Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONT
E AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCAT
ES FOR

PEOPLE'S RIGHT
S (ULAP), petitioners
, vs
.GEN. RENAT
O DE VILLA AND
NAT
IONAL CAPIT
AL REGION DIST
RICT
 COMMAND, res
pondents
.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for hims
elf and his
 co-petitioners
.

PADILLA, J.:

T
his
 is
 a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
res
training order, s
eeking the declaration of checkpoints
 in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila or els
ewhere, as
 uncons
titutional and the dis
mantling and banning of
the s
ame or, in the alternative, to direct the res
pondents
 to formulate
guidelines
 in the implementation of checkpoints
, for the protection of the
people.

Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte s
ues
 in his
 capacity as
 citizen of the Republic,
taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
 (IBP), and res
ident
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers
 and Advocates

for People's
 Rights
 (ULAP) s
ues
 in its
 capacity as
 an as
s
ociation whos
e
members
 are all members
 of the IBP.

T
he factual background of the cas
e is
 as
 follows
:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region Dis
trict Command (NCRDC)

was
 activated purs
uant to Letter of Ins
truction 02/87 of the Philippine
General Headquarters
, AFP, with the mis
s
ion of conducting s
ecurity
operations
 within its
 area of res
pons
ibility and peripheral areas
, for the
purpos
e of es
tablis
hing an effective territorial defens
e, maintaining peace
and order, and providing an atmos
phere conducive to the s
ocial, economic
and political development of the National Capital Region. 1 As
 part of its
 duty
to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC ins
talled checkpoints
 in various

parts
 of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners
 aver that, becaus
e of the ins
tallation of s
aid checkpoints
, the

res
idents
 of Valenzuela are worried of being haras
s
ed and of their s
afety
being placed at the arbitrary, capricious
 and whims
ical dis
pos
ition of the
military manning the checkpoints
, cons
idering that their cars
 and vehicles

are being s
ubjected to regular s
earches
 and check-ups
, es
pecially at night or
at dawn, without the benefit of a s
earch warrant and/or court order. T
heir
alleged fear for their s
afety increas
ed when, at dawn of 9 July 1988,
Benjamin Parpon, a s
upply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan,
was
 gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members
 of the NCRDC
manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for
ignoring and/or refus
ing to s
ubmit hims
elf to the checkpoint and for
continuing to s
peed off ins
pire of warning s
hots
 fired in the air. Petitioner
Valmonte als
o claims
 that, on s
everal occas
ions
, he had gone thru thes
e
checkpoints
 where he was
 s
topped and his
 car s
ubjected to s
earch/check-up
without a court order or s
earch warrant.

Petitioners
 further contend that the s
aid checkpoints
 give the res
pondents
 a
blanket authority to make s
earches
 and/or s
eizures
 without s
earch warrant or
court order in violation of the Cons
titution; 2 and, ins
tances
 have occurred
where a citizen, while not killed, had been haras
s
ed.

Petitioners
' concern for their s
afety and apprehens
ion at being haras
s
ed by

the military manning the checkpoints
 are not s
ufficient grounds
 to declare
the checkpoints
 as
 per s
e illegal. No proof has
 been pres
ented before the
Court to s
how that, in the cours
e of their routine checks
, the military indeed
committed s
pecific violations
 of petitioners
' right agains
t unlawful s
earch and
s
eizure or other rights
.

In a cas
e filed by the s
ame petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers
 and

Advocates
 for People's
 Right (ULAP) vs
. Integrated National Police, 3 it was

held that individual petitioners
 who do not allege that any of their rights

were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as
 real parties
 in interes
t.

T
he cons
titutional right agains
t unreas
onable s
earches
 and s
eizures
 is
 a

pers
onal right invocable only by thos
e whos
e rights
 have been infringed, 4 or
threatened to be infringed. What cons
titutes
 a reas
onable or unreas
onable
s
earch and s
eizure in any particular cas
e is
 purely a judicial ques
tion,
determinable from a cons
ideration of the circums
tances
 involved. 5

Petitioner Valmonte's
 general allegation to the effect that he had been

s
topped and s
earched without a s
earch warrant by the military manning the
checkpoints
, without more, i.e., without s
tating the details
 of the incidents

which amount to a violation of his
 right agains
t unlawful s
earch and s
eizure,
is
 not s
ufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was
 a
violation of Valmonte's
 right agains
t unlawful s
earch and s
eizure. Not all
s
earches
 and s
eizures
 are prohibited. T
hos
e which are reas
onable are not
forbidden. A reas
onable s
earch is
 not to be determined by any fixed formula
but is
 to be res
olved according to the facts
 of each cas
e. 6

Where, for example, the officer merely draws
 as
ide the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is
 parked on the public fair grounds
, 7 or s
imply looks
 into a
vehicle, 8 or flas
hes
 a light therein, 9 thes
e do not cons
titute unreas
onable
s
earch.

T
he s
etting up of the ques
tioned checkpoints
 in Valenzuela (and probably in

other areas
) may be cons
idered as
 a s
ecurity meas
ure to enable the NCRDC
to purs
ue its
 mis
s
ion of es
tablis
hing effective territorial defens
e and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints
 may
als
o be regarded as
 meas
ures
 to thwart plots
 to des
tabilize the government,
in the interes
t of public s
ecurity. In this
 connection, the Court may take
judicial notice of the s
hift to urban centers
 and their s
uburbs
 of the
ins
urgency movement, s
o clearly reflected in the increas
ed killings
 in cities

of police and military men by NPA "s
parrow units
," not to mention the
abundance of unlicens
ed firearms
 and the alarming ris
e in lawles
s
nes
s
 and
violence in s
uch urban centers
, not all of which are reported in media, mos
t
likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions
 — which all s
um
up to what one can rightly cons
ider, at the very leas
t, as
 abnormal times
.
Between the inherent right of the s
tate to protect its
 exis
tence and promote
public welfare and an individual's
 right agains
t a warrantles
s
 s
earch which is

however reas
onably conducted, the former s
hould prevail.

T
rue, the manning of checkpoints
 by the military is
 s
us
ceptible of abus
e by

the men in uniform, in the s
ame manner that all governmental power is

s
us
ceptible of abus
e. But, at the cos
t of occas
ional inconvenience,
dis
comfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints
 during thes
e
abnormal times
, when conducted within reas
onable limits
, are part of the
price we pay for an orderly s
ociety and a peaceful community.

Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints
 in Metro Manila were
temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules
 in the conduct of
the police and military manning the checkpoints
 was
 ordered by the National
Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is
 DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvas
a, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras
, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes
, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]

PEOPLE OF T
HE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs
. FLORENCIO DORIA y

BOLADO, and VIOLET
A GADDAO y CAT
AMA @ "NENET
H," accus
ed-
appellants
.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

On December 7, 1995, accus
ed-appellants
 Florencio Doria y Bolado and

Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section
4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous
 Drugs
 Act of 1972. [1] T
he
information reads
:
"T
hat on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines
, a place within the juris
diction of this
 Honorable
Court, the above-named accus
ed, cons
piring, confederating and mutually
helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and felonious
ly s
ell, adminis
ter,
deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plas
tic bags
 of s
us
pected
marijuana fruiting tops
 weighing 7,641.08 grams
 in violation of the above-
cited law.

CONT
RARY T
O LAW."[2]

T
he pros
ecution contends
 the offens
e was
 committed as
 follows
: In

November 1995, members
 of the North Metropolitan Dis
trict, Philippine
National Police (PNP) Narcotics
 Command (Narcom), received information
from two (2) civilian informants
 (CI) that one "Jun" was
 engaged in illegal
drug activities
 in Mandaluyong City. T
he Narcom agents
 decided to entrap
and arres
t "Jun" in a buy-bus
t operation. As
 arranged by one of the CI's
, a
meeting between the Narcom agents
 and "Jun" was
 s
cheduled on December
5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.

On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP

Headquarters
 at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bus
t
operation. T
he Narcom agents
 formed T
eam Alpha compos
ed of P/Ins
p.
Nolas
co Cortes
 as
 team leader and PO3 Cels
o Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund
Badua and four (4) other policemen as
 members
. P/Ins
p. Cortes
 des
ignated
PO3 Manlangit as
 the pos
eur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as
 his
 back-up, and the
res
t of the team as
 perimeter s
ecurity. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief
of the North Metropolitan Dis
trict PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to
cover operational expens
es
. From this
 s
um, PO3 Manlangit s
et
as
ide P1,600.00-- a one thous
and pes
o bill and s
ix (6) one hundred pes
o
bills
[3]-- as
 money for the buy-bus
t operation. T
he market price of one kilo of
marijuana was
 then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills
 with his

initials
 and lis
ted their s
erial numbers
 in the police blotter. [4] T
he team rode in
two cars
 and headed for the target area.

At 7:20 of the s
ame morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3
Manlangit as
 interes
ted in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit
handed "Jun" the marked bills
 worth P1,600.00. "Jun" ins
tructed PO3
Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street
while he got the marijuana from his
 as
s
ociate. [5] An hour later, "Jun"
appeared at the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the res
t of
the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his
 bag an object wrapped in
plas
tic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arres
ted "Jun"
as
 SPO1 Badua rus
hed to help in the arres
t. T
hey fris
ked "Jun" but did not
find the marked bills
 on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the
money at the hous
e of his
 as
s
ociate named "Neneth." [6] "Jun" led the police
team to "Neneth's
" hous
e nearby at Daang Bakal.

T
he team found the door of "Neneth's
" hous
e open and a woman ins
ide.
"Jun" identified the woman as
 his
 as
s
ociate. [7] SPO1 Badua as
ked "Neneth"
about the P1,600.00 as
 PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's
" hous
e.
Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining
table. He s
aw that one of the box's
 flaps
 was
 open and ins
ide the box was

s
omething wrapped in plas
tic. T
he plas
tic wrapper and its
 contents
 appeared
s
imilar to the marijuana earlier "s
old" to him by "Jun." His
 s
us
picion arous
ed,
PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's
" hous
e and took hold of the box. He
peeked ins
ide the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks
 of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves
.

Simultaneous
 with the box's
 dis
covery, SPO1 Badua recovered the

marked bills
 from "Neneth."[8] T
he policemen arres
ted "Neneth." T
hey took
"Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its
 contents
 and the marked bills

and turned them over to the inves
tigator at headquarters
. It was
 only then
that the police learned that "Jun" is
 Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth"
is
 Violeta Gaddao y Catama. T
he one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves

recovered from "Jun" plus
 the ten (10) bricks
 recovered from "Neneth's
"
hous
e were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. [9] T
he bricks
, eleven (11)
in all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops
 of various
 weights

totalling 7,641.08 grams
.[10]

T
he pros
ecution s
tory was
 denied by accus
ed-appellants
 Florencio Doria

and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, tes
tified that
on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was
 at the gate of his

hous
e reading a tabloid news
paper. T
wo men appeared and as
ked him if he
knew a certain "T
otoy." T
here were many "T
otoys
" in their area and as
 the
men ques
tioning him were s
trangers
, accus
ed-appellant denied knowing any
"T
otoy." T
he men took accus
ed-appellant ins
ide his
 hous
e and accus
ed him of
being a pus
her in their community. When accus
ed-appellant denied the
charge, the men led him to their car outs
ide and ordered him to point out the
hous
e of "T
otoy." For five (5) minutes
, accus
ed-appellant s
tayed in the
car. T
hereafter, he gave in and took them to "T
otoy's
" hous
e.

Doria knocked on the door of "T
otoy's
" hous
e but no one ans
wered. One
of the men, later identified as
 PO3 Manlangit, pus
hed open the door and he
and his
 companions
 entered and looked around the hous
e for about three
minutes
. Accus
ed-appellant Doria was
 left s
tanding at the door. T
he
policemen came out of the hous
e and they s
aw Violeta Gaddao carrying
water from the well. He as
ked Violeta where "T
otoy" was
 but s
he replied he
was
 not there. Curious
 onlookers
 and kibitzers
 were, by that time,
s
urrounding them. When Violeta entered her hous
e, three men were already
ins
ide. Accus
ed-appellant Doria, then s
till at the door, overheard one of the
men s
ay that they found a carton box. T
urning towards
 them, Doria s
aw a
box on top of the table. T
he box was
 open and had s
omething ins
ide. PO3
Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outs
ide the hous
e and board the car.
T
hey were brought to police headquarters
 where they were inves
tigated.

Accus
ed-appellant Doria further declared that his
 co-accus
ed, Violeta

Gaddao, is
 the wife of his
 acquaintance, T
otoy Gaddao. He s
aid that he and
T
otoy Gaddao s
ometimes
 drank together at the neighborhood s
tore. T
his

clos
enes
s
, however, did not extend to Violeta, T
otoy's
 wife.[11]

Accus
ed-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed

that on December 5, 1995, s
he was
 at her hous
e at Daang Bakal,
Mandaluyong City where s
he lived with her hus
band and five (5) children,
namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins
 Raymond and Raynan, aged
5, and Jas
on, aged 3. T
hat day, accus
ed-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the
morning and bought pan de s
al for her children's
 breakfas
t. Her hus
band,
T
otoy, a hous
epainter, had left for Pangas
inan five days
 earlier. She woke her
children and bathed them. Her eldes
t s
on, Arvy, left for s
chool at 6:45
A.M. T
en minutes
 later, s
he carried her younges
t s
on, Jays
on, and
accompanied Arjay to s
chool. She left the twins
 at home leaving the door
open. After s
eeing Arjay off, s
he and Jays
on remained s
tanding in front of the
s
chool s
oaking in the s
un for about thirty minutes
. T
hen they headed for
home. Along the way, they pas
s
ed the artes
ian well to fetch water. She was

pumping water when a man clad in s
hort pants
 and denim jacket s
uddenly
appeared and grabbed her left wris
t. T
he man pulled her and took her to her
hous
e. She found out later that the man was
 PO3 Manlangit.

Ins
ide her hous
e were her co-accus
ed Doria and three (3) other
pers
ons
. T
hey as
ked her about a box on top of the table. T
his
 was
 the firs
t
time s
he s
aw the box. T
he box was
 clos
ed and tied with a piece of green
s
traw. T
he men opened the box and s
howed her its
 contents
. She s
aid s
he
did not know anything about the box and its
 contents
.

Accus
ed-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accus
ed

Florencio Doria was
 a friend of her hus
band, and that her hus
band never
returned to their hous
e after he left for Pangas
inan.She denied the charge
agains
t her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills
 were found in her
pers
on.[12]

After trial, the Regional T
rial Court, Branch 156, Pas
ig City convicted the
accus
ed-appellants
. T
he trial court found the exis
tence of an
"organized/s
yndicated crime group" and s
entenced both accus
ed-appellants

to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. T
he dis
pos
itive portion of the
decis
ion reads
 as
 follows
:
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accus
ed, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun"
and VIOLET
A GADDAO y CAT
AMA @ "Neneth" having been es
tablis
hed
beyond reas
onable doubt, they are both CONVICT
ED of the pres
ent charge
agains
t them.

According to the amendatory provis
ions
 of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659

which cover violations
 of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was

exhaus
tively dis
cus
s
ed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the penalty
impos
able in this
 cas
e is
 reclus
ion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thous
and pes
os
 to ten million pes
os
. T
aking into cons
ideration,
however, the provis
ions
 of Sec. 23, als
o of Republic Act No. 7659 which
explicitly s
tate that:

'T
he maximum penalty s
hall be impos
ed if the offens
e was
 committed by any
pers
on who belongs
 to an organized/s
yndicated crime group.

An organized/s
yndicated crime group means
 a group of two or more pers
ons


collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purpos
es
 of
gain in the commis
s
ion of any crime.'

the Court is
 hereby cons
trained to s
entence (hereby s
entences
) s
aid

FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLET
A GADDAO y CAT
AMA @
"Neneth" to DEAT
H and to pay a fine of Five Hundred T
hous
and Pes
os

(P500,000.00) each without s
ubs
idiary impris
onment in cas
e of ins
olvency
and to pay the cos
ts
.

T
he confis
cated marijuana bricks
 (7,641.08 grams
) s
hall be turned over to

the Dangerous
 Drugs
 Board, NBI for des
truction in accordance with law.

Let a Commitment Order be is
s
ued for the trans
fer of accus
ed DORIA from
the Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Pris
ons
, Muntinlupa City and als
o
for accus
ed GADDAO for her trans
fer to the Correctional Ins
titute for Women,
Mandaluyong City.

Let the entire records
 of this
 cas
e be forwarded immediately to the Supreme
Court for mandatory review.

SO ORDERED."[13]

Before this
 Court, accus
ed-appellant Doria as
s
igns
 two errors
, thus
:

"I
T
HE COURT
 A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT
 T
O T
HE T
EST
IMONY
OF T
HE WIT
NESSES FOR T
HE PROSECUT
ION WHEN T
HEIR T
EST
IMONIES
WERE SHOT
 WIT
H DISCREPANCIES, INCONSIST
ENCIES AND T
HAT
 T
HE
CORPUS DELICT
I OF T
HE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY T
AKEN FROM APPELLANT

WAS NOT
 POSIT
IVELY IDENT
IFIED BY T
HE POSEUR-BUYER.

II
T
HE COURT
 A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMIT
T
ING AS EVIDENCE T
HE
MARIJUANA FRUIT
INGS FOUND INSIDE T
HE CART
ON BOX AS T
HESE WERE
OBT
AINED T
HROUGH A WARRANT
LESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT
 COME
WIT
HIN T
HE PLAIN VIEW DOCT
RINE."[14]

Accus
ed-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends
:

"I
T
HE LOWER COURT
 ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT
 GUILT
Y DESPIT
E T
HE
INCREDIBILIT
Y OF T
HE POLICE VERSION OF T
HE MANNER T
HE ALLEGED BUY-
BUST
 AS CONDUCT
ED.

II
T
HE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS T
O WHERE T
HE BUY-BUST
 MONEY CAME
FROM ARE INCONSIST
ENT
 WIT
H ONE ANOT
HER AND ALSO REEKS WIT
H
INCREDIBILIT
Y.

III
T
HE LOWER COURT
 ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT
 GUILT
Y AND SENT
ENCING
HER T
O DEAT
H DESPIT
E T
HE MANIFEST
LY IRRECONCILABLE
INCONSIST
ENCIES IN T
HE VERSIONS OF T
HE POLICE AS T
O HOW AND BY
WHOM T
HE ALLEGED BUY-BUST
 MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH
IN CONSEQUENCE RESULT
S IN T
HE EVIDENCE, OF RET
RIEVAL FROM HER OF
T
HE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT
 BEST
, NIL, AT
 WORST
.

IV
T
HE LOWER COURT
 ERRED IN UPHOLDING T
HE VALIDIT
Y OF T
HE
WARRANT
LESS SEARCH LEADING T
O T
HE SEIZURE OF T
HE MARIJUANA
ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE T
HE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
." [15]

T
he as
s
igned errors
 involve two principal is
s
ues
: (1) the validity of the
buy-bus
t operation in the apprehens
ion of accus
ed-appellant Doria; and (2)
the validity of the warrantles
s
 arres
t of accus
ed-appellant Gaddao, the
s
earch of her pers
on and hous
e, and the admis
s
ibility of the pieces
 of
evidence obtained therefrom.

Accus
ed-appellants
 were caught by the police in a buy-bus
t operation. A

buy-bus
t operation is
 a form of entrapment employed by peace officers
 as
 an
effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commis
s
ion of an
offens
e.[16] Entrapment has
 received judicial s
anction when undertaken with
due regard to cons
titutional and legal s
afeguards
.[17]

Entrapment was
 unknown in common law. It is
 a judicially created

twentieth-century American doctrine that evolved from the increas
ing us
e of
informers
 and undercover agents
 in the detection of crimes
, particularly
liquor and narcotics
 offens
es
.[18] Entrapment s
prouted from the doctrine of
es
toppel and the public interes
t in the formulation and application of decent
s
tandards
 in the enforcement of criminal law. [19] It als
o took off from a
s
pontaneous
 moral revuls
ion agains
t us
ing the powers
 of government to
beguile innocent but ductile pers
ons
 into laps
es
 that they might otherwis
e
res
is
t.[20]

In the American juris
diction, the term "entrapment" has
 a generally

negative meaning becaus
e it is
 unders
tood as
 the inducement of one to
commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpos
e of ins
tituting
a criminal pros
ecution agains
t him.[21] T
he clas
s
ic definition of entrapment is

that articulated by Jus
tice Roberts
 in Sorrells
 v. United States
,[22] the firs
t
Supreme Court decis
ion to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is
 the
conception and planning of an offens
e by an officer, and his
 procurement of
its
 commis
s
ion by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the
trickery, pers
uas
ion or fraud of the officer." [23] It cons
is
ts
 of two (2) elements
:
(a) acts
 of pers
uas
ion, trickery, or fraud carried out by law enforcement
officers
 or the agents
 to induce a defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the
origin of the criminal des
ign in the minds
 of the government officials
 rather
than that of the innocent defendant, s
uch that the crime is
 the product of the
creative activity of the law enforcement officer.[24]

It is
 recognized that in every arres
t, there is
 a certain amount of

entrapment us
ed to outwit the pers
ons
 violating or about to violate the law.
Not every deception is
 forbidden. T
he type of entrapment the law forbids
 is

the inducing of another to violate the law, the "s
eduction" of an otherwis
e
innocent pers
on into a criminal career. [25] Where the criminal intent originates

in the mind of the entrapping pers
on and the accus
ed is
 lured into the
commis
s
ion of the offens
e charged in order to pros
ecute him, there is

entrapment and no conviction may be had. [26] Where, however, the criminal
intent originates
 in the mind of the accus
ed and the criminal offens
e is

completed, the fact that a pers
on acting as
 a decoy for the s
tate, or public
officials
 furnis
hed the accus
ed an opportunity for commis
s
ion of the offens
e,
or that the accus
ed is
 aided in the commis
s
ion of the crime in order to
s
ecure the evidence neces
s
ary to pros
ecute him, there is
 no entrapment and
the accus
ed mus
t be convicted. [27] T
he law tolerates
 the us
e of decoys
 and
other artifices
 to catch a criminal.

