Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cases 22-27 KC
Cases 22-27 KC
EN BANC
PADILLA, J.:
T
his
is
a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
res
training order, s
eeking the declaration of checkpoints
in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila or els
ewhere, as
uncons
titutional and the dis
mantling and banning of
the s
ame or, in the alternative, to direct the res
pondents
to formulate
guidelines
in the implementation of checkpoints
, for the protection of the
people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte s
ues
in his
capacity as
citizen of the Republic,
taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), and res
ident
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers
and Advocates
for People's
Rights
(ULAP) s
ues
in its
capacity as
an as
s
ociation whos
e
members
are all members
of the IBP.
Petitioners
further contend that the s
aid checkpoints
give the res
pondents
a
blanket authority to make s
earches
and/or s
eizures
without s
earch warrant or
court order in violation of the Cons
titution; 2 and, ins
tances
have occurred
where a citizen, while not killed, had been haras
s
ed.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws
as
ide the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds
, 7 or s
imply looks
into a
vehicle, 8 or flas
hes
a light therein, 9 thes
e do not cons
titute unreas
onable
s
earch.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints
in Metro Manila were
temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules
in the conduct of
the police and military manning the checkpoints
was
ordered by the National
Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
At 7:20 of the s
ame morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3
Manlangit as
interes
ted in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit
handed "Jun" the marked bills
worth P1,600.00. "Jun" ins
tructed PO3
Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street
while he got the marijuana from his
as
s
ociate. [5] An hour later, "Jun"
appeared at the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the res
t of
the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his
bag an object wrapped in
plas
tic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arres
ted "Jun"
as
SPO1 Badua rus
hed to help in the arres
t. T
hey fris
ked "Jun" but did not
find the marked bills
on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the
money at the hous
e of his
as
s
ociate named "Neneth." [6] "Jun" led the police
team to "Neneth's
" hous
e nearby at Daang Bakal.
T
he team found the door of "Neneth's
" hous
e open and a woman ins
ide.
"Jun" identified the woman as
his
as
s
ociate. [7] SPO1 Badua as
ked "Neneth"
about the P1,600.00 as
PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's
" hous
e.
Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining
table. He s
aw that one of the box's
flaps
was
open and ins
ide the box was
s
omething wrapped in plas
tic. T
he plas
tic wrapper and its
contents
appeared
s
imilar to the marijuana earlier "s
old" to him by "Jun." His
s
us
picion arous
ed,
PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's
" hous
e and took hold of the box. He
peeked ins
ide the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks
of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves
.
Doria knocked on the door of "T
otoy's
" hous
e but no one ans
wered. One
of the men, later identified as
PO3 Manlangit, pus
hed open the door and he
and his
companions
entered and looked around the hous
e for about three
minutes
. Accus
ed-appellant Doria was
left s
tanding at the door. T
he
policemen came out of the hous
e and they s
aw Violeta Gaddao carrying
water from the well. He as
ked Violeta where "T
otoy" was
but s
he replied he
was
not there. Curious
onlookers
and kibitzers
were, by that time,
s
urrounding them. When Violeta entered her hous
e, three men were already
ins
ide. Accus
ed-appellant Doria, then s
till at the door, overheard one of the
men s
ay that they found a carton box. T
urning towards
them, Doria s
aw a
box on top of the table. T
he box was
open and had s
omething ins
ide. PO3
Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outs
ide the hous
e and board the car.
T
hey were brought to police headquarters
where they were inves
tigated.
Ins
ide her hous
e were her co-accus
ed Doria and three (3) other
pers
ons
. T
hey as
ked her about a box on top of the table. T
his
was
the firs
t
time s
he s
aw the box. T
he box was
clos
ed and tied with a piece of green
s
traw. T
he men opened the box and s
howed her its
contents
. She s
aid s
he
did not know anything about the box and its
contents
.
After trial, the Regional T
rial Court, Branch 156, Pas
ig City convicted the
accus
ed-appellants
. T
he trial court found the exis
tence of an
"organized/s
yndicated crime group" and s
entenced both accus
ed-appellants
to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. T
he dis
pos
itive portion of the
decis
ion reads
as
follows
:
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accus
ed, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun"
and VIOLET
A GADDAO y CAT
AMA @ "Neneth" having been es
tablis
hed
beyond reas
onable doubt, they are both CONVICT
ED of the pres
ent charge
agains
t them.
'T
he maximum penalty s
hall be impos
ed if the offens
e was
committed by any
pers
on who belongs
to an organized/s
yndicated crime group.
Let a Commitment Order be is
s
ued for the trans
fer of accus
ed DORIA from
the Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Pris
ons
, Muntinlupa City and als
o
for accus
ed GADDAO for her trans
fer to the Correctional Ins
titute for Women,
Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records
of this
cas
e be forwarded immediately to the Supreme
Court for mandatory review.
SO ORDERED."[13]
"I
T
HE COURT
A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT
T
O T
HE T
EST
IMONY
OF T
HE WIT
NESSES FOR T
HE PROSECUT
ION WHEN T
HEIR T
EST
IMONIES
WERE SHOT
WIT
H DISCREPANCIES, INCONSIST
ENCIES AND T
HAT
T
HE
CORPUS DELICT
I OF T
HE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY T
AKEN FROM APPELLANT
WAS NOT
POSIT
IVELY IDENT
IFIED BY T
HE POSEUR-BUYER.
II
T
HE COURT
A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMIT
T
ING AS EVIDENCE T
HE
MARIJUANA FRUIT
INGS FOUND INSIDE T
HE CART
ON BOX AS T
HESE WERE
OBT
AINED T
HROUGH A WARRANT
LESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT
COME
WIT
HIN T
HE PLAIN VIEW DOCT
RINE."[14]
"I
T
HE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT
GUILT
Y DESPIT
E T
HE
INCREDIBILIT
Y OF T
HE POLICE VERSION OF T
HE MANNER T
HE ALLEGED BUY-
BUST
AS CONDUCT
ED.
II
T
HE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS T
O WHERE T
HE BUY-BUST
MONEY CAME
FROM ARE INCONSIST
ENT
WIT
H ONE ANOT
HER AND ALSO REEKS WIT
H
INCREDIBILIT
Y.
III
T
HE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT
GUILT
Y AND SENT
ENCING
HER T
O DEAT
H DESPIT
E T
HE MANIFEST
LY IRRECONCILABLE
INCONSIST
ENCIES IN T
HE VERSIONS OF T
HE POLICE AS T
O HOW AND BY
WHOM T
HE ALLEGED BUY-BUST
MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH
IN CONSEQUENCE RESULT
S IN T
HE EVIDENCE, OF RET
RIEVAL FROM HER OF
T
HE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT
BEST
, NIL, AT
WORST
.
IV
T
HE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN UPHOLDING T
HE VALIDIT
Y OF T
HE
WARRANT
LESS SEARCH LEADING T
O T
HE SEIZURE OF T
HE MARIJUANA
ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE T
HE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
." [15]
T
he as
s
igned errors
involve two principal is
s
ues
: (1) the validity of the
buy-bus
t operation in the apprehens
ion of accus
ed-appellant Doria; and (2)
the validity of the warrantles
s
arres
t of accus
ed-appellant Gaddao, the
s
earch of her pers
on and hous
e, and the admis
s
ibility of the pieces
of
evidence obtained therefrom.
Entrapment is
recognized as
a valid defens
e [28] that can be rais
ed by an
accus
ed and partakes
of the nature of a confes
s
ion and avoidance. [29] It is
a
pos
itive defens
e. Initially, an accus
ed has
the burden of providing s
ufficient
evidence that the government induced him to commit the offens
e. Once
es
tablis
hed, the burden s
hifts
to the government to s
how otherwis
e. [30] When
entrapment is
rais
ed as
a defens
e, American federal courts
and a majority of
s
tate courts
us
e the "s
ubjective" or "origin of intent" tes
t laid down in Sorrells
v. United States
[31] to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. T
he
focus
of the inquiry is
on the accus
ed's
predis
pos
ition to commit the offens
e
charged, his
s
tate of mind and inclination before his
initial expos
ure to
government agents
.[32]All relevant facts
s
uch as
the accus
ed's
mental and
character traits
, his
pas
t offens
es
, activities
, his
eagernes
s
in committing the
crime, his
reputation, etc., are cons
idered to as
s
es
s
his
s
tate of mind before
the crime.[33] T
he predis
pos
ition tes
t emphas
izes
the accus
ed's
propens
ity to
commit the offens
e rather than the officer's
mis
conduct [34] and reflects
an
attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap
for the unwary criminal."[35] If the accus
ed was
found to have been ready and
willing to commit the offens
e at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment
defens
e will fail even if a police agent us
ed an unduly pers
uas
ive
inducement.[36] Some s
tates
, however, have adopted the "objective" tes
t.
[37]
T
his
tes
t was
firs
t authoritatively laid down in the cas
e of Gros
s
man v.
State[38] rendered by the Supreme Court of Alas
ka. Several other s
tates
have
s
ubs
equently adopted the tes
t by judicial pronouncement or
legis
lation. Here, the court cons
iders
the nature of the police activity
involved and the propriety of police conduct.[39] T
he inquiry is
focus
ed on the
inducements
us
ed by government agents
, on police conduct, not on the
accus
ed and his
predis
pos
ition to commit the crime. For the goal of the
defens
e is
to deter unlawful police conduct. [40] T
he tes
t of entrapment is
whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was
likely to induce a
normally law-abiding pers
on, other than one who is
ready and willing, to
commit the offens
e;[41] for purpos
es
of this
tes
t, it is
pres
umed that a law-
abiding pers
on would normally res
is
t the temptation to commit a crime that
is
pres
ented by the s
imple opportunity to act unlawfully. [42] Official conduct
that merely offers
s
uch an opportunity is
permis
s
ible, but overbearing
conduct, s
uch as
badgering, cajoling or importuning, [43] or appeals
to
s
entiments
s
uch as
pity, s
ympathy, friends
hip or pleas
of des
perate illnes
s
,
are not.[44] Proponents
of this
tes
t believe that courts
mus
t refus
e to convict
an entrapped accus
ed not becaus
e his
conduct falls
outs
ide the legal norm
but rather becaus
e, even if his
guilt has
been es
tablis
hed, the methods
employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be
countenanced." T
o s
ome extent, this
reflects
the notion that the courts
s
hould not become tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties
.
