Case Digest Ownership
Case Digest Ownership
EN BANC The appellants contend that the lower erred in upholding the validity of
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo during the
G.R. No. L-803 August 27, 1948 Japanese occupation, because: (1) "The said court had no jurisdiction
to try civil case No. 21, much less to render the decision in question
JOSE P. SANDEJAS, plaintiff-appellant, on October 2, 1944;" and (2) "That granting for the sake of argument
vs. that the puppet Court of First Instance of Iloilo had jurisdiction, yet
ZACARIAS C. ROBLES, ELENA C. VDA. DE ROBLES and such decision was rendered after having deprived plaintiff of his day in
ROSARIO Y. SINGSON, defendants-appellees. court and is therefore in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Benjamin H. Tirol, Corazon C. Miraflores and Orlando M. Jesena for
appellant. As to the first question, the appellants do not question the ruling of
W. E. Greenbaum and Luis G. Hofilena for appellee Rosario Y. this Supreme Court on the validity of the judgments rendered by the
Singson. courts established in these Islands during the Japanese occupation
M. F. Zamora and Jose C. Robles for appellee Zacarias C. Robles laid down in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh,1 Off. Gaz., 779; but
and Elena C. Vda. de Robles. they contend that, as the three parcels of land involved or sold in the
contract of the sale resolved by the prior judgment were located in the
FERIA, J.: Municipality of Passi, Province of Iloilo, and "the puppet Republic of
the Philippines since the middle of the month of September, 1944,
could no longer assert its authority over the major portion of the
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
territory of Iloilo including the Municipality of Passi," then under the
dismissing the plaintiff's action upon motion of the defendant on the
possession and control of the Panay guerrilla forces, the Court of First
ground that it is barred by prior judgment.
Instance of Iloilo which rendered the prior judgment had no jurisdiction
over the res or the property because the action was quasi in rem, and
The pertinent facts alleged in the complaint to which a motion to therefore the said judgment is null and void.
dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment is filed, are those relating to the cause of action and the
This contention is premised on the wrong assumption that the action
parties, because if they are the same as the cause of action and the
for the resolution of a contract of sale of a real property is an
parties in the prior judgment, or though the parties are different they
action quasi in rem. The action instituted by the appellees to resolve
represent the same interest, and the court rendering the prior
the contract of sale of said parcels of land, is in personam and
judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, the
not quasi in rem.
subsequent action is barred by the prior judgment and should be
dismissed.
This Court quoted with approval in Grey Alba vs. Dela Cruz, 17 Phil.,
61-62, the following definition of an action in personam:
In the present appeal, there is no question that the parties in the
present and prior action are the same or represent the same interest,
and that the cause of action in both are the same, that is, the If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against
some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in
theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim that it was difficult to communicate with his clients, who went to
or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be Arevalo, a suburb of and distant of about six or seven kilometers from
heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may the Iloilo City, capital of the Province of Iloilo; that to give the
concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the appellants opportunity to be heard, the hearing was postponed and
other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be set on the afternoon of the same date; and that as they did not appear
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right on the afternoon the case was heard and judgment was rendered on
sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right October 2, 1944, declaring the resolution of the contract between the
to be heard on the strength of alleging facts which, if true, parties and ordering the appellees to return to the appellants the sum
show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler of P5,723.60, received by the former from the latter as payment on
vs. Judges, supra.). account of the sum of P35,000 agreed upon as purchase price.
According to American Jurisprudence, Vol. I page 435, "An action in And, according to the allegations in appellants' complaint, on October
personam has for its object a judgment against the person, as 25, 1944, the appellants filed a motion for reconsideration which was
distinguished from a judgment against property, to determine its denied by the court, and when they tried to appeal from the decision
status. Whether a proceeding is in rem or in personam is determined the court denied the appeal on November 23, 1944, and declared the
by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in judgement final and executory; and, on November 29, the appellants
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the appeal, and
brought against the person and based on jurisdiction of the person, up to the filing of the complaint in the present case no resolution of the
although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, motion has been received by the appellants.
specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. In view of the foregoing facts set forth in the decision Exhibit A and
not contradicted or denied by the appellants, which show that the
In the case of Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil., 921, we absence from the trial of the appellants was due to their own fault,
held that "The action quasi in rem differs from the true action in rem in appellants' contention that they were deprived of their day in court is
the circumstances that in the former an individual is named as untenable. The appeal is therefore dismissed. So ordered.
defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest
therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of
the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or
other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The Separate Opinions
judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties. PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
With respect to the second question, from the prior judgment marked We dissent:
as Exhibit A of the motion to dismiss, it appears that the appellants
had submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court of First We are of the opinion that the appealed decision should be reversed
Instance of Iloilo by filing their answers to the complaint through their and the lower court ordered to proceed with the case and render
Atty. Benjamin H. Tirol, the same attorney who represents them now; decision on the merits.
that they were notified of the date set for the hearing of the action, but
when the case was called for trial on September 29, 1944, their
This stand is based on the reasons stated in our opinion in Co Kim
attorney asked and obtained permission from the court to withdraw his
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh,141 Off. Gaz., 779.
appearance as attorney for the appellants stating as ground therefor
Ching v CA (Civil Procedure) Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed
against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are
Action in Rem and Action in Personam directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek
judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.