Entrapment is
 recognized as
 a valid defens
e [28] that can be rais
ed by an
accus
ed and partakes
 of the nature of a confes
s
ion and avoidance. [29] It is
 a
pos
itive defens
e. Initially, an accus
ed has
 the burden of providing s
ufficient
evidence that the government induced him to commit the offens
e. Once
es
tablis
hed, the burden s
hifts
 to the government to s
how otherwis
e. [30] When
entrapment is
 rais
ed as
 a defens
e, American federal courts
 and a majority of
s
tate courts
 us
e the "s
ubjective" or "origin of intent" tes
t laid down in Sorrells

v. United States
[31] to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. T
he
focus
 of the inquiry is
 on the accus
ed's
 predis
pos
ition to commit the offens
e
charged, his
 s
tate of mind and inclination before his
 initial expos
ure to
government agents
.[32]All relevant facts
 s
uch as
 the accus
ed's
 mental and
character traits
, his
 pas
t offens
es
, activities
, his
 eagernes
s
 in committing the
crime, his
 reputation, etc., are cons
idered to as
s
es
s
 his
 s
tate of mind before
the crime.[33] T
he predis
pos
ition tes
t emphas
izes
 the accus
ed's
 propens
ity to
commit the offens
e rather than the officer's
 mis
conduct [34] and reflects
 an
attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap
for the unwary criminal."[35] If the accus
ed was
 found to have been ready and
willing to commit the offens
e at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment
defens
e will fail even if a police agent us
ed an unduly pers
uas
ive
inducement.[36] Some s
tates
, however, have adopted the "objective" tes
t.
[37]
T
his
 tes
t was
 firs
t authoritatively laid down in the cas
e of Gros
s
man v.
State[38] rendered by the Supreme Court of Alas
ka. Several other s
tates
 have
s
ubs
equently adopted the tes
t by judicial pronouncement or
legis
lation. Here, the court cons
iders
 the nature of the police activity
involved and the propriety of police conduct.[39] T
he inquiry is
 focus
ed on the
inducements
 us
ed by government agents
, on police conduct, not on the
accus
ed and his
 predis
pos
ition to commit the crime. For the goal of the
defens
e is
 to deter unlawful police conduct. [40] T
he tes
t of entrapment is

whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was
 likely to induce a
normally law-abiding pers
on, other than one who is
 ready and willing, to
commit the offens
e;[41] for purpos
es
 of this
 tes
t, it is
 pres
umed that a law-
abiding pers
on would normally res
is
t the temptation to commit a crime that
is
 pres
ented by the s
imple opportunity to act unlawfully. [42] Official conduct
that merely offers
 s
uch an opportunity is
 permis
s
ible, but overbearing
conduct, s
uch as
 badgering, cajoling or importuning, [43] or appeals
 to
s
entiments
 s
uch as
 pity, s
ympathy, friends
hip or pleas
 of des
perate illnes
s
,
are not.[44] Proponents
 of this
 tes
t believe that courts
 mus
t refus
e to convict
an entrapped accus
ed not becaus
e his
 conduct falls
 outs
ide the legal norm
but rather becaus
e, even if his
 guilt has
 been es
tablis
hed, the methods

employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be
countenanced." T
o s
ome extent, this
 reflects
 the notion that the courts

s
hould not become tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties
.
[45]
Hence, the trans
actions
 leading up to the offens
e, the interaction between
the accus
ed and law enforcement officer and the accus
ed's
 res
pons
e to the
officer's
 inducements
, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting
ins
tances
 of its
 commis
s
ion are cons
idered in judging what the effect of the
officer's
 conduct would be on a normal pers
on.[46]

Both the "s
ubjective" and "objective" approaches
 have been criticized

and objected to. It is
 claimed that the "s
ubjective" tes
t creates
 an "anything
goes
" rule, i.e., if the court determines
 that an accus
ed was
 predis
pos
ed to
commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other
uns
avory practices
 will be deemed impermis
s
ible. [47] Delving into the
accus
ed's
 character and predis
pos
ition obs
cures
 the more important tas
k of
judging police behavior and prejudices
 the accus
ed more generally. It ignores

the pos
s
ibility that no matter what his
 pas
t crimes
 and general dis
pos
ition
were, the accus
ed might not have committed the particular crime unles
s

confronted with inordinate inducements
.[48] On the other extreme, the purely
"objective" tes
t eliminates
 entirely the need for cons
idering a particular
accus
ed's
 predis
pos
ition. His
 predis
pos
ition, at leas
t if known by the police,
may have an important bearing upon the ques
tion of whether the conduct of
the police and their agents
 was
 proper. [49] T
he undis
puted fact that the
accus
ed was
 a dangerous
 and chronic offender or that he was
 a s
hrewd and
active member of a criminal s
yndicate at the time of his
 arres
t is
 relegated to
irrelevancy.[50]

Objections
 to the two tes
ts
 gave birth to hybrid approaches
 to

entrapment. Some s
tates
 in the United States
 now combine both the
"s
ubjective" and "objective" tes
ts
.[51] In Cruz v. State,[52] the Florida Supreme
Court declared that the permis
s
ibility of police conduct mus
t firs
t be
determined. If this
 objective tes
t is
 s
atis
fied, then the analys
is
 turns
 to
whether the accus
ed was
 predis
pos
ed to commit the crime. [53] In Baca v.
State,[54] the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the s
tate's
 entrapment
analys
is
 by holding that "a criminal defendant may s
ucces
s
fully as
s
ert a
defens
e of entrapment, either by s
howing lack of predis
pos
ition to commit
the crime for which he is
 charged, or, that the police exceeded the s
tandards

of proper inves
tigation.[55] T
he hybrid approaches
 combine and apply the
"objective" and "s
ubjective" tes
ts
 alternatively or concurrently.

As
 early as
 1910, this
 Court has
 examined the conduct of law enforcers

while apprehending the accus
ed caught in flagrante delicto. In United States

v. Phelps
,[56] we acquitted the accus
ed from the offens
e of s
moking opium
after finding that the government employee, a BIR pers
onnel, actually
induced him to commit the crime in order to pros
ecute him. Smith, the BIR
agent, tes
tified that Phelps
' apprehens
ion came after he overheard Phelps
 in
a s
aloon s
ay that he liked s
moking opium on s
ome occas
ions
. Smith's

tes
timony was
 dis
regarded. We accorded s
ignificance to the fact that it was

Smith who went to the accus
ed three times
 to convince him to look for an
opium den where both of them could s
moke this
 drug. [57] T
he conduct of the
BIR agent was
 condemned as
 "mos
t reprehens
ible." [58] In People v. Abella,
[59]
we acquitted the accus
ed of the crime of s
elling explos
ives
 after
examining the tes
timony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to
be a merchant. T
he police officer offered "a tempting price, xxx a very high
one" caus
ing the accus
ed to s
ell the explos
ives
. We found that there was

inducement, "direct, pers
is
tent and effective" by the police officer and that
outs
ide of his
 tes
timony, there was
 no evidence s
ufficient to convict the
accus
ed.[60] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se T
ieng,[61] we convicted the
accus
ed after finding that there was
 no inducement on the part of the law
enforcement officer. We s
tated that the Cus
toms
 s
ecret s
erviceman
s
moothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after
the accus
ed had already planned its
 importation and ordered s
aid drug. We
ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the accus
ed to import
opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an unders
tanding
with the Collector of Cus
toms
 of Cebu to better as
s
ure the s
eizure of the
prohibited drug and the arres
t of the s
urreptitious
 importers
.[62]

It was
 als
o in the s
ame cas
e of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se T
ieng[63] we
firs
t laid down the dis
tinction between entrapment vis
-a-vis
 ins
tigation or
inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus
 Juris
,[64]we held:
"ENT
RAPMENT
 AND INST
IGAT
ION. -- While it has
 been s
aid that the practice
of entrapping pers
ons
 into crime for the purpos
e of ins
tituting criminal
pros
ecutions
 is
 to be deplored, and while ins
tigation, as
 dis
tinguis
hed from
mere entrapment, has
 often been condemned and has
 s
ometimes
 been held
to prevent the act from being criminal or punis
hable, the general rule is
 that
it is
 no defens
e to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities
 for its
 commis
s
ion
were purpos
ely placed in his
 way, or that the criminal act was
 done at the
'decoy s
olicitation' of pers
ons
 s
eeking to expos
e the criminal, or that
detectives
 feigning complicity in the act were pres
ent and apparently
as
s
is
ting in its
 commis
s
ion. Es
pecially is
 this
 true in that clas
s
 of cas
es
 where
the offens
e is
 one of a kind habitually committed, and the s
olicitation merely
furnis
hes
 evidence of a cours
e of conduct. Mere deception by the detective
will not s
hield defendant, if the offens
e was
 committed by him, free from the
influence or ins
tigation of the detective. T
he fact that an agent of an owner
acts
 as
 a s
uppos
ed confederate of a thief is
 no defens
e to the latter in a
pros
ecution for larceny, provided the original des
ign was
 formed
independently of s
uch agent; and where a pers
on approached by the thief as

his
 confederate notifies
 the owner or the public authorities
, and, being
authoris
ed by them to do s
o, as
s
is
ts
 the thief in carrying out the plan, the
larceny is
 nevertheles
s
 committed. It is
 generally held that it is
 no defens
e to
a pros
ecution for an illegal s
ale of liquor that the purchas
e was
 made by a
's
potter,' detective, or hired informer; but there are cas
es
 holding the
contrary."[65]

T
he dis
tinction above-quoted was
 reiterated in two (2) decis
ions
 of the Court
of Appeals
. In People v. Galicia,[66] the appellate court declared that "there is

a wide difference between entrapment and ins
tigation." T
he ins
tigator
practically induces
 the would-be accus
ed into the commis
s
ion of the offens
e
and hims
elf becomes
 a co-principal. In entrapment, ways
 and means
 are
res
orted to by the peace officer for the purpos
e of trapping and capturing the
lawbreaker in the execution of his
 criminal plan. [67] In People v. T
an T
iong,
[68]
the Court of Appeals
 further declared that "entrapment is
 no bar to the
pros
ecution and conviction of the lawbreaker." [69]

T
he pronouncement of the Court of Appeals
 in People v. Galicia was


affirmed by this
 Court in People v. T
iu Ua.[70] Entrapment, we further held, is

not contrary to public policy. It is
 ins
tigation that is
 deemed contrary to
public policy and illegal.[71]

It can thus
 be s
een that the concept of entrapment in the American

juris
diction is
 s
imilar to ins
tigation or inducement in Philippine
juris
prudence. Entrapment in the Philippines
 is
 not a defens
e available to the
accus
ed. It is
 ins
tigation that is
 a defens
e and is
 cons
idered an abs
olutory
caus
e.[72] T
o determine whether there is
 entrapment or ins
tigation, our courts

have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers
, not the
predis
pos
ition of the accus
ed to commit the crime. T
he "objective" tes
t firs
t
applied in United States
 v. Phelps
 has
 been followed in a s
eries
 of s
imilar
cas
es
.[73] Nevertheles
s
, adopting the "objective" approach has
 not precluded
us
 from likewis
e applying the "s
ubjective" tes
t. In People v. Bohols
t,[74] we
applied both tes
ts
 by examining the conduct of the police officers
 in a buy-
bus
t operation and admitting evidence of the accus
ed's
 members
hip with the
notorious
 and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We als
o cons
idered
accus
ed's
 previous
 convictions
 of other crimes
 [75] and held that his

opprobrious
 pas
t and members
hip with the dreaded gang s
trengthened the
s
tate's
 evidence agains
t him. Convers
ely, the evidence that the accus
ed did
not s
ell or s
moke marijuana and did not have any criminal record was

likewis
e admitted in People v. Yutuc[76] thereby s
us
taining his
 defens
e that led
to his
 acquittal.

T
he dis
tinction between entrapment and ins
tigation has
 proven to be

very material in anti-narcotics
 operations
. In recent years
, it has
 become
common practice for law enforcement officers
 and agents
 to engage in buy-
bus
t operations
 and other entrapment procedures
 in apprehending drug
offenders
. Anti-narcotics
 laws
, like anti-gambling laws
 are regulatory
s
tatutes
.[77] T
hey are rules
 of convenience des
igned to s
ecure a more orderly
regulation of the affairs
 of s
ociety, and their violation gives
 ris
e to
crimes
 mala prohibita.[78] T
hey are not the traditional type of criminal law
s
uch as
 the law of murder, rape, theft, ars
on, etc. that deal with crimes
 mala
in s
e or thos
e inherently wrongful and immoral. [79] Laws
 defining crimes
 mala
prohibita condemn behavior directed, not agains
t particular individuals
, but
agains
t public order.[80] Violation is
 deemed a wrong agains
t s
ociety as
 a
whole and is
 generally unattended with any particular harm to a definite
pers
on.[81] T
hes
e offens
es
 are carried on in s
ecret and the violators
 res
ort to
many devices
 and s
ubterfuges
 to avoid detection. It is
 rare for any member
of the public, no matter how furious
ly he condemns
 acts
 mala prohibita, to
be willing to as
s
is
t in the enforcement of the law. It is
 neces
s
ary, therefore,
that government in detecting and punis
hing violations
 of thes
e laws
, rely, not
upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals
, but upon the diligence of
its
 own officials
. T
his
 means
 that the police mus
t be pres
ent at the time the
offens
es
 are committed either in an undercover capacity or through
informants
, s
pies
 or s
tool pigeons
.[82]

T
hough cons
idered es
s
ential by the police in enforcing vice legis
lation,

the confidential informant s
ys
tem breeds
 abominable abus
e. Frequently, a
pers
on who accepts
 payment from the police in the apprehens
ion of drug
peddlers
 and gamblers
 als
o accept payment from thes
e pers
ons
 who deceive
the police. T
he informant hims
elf may be a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or
other petty criminal. For whatever noble purpos
e it s
erves
, the s
pectacle that
government is
 s
ecretly mated with the underworld and us
es
 underworld
characters
 to help maintain law and order is
 not an ins
piring one. [83] Equally
odious
 is
 the bitter reality of dealing with uns
crupulous
, corrupt and
exploitative law enforcers
. Like the informant, uns
crupulous
 law enforcers
'
motivations
 are legion-- haras
s
ment, extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a
des
ire to report an accomplis
hment to their s
uperiors
. T
his
 Court has
 taken
judicial notice of this
 ugly reality in a number of cas
es
 [84] where we obs
erved
that it is
 a common modus
 operandi of corrupt law enforcers
 to prey on weak
and haples
s
 pers
ons
, particularly uns
us
pecting provincial hicks
. [85] T
he us
e of
s
hady underworld characters
 as
 informants
, the relative eas
e with which
illegal drugs
 may be planted in the hands
 or property of trus
ting and
ignorant pers
ons
, and the impos
ed s
ecrecy that inevitably s
hrouds
 all drug
deals
 have compelled this
 Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug cas
es
.
[86]
Criminal activity is
 s
uch that s
tealth and s
trategy, although neces
s
ary
weapons
 in the ars
enal of the police officer, become as
 objectionable police
methods
 as
 the coerced confes
s
ion and the unlawful s
earch. As
 well put by
the Supreme Court of California in People v. Barraza,[87]
"[E]ntrapment is
 a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal s
earch and
s
eizures
, wiretapping, fals
e arres
t, illegal detention and the third degree, it is

a type of lawles
s
 enforcement. T
hey all s
pring from common
motivations
. Each is
 a s
ubs
titute for s
killful and s
cientific inves
tigation. Each
is
 condoned by the s
inis
ter s
ophis
m that the end, when dealing with known
criminals
 of the 'criminal clas
s
es
,' jus
tifies
 the employment of illegal
means
."[88]

It is
 thus
 imperative that the pres
umption, juris
 tantum, of regularity in the
performance of official duty by law enforcement agents
 rais
ed by the
Solicitor General be applied with s
tudied res
traint.T
his
 pres
umption s
hould
not by its
elf prevail over the pres
umption of innocence and the
cons
titutionally-protected rights
 of the individual. [89] It is
 the duty of courts
 to
pres
erve the purity of their own temple from the pros
titution of the criminal
law through lawles
s
 enforcement. [90] Courts
 s
hould not allow thems
elves
 to
be us
ed as
 an ins
trument of abus
e and injus
tice les
t an innocent pers
on be
made to s
uffer the unus
ually s
evere penalties
 for drug offens
es
.[91]

We therefore s
tres
s
 that the "objective" tes
t in buy-bus
t operations


demands
 that the details
 of the purported trans
action mus
t be clearly and
adequately s
hown. T
his
 mus
t s
tart from the initial contact between the
pos
eur-buyer and the pus
her, the offer to purchas
e, the promis
e or payment
of the cons
ideration until the cons
ummation of the s
ale by the delivery of the
illegal drug s
ubject of the s
ale.[92] T
he manner by which the initial contact
was
 made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchas
e the
drug, the payment of the "buy-bus
t" money, and the delivery of the illegal
drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, mus
t be the
s
ubject of s
trict s
crutiny by courts
 to ins
ure that law-abiding citizens
 are not
unlawfully induced to commit an offens
e. Criminals
 mus
t be caught but not
at all cos
t. At the s
ame time, however, examining the conduct of the police
s
hould not dis
able courts
 into ignoring the accus
ed's
 predis
pos
ition to
commit the crime. If there is
 overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency,
recidivis
m or plain criminal proclivity, then this
 mus
t als
o be cons
idered.
Courts
 s
hould look at all factors
 to determine the predis
pos
ition of an
accus
ed to commit an offens
e in s
o far as
 they are relevant to determine the
validity of the defens
e of inducement.

In the cas
e at bar, the evidence s
hows
 that it was
 the confidential
informant who initially contacted accus
ed-appellant Doria. At the pre-
arranged meeting, the informant was
 accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who
pos
ed as
 the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed the marked money
to accus
ed-appellant Doria as
 advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana.
Accus
ed-appellant Doria was
 apprehended when he later returned and
handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.

PO3 Manlangit tes
tified in a frank, s
pontaneous
, s
traighforward and

categorical manner and his
 credibility was
 not crumpled on cros
s
-
examination by defens
e couns
el. Moreover, PO3 Manlangit's
 tes
timony was

corroborated on its
 material points
 by SPO1 Badua, his
 back-up s
ecurity. T
he
non-pres
entation of the confidential informant is
 not fatal to the pros
ecution.
Informants
 are us
ually not pres
ented in court becaus
e of the need to hide
their identity and pres
erve their invaluable s
ervice to the police. [93] It is
 well-
s
ettled that except when the appellant vehemently denies
 s
elling prohibited
drugs
 and there are material incons
is
tencies
 in the tes
timonies
 of the
arres
ting officers
,[94] or there are reas
ons
 to believe that the arres
ting officers

had motives
 to tes
tify fals
ely agains
t the appellant, [95] or that only the
informant was
 the pos
eur-buyer who actually witnes
s
ed the entire
trans
action,[96] the tes
timony of the informant may be dis
pens
ed with as
 it
will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers
' eyewitnes
s

tes
timonies
.[97] T
here is
 no need to pres
ent the informant in court where the
s
ale was
 actually witnes
s
ed and adequately proved by pros
ecution
witnes
s
es
.[98]

T
he incons
is
tencies
 in PO3 Manlangit's
 and SPO1 Badua's
 tes
timonies


and the other police officers
' tes
timonies
 are minor and do not detract from
the veracity and weight of the pros
ecution evidence. T
he s
ource of the
money for the buy-bus
t operation is
 not a critical fact in the cas
e at bar. It is

enough that the pros
ecution proved that money was
 paid to accus
ed-
appellant Doria in cons
ideration of which he s
old and delivered the
marijuana.

Contrary to accus
ed-appellant Doria's
 claim, the one kilo of marijuana

"s
old" by him to PO3 Manlangit was
 actually identified by PO3 Manlangit
hims
elf before the trial court. After appellants
' apprehens
ion, the Narcom
agents
 placed this
 one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant Doria
ins
ide the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks
 ins
ide. T
his

is
 why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks
 of marijuana when
brought before the trial court. T
he one (1) brick recovered from appellant
Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks
, however, were identified and marked
in court. T
hus
:

"AT
T
Y. ARIAS, Couns
el for Florencio Doria:

Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. T
ell the court, how
were you able to identify that box?

A T
his
 is
 the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained
the eleven pieces
 of marijuana brick we confis
cated from the
s
us
pect, s
ir.

Q Pleas
e open it and s
how thos
e eleven bricks
.

PROSECUT
OR Witnes
s
 bringing out from the s
aid box...

AT
T
Y. VALDEZ, Couns
el for Violeta Gaddao:

 Your Honor, I mus
t protes
t the line of ques
tioning cons
idering the fact
that we are now dealing with eleven items
 when the ques
tion pos
ed
to the witnes
s
 was
 what was
 handed to him by Jun?

COURT
 So be it.

AT
T
Y. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witnes
s
 is
 pulling out item
after item from the box s
howed to him and brought in front of him.

COURT
 Noted.

Q Now tell the court, how did you know that thos
e are the eleven bricks
?

x x x.

A I have markings
 on thes
e eleven bricks
, s
ir.

Q Point to the court, where are thos
e markings
?

A Here, s
ir, my s
ignature, my initials
 with the date, s
ir.

PROSECUT
OR Witnes
s
 s
howed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and

the s
ignature.

Q Whos
e s
ignature is
 that?

AT
T
Y VALDEZ Your Honor, may we jus
t limit the inquiry to the bas
ic
ques
tion of the fis
cal as
 to what was
 handed to him by the accus
ed
Jun, your Honor?

PROSECUT
OR Your Honor, there is
 already a ruling by this
 Honorable

Court, your Honor, des
pite recons
ideration.

COURT
 Let the pros
ecution do its
 own thing and leave the appreciation of
what it has
 done to the court.

AT
T
Y. VALDEZ We s
ubmit, your Honor.

A T
his
 brick is
 the one that was
 handed to me by the s
us
pect Jun, s
ir.

COURT
 Why do you know that that is
 the thing? Are you s
ure that is
 not
"tikoy?"

A Yes
, your Honor.

 Q What makes
 you s
o s
ure?

A I am s
ure that this
 is
 the one, your Honor. T
his
 is
 the Exhibit "A" which I
marked before I brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.

Q What are you s
ure of?

A I am s
ure that this
 is
 the brick that was
 given to me by one alias
 Jun, s
ir.

Q What makes
 you s
o s
ure?

A Becaus
e I marked it with my own initials
 before giving it to the

inves
tigator and before we brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.

x x x.

PROSECUT
OR May we reques
t that a tag be placed on this
 white plas
tic

bag and this
 be marked as
 Exhibit "D?"

COURT
 Mark it as
 Exhibit "D."

Q T
o s
tres
s
, who made the entries
 of this
 date, Exhibit "A" then the other
letters
 and figures
 on this
 plas
tic?

A T
his
 one, the s
ignature, I made the s
ignature, the date and the time and
this
 Exhibit "A."

Q How about this
 one?

A I don't know who made this
 marking, s
ir.

PROSECUT
OR May it be of record that this
 was
 jus
t entered this
 morning.

Q I am as
king you about this
 "itim" and not the "as
ul."

A T
his
 CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was
 the one who
made thes
e markings
, s
ir.

PROSECUT
OR May we place on record that the one that was
 enclos
ed...

AT
T
Y. ARIAS Your Honor, there are als
o entries
 included in that enclos
ure
where it appears
 D-394-95, als
o Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was
 not
pointed to by the witnes
s
. I want to make it of record that there are
other entries
 included in the enclos
ure.
 COURT
 Noted. T
he court s
aw it.

Q Now, and this
 alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a
news
paper wrapping with a piece of paper ins
ide which reads
: "D-
394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams
 SSL" be marked as
 our Exhibit "D-2?"

COURT
 T
ag it. Mark it.

Q T
his
 particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents

was
 given to you by whom?

A It was
 given to me by s
us
pect Jun, s
ir.

Q Whereat?

A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., s
ir.

Q How about the other items
 that you were able to recover?

x x x.