[45]
Hence, the trans
actions
leading up to the offens
e, the interaction between
the accus
ed and law enforcement officer and the accus
ed's
res
pons
e to the
officer's
inducements
, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting
ins
tances
of its
commis
s
ion are cons
idered in judging what the effect of the
officer's
conduct would be on a normal pers
on.[46]
As
early as
1910, this
Court has
examined the conduct of law enforcers
while apprehending the accus
ed caught in flagrante delicto. In United States
v. Phelps
,[56] we acquitted the accus
ed from the offens
e of s
moking opium
after finding that the government employee, a BIR pers
onnel, actually
induced him to commit the crime in order to pros
ecute him. Smith, the BIR
agent, tes
tified that Phelps
' apprehens
ion came after he overheard Phelps
in
a s
aloon s
ay that he liked s
moking opium on s
ome occas
ions
. Smith's
tes
timony was
dis
regarded. We accorded s
ignificance to the fact that it was
Smith who went to the accus
ed three times
to convince him to look for an
opium den where both of them could s
moke this
drug. [57] T
he conduct of the
BIR agent was
condemned as
"mos
t reprehens
ible." [58] In People v. Abella,
[59]
we acquitted the accus
ed of the crime of s
elling explos
ives
after
examining the tes
timony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to
be a merchant. T
he police officer offered "a tempting price, xxx a very high
one" caus
ing the accus
ed to s
ell the explos
ives
. We found that there was
inducement, "direct, pers
is
tent and effective" by the police officer and that
outs
ide of his
tes
timony, there was
no evidence s
ufficient to convict the
accus
ed.[60] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se T
ieng,[61] we convicted the
accus
ed after finding that there was
no inducement on the part of the law
enforcement officer. We s
tated that the Cus
toms
s
ecret s
erviceman
s
moothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after
the accus
ed had already planned its
importation and ordered s
aid drug. We
ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the accus
ed to import
opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an unders
tanding
with the Collector of Cus
toms
of Cebu to better as
s
ure the s
eizure of the
prohibited drug and the arres
t of the s
urreptitious
importers
.[62]
It was
als
o in the s
ame cas
e of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se T
ieng[63] we
firs
t laid down the dis
tinction between entrapment vis
-a-vis
ins
tigation or
inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus
Juris
,[64]we held:
"ENT
RAPMENT
AND INST
IGAT
ION. -- While it has
been s
aid that the practice
of entrapping pers
ons
into crime for the purpos
e of ins
tituting criminal
pros
ecutions
is
to be deplored, and while ins
tigation, as
dis
tinguis
hed from
mere entrapment, has
often been condemned and has
s
ometimes
been held
to prevent the act from being criminal or punis
hable, the general rule is
that
it is
no defens
e to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities
for its
commis
s
ion
were purpos
ely placed in his
way, or that the criminal act was
done at the
'decoy s
olicitation' of pers
ons
s
eeking to expos
e the criminal, or that
detectives
feigning complicity in the act were pres
ent and apparently
as
s
is
ting in its
commis
s
ion. Es
pecially is
this
true in that clas
s
of cas
es
where
the offens
e is
one of a kind habitually committed, and the s
olicitation merely
furnis
hes
evidence of a cours
e of conduct. Mere deception by the detective
will not s
hield defendant, if the offens
e was
committed by him, free from the
influence or ins
tigation of the detective. T
he fact that an agent of an owner
acts
as
a s
uppos
ed confederate of a thief is
no defens
e to the latter in a
pros
ecution for larceny, provided the original des
ign was
formed
independently of s
uch agent; and where a pers
on approached by the thief as
his
confederate notifies
the owner or the public authorities
, and, being
authoris
ed by them to do s
o, as
s
is
ts
the thief in carrying out the plan, the
larceny is
nevertheles
s
committed. It is
generally held that it is
no defens
e to
a pros
ecution for an illegal s
ale of liquor that the purchas
e was
made by a
's
potter,' detective, or hired informer; but there are cas
es
holding the
contrary."[65]
T
he dis
tinction above-quoted was
reiterated in two (2) decis
ions
of the Court
of Appeals
. In People v. Galicia,[66] the appellate court declared that "there is
a wide difference between entrapment and ins
tigation." T
he ins
tigator
practically induces
the would-be accus
ed into the commis
s
ion of the offens
e
and hims
elf becomes
a co-principal. In entrapment, ways
and means
are
res
orted to by the peace officer for the purpos
e of trapping and capturing the
lawbreaker in the execution of his
criminal plan. [67] In People v. T
an T
iong,
[68]
the Court of Appeals
further declared that "entrapment is
no bar to the
pros
ecution and conviction of the lawbreaker." [69]
It is
thus
imperative that the pres
umption, juris
tantum, of regularity in the
performance of official duty by law enforcement agents
rais
ed by the
Solicitor General be applied with s
tudied res
traint.T
his
pres
umption s
hould
not by its
elf prevail over the pres
umption of innocence and the
cons
titutionally-protected rights
of the individual. [89] It is
the duty of courts
to
pres
erve the purity of their own temple from the pros
titution of the criminal
law through lawles
s
enforcement. [90] Courts
s
hould not allow thems
elves
to
be us
ed as
an ins
trument of abus
e and injus
tice les
t an innocent pers
on be
made to s
uffer the unus
ually s
evere penalties
for drug offens
es
.[91]
In the cas
e at bar, the evidence s
hows
that it was
the confidential
informant who initially contacted accus
ed-appellant Doria. At the pre-
arranged meeting, the informant was
accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who
pos
ed as
the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed the marked money
to accus
ed-appellant Doria as
advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana.
Accus
ed-appellant Doria was
apprehended when he later returned and
handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. T
ell the court, how
were you able to identify that box?
A T
his
is
the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained
the eleven pieces
of marijuana brick we confis
cated from the
s
us
pect, s
ir.
COURT So be it.
AT
T
Y. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witnes
s
is
pulling out item
after item from the box s
howed to him and brought in front of him.
COURT Noted.
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that thos e are the eleven bricks ?
x x x.
AT
T
Y VALDEZ Your Honor, may we jus
t limit the inquiry to the bas
ic
ques
tion of the fis
cal as
to what was
handed to him by the accus
ed
Jun, your Honor?
COURT
Let the pros
ecution do its
own thing and leave the appreciation of
what it has
done to the court.
A T his brick is the one that was handed to me by the s us pect Jun, s ir.
COURT
Why do you know that that is
the thing? Are you s
ure that is
not
"tikoy?"
A I am s
ure that this
is
the one, your Honor. T
his
is
the Exhibit "A" which I
marked before I brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
A I am s ure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, s ir.
x x x.
Q T
o s
tres
s
, who made the entries
of this
date, Exhibit "A" then the other
letters
and figures
on this
plas
tic?
A T
his
one, the s
ignature, I made the s
ignature, the date and the time and
this
Exhibit "A."
PROSECUT OR May it be of record that this was jus t entered this morning.
A T
his
CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was
the one who
made thes
e markings
, s
ir.
PROSECUT OR May we place on record that the one that was enclos ed...
AT
T
Y. ARIAS Your Honor, there are als
o entries
included in that enclos
ure
where it appears
D-394-95, als
o Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was
not
pointed to by the witnes
s
. I want to make it of record that there are
other entries
included in the enclos
ure.
COURT
Noted. T
he court s
aw it.
Q Now, and this
alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a
news
paper wrapping with a piece of paper ins
ide which reads
: "D-
394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams
SSL" be marked as
our Exhibit "D-2?"
Q T
his
particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents
was
given to you by whom?
Q Whereat?
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
x x x.
x x x."[99]
T
he firs
t brick identified by P03 Manlangit was
the brick of marijuana "given
to [him] by s
us
pect Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets
. T
his
brick, including the news
paper and white plas
tic wrapping were marked as
Exhibits
"D," "D-1," and "D-2" and des
cribed as
weighing nine hundred
s
eventy (970) grams
.[100]
We als
o reject appellant's
s
ubmis
s
ion that the fact that PO3 Manlangit
and his
team waited for almos
t one hour for appellant Doria to give them the
one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00 s
trains
credulity. Appellant
cannot capitalize on the circums
tance that the money and the marijuana in
the cas
e at bar did not change hands
under the us
ual "kaliwaan"
s
ys
tem. T
here is
no rule of law which requires
that in "buy-bus
t" operations
there mus
t be a s
imultaneous
exchange of the marked money and the
prohibited drug between the pos
eur-buyer and the pus
her. [101] Again, the
decis
ive fact is
that the pos
eur-buyer received the marijuana from the
accus
ed-appellant.[102]
(b) When an offens
e has
in fact jus
t been committed, and he has
pers
onal knowledge of facts
indicating that the pers
on to be arres
ted
has
committed it; and
(c) When the pers
on to be arres
ted is
a pris
oner who es
caped from
a penal es
tablis
hment or place where he is
s
erving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his
cas
e is
pending, or has
es
caped while
being trans
ferred from one confinement to another.
x x x."[103]
T
o be lawful, the warrantles
s
arres
t of appellant Gaddao mus
t fall under
any of the three (3) ins
tances
enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as
aforequoted. T
he direct tes
timony of
PO3 Manlangit, the arres
ting officer, however s
hows
otherwis
e:
We s
ubmit at this
juncture, your Honor, that there will be no bas
is
for
that ques
tion.
Q T
his
particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents
was
given to you by whom?
Q Whereat?
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
AT
T
Y. VALDEZ: We s
ubmit at this
juncture, your Honor, that there will be
no bas
is
for that ques
tion.
Q Whereat?
A We s
aw alias
Neneth ins
ide the hous
e and we as
ked him to give us
the
buy-bus
t money, s
ir.
A Her, s
ir. We as
ked her to give us
the money, the marked money which
Jun gave her, s
ir.
A At this
ins
tance, it was
SPO1 Badua who can tes
tify regarding this
buy-
bus
t money, s
ir.
x x x."[112]
Q But the fact is
, Mr. Witnes
s
, when you reached the hous
e of Aling
Neneth, Aling Neneth was
there?
A Yes , s ir.
Q As far as you can s ee, s he was jus t ins ide her hous e?
Q Carrying a baby?
A No, s ir.
Q At that particular time when you reached the hous
e of Aling Neneth and
s
aw her outs
ide the hous
e, s
he was
not committing any crime, s
he
was
jus
t outs
ide the hous
e?
A No, s
ir.
Q She was
not about to commit any crime becaus
e s
he was
jus
t outs
ide
the hous
e doing her daily chores
. Am I correct?
Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arres
t her. T
hat is
correct, is
it not?
A Yes , s ir.
Q Now, if any memory of your tes
timony is
correct, according to you SPO1
Manlangit approached her?
Q You did not approach her becaus e PO3 Manlangit approached her?
A Yes , s ir.
Q During all the time that this
confrontation, arres
t or whatever by SPO3
Manlangit was
taking place, you were jus
t in the s
ide lines
?
A Yes , s ir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from ins ide the hous e of Mrs . Neneth?
A Yes , s ir.
Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?
PROSECUT
OR:
T
here is
no bas
is
for this
ques
tion, your Honor. Money, there's
no
tes
timony on that.
AT T Y. VALDEZ:
PROSECUT OR:
No bas is .
COURT :
Sus tained.
Q What you are now s
aying for certain and for the record is
the fact that
you were not the one who retrieved the money from Aling Neneth, it
was
Manlangit maybe?
A T he buy-bus t money was recovered from the hous e of Aling Neneth, s ir.
Q It was
taken from the hous
e of Aling Neneth, not from the pers
on of
Aling Neneth. Is
that what you are trying to tell the Court?
A No, s ir.
It is
clear that an object is
in plain view if the object its
elf is
plainly
expos
ed to s
ight. T
he difficulty aris
es
when the object is
ins
ide a clos
ed
container. Where the object s
eized was
ins
ide a clos
ed package, the object
its
elf is
not in plain view and therefore cannot be s
eized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims
its
contents
, whether by its
dis
tinctive configuration, its
trans
parency, or if its
contents
are obvious
to an
obs
erver, then the contents
are in plain view and may be s
eized. [127] In other
words
, if the package is
s
uch that an experienced obs
erver could infer from
its
appearance that it contains
the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view.[128] It mus
t be immediately apparent to the police that
the items
that they obs
erve may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwis
e s
ubject to s
eizure.[129]
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, tes
tified on cros
s
-
examination as
follows
:
"AT T Y. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was
ins
ide the hous
e?
A Yes , s ir.
A Yes , s ir.
A Yes , s ir.
COURT
INT ERPRET ER
Witnes s went down the witnes s s tand and approached a carton box.
PROSECUT OR
AT T Y. VALDEZ
Yes .
PROSECUT OR
One flap is
ins
ide and the other flap is
s
tanding and with the
contents
vis
ible.
COURT
Noted.
A Yes , s ir.
A Yes
, s
ir.
Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?
Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the
carton?
A I think it was
Badua who accos
ted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bus
t
money and he as
ked "Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito, nas
aan ang
buy-bus
t money namin?" s
ir.
A Yes , s ir.
Q When you proceeded to take hold of this
carton, Aling Neneth was
not
yet fris
ked, is
it not [s
ic]?
A Yes , s ir.
Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bus
t
money was
already retrieved by Badua?
A Yes , s ir.
A Yes , s ir.
A Yes , s ir.
Q In fact, there was
nothing yet as
far as
you were concerned to validate
the fact that Mrs
. Gadao was
in pos
s
es
s
ion of the buy-bus
t money
becaus
e according to you, you did not know whether Badua already
retrieved the buy-bus
t money from her?
A Yes
, s
ir.
A T wo and a half meters from the door, s ir. It was in plain view.
Q Somewhere here?
PROSECUT OR
A Here, s ir.
A Yes , s ir.
A Yes , s ir.
A Yes , s ir.
PROSECUT OR
PROSECUT OR
AT
T
Y. VALDEZ
T
hat's
a piece of plas
tic.
PROSECUT OR
AT T Y. VALDEZ
What is that? What can you s ay, Fis cal? I'm as king you?
PROSECUT OR
With due res
pect, what I am s
aying is
, let's
place the s
ize of the
plas
tic. A piece of plas
tic may be big or a s
mall one, for record
purpos
es
.
COURT
PROSECUT OR
Q T
he only reas
on according to you, you were able to... Look at this
, no
even Superman... I withdraw that. Not even a man with very kin [s
ic]
eyes
can tell the contents
here. And according to the Court, it could
be "tikoy," is
it not [s
ic]?
A Yes , s ir.
Q Siopao?
A Yes , s ir.
Q Canned goods ?
A Yes , s ir.
Q I am not as
king you what your pres
umptions
are. I'm as
king you what it
could pos
s
ibly be.
A It's
the s
ame plas
tic, s
ir.
AT T Y. VALDEZ
I'm not even as
king you that ques
tion s
o why are you voluntarily
s
aying the information. Let the pros
ecutor do that for you.
COURT
x x x."[130]
PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's
hous
e
becaus
e they were led there by appellant Doria. T
he Narcom agents
tes
tified
that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria
named her and led them to her. [131] Standing by the door of appellant
Gaddao's
hous
e, PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of s
aid hous
e. T
wo
and a half meters
away was
the dining table and underneath it was
a carton
box. T
he box was
partially open and revealed s
omething wrapped in plas
tic.
In his
direct examination, PO3 Manlangit s
aid that he was
s
ure that the
contents
of the box were marijuana becaus
e he hims
elf checked and marked
the s
aid contents
.[132] On cros
s
-examination, however, he admitted that he
merely pres
umed the contents
to be marijuana becaus
e it had the s
ame
plas
tic wrapping as
the "buy-bus
t marijuana." A clos
e s
crutiny of the records
reveals
that the plas
tic wrapper was
not colorles
s
and trans
parent as
to
clearly manifes
t its
contents
to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks
of
marijuana in the box was
individually wrapped in old news
paper and placed
ins
ide plas
tic bags
-- white, pink or blue in color. [133] PO3 Manlangit hims
elf
admitted on cros
s
-examination that the contents
of the box could be items
other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that
he had to as
k appellant Gaddao about its
contents
. [134] It was
not
immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was
marijuana. T
he marijuana was
not in plain view and its
s
eizure without the
requis
ite s
earch warrant was
in violation of the law and the Cons
titution. [135] It
was
fruit of the pois
onous
tree and s
hould have been excluded and never
cons
idered by the trial court.[136]
T
he fact that the box containing about s
ix (6) kilos
of marijuana [137] was
found in the hous
e of accus
ed-appellant Gaddao does
not jus
tify a finding
that s
he hers
elf is
guilty of the crime charged. [138] Apropos
is
our ruling
in People v. Aminnudin,[139] viz:
"T
he Court s
trongly s
upports
the campaign of the government agains
t drug
addiction and commends
the efforts
of our law enforcement officers
agains
t
thos
e who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, es
pecially the
s
us
ceptible youth. But as
demanding as
this
campaign may be, it cannot be
more s
o than the compuls
ions
of the Bill of Rights
for the protection of the
liberty of every individual in the realm, including the bas
es
t of criminals
. T
he
Cons
titution covers
with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the
guilty alike agains
t any manner of high-handednes
s
from the authorities
,
however prais
eworthy their intentions
.
T
hos
e who are s
uppos
ed to enforce the law are not jus
tified in dis
regarding
the right of the individual in the name of order. Order is
too high a price for
the los
s
of liberty. As
Jus
tice Holmes
, again, s
aid, 'I think it a les
s
evil that
s
ome criminals
s
hould es
cape than that the government s
hould play an
ignoble part.' It is
s
imply not allowed in the free s
ociety to violate a law to
enforce another, es
pecially if the law violated is
the Cons
titution its
elf." [140]
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous
Drugs
Act of 1972, as
amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 punis
hes
the "s
ale,
adminis
tration, delivery, dis
tribution and trans
portation of a prohibited drug"
with the penalty of reclus
ion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:
"Sec. 4. Sale, Adminis
tration, Delivery, Dis
tribution and T
rans
portation of
Prohibited Drugs
.-- T
he penalty of reclus
ion perpetua to death, and a fine
ranging from five hundred thous
and pes
os
to ten million pes
os
s
hall be
impos
ed upon any pers
on who, unles
s
authorized by law, s
hall s
ell,
adminis
ter, deliver, give away to another, dis
tribute, dis
patch in trans
it or
trans
port any prohibited drug, or s
hall act as
a broker in any of s
uch
trans
actions
.
x x x."
In every pros
ecution for illegal s
ale of dangerous
drugs
, what is
material is
the s
ubmis
s
ion of proof that the s
ale took place between the pos
eur-buyer
and the s
eller thereof and the pres
entation of the drug, i.e., the corpus
delicti, as
evidence in court.[141] T
he pros
ecution has
clearly es
tablis
hed the
fact that in cons
ideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accus
ed-appellant
Doria s
old and delivered nine hundred s
eventy (970) grams
of marijuana to
PO3 Manlangit, the pos
eur-buyer. T
he pros
ecution, however, has
failed to
prove that accus
ed-appellant Gaddao cons
pired with accus
ed-appellant Doria
in the s
ale of s
aid drug. T
here being no mitigating or aggravating
circums
tances
, the lower penalty of reclus
ion perpetua mus
t be impos
ed.[142]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decis
ion of the Regional T
rial Court, Branch 156,
Pas
ig City acting as
a Special Court in Criminal Cas
e No. 3307-D is
revers
ed
and modified as
follows
:
SO ORDERED.
T HIRD DIVISION
DECISION
AUST RIA-MART INEZ, J.:
For review before the Court is
the Decis
ion 1 dated November 29, 2002 of the
Court of Appeals
(CA) which affirmed the Joint Decis
ion of the Regional T
rial
Court (RT
C) of Pagadian City, Branch 19, dated June 5, 2000, finding Rodolfo
Abenes
y Gacutan (petitioner) guilty beyond reas
onable doubt of Illegal
Pos
s
es
s
ion of High Powered Firearm and Ammunition under Pres
idential
Decree No. 1866 (P.D. No. 1866) in Criminal Cas
e No. 4559-98, and of
violating Section 261(q) of Batas
Pambans
a Blg. 881 (B.P. Blg. 881),
otherwis
e known as
the Omnibus
Election Code, vis
-à-vis
COMELEC
Res
olution No. 2958 (Gun Ban) in Criminal Cas
e No. 4563-98.
in gros s violation of P.D. No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294.
T he facts , as found by the RT C and s ummarized by the CA, are as follows :
T
he pros
ecution s
howed that three days
prior to the May 11, 1998 national
and local elections
, the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pagadian City,
through its
Company Commander Major Pedronis
to Quano, created a team
compos
ed of s
even policemen with a directive to es
tablis
h and man a
checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan at s
aid city, for the purpos
e of enforcing
the Gun Ban which was
then being implemented by the COMELEC. SPO3
Cipriano Q. Pas
cua was
the des
ignated team leader.