Alfredo Ching v. CA, Pedro Asedillo
Facts: An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in
Alfredo Ching is the legitimate son of Ching Leng; personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the
Ching Leng bought a property from Sps. Nofuente and the former right to a tangible thing.
registered the property in her name on September 18, 1961, her postal
address was in Pasay City; Private respondent’s action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being
Ching Leng died in Boston and his legitimate son was appointed as in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction
administrator of her estate; over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was
13 years after the death of Ching Leng, a suit was commenced on commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter’s death.
December 27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo against Ching
Leng for the reconveyance of said property; According to Dumlao v. Quality plastic products, the decision of the lower
An amended complaint was made by private respondent alleging “that on court insofar as the deceased is concerned is void for lack of jurisdiction over
account of the fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with
present, and it is not known whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or summons. He had no more civil personality, that its fitness to be subject of
his estate may be served by summons and other processes only by legal relations was lost through death.
publication.”
Summons by publication was made through “Economic Monitor”, Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the evidence
newspaper of general circulation in Province of Rizal, Pasay City. Since no adduced in his behalf by petitioner herein, tracking back the roots of his title
responsive pleading was filed after the lapse of 60 days, judgment on the since 1960, from the time the decree of registration was issued.
merits in favor of private respondents was made.
Consequently, the title of Ching Leng was cancelled and transferred to
private respondent who sold the same to Villa Esperanza Dev., Inc. The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
Petitioner learned of the decision, and so he filed a petition to set it aside as erroneously registered in another’s name after one year from the date of the
null and void for lack of jurisdiction; decree is not to set aside the decree but respecting it and to bring an ordinary
action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has
transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.
Lower court decision:
RTC: At first, granted the verified petition to set aside as null and void the
prior order of the RTC; however, on motion by private respondent, the same
was set aside. So, petitioner filed for reconsideration but was denied. ernandez v DBP (Civil Procedure)
*the case was elevated directly to SC
Jose M. Hernandez v. DBP and CFI of Batangas
Issue: WON reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam which
cannot give jurisdiction to the court by service of summons by publication. Facts:
(Note: private respondents argue that they are quasi in rem) Petitioner was an employee of defendant in its Legal Department for 21
years until his retirement due to illness;
Ruling: Yes, reconveyance and cancellation of title are acts in personam. Petitioner was awarded a lot (810 sq-m, type E) in respondent’s Housing
Project in Quezon City;
However, more than a week thereafter, the Chief Accountant and The court agrees that petitioner’s action is not a real but a personal action. As
Comptroller of the private respondent returned to the petitioner the checks he correctly insisted by petitioner, his action is one to declare null and void the
has paid pursuant to such award and informed him that the private cancellation of the lot and house in his favor which does not involve title and
respondent, through its Committee on Organization, Personnel and Facilities, ownership over said properties but seeks to compel respondent to recognize
had cancelled the award of the lot and hour previously awarded on the that the award is a valid and subsisting one which cannot arbitrarily and
ground that: unilaterally cancel and accordingly to accept the proffered payment in full
(a) He has already retired; which it had rejected and returned to petitioner.
(b) He has only an option to purchase said house and lot;
(c) There are a big number of employees who have no houses or lots; Such an action is a personal action which may be properly brought by
(d) He has been given his retirement gratuity; that the awarding of the petitioner in his residence.
aforementioned house and lot in his favor would subserve the purpose;
Petitioner protested the cancellation and so filed a complaint in the CFI of
Batangas, seeking annulment of the cancellation of the award of the lot and DOMAGAS vs. JENSEN
house in his favor and the restoration of all his rights thereto;
He contends that it is illegal and unwarranted because he has already a GRN 158407 158407 January 17,2005
vested right thereto because of the award;
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, Callejo, Sr. J.:
contending that since the petitioner’s action affects the title to a house and lot
in Quezon city, the same should have been commenced in the CFI of Quezon FACTS:
City where the real property is located.