A T
hes
e other marijuana bricks
, becaus
e during our follow-up, becaus
e

according to Jun the money which I gave him was
 in the hands
 of
Neneth and s
o we proceeded to the hous
e of Neneth, s
ir.

x x x."[99]

T
he firs
t brick identified by P03 Manlangit was
 the brick of marijuana "given
to [him] by s
us
pect Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets
. T
his

brick, including the news
paper and white plas
tic wrapping were marked as

Exhibits
 "D," "D-1," and "D-2" and des
cribed as
 weighing nine hundred
s
eventy (970) grams
.[100]

We als
o reject appellant's
 s
ubmis
s
ion that the fact that PO3 Manlangit
and his
 team waited for almos
t one hour for appellant Doria to give them the
one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00 s
trains
 credulity. Appellant
cannot capitalize on the circums
tance that the money and the marijuana in
the cas
e at bar did not change hands
 under the us
ual "kaliwaan"
s
ys
tem. T
here is
 no rule of law which requires
 that in "buy-bus
t" operations

there mus
t be a s
imultaneous
 exchange of the marked money and the
prohibited drug between the pos
eur-buyer and the pus
her. [101] Again, the
decis
ive fact is
 that the pos
eur-buyer received the marijuana from the
accus
ed-appellant.[102]

We als
o hold that the warrantles
s
 arres
t of accus
ed-appellant Doria is


not unlawful. Warrantles
s
 arres
ts
 are allowed in three ins
tances
 as
 provided
by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
 on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
"Sec. 5. Arres
t without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private
pers
on may, without a warrant, arres
t a pers
on:

(a) When, in his
 pres
ence, the pers
on to be arres
ted has


committed, is
 actually committing, or is
 attempting to commit an
offens
e;

(b) When an offens
e has
 in fact jus
t been committed, and he has

pers
onal knowledge of facts
 indicating that the pers
on to be arres
ted
has
 committed it; and

(c) When the pers
on to be arres
ted is
 a pris
oner who es
caped from
a penal es
tablis
hment or place where he is
 s
erving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his
 cas
e is
 pending, or has
 es
caped while
being trans
ferred from one confinement to another.

x x x."[103]

Under Section 5 (a), as
 above-quoted, a pers
on may be arres
ted without a

warrant if he "has
 committed, is
 actually committing, or is
 attempting to
commit an offens
e." Appellant Doria was
 caught in the act of committing an
offens
e. When an accus
ed is
 apprehended in flagrante delicto as
 a res
ult of a
buy-bus
t operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to
arres
t him even without a warrant.[104]

T
he warrantles
s
 arres
t of appellant Gaddao, the s
earch of her pers
on

and res
idence, and the s
eizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills
 are
different matters
.

Our Cons
titution pros
cribes
 s
earch and s
eizure without a judicial warrant

and any evidence obtained without s
uch warrant is
 inadmis
s
ible for any
purpos
e in any proceeding.[105] T
he rule is
, however, not abs
olute. Search and
s
eizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admis
s
ible in the following ins
tances
: [106] (1) s
earch
incident to a lawful arres
t;[107] (2) s
earch of a moving motor vehicle; [108] (3)
s
earch in violation of cus
toms
 laws
;[109] (4) s
eizure of evidence in plain view;
[110]
(5) when the accus
ed hims
elf waives
 his
 right agains
t unreas
onable
s
earches
 and s
eizures
.[111]

T
he pros
ecution admits
 that appellant Gaddao was
 arres
ted without a

warrant of arres
t and the s
earch and s
eizure of the box of marijuana and the
marked bills
 were likewis
e made without a s
earch warrant. It is
 claimed,
however, that the warrants
 were not neces
s
ary becaus
e the arres
t was
 made
in "hot purs
uit" and the s
earch was
 an incident to her lawful arres
t.

T
o be lawful, the warrantles
s
 arres
t of appellant Gaddao mus
t fall under
any of the three (3) ins
tances
 enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules
 on Criminal Procedure as
 aforequoted. T
he direct tes
timony of
PO3 Manlangit, the arres
ting officer, however s
hows
 otherwis
e:

"AT
T
Y VALDEZ, Couns
el for appellant Gaddao:

We s
ubmit at this
 juncture, your Honor, that there will be no bas
is
 for
that ques
tion.

Q T
his
 particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents

was
 given to you by whom?

A It was
 given to me by s
us
pect Jun, s
ir.

Q Whereat?

A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, s
ir.

Q How about the other items
 that you were able to recover?

AT
T
Y. VALDEZ: We s
ubmit at this
 juncture, your Honor, that there will be
no bas
is
 for that ques
tion.

COURT
 T
here is
. Ans
wer.

A T
hes
e other marijuana bricks
, becaus
e during our follow-up, becaus
e

according to Jun the money which I gave him was
 in the hands
 of
Neneth and s
o we proceeded to the hous
e of Neneth, s
ir.

Q Whereat?

A At Daang Bakal near the crime s
cene at Shaw Boulevard, s
ir.

 Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?

A We s
aw alias
 Neneth ins
ide the hous
e and we as
ked him to give us
 the
buy-bus
t money, s
ir.

Q You mentioned "him?"

A Her, s
ir. We as
ked her to give us
 the money, the marked money which
Jun gave her, s
ir.

Q And what happened?

A At this
 ins
tance, it was
 SPO1 Badua who can tes
tify regarding this
 buy-
bus
t money, s
ir.

x x x."[112]

SPO1 Badua tes
tified on cros
s
-examination that:

Q What was
 your intention in going to the hous
e of Aling Neneth?

A T
o arres
t her, s
ir.

Q But the fact is
, Mr. Witnes
s
, when you reached the hous
e of Aling
Neneth, Aling Neneth was
 there?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q As
 far as
 you can s
ee, s
he was
 jus
t ins
ide her hous
e?

A I s
aw her outs
ide, s
ir.

Q She was
 fetching water as
 a matter of fact?

A She was
 `s
a bandang pos
o.'

Q Carrying a baby?

A No, s
ir.

Q At that particular time when you reached the hous
e of Aling Neneth and
s
aw her outs
ide the hous
e, s
he was
 not committing any crime, s
he
was
 jus
t outs
ide the hous
e?

A No, s
ir.
Q She was
 not about to commit any crime becaus
e s
he was
 jus
t outs
ide
the hous
e doing her daily chores
. Am I correct?

A I jus
t s
aw her outs
ide, s
ir.

Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arres
t her. T
hat is

correct, is
 it not?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q Now, if any memory of your tes
timony is
 correct, according to you SPO1
Manlangit approached her?

A PO3 Manlangit, s
ir.

Q You did not approach her becaus
e PO3 Manlangit approached her?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q During all the time that this
 confrontation, arres
t or whatever by SPO3
Manlangit was
 taking place, you were jus
t in the s
ide lines
?

A I was
 jus
t watching, s
ir.

Q So you were jus
t an on-looker to what Manlangit was
 doing, becaus
e

precis
ely according to you your role in this
 buy-bus
t operation was
 as

a back-up?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q Who got the alleged marijuana from ins
ide the hous
e of Mrs
. Neneth?

A PO3 Manlangit, s
ir.

Q Manlangit got the marijuana?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q And the money from Aling Neneth?

A I don't know, s
ir.

Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?

PROSECUT
OR:
 T
here is
 no bas
is
 for this
 ques
tion, your Honor. Money, there's
 no
tes
timony on that.

AT
T
Y. VALDEZ:

I was
 as
king him precis
ely.

PROSECUT
OR:

No bas
is
.

COURT
:

Sus
tained.

Q Alright. I will as
k you a ques
tion and I expect an hones
t

ans
wer. According to the records
, the amount of P1,600.00 was

recovered from the pers
on of Aling Neneth. T
hat's
 right?

A Yes
, s
ir, the buy-bus
t money.

Q What you are now s
aying for certain and for the record is
 the fact that
you were not the one who retrieved the money from Aling Neneth, it
was
 Manlangit maybe?

A I s
aw it, s
ir.

Q It was
 Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?

A T
he buy-bus
t money was
 recovered from the hous
e of Aling Neneth, s
ir.

Q It was
 taken from the hous
e of Aling Neneth, not from the pers
on of
Aling Neneth. Is
 that what you are trying to tell the Court?

A No, s
ir.

AT
T
Y. VALDEZ: I am through with this
 witnes
s
, your Honor."[113]

Accus
ed-appellant Gaddao was
 not caught red-handed during the buy-

bus
t operation to give ground for her arres
t under Section 5 (a) of Rule
113. She was
 not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial
court, there was
 no occas
ion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the
policemen to jus
tify her arres
t in "hot purs
uit." [114] In fact, s
he was
 going
about her daily chores
 when the policemen pounced on her.
 Neither could the arres
t of appellant Gaddao be jus
tified under the
s
econd ins
tance of Rule 113. "Pers
onal knowledge" of facts
 in arres
ts
 without
warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 mus
t be bas
ed upon "probable
caus
e" which means
 an "actual belief or reas
onable grounds
 of
s
us
picion."[115] T
he grounds
 of s
us
picion are reas
onable when, in the abs
ence
of actual belief of the arres
ting officers
, the s
us
picion that the pers
on to be
arres
ted is
 probably guilty of committing the offens
e, is
 bas
ed on actual
facts
, i.e., s
upported by circums
tances
 s
ufficiently s
trong in thems
elves
 to
create the probable caus
e of guilt of the pers
on to be arres
ted. [116] A
reas
onable s
us
picion therefore mus
t be founded on probable caus
e, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers
 making the arres
t.[117]

Accus
ed-appellant Gaddao was
 arres
ted s
olely on the bas
is
 of the

alleged identification made by her co-accus
ed. PO3 Manlangit, however,
declared in his
 direct examination that appellant Doria named his
 co-accus
ed
in res
pons
e to his
 (PO3 Manlangit's
) query as
 to where the
marked money was
.[118] Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as

his
 as
s
ociate in the drug bus
ines
s
, but as
 the pers
on with whom he left the
marked bills
. T
his
 identification does
 not neces
s
arily lead to the conclus
ion
that appellant Gaddao cons
pired with her co-accus
ed in pus
hing
drugs
.Appellant Doria may have left the money in her hous
e, [119] with or
without her knowledge, with or without any cons
piracy. Save for accus
ed-
appellant Doria's
 word, the Narcom agents
 had no reas
onable grounds
 to
believe that s
he was
 engaged in drug pus
hing. If there is
 no s
howing that the
pers
on who effected the warrantles
s
 arres
t had, in his
 own right, knowledge
of facts
 implicating the pers
on arres
ted to the perpetration of a criminal
offens
e, the arres
t is
 legally objectionable.[120]

Since the warrantles
s
 arres
t of accus
ed-appellant Gaddao was
 illegal, it

follows
 that the s
earch of her pers
on and home and the s
ubs
equent s
eizure
of the marked bills
 and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as
 an incident to
her arres
t. T
his
 brings
 us
 to the ques
tion of whether the trial court correctly
found that the box of marijuana was
 in plain view, making its
 warrantles
s

s
eizure valid.

Objects
 falling in plain view of an officer who has
 a right to be in the

pos
ition to have that view are s
ubject to s
eizure even without a s
earch
warrant and may be introduced in evidence. [121]T
he "plain view" doctrine
applies
 when the following requis
ites
 concur: (a) the law enforcement officer
in s
earch of the evidence has
 a prior jus
tification for an intrus
ion or is
 in a
pos
ition from which he can view a particular area; (b) the dis
covery of the
evidence in plain view is
 inadvertent; (c) it is
 immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he obs
erves
 may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwis
e s
ubject to s
eizure.[122] T
he law enforcement officer mus
t lawfully
make an initial intrus
ion or properly be in a pos
ition from which he can
particularly view the area.[123] In the cours
e of s
uch lawful intrus
ion, he came
inadvertently acros
s
 a piece of evidence incriminating the accus
ed. [124] T
he
object mus
t be open to eye and hand[125] and its
 dis
covery inadvertent.[126]

It is
 clear that an object is
 in plain view if the object its
elf is
 plainly
expos
ed to s
ight. T
he difficulty aris
es
 when the object is
 ins
ide a clos
ed
container. Where the object s
eized was
 ins
ide a clos
ed package, the object
its
elf is
 not in plain view and therefore cannot be s
eized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims
 its
 contents
, whether by its

dis
tinctive configuration, its
 trans
parency, or if its
 contents
 are obvious
 to an
obs
erver, then the contents
 are in plain view and may be s
eized. [127] In other
words
, if the package is
 s
uch that an experienced obs
erver could infer from
its
 appearance that it contains
 the prohibited article, then the article is

deemed in plain view.[128] It mus
t be immediately apparent to the police that
the items
 that they obs
erve may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwis
e s
ubject to s
eizure.[129]

PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, tes
tified on cros
s
-
examination as
 follows
:

"AT
T
Y. VALDEZ:

So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was

ins
ide the hous
e?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bus
t money?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q At that particular ins
tance, you s
aw the carton?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q T
his
 carton, according to you was
 under a table?

A Yes
, s
ir, dining table.

Q I noticed that this
 carton has
 a cover?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q I as
k you were the flaps
 of the cover rais
ed or clos
ed?

A It was
 open, s
ir. Not like that.

COURT


Go down there. Show to the court.

INT
ERPRET
ER

Witnes
s
 went down the witnes
s
 s
tand and approached a carton box.

A Like this
, s
ir.

PROSECUT
OR

Can we des
cribe it?

AT
T
Y. VALDEZ

Yes
.

PROSECUT
OR

One flap is
 ins
ide and the other flap is
 s
tanding and with the
contents
 vis
ible.

COURT


Noted.

Q At this
 juncture, you went ins
ide the hous
e?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q And got hold of this
 carton?

A Yes
, s
ir.
Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?

A I as
ked her, what's
 this
...

Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the
carton?

A I think it was
 Badua who accos
ted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bus
t
money and he as
ked "Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito, nas
aan ang
buy-bus
t money namin?" s
ir.

Q Making reference to the marijuana that was
 given by alias
 Jun?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q When you proceeded to take hold of this
 carton, Aling Neneth was
 not
yet fris
ked, is
 it not [s
ic]?

A I jus
t don't know if s
he was
 fris
ked already by Badua, s
ir.

Q Who got hold of this
?

A I was
 the one, s
ir.

Q You were the one who got this
?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bus
t
money was
 already retrieved by Badua?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q You went ins
ide the hous
e?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q You did not have any s
earch warrant?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q In fact, there was
 nothing yet as
 far as
 you were concerned to validate
the fact that Mrs
. Gadao was
 in pos
s
es
s
ion of the buy-bus
t money
becaus
e according to you, you did not know whether Badua already
retrieved the buy-bus
t money from her?
A Yes
, s
ir.

Q How far was
 this
 from the door?

A T
wo and a half meters
 from the door, s
ir. It was
 in plain view.

Q Under the table according to you?

A Yes
, s
ir, dining table.

Q Somewhere here?

A It's
 far, s
ir.

PROSECUT
OR

May we reques
t the witnes
s
 to place it, where he s
aw it?

A Here, s
ir.

Q What you s
ee is
 a carton?

A Yes
, s
ir, with plas
tic.

Q Marked "Snow T
ime Ice Pop?"

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q With a piece of plas
tic vis
ible on top of the carton?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q T
hat is
 all that you s
aw?

A Yes
, s
ir.

PROSECUT
OR

For the record, your Honor...

Q You were only able to verify according to you...

PROSECUT
OR

Panero, wait. Becaus
e I am objecting to the words
 a piece of

plas
tic. By reading it...

AT
T
Y. VALDEZ
 T
hat's
 a piece of plas
tic.

PROSECUT
OR

By reading it, it will connote... this
 is
 not a piece of plas
tic.

AT
T
Y. VALDEZ

What is
 that? What can you s
ay, Fis
cal? I'm as
king you?

PROSECUT
OR

With due res
pect, what I am s
aying is
, let's
 place the s
ize of the
plas
tic. A piece of plas
tic may be big or a s
mall one, for record
purpos
es
.

COURT


Leave that to the court.

PROSECUT
OR

Leave that to the court.

Q T
he only reas
on according to you, you were able to... Look at this
, no
even Superman... I withdraw that. Not even a man with very kin [s
ic]
eyes
 can tell the contents
 here. And according to the Court, it could
be "tikoy," is
 it not [s
ic]?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q Siopao?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q Canned goods
?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q It could be ice cream becaus
e it s
ays
 Snow Pop, Ice Pop?

A I pres
umed it was
 als
o marijuana becaus
e it may ...

Q I am not as
king you what your pres
umptions
 are. I'm as
king you what it
could pos
s
ibly be.
 A It's
 the s
ame plas
tic, s
ir.

AT
T
Y. VALDEZ

I'm not even as
king you that ques
tion s
o why are you voluntarily
s
aying the information. Let the pros
ecutor do that for you.

COURT


Continue. Next ques
tion.

x x x."[130]

PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's
 hous
e
becaus
e they were led there by appellant Doria. T
he Narcom agents
 tes
tified
that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria
named her and led them to her. [131] Standing by the door of appellant
Gaddao's
 hous
e, PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of s
aid hous
e. T
wo
and a half meters
 away was
 the dining table and underneath it was
 a carton
box. T
he box was
 partially open and revealed s
omething wrapped in plas
tic.

In his
 direct examination, PO3 Manlangit s
aid that he was
 s
ure that the
contents
 of the box were marijuana becaus
e he hims
elf checked and marked
the s
aid contents
.[132] On cros
s
-examination, however, he admitted that he
merely pres
umed the contents
 to be marijuana becaus
e it had the s
ame
plas
tic wrapping as
 the "buy-bus
t marijuana." A clos
e s
crutiny of the records

reveals
 that the plas
tic wrapper was
 not colorles
s
 and trans
parent as
 to
clearly manifes
t its
 contents
 to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks
 of
marijuana in the box was
 individually wrapped in old news
paper and placed
ins
ide plas
tic bags
-- white, pink or blue in color. [133] PO3 Manlangit hims
elf
admitted on cros
s
-examination that the contents
 of the box could be items

other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that
he had to as
k appellant Gaddao about its
 contents
. [134] It was
 not
immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was

marijuana. T
he marijuana was
 not in plain view and its
 s
eizure without the
requis
ite s
earch warrant was
 in violation of the law and the Cons
titution. [135] It
was
 fruit of the pois
onous
 tree and s
hould have been excluded and never
cons
idered by the trial court.[136]

T
he fact that the box containing about s
ix (6) kilos
 of marijuana [137] was

found in the hous
e of accus
ed-appellant Gaddao does
 not jus
tify a finding
that s
he hers
elf is
 guilty of the crime charged. [138] Apropos
 is
 our ruling
in People v. Aminnudin,[139] viz:
"T
he Court s
trongly s
upports
 the campaign of the government agains
t drug
addiction and commends
 the efforts
 of our law enforcement officers
 agains
t
thos
e who would inflict this
 malediction upon our people, es
pecially the
s
us
ceptible youth. But as
 demanding as
 this
 campaign may be, it cannot be
more s
o than the compuls
ions
 of the Bill of Rights
 for the protection of the
liberty of every individual in the realm, including the bas
es
t of criminals
. T
he
Cons
titution covers
 with the mantle of its
 protection the innocent and the
guilty alike agains
t any manner of high-handednes
s
 from the authorities
,
however prais
eworthy their intentions
.

T
hos
e who are s
uppos
ed to enforce the law are not jus
tified in dis
regarding
the right of the individual in the name of order. Order is
 too high a price for
the los
s
 of liberty. As
 Jus
tice Holmes
, again, s
aid, 'I think it a les
s
 evil that
s
ome criminals
 s
hould es
cape than that the government s
hould play an
ignoble part.' It is
 s
imply not allowed in the free s
ociety to violate a law to
enforce another, es
pecially if the law violated is
 the Cons
titution its
elf." [140]

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous
 Drugs
 Act of 1972, as

amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 punis
hes
 the "s
ale,
adminis
tration, delivery, dis
tribution and trans
portation of a prohibited drug"
with the penalty of reclus
ion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:
"Sec. 4. Sale, Adminis
tration, Delivery, Dis
tribution and T
rans
portation of
Prohibited Drugs
.-- T
he penalty of reclus
ion perpetua to death, and a fine
ranging from five hundred thous
and pes
os
 to ten million pes
os
 s
hall be
impos
ed upon any pers
on who, unles
s
 authorized by law, s
hall s
ell,
adminis
ter, deliver, give away to another, dis
tribute, dis
patch in trans
it or
trans
port any prohibited drug, or s
hall act as
 a broker in any of s
uch
trans
actions
.

x x x."

In every pros
ecution for illegal s
ale of dangerous
 drugs
, what is
 material is

the s
ubmis
s
ion of proof that the s
ale took place between the pos
eur-buyer
and the s
eller thereof and the pres
entation of the drug, i.e., the corpus

delicti, as
 evidence in court.[141] T
he pros
ecution has
 clearly es
tablis
hed the
fact that in cons
ideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accus
ed-appellant
Doria s
old and delivered nine hundred s
eventy (970) grams
 of marijuana to
PO3 Manlangit, the pos
eur-buyer. T
he pros
ecution, however, has
 failed to
prove that accus
ed-appellant Gaddao cons
pired with accus
ed-appellant Doria
in the s
ale of s
aid drug. T
here being no mitigating or aggravating
circums
tances
, the lower penalty of reclus
ion perpetua mus
t be impos
ed.[142]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decis
ion of the Regional T
rial Court, Branch 156,
Pas
ig City acting as
 a Special Court in Criminal Cas
e No. 3307-D is
 revers
ed
and modified as
 follows
:

1. Accus
ed-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is
 s
entenced to s
uffer

the penalty of reclus
ion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred
thous
and pes
os
 (P500,000.00).

2. Accus
ed-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is
 acquitted.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

T
HIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 156320 February 14, 2007

RODOLFO ABENES y GACUT
AN, Petitioner, vs
.HE HON. COURT
 OF APPEALS

and PEOPLE OF T
HE PHILIPPINES, Res
pondents
.

DECISION

AUST
RIA-MART
INEZ, J.:

For review before the Court is
 the Decis
ion 1 dated November 29, 2002 of the
Court of Appeals
 (CA) which affirmed the Joint Decis
ion of the Regional T
rial
Court (RT
C) of Pagadian City, Branch 19, dated June 5, 2000, finding Rodolfo
Abenes
 y Gacutan (petitioner) guilty beyond reas
onable doubt of Illegal
Pos
s
es
s
ion of High Powered Firearm and Ammunition under Pres
idential
Decree No. 1866 (P.D. No. 1866) in Criminal Cas
e No. 4559-98, and of
violating Section 261(q) of Batas
 Pambans
a Blg. 881 (B.P. Blg. 881),
otherwis
e known as
 the Omnibus
 Election Code, vis
-à-vis
 COMELEC
Res
olution No. 2958 (Gun Ban) in Criminal Cas
e No. 4563-98.