At about 10:30 in the morning of the s
ame day, a red T
amaraw FX trying to
pas
s
through the check point was
s
topped by the team and directed to park
at the s
ide of the road. As
the occupants
within the vehicle could not be s
een
through its
tinted windows
, SPO1 Eliezer Requejo, a member of the team,
knocked on the vehicle’s
window and reques
ted the occupants
to s
tep down
for a routine ins
pection. T
he eight occupants
, which included the accus
ed-
appellant Rodolfo Abenes
who is
the Barangay Chairman of T
awagan Norte,
Labangan, Zamboanga Del Sur, alighted from the vehicle. At this
juncture,
SPO1 Requejo and SPO3 Pas
cua noticed that a hols
tered firearm was
tucked
at the right wais
t of Abenes
. T
he firearm was
readily vis
ible to the policemen;
it was
not covered by the s
hirt worn by Abenes
. Abenes
was
then as
ked by
SPO3 Pas
cua whether he had a licens
e and authority to carry the firearm,
and whether his
pos
s
es
s
ion was
exempted from the Gun Ban being enforced
by the COMELEC. Accus
ed ans
wered in the affirmative. T
he policemen then
demanded for the pertinent documents
to be s
hown to s
upport Abenes
’
claim. He could not s
how any. Hence, SPO1 Requejo confis
cated Abenes
’
firearm, which was
later identified as
a Norinco .45 caliber pis
tol bearing
Serial No. 906347, including its
magazine containing s
even live ammunitions
.
Subs
equently SPO3 Pas
cua, us
ing his
privately owned jeep, brought Abenes
to the PNP Headquarters
at Camp Abelon in Pagadian City. Upon reaching the
Headquarters
, SPO3 Pas
cua indors
ed Abenes
to Major Quano who in turn
referred Abenes
to a certain SPO2 Benvienido Albon for further inves
tigation
(T
SN, Augus
t 24, 1998 [SPO3 Cipriano Q. Pas
cua] pp. 5-27, [SPO1 Eliezer
Requejo] pp. 29-50).
A certification dated May 18, 1998 from the Firearms
and Explos
ives
Licens
e
Proces
s
ing Section of the PNP, Pagadian City dis
clos
ed that Abenes
is
not a
regis
tered nor a licens
ed firearm holder (Record of Criminal Cas
e No. 4559-
98, p. 56).
After the pros
ecution pres
ented its
evidence, [the] accus
ed filed a Demurrer
to Evidence with Motion to Dis
mis
s
(s
upra, pp. 72-79), which was
denied by
the trial court in a Res
olution dated March 5, 1999 (s
upra, pp. 80-82).
In his
defens
e, accus
ed-appellant tried to es
tablis
h that the firearm did not
belong to and was
not recovered from him; that the firearm was
recovered
by the policemen from the floor of the vehicle ins
ide a clutch bag which was
allegedly left by an unidentified pers
on who hitched a ride s
omewhere along
the national highway of T
awagan Norte Zamboanga Del Sur and alighted
near the Mabuhay Bazaar in Pagadian City (T
SN, July 12, 1999 [Noel Rivera],
pp. 7-13; September 15, 1999 [Rodolfo Abenes
], pp. 11-15; September 27,
1999 [Manuel Sabado Gengania], pp. 9-16).5
On June 5, 2000, the RT
C rendered its
Joint Decis
ion convicting the petitioner
on both charges
, the dis
pos
itive portion of which s
tates
:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing dis
cus
s
ion, this
Court hereby finds
accus
ed Rodolfo Abenes
y Gacutan GUILT
Y beyond reas
onable doubt for
Violation of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8294, having
been found in pos
s
es
s
ion without licens
e/permit of a Norinco .45 caliber
pis
tol bearing Serial No. 906347 and 7 rounds
of ammunitions
and s
entences
him to impris
onment ranging from T
WO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONT
HS and
ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its
MEDIUM PERIOD, as
MINIMUM,
to EIGHT
(8) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR in its
MINIMUM, as
MAXIMUM and a
FINE of T
HIRT
Y T
HOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00), Philippine currency. Ins
ofar
as
Criminal Cas
e No. 4559-98 is
concerned. T
he .45 Caliber Pis
tol
aforementioned and the s
even (7) rounds
of ammunitions
are hereby
forfeited in favor of the government the s
ame being effects
of the Violation
of P.D. 1866, amended.
As
regards
Criminal Cas
e No. 4563-98, this
Court als
o finds
herein accus
ed
Rodolfo Abenes
y Gacutan GUILT
Y of Violation of Section 264, in relation to
Section 261, paragraphs
(p) and (q) of Batas
Pambans
a Blg. 881, otherwis
e
known as
the Omnibus
Election Code and s
entences
him to impris
onment for
a period of ONE (1) YEAR, and in addition thereto, herein accus
ed is
dis
qualified to hold any public office and deprived [of] the right of s
uffrage. It
s
hall be unders
tood that the s
entence herein impos
ed s
hall be s
erved
s
imultaneous
ly with the s
entence impos
ed in Criminal Cas
e No. 4559-98.
SO ORDERED.6
T
he RT
C found that, as
between the pos
itive and categorical as
s
ertions
of
facts
by the two policemen – the witnes
s
es
for the pros
ecution – and the
mere denial of the accus
ed and his
witnes
s
es
, the former mus
t prevail over
the latter; that the pros
ecution s
ucces
s
fully proved that the petitioner had no
licens
e or permit to carry the firearm through the officer-in-charge of the
firearms
and explos
ives
office who tes
tified that, bas
ed on his
records
, the
petitioner had not been is
s
ued a licens
e, and whos
e tes
timony had not been
impugned by the defens
e; and that the tes
timonies
of the accus
ed and his
two witnes
s
es
to the effect that while aboard their private vehicle and on
their way to attend an election campaign meeting, they s
imply s
topped and
allowed a complete s
tranger to hitch a ride who was
carrying a clutch bag,
left the s
ame in the vehicle when he alighted, and which later turned out to
contain the s
ubject firearm, were flims
y and unbelievable. T
he RT
C ruled that
the defens
e of alibi or denial cannot prevail over the pos
itive identification by
eyewitnes
s
es
who have no improper motive to fals
ely tes
tify agains
t the
petitioner, es
pecially where the policemen and the petitioner do not know
each other; and, that the petitioner failed to s
how any licens
e or any other
document to jus
tify his
lawful pos
s
es
s
ion of the firearm.
T
he petitioner appealed to the CA claiming that the checkpoint was
not
s
hown to have been legally s
et up, and/or that the fris
king of the petitioner
who was
ordered to alight from the T
amaraw FX, along with his
companions
in the vehicle, violated his
cons
titutional right agains
t unlawful s
earch and
s
eizure; and, that the trial court erred in believing the vers
ion of the incident
as
tes
tified to by the policemen ins
tead of the vers
ion pres
ented by the
defens
e’s
witnes
s
which is
more cons
is
tent with truth and human
experience.7
On November 29, 2002, the CA rendered its
Decis
ion, the dis
pos
itive portion
of which reads
:
SO ORDERED.8
With res
pect to the validity of the checkpoint, the CA found that not only do
the police officers
have in their favor the pres
umption that official duties
have been regularly performed, but als
o that the proximity of the day the
checkpoint had been s
et up, to the day of the May 11, 1998 elections
,
s
pecifically for the purpos
e of enforcing the COMELEC gun ban, gives
a
s
trong badge of the legitimacy of the checkpoint; that after a review of the
records
, the evidence adduced by the pros
ecution prevails
over the s
elf-
s
erving and uncorroborated claim of the petitioner that he had been
"framed"; and, that with res
pect to the admis
s
ibility of the firearm as
evidence, the pros
ecution witnes
s
es
convincingly es
tablis
hed that the .45
caliber pis
tol, tucked into the right wais
t of the petitioner when he alighted
from the vehicle, was
readily vis
ible, and, therefore, could be s
eized without
a s
earch warrant under the "plain view" doctrine.
T he petitioner is now before this Court, rais ing the following is s ues :
I.
Given the circums
tances
, and the evidence adduced, was
the check-point
validly es
tablis
hed?
II.
Given the circums
tances
, and the evidence adduced, was
the petitioner’s
cons
titutional right agains
t unlawful s
earch and s
eizure violated?
III.
Given the circums
tances
, and the evidence adduced, did not the honorable
court of appeals
commit a grave abus
e of dis
cretion for adopting the trial
court’s
uns
ubs
tantiated findings
of fact?
IV.
Given the circums
tances
, and the evidence adduced, is
not the petitioner
entitled to an acquittal, if not on the ground that the pros
ecution failed to
prove guilt beyond reas
onable doubt, on the ground of reas
onable doubt
its
elf . . . as
to where the gun was
taken: from the floor of the vehicle or from
the wais
t of petitioner?9
T
he appeal is
partly meritorious
. T
he Court revers
es
the CA’s
finding of his
conviction in Criminal Cas
e No. 4559-98.
After a thorough review of the records
, this
Court is
of the view that the
courts
a quo – except for a notable exception with res
pect to the negative
allegation in the Information – are correct in their findings
of fact. Indeed, the
vers
ion of the defens
e, as
found by the lower courts
, is
implaus
ible and
belies
the common experience of mankind. Evidence to be believed mus
t not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witnes
s
but it mus
t be credible in
its
elf s
uch as
the common experience and obs
ervation of mankind can
approve as
probable under the circums
tances
. 10In addition, the ques
tion of
credibility of witnes
s
es
is
primarily for the trial court to determine. 11 For this
reas
on, its
obs
ervations
and conclus
ions
are accorded great res
pect on
appeal.12
T
he trial court's
as
s
es
s
ment of the credibility of a witnes
s
is
entitled to great
weight. It is
conclus
ive and binding unles
s
s
hown to be tainted with
arbitrarines
s
or unles
s
, through overs
ight, s
ome fact or circums
tance of
weight and influence has
not been cons
idered. 13 Abs
ent any s
howing that the
trial judge overlooked, mis
unders
tood, or mis
applied s
ome facts
or
circums
tances
of weight which would affect the res
ult of the cas
e, or that the
judge acted arbitrarily, his
as
s
es
s
ment of the credibility of witnes
s
es
des
erves
high res
pect by appellate courts
. 14 T
hus
, the Court finds
no cogent
reas
on to dis
turb the findings
of the lower courts
that the police found in
plain view a gun tucked into the wais
t of the petitioner during the Gun Ban
period enforced by the COMELEC.