Petitioner Domagas filed for a forcible entry case against Jensen. Summons
Lower court ruling: and complaint were not served on respondent because the latter was
CFI of Batangas: sustained the motion to dismiss based on improper venue. apparently out of the country but it was received by respondent’s brother
Oscar who was then at the respondent’s house. The trial court rendered a
*Case immediately elevated to the SC
decision in favor of petitioner. Respondent did not appeal. August 20, 2000,
Issue: WON the action of petitioner was improperly laid in the CFI of respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for the annulment of the
Batangas decision of MTC since the service of summons was ineffective, the
respondent being out of the country. The RTC decided in favor of Jensen
Ruling: No, the case was not improperly filed in the CFI of Batangas. since there was no valid service of the complaint and summons. The CA
The venue of actions or, more appropriately, the county where the action is affirmed the decision, ruling that the case was an ejectment case which is
triable depends to a great extent on the nature of the action to be filed, an action quasi in rem.
whether it is real or personal.
ISSUE:
Real action is one brought for the specific recovery of land, tenements, or
hereditaments. A personal action is one brought for recovery of personal Whether or not the action of petitioner in the MTC against respondent is an
property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its action in personam or quasi in rem.
breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the
person or property. RULING:
The action of the petitioner fro forcible entry is a real action and one in A parcel of land owned by the respondent Castellvi has been rented and
personam. The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine occupied by the Philippine Air Force of the AFP in 1947. The petitioner, in
behalf of the AFP, refused to extend the lease, informing the latter that the
its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem or in personam or in quasi in
heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property and,
rem is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A demanded that the property be vacated. Hence, the petitioner Republic
proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and instituted expropriation proceedings in 1959.
obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of
the person, although it may involve his right, or the exercise of ownership During the assessment for just compensation, the petitioner argued that it had
of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in taken the property when the contract of lease commenced in 1947 and not
accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in when the proceedings begun in 1959.
personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some
responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this Respondent maintains that the subject land was not taken when the petitioner
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements
character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain is lacking, to
or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is wit:
said to be one which has for its object a judgment against a person, as
distinguished from a judgment against the proprietary to determine its 1. entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more
state… Actions for recovery of real property are in personam. than a momentary period, and
2. devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
v Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions ISSUE:
Whether the the “taking” should be reckoned from the year 1947, when the
only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to
petitioner has entered and occupied the property as lessee, or the filing on
ascertain or cut off the rights or interest of all possible claimants. The 1959.
judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the
action. HELD:
No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
Limitations of Ownership commenced in 1959.
This prompted Mayfair to file a case for the annulment of the Deed of Industrial
Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific performance and LIWANAG v YU-SONGQUIAN
damages. FACTS: Yu-Chiocco leased a land on Calle Lemery, Tondo in 1901. The property,
however, was later claimed by Leoncia Liuanag, on behalf of the estate of Yu-
Chingco, who had died in China on Oct. 30 1901. Yu-Chiocco himself died in August
In 1996, the Court ruled in favor of Mayfair. 1902.
The lower court found that Yu-Chiocco contributed the labor, while the materials used
Barely five months after Mayfair had submitted its Motion for Execution, belonged to the estate of Yu-Chingco, and ruled that the estate of Yu-Chingco owned
half of the buildings.
Equatorial filed an action for collection of sum of money against Mayfair The Supreme Court overturned the ruling, saying that even if the materials belonged
claiming payment of rentals or reasonable compensation for the to Yu-Chingco, “it does not follow, as a conclusion of law, that the owner of the
material thereby became the owner of any part of the buildings.”
defendant’s use of the subject premises after its lease contracts had Instead, Liuanag should be paid for the materials that were used to construct the
expired. building.
It cited Art. 360 of the Civil Code, which says that a landowner who builds on his land
using the materials of another is obliged to pay for the value of the material. Saying
Maxim Theater contract expired on May 31, 1987, while the Lease Contract that the provision would also apply to a leasehold in real estate, the Court said
covering the premises occupied by Miramar Theater lapsed on March 31, Liuanag has a claim for the value of the materials that were used in the construction
of the building.
1989. Judgment: Ruling REVERSED. Case remanded to lower court with directions to enter
judgment in favor of defendant, without prejudice to present claim against the person
The lower court debunked the claim of Equatorial for unpaid back rentals, or estate bound to pay it.
holding that the rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale in the mother case
did not confer on Equatorial any vested or residual propriety rights, even in .M. TUASON and CO., INC. V ESTRELLA VDA. DE LUMANLAN and CA
expectancy.
G.R. No: L-23497 The agreement also states that “the sums paid by them to the Deudors...shall be credited to
Petitioner/s: J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. the buyers.”
