
quash on the ground of prescription.
The prosecutor assigned to prosecute the case, after given
15 days to file and opposition and after few extensions given, for
the comment on the motion to quash, failed to file therewith due
to the reason that he was not furnished a copy of the said motion.
Also, on the prosecutor’s failure to prosecute for over two (2)
years, and the cases have been pending for four (4) years, only
delayed the case. The delay in the investigation violated the rights
of the accused for the constitutional right to due process and
speedy disposition of their cases.
ISSUE:
Decision: Yes. The case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled
in the affirmative. With reference to Castillo's criminal liability,
there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished. The civil liability,
however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. It should
be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction
of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability
arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently,
where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto
extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes
before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally
from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale.
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict.
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where -during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on
the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription
De Leon vs Director of Prison, 31 Phil 60
G.R. No. L-10038, March 31, 1915
Facts:
1. That some time prior to the 11th day of January, 1904, the said
Marcelo de Leon and others were charged with the crime of illegal
detention, were arrested, tried, found guilty of said crime, and
sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court;
2. From the sentence of the lower court Marcelo de Leon, together
with the others, appealed to this court where, after a consideration
of the cause, the sentence of the lower court was modified and he
(Marcelo de Leon) was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of
eighteen years of reclusion temporal, with the legal accessory
penalties, and to pay the costs;
3. On the 19th day of November, 1909, the Honorable W.
Cameron Forbes, Acting Governor-General, extended to the
defendant a conditional pardon
4. That the plaintiff, Marcelo de Leon, was transferred to the
Iwahig Penal Colony, but for some reason or other was later
transferred again to Bilibid;
5. That on the 17th day of November, 1913, the Honorable Francis
Burton Harrison, Governor-General, issued a conditional pardon
to the plaintiff, the condition being that he should not be guilty of
any crime or infraction of the law, the punishment for which
should be a year or more of imprisonment, during the rest of the
unexpired time of his sentence of imprisonment already imposed;
6. On the 15th day of June, 1914, by a letter from the Honorable
Ignacio Villamor, Executive Secretary, to the Director of Prisons,
it appears that the Governor-General, by reason of representations
made to him by the prison authorities, directed the cancellation of
the conditional pardon signed by him under date of November 17,
1913;
7. The said conditional pardon of His Excellency the Governor-
General of the 17th of November, 1913, had never been delivered
nor communicated to the plaintiff, neither had the same been
accepted by him
Facts:
Petitioner Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were
charged with the crime of murder. Barrioquinto had not yet been
arrested. The case proceeded against Jimenez and he was
sentenced to life imprisonment.
Held:
No. Respondents fail to differentiate between amnesty and
pardon.
Facts:
Issue:
WON the accused is liable to pay for civil indemnity arising from
a criminal liability.
Held:
When an accused, who has been charged with estafa, has been
acquitted on the ground that his liability is civil in nature, no civil
liability arising from the criminal charges may be imposed on him.
In view of the foregoing, the portion of the decision appealed
from, which orders the accused to pay P2,000.00 to the
complainant is set aside, reserving the offended party the right to
institute the corresponding civil action for the recovery of the said
amount.
PEOPLE VS EZPERANZA
Nelson argues that Irma's testimony should not be given weight for being
obviously rehearsed, as shown by her identical answers as to the time, place,
and manner the rapes were committed. He also asserts that Irma's testimony
bore several inconsistencies
Time and again we have held that the factual findings of the trial court,
especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.28
The fact that the series of rape had been committed in almost the same manner
and the same time is nothing extraordinary and does not necessarily render
the testimony of Irma incredible.[37 In rape cases, the lone testimony of the
offended party, if free from serious and material contradictions, is sufficient
to sustain a verdict of conviction. In the cases at bar, considering the age of
the victim, it is unlikely that her narration is merely the product of a scheming
and malicious mind. No woman would openly admit that she was raped and
consequently subject herself to an examination of her private parts, undergo
the trauma and humiliation of a public trial, and embarrass herself with the
need to narrate in detail how she was raped, if she was not raped at all.