Petitioner was
 charged under the following Informations
:

In Criminal Cas
e No. 4559-98 —

T
he unders
igned As
s
is
tant City Pros
ecutor hereby accus
es
 RODOLFO ABENES

Y GACUT
AN of the offens
e of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HIGH POWERED
FIREARM & IT
S AMMUNIT
IONS (Violation of P.D. No. 1866, as
 amended by R.A.
No. 8294), committed as
 follows
:

On May 8, 1998, at about 10:30 a.m., in Danlugan, Pagadian City,

Philippines
, within the juris
diction of this
 Honorable Court, s
aid RODOLFO
ABENES Y GACUT
AN did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and without any
prior authority, licens
e or permit to pos
s
es
s
 or carry the firearm hereunder
des
cribed, have in his
 pos
s
es
s
ion and control the following firearm clas
s
ified
as
 high powered, with its
 corres
ponding ammunitions
 and acces
s
ory, viz:

- one (1) cal. 45 pis
tol (NORINCO) bearing SN 906347;

- one (1) magazine for pis
tol cal. 45

- s
even (7) rounds
 live ammunitions
 for cal. 45,

in gros
s
 violation of P.D. No. 1866 as
 amended by R.A. No. 8294.

CONT
RARY T
O LAW.2

In Criminal Cas
e No. 4563-98 —

T
he unders
igned As
s
is
tant City Pros
ecutor hereby accus
es
 RODOLFO ABENES

Y GACUT
AN of Election Offens
e in violation of Sec. 261 (9) 3 , BP 881
(OMNIBUS ELECT
ION CODE), vis
-à-vis
 COMELEC RESOLUT
ION # 1958 (GUN
BAN), committed as
 follows
:
On May 8, 1998, at about 10:30 a.m. within the Election period which is
 from
January 11, 1998 to June 30, 1998, in Danlugan, Pagadian City, Philippines
,
within the juris
diction of this
 Honorable Court, s
aid RODOLFO ABENES Y
GACUT
AN did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully, carry in his
 pers
on a
cal. .45 (NORINCO) pis
tol, bearing s
erial number 906347, and loaded with
s
even (7) rounds
 of live ammunitions
, without any prior authority from the
COMELEC in gros
s
 violation of Sec. 261 (9) of BP 881 (OMNIBUS ELECT
ION
CODE) in relation to COMELEC RESOLUT
ION No. 2958 (GUN BAN).

CONT
RARY T
O LAW.4

Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty. T
rial ens
ued.

T
he facts
, as
 found by the RT
C and s
ummarized by the CA, are as
 follows
:

T
he pros
ecution s
howed that three days
 prior to the May 11, 1998 national
and local elections
, the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pagadian City,
through its
 Company Commander Major Pedronis
to Quano, created a team
compos
ed of s
even policemen with a directive to es
tablis
h and man a
checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan at s
aid city, for the purpos
e of enforcing
the Gun Ban which was
 then being implemented by the COMELEC. SPO3
Cipriano Q. Pas
cua was
 the des
ignated team leader.

T
he team proceeded to Barangay Danlugan, arriving thereat at 8:15 in the

morning of May 8, 1998. T
eam leader SPO3 Pas
cua coordinated with the
Barangay Chairman of Danlugan, and the team put up a road block with the
marking "COMELEC GUN BAN". Vehicles
 pas
s
ing through the road block were
required by the team to s
top and their occupants
 were then politely
reques
ted to alight in order to allow routine ins
pection and checking of their
vehicles
. Motoris
ts
 who refus
ed the reques
t were not forced to do s
o.

At about 10:30 in the morning of the s
ame day, a red T
amaraw FX trying to
pas
s
 through the check point was
 s
topped by the team and directed to park
at the s
ide of the road. As
 the occupants
 within the vehicle could not be s
een
through its
 tinted windows
, SPO1 Eliezer Requejo, a member of the team,
knocked on the vehicle’s
 window and reques
ted the occupants
 to s
tep down
for a routine ins
pection. T
he eight occupants
, which included the accus
ed-
appellant Rodolfo Abenes
 who is
 the Barangay Chairman of T
awagan Norte,
Labangan, Zamboanga Del Sur, alighted from the vehicle. At this
 juncture,
SPO1 Requejo and SPO3 Pas
cua noticed that a hols
tered firearm was
 tucked
at the right wais
t of Abenes
. T
he firearm was
 readily vis
ible to the policemen;
it was
 not covered by the s
hirt worn by Abenes
. Abenes
 was
 then as
ked by
SPO3 Pas
cua whether he had a licens
e and authority to carry the firearm,
and whether his
 pos
s
es
s
ion was
 exempted from the Gun Ban being enforced
by the COMELEC. Accus
ed ans
wered in the affirmative. T
he policemen then
demanded for the pertinent documents
 to be s
hown to s
upport Abenes
’
claim. He could not s
how any. Hence, SPO1 Requejo confis
cated Abenes
’
firearm, which was
 later identified as
 a Norinco .45 caliber pis
tol bearing
Serial No. 906347, including its
 magazine containing s
even live ammunitions
.

Subs
equently SPO3 Pas
cua, us
ing his
 privately owned jeep, brought Abenes

to the PNP Headquarters
 at Camp Abelon in Pagadian City. Upon reaching the
Headquarters
, SPO3 Pas
cua indors
ed Abenes
 to Major Quano who in turn
referred Abenes
 to a certain SPO2 Benvienido Albon for further inves
tigation
(T
SN, Augus
t 24, 1998 [SPO3 Cipriano Q. Pas
cua] pp. 5-27, [SPO1 Eliezer
Requejo] pp. 29-50).

A certification dated May 18, 1998 from the Firearms
 and Explos
ives
 Licens
e
Proces
s
ing Section of the PNP, Pagadian City dis
clos
ed that Abenes
 is
 not a
regis
tered nor a licens
ed firearm holder (Record of Criminal Cas
e No. 4559-
98, p. 56).

After the pros
ecution pres
ented its
 evidence, [the] accus
ed filed a Demurrer
to Evidence with Motion to Dis
mis
s
 (s
upra, pp. 72-79), which was
 denied by
the trial court in a Res
olution dated March 5, 1999 (s
upra, pp. 80-82).

In his
 defens
e, accus
ed-appellant tried to es
tablis
h that the firearm did not
belong to and was
 not recovered from him; that the firearm was
 recovered
by the policemen from the floor of the vehicle ins
ide a clutch bag which was

allegedly left by an unidentified pers
on who hitched a ride s
omewhere along
the national highway of T
awagan Norte Zamboanga Del Sur and alighted
near the Mabuhay Bazaar in Pagadian City (T
SN, July 12, 1999 [Noel Rivera],
pp. 7-13; September 15, 1999 [Rodolfo Abenes
], pp. 11-15; September 27,
1999 [Manuel Sabado Gengania], pp. 9-16).5

On June 5, 2000, the RT
C rendered its
 Joint Decis
ion convicting the petitioner
on both charges
, the dis
pos
itive portion of which s
tates
:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing dis
cus
s
ion, this
 Court hereby finds

accus
ed Rodolfo Abenes
 y Gacutan GUILT
Y beyond reas
onable doubt for
Violation of P.D. No. 1866, as
 amended by Republic Act No. 8294, having
been found in pos
s
es
s
ion without licens
e/permit of a Norinco .45 caliber
pis
tol bearing Serial No. 906347 and 7 rounds
 of ammunitions
 and s
entences

him to impris
onment ranging from T
WO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONT
HS and
ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its
 MEDIUM PERIOD, as
 MINIMUM,
to EIGHT
 (8) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR in its
 MINIMUM, as
 MAXIMUM and a
FINE of T
HIRT
Y T
HOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00), Philippine currency. Ins
ofar
as
 Criminal Cas
e No. 4559-98 is
 concerned. T
he .45 Caliber Pis
tol
aforementioned and the s
even (7) rounds
 of ammunitions
 are hereby
forfeited in favor of the government the s
ame being effects
 of the Violation
of P.D. 1866, amended.

As
 regards
 Criminal Cas
e No. 4563-98, this
 Court als
o finds
 herein accus
ed
Rodolfo Abenes
 y Gacutan GUILT
Y of Violation of Section 264, in relation to
Section 261, paragraphs
 (p) and (q) of Batas
 Pambans
a Blg. 881, otherwis
e
known as
 the Omnibus
 Election Code and s
entences
 him to impris
onment for
a period of ONE (1) YEAR, and in addition thereto, herein accus
ed is

dis
qualified to hold any public office and deprived [of] the right of s
uffrage. It
s
hall be unders
tood that the s
entence herein impos
ed s
hall be s
erved
s
imultaneous
ly with the s
entence impos
ed in Criminal Cas
e No. 4559-98.

SO ORDERED.6

T
he RT
C found that, as
 between the pos
itive and categorical as
s
ertions
 of
facts
 by the two policemen – the witnes
s
es
 for the pros
ecution – and the
mere denial of the accus
ed and his
 witnes
s
es
, the former mus
t prevail over
the latter; that the pros
ecution s
ucces
s
fully proved that the petitioner had no
licens
e or permit to carry the firearm through the officer-in-charge of the
firearms
 and explos
ives
 office who tes
tified that, bas
ed on his
 records
, the
petitioner had not been is
s
ued a licens
e, and whos
e tes
timony had not been
impugned by the defens
e; and that the tes
timonies
 of the accus
ed and his

two witnes
s
es
 to the effect that while aboard their private vehicle and on
their way to attend an election campaign meeting, they s
imply s
topped and
allowed a complete s
tranger to hitch a ride who was
 carrying a clutch bag,
left the s
ame in the vehicle when he alighted, and which later turned out to
contain the s
ubject firearm, were flims
y and unbelievable. T
he RT
C ruled that
the defens
e of alibi or denial cannot prevail over the pos
itive identification by
eyewitnes
s
es
 who have no improper motive to fals
ely tes
tify agains
t the
petitioner, es
pecially where the policemen and the petitioner do not know
each other; and, that the petitioner failed to s
how any licens
e or any other
document to jus
tify his
 lawful pos
s
es
s
ion of the firearm.

T
he petitioner appealed to the CA claiming that the checkpoint was
 not
s
hown to have been legally s
et up, and/or that the fris
king of the petitioner
who was
 ordered to alight from the T
amaraw FX, along with his
 companions

in the vehicle, violated his
 cons
titutional right agains
t unlawful s
earch and
s
eizure; and, that the trial court erred in believing the vers
ion of the incident
as
 tes
tified to by the policemen ins
tead of the vers
ion pres
ented by the
defens
e’s
 witnes
s
 which is
 more cons
is
tent with truth and human
experience.7

On November 29, 2002, the CA rendered its
 Decis
ion, the dis
pos
itive portion
of which reads
:

WHEREFORE, premis
es
 cons
idered, the Joint Decis
ion appealed from is


AFFIRMED with the MODIFICAT
ION that with res
pect to Criminal Cas
e No.
4559-98, accus
ed-appellant is
 s
entenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4
years
, 2 months
 and 1 day of pris
ion correccional as
 minimum to 7 years
 and
4 months
 of pris
ion mayor as
 maximum.

SO ORDERED.8

With res
pect to the validity of the checkpoint, the CA found that not only do
the police officers
 have in their favor the pres
umption that official duties

have been regularly performed, but als
o that the proximity of the day the
checkpoint had been s
et up, to the day of the May 11, 1998 elections
,
s
pecifically for the purpos
e of enforcing the COMELEC gun ban, gives
 a
s
trong badge of the legitimacy of the checkpoint; that after a review of the
records
, the evidence adduced by the pros
ecution prevails
 over the s
elf-
s
erving and uncorroborated claim of the petitioner that he had been
"framed"; and, that with res
pect to the admis
s
ibility of the firearm as

evidence, the pros
ecution witnes
s
es
 convincingly es
tablis
hed that the .45
caliber pis
tol, tucked into the right wais
t of the petitioner when he alighted
from the vehicle, was
 readily vis
ible, and, therefore, could be s
eized without
a s
earch warrant under the "plain view" doctrine.

T
he petitioner is
 now before this
 Court, rais
ing the following is
s
ues
:

I.

Given the circums
tances
, and the evidence adduced, was
 the check-point
validly es
tablis
hed?

II.
Given the circums
tances
, and the evidence adduced, was
 the petitioner’s

cons
titutional right agains
t unlawful s
earch and s
eizure violated?

III.

Given the circums
tances
, and the evidence adduced, did not the honorable
court of appeals
 commit a grave abus
e of dis
cretion for adopting the trial
court’s
 uns
ubs
tantiated findings
 of fact?

IV.

Given the circums
tances
, and the evidence adduced, is
 not the petitioner
entitled to an acquittal, if not on the ground that the pros
ecution failed to
prove guilt beyond reas
onable doubt, on the ground of reas
onable doubt
its
elf . . . as
 to where the gun was
 taken: from the floor of the vehicle or from
the wais
t of petitioner?9

T
he appeal is
 partly meritorious
. T
he Court revers
es
 the CA’s
 finding of his

conviction in Criminal Cas
e No. 4559-98.

After a thorough review of the records
, this
 Court is
 of the view that the
courts
 a quo – except for a notable exception with res
pect to the negative
allegation in the Information – are correct in their findings
 of fact. Indeed, the
vers
ion of the defens
e, as
 found by the lower courts
, is
 implaus
ible and
belies
 the common experience of mankind. Evidence to be believed mus
t not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witnes
s
 but it mus
t be credible in
its
elf s
uch as
 the common experience and obs
ervation of mankind can
approve as
 probable under the circums
tances
. 10In addition, the ques
tion of
credibility of witnes
s
es
 is
 primarily for the trial court to determine. 11 For this

reas
on, its
 obs
ervations
 and conclus
ions
 are accorded great res
pect on
appeal.12

T
he trial court's
 as
s
es
s
ment of the credibility of a witnes
s
 is
 entitled to great
weight. It is
 conclus
ive and binding unles
s
 s
hown to be tainted with
arbitrarines
s
 or unles
s
, through overs
ight, s
ome fact or circums
tance of
weight and influence has
 not been cons
idered. 13 Abs
ent any s
howing that the
trial judge overlooked, mis
unders
tood, or mis
applied s
ome facts
 or
circums
tances
 of weight which would affect the res
ult of the cas
e, or that the
judge acted arbitrarily, his
 as
s
es
s
ment of the credibility of witnes
s
es

des
erves
 high res
pect by appellate courts
. 14 T
hus
, the Court finds
 no cogent
reas
on to dis
turb the findings
 of the lower courts
 that the police found in
plain view a gun tucked into the wais
t of the petitioner during the Gun Ban
period enforced by the COMELEC.

So too mus
t this
 Court uphold the validity of the checkpoint. T
he petitioner
ins
is
ts
 that the pros
ecution s
hould have produced the mis
s
ion order
cons
tituting the checkpoint, and invokes
 Aniag, Jr. v. Comelec, 15 where the
Court purportedly held that firearms
 s
eized from a motor vehicle without a
warrant are inadmis
s
ible becaus
e there was
 no indication that would trigger
any s
us
picion from the policemen nor any other circums
tance s
howing
probable caus
e.

On both points
 the petitioner is
 wrong. In the pres
ent cas
e, the production of
the mis
s
ion order is
 not neces
s
ary in view of the fact that the checkpoint was

es
tablis
hed three days
 before the May 11, 1998 elections
; and, the
circums
tances
 under which the policemen found the gun warranted its

s
eizure without a warrant.

In People v. Es
caño,16 the Court, through the ponencia of Chief Jus
tice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., held:

Accus
ed-appellants
 as
s
ail the manner by which the checkpoint in ques
tion

was
 conducted. T
hey contend that the checkpoint manned by elements
 of
the Makati Police s
hould have been announced. T
hey als
o complain of its

having been conducted in an arbitrary and dis
criminatory manner.

We take judicial notice of the exis
tence of the COMELEC res
olution impos
ing

a gun ban during the election period is
s
ued purs
uant to Section 52(c) in
relation to Section 26(q) of the Omnibus
 Election Code (Batas
 Pambans
a Blg.
881). T
he national and local elections
 in 1995 were held on 8 May, the
s
econd Monday of the month. T
he incident, which happened on 5 April 1995,
was
 well within the election period.

T
his
 Court has
 ruled that not all checkpoints
 are illegal. T
hos
e which are
warranted by the exigencies
 of public order and are conducted in a way leas
t
intrus
ive to motoris
ts
 are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints
 do
intrude, to a certain extent, on motoris
ts
’ right to "free pas
s
age without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as
 a rule, it involves
 only a brief
detention of travelers
 during which the vehicle’s
 occupants
 are required to
ans
wer a brief ques
tion or two. For as
 long as
 the vehicle is
 neither s
earched
nor its
 occupants
 s
ubjected to a body s
earch, and the ins
pection of the
vehicle is
 limited to a vis
ual s
earch, s
aid routine checks
 cannot be regarded
as
 violative of an individual’s
 right agains
t unreas
onable s
earch. In fact,
thes
e routine checks
, when conducted in a fixed area, are even les
s

intrus
ive.

T
he checkpoint herein conducted was
 in purs
uance of the gun ban enforced
by the COMELEC. T
he COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if
its
 deputized agents
 were limited to a vis
ual s
earch of pedes
trians
. It would
als
o defeat the purpos
e for which s
uch ban was
 ins
tituted. T
hos
e who intend
to bring a gun during s
aid period would know that they only need a car to be
able to eas
ily perpetrate their malicious
 des
igns
.

T
he facts
 adduced do not cons
titute a ground for a violation of the

cons
titutional rights
 of the accus
ed agains
t illegal s
earch and s
eizure. PO3
Suba admitted that they were merely s
topping cars
 they deemed s
us
picious
,
s
uch as
 thos
e whos
e windows
 are heavily tinted jus
t to s
ee if the pas
s
engers

thereof were carrying guns
. At bes
t they would merely direct their flas
hlights

ins
ide the cars
 they would s
top, without opening the car’s
 doors
 or
s
ubjecting its
 pas
s
engers
 to a body s
earch. T
here is
 nothing dis
criminatory in
this
 as
 this
 is
 what the s
ituation demands
.17(Emphas
is
 s
upplied)

T
hus
, the Court agrees
 with the Solicitor General that petitioner’s
 reliance on
Aniag is
 mis
placed.

In Aniag, the police officers
 manning the checkpoint near the Batas
ang
Pambans
a complex s
topped the vehicle driven by the driver of Congres
s
man
Aniag. After s
topping the vehicle, the police opened a package ins
ide the car
which contained a firearm purportedly belonging to Congres
s
man Aniag. In
declaring the s
earch illegal, the Supreme Court s
tated that the law enforcers

who conducted the s
earch had no probable caus
e to check the content of the
package becaus
e the driver did not behave s
us
picious
ly nor was
 there any
previous
 information that a vehicle hiding a firearm would pas
s
 by the
checkpoint.

In the ins
tant cas
e, the firearm was
 s
eized from the petitioner when in plain
view, the policemen s
aw it tucked into his
 wais
t uncovered by his
 s
hirt.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects
 falling in the "plain view" of an officer
who has
 a right to be in the pos
ition to have that view are s
ubject to s
eizure
and may be pres
ented as
 evidence.18 T
he "plain view" doctrine applies
 when
the following requis
ites
 concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in s
earch of
the evidence has
 a prior jus
tification for an intrus
ion or is
 in a pos
ition from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the dis
covery of the evidence in
plain view is
 inadvertent; and (c) it is
 immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he obs
erves
 may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwis
e s
ubject to s
eizure.19

All the foregoing requirements
 are pres
ent in the ins
tant cas
e. T
he law
enforcement officers
 lawfully made an initial intrus
ion becaus
e of the
enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a pos
ition from which they
particularly viewed the area. In the cours
e of s
uch lawful intrus
ion, the
policemen came inadvertently acros
s
 a piece of evidence incriminating the
petitioner where they s
aw the gun tucked into his
 wais
t. T
he gun was
 in plain
view and dis
covered inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the
vehicle.

As
 accurately found by the CA:

xxx It mus
t be emphas
ized that the policemen dis
covered the firearm [on]
the pers
on of the [petitioner] s
hortly after he alighted from the vehicle and
before he was
 fris
ked. SPO3 Pas
cua’s
 tes
timony[,] corroborated by that of
SPO1 Requejo[,] convincingly es
tablis
hed that the hols
tered .45 caliber pis
tol
tucked at the right wais
t of the [petitioner] was
 readily vis
ible to the
policemen (T
SN, Augus
t 24, 1998, pp. 18, 37). T
hus
, notwiths
tanding the
abs
ence of a Search Warrant, the policemen may validly s
eize the firearm
and the s
ame is
 admis
s
ible in evidence agains
t the [petitioner] purs
uant to
the "plain view doctrine" xxx.20

Nor can the Court believe petitioner’s
 claim that he could not have freely
refus
ed the "police orders
" is
s
ued by the police team who were "armed to
the teeth" and "in the face of s
uch s
how of force." T
he courts
 a quo
cons
is
tently found that the police team manning the checkpoint politely
reques
ted the pas
s
engers
 to alight from their vehicles
, and the motoris
ts

who refus
ed this
 reques
t were not forced to do s
o. T
hes
e findings
 of fact are
fully s
upported by the evidence in the record.

However, the Court mus
t unders
core that the pros
ecution failed to

s
atis
factorily prove the negative allegation in the Information that the
petitioner pos
s
es
s
ed no licens
e or permit to bear the s
ubject firearm.

It is
 a well-entrenched rule "that in crimes
 involving illegal pos
s
es
s
ion of

firearm, the pros
ecution has
 the burden of proving the elements

thereof, viz: the exis
tence of the s
ubject firearm, and the fact that the
accus
ed who owned or pos
s
es
s
ed the firearm does
 not have the
corres
ponding licens
e or permit to pos
s
es
s
 the s
ame."21

Undoubtedly, it is
 the cons
titutional pres
umption of innocence that lays
 s
uch

burden upon the pros
ecution. T
he abs
ence of s
uch licens
e and legal
authority cons
titutes
 an es
s
ential ingredient of the offens
e of illegal
pos
s
es
s
ion of firearm, and every ingredient or es
s
ential element of an
offens
e mus
t be s
hown by the pros
ecution by proof beyond reas
onable
doubt.22

Witnes
s
 for the pros
ecution SPO4 Gilbert C. Senados
 admitted that his

records
 were outdated, i.e., that his
 Mas
ter Lis
t of holders
 of firearms
 only
covered licens
es
 up to 1994; that it was
 pos
s
ible for the petitioner to acquire
a licens
e after 1994; and that he is
s
ued the Certification, dated May 18,
1998, s
tating that the petitioner carried no licens
e or permit to pos
s
es
s
 the
guns
 becaus
e he was
 ordered to do s
o by his
 s
uperiors
.23

T
here is
 no evidence that between 1994 and May 8, 1998, the date the crime
was
 allegedly committed, no licens
e was
 is
s
ued to petitioner.

While the pros
ecution was
 able to es
tablis
h the fact that the s
ubject firearm
was
 s
eized by the police from the pos
s
es
s
ion of the petitioner, without the
latter being able to pres
ent any licens
e or permit to pos
s
es
s
 the s
ame, s
uch
fact alone is
 not conclus
ive proof that he was
 not lawfully authorized to carry
s
uch firearm. In other words
, s
uch fact does
 not relieve the pros
ecution from
its
 duty to es
tablis
h the lack of a licens
e or permit to carry the firearm by
clear and convincing evidence, like a certification from the government
agency concerned.24

T
hus
, for failure of the pros
ecution to prove beyond reas
onable doubt that
petitioner was
 carrying a firearm without prior authority, licens
e or permit,
the latter mus
t be exculpated from criminal liability under P.D. No. 1866, as

amended.