So too mus
t this
Court uphold the validity of the checkpoint. T
he petitioner
ins
is
ts
that the pros
ecution s
hould have produced the mis
s
ion order
cons
tituting the checkpoint, and invokes
Aniag, Jr. v. Comelec, 15 where the
Court purportedly held that firearms
s
eized from a motor vehicle without a
warrant are inadmis
s
ible becaus
e there was
no indication that would trigger
any s
us
picion from the policemen nor any other circums
tance s
howing
probable caus
e.
On both points
the petitioner is
wrong. In the pres
ent cas
e, the production of
the mis
s
ion order is
not neces
s
ary in view of the fact that the checkpoint was
es
tablis
hed three days
before the May 11, 1998 elections
; and, the
circums
tances
under which the policemen found the gun warranted its
s
eizure without a warrant.
In People v. Es
caño,16 the Court, through the ponencia of Chief Jus
tice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., held:
T
his
Court has
ruled that not all checkpoints
are illegal. T
hos
e which are
warranted by the exigencies
of public order and are conducted in a way leas
t
intrus
ive to motoris
ts
are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints
do
intrude, to a certain extent, on motoris
ts
’ right to "free pas
s
age without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as
a rule, it involves
only a brief
detention of travelers
during which the vehicle’s
occupants
are required to
ans
wer a brief ques
tion or two. For as
long as
the vehicle is
neither s
earched
nor its
occupants
s
ubjected to a body s
earch, and the ins
pection of the
vehicle is
limited to a vis
ual s
earch, s
aid routine checks
cannot be regarded
as
violative of an individual’s
right agains
t unreas
onable s
earch. In fact,
thes
e routine checks
, when conducted in a fixed area, are even les
s
intrus
ive.
T
he checkpoint herein conducted was
in purs
uance of the gun ban enforced
by the COMELEC. T
he COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if
its
deputized agents
were limited to a vis
ual s
earch of pedes
trians
. It would
als
o defeat the purpos
e for which s
uch ban was
ins
tituted. T
hos
e who intend
to bring a gun during s
aid period would know that they only need a car to be
able to eas
ily perpetrate their malicious
des
igns
.
T
hus
, the Court agrees
with the Solicitor General that petitioner’s
reliance on
Aniag is
mis
placed.
In Aniag, the police officers
manning the checkpoint near the Batas
ang
Pambans
a complex s
topped the vehicle driven by the driver of Congres
s
man
Aniag. After s
topping the vehicle, the police opened a package ins
ide the car
which contained a firearm purportedly belonging to Congres
s
man Aniag. In
declaring the s
earch illegal, the Supreme Court s
tated that the law enforcers
who conducted the s
earch had no probable caus
e to check the content of the
package becaus
e the driver did not behave s
us
picious
ly nor was
there any
previous
information that a vehicle hiding a firearm would pas
s
by the
checkpoint.
In the ins
tant cas
e, the firearm was
s
eized from the petitioner when in plain
view, the policemen s
aw it tucked into his
wais
t uncovered by his
s
hirt.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects
falling in the "plain view" of an officer
who has
a right to be in the pos
ition to have that view are s
ubject to s
eizure
and may be pres
ented as
evidence.18 T
he "plain view" doctrine applies
when
the following requis
ites
concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in s
earch of
the evidence has
a prior jus
tification for an intrus
ion or is
in a pos
ition from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the dis
covery of the evidence in
plain view is
inadvertent; and (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he obs
erves
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwis
e s
ubject to s
eizure.19
All the foregoing requirements
are pres
ent in the ins
tant cas
e. T
he law
enforcement officers
lawfully made an initial intrus
ion becaus
e of the
enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a pos
ition from which they
particularly viewed the area. In the cours
e of s
uch lawful intrus
ion, the
policemen came inadvertently acros
s
a piece of evidence incriminating the
petitioner where they s
aw the gun tucked into his
wais
t. T
he gun was
in plain
view and dis
covered inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the
vehicle.
xxx It mus
t be emphas
ized that the policemen dis
covered the firearm [on]
the pers
on of the [petitioner] s
hortly after he alighted from the vehicle and
before he was
fris
ked. SPO3 Pas
cua’s
tes
timony[,] corroborated by that of
SPO1 Requejo[,] convincingly es
tablis
hed that the hols
tered .45 caliber pis
tol
tucked at the right wais
t of the [petitioner] was
readily vis
ible to the
policemen (T
SN, Augus
t 24, 1998, pp. 18, 37). T
hus
, notwiths
tanding the
abs
ence of a Search Warrant, the policemen may validly s
eize the firearm
and the s
ame is
admis
s
ible in evidence agains
t the [petitioner] purs
uant to
the "plain view doctrine" xxx.20
Nor can the Court believe petitioner’s
claim that he could not have freely
refus
ed the "police orders
" is
s
ued by the police team who were "armed to
the teeth" and "in the face of s
uch s
how of force." T
he courts
a quo
cons
is
tently found that the police team manning the checkpoint politely
reques
ted the pas
s
engers
to alight from their vehicles
, and the motoris
ts
who refus
ed this
reques
t were not forced to do s
o. T
hes
e findings
of fact are
fully s
upported by the evidence in the record.
Witnes
s
for the pros
ecution SPO4 Gilbert C. Senados
admitted that his
records
were outdated, i.e., that his
Mas
ter Lis
t of holders
of firearms
only
covered licens
es
up to 1994; that it was
pos
s
ible for the petitioner to acquire
a licens
e after 1994; and that he is
s
ued the Certification, dated May 18,
1998, s
tating that the petitioner carried no licens
e or permit to pos
s
es
s
the
guns
becaus
e he was
ordered to do s
o by his
s
uperiors
.23
T
here is
no evidence that between 1994 and May 8, 1998, the date the crime
was
allegedly committed, no licens
e was
is
s
ued to petitioner.
While the pros
ecution was
able to es
tablis
h the fact that the s
ubject firearm
was
s
eized by the police from the pos
s
es
s
ion of the petitioner, without the
latter being able to pres
ent any licens
e or permit to pos
s
es
s
the s
ame, s
uch
fact alone is
not conclus
ive proof that he was
not lawfully authorized to carry
s
uch firearm. In other words
, s
uch fact does
not relieve the pros
ecution from
its
duty to es
tablis
h the lack of a licens
e or permit to carry the firearm by
clear and convincing evidence, like a certification from the government
agency concerned.24
T
hus
, for failure of the pros
ecution to prove beyond reas
onable doubt that
petitioner was
carrying a firearm without prior authority, licens
e or permit,
the latter mus
t be exculpated from criminal liability under P.D. No. 1866, as
amended.
With res
pect to the charge of violating Section 261(q) of B.P. Blg. 881, as
amended, otherwis
e known as
the Omnibus
Election Code, the Court is
cons
trained to affirm the conviction of the petitioner, s
ince the pros
ecution
s
ucces
s
fully dis
charged its
burden of proof.
Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code), as
originally worded,
provides
:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts
. – T
he following s
hall be guilty of an election
offens
e:
x x x x (Emphas is s upplied)
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 (R.A. No. 7166), amending Section 261
of the Omnibus
Election Code, provides
:
SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms
. – During the election period, no pers
on
s
hall bear, carry or trans
port firearms
or other deadly weapons
in public
places
, including any building, s
treet, park, private vehicle or public
conveyance, even if licens
ed to pos
s
es
s
or carry the s
ame, unles
s
authorized
in writing by the Commis
s
ion. T
he is
s
uance of firearm licens
es
s
hall be
s
us
pended during the election period. (Emphas
is
s
upplied)
In view of the foregoing provis
ions
, while it is
well-s
ettled that under P.D. No.
1866, as
amended, the burden to prove the negative allegation that the
accus
ed has
no licens
e or permit to carry a firearm lies
with the pros
ecution;
under the Omnibus
Election Code, however, the burden to adduce evidence
that accus
ed is
exempt from the COMELEC Gun Ban, lies
with the accus
ed.
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 is
clear and unequivocal 25 that the prohibited act
to which this
provis
ion refers
is
made up of the following elements
: 1) the
pers
on is
bearing, carrying, or trans
porting firearms
or other deadly
weapons
; 2) s
uch pos
s
es
s
ion occurs
during the election period; and, 3) the
weapon is
carried in a public place. Under s
aid provis
ion, it is
explicit that
even if the accus
ed can prove that he is
holding a valid licens
e to pos
s
es
s
s
uch firearm, this
circums
tance by its
elf cannot exculpate him from criminal
liability. T
he burden is
on the accus
ed to s
how that he has
a written authority
to pos
s
es
s
s
uch firearm is
s
ued by no les
s
than the COMELEC.
On this
point, the petitioner failed to pres
ent any form of s
uch authority, and,
therefore, his
conviction mus
t be affirmed.
Section 264 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides
:
Sec. 264. Penalties
. – Any pers
on found guilty of any election offens
e under
this
Code s
hall be punis
hed with impris
onment of not les
s
than one year but
not more than s
ix years
and s
hall not be s
ubject to probation. In addition, the
guilty party s
hall be s
entenced to s
uffer dis
qualification to hold public office
and deprivation of the right of s
uffrage. If he is
a foreigner, he s
hall be
s
entenced to deportation which s
hall be enforced after the pris
on term has
been s
erved.
T
he CA affirmed the penalty impos
ed by the RT
C. However, the RT
C failed to
apply Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law26 which provides
:
T
hus
, the penalty that s
hould be meted out to petitioner s
hould have a
minimum and a maximum period. T
he Court deems
it reas
onable that
petitioner s
hould s
uffer impris
onment for a period of one (1) year as
the
minimum and two (2) years
, as
the maximum.
Furthermore, under Section 34 of R.A. No. 7166, the s
ubject firearm s
hall be
dis
pos
ed of according to exis
ting laws
, which, in this
cas
e, mus
t be read in
light of Article 45 of the Revis
ed Penal Code, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is
partly GRANT
ED. T
he Decis
ion dated November
29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals
is
REVERSED and SET
ASIDE ins
ofar as
Criminal Cas
e No. 4559-98 is
concerned. Petitioner Rodolfo Abenes
Y
Gacutan is
ACQUIT
T
ED from the charge of illegal pos
s
es
s
ion of firearm under
P.D. No. 1866, as
amended, for failure of the pros
ecution to prove his
guilt
beyond unreas
onable doubt.
