THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5798. January 20, 2005]

ALEX B. CUETO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a complaint[1] for disciplinary action against Atty. Jose Jimenez, Jr.
filed by Engr. Alex B. Cueto with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Commission on Bar Discipline.
Engr. Alex Cueto alleged that sometime in October 1999 he engaged the
services of respondent as notary public, the latter being the father of the owner of
the building subject of the Construction Agreement[2] to be notarized. He was
then accompanied by a certain Val Rivera, the building administrator of
respondents son Jose Jimenez III.
After notarizing the agreement, respondent demanded P50,000 as notarial fee.
Despite his surprise as to the cost of the notarial service, complainant informed
respondent that he only had P30,000 in cash. Respondent persuaded complainant
to pay the P30,000 and to issue a check for the remaining P20,000. Being
unfamiliar with the cost of notarial services, complainant paid all his cash[3] and
issued a Far East Bank check dated December 28, 1999 for the balance.
Before the maturity date of the check, complainant requested respondent not
to deposit the same for lack of sufficient funds. He also informed respondent that
the latters son Jose Jimenez III had not yet paid his services as general contractor.
Still, respondent deposited the check which was consequently dishonored for
insufficient funds. Meanwhile, the P2,500,000 check issued by respondents son to
complainant as initial payment pursuant to the Construction Agreement was itself
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account.
Subsequently, Atty. Jimenez lodged a complaint for violation of BP 22 against
Cueto before the City Prosecutors Office in Angeles City. The criminal case was
tried in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch I.
In the meantime, Cueto filed his own administrative complaint against Jimenez
on November 16, 2001. He alleged that Jimenez violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Canons of Professional Ethics when he filed the criminal case
against Cueto so he could collect the balance of his notarial fee.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, respondent Jimenez
was required to answer the complaint filed against him.[4] Despite notice, however,
respondent failed to file his answer and to appear before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline. After hearing the case ex-parte, the case was deemed submitted
for resolution.[5]
In its report[6] dated April 21, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found
respondent guilty of violating Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that Atty. Jose B. Jimenez, Jr. be reprimanded.
On June 29, 2002, the Board of Governors passed a resolution[7] adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner:[8]
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A;
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and in view of respondents violation of Canon 20,
Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent is hereby
reprimanded.
Complainants claim that respondents P50,000 notarial fee was exorbitant is
debatable. As confirmed by the IBP, it is a recognized legal practice in real estate
transactions and construction projects to base the amount of notarial fees on the
contract price. Based on the amount demanded by respondent, the fee
represented only 1% of the contract price of P5,000,000. It cannot be said
therefore that respondent notary demanded more than a reasonable recompense
for his service.
We are also convinced that the two contracting parties implicitly agreed on the
cost of Jimenezs notarial service. It was Cuetos responsibility to first inquire how
much he was going to be charged for notarization. And once informed, he was
free to accept or reject it, or negotiate for a lower amount. In this case,
complainants concern that the other party to the construction agreement was the
son of respondent notary and that his non-availment of respondents service
might jeopardize the agreement, was purely speculative. There was no
compulsion to avail of respondents service. Moreover, his failure to negotiate the
amount of the fee was an implicit acquiescence to the terms of the notarial
service. His subsequent act of paying in cash and in check all the more proved it.
However, we agree with the IBP that respondents conduct in filing a criminal
case for violation of BP 22 against complainant (when the check representing
the P20,000 balance was dishonored for insufficient funds) was highly improper.
Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that
[a] lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and
shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Likewise, in Canon 14 of the Canons of Professional Ethics it states that,
[c]ontroversies with clients concerning compensation are to be avoided by the
lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his self-respect and with his right to
receive reasonable recompense for his service; and lawsuits with the clients should
be resorted to only to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud.
There was clearly no imposition, injustice or fraud obtaining in this case to
justify the legal action taken by respondent. As borne out by the records,
complainant Cueto had already paid more than half of respondents fee. To resort
to a suit to recover the balance reveals a certain kind of shameful conduct and
inconsiderate behavior that clearly undermines the tenet embodied in Canon 15
that [A] lawyer should observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client. And what can we say about the failure of respondents
son Jose III to pay his own obligation to complainant Cueto? It in all probability
explains why Cueto ran short of funds. Respondent therefore should have been
more tolerant of the delay incurred by complainant Cueto.
We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession.[9] He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. He should always remind
himself that the legal profession is imbued with public service. Remuneration is a
mere incident.
 Although we acknowledge that every lawyer must be paid what is due to him,
he must never resort to judicial action to recover his fees, in a manner that
detracts from the dignity of the profession.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose Jimenez, Jr. is hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for
violating Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO, Adm. Case No. 6708