With res
pect to the charge of violating Section 261(q) of B.P. Blg. 881, as

amended, otherwis
e known as
 the Omnibus
 Election Code, the Court is

cons
trained to affirm the conviction of the petitioner, s
ince the pros
ecution
s
ucces
s
fully dis
charged its
 burden of proof.

Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus
 Election Code), as
 originally worded,
provides
:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts
. – T
he following s
hall be guilty of an election
offens
e:

(q) Carrying firearms
 outs
ide res
idence or place of bus
ines
s
. – Any pers
on

who, although pos
s
es
s
ing a permit to carry firearms
, carries
 any firearms

outs
ide his
 res
idence or place of bus
ines
s
 during the election period, unles
s

authorized in writing by the Commis
s
ion: Provided, T
hat a motor vehicle,
water or air craft s
hall not be cons
idered a res
idence or place of bus
ines
s
 or
extens
ion hereof.

x x x x (Emphas
is
 s
upplied)

Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 (R.A. No. 7166), amending Section 261
of the Omnibus
 Election Code, provides
:

SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms
. – During the election period, no pers
on
s
hall bear, carry or trans
port firearms
 or other deadly weapons
 in public
places
, including any building, s
treet, park, private vehicle or public
conveyance, even if licens
ed to pos
s
es
s
 or carry the s
ame, unles
s
 authorized
in writing by the Commis
s
ion. T
he is
s
uance of firearm licens
es
 s
hall be
s
us
pended during the election period. (Emphas
is
 s
upplied)

In view of the foregoing provis
ions
, while it is
 well-s
ettled that under P.D. No.
1866, as
 amended, the burden to prove the negative allegation that the
accus
ed has
 no licens
e or permit to carry a firearm lies
 with the pros
ecution;
under the Omnibus
 Election Code, however, the burden to adduce evidence
that accus
ed is
 exempt from the COMELEC Gun Ban, lies
 with the accus
ed.

Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 is
 clear and unequivocal 25 that the prohibited act
to which this
 provis
ion refers
 is
 made up of the following elements
: 1) the
pers
on is
 bearing, carrying, or trans
porting firearms
 or other deadly
weapons
; 2) s
uch pos
s
es
s
ion occurs
 during the election period; and, 3) the
weapon is
 carried in a public place. Under s
aid provis
ion, it is
 explicit that
even if the accus
ed can prove that he is
 holding a valid licens
e to pos
s
es
s

s
uch firearm, this
 circums
tance by its
elf cannot exculpate him from criminal
liability. T
he burden is
 on the accus
ed to s
how that he has
 a written authority
to pos
s
es
s
 s
uch firearm is
s
ued by no les
s
 than the COMELEC.

On this
 point, the petitioner failed to pres
ent any form of s
uch authority, and,
therefore, his
 conviction mus
t be affirmed.
Section 264 of the Omnibus
 Election Code provides
:

Sec. 264. Penalties
. – Any pers
on found guilty of any election offens
e under
this
 Code s
hall be punis
hed with impris
onment of not les
s
 than one year but
not more than s
ix years
 and s
hall not be s
ubject to probation. In addition, the
guilty party s
hall be s
entenced to s
uffer dis
qualification to hold public office
and deprivation of the right of s
uffrage. If he is
 a foreigner, he s
hall be
s
entenced to deportation which s
hall be enforced after the pris
on term has

been s
erved.

T
he CA affirmed the penalty impos
ed by the RT
C. However, the RT
C failed to
apply Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law26 which provides
:

SECT
ION 1. Hereafter, in impos
ing a pris
on s
entence for an offens
e punis
hed

by the Revis
ed Penal Code, or its
 amendments
, the court s
hall s
entence the
accus
ed to an indeterminate s
entence the maximum term of which s
hall be
that which, in view of the attending circums
tances
, could be properly
impos
ed under the rules
 of the s
aid Code, and the minimum which s
hall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that pres
cribed by the Code for
the offens
e; and if the offens
e is
 punis
hed by any other law, the court s
hall
s
entence the accus
ed to an indeterminate s
entence, the maximum term of
which s
hall not exceed the maximum fixed by s
aid law and the minimum
s
hall not be les
s
 than the minimum term pres
cribed by the s
ame.

T
hus
, the penalty that s
hould be meted out to petitioner s
hould have a
minimum and a maximum period. T
he Court deems
 it reas
onable that
petitioner s
hould s
uffer impris
onment for a period of one (1) year as
 the
minimum and two (2) years
, as
 the maximum.

Furthermore, under Section 34 of R.A. No. 7166, the s
ubject firearm s
hall be
dis
pos
ed of according to exis
ting laws
, which, in this
 cas
e, mus
t be read in
light of Article 45 of the Revis
ed Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 45. Confis
cation and forfeiture of the proceeds
 or ins
truments
 of the

crime.— Every penalty impos
ed for the commis
s
ion of a felony s
hall carry
with it the forefeiture of the proceeds
 of the crime and the ins
truments
 or
tools
 with which it was
 committed.

Such proceeds
 and ins
truments
 or tools
 s
hall be confis
cated and forfeited in

favor of the Government, unles
s
 they be the property of a third pers
on not
liable for the offens
e, but thos
e articles
 which are not s
ubject of lawful
commerce s
hall be des
troyed.1awphi1.net

WHEREFORE, the petition is
 partly GRANT
ED. T
he Decis
ion dated November
29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals
 is
 REVERSED and SET
 ASIDE ins
ofar as

Criminal Cas
e No. 4559-98 is
 concerned. Petitioner Rodolfo Abenes
 Y
Gacutan is
 ACQUIT
T
ED from the charge of illegal pos
s
es
s
ion of firearm under
P.D. No. 1866, as
 amended, for failure of the pros
ecution to prove his
 guilt
beyond unreas
onable doubt.

With res
pect to Criminal Cas
e No. 4563-98, the as
s
ailed Decis
ion of the Court
of Appeals
 is
 AFFIRMED with MODIFICAT
IONS that petitioner is
 s
entenced to
an indeterminate s
entence of one year of impris
onment as
 minimum to two
years
 of impris
onment as
 maximum, not s
ubject to probation; and he s
hall
s
uffer DISQUALIFICAT
ION to hold public office and DEPRIVAT
ION of the right
of s
uffrage. T
he s
ubject firearm is
 CONFISCAT
ED and FORFEIT
ED in favor of
the Government.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997]

SAMMY MALACAT
 y MANDAR, petitioner, vs
. COURT
 OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE

OF T
HE PHILIPPINES, res
pondents
.
 DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In an Information[1] filed on 30 Augus
t 1990, in Criminal Cas
e No. 90-

86748 before the Regional T
rial Court (RT
C) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner
Sammy Malacat y Mandar was
 charged with violating Section 3 of
Pres
idential Decree No. 1866,[2] as
 follows
:
T
hat on or about Augus
t 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines
, the s
aid
accus
ed did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, pos
s
es
s

and/or acquire a hand grenade, without firs
t s
ecuring the neces
s
ary licens
e
and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities
.

At arraignment[3] on 9 October 1990, petitioner, as
s
is
ted by couns
el de

oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the exis
tence of
Exhibits
 A, A-1, and A-2, [4] while the pros
ecution admitted that the police
authorities
 were not armed with a s
earch warrant nor warrant of arres
t at the
time they arres
ted petitioner.[5]
At trial on the merits
, the pros
ecution pres
ented the following police
officers
 as
 its
 witnes
s
es
: Rodolfo Yu, the arres
ting officer; Jos
efino G. Serapio,
the inves
tigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Wes
tern Police Dis
trict, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, tes
tified that
on 27 Augus
t 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in res
pons
e to bomb threats
 reported
s
even days
 earlier, he was
 on foot patrol with three other police officers
 (all
of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the
Mercury Drug s
tore at Plaza Miranda. T
hey chanced upon two groups
 of
Mus
lim-looking men, with each group, compris
ed of three to four men,
pos
ted at oppos
ite s
ides
 of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury
Drug Store. T
hes
e men were acting s
us
picious
ly with [t]heir eyes
 moving
very fas
t.[6]
Yu and his
 companions
 pos
itioned thems
elves
 at s
trategic points
 and
obs
erved both groups
 for about thirty minutes
. T
he police officers
 then
approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions
. As
 the
policemen gave chas
e, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon
s
earching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked ins
ide
petitioners
 front wais
t line.[7] Yus
 companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Cas
an from whom a .38 caliber revolver was

recovered. Petitioner and Cas
an were then brought to Police Station No. 3
where Yu placed an X mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave
it to his
 commander.[8]
 On cros
s
-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol
due to a report that a group of Mus
lims
 was
 going to explode a grenade
s
omewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as
 the
previous
 Saturday, 25 Augus
t 1990, likewis
e at Plaza Miranda, Yu s
aw
petitioner and 2 others
 attempt to detonate a grenade. T
he attempt was

aborted when Yu and other policemen chas
ed petitioner and his
 companions
;
however, the former were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu further
admitted that petitioner and Cas
an were merely s
tanding on the corner of
Quezon Boulevard when Yu s
aw them on 27 Augus
t 1990. Although they
were not creating a commotion, s
ince they were s
uppos
edly acting
s
us
picious
ly, Yu and his
 companions
 approached them. Yu did not is
s
ue any
receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.[9]
Jos
efino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 Augus
t 1990,
petitioner and a certain Abdul Cas
an were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla [10] for
inves
tigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inques
t of the two s
us
pects
,
informing them of their rights
 to remain s
ilent and to be as
s
is
ted by
competent and independent couns
el. Des
pite Serapios
 advice, petitioner and
Cas
an manifes
ted their willingnes
s
 to ans
wer ques
tions
 even without the
as
s
is
tance of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioners
 uncouns
elled confes
s
ion
(Exh. E), there being no PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted
pos
s
es
s
ion of the grenade. T
hereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit of
arres
t and booking s
heet of petitioner and Cas
an. Later, Serapio turned over
the grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action Divis
ion (ISAD) of the
Explos
ive Ordnance Dis
pos
al Unit for examination.[11]
On cros
s
-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioners

confes
s
ion knowing it was
 inadmis
s
ible in evidence.[12]
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Dis
pos
al Unit, whos
e principal
duties
 included, among other things
, the examination of explos
ive devices
,
tes
tified that on 22 March 1991, he received a reques
t dated 19 March 1991
from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO Dios
dado Diotoy for examination of a
grenade. Ramilo then affixed an orange tag on the s
ubject grenade detailing
his
 name, the date and time he received the s
pecimen. During the
preliminary examination of the grenade, he [f]ound that [the] major
components
 cons
is
ting of [a] high filler and fus
e as
s
embly [were] all pres
ent,
and concluded that the grenade was
 [l]ive and capable of exploding. On
even date, he is
s
ued a certification s
tating his
 findings
, a copy of which he
forwarded to Diotoy on 11 Augus
t 1991.[13]
Petitioner was
 the lone defens
e witnes
s
. He declared that he arrived in
Manila on 22 July 1990 and res
ided at the Mus
lim Center in Quiapo,
Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 Augus
t 1990, he went to Plaza
Miranda to catch a breath of fres
h air. Shortly after, s
everal policemen
arrived and ordered all males
 to s
tand as
ide. T
he policemen s
earched
petitioner and two other men, but found nothing in their
pos
s
es
s
ion. However, he was
 arres
ted with two others
, brought to and
detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was
 accus
ed of having s
hot a police
officer. T
he officer s
howed the guns
hot wounds
 he allegedly s
us
tained and
s
houted at petitioner [i]to ang tama mo s
a akin. T
his
 officer then ins
erted the
muzzle of his
 gun into petitioners
 mouth and s
aid, [y]ou are the one who
s
hot me. Petitioner denied the charges
 and explained that he only recently
arrived in Manila.However, s
everal other police officers
 mauled him, hitting
him with benches
 and guns
. Petitioner was
 once again s
earched, but nothing
was
 found on him. He s
aw the grenade only in court when it was
 pres
ented.
[14]

T
he trial court ruled that the warrantles
s
 s
earch and s
eizure of petitioner
was
 akin to a s
top and fris
k, where a warrant and s
eizure can be effected
without neces
s
arily being preceded by an arres
t and whos
e object is
 either to
maintain the s
tatus
 quo momentarily while the police officer s
eeks
 to obtain
more information.[15] Probable caus
e was
 not required as
 it was
 not certain
that a crime had been committed, however, the s
ituation called for an
inves
tigation, hence to require probable caus
e would have been premature.
[16]
T
he RT
C emphas
ized that Yu and his
 companions
 were [c]onfronted with
an emergency, in which the delay neces
s
ary to obtain a warrant, threatens

the des
truction of evidence[17]and the officers
 [h]ad to act in has
te, as

petitioner and his
 companions
 were acting s
us
picious
ly, cons
idering the
time, place and reported cas
es
 of bombing. Further, petitioners
 group
s
uddenly ran away in different directions
 as
 they s
aw the arres
ting officers

approach, thus
 [i]t is
 reas
onable for an officer to conduct a limited s
earch,
the purpos
e of which is
 not neces
s
arily to dis
cover evidence of a crime, but
to allow the officer to purs
ue his
 inves
tigation without fear of violence.[18]
T
he trial court then ruled that the s
eizure of the grenade from petitioner
was
 incidental to a lawful arres
t, and s
ince petitioner [l]ater voluntarily
admitted s
uch fact to the police inves
tigator for the purpos
e of bombing the
Mercury Drug Store, concluded that s
ufficient evidence exis
ted to es
tablis
h
petitioners
 guilt beyond reas
onable doubt.
In its
 decis
ion[19] dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15
February 1994, the trial court thus
 found petitioner guilty of the crime of
illegal pos
s
es
s
ion of explos
ives
 under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, and
s
entenced him to s
uffer:
[T
]he penalty of not les
s
 than SEVENT
EEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONT
HS
AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION T
EMPORAL, as
 minimum, and not more than
T
HIRT
Y (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPET
UA, as
 maximum.

On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal [20] indicating

that he was
 appealing to this
 Court. However, the record of the cas
e was

forwarded to the Court of Appeals
 which docketed it as
 CA-G.R. CR No. 15988
and is
s
ued a notice to file briefs
.[21]
 In his
 Appellants
 Brief [22]
filed with the Court of Appeals
, petitioner
as
s
erted that:

1. T
HE LOWER COURT
 ERRED IN HOLDING T
HAT
 T
HE SEARCH UPON

T
HE PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
 AND T
HE SEIZURE OF
T
HE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE FROM HIM WAS AN APPROPRIAT
E
INCIDENT
 T
O HIS ARREST
.

2. T
HE LOWER COURT
 ERRED IN ADMIT
T
ING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST


ACCUSED-APPELLANT
 T
HE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED
FROM HIM AS IT
 WAS A PRODUCT
 OF AN UNREASONABLE AND
ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In s
um, petitioner argued that the warrantles
s
 arres
t was
 invalid due to
abs
ence of any of the conditions
 provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
Rules
 of Court, citing People vs
. Mengote.[23] As
 s
uch, the s
earch was
 illegal,
and the hand grenade s
eized, inadmis
s
ible in evidence.
In its
 Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed
with the trial court and prayed that its
 decis
ion be affirmed in toto.[24]
In its
 decis
ion of 24 January 1996, [25] the Court of Appeals
 affirmed the
trial court, noting, firs
t, that petitioner abandoned his
 original theory before
the court a quo that the grenade was
 planted by the police officers
; and
s
econd, the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was
 s
eized from
petitioners
 pos
s
es
s
ion was
 not rais
ed as
 an is
s
ue.Further, res
pondent court
focus
ed on the admis
s
ibility in evidence of Exhibit D, the hand grenade
s
eized from petitioner. Meeting the is
s
ue s
quarely, the Court of Appeals
 ruled
that the arres
t was
 lawful on the ground that there was
 probable caus
e for
the arres
t as
 petitioner was
 attempting to commit an offens
e, thus
:
We are at a los
s
 to unders
tand how a man, who was
 in pos
s
es
s
ion of a live
grenade and in the company of other s
us
picious
 character[s
] with unlicens
ed
firearm[s
] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political tens
ion ha[d]
been enkindling a s
eries
 of terroris
tic activities
, [can] claim that he was
 not
attempting to commit an offens
e. We need not mention that Plaza Miranda is

his
torically notorious
 for being a favorite bomb s
ite es
pecially during times
 of
political upheaval. As
 the mere pos
s
es
s
ion of an unlicens
ed grenade is
 by
its
elf an offens
e, Malacats
 pos
ture is
 s
imply too prepos
terous
 to ins
pire
belief.

In s
o doing, the Court of Appeals
 took into account petitioners
 failure to
rebut the tes
timony of the pros
ecution witnes
s
es
 that they received
intelligence reports
 of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu
chas
ed petitioner two days
 prior to the latters
 arres
t, or on 27 Augus
t 1990;
and that petitioner and his
 companions
 acted s
us
picious
ly, the accumulation
of which was
 more than s
ufficient to convince a reas
onable man that an
offens
e was
 about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals

obs
erved:
T
he police officers
 in s
uch a volatile s
ituation would be guilty of gros
s

negligence and dereliction of duty, not to mention of gros
s
 incompetence, if
they [would] firs
t wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill s
everal
innocent pers
ons
 while maiming numerous
 others
, before arriving at what
would then be an as
s
ured but moot conclus
ion that there was
 indeed
probable caus
e for an arres
t.We are in agreement with the lower court in
s
aying that the probable caus
e in s
uch a s
ituation s
hould not be the kind of
proof neces
s
ary to convict, but rather the practical cons
iderations
 of
everyday life on which a reas
onable and prudent mind, and not legal
technicians
, will ordinarily act.

Finally, the Court of Appeals
 held that the rule laid down in People v.
Mengote,[26] which petitioner relied upon, was
 inapplicable in light of [c]rucial
differences
, to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers
 never received any intelligence report that
s
omeone [at] the corner of a bus
y s
treet [would] be in pos
s
es
s
ion of a
prohibited article. Here the police officers
 were res
ponding to a [s
ic] public
clamor to put a check on the s
eries
 of terroris
tic bombings
 in the Metropolis
,
and, after receiving intelligence reports
 about a bomb threat aimed at the
vicinity of the his
torically notorious
 Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot
patrols
 for about s
even days
 to obs
erve s
us
picious
 movements
 in the
area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers
 [had] no pers
onal
knowledge that the pers
on arres
ted has
 committed, is
 actually committing,
or is
 attempting to commit an offens
e. Here, PO3 Yu [had] pers
onal
knowledge of the fact that he chas
ed Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days

before he finally s
ucceeded in apprehending him.

Unable to accept his
 conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the ins
tant

petition and as
s
igns
 the following errors
:

1. T
HE RESPONDENT
 COURT
 ERRED IN AFFIRMING T
HE FINDING OF

T
HE T
RIAL COURT
 T
HAT
 T
HE WARRANT
LESS ARREST
 OF
PET
IT
IONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.

2. T
HE RESPONDENT
 COURT
 ERRED IN HOLDING T
HAT
 T
HE RULING

IN PEOPLE VS. MENGOT
E DOES NOT
 FIND APPLICAT
ION IN T
HE
INST
ANT
 CASE.
In s
upport thereof, petitioner merely res
tates
 his
 arguments
 below regarding
the validity of the warrantles
s
 arres
t and s
earch, then dis
agrees
 with the
finding of the Court of Appeals
 that he was
 attempting to commit a crime, as

the evidence for the pros
ecution merely dis
clos
ed that he was
 s
tanding at
the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard with his
 eyes
 moving very
fas
t and looking at every pers
on that come (s
ic) nearer (s
ic) to them. Finally,
petitioner points
 out the factual s
imilarities
 between his
 cas
e and that
of People v. Mengote to demons
trate that the Court of Appeals

mis
comprehended the latter.
In its
 Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays
 that we affirm
the challenged decis
ion.
For being impres
s
ed with merit, we res
olved to give due cours
e to the
petition.
T
he challenged decis
ion mus
t immediately fall on juris
dictional
grounds
. T
o repeat, the penalty impos
ed by the trial court was
:
[N]ot les
s
 than SEVENT
EEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONT
HS AND ONE (1)
DAY OF RECLUSION T
EMPORAL, as
 minimum, and not more than T
HIRT
Y
(30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPET
UA, as
 maximum.