With res
pect to Criminal Cas
e No. 4563-98, the as
s
ailed Decis
ion of the Court
of Appeals
is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICAT
IONS that petitioner is
s
entenced to
an indeterminate s
entence of one year of impris
onment as
minimum to two
years
of impris
onment as
maximum, not s
ubject to probation; and he s
hall
s
uffer DISQUALIFICAT
ION to hold public office and DEPRIVAT
ION of the right
of s
uffrage. T
he s
ubject firearm is
CONFISCAT
ED and FORFEIT
ED in favor of
the Government.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997]
T
he trial court ruled that the warrantles
s
s
earch and s
eizure of petitioner
was
akin to a s
top and fris
k, where a warrant and s
eizure can be effected
without neces
s
arily being preceded by an arres
t and whos
e object is
either to
maintain the s
tatus
quo momentarily while the police officer s
eeks
to obtain
more information.[15] Probable caus
e was
not required as
it was
not certain
that a crime had been committed, however, the s
ituation called for an
inves
tigation, hence to require probable caus
e would have been premature.
[16]
T
he RT
C emphas
ized that Yu and his
companions
were [c]onfronted with
an emergency, in which the delay neces
s
ary to obtain a warrant, threatens
the des
truction of evidence[17]and the officers
[h]ad to act in has
te, as
petitioner and his
companions
were acting s
us
picious
ly, cons
idering the
time, place and reported cas
es
of bombing. Further, petitioners
group
s
uddenly ran away in different directions
as
they s
aw the arres
ting officers
approach, thus
[i]t is
reas
onable for an officer to conduct a limited s
earch,
the purpos
e of which is
not neces
s
arily to dis
cover evidence of a crime, but
to allow the officer to purs
ue his
inves
tigation without fear of violence.[18]
T
he trial court then ruled that the s
eizure of the grenade from petitioner
was
incidental to a lawful arres
t, and s
ince petitioner [l]ater voluntarily
admitted s
uch fact to the police inves
tigator for the purpos
e of bombing the
Mercury Drug Store, concluded that s
ufficient evidence exis
ted to es
tablis
h
petitioners
guilt beyond reas
onable doubt.
In its
decis
ion[19] dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15
February 1994, the trial court thus
found petitioner guilty of the crime of
illegal pos
s
es
s
ion of explos
ives
under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, and
s
entenced him to s
uffer:
[T
]he penalty of not les
s
than SEVENT
EEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONT
HS
AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION T
EMPORAL, as
minimum, and not more than
T
HIRT
Y (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPET
UA, as
maximum.
In s
o doing, the Court of Appeals
took into account petitioners
failure to
rebut the tes
timony of the pros
ecution witnes
s
es
that they received
intelligence reports
of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu
chas
ed petitioner two days
prior to the latters
arres
t, or on 27 Augus
t 1990;
and that petitioner and his
companions
acted s
us
picious
ly, the accumulation
of which was
more than s
ufficient to convince a reas
onable man that an
offens
e was
about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
obs
erved:
T
he police officers
in s
uch a volatile s
ituation would be guilty of gros
s
negligence and dereliction of duty, not to mention of gros
s
incompetence, if
they [would] firs
t wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill s
everal
innocent pers
ons
while maiming numerous
others
, before arriving at what
would then be an as
s
ured but moot conclus
ion that there was
indeed
probable caus
e for an arres
t.We are in agreement with the lower court in
s
aying that the probable caus
e in s
uch a s
ituation s
hould not be the kind of
proof neces
s
ary to convict, but rather the practical cons
iderations
of
everyday life on which a reas
onable and prudent mind, and not legal
technicians
, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals
held that the rule laid down in People v.
Mengote,[26] which petitioner relied upon, was
inapplicable in light of [c]rucial
differences
, to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers
never received any intelligence report that
s
omeone [at] the corner of a bus
y s
treet [would] be in pos
s
es
s
ion of a
prohibited article. Here the police officers
were res
ponding to a [s
ic] public
clamor to put a check on the s
eries
of terroris
tic bombings
in the Metropolis
,
and, after receiving intelligence reports
about a bomb threat aimed at the
vicinity of the his
torically notorious
Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot
patrols
for about s
even days
to obs
erve s
us
picious
movements
in the
area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers
[had] no pers
onal
knowledge that the pers
on arres
ted has
committed, is
actually committing,
or is
attempting to commit an offens
e. Here, PO3 Yu [had] pers
onal
knowledge of the fact that he chas
ed Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days
before he finally s
ucceeded in apprehending him.
T
he penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any pers
on who
s
hall unlawfully pos
s
es
s
grenades
is
reclus
ion temporal in its
maximum
period to reclus
ion perpetua.
For purpos
es
of determining appellate juris
diction in criminal cas
es
, the
maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is
taken into account. Since
the maximum of the penalty is
reclus
ion perpetua, the appeal therefrom
s
hould have been to us
, and not the Court of Appeals
, purs
uant to Section
9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), [27] in relation
to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, [28] Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Cons
titution[29] and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court.[30]T
he term
life impris
onment as
us
ed in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of
1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 mus
t be deemed to
include reclus
ion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Cons
titution.
Petitioners
Notice of Appeal indicated that he was
appealing from the
trial courts
decis
ion to this
Court, yet the trial court trans
mitted the record to
the Court of Appeals
and the latter proceeded to res
olve the appeal.
We then s
et as
ide the decis
ion of the Court of Appeals
for having been
rendered without juris
diction, and cons
ider the appeal as
having been
directly brought to us
, with the petition for review as
petitioners
Brief for the
Appellant, the comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as
the
Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the parties
as
their
Supplemental Briefs
.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings
, we find ours
elves
convinced
that the pros
ecution failed to es
tablis
h petitioners
guilt with moral certainty.
Firs
t, s
erious
doubt s
urrounds
the s
tory of police officer Yu that a
grenade was
found in and s
eized from petitioners
pos
s
es
s
ion. Notably, Yu did
not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly s
eized. According to him, he
turned it over to his
commander after putting an X mark at its
bottom;
however, the commander was
not pres
ented to corroborate this
claim. On
the other hand, the grenade pres
ented in court and identified by police
officer Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera
and police officer Diotoy not immediately after petitioners
arres
t, but
nearly s
even (7) months
later, or on 19 March 1991; further, there was
no
evidence whats
oever that what Ramilo received was
the very s
ame grenade
s
eized from petitioner. In his
tes
timony, Yu never declared that the grenade
pas
s
ed on to Ramilo was
the grenade the former confis
cated from
petitioner. Yu did not, and was
not made to, identify the grenade examined
by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was
that s
eized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities
failed to
s
afeguard and pres
erve the chain of evidence s
o crucial in cas
es
s
uch as
thes
e.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days
earlier he was
with a group about to detonate an explos
ive at Plaza Miranda,
and Yu and his
fellow officers
chas
ed, but failed to arres
t them, then
cons
idering that Yu and his
three fellow officers
were in uniform and
therefore eas
ily cognizable as
police officers
, it was
then unnatural and
agains
t common experience that petitioner s
imply s
tood there in proximity to
the police officers
. Note that Yu obs
erved petitioner for thirty minutes
and
mus
t have been clos
e enough to petitioner in order to dis
cern petitioners
eyes
moving very fas
t.
Finally, even as
s
uming that petitioner admitted pos
s
es
s
ion of the
grenade during his
cus
todial inves
tigation by police officer Serapio, s
uch
admis
s
ion was
inadmis
s
ible in evidence for it was
taken in palpable violation
of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Cons
titution, which provide as
follows
:
SEC. 12 (1). Any pers
on under inves
tigation for the commis
s
ion of an offens
e
s
hall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain s
ilent and to have
competent and independent couns
el preferably of his
own choice. If the
pers
on cannot afford the s
ervices
of couns
el, he mus
t be provided with
one. T
hes
e rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the pres
ence of
couns
el.
xxx
(b) When an offens
e has
in fact jus
t been committed, and he has
pers
onal knowledge of facts
indicating that the pers
on to be
arres
ted has
committed it; and
Other notable points
of T
erry are that while probable caus
e is
not required to
conduct a "s
top and fris
k,"[40] it nevertheles
s
holds
that mere s
us
picion or a
hunch will not validate a "s
top and fris
k." A genuine reas
on mus
t exis
t, in
light of the police officer's
experience and s
urrounding conditions
, to warrant
the belief that the pers
on detained has
weapons
concealed about him.
Finally, a "s
top-and-fris
k" s
erves
a two-fold interes
t: (1) the general
[41]
A Yes , s ir.
Q And when you s
aw them s
tanding, there were nothing or they did
not create any commotion?
A None, s ir.
SECOND DIVISION
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
T INGA, J.:
T he s acred right agains t an arres t, s earch or s eizure without valid warrant is
papers and effects agains t unreas onable s earches and s eizures . [1] Any
purpos e in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to s earch and s eize may
at times be neces s ary to the public welfare, s till it mus t be exercis ed and the
On appeal is the Decis ion[3] of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005,
affirming the Judgment[4] of the Regional T rial Court (RT C), Branch 31, Agoo,
impris onment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of pris ion
of P350,000.00.[6]
I.
On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par.
ens ued with the pros ecution pres enting the three (3) barangay tanods of San
Bautis ta tes tified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was
conducting the routine patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San
Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas and Ordoo when they
s eemed to be looking for s omething. T hey thus approached him but the
latter purportedly attempted to run away. T hey chas ed him, put him under
arres t and thereafter brought him to the hous e of Barangay Captain Orencio
Mercado to open his bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim
news paper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the
the contents of petitioners bag before petitioner was taken to the hous e of
petitioner hims elf who brought out the contents of his bag upon orders from
Mercado. For his part, Ordoo tes tified that it was he who was ordered by
Mercado to open petitioners bag and that it was then that they s aw the
how the marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how the s aid s ubs tance
reached the police officers . Moreover, he could not identify whos e marking
from his place in Curro-oy, Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus ,
petitioner claimed that he went to the hous e of a friend to drink water and
approached him and as ked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he
was going to his brothers hous e. Ordoo then purportedly reques ted to s ee
the contents of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this point that
Bautis ta and Aratas joined them. After ins pecting all the contents of his bag,
petitioner tes tified that he was res trained by the tanod and taken to the
hous e of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried the bag until they reached their
des tination.[13]
by the tanod and Mercado hims elf. T hey took out an item wrapped in
by his arres tors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to s omeone from the
eas t in order for them to apprehend s uch pers on. As petitioner declined, he
was brought to the police s tation and charged with the ins tant offens e.