Complainant, (CBD Case No. 01-874)
- versus -
ATTY. NESTOR A. BAMBA, Promulgated:
Respondent.
August 25, 2005
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
 We are aware of the hapless fact that there are not enough
lawyers to serve an exploding population. This unfortunate state of
affairs, however, will not seize this Court from exercising its
disciplinary power over lawyers culpable of serious indiscretions. The
incidence of public force must be deployed to bear upon the
community to eventually forge a legal profession that provides quality,
ethical, accessible, and cost-effective legal service to our people and
whose members are willing and able to answer the call to public
service.

In this administrative case for disbarment, complainant Felicitas S.

Quiambao charges respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba wi th violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests when the latter filed a case against her while he was at that
time representing her in another case, and for committing other acts
of disloyalty and double-dealing.

From June 2000 to January 2001, the complainant was the

president and managing director of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc.
(AIB), a family-owned corporation engaged in providing security and
investigation services. She avers that she procured the legal s ervices of
the respondent not only for the corporate affairs of AIB but also for
her personal case. Particularly, the respondent acted as her counsel of
record in an ejectment case against Spouses Santiago and Florita
Torroba filed by her on 29 December 20 00 before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Paraaque City, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 11928. She paid attorneys fees for respondents legal services in
that case. [ 1] About six months after she resigned as AIB president, or
on 14 June 2001, the respondent filed on behalf of AIB a complaint for
replevin and damages against her before the MeTC of Quezon City for
the purpose of recovering from her the car of AIB assigned to her as a
service vehicle. This he did without withdrawing as counsel of record
in the ejectment case, which was then still pending. [ 2 ]
Apart from the foregoing litigation matter, the complainant, in
her Position Paper, charges the respondent with acts of disloyalty and
double-dealing. She avers that the respondent proposed to her that
she organize her own security agency and that he would assist h er in
its organization, causing her to resign as president of AIB. The
respondent indeed assisted her in December 2000 in the formation of
another security agency, Quiambao Risk Management Specialists, Inc.,
(QRMSI), which was later registered under compla inants name, with
the respondent as a silent partner represented by his associate Atty.
Gerardo P. Hernandez. The respondent was paid attorneys fees for his
legal services in organizing and incorporating QRMSI. He also planned
to steal or pirate some of the more important clients of AIB. While
serving as legal counsel for AIB and a silent partner of QRMSI, he
convinced complainants brother Leodegario Quiambao to organize
another security agency, San Esteban Security Services, Inc. (SESSI)
where he (the respondent) served as its incorporator, director, and
president. The respondent and Leodegario then illegally diverted the
funds of AIB to fund the incorporation of SESSI, and likewise planned
to eventually close down the operations of AIB and transfer the
business to SESSI. [ 3 ]
For his part, the respondent admits that he represented the
complainant in the aforementioned ejectment case and later
represented AIB in the re plevin case against her. He, however, denies
that he was the personal lawyer of the complainant, and avers that he
was made to believe that it was part of his function as counsel for AIB
to handle even the personal cases of its officers. Even assuming that
the complainant confided to him privileged information about her
legal interests, the ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated
cases involving different issues and parties and, therefore, the
privileged information which might have been gathered from one case
would have no use in the other. At any rate, it was the complainant
herself who insisted that he stay as her counsel despite the perceived
differences among her, her brother, and AIB over the motor vehicle
subject of the replevin case. The c omplainant even asked him to assist
her in her monetary claims against AIB. [ 4 ]
The respondent also denies the charge raised by the complainant in
her position paper that he agreed to be a silent partner of QRMSI
through his nominee, Atty. Gerardo P. Hernandez, who was his former
law partner. He declined complainants offer to assume that role and
suggested Atty. Hernandez in his place; thus, 375 shares of stock were
registered in Atty. Hernandezs name as consideration of his (Atty.
Hernandezs) legal services as corporate secretary and legal counsel of
QRMSI. The respondent also denies that he convinced complainants
brother Leodegario to organize another security agenc y and that the
funds of AIB were unlawfully diverted to SESSI. It was to complement