T
he penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any pers
on who
s
hall unlawfully pos
s
es
s
 grenades
 is
 reclus
ion temporal in its
 maximum
period to reclus
ion perpetua.
For purpos
es
 of determining appellate juris
diction in criminal cas
es
, the
maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is
 taken into account. Since
the maximum of the penalty is
 reclus
ion perpetua, the appeal therefrom
s
hould have been to us
, and not the Court of Appeals
, purs
uant to Section
9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), [27] in relation
to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, [28] Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Cons
titution[29] and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules
 of Court.[30]T
he term
life impris
onment as
 us
ed in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of
1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 mus
t be deemed to
include reclus
ion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Cons
titution.
Petitioners
 Notice of Appeal indicated that he was
 appealing from the
trial courts
 decis
ion to this
 Court, yet the trial court trans
mitted the record to
the Court of Appeals
 and the latter proceeded to res
olve the appeal.
We then s
et as
ide the decis
ion of the Court of Appeals
 for having been
rendered without juris
diction, and cons
ider the appeal as
 having been
directly brought to us
, with the petition for review as
 petitioners
 Brief for the
Appellant, the comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as
 the
Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the parties
 as
 their
Supplemental Briefs
.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings
, we find ours
elves
 convinced
that the pros
ecution failed to es
tablis
h petitioners
 guilt with moral certainty.
Firs
t, s
erious
 doubt s
urrounds
 the s
tory of police officer Yu that a
grenade was
 found in and s
eized from petitioners
 pos
s
es
s
ion. Notably, Yu did
not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly s
eized. According to him, he
turned it over to his
 commander after putting an X mark at its
 bottom;
however, the commander was
 not pres
ented to corroborate this
 claim. On
the other hand, the grenade pres
ented in court and identified by police
officer Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera
and police officer Diotoy not immediately after petitioners
 arres
t, but
nearly s
even (7) months
 later, or on 19 March 1991; further, there was
 no
evidence whats
oever that what Ramilo received was
 the very s
ame grenade
s
eized from petitioner. In his
 tes
timony, Yu never declared that the grenade
pas
s
ed on to Ramilo was
 the grenade the former confis
cated from
petitioner. Yu did not, and was
 not made to, identify the grenade examined
by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was

that s
eized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities
 failed to
s
afeguard and pres
erve the chain of evidence s
o crucial in cas
es
 s
uch as

thes
e.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days

earlier he was
 with a group about to detonate an explos
ive at Plaza Miranda,
and Yu and his
 fellow officers
 chas
ed, but failed to arres
t them, then
cons
idering that Yu and his
 three fellow officers
 were in uniform and
therefore eas
ily cognizable as
 police officers
, it was
 then unnatural and
agains
t common experience that petitioner s
imply s
tood there in proximity to
the police officers
. Note that Yu obs
erved petitioner for thirty minutes
 and
mus
t have been clos
e enough to petitioner in order to dis
cern petitioners

eyes
 moving very fas
t.
Finally, even as
s
uming that petitioner admitted pos
s
es
s
ion of the
grenade during his
 cus
todial inves
tigation by police officer Serapio, s
uch
admis
s
ion was
 inadmis
s
ible in evidence for it was
 taken in palpable violation
of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Cons
titution, which provide as

follows
:
SEC. 12 (1). Any pers
on under inves
tigation for the commis
s
ion of an offens
e
s
hall have the right to be informed of his
 right to remain s
ilent and to have
competent and independent couns
el preferably of his
 own choice. If the
pers
on cannot afford the s
ervices
 of couns
el, he mus
t be provided with
one. T
hes
e rights
 cannot be waived except in writing and in the pres
ence of
couns
el.

xxx

(3) Any confes
s
ion or admis
s
ion obtained in violation of this
 or

Section 17 hereof s
hall be inadmis
s
ible in evidence agains
t him.
Serapio conducted the cus
todial inves
tigation on petitioner the day following
his
 arres
t. No lawyer was
 pres
ent and Serapio could not have reques
ted a
lawyer to as
s
is
t petitioner as
 no PAO lawyer was
 then available. T
hus
, even if
petitioner cons
ented to the inves
tigation and waived his
 rights
 to remain
s
ilent and to couns
el, the waiver was
 invalid as
 it was
 not in writing, neither
was
 it executed in the pres
ence of couns
el.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was
 in pos
s
es
s
ion of a grenade,
the arres
t and s
earch of petitioner were invalid, as
 will be dis
cus
s
ed below.
T
he general rule as
 regards
 arres
ts
, s
earches
 and s
eizures
 is
 that a
warrant is
 needed in order to validly effect the s
ame. [31] T
he Cons
titutional
prohibition agains
t unreas
onable arres
ts
, s
earches
 and s
eizures
 refers
 to
thos
e effected without a validly is
s
ued warrant, [32] s
ubject to certain
exceptions
. As
 regards
 valid warrantles
s
 arres
ts
, thes
e are found in Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules
 of Court, which reads
, in part:
Sec. 5. -- Arres
t, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private
pers
on may, without a warrant, arres
t a pers
on:

(a) When, in his
 pres
ence, the pers
on to be arres
ted has


committed, is
 actually committing, or is
 attempting to commit
an offens
e;

(b) When an offens
e has
 in fact jus
t been committed, and he has

pers
onal knowledge of facts
 indicating that the pers
on to be
arres
ted has
 committed it; and

(c) When the pers
on to be arres
ted is
 a pris
oner who has


es
caped ***
A warrantles
s
 arres
t under the circums
tances
 contemplated under Section
5(a) has
 been denominated as
 one "in flagrante delicto," while that under
Section 5(b) has
 been des
cribed as
 a "hot purs
uit" arres
t.
T
urning to valid warrantles
s
 s
earches
, they are limited to the
following: (1) cus
toms
 s
earches
; (2) s
earch of moving vehicles
; (3) s
eizure of
evidence in plain view; (4) cons
ent s
earches
;[33] (5) a s
earch incidental to a
lawful arres
t;[34] and (6) a "s
top and fris
k."[35]
In the ins
tant petition, the trial court validated the warrantles
s
 s
earch as

a s
top and fris
k with the s
eizure of the grenade from the accus
ed [as
] an
appropriate incident to his
 arres
t, hence neces
s
itating a brief dis
cus
s
ion on
the nature of thes
e exceptions
 to the warrant requirement.
At the outs
et, we note that the trial court confus
ed the concepts
 of a
"s
top-and-fris
k" and of a s
earch incidental to a lawful arres
t. T
hes
e two types

of warrantles
s
 s
earches
 differ in terms
 of the requis
ite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in their allowable s
cope.
In a s
earch incidental to a lawful arres
t, as
 the precedent arres
t
determines
 the validity of the incidental s
earch, the legality of the arres
t is

ques
tioned in a large majority of thes
e cas
es
, e.g., whether an arres
t was

merely us
ed as
 a pretext for conducting a s
earch. [36] In this
 ins
tance, the law
requires
 that there firs
t be a lawful arres
t before a s
earch can be made -- the
proces
s
 cannot be revers
ed.[37] At bottom, as
s
uming a valid arres
t, the
arres
ting officer may s
earch the pers
on of the arres
tee and the area within
which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to des
troy, and
s
eize any money or property found which was
 us
ed in the commis
s
ion of the
crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be us
ed as
 evidence, or
which might furnis
h the arres
tee with the means
 of es
caping or committing
violence.[38]
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot purs
uit
arres
t preceding the s
earch in light of the lack of pers
onal knowledge on the
part of Yu, the arres
ting officer, or an overt phys
ical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had jus
t been committed, was
 being
committed or was
 going to be committed.
Having thus
 s
hown the invalidity of the warrantles
s
 arres
t in this
 cas
e,
plainly, the s
earch conducted on petitioner could not have been one
incidental to a lawful arres
t.
We now proceed to the jus
tification for and allowable s
cope of a "s
top-
and-fris
k" as
 a "limited protective s
earch of outer clothing for weapons
," as

laid down in T
erry, thus
:
We merely hold today that where a police officer obs
erves
 unus
ual
conduct which leads
 him reas
onably to conclude in light of his

experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the pers
ons
 with
whom he is
 dealing may be armed and pres
ently dangerous
, where in
the cours
e of inves
tigating this
 behavior he identifies
 hims
elf as
 a
policeman and makes
 reas
onable inquiries
, and where nothing in the
initial s
tages
 of the encounter s
erves
 to dis
pel his
 reas
onable fear for
his
 own or others
' s
afety, he is
 entitled for the protection of hims
elf and
others
 in the area to conduct a carefully limited s
earch of the outer
clothing of s
uch pers
ons
 in an attempt to dis
cover weapons
 which might
be us
ed to as
s
ault him. Such a s
earch is
 a reas
onable s
earch under the
Fourth Amendment ***[39]

Other notable points
 of T
erry are that while probable caus
e is
 not required to
conduct a "s
top and fris
k,"[40] it nevertheles
s
 holds
 that mere s
us
picion or a
hunch will not validate a "s
top and fris
k." A genuine reas
on mus
t exis
t, in
light of the police officer's
 experience and s
urrounding conditions
, to warrant
the belief that the pers
on detained has
 weapons
 concealed about him.
 Finally, a "s
top-and-fris
k" s
erves
 a two-fold interes
t: (1) the general
[41]

interes
t of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies
 the

recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circums
tances
 and in
an appropriate manner, approach a pers
on for purpos
es
 of inves
tigating
pos
s
ible criminal behavior even without probable caus
e; and (2) the more
pres
s
ing interes
t of s
afety and s
elf-pres
ervation which permit the police
officer to take s
teps
 to as
s
ure hims
elf that the pers
on with whom he deals
 is

not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be us
ed
agains
t the police officer.
Here, here are at leas
t three (3) reas
ons
 why the s
top-and-fris
k was

invalid:
Firs
t, we harbor grave doubts
 as
 to Yus
 claim that petitioner was
 a
member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days

earlier. T
his
 claim is
 neither s
upported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chas
ed that
group. As
ide from impairing Yu's
 credibility as
 a witnes
s
, this
 likewis
e
diminis
hes
 the probability that a genuine reas
on exis
ted s
o as
 to arres
t and
s
earch petitioner. If only to further tarnis
h the credibility of Yu's
 tes
timony,
contrary to his
 claim that petitioner and his
 companions
 had to be chas
ed
before being apprehended, the affidavit of arres
t (Exh. "A") expres
s
ly
declares
 otherwis
e, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers
,
petitioner and his
 companions
 were "immediately collared."
Second, there was
 nothing in petitioners
 behavior or conduct which
could have reas
onably elicited even mere s
us
picion other than that his
 eyes

were moving very fas
t an obs
ervation which leaves
 us
 incredulous
 s
ince Yu
and his
 teammates
 were nowhere near petitioner and it was
 already 6:30
p.m., thus
 pres
umably dus
k. Petitioner and his
 companions
 were merely
s
tanding at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble, as

Yu explicitly declared on cros
s
-examination:

Q And what were they doing?

A T
hey were merely s
tanding.

Q You are s
ure of that?

A Yes
, s
ir.

Q And when you s
aw them s
tanding, there were nothing or they did
not create any commotion?

A None, s
ir.

Q Neither did you s
ee them create commotion?

 A None, s
ir.[42]
T
hird, there was
 at all no ground, probable or otherwis
e, to believe that
petitioner was
 armed with a deadly weapon. None was
 vis
ible to Yu, for as
 he
admitted, the alleged grenade was
 dis
covered ins
ide the front wais
tline of
petitioner, and from all indications
 as
 to the dis
tance between Yu and
petitioner, any telltale bulge, as
s
uming that petitioner was
 indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have been vis
ible to Yu. In fact, as
 noted by the trial
court:
When the policemen approached the accus
ed and his
 companions
, they were
not yet aware that a handgrenade was
 tucked ins
ide his
 wais
tline. T
hey did
not s
ee any bulging object in [s
ic] his
 pers
on.[43]

What is
 unequivocal then in this
 cas
e are blatant violations
 of

petitioners
 rights
 s
olemnly guaranteed in Sections
 2 and 12(1) of Article III of
the Cons
titution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decis
ion of the Seventeenth Divis
ion of the
Court of Appeals
 in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is
 SET
 ASIDE for lack of juris
diction
on the part of s
aid Court and, on ground of reas
onable doubt, the decis
ion of
10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional T
rial Court of Manila is

REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT
 y MANDAR is
 hereby ACQUIT
T
ED
and ORDERED immediately releas
ed from detention, unles
s
 his
 further
detention is
 jus
tified for any other lawful caus
e.
Cos
ts
 de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, G.R. No. 170180

Petitioner,
Pres
ent:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairpers
on,
- vers
us
 - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
T
INGA, and
VELASCO, JJ.

PEOPLE OF T
HE PHILIPPINES,

Res
pondent. Promulgated:

November 23, 2007

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

T
INGA, J.:

T
he s
acred right agains
t an arres
t, s
earch or s
eizure without valid warrant is


not only ancient. It is
 als
o zealous
ly s
afeguarded. T
he Cons
titution

guarantees
 the right of the people to be s
ecure in their pers
ons
, hous
es
,

papers
 and effects
 agains
t unreas
onable s
earches
 and s
eizures
. [1] Any

evidence obtained in violation of s
aid right s
hall be inadmis
s
ible for any

purpos
e in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to s
earch and s
eize may

at times
 be neces
s
ary to the public welfare, s
till it mus
t be exercis
ed and the

law implemented without contravening the cons
titutional rights
 of the

citizens
, for the enforcement of no s
tatute is
 of s
ufficient importance to

jus
tify indifference to the bas
ic principles
 of government.[2]

On appeal is
 the Decis
ion[3] of the Court of Appeals
 dated 28 July 2005,

affirming the Judgment[4] of the Regional T
rial Court (RT
C), Branch 31, Agoo,

La Union dated 31 March 2004 finding petitioner Ars
enio Vergara Valdez

guilty beyond reas
onable doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No.

9165 (R.A. No. 9165)[5]and s
entencing him to s
uffer the penalty of

impris
onment ranging from eight (8) years
 and one (1) day of pris
ion

mayor medium as
 minimum to fifteen (15) years
 of reclus
ion

temporal medium as
 maximum and ordering him to pay a fine

of P350,000.00.[6]

I.

On 26 June 2003, petitioner was
 charged with violation of Section 11, par.

2(2) of R.A. No. 9165 in an Information[7] which reads
:

T
hat on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the

Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines
 and
within the juris
diction of this
 Honorable Court, the above-
named accus
ed, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
felonious
ly have in his
 pos
s
es
s
ion, control and cus
tody dried
marijuana leaves
 wrapped in a cellophane and news
paper
page, weighing more or les
s
 twenty-five (25) grams
, without
firs
t s
ecuring the neces
s
ary permit, licens
e or pres
cription
from the proper government agency.
 CONT
RARY T
O LAW.[8]

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. T
hereafter, trial on the merits


ens
ued with the pros
ecution pres
enting the three (3) barangay tanods
 of San

Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union namely, Rogelio Bautis
ta (Bautis
ta), Nes
tor

Aratas
 (Aratas
) and Eduardo Ordoo (Ordoo), who arres
ted petitioner.

Bautis
ta tes
tified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was


conducting the routine patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San

Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas
 and Ordoo when they

noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus
.

T
he tanods
 obs
erved that petitioner, who appeared s
us
picious
 to them,

s
eemed to be looking for s
omething. T
hey thus
 approached him but the

latter purportedly attempted to run away. T
hey chas
ed him, put him under

arres
t and thereafter brought him to the hous
e of Barangay Captain Orencio

Mercado (Mercado) where he, as
 averred by Bautis
ta, was
 ordered by

Mercado to open his
 bag. Petitioners
 bag allegedly contained a pair of denim

pants
, eighteen pieces
 of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves
 wrapped in

news
paper and cellophane. It was
 then that petitioner was
 taken to the

police s
tation for further inves
tigation.[9]

Aratas
 and Ordoo corroborated Bautis
tas
 tes
timony on mos
t material points
.

On cros
s
-examination, however, Aratas
 admitted that he hims
elf brought out

the contents
 of petitioners
 bag before petitioner was
 taken to the hous
e of

Mercado.[10] Nonetheles
s
, he claimed that at Mercados
 hous
e, it was


petitioner hims
elf who brought out the contents
 of his
 bag upon orders
 from

Mercado. For his
 part, Ordoo tes
tified that it was
 he who was
 ordered by

Mercado to open petitioners
 bag and that it was
 then that they s
aw the

purported contents
 thereof.[11]

T
he pros
ecution likewis
e pres
ented Police Ins
pector Valeriano Laya II (Laya),

the forens
ic chemis
t who conducted the examination of the marijuana

allegedly confis
cated from petitioner. Laya maintained that the s
pecimen

s
ubmitted to him for analys
is
, a s
achet of the s
ubs
tance weighing 23.10

grams
 and contained in a plas
tic bag, tes
ted pos
itive of marijuana. He

dis
clos
ed on cros
s
-examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of

how the marijuana was
 taken from petitioner nor of how the s
aid s
ubs
tance

reached the police officers
. Moreover, he could not identify whos
e marking

was
 on the ins
ide of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves
.[12]

 T
he charges
 were denied by petitioner. As
 the defens
es
 s
ole witnes
s
,

he tes
tified that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay

from his
 place in Curro-oy, Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus
,

petitioner claimed that he went to the hous
e of a friend to drink water and

then proceeded to walk to his
 brothers
 hous
e. As
 he was
 walking,

pros
ecution witnes
s
 Ordoo, a cous
in of his
 brothers
 wife, allegedly

approached him and as
ked where he was
 going. Petitioner replied that he

was
 going to his
 brothers
 hous
e. Ordoo then purportedly reques
ted to s
ee

the contents
 of his
 bag and appellant acceded. It was
 at this
 point that

Bautis
ta and Aratas
 joined them. After ins
pecting all the contents
 of his
 bag,

petitioner tes
tified that he was
 res
trained by the tanod and taken to the

hous
e of Mercado. It was
 Aratas
 who carried the bag until they reached their

des
tination.[13]

Petitioner maintained that at Mercados
 hous
e, his
 bag was
 opened

by the tanod and Mercado hims
elf. T
hey took out an item wrapped in

news
paper, which later turned out to be marijuana leaves
. Petitioner denied

owners
hip thereof. He claimed to have been threatened with impris
onment

by his
 arres
tors
 if he did not give the prohibited drugs
 to s
omeone from the

eas
t in order for them to apprehend s
uch pers
on. As
 petitioner declined, he

was
 brought to the police s
tation and charged with the ins
tant offens
e.

Although petitioner divulged that it was
 he who opened and took out the

contents
 of his
 bag at his
 friends
 hous
e, he averred that it was
 one of
the tanodwho did s
o at Mercados
 hous
e and that it was
 only there that they

s
aw the marijuana for the firs
t time.[14]

Finding that the pros
ecution had proven petitioners
 guilt beyond

reas
onable doubt, the RT
C rendered judgment agains
t him and s
entenced

him to s
uffer indeterminate impris
onment ranging from eight (8) years
 and

one (1) day of pris
ion mayor medium as
 minimum to fifteen (15) years


of reclus
ion temporal medium as
 maximum and ordered him to pay a fine

of P350,000.00.[15]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decis
ion of the RT
C to the Court of

Appeals
. On 28 July 2005, the appellate court affirmed the challenged

decis
ion. T
he Court of Appeals
, finding no cogent reas
on to overturn the

pres
umption of regularity in favor of the barangay tanod in the abs
ence of

evidence of ill-motive on their part, agreed with the trial court that there was


probable caus
e to arres
t petitioner. It obs
erved further:

T
hat the pros
ecution failed to es
tablis
h the chain of cus
tody

of the s
eized marijuana is
 of no moment. Such circums
tance
finds
 prominence only when the exis
tence of the s
eized
prohibited drugs
 is
 denied. In this
 cas
e, accus
ed-appellant
hims
elf tes
tified that the marijuana wrapped in a news
paper
was
 taken from his
 bag. T
he corpus
 delicti of the crime, i.e.[,]
the exis
tence of the marijuana and his
 pos
s
es
s
ion thereof,
was
 amply proven by accus
ed-appellant Valdezs
 own
tes
timony.[16]
 In this
 appeal, petitioner prays
 for his
 acquittal and as
s
erts
 that his


guilt of the crime charged had not been proven beyond reas
onable doubt. He

argues
, albeit for the firs
t time on appeal, that the warrantles
s
 arres
t

effected agains
t him by the barangay tanod was
 unlawful and that the

warrantles
s
 s
earch of his
 bag that followed was
 likewis
e contrary to law.

Cons
equently, he maintains
, the marijuana leaves
 purportedly s
eized from

him are inadmis
s
ible in evidence for being the fruit of a pois
onous
 tree.

Well-s
ettled is
 the rule that the findings
 of the trial court on the

credibility of witnes
s
es
 and their tes
timonies
 are accorded great res
pect and

weight, in the abs
ence of any clear s
howing that s
ome facts
 and

circums
tances
 of weight or s
ubs
tance which could have affected the res
ult of

the cas
e have been overlooked, mis
unders
tood or mis
applied.[17]

After meticulous
 examination of the records
 and evidence on hand,

however, the Court finds
 and s
o holds
 that a revers
al of the decis
ion a

quo under review is
 in order.

II.

At the outs
et, we obs
erve that nowhere in the records
 can we find

any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his
 arres
t before his


arraignment. Cons
idering this
 and his
 active participation in the trial of the

cas
e, juris
prudence dictates
 that petitioner is
 deemed to have s
ubmitted to

the juris
diction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his
 arres
t. T
he

legality of an arres
t affects
 only the juris
diction of the court over his
 pers
on.
[18]
Petitioners
 warrantles
s
 arres
t therefore cannot, in its
elf, be the bas
is
 of his


acquittal.

However, to determine the admis
s
ibility of the s
eized drugs
 in

evidence, it is
 indis
pens
able to as
certain whether or not the s
earch which

yielded the alleged contraband was
 lawful. T
he s
earch, conducted as
 it was


without a warrant, is
 jus
tified only if it were incidental to a lawful arres
t.

[19]
Evaluating the evidence on record in its
 totality, as
 earlier intimated, the

reas
onable conclus
ion is
 that the arres
t of petitioner without a warrant is
 not

lawful as
 well.

Petitioner maintains
, in a nuts
hell, that after he was
 approached by

the tanod and as
ked to s
how the contents
 of his
 bag, he was
 s
imply herded

without explanation and taken to the hous
e of the barangay captain. On their

way there, it was
 Aratas
 who carried his
 bag. He denies
 owners
hip over the

contraband allegedly found in his
 bag and as
s
erts
 that he s
aw it for the firs
t

time at the barangay captains
 hous
e.

Even cas
ting as
ide petitioners
 vers
ion and bas
ing the res
olution of

this
 cas
e on the general thrus
t of the pros
ecution evidence, the unlawfulnes
s


of petitioners
 arres
t s
tands
 out jus
t the s
ame.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
 on Criminal Procedure provides
 the

only occas
ions
 on which a pers
on may be arres
ted without a warrant, to wit:

Section 5. Arres
t without warrant; when lawful.A peace

officer or a private pers
on may, without a warrant, arres
t a
pers
on:

(a) When, in his
 pres
ence, the pers
on to be

arres
ted has
 committed, is
 actually committing,
or is
 attempting to commit an offens
e;
(b) When an offens
e has
 jus
t been committed and
he has
 probable caus
e to believe bas
ed on
pers
onal knowledge of facts
 or circums
tances

that the pers
on to be arres
ted has
 committed it;
and
(c) When the pers
on to be arres
ted is
 a pris
oner
who has
 es
caped from a penal es
tablis
hment or
place where he is
 s
erving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his
 cas
e is
 pending,
or has
 es
caped while being trans
ferred from one
confinement to another.

xxx

It is
 obvious
 that bas
ed on the tes
timonies
 of the arres
ting

barangay tanod, not one of thes
e circums
tances
 was
 obtaining at the time

petitioner was
 arres
ted. By their own admis
s
ion, petitioner was
 not

committing an offens
e at the time he alighted from the bus
, nor did he

appear to be then committing an offens
e.[20] T
he tanoddid not have probable

caus
e either to jus
tify petitioners
 warrantles
s
 arres
t.

For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this
 Court has


ruled that two (2) elements
 mus
t be pres
ent: (1) the pers
on to be arres
ted

mus
t execute an overt act indicating that he has
 jus
t committed, is
 actually

committing, or is
 attempting to commit a crime; and (2) s
uch overt act is


done in the pres
ence or within the view of the arres
ting officer. [21] Here,

petitioners
 act of looking around after getting off the bus
 was
 but natural as


he was
 finding his
 way to his
 des
tination. T
hat he purportedly attempted to

run away as
 the tanod approached him is
 irrelevant and cannot by its
elf be

cons
trued as
 adequate to charge the tanod with pers
onal knowledge that

petitioner had jus
t engaged in, was
 actually engaging in or was
 attempting

to engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner tes
tified that he

did not run away but in fact s
poke with the barangay tanod when they

approached him.

Even taking the pros
ecutions
 vers
ion generally as
 the truth, in line

with our as
s
umption from the s
tart, the conclus
ion will not be any different. It

is
 not unreas
onable to expect that petitioner, walking the s
treet at night,

after being clos
ely obs
erved and then later tailed by three unknown pers
ons
,

would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per s
e is
 not s
ynonymous
 with

guilt and mus
t not always
 be attributed to ones
 cons
cious
nes
s
 of guilt. [22] Of

pers
uas
ion was
 the Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in People v.