Respondent/s: Estrella Vda. De Lumanlan and the Court of Appeals (Fifth Division)
Ponente: Acting C.J. JBL Reyes 3. All that Tuason agreed to was to grant the Deudor buyers preferential right to purchase “at
Action: Petition for review by certiorari current prices and terms” upon recognizing the title of Tuason and signing new contracts and
Date: April 26, 1968 to credit to them for the amounts they had paid to the Deudors.
4. Lumanlan never claimed that she had signed a new contract with Tuason for the
FACTS
puchase of the lot occupied. Instead of recognizing the title of Tuason as required by the
1. J.M. Tuason & Co Inc (Tuason) filed a case against Lumanlan after the latter unlawfully agreement, she used paragraph 6 of the agreement for her special defense, arguing that
entered into its property known as Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision (situated at Barrio North Deudor and Tuason entered into the compromise agreement where Deudor and his co-
Tatalon, Quezon City). Lumanlan took possession of 800 sq m land and constructed her owners renouced, ceded, waived, and quitclaimed all their rights in the property in favor of
house on the said land. Tuason prays for ejectment and damages for occupancy. Tuason without her knowledge and consent. Now she does not rely on the compromise
agreement but she assails it. -_-
2. Lumanlan argues that she had brought the property from one Pedro Deudor and that there
is a Compromise Agreement between Deudor and Tuason stating that she was one of the 5. Without the compromise agreement, Lumanlan must justify her possession on the basis of
buyers recognized therein. a pretended superiority of the Deudors’ old Spanish nformacion posesoria over Tuason’s
Certificate of Title No. 1267. But the Court has already ruled in previous cases that Lumanlan
3. CFI: Lower Court ruled in favor of Tuason, holding that it is the registered owner and the is barred from assailing the decree of registration in favor of Tuason’s predecessors 20 years
question being purely one of possession. Lumanlan’s evidence (Compromise Agreement) was after its issuance.
completely immaterial.
6. The agreement provides that the Deudor buyers should sign new contracts with it at current
4. Upon appeal, CA ruled in favor of Lumanlan, holding that the Compromise Agreement was prices specified for the sales of lots. Article 1474 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case
a valid defense against the possessory action filed by Tuason. Under paragraph 7 of the said because Lumanlan is not a buyer from Tuason since there is no contract between the two.
agreement, Tuason bound and committed itself to sell to Lumanlan the lot occupied by her at
a reasonable price. Lumanlan has the right to compel Tuason to accept payment for the lot in 7. Lumanlan’s argument that she should be deemed a builder in good faith does not hold
question and that the agreement legalized the possession of Lumanlan. water. In a related case (Tuason v Macalindong), the Court ruled that there being a
presumptive knowledge of the Torrents titles issued to Tuason, the buyer from the Deudors
cannot say now that she believer her vendor had rights of ownership over the lot purchaser.
ISSUE
She had chose to ignore the Torrens title of Tuason and relied instead upon the Deudor’s
Whether or not J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc is the rightful owner of the said land? – YES
claim of ownership, perhaps because such course appeared to her as more advantageous;
hence, she has only herself to blame for the consequences now that the Deudors' claim has
HELD
been abandoned by the Deudors themselves, and can not pretend good faith.
1. A careful analysis of the compromise agreement will show that in no way did it obligate
Tuason to sell to those buyers the lots occupied by them at the price stipulated by the
8. Lumanlan could have asked that she recover or be credited with the amounts paid by her to
Deudors, but at “the current prices and terms specified by the OWNERS (Tuason) in their
the Deudors. Equity demands, however, that her right to claim such return, or to have the
sales of lots. (See notes for paragraph 7 of compromise agreement)
amount offset against the sums she was sentenced to pay should be reserved.
2. Paragraph 7 also imports that these buyers of the Deudors must (1) “recognize the title of
the OWNERS (Tuason) over the property purportedly bought by them” and from the DISPO
Deudors, and (2) “sign, whenever possible, new contracts of purchase for said property.”
Petition granted. Decision of CA reversed. Decision of CFI reinstated. Costs against GABOYA V. CUI- Usufruct
Lumanlan.