Although petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out the
contents
of his
bag at his
friends
hous
e, he averred that it was
one of
the tanodwho did s
o at Mercados
hous
e and that it was
only there that they
reas onable doubt, the RT C rendered judgment agains t him and s entenced
him to s uffer indeterminate impris onment ranging from eight (8) years and
one (1) day of pris ion mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years
of reclus ion temporal medium as maximum and ordered him to pay a fine
of P350,000.00.[15]
evidence of ill-motive on their part, agreed with the trial court that there was
guilt of the crime charged had not been proven beyond reas onable doubt. He
argues , albeit for the firs t time on appeal, that the warrantles s arres t
effected agains t him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the
warrantles s s earch of his bag that followed was likewis e contrary to law.
him are inadmis s ible in evidence for being the fruit of a pois onous tree.
Well-s ettled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnes s es and their tes timonies are accorded great res pect and
weight, in the abs ence of any clear s howing that s ome facts and
however, the Court finds and s o holds that a revers al of the decis ion a
II.
the juris diction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arres t. T he
legality of an arres
t affects
only the juris
diction of the court over his
pers
on.
[18]
Petitioners
warrantles
s
arres
t therefore cannot, in its
elf, be the bas
is
of his
acquittal.
yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. T he s earch, conducted as it was
reas onable conclus ion is that the arres t of petitioner without a warrant is not
the tanod and as ked to s how the contents of his bag, he was s imply herded
without explanation and taken to the hous e of the barangay captain. On their
way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies owners hip over the
contraband allegedly found in his bag and as s erts that he s aw it for the firs t
xxx
barangay tanod, not one of thes e circums tances was obtaining at the time
committing an offens e at the time he alighted from the bus , nor did he
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has
ruled that two (2) elements mus t be pres ent: (1) the pers on to be arres ted
mus t execute an overt act indicating that he has jus t committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) s uch overt act is
done in the pres ence or within the view of the arres ting officer. [21] Here,
petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as
run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by its elf be
cons trued as adequate to charge the tanod with pers onal knowledge that
petitioner had jus t engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting
did not run away but in fact s poke with the barangay tanod when they
approached him.
Even taking the pros ecutions vers ion generally as the truth, in line
with our as s umption from the s tart, the conclus ion will not be any different. It
is not unreas onable to expect that petitioner, walking the s treet at night,
after being clos ely obs erved and then later tailed by three unknown pers ons ,
would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per s e is not s ynonymous with
guilt and mus t not always be attributed to ones cons cious nes s of guilt. [22] Of
under the circums tances of this cas e, petitioners flight lends its elf jus t as
s earches on and s eizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty
being a mos t bas ic and fundamental one, the s tatute or rule that allows
law.[25]
criminal activity enough to validate his warrantles s arres t. [26] If at all, the
s earch mos t permis s ible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing
backdrop of the cas e was a s top-and-fris k to allay any s us picion they have
cannot be admitted in evidence agains t him as they were s eized during a
warrantles s s earch which was not lawful. [29] As we pronounced in People v.
Bacla-an
caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arres t effected in
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General pos its that apart
from the warrantles s s earch being incidental to his lawful arres t, petitioner
of the public officials who had cus tody of him when the s earch of his bag was
as to how the cons ent was as ked and how it was given, nor the s pecific
that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoo as ked to s ee its
contents , his implied acquies cence, if at all, could not have been more than
and hence, is cons idered no cons ent at all within the contemplation of the
s earch and s eizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his cons titutional right or
III.
leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful s earch is not the lone caus e that
militates agains t the cas e of the pros ecution. We likewis e find that it has
following elements
mus
t concur: (1) proof that the trans
action took place;
and (2) pres
entation in court of the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence.[35] T he exis tence of dangerous drugs is a condition s ine qua non for
conviction for the illegal s ale of dangerous drugs , it being the very corpus
In a line of cas es , we have ruled as fatal to the pros ecutions cas e its
failure to prove that the s pecimen s ubmitted for laboratory examination was
the s ame one allegedly s eized from the accus ed. [37] T here can be no crime of
whether the item confis cated was the s ame s pecimen examined and
the elements neces s ary for conviction of appellant for illegal s ale of s habu
barangay tanod, the records only s how that he was taken to the hous e of
the barangay captain and thereafter to the police s tation. T he Joint
Affidavit[40] executed by the tanod merely s tates that they confis cated the
marijuana leaves which they brought to the police s tation together with
from petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of
when petitioners
bag was
opened, they als
o gave conflicting tes
timony on
who actually opened the s
ame. T
he pros
ecution, des
pite thes
e material
to its caus e was the admis s ion by Laya, the forens ic chemis t, that he did not
know how the s pecimen was taken from petitioner, how it reached the police
officers who conducted the inques t proceedings and marked the s eized
drugs , if s uch was the cas e, is fatal to the cas e. Plainly, the pros ecution
neglected to es tablis h the crucial link in the chain of cus tody of the s eized
marijuana leaves from the time they were firs t allegedly dis covered until
pros ecution to es tablis h the chain of cus tody over the s eized marijuana as
s uch [f]inds prominence only when the exis tence of the s eized prohibited
petitioners tes timony that the marijuana was taken from his bag, without
taking the s tatement in full context. [43] Contrary to the Court of Appeals
findings , although petitioner tes tified that the marijuana was taken from his
State. In conjunction with this , law enforcers and public officers alike have
the corollary duty to pres erve the chain of cus tody over the s eized drugs .
labeling and recording, and mus t exis t from the time the evidence is found
until the time it is offered in evidence. Each pers on who takes pos s es s ion of
the s pecimen is duty-bound to detail how it was cared for, s afeguarded and
invoked by the pros ecution and relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by
accus ed, the mos t primordial yet often dis regarded is the pres umption of
doubt. T hus , the burden of proving the guilt of the accus ed res ts upon the
pros ecution.
the pros ecution as its evidence mus t s tand or fall on its own weight and
inferences , one incons is tent with the pres umption of innocence and the other
compatible with the finding of guilt, the court mus t acquit the accus ed for
the reas on that the evidence does not s atis fy the tes t of moral certainty and
vicious crime,[48] and one of the mos t pernicious evils that has ever crept into
our s ociety,[49] for thos e who become addicted to it not only s lide into the
ranks of the living dead, what is wors e, they become a grave menace to the
actually agents of des truction. [51] Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous
pres umed innocent until proven to the contrary and neither can it s hirk from
criminal liability.
IV.
es pecially in light of the fundamental rights at s take. Here, we note that the
is s ues in the determination of the merits of the cas e. We are not oblivious to
the fact that in s ome ins tances , law enforcers res ort to the practice of
drug offens es .[52] In the s ame vein, let this s erve as an admonition to police
officers and public officials alike to perform their mandated duties with
releas e of petitioner, unles s the latter is being lawfully held for another
the date of his releas e, or the reas ons for his continued confinement, within
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
T
HE PEOPLE OF T
HE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 170233
Appellee,
Pres
ent:
QUISUMBING, J.,
- vers
us
- Chairpers
on,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
JESUS NUEVAS y GARCIA, T
INGA, and
REYNALDO DIN y GONZAGA, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
and FERNANDO INOCENCIO y
ABADEOS,
Appellants
. Promulgated:
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
T INGA, J.:
Jes us Nuevas y Garcia (Nuevas ) was charged [1] before the Regional T rial Court
were likewis e charged[3] with the s ame crime, before the s ame court.
Upon arraignment, Nuevas , Din and Inocencio pleaded not guilty to the
charges .[4] As the evidence in the cas es was common and the pros ecution
would utilize the s ame witnes s es , the cas es were cons olidated. After a joint
trial on the merits , the RT C rendered a Decis ion [5] dated 4 April 2002,
SO ORDERED.[6]
T o put in appropriate context the operative facts on which adjudication of this
cas e hinges , there is need to recall the factual as s ertions of the witnes s es for
tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and us ually wearing a s ando
and maong pants , would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves . While
s tationed thereat, they s aw a male pers on who fit the des cription, carrying a
plas tic bag, later identified as Jes us Nuevas (Nuevas ), alight from a motor
vehicle. T hey accos ted Nuevas and informed him that they are police
arrogantly but afterwards , calmed down. Nuevas and Fami convers ed in the
Waray dialect. Nuevas informed him that there were other s tuff in the
Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plas tic bag
which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped
in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to es cape charges , Nuevas dis clos ed where
the two (2) other male pers ons would make the delivery of marijuana
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas , then proceeded to Purok 12, Old
Cabalan, Olongapo City, which according to Nuevas
was
where his
two (2)
companions
, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From there, they s
aw and
thems elves as police officers . Din was carrying a light blue plas tic bag. When
as ked, Din dis clos ed that the bag belonged to Nuevas . Fami then took the
bag and upon ins pection found ins ide it marijuana packed in news paper and
wrapped therein.[8] After confis cating the items , Fami and Cabling brought
Nuevas , Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for proper
documentation.[9] Fami further tes tified that a receipt for the property s eized
was is s ued by Cabling and that a field tes t was duly conducted on the
Fami s tated that he and Cabling executed a joint affidavit in connection with
the arres t of all the accus ed and the confis cation of the items .[10]
s eized was prepared, all three (3) accus ed were not repres ented by couns el.
He likewis e dis clos ed that he was the one who es corted all the accus ed
during their phys ical examination. He als o es corted all three to the Fis cals
office where the latter were informed of the charges agains t them.[11]
and Fami had introduced thems
elves
as
police officers
, Din and Inocencio
voluntarily handed to Fami the marijuana dried leaves
.[12]
res ult of a tip from Famis informant, conceding though that the name of
Nuevas was not included in the lis t of pers ons under s urveillance. Fami then
relayed the tip to Cabling.[13] Cabling res tated that Nuevas had voluntarily
s ubmitted the plas tic bag he was holding and that after Nuevas had been
to cooperate and point to his other cohorts . [14]When Fami and Cabling
Din and Inocencio along the road. Din was holding a bag while Inocencio was
looking into its contents .[15] Cabling averred that Din voluntarily handed the
1997, he was walking along Perimeter Street, on his way home from the
Barangay Hall, when Fami called him. Nuevas approached Fami, who was
then in front of his hous e, and as ked why Fami had called him. Fami poked
his gun at Nuevas and as ked him to go ins ide the room where Fami
handcuffed Nuevas s hands , got Nuevas s wallet, took out P1,500.00 and put
it in his (Famis ) wallet. Fami then confronted Nuevas with s habu us e but the
latter denied the charge. Before leaving the hous e with Nuevas , Fami
brought out a plas
tic bag and told Nuevas
to carry it. Subs
equently, they
boarded a red ownertype jeep and proceeded to Station B where Nuevas
was
put in jail. Nuevas further s tated that he did not know Din or Inocencio. [17]
Din, on the other hand, s tated that at about 10 oclock in the morning of 27
September 1997, while his compare Inocencio was vis iting, two (2) men
entered his hous e looking for a woman. T he two (2) introduced thems elves
as police officers . T hen, Din and Inocencio were immediately handcuffed.