the business of AIB, which was then in danger of collapse, that SESSI
was established. Leodegarios wife and her son have the effective
control over SESSI. Respondents subsc ribed shareholdings in SESSI
comprise only 800 shares out of 12,500 subscribed shares. He serves
AIB and SESSI in different capacities: as legal counsel of the former
and as president of the latter. [ 5 ]
In his Report and Recommendation [ 6 ] dated 31 August 2004, the
investigating commissioner of the IBP found the respondent gui lty of
representing conflicting interests based on the following undisputed
facts: first, the respondent was still complainants counsel of record in
the ejectment case when he filed, as legal counsel of AIB, the replevin
case against her; and second, the r espondent was still the legal
counsel of AIB when he advised the complainant on the incorporation
of another security agency, QRMSI, and recommended his former law
partner, Atty. Gerardo Hernandez, to be its corporate secretary and
legal counsel and also when he conferred with Leodegario to organize
another security agency, SESSI, where the respondent became an
incorporator, stockholder, and president. Thus, the investigating
commissioner recommended that the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one year.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
investigating commissioners report and recommendation, but reduced
the penalty from one year to a stern reprimand. [ 7 ]
The issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting interests in contravention of
the basic tenets of the legal profession.
Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and
good taste. [ 8 ] In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak
and strong points of the case. The nature of th at relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. [ 9 ] It
behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double -dealing for
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice. [ 1 0 ]
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which
duty to another client requires them to oppose. [ 1 1 ] Developments in
jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether a
lawyers conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether a
lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one
client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
client. [ 1 2 ] Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed
by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation
of the rule.
 Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double -dealing in the performance of
that duty. [ 1 3 ] Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called
upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment. [ 14 ]
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in
the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment tha t the
lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which
the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be
no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to
the disadvantage of the other as the two a ctions are wholly unrelated.
It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would
lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the
lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. [ 1 5 ]
In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent filed
the replevin case on behalf of AIB he was still the counsel of record of
the complainant in the pending ejectment case. We do not sustain
respondents theory that since the ejectment case and the replevin
case are unrelated cases fraught with different issues, parties, and
subject matters, the prohibition is inapplicable. His representation of
opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes
conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of double -dealing.
While the respondent may assert that the complainant express ly
consented to his continued representation in the ejectment case, the
respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his
clients and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant
and AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Ca non 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Neither can we accept respondents plea that he was duty -bound to
handle all the cases referred to him by AIB, including the personal
cases of its officers which had no connection to its corporate affairs.
That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with
honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the
prohibition inoperative. [ 1 6 ] Moreover, lawyers are not obliged to act
either as an adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become their client. They have the right to decline such employment,
subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. [ 1 7 ] Although there are instances where lawyers cannot
decline representation, [ 18 ] they cannot be made to labor under conflict
of interest between a present client and a prospective one. [ 19 ]
Additionally, in his position paper, the respondent alleges that
when the complainant invited the respondent to join QRMSI, he
vehemently refused to join them due to his perception of conflicting
interest as he was then (and still is at present) the Legal Counsel of