Shabaz[23] that [f]light alone is
 not a reliable indicator of guilt without other

circums
tances
 becaus
e flight alone is
 inherently ambiguous
. Alone, and

under the circums
tances
 of this
 cas
e, petitioners
 flight lends
 its
elf jus
t as


eas
ily to an innocent explanation as
 it does
 to a nefarious
 one.

Moreover, as
 we pointed out in People v. T
udtud,[24] [t]he phras
e in his


pres
ence therein, connot[es
] penal knowledge on the part of the arres
ting

officer. T
he right of the accus
ed to be s
ecure agains
t any unreas
onable

s
earches
 on and s
eizure of his
 own body and any deprivation of his
 liberty

being a mos
t bas
ic and fundamental one, the s
tatute or rule that allows


exception to the requirement of a warrant of arres
t is
 s
trictly cons
trued. Its


application cannot be extended beyond the cas
es
 s
pecifically provided by

law.[25]

Indeed, the s
uppos
ed acts
 of petitioner, even as
s
uming that they

appeared dubious
, cannot be viewed as
 s
ufficient to incite s
us
picion of

criminal activity enough to validate his
 warrantles
s
 arres
t. [26] If at all, the

s
earch mos
t permis
s
ible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing

backdrop of the cas
e was
 a s
top-and-fris
k to allay any s
us
picion they have

been harboring bas
ed on petitioners
 behavior. However, a s
top-and-fris
k

s
ituation, following T
erry v. Ohio,[27] mus
t precede a warrantles
s
 arres
t, be

limited to the pers
ons
 outer clothing, and s
hould be grounded upon a

genuine reas
on, in light of the police officers
 experience and s
urrounding

conditions
, to warrant the belief that the pers
on detained has
 weapons


concealed about him.[28]

Accordingly, petitioners
 waiver of his
 right to ques
tion his
 arres
t

notwiths
tanding, the marijuana leaves
 allegedly taken during the s
earch

cannot be admitted in evidence agains
t him as
 they were s
eized during a

warrantles
s
 s
earch which was
 not lawful. [29] As
 we pronounced in People v.

Bacla-an

A waiver of an illegal warrantles
s
 arres
t does
 not als
o

mean a waiver of the inadmis
s
ibility of evidence s
eized
during an illegal warrantles
s
 arres
t. T
he following s
earches

and s
eizures
 are deemed permis
s
ible by juris
prudence: (1)
s
earch of moving vehicles
 (2) s
eizure in plain view (3)
cus
toms
 s
earches
 (4) waiver or cons
ent s
earches
 (5) s
top
and fris
k s
ituations
 (T
erry Search) and (6) s
earch incidental to
a lawful arres
t. T
he las
t includes
 a valid warrantles
s
 s
earch
and s
eizure purs
uant to an equally valid warrantles
s
 arres
t,
for, while as
 a rule, an arres
t is
 cons
idered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arres
t, the Rules
 of Court
recognize permis
s
ible warrantles
s
 arres
ts
, to wit: (1) arres
ts

in flagrante delicto, (2) arres
ts
 effected in hot purs
uit, and,
(3) arres
ts
 of es
caped pris
oners
.[30]

When petitioner was
 arres
ted without a warrant, he was
 neither

caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was
 the arres
t effected in

hot purs
uit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reas
onably argued that the

warrantles
s
 s
earch conducted on petitioner was
 incidental to a lawful arres
t.

In its
 Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General pos
its
 that apart

from the warrantles
s
 s
earch being incidental to his
 lawful arres
t, petitioner

had cons
ented to the s
earch. We are not convinced. As
 we explained

in Caballes
 v. Court of Appeals
[31]

Doubtles
s
, the cons
titutional immunity agains
t

unreas
onable s
earches
 and s
eizures
 is
 a pers
onal right which
may be waived. T
he cons
ent mus
t be voluntary in order to
validate an otherwis
e illegal detention and s
earch, i.e., the
cons
ent is
 unequivocal, s
pecific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any dures
s
 or coercion. Hence, cons
ent to
a s
earch is
 not to be lightly inferred, but mus
t be s
hown by
clear and convincing evidence. T
he ques
tion whether a
cons
ent to a s
earch was
 in fact voluntary is
 a ques
tion of fact
to be determined from the totality of all the circums
tances
.
Relevant to this
 determination are the following
characteris
tics
 of the pers
on giving cons
ent and the
environment in which cons
ent is
 given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether he was
 in a public or s
ecluded
location; (3) whether he objected to the s
earch or pas
s
ively
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the
defendant; (5) the pres
ence of coercive police procedures
; (6)
the defendant's
 belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found; (7) the nature of the police ques
tioning; (8) the
environment in which the ques
tioning took place; and (9) the
pos
s
ibly vulnerable s
ubjective s
tate of the pers
on cons
enting.
It is
 the State which has
 the burden of proving, by clear and
pos
itive tes
timony, that the neces
s
ary cons
ent was
 obtained
and that it was
 freely and voluntarily given.[32]

In the cas
e at bar, following the theory of the pros
ecution albeit

bas
ed on conflicting tes
timonies
 on when petitioners
 bag was
 actually

opened, it is
 apparent that petitioner was
 already under the coercive control

of the public officials
 who had cus
tody of him when the s
earch of his
 bag was


demanded. Moreover, the pros
ecution failed to prove any s
pecific s
tatement

as
 to how the cons
ent was
 as
ked and how it was
 given, nor the s
pecific

words
 s
poken by petitioner indicating his
 alleged "cons
ent." Even granting

that petitioner admitted to opening his
 bag when Ordoo as
ked to s
ee its


contents
, his
 implied acquies
cence, if at all, could not have been more than

mere pas
s
ive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circums
tances


and hence, is
 cons
idered no cons
ent at all within the contemplation of the

cons
titutional guarantee.[33] As
 a res
ult, petitioners
 lack of objection to the

s
earch and s
eizure is
 not tantamount to a waiver of his
 cons
titutional right or

a voluntary s
ubmis
s
ion to the warrantles
s
 s
earch and s
eizure.[34]

III.

Notably, the inadmis
s
ibility in evidence of the s
eized marijuana

leaves
 for being the fruit of an unlawful s
earch is
 not the lone caus
e that

militates
 agains
t the cas
e of the pros
ecution. We likewis
e find that it has


failed to convincingly es
tablis
h the identity of the marijuana leaves


purportedly taken from petitioners
 bag.

In all pros
ecutions
 for violation of the Dangerous
 Drugs
 Act, the

following elements
 mus
t concur: (1) proof that the trans
action took place;
and (2) pres
entation in court of the corpus
 delicti or the illicit drug as


evidence.[35] T
he exis
tence of dangerous
 drugs
 is
 a condition s
ine qua non for

conviction for the illegal s
ale of dangerous
 drugs
, it being the very corpus


delicti of the crime.[36]

In a line of cas
es
, we have ruled as
 fatal to the pros
ecutions
 cas
e its


failure to prove that the s
pecimen s
ubmitted for laboratory examination was


the s
ame one allegedly s
eized from the accus
ed. [37] T
here can be no crime of

illegal pos
s
es
s
ion of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts
 pers
is
t on

whether the item confis
cated was
 the s
ame s
pecimen examined and

es
tablis
hed to be the prohibited drug. [38] As
 we dis
cus
s
ed in People v.

Orteza[39], where we deemed the pros
ecution to have failed in es
tablis
hing all

the elements
 neces
s
ary for conviction of appellant for illegal s
ale of s
habu

Firs
t, there appears
 nothing in the record s
howing

that police officers
 complied with the proper procedure in the
cus
tody of s
eized drugs
 as
 s
pecified in People v. Lim, i.e., any
apprehending team having initial control of s
aid drugs
 and/or
paraphernalia s
hould, immediately after s
eizure or
confis
cation, have the s
ame phys
ically inventoried and
photographed in the pres
ence of the accus
ed, if there be any,
and or his
 repres
entative, who s
hall be required to s
ign the
copies
 of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. T
he
failure of the agents
 to comply with the requirement rais
es

doubt whether what was
 s
ubmitted for laboratory
examination and pres
ented in court was
 actually recovered
from appellant. It negates
 the pres
umption that official duties

have been regularly performed by the police officers
.

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bus
t team failed to

mark the confis
cated marijuana immediately after the
 apprehens
ion of the accus
ed, the Court held that the
deviation from the s
tandard procedure in anti-narcotics

operations
 produced doubts
 as
 to the origins
 of the
marijuana. Cons
equently, the Court concluded that the
pros
ecution failed to es
tablis
h the identity of the corpus

delicti.

T
he Court made a s
imilar ruling in People v. Kimura,

where the Narcom operatives
 failed to place markings
 on the
s
eized marijuana at the time the accus
ed was
 arres
ted and to
obs
erve the procedure and take cus
tody of the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held

that the material incons
is
tencies
 with regard to when and
where the markings
 on the s
habu were made and the lack of
inventory on the s
eized drugs
 created reas
onable doubt as
 to
the identity of the corpus
 delicti. T
he Court thus
 acquitted
the accus
ed due to the pros
ecutions
 failure to indubitably
s
how the identity of the s
habu.

In the cas
e at bar, after the arres
t of petitioner by the

barangay tanod, the records
 only s
how that he was
 taken to the hous
e of

the barangay captain and thereafter to the police s
tation. T
he Joint

Affidavit[40] executed by the tanod merely s
tates
 that they confis
cated the

marijuana leaves
 which they brought to the police s
tation together with

petitioner. Likewis
e, the Receipt[41] is
s
ued by the Aringay Police Station

merely acknowledged receipt of the s
us
pected drugs
 s
uppos
edly confis
cated

from petitioner.

Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of

when petitioners
 bag was
 opened, they als
o gave conflicting tes
timony on
who actually opened the s
ame. T
he pros
ecution, des
pite thes
e material

incons
is
tencies
, neglected to explain the dis
crepancies
. Even more damning

to its
 caus
e was
 the admis
s
ion by Laya, the forens
ic chemis
t, that he did not

know how the s
pecimen was
 taken from petitioner, how it reached the police

authorities
 or whos
e marking was
 on the cellophane wrapping of the

marijuana. T
he non-pres
entation, without jus
tifiable reas
on, of the police

officers
 who conducted the inques
t proceedings
 and marked the s
eized

drugs
, if s
uch was
 the cas
e, is
 fatal to the cas
e. Plainly, the pros
ecution

neglected to es
tablis
h the crucial link in the chain of cus
tody of the s
eized

marijuana leaves
 from the time they were firs
t allegedly dis
covered until

they were brought for examination by Laya.

T
he Court of Appeals
 found as
 irrelevant the failure of the

pros
ecution to es
tablis
h the chain of cus
tody over the s
eized marijuana as


s
uch [f]inds
 prominence only when the exis
tence of the s
eized prohibited

drug is
 denied.[42] We cannot agree.

T
o buttres
s
 its
 ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on

petitioners
 tes
timony that the marijuana was
 taken from his
 bag, without

taking the s
tatement in full context. [43] Contrary to the Court of Appeals


findings
, although petitioner tes
tified that the marijuana was
 taken from his


bag, he cons
is
tently denied owners
hip thereof. [44] Furthermore, it defies
 logic

to require a denial of owners
hip of the s
eized drugs
 before the principle of

chain of cus
tody comes
 into play.

T
he onus
 of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls
 upon the

State. In conjunction with this
, law enforcers
 and public officers
 alike have

the corollary duty to pres
erve the chain of cus
tody over the s
eized drugs
.

T
he chain of evidence is
 cons
tructed by proper exhibit handling, s
torage,

labeling and recording, and mus
t exis
t from the time the evidence is
 found

until the time it is
 offered in evidence. Each pers
on who takes
 pos
s
es
s
ion of

the s
pecimen is
 duty-bound to detail how it was
 cared for, s
afeguarded and

pres
erved while in his
 or her control to prevent alteration or replacement

while in cus
tody. T
his
 guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be us
ed

agains
t an accus
ed goes
 to the very heart of his
 fundamental rights
.

T
he pres
umption of regularity in the performance of official duty

invoked by the pros
ecution and relied upon by the courts
 a quo cannot by

its
elf overcome the pres
umption of innocence nor cons
titute proof of guilt

beyond reas
onable doubt.[45] Among the cons
titutional rights
 enjoyed by an

accus
ed, the mos
t primordial yet often dis
regarded is
 the pres
umption of

innocence. T
his
 elementary principle accords
 every accus
ed the right to be

pres
umed innocent until the contrary is
 proven beyond reas
onable

doubt. T
hus
, the burden of proving the guilt of the accus
ed res
ts
 upon the

pros
ecution.

Concededly, the evidence of the defens
e is
 weak and

uncorroborated. Nevertheles
s
, this
 [c]annot be us
ed to advance the caus
e of

the pros
ecution as
 its
 evidence mus
t s
tand or fall on its
 own weight and

cannot be allowed to draw s
trength from the weaknes
s
 of the defens
e.

[46]
Moreover, where the circums
tances
 are s
hown to yield two or more

inferences
, one incons
is
tent with the pres
umption of innocence and the other

compatible with the finding of guilt, the court mus
t acquit the accus
ed for

the reas
on that the evidence does
 not s
atis
fy the tes
t of moral certainty and

is
 inadequate to s
upport a judgment of conviction. [47]

Drug addiction has
 been invariably denounced as
 an es
pecially

vicious
 crime,[48] and one of the mos
t pernicious
 evils
 that has
 ever crept into

our s
ociety,[49] for thos
e who become addicted to it not only s
lide into the

ranks
 of the living dead, what is
 wors
e, they become a grave menace to the

s
afety of law-abiding members
 of s
ociety, [50] whereas
 peddlers
 of drugs
 are

actually agents
 of des
truction. [51] Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous


effects
 of prohibited drugs
 on the moral fiber of s
ociety cannot be

unders
cored enough. However, in the rightfully vigorous
 campaign of the

government to eradicate the hazards
 of drug us
e and drug trafficking, it

cannot be permitted to run roughs
hod over an accus
eds
 right to be

pres
umed innocent until proven to the contrary and neither can it s
hirk from

its
 corollary obligation to es
tablis
h s
uch guilt beyond reas
onable doubt.

In this
 cas
e, the totality of the evidence pres
ented utterly fails
 to

overcome the pres
umption of innocence which petitioner enjoys
. T
he failure

of the pros
ecution to prove all the elements
 of the offens
e beyond

reas
onable doubt mus
t perforce res
ult in petitioners
 exoneration from

criminal liability.

IV.

A final word. We find it fitting to take this
 occas
ion to remind the

courts
 to exercis
e the highes
t degree of diligence and prudence in

deliberating upon the guilt of accus
ed pers
ons
 brought before them,

es
pecially in light of the fundamental rights
 at s
take. Here, we note that the

courts
 a quo neglected to give more s
erious
 cons
ideration to certain material

is
s
ues
 in the determination of the merits
 of the cas
e. We are not oblivious
 to

the fact that in s
ome ins
tances
, law enforcers
 res
ort to the practice of

planting evidence to extract information or even haras
s
 civilians
.

Accordingly, courts
 are duty-bound to be [e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cas
es


les
t an innocent pers
on be made to s
uffer the unus
ually s
evere penalties
 for

drug offens
es
.[52] In the s
ame vein, let this
 s
erve as
 an admonition to police

officers
 and public officials
 alike to perform their mandated duties
 with

commitment to the highes
t degree of diligence, righteous
nes
s
 and res
pect

for the law.

WHEREFORE, the as
s
ailed Decis
ion is
 REVERSED and SET
 ASIDE.

Petitioner Ars
enio Vergara Valdez is
 ACQUIT
T
ED on reas
onable doubt. T
he

Director of the Bureau of Corrections
 is
 directed to caus
e the immediate

releas
e of petitioner, unles
s
 the latter is
 being lawfully held for another

caus
e; and to inform the Court of

the date of his
 releas
e, or the reas
ons
 for his
 continued confinement, within

ten (10) days
 from notice. No cos
ts
.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
T
HE PEOPLE OF T
HE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 170233
Appellee,
Pres
ent:

QUISUMBING, J.,
- vers
us
 - Chairpers
on,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
JESUS NUEVAS y GARCIA, T
INGA, and
REYNALDO DIN y GONZAGA, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
and FERNANDO INOCENCIO y
ABADEOS,
Appellants
. Promulgated:

February 22, 2007

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

T
INGA, J.:

Jes
us
 Nuevas
 y Garcia (Nuevas
) was
 charged [1] before the Regional T
rial Court

(RT
C) of Olongapo City, Branch 75, with illegal pos
s
es
s
ion of marijuana in

violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425[2] as
 amended.

Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga (Din) and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos
 (Inocencio)

were likewis
e charged[3] with the s
ame crime, before the s
ame court.

Upon arraignment, Nuevas
, Din and Inocencio pleaded not guilty to the

charges
.[4] As
 the evidence in the cas
es
 was
 common and the pros
ecution

would utilize the s
ame witnes
s
es
, the cas
es
 were cons
olidated. After a joint

trial on the merits
, the RT
C rendered a Decis
ion [5] dated 4 April 2002,

dis
pos
ing as
 follows
:

WHEREFORE, finding all accus
ed in the above-entitled cas
es


guilty beyond reas
onable doubt, this
 Court hereby s
entences

them to s
uffer the penalty of Reclus
ion Perpetua and each to
pay [a] fine of P500,000.00 without s
ubs
idiary impris
onment
in cas
e of ins
olvency and to pay the cos
ts
.

T
he bricks
 of marijuana are hereby confis
cated and dis
pos
ed

in accordance with exis
ting regulations
.

SO ORDERED.[6]

T
o put in appropriate context the operative facts
 on which adjudication of this


cas
e hinges
, there is
 need to recall the factual as
s
ertions
 of the witnes
s
es
 for

both the pros
ecution and the defens
e.

PO3 T
eofilo B. Fami (Fami) tes
tified that in the morning of 27 September

1997, he and SPO3 Ces
ar B. Cabling (Cabling) conducted a s
tationary

s
urveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter Street,

Barangay Pag-as
a, Olongapo City. T
hey had received information that a

certain male pers
on, more or les
s
 54 in height, 25 to 30 years
 old, with a

tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and us
ually wearing a s
ando

and maong pants
, would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves
. While

s
tationed thereat, they s
aw a male pers
on who fit the des
cription, carrying a

plas
tic bag, later identified as
 Jes
us
 Nuevas
 (Nuevas
), alight from a motor

vehicle. T
hey accos
ted Nuevas
 and informed him that they are police

officers
. Fami as
ked Nuevas
 where he was
 going. Nuevas
 ans
wered

arrogantly but afterwards
, calmed down. Nuevas
 and Fami convers
ed in the

Waray dialect. Nuevas
 informed him that there were other s
tuff in the

pos
s
es
s
ion of a certain Vangie, an as
s
ociate, and two other male pers
ons
.

Later on, Nuevas
 voluntarily pointed to the police officers
 a plas
tic bag

which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves
 and bricks
 wrapped

in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his
 bid to es
cape charges
, Nuevas
 dis
clos
ed where

the two (2) other male pers
ons
 would make the delivery of marijuana

weighing more or les
s
 five (5) kilos
.[7]

Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas
, then proceeded to Purok 12, Old

Cabalan, Olongapo City, which according to Nuevas
 was
 where his
 two (2)
companions
, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From there, they s
aw and

approached two (2) pers
ons
 along the National Highway, introducing

thems
elves
 as
 police officers
. Din was
 carrying a light blue plas
tic bag. When

as
ked, Din dis
clos
ed that the bag belonged to Nuevas
. Fami then took the

bag and upon ins
pection found ins
ide it marijuana packed in news
paper and

wrapped therein.[8] After confis
cating the items
, Fami and Cabling brought

Nuevas
, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for proper

documentation.[9] Fami further tes
tified that a receipt for the property s
eized

was
 is
s
ued by Cabling and that a field tes
t was
 duly conducted on the

confis
cated items
. All three accus
ed were likewis
e phys
ically examined on

the bas
is
 of which corres
ponding medical certificates
 were is
s
ued. T
he

corres
ponding booking s
heets
 and arres
t report were als
o accomplis
hed.

Fami s
tated that he and Cabling executed a joint affidavit in connection with

the arres
t of all the accus
ed and the confis
cation of the items
.[10]

On cros
s
-examination, Fami revealed that when the receipt of evidence

s
eized was
 prepared, all three (3) accus
ed were not repres
ented by couns
el.

He likewis
e dis
clos
ed that he was
 the one who es
corted all the accus
ed

during their phys
ical examination. He als
o es
corted all three to the Fis
cals


office where the latter were informed of the charges
 agains
t them.[11]

Cabling corroborated Famis
 tes
timony. He, however, tes
tified that after he

and Fami had introduced thems
elves
 as
 police officers
, Din and Inocencio
voluntarily handed to Fami the marijuana dried leaves
.[12]

On cros
s
-examination, Cabling tes
tified that the arres
t of Nuevas
 was
 the

res
ult of a tip from Famis
 informant, conceding though that the name of

Nuevas
 was
 not included in the lis
t of pers
ons
 under s
urveillance. Fami then

relayed the tip to Cabling.[13] Cabling res
tated that Nuevas
 had voluntarily

s
ubmitted the plas
tic bag he was
 holding and that after Nuevas
 had been

informed of the violation of law attributed to him, he admitted his
 willingnes
s


to cooperate and point to his
 other cohorts
. [14]When Fami and Cabling

proceeded to the identified location of Nuevas
s
 cohorts
, they chanced upon

Din and Inocencio along the road. Din was
 holding a bag while Inocencio was


looking into its
 contents
.[15] Cabling averred that Din voluntarily handed the

plas
tic bag he was
 holding to the police officers
.[16]

For his
 defens
e, Nuevas
 tes
tified that in the morning of 27 September

1997, he was
 walking along Perimeter Street, on his
 way home from the

Barangay Hall, when Fami called him. Nuevas
 approached Fami, who was


then in front of his
 hous
e, and as
ked why Fami had called him. Fami poked

his
 gun at Nuevas
 and as
ked him to go ins
ide the room where Fami

handcuffed Nuevas
s
 hands
, got Nuevas
s
 wallet, took out P1,500.00 and put

it in his
 (Famis
) wallet. Fami then confronted Nuevas
 with s
habu us
e but the

latter denied the charge. Before leaving the hous
e with Nuevas
, Fami

brought out a plas
tic bag and told Nuevas
 to carry it. Subs
equently, they
boarded a red ownertype jeep and proceeded to Station B where Nuevas
 was


put in jail. Nuevas
 further s
tated that he did not know Din or Inocencio. [17]

Din, on the other hand, s
tated that at about 10 oclock in the morning of 27

September 1997, while his
 compare Inocencio was
 vis
iting, two (2) men

entered his
 hous
e looking for a woman. T
he two (2) introduced thems
elves


as
 police officers
. T
hen, Din and Inocencio were immediately handcuffed.