T hey were not informed of the reas on for their arres t and were told that the
reas on will be explained to them in court. Next, they were brought to the
Cabalan precinct where the inves tigator as ked for their names , and
photographed with Nuevas , who Din firs t met in jail. Ins ide the room where
they had their fingerprints taken, he s aw marijuana placed on top of the
table.[18]
Inocencio tes tified that he went to his compadre Dins hous e in the morning
redeem his drivers licens e. While there, he and Din were arres ted by two
pers ons , one of whom pointed a gun at them while the other s earched the
hous e for a lady named Vangie. Afterwards , he and Din were brought to the
Cabalan Police Precinct and then to Station B where he firs t came to know
from them and claimed that he only s
aw s
uch evidence on the day he gave
his
tes
timony. He als
o s
tated that when a photograph was
taken of the three
of them, he and Din were ordered to point to a wrapped thing. When the
photograph was taken, they were not as s is ted by couns el. He als o does not
brought to a detention cell. And when they as ked the police what they did
wrong, the police replied that they will jus t explain it in court. [19]
All three were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was
Nuevas filed a manifes tation and motion to withdraw appeal. [20] T he Court
granted Nuevas s withdrawal of appeal and cons idered the cas e clos ed and
Before the Court of Appeals , Din and Inocencio (appellants ) argued that the
trial court erred: (1) in finding them guilty of the crime charged on the bas is
of the tes timonies of the arres ting officers ; and (2) n not finding that their
decis ion reads :
SO ORDERED.[27]
T he Court of Appeals res tated the rule that when the is s ue involves the
weight, even finality, unles s it is s hown that it was tainted with arbitrarines s
influence. T he appellate court found Fami and Cablings vers ion of how
was es tablis hed by the fact that he was s een in the act of looking into the
With res pect to appellants claim that their cons titutional rights have been
violated, the appellate court s tated that the s earch in the ins tant cas e is
According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami tes tified that Din
rebut the s ame. T hus , in the ins tant cas e, the exclus ionary rule does not
apply.[29]
Din and Inocencio are now before the Court s ubmitting for res olution the
appellants s tated that all the arguments neces s ary to s upport their acquittal
have already been dis cus s ed in the brief they had s ubmitted before the
reiteration of the arguments dis cus s ed in s aid brief. [31] T he Office of the
Solicitor General manifes ted that it is no longer filing a s upplemental brief. [32]
warrantles s s earches and s eizure made by the police officers and the
In holding that the warrantles s s earches and s eizure are valid, the trial court
Appellants maintain that there was no bas is for their ques tioning and the
s ubs equent ins pection of the plas tic bags of Nuevas and Din, as they were
unreas onable and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmis s ible for any
purpos e in any proceeding. [35] T he cons titutional pros cription, however, is not
5. Cus toms s earch;
abs ence of probable caus e, the manner in which the s earch and s eizure was
made, the place or thing s
earched and the character of the articles
procured.
[37]
T he courts below anchor appellants conviction on the ground that the
s earches and s eizure conducted in the ins tant cas e bas ed on a tip from an
informant fall under one of the exceptions as Nuevas , Din and
We differ.
Firs t, the Court holds that the s earches and s eizures conducted do not fall
proces s cannot be revers ed as in this cas e where the s earch preceded the
can precede the arres t if the police have probable caus e to make the arres t
In this cas e, Nuevas , Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the
pres ence of the police officers . Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did
not have pers onal knowledge of the facts indicating that the pers ons to be
Section 5(a), Rule 113. T he rule requires , in addition, that the accus ed
perform s ome overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
Secondly, neither could the s earches be jus tified under the plain view
doctrine.
An object is in plain view if it is plainly expos ed to s ight. Where the object
s eized was ins ide a clos ed package, the object its elf is not in plain view and
are in plain view and may be s eized. In other words , if the package is s uch
that an experienced obs erver could infer from its appearance that it contains
the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It mus t be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they obs erve may be
Records s how that the dried marijuana leaves were ins ide the plas tic bags
that Nuevas and Din were carrying and were not readily apparent or
leaves found ins ide the plas tic bag were wrapped ins ide a blue cloth. [43] In
Dins cas e, the marijuana found upon ins pection of the plas tic bag was
packed in news paper and wrapped therein. [44] It cannot be therefore s aid the
items were in plain view which could have jus tified mere s eizure of the
On the other hand, the Court finds that the s earch conducted in Nuevas s
cas e was made with his cons ent. In Dins cas e, there was none.
s eizures is a pers onal right which may be waived. However, it mus t be s een
otherwis
e illegal detention and s
earch, i.e., the cons
ent was
unequivocal,
s
pecific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any dures
s
or
coercion. T he cons ent to a s earch is not to be lightly inferred, but mus t be
a s earch was in fact voluntary is a ques tion of fact to be determined from the
which cons ent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a
pas s ively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5)
ques tioning; (8) the environment in which the ques tioning took place; and (9)
the pos s ibly vulnerable s ubjective s tate of the pers on cons enting. It is the
State which has the burden of proving, by clear and pos itive tes timony, that
the neces s ary cons ent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily
given.[46]
s urrendered the incriminating bag to the police officers . Fami tes tified in this
wis e:
FISCAL BELT
RAN:
Q Now, when you s
aw this
accus
ed carrying this
Exhibit D,
[47]
for your part, what did you do?
A I jus
t talked to him and as
ked him where he was
going and
according to him, he acted arrogantly, s
ir.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Q With res
pect to the bag that you confis
cated from him, what did
you do?
A He voluntarily pointed it to me and I checked it, the bag, for
verification, s
ir.[49]
Q When Fami got this
from the accus
ed, he opened this
thing
that he got?
A T
he s
ubject voluntarily s
ubmitted the s
ame, s
ir.
T here is reas on to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly s ubmitted the plas tic
bag with the incriminating contents to the police officers . It can be s een that
Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave them the plas tic bag and even
revealed his as s ociates , offering hims elf as an informant. His actuations were
others and s ave ones elf even at the cos t of others lives . T hus , the Court
would have affirmed Nuevas s conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal.
However, with res pect to the s earch conducted in the cas e of Din, the Court
finds that no s uch cons ent had actually been given. Fami tes tified as follows :
FISCAL BELT
RAN
Q Now, what did you do when you s
aw Din with that Exhibit
C, the plas
tic bag?
A Din s
aid that Oo, Sir, that is
owned by Nuevas
[s
ic] and
I took the s
aid plas
tic bag.
Q And what was
the reaction of Nuevas
when Din told you
that the bag belongs
to him?
A I did not react, s
ir.
Q After getting that plas
tic bag from Reynaldo Din, what did
you do with it?
A I ins
pected the bag and I found out that there is
s
till
marijuana packed in news
paper and wrapped
therein, s
ir.[51] [Emphas
is
s
upplied.]
FISCAL BELT RAN
Q And upon s
iting [s
ic] the two s
ubject pers
ons
you have jus
t
indicated in your earlier tes
timony, what did you do?
A We approached them and introduced ours
elves
as
police
officers
, and pinpointed by Nuevas
as
the ones
who
kept s
us
pected prohibited drugs
, s
ir.
Q After you approached thes
e two people, what happened?
A T
hes
e two people, upon introducing ours
elves
, [s
ic]
voluntarily s
urrendered to Fami thos
e marijuana dry
leaves
, s
ir.[52]
manner by which they got hold of the bag. T his already rais es s erious doubts
waiver, it mus t firs t appear that (1) the right exis ts ; (2) the pers on involved
and (3) the s aid pers on had an actual intention to relinquis h the right.[53]
T he pros ecution failed to clearly s how that Din intentionally s urrendered his
authorities , Famis and Cablings tes timonies do not s how that Din was in s uch
a s tate of mind or condition. Fami and Cabling did not tes tify on Dins
find neces s ary to provide bas is for the s urrender of the bag. T here was no
mention of any permis
s
ion made by the police officers
to get or s
earch the
bag or of any cons
ent given by Din for the officers
to s
earch it. It is
worthy to
note that in cas es where the Court upheld the validity of cons ented s earch,
the police authorities expres s ly as ked, in no uncertain terms , for the cons ent
aptly ruled:
Without the dried marijuana leaves as evidence, Dins conviction cannot be
declared that the conviction of the accus ed mus t res t not on the weaknes s of
the defens e but on the s trength of the pros ecution. [56] As s uch, Din des erves
an acquittal.
In this
cas
e, an acquittal is
warranted des
pite the pros
ecutions
ins
is
tence
that the appellants have effectively waived any defect in their arres t by
entering their plea and by their active participation in the trial of the cas e. Be
it s tres s ed that the legality of an arres t affects only the juris diction of the
court over the pers on of the accus ed. Ins pite of any alleged waiver, the dried
more s pecifically, as they were s eized during a warrantles s s earch which was
not lawful. A waiver of an illegal warrantles s arres t does not als o mean a
arres t.[57]
T urning to Inocencios cas e, the Court likewis e finds that he was wrongly
marijuana leaves was s ought to be s hown through his act of looking into the
plas tic bag that Din was carrying. [58] T aking a look at an object, more s o in
this cas e peeping into a bag while held by another, is not the s ame as taking
pos s es s ion thereof. T o behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act attributed to
convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he
cons pired with Din to pos s es s the illegal items . Inocencio was firm and
the Regional T rial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in Criminal Cas e No.
458-97 and No. 459-97 is
revers
ed and modified. Appellants
Reynaldo Din y
Gonzaga and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos
are hereby ACQUIT
T
ED. T
he
Director of the Bureau of Pris ons is ordered to caus e the immediate releas e
of appellants from confinement, unles s they are being held for s ome other
lawful caus e, and to report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5)
SO ORDERED.