AIB, which is also a security agency. [ 2 0 ] To bolster his allegation, he
invoked the affidavits of complainants witnesses which contained
statements of his apprehension of conflict of interest should he join
QRMSI. [ 2 1 ]
Surprisingly, despite his apprehension or awareness of a possible
conflict of interest should he join QRMSI, the respondent later allowed
himself to become an incorporator, stockholder, and president of
SESSI, which is also a security agency. He justified his act by claiming
that that while both AIB and SESSI are engaged in security agency
business, he is serving in different capacities. As the in -house legal
counsel of AIB, he serves its legal interest the parameter of which
evolves around legal matters such as protecting the legal rights and
interest of the corporation; conducting an investigation or a hearing
on violations of company rules and regulations of their office
employees and security guards; sending demand letters in collection
cases; and representing the corporation in any litigation for or against
it. And as president of SESSI, he serves th e operational aspects of the
business such as how does it operate[], how much do they price their
services, what kind or how do they train[] their security guards, how
they solicit clients. Thus, conflict of interest is far -fetched. Moreover,
the respondent argues that the complainant, not being a stockholder
of AIB and SESSI, has no right to question his alleged conflict of
interest in serving the two security agencies. [ 2 2 ]
While the complainant lacks personality to question the alleged
conflict of interests on the part of the respondent in serving both
security agencies, we cannot just turn a blind eye to respondents act.
It must be noted that the proscripti on against representation of
conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests
arise with respect to the same general matter however slight the
adverse interest may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the
lawyers private activity or in the performance of a function in a non -
professional capacity. [ 2 3 ] In the process of determining whether there is
a conflict of interest, an im portant criterion is probability, not
certainty, of conflict.
Since the respondent has financial or pecuniary interest in SESSI, which
is engaged in a business competing with his clients, and, more
importantly, he occupies the highest position in SESSI, on e cannot
help entertaining a doubt on his loyalty to his client AIB. This kind of
situation passes the second test of conflict of interest, which is
whether the acceptance of a new relationship would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyers duty of undivi ded fidelity and loyalty to the
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double -dealing in the
performance of that duty. The close relationship of the majority
stockholders of both companies does not negate the conflict of
interest. Neither does his protestation that his shareholding in SESSI is
a mere pebble among the sands.
 In view of all of the foregoing, we find the respondent guilty of
serious misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
Furthermore, it must be noted that Republic Act No. 5487,
otherwise known as the Private Security Agency Law , prohibits a
person from organizing or having an interest in more than one
security agency. From respondents position paper, it can be culled
that Leodegario Quiambao is the president and managing di rector of
AIB, holding 60% of the outstanding shares; while his four other
siblings who are permanent residents in the United States own the
remaining 40%. [ 2 4 ] This prohibition notwithstanding, the respondent
organized SESSI, with Leodegarios wife and son as majority
stockholders holding about 70% of the outstanding shares and with
him (the respondent), as well as the rest of the stockholders, holding
minimal shares. [ 2 5 ] In doing so, the respondent virtually allowed
Leodegario and the latters wife to violate or circumvent the law by
having an interest in more th an one security agency. It must be noted
that in the affidavit [ 2 6 ] of Leodegarios wife, she mentioned of their
conjugal property. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
property relation of Leodegario and his wife can be presumed to be
that of conjugal partnership of gains; hence, the majority shares in AIB
and SESSI are the conjugal property of Leodegario and his wife,
thereby placing themselves in possession of an interest in more than
one security agency in contravention of R.A. No. 5487. Thus, in
organizing SESSI, the respondent violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to
promote respect for the law and refrain from counseling or abetting
activities aimed at defiance of the law.
As to the recommendation that the penalty be reduced from a
suspension of one year to a stern warning, we find the same to be
without basis. We are disturbed by the reduction made by the IBP
Board of Governors of the penalty recommended by the investigating
commissioner without clearly and distinctly stating the facts and
reasons on which that redu ction is based.
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court reads in part
as follows:

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors .

(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed
by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and
evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his
report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be
in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and
the reasons on which it is based.

We may consider the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as

a memorandum decision adopting by reference the report of the
investigating commissioner. However, we look with disfavor the
change in the recommended penalty without any explanation therefor.
Again, we remind the IBP Board of Gov ernors of the importance of the
requirement to announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the
requirement that its decision in disciplinary proceedings must state the
facts and the reasons on which its decision is based is akin to what is
required of the decisions of courts of record. [ 2 7 ] The reasons for
handing down a penalty occupy no lesser station than any other
portion of the ratio.

In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of

representing conflicting interests a penalty ranging from one to three
years suspension was imposed. [ 2 8 ] In this case, we find that a
suspension from the practice of law for one year is warranted.
 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba is hereby
held GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Rule 1.02 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of ONE (1)
YEAR effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a
similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar

Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON vs. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO A.C. No. 6116, 1
August 2012
Facts:
According to complainant, respondent undertook to give him 20% commission,
later reduced to 10%, of the attorney’s fees the latter would receive in
representing Spouses Yap whom he referred, in an action for partition of the
estate of the spouses relative. Their agreement was reflected in a letter dated
August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission
notwithstanding receipt of attorney’s fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or
about P 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter dated July 16, 1997
that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his
attorney’s fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his
commission which respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral
standards required of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife with
whom he has two children, and cohabited with another with whom he has four
children. He also accused respondent of engaging in money-lending business
without the required authorization from the BangkoSentralngPilipinas
In his defense, he disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and
claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay.
Ruling:
Respondent’s defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August 11,
1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the
payment of complainant’s commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps.
Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which
prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain
in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal
family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children
notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral fitness to be retained
in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the
marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws. Consequently, SC find no reason to disturb the IBP’s finding that respondent
violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a
lawyer from engaging in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
However, SC find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have
been sufficiently established.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO was found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE
(1) YEAR.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10567 February 25, 2015
WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z.
DABAO, ATTY. LILY UYV ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G.
DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and
ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M. PENALOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case stemming from a complaint-affidavit1 dated
December 4, 2009 filed by complainant Wilfredo Anglo (complainant) charging
respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia (Atty. Valencia), Jose Ma. J. Ciocon (Atty.
Ciocon ), Philip Z. Dabao (Atty. Dabao ), Lily Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-Valencia), Joey
P. De La Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris G. Dionela (Atty. Dionela), Raymundo T.
Pandan, Jr. (Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica), and Wilfred Ramon
M. Penalosa (Atty. Penalosa; collectively, respondents) of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifica1ly the rule against conflict of interest.
The Facts
In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed the services of the
law firm Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law
Office(law firm), of which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz,
Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and Rubica were partners, for two (2) consolidated labor
cases2 where he was impleaded as respondent. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law
firm, was assigned to represent complainant. The labor cases were terminated on
June 5, 2008 upon the agreement of both parties.
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft was filed against
complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms)
acting through a certain Michael Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was
represented by the law firm, the same law office which handled complainant’s
labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this disbarment case against
respondents, alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the
CPR,5 to wit:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN
ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF
HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
In their defense, respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name
Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but
explained that their association is not a formal partnership, but one that is subject
to certain "arrangements." According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed
amount every month for the maintenance of the entire office; and expenses for
cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and the like are
shouldered by each lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive his
own professional fees exclusively.7 As such, the lawyers do not discuss their
clientele with the other lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be
handled collaboratively. Respondents claim that this has been the practice of the
law firm since its inception. They averred that complainant’s labor cases were
solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela and not by the entire law firm.
Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case filed by FEVE Farms
was handled by Atty. Peñalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of
complainant’s labor cases, as he started working for the firm after the termination
thereof.8 Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela confirmed