T
hey were not informed of the reas
on for their arres
t and were told that the

reas
on will be explained to them in court. Next, they were brought to the

Cabalan precinct where the inves
tigator as
ked for their names
, and

s
ubs
equently to Station B where they were ordered to s
tand up and be

photographed with Nuevas
, who Din firs
t met in jail. Ins
ide the room where

they had their fingerprints
 taken, he s
aw marijuana placed on top of the

table.[18]

Inocencio tes
tified that he went to his
 compadre Dins
 hous
e in the morning

of 27 September 1997 to s
ell his
 fighting cocks
 as
 he needed money to

redeem his
 drivers
 licens
e. While there, he and Din were arres
ted by two

pers
ons
, one of whom pointed a gun at them while the other s
earched the

hous
e for a lady named Vangie. Afterwards
, he and Din were brought to the

Cabalan Police Precinct and then to Station B where he firs
t came to know

Nuevas
. He denied that a plas
tic bag containing marijuana was
 recovered

from them and claimed that he only s
aw s
uch evidence on the day he gave
his
 tes
timony. He als
o s
tated that when a photograph was
 taken of the three

of them, he and Din were ordered to point to a wrapped thing. When the

photograph was
 taken, they were not as
s
is
ted by couns
el. He als
o does
 not

recall having s
igned a receipt of property s
eized. Afterwards
, they were

brought to a detention cell. And when they as
ked the police what they did

wrong, the police replied that they will jus
t explain it in court. [19]

All three were found guilty as
 charged and the judgment of conviction was


elevated to the Court for automatic review. However, on 14 July 2003,

Nuevas
 filed a manifes
tation and motion to withdraw appeal. [20] T
he Court

granted Nuevas
s
 withdrawal of appeal and cons
idered the cas
e clos
ed and

terminated as
 to him, in a Res
olution[21] dated 25 Augus
t 2003.

In a Res
olution[22] dated 22 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos
.

153641-42,[23] the cas
es
 were trans
ferred to the Court of Appeals
 purs
uant to

the Courts
 ruling in People v. Efren Mateo.[24]

Before the Court of Appeals
, Din and Inocencio (appellants
) argued that the

trial court erred: (1) in finding them guilty of the crime charged on the bas
is


of the tes
timonies
 of the arres
ting officers
; and (2) n not finding that their

cons
titutional rights
 have been violated.[25]

T
he Court of Appeals
 in a Decis
ion[26] dated 27 May 2005, in CA-G.R. CR No.

00341, affirmed the decis
ion of the trial court. T
he dis
pos
itive portion of the

decis
ion reads
:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing cons
idered, the ins
tant appeal

is
 DENIED. T
he Decis
ion of
the Regional T
rial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in
Criminal Cas
e No. 459-97, is
 AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[27]

T
he Court of Appeals
 res
tated the rule that when the is
s
ue involves
 the

credibility of a witnes
s
, the trial courts
 as
s
es
s
ment is
 entitled to great

weight, even finality, unles
s
 it is
 s
hown that it was
 tainted with arbitrarines
s


or there was
 an overs
ight of s
ome fact or circums
tance of weight or

influence. T
he appellate court found Fami and Cablings
 vers
ion of how

appellants
 were apprehended to be categorical and clear. Din, at the time of

his
 apprehens
ion, was
 s
een holding a plas
tic bag containing marijuana

leaves
. On the other hand, Inocencios
 pos
s
es
s
ion of the marijuana leaves


was
 es
tablis
hed by the fact that he was
 s
een in the act of looking into the

plas
tic bag carried by Din.[28]

With res
pect to appellants
 claim that their cons
titutional rights
 have been

violated, the appellate court s
tated that the s
earch in the ins
tant cas
e is


exempted from the requirement of a judicial warrant as
 appellants


thems
elves
 waived their right agains
t unreas
onable s
earches
 and s
eizures
.

According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami tes
tified that Din

voluntarily s
urrendered the bag. Appellants
 never pres
ented evidence to

rebut the s
ame. T
hus
, in the ins
tant cas
e, the exclus
ionary rule does
 not

apply.[29]

Din and Inocencio are now before the Court s
ubmitting for res
olution the

s
ame matters
 argued before the Court of Appeals
. T
hrough their

Manifes
tation (In Lieu of Supplementary Brief) [30] dated 22 March 2006,

appellants
 s
tated that all the arguments
 neces
s
ary to s
upport their acquittal

have already been dis
cus
s
ed in the brief they had s
ubmitted before the

appellate court; thus
, the filing of a s
upplemental brief would be a mere

reiteration of the arguments
 dis
cus
s
ed in s
aid brief. [31] T
he Office of the

Solicitor General manifes
ted that it is
 no longer filing a s
upplemental brief. [32]

T
he conviction or acquittal of appellants
 res
ts
 on the validity of the

warrantles
s
 s
earches
 and s
eizure made by the police officers
 and the

admis
s
ibility of the evidence obtained by virture thereof.

In holding that the warrantles
s
 s
earches
 and s
eizure are valid, the trial court

ruled as
 follows
:

While the confis
cation of the bricks
 of marijuana from the

accus
ed Jes
us
 Nuevas
 was
 without a s
earch warrant, it was

 not bereft of a probable caus
e. T
he police team received
informations
 [s
ic] from an as
s
et that on that day, a male
pers
on whom he s
ufficiently des
cribed will deliver marijuana
at the vicinity of Perimeter and Bonifacio S[t]., Pag-as
a,
Olongapo City, a known drop point of illegal drugs
. T
hey went
to the s
aid area upon that information. T
heir waiting was

fruitful becaus
e not long afterwards
 they s
aw the accus
ed
Jes
us
 Nuevas
 alighting from a tricycle carrying a bag and
after confronting him, he voluntarily gave the bag containing
bricks
 of dried marijuana leaves
. With res
pect to the
confis
cation of 2 kilos
 of marijuana and the apprehens
ion of
accus
ed Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, it was
 a res
ult
of a continued operation by the team which this
 time was
 led
by accus
ed Nuevas
 to get s
ome conces
s
ion from the team
for his
 own earlier apprehens
ion. As
 the apprehens
ion of
Nuevas
 was
 upon a probable caus
e, in the s
ame vein was
 the
apprehens
ion of Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio and
the recovery from them [of] 2 kilos
 of dried marijuana leaves
.
T
he propriety of this
 conclus
ion is
 neces
s
ity [s
ic] becaus
e of
the impos
s
ibility of getting firs
t a warrant in s
o s
hort a time
with s
uch cumbers
ome requirements
 before one can be
is
s
ued. Before getting a warrant, the culprits
 s
hall have
already gone into hiding. T
hes
e s
ituations
 are not dis
tant to
the cas
e of People v[.] Jean Balingan (G.R. No. 105834, 13
Feb. 1995) where we learned that expediency and
practicality are s
ome of the jus
tification[s
] in the warrantles
s

arres
t.[33] [Emphas
is
 s
upplied]

Appellants
 maintain that there was
 no bas
is
 for their ques
tioning and the

s
ubs
equent ins
pection of the plas
tic bags
 of Nuevas
 and Din, as
 they were

not doing anything illegal at the time.[34]

Our Cons
titution s
tates
 that a s
earch and s
eizure mus
t be carried through or

with a judicial warrant; otherwis
e, s
uch s
earch and s
eizure becomes


unreas
onable and any evidence obtained therefrom is
 inadmis
s
ible for any

purpos
e in any proceeding. [35] T
he cons
titutional pros
cription, however, is
 not

abs
olute but admits
 of exceptions
, namely:

1. Warrantles
s
 s
earch incidental to a lawful arres
t. (Sec. 12,

Rule 126 of the Rules
 of Court and prevailing juris
prudence);

2. Search of evidence in plain view. T
he elements
 are: (a) a

prior valid intrus
ion bas
ed on the valid warrantles
s
 arres
t in
which the police are legally pres
ent in the purs
uit of their
official duties
; (b) the evidence was
 inadvertently dis
covered
by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence mus
t be immediately apparent; (d) plain view
jus
tified mere s
eizure of evidence without further s
earch;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the

government, the vehicles
 inherent mobility reduces

expectation of privacy es
pecially when its
 trans
it in public
thoroughfares
 furnis
hes
 a highly reas
onable s
us
picion
amounting to probable caus
e that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;

4. Cons
ented warrantles
s
 s
earch;

5. Cus
toms
 s
earch;

6. Stop and Fris
k; and

7. Exigent and emergency circums
tances
.[36]

In the ins
tances
 where a warrant is
 not neces
s
ary to effect a valid s
earch or

s
eizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant,

what cons
titutes
 a reas
onable or unreas
onable s
earch or s
eizure is
 purely a

judicial ques
tion, determinable from the uniquenes
s
 of the circums
tances


involved, including the purpos
e of the s
earch or s
eizure, the pres
ence or

abs
ence of probable caus
e, the manner in which the s
earch and s
eizure was


made, the place or thing s
earched and the character of the articles
 procured.
[37]

T
he courts
 below anchor appellants
 conviction on the ground that the

s
earches
 and s
eizure conducted in the ins
tant cas
e bas
ed on a tip from an

informant fall under one of the exceptions
 as
 Nuevas
, Din and

Inocencio all allegedly voluntarily s
urrendered the plas
tic bags
 containing

marijuana to the police officers
.[38]

We differ.

Firs
t, the Court holds
 that the s
earches
 and s
eizures
 conducted do not fall

under the firs
t exception, warrantles
s
 s
earches
 incidental to lawful arres
ts
.

A s
earch incidental to a lawful arres
t is
 s
anctioned by the Rules
 of Court.

[39]
Recent juris
prudence holds
 that the arres
t mus
t precede the s
earch; the

proces
s
 cannot be revers
ed as
 in this
 cas
e where the s
earch preceded the

arres
t. Nevertheles
s
, a s
earch s
ubs
tantially contemporaneous
 with an arres
t

can precede the arres
t if the police have probable caus
e to make the arres
t

at the outs
et of the s
earch. [40]

In this
 cas
e, Nuevas
, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the

pres
ence of the police officers
. Moreover, police officers
 Fami and Cabling did

not have pers
onal knowledge of the facts
 indicating that the pers
ons
 to be

arres
ted had committed an offens
e. T
he s
earches
 conducted on the plas
tic

bag then cannot be s
aid to be merely incidental to a lawful arres
t. Reliable

information alone is
 not s
ufficient to jus
tify a warrantles
s
 arres
t under

Section 5(a), Rule 113. T
he rule requires
, in addition, that the accus
ed

perform s
ome overt act that would indicate that he has
 committed, is


actually committing, or is
 attempting to commit an offens
e.[41]

Secondly, neither could the s
earches
 be jus
tified under the plain view

doctrine.

An object is
 in plain view if it is
 plainly expos
ed to s
ight. Where the object

s
eized was
 ins
ide a clos
ed package, the object its
elf is
 not in plain view and

therefore cannot be s
eized without a warrant. However, if the package

proclaims
 its
 contents
, whether by its
 dis
tinctive configuration, its


trans
parency, or if its
 contents
 are obvious
 to an obs
erver, then the contents


are in plain view and may be s
eized. In other words
, if the package is
 s
uch

that an experienced obs
erver could infer from its
 appearance that it contains


the prohibited article, then the article is
 deemed in plain view. It mus
t be

immediately apparent to the police that the items
 that they obs
erve may be

evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwis
e s
ubject to s
eizure.[42]

Records
 s
how that the dried marijuana leaves
 were ins
ide the plas
tic bags


that Nuevas
 and Din were carrying and were not readily apparent or

trans
parent to the police officers
. In Nuevas
s
 cas
e, the dried marijuana

leaves
 found ins
ide the plas
tic bag were wrapped ins
ide a blue cloth. [43] In

Dins
 cas
e, the marijuana found upon ins
pection of the plas
tic bag was


packed in news
paper and wrapped therein. [44] It cannot be therefore s
aid the

items
 were in plain view which could have jus
tified mere s
eizure of the

articles
 without further s
earch.[45]

On the other hand, the Court finds
 that the s
earch conducted in Nuevas
s


cas
e was
 made with his
 cons
ent. In Dins
 cas
e, there was
 none.

Indeed, the cons
titutional immunity agains
t unreas
onable s
earches
 and

s
eizures
 is
 a pers
onal right which may be waived. However, it mus
t be s
een

that the cons
ent to the s
earch was
 voluntary in order to validate an

otherwis
e illegal detention and s
earch, i.e., the cons
ent was
 unequivocal,
s
pecific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any dures
s
 or

coercion. T
he cons
ent to a s
earch is
 not to be lightly inferred, but mus
t be

s
hown by clear and convincing evidence. T
he ques
tion whether a cons
ent to

a s
earch was
 in fact voluntary is
 a ques
tion of fact to be determined from the

totality of all the circums
tances
. Relevant to this
 determination are the

following characteris
tics
 of the pers
on giving cons
ent and the environment in

which cons
ent is
 given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was
 in a

public or s
ecluded location; (3) whether he objected to the s
earch or

pas
s
ively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5)

the pres
ence of coercive policeprocedures
; (6) the defendant's
 belief that no

incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police

ques
tioning; (8) the environment in which the ques
tioning took place; and (9)

the pos
s
ibly vulnerable s
ubjective s
tate of the pers
on cons
enting. It is
 the

State which has
 the burden of proving, by clear and pos
itive tes
timony, that

the neces
s
ary cons
ent was
 obtained and that it was
 freely and voluntarily

given.[46]

In Nuevas
s
 cas
e, the Court is
 convinced that he indeed voluntarily

s
urrendered the incriminating bag to the police officers
. Fami tes
tified in this


wis
e:

FISCAL BELT
RAN:
Q Now, when you s
aw this
 accus
ed carrying this
 Exhibit D,
[47]
for your part, what did you do?
A I jus
t talked to him and as
ked him where he was
 going and
according to him, he acted arrogantly, s
ir.

Q T
his
 arrogant action of the accus
ed Jes
us
 Nuevas
, when

you confronted him did he res
is
t?
A How did he s
how his
 elements
, [s
ic] he s
aid, So what if you
are policeman[?]

Q And being confronted with that arrogance, what did you do

next?
A Later on he kept calm by s
aying [s
ic] in Waray dialect, s
ir.

xxxx

Q What, exactly, did he tell you in Waray dialect?

A Sir Famir[s
ic], dont charge me, s
ir[.] I am planning to go
home to Leyte. I was
 jus
t earning enough money for
my fare, s
ir.

xxxx

Q So when the accus
ed s
peak [s
ic] to you in Waray, what

els
e did you do if you did anything?
A I pretended that I agree in his
 [s
ic] offer but I als
o as
ked
him where are the other s
taffs
[s
ic] s
ir. [48]

xxxx

Q With res
pect to the bag that you confis
cated from him, what did
you do?
A He voluntarily pointed it to me and I checked it, the bag, for
 verification, s
ir.[49]

Cabling likewis
e tes
tified as
 follows
:

Q When Fami got this
 from the accus
ed, he opened this
 thing
that he got?
A T
he s
ubject voluntarily s
ubmitted the s
ame, s
ir.

Q Upon the order of Fami to open it?

A Nobody ordered it, s
ir.[50]

T
here is
 reas
on to believe that Nuevas
 indeed willingly s
ubmitted the plas
tic

bag with the incriminating contents
 to the police officers
. It can be s
een that

in his
 des
perate attempt to exculpate hims
elf from any criminal liability,

Nuevas
 cooperated with the police, gave them the plas
tic bag and even

revealed his
 as
s
ociates
, offering hims
elf as
 an informant. His
 actuations
 were

cons
is
tent with the lamentable human inclination to find excus
es
, blame

others
 and s
ave ones
elf even at the cos
t of others
 lives
. T
hus
, the Court

would have affirmed Nuevas
s
 conviction had he not withdrawn his
 appeal.

However, with res
pect to the s
earch conducted in the cas
e of Din, the Court

finds
 that no s
uch cons
ent had actually been given. Fami tes
tified as
 follows
:

FISCAL BELT
RAN
 Q Now, what did you do when you s
aw Din with that Exhibit
C, the plas
tic bag?
A Din s
aid that Oo, Sir, that is
 owned by Nuevas
 [s
ic] and
I took the s
aid plas
tic bag.

Q When you took this
 plas
tic bag from Din.

Was
 the accus
ed Jes
us
 Nueva [s
ic] pres
ent when Din
told you that?
A Yes
, s
ir. Nuevas
 alighted als
o [from] the vehicle with
Cabling.

Q And what was
 the reaction of Nuevas
 when Din told you
that the bag belongs
 to him?
A I did not react, s
ir.

Q After getting that plas
tic bag from Reynaldo Din, what did
you do with it?
A I ins
pected the bag and I found out that there is
 s
till
marijuana packed in news
paper and wrapped
therein, s
ir.[51] [Emphas
is
 s
upplied.]

Cabling, however, gave a different tes
timony, viz.:

FISCAL BELT
RAN

Q And upon s
iting [s
ic] the two s
ubject pers
ons
 you have jus
t
indicated in your earlier tes
timony, what did you do?
A We approached them and introduced ours
elves
 as
 police
officers
, and pinpointed by Nuevas
 as
 the ones
 who
kept s
us
pected prohibited drugs
, s
ir.
 Q After you approached thes
e two people, what happened?
A T
hes
e two people, upon introducing ours
elves
, [s
ic]
voluntarily s
urrendered to Fami thos
e marijuana dry
leaves
, s
ir.[52]

T
he police officers
 gave incons
is
tent, dis
s
imilar tes
timonies
 regarding the

manner by which they got hold of the bag. T
his
 already rais
es
 s
erious
 doubts


on the voluntarines
s
 of Dins
 s
ubmis
s
ion of the plas
tic bag. Juris
prudence

requires
 that in cas
e of cons
ented s
earches
 or waiver of the cons
titutional

guarantee agains
t obtrus
ive s
earches
, it is
 fundamental that to cons
titute a

waiver, it mus
t firs
t appear that (1) the right exis
ts
; (2) the pers
on involved

had knowledge, either actual or cons
tructive, of the exis
tence of s
uch right;

and (3) the s
aid pers
on had an actual intention to relinquis
h the right.[53]

T
he pros
ecution failed to clearly s
how that Din intentionally s
urrendered his


right agains
t unreas
onable s
earches
. While it may not be contrary to human

nature for one to be jolted into s
urrendering s
omething incriminating to

authorities
, Famis
 and Cablings
 tes
timonies
 do not s
how that Din was
 in s
uch

a s
tate of mind or condition. Fami and Cabling did not tes
tify on Dins


compos
urewhether he felt s
urpris
ed or frightened at the timewhich fact we

find neces
s
ary to provide bas
is
 for the s
urrender of the bag. T
here was
 no

mention of any permis
s
ion made by the police officers
 to get or s
earch the
bag or of any cons
ent given by Din for the officers
 to s
earch it. It is
 worthy to

note that in cas
es
 where the Court upheld the validity of cons
ented s
earch,

the police authorities
 expres
s
ly as
ked, in no uncertain terms
, for the cons
ent

of the accus
ed to be s
earched. And the cons
ent of the accus
ed was


es
tablis
hed by clear and pos
itive proof.

Neither can Dins
 s
ilence at the time be cons
trued as
 an implied

acquies
cence to the warrantles
s
 s
earch. In People v. Burgos
,[54] the Court

aptly ruled:

x x x As
 the cons
titutional guaranty is
 not dependent upon

any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
 do not place the
citizen in the pos
ition of either contes
ting an officers

authority by force, or waiving his
 cons
titutional rights
; but
ins
tead they hold that a peaceful s
ubmis
s
ion to a s
earch or
s
eizure is
 not a cons
ent or an invitation thereto, but is
 merely
a demons
tration of regard for the s
upremacy of the law. [55]

Without the dried marijuana leaves
 as
 evidence, Dins
 conviction cannot be

s
us
tained bas
ed on the remaining evidence. T
he Court has
 repeatedly

declared that the conviction of the accus
ed mus
t res
t not on the weaknes
s
 of

the defens
e but on the s
trength of the pros
ecution. [56] As
 s
uch, Din des
erves


an acquittal.
In this
 cas
e, an acquittal is
 warranted des
pite the pros
ecutions
 ins
is
tence

that the appellants
 have effectively waived any defect in their arres
t by

entering their plea and by their active participation in the trial of the cas
e. Be

it s
tres
s
ed that the legality of an arres
t affects
 only the juris
diction of the

court over the pers
on of the accus
ed. Ins
pite of any alleged waiver, the dried

marijuana leaves
 cannot be admitted in evidence agains
t the appellants
, Din

more s
pecifically, as
 they were s
eized during a warrantles
s
 s
earch which was


not lawful. A waiver of an illegal warrantles
s
 arres
t does
 not als
o mean a

waiver of the inadmis
s
ibility of evidence s
eized during an illegal warrantles
s


arres
t.[57]

T
urning to Inocencios
 cas
e, the Court likewis
e finds
 that he was
 wrongly

convicted of the crime charged. Inocencios
 s
uppos
ed pos
s
es
s
ion of the dried

marijuana leaves
 was
 s
ought to be s
hown through his
 act of looking into the

plas
tic bag that Din was
 carrying. [58] T
aking a look at an object, more s
o in

this
 cas
e peeping into a bag while held by another, is
 not the s
ame as
 taking

pos
s
es
s
ion thereof. T
o behold is
 not to hold. Indeed, the act attributed to

Inocencio is
 ins
ufficient to es
tablis
h illegal pos
s
es
s
ion of the drugs
 or even

cons
piracy to illegally pos
s
es
s
 the s
ame. T
he pros
ecution failed to s
how by

convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents
 of the bag and that he

cons
pired with Din to pos
s
es
s
 the illegal items
. Inocencio was
 firm and

uns
hakeable in his
 tes
timony that he had no part in any delivery of

marijuana dried leaves
.

Finally, the law enforcers
 s
hould be reminded of the Courts
 dated but

nevertheles
s
 current exhortation:

x x x In the final analys
is
, we in the adminis
tration of jus
tice

would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-
abiding if we do not ins
is
t on the full protection of their
rights
. Some lawmen, pros
ecutors
 and judges
 may s
till tend
to glos
s
 over an illegal s
earch and s
eizure as
 long as
 the law
enforcers
 s
how the alleged evidence of the crime regardles
s

of the methods
 by which they were obtained. T
his
 kind of
attitude condones
 law-breaking in the name of law
enforcement. Ironically, it only fos
ters
 the more rapid
breakdown of our s
ys
tem of jus
tice, and the eventual
denigration of s
ociety. While this
 Court appreciates
 and
encourages
 the efforts
 of law enforcers
 to uphold the law and
to pres
erve the peace and s
ecurity of s
ociety, we
nevertheles
s
 admonis
h them to act with deliberate care and
within the parameters
 s
et by the Cons
titution and the law.
T
ruly, the end never jus
tifies
 the means
.[59]

WHEREFORE, the Decis
ion dated 4 April 2002 of

the Regional T
rial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in Criminal Cas
e No.

458-97 and No. 459-97 is
 revers
ed and modified. Appellants
 Reynaldo Din y
Gonzaga and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos
 are hereby ACQUIT
T
ED. T
he

Director of the Bureau of Pris
ons
 is
 ordered to caus
e the immediate releas
e

of appellants
 from confinement, unles
s
 they are being held for s
ome other

lawful caus
e, and to report to this
 Court compliance herewith within five (5)

days
 from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.