PEOPLE VS MADLANGBAYAN
In this case, from the evidence of the prosecution, apart from the extrajudicial
confession of the appellant, the fact of the commission of the crime of robbery
with homicide, is well and sufficiently established. Said fact, which is the
corpus delicti of the offense charged has been proved by the uncontradicted
testimonies of Elywelyn Fallarme and the police officers assigned to this case,
as well as by the testimony of Dr. Abelardo Lucero, the police medical
examiner, as to the death of Enrique Fallarme, together with the documentary
evidence of the necropsy report stating the post- mortem findings, including
the cause of death.
Finally, it is manifest that the accused together with his co-assailants who
unfortunately have not been apprehended, took advantage of their superior
strength, when the four of them, two of whom were armed with bladed
weapons surrounded and stabbed the unarmed, helpless and unsuspecting
victim. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was
correctly appreciated by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS VICENTE
HELD:
Although this Court ordinarily relies on the factual findings of the trial
court, recognizing its superior competence to assess the credibility of
the witnesses through direct observation of their deportment on the
stand, We decline to apply this policy in the case before Us. 14 It is
not enough that the victim expressed her emotions to the fullest while
testifying, the totality of the evidence should be considered before
reaching the conclusion that, indeed, her testimony is credible and
positive. A meticulous examination of the records and analysis of the
arguments of the parties enabled Us to unearth the truth behind the
victim's serious charge of rape against the accused-appellant. The
prosecution has not sufficiently established his guilt to the point of
overcoming the constitutional presumption of innocence that he
enjoys.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS REYES
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
Pasig, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 146B-D, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Appellant claims that there exists a major discrepancy in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses with regard to the place where appellant was arrested.
The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer "the penalty of life imprisonment with
all its accessory penalties and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) and to pay the costs" pursuant to Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended by B.P. Blg. 179. The said law,
however, was further amended by R.A. No. 7659.
Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty imposed for the selling,
dispensing, delivering, transporting or distributing of shabu of less than 200
grams is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua.
Under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which has suppletory application to
special laws, penal laws shall be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
accused. Appellant is entitled to benefit from the reduction of the penalty
introduced by R.A. No. 7659.
MTCC decided in favor of Malvar and ordered Bongato to vacate the land. RTC affirmed
the decision. CA also held that MTCC had jurisdiction. On appeal, Bongato raised the
issue of MTCC jurisdiction; that the complaint was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive
period.
ISSUE:
Wherther or not the MTCC had jurisdiction since the Complaint was filed beyond the
one-year period from date of alleged entry?
HELD:
No, MTCC had no jurisdiction. It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting
process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature
of such process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible
entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry
is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff
learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of the
parcel of land may file either accion publiciana; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an
action to recover ownership as well as possession.
One the basis of the facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible entry filed by
respondents had already prescribed when they filed the complaint on July 10, 1992 (the
house was built as early as 1987), thus the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case
IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF
LANDS AND VALERIANO
108 SCRA 335
FACTS
Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land (mangrove) which he alleged
he acquired by right of accretion since it adjoins a parcel of land owned by the Ignacio. His
application is opposed by the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano, contending that said
land forms part of the public domain. The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that
said land formed part of the public domain. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain
HELD: YES
1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the present case because it refers
to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers while this refers to action in the Manila Bay,
which is held to be part of the sea
2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands added to shores by accretions
caused by actions of the sea form part of the pubic domain when they are no longer
necessary for purposes of public utility, only the executive and the legislative departments
have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any said land is no longer
necessary for public use. Until such declaration is made by said departments, the lot in
question forms part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership
In carrying out the charade, the manager went to the extent of delivering a
speech and personally encouraging people to deposit or invest in the
foundation. Alfonso Lacao, a complainant and prosecution witness, testified:
Other than to issue slots, do you know what other phase of operation
"Q: in running the Panata Foundation during the time that you were
employed?
A: No sir, I can only observe that issuing of slots.
Madam Witness, aside from issuing slots, there is only the activity of
Q:
the foundation that you are well aware of?
A: Sometimes they also sent me to deposit.
Q: The deposit of the amount collected in the bank, is that correct?
A: I do not know but they just send me to deposit amounts.
But you do not know in what other business activity other than the
Q: matter of collecting money and issuance of slots you do not know if
the Panata Foundation is involved in any business activity?