FACTS:
NOTES Don Mariano sold his 2 lots to two of his children. Later on, he and his
Paragraph 7 of the Compromise Agreement: children became co-owners of the property. Don Mariano executed a deed
authorizing the children to apply for a loan w/ mortgage with a stipulation
That the sales of the possessory rights claimed by the DEUDORS, are described in reserving his right to the fruits of the land. The children then constructed a
the lists submitted by them to the OWNERS which are attached hereto marked building on the land and collected rent from the lessee thereof. Much later,
Annexes "B" and "C" and made part hereof. Whatever amounts may have been
when Don Mariano died, his estate was claiming the fruits of the building.
collected by the DEUDORS on account thereof, shall be deducted from the total
sum of P1,201,063.00 to be paid to them. It shall be the joint and solidary obligation
ISSUE:
of the DEUDORS to make the buyer of the lots purportedly sold by them to
recognize the title of the OWNERS over the property purportedly bought by them,
Whether or not Don Mariano had a right to fruits of the building?
and to make them sign, whenever possible, new contracts of purchase for said
property at the current paces and terms specified by the OWNERS in their sales of RULING: NO.
lots in their subdivision known at "Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision." The DEUDORS
HEREBY advised the OWNERS that the buyer listed in Annex "B" herein with the The deed expressly reserved only to his right to the fruits of the land. He
annotation "continue" shall buy the lots respectively occupied by them and shall sign
only owned the rent for the portion of land occupied by the building; thus,
contracts, but the sums already paid by them to the DEUDORS amounting to
P134,922.84 (subject to verification by the Court) shall be credited to the buyers and
the estate could only claim the rent on that piece of land and not on the
shall be deducted from the sums to be paid to the DEUDORS by the OWNERS. The entire parcel of land. The children are entitled to the rents of the building.
DEUDORS also advise the OWNERS that, the buyers listed in Annex "C" herein (A usufruct on the land may be separate from the building.
with the annotation "Refund" have decided not to continue with their former
contracts or purchases with the DEUDORS and the sums already paid by them to
the DEUDORS TOTALLING P101,182.42 (subject to verification by the Court) shall There should be no rescission of the contract coz the exact amount of rent
be refunded to them by the OWNERS and deducted from the sums that may be due due and owing to the Don Mariano’s estate is still unliquidated and
to the DEUDORS from the OWNERS (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Jaramillo, L- undetermined. The trial court has the discretion to grant the debtor
18932, Sept. 30, 1963);
(children) a period within which to pay the rental income from the portion
Article 1474 of the Civil Code: of land owned by the building because the same has not yet been
determined. Article 1191 of the Civil Code grants the right to rescind but
Where the price cannot be determined in accordance with the preceding articles, or subject to the period that the court will grant.
in any other manner, the contract is inefficacious. However, if the thing or any part
thereof has been delivered to and appropriated by the buyer, he must pay a
reasonable price therefor. What is a reasonable price is a question of fact Moreover, on the issue of co-ownership, the court held that a co-owner
dependent on the circumstances of each particular case. cannot simultaneously be a usufructuary of the same land owned.
GABOYA V. CUI However, since there is a pending case (Manotok v. NHA) involving the
expropriation of the land in question it is better to suspend the current case
38 SCRA 85 til after the outcome of the expropriation proceedings is done. Moreover, a
FACTS: fire engulfed the Tambunting estate covering the disputed area of the
land.The expropriation case was not granted and the law that provided for
Don Mariano sold his three lots prodiviso to his three children. One of his such was declared unconstitutional.
children, due to lack of funds, wasn’t able to purchase part of the land. This Due to the fire, petitioner is contending that the execution of the decision
reverted back to the father. As part of the sale, the father reserved for must now involve the delivery of possession.
himself the usufruct of the property. He co-owned the land with his children
then. A building was then constructed in a portion of the land, wherein ISSUE
rentals was given to the father. Thereafter, the two children who were co-
Whether or not there should be a delivery of possession by the respondent
owners obtained a loan, secured by a mortgage, with authority of the to the petitioner
father, to construct a commercial building. The father alleges that since he
has usufruct over the land, he has usufruct or share in the rentals earned RULING
through the constructed building.
When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it becomes
HELD: incumbent upon the respondent judge to issue the necessary writ for the
execution of the same. Since the improvements have been gutted by fire,
The reserved right of vendor on a parcel of land doesn’t include rentals from and therefore, the basis for private respondent's right to retain the
the buildings subsequently constructed on the vacant lots, but that it did premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the petitioner,
entitle the usufructuary to a reasonable rental for the portion of the land there is no other recourse for the private respondent but to vacate the
being occupied by the building. premises and deliver the same to the petitioner.
MANOTOK REALTY INC v. TECSON
MWSS V. CA, CITY OF DAGUPAN,
143 SCRA 623
FACTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not MWSS has the right to remove all the useful
improvements introduced by NAWASA to the Dagupan
Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA
was found to be a possessor in bad faith?
HELD: No.
Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he
who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity."
As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful
improvements it had made without right to indemnity. Moreover,
under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith
shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention
until reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only a
possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if this