A: Yes, sir.
You do not know whether the foundation receives money regularly
Q:
from any other source?
A: I do not know sir."[26]
On cross-examination, she testified:
You mentioned Madam Witness, that on several occasions you were
"Q: asked to deposit certain amounts in the bank, do you remember
having told the Court that?
A: Right, sir.
Do you remember how many banks these deposited amounts were if
Q:
you remember?
A: I deposited at PNB, PCIBank, and DBP and Rural Bank of Coron.
Do you remember in whose names you deposited these amounts you
Q:
deposited?
In the name of the joint account of Priscilla Balasa and Norma
A:
Francisco."[
Q: And after your son was slumped, what did you do?
A: I went to my son and carried him to take him to the hospital.
Q: How many shots did you hear?
A: Five shots.
Q: That was prior to helping your son?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how many times was your son hit?
ATTY. VARGAS:
Objection, your honor. It was already answered. Because according to
her it was five shots.
I don’t get it: the defense objects because it was “already answered.”
In the same breath, however, he provides the answer: 5 shots. Why
object at all?
COURT:
It does not follow that the victim was hit. So, the witness may answer.
WITNESS:
Twice, Two shots hit my son, two shots on the sofa and one shot on
the cement.
COURT:
How about the other one?
A: Doon po sa semento.
Again, the diagram could have proved useful here by pointing to where
the bullets hit. It wouldn’t also have hurt if more details are elicited so
that the testimony is mined the more: Q: Can you describe the gun as
you saw it? Please demonstrate the position of the gun and your son
when you heard the shots (then make of record how the witness
demonstrated the scene).
As earlier noted, we think that there could have been more impact if
the identification was made earlier.
Since Noel Lee was already identified here, the examiner could have
used either the name or the label “the accused” when referring to Lee.
The testimony can be mined more by asking about what the witness
was thinking when she saw Noel Lee’s gun pointed at her son, when
the son was shot, when she saw him slumped on the sofa. Because it
involves state of mind, not to mention her emotions at the time, the
testimony would add more action and drama, making the testimony
more memorable to the judge.
COURT:
She was emotionally upset.
ATTY. OPENA:
I’ll just make it on record that the witness was emotionally upset. May
I ask if she can still testify?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
Masakit lang po sa loob ko ang pagkawala ng anak ko.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Q: You saw that the light was bright. Where were those lights coming
from?
A: Maliwanag po sa loob ng bahay namin dahil may fluorescent na bilog.
Saka sa labas may nananahi po doon sa alley katapat ng bahay namin.
At saka po doon sa kabila, tindahan po tapat po namin, kaya
maliwanag ang ilaw.
Q: After trying to help your son, what happened?
A: I was able to hold on to my son up to the door. Upon reaching the
door, I asked the help of my kumpare.
Q: Meanwhile, what did the accused do after shooting five times?
A: He ran to the alley to go home.
Q: Now you said he ran to an alley towards the direction of their house.
Do you know where his house is located?
A: Yes, sir. 142 M. de Castro Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
Q: How far is that from your residence?
A: More or less 150 to 200 meters.
Q: Where did you finally bring your son?
A: MCU.
Q: When you say MCU, are you referring to MCU Hospital?
A: Yes, sir. MCU Hospital. At MCU, life-saving devices were attached to
my son. Later, after reaching 11:00, he died.
COURT:
11:00 P.M.?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Same day?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Not to be callous but there could have been added persuasive impact if
the examiner also brought out the emotions in the testimony. This
could be the perfect ending for the testimony, and they could be
justified because they are the basis for moral damages. “Q: What were
you thinking while your son was being revived in the hospital? Q: How
did you feel when you received the news that your son is already
dead? Q: What were you feeling during her son’s wake? Q: During the
burial? Q: How do you feel about Noel Lee, your son’s killer, as you
now sit on that stand?”
As can be seen, it's always a good idea to get hold of the transcript of
our examination (particularly on cross-exams!), evaluate what we've
done wrong and see what can be done about it next time. Or, if we
think we did right, what else can be done to make it better. The key is
always to look for ways to learn and improve - and then learn and
improve at our next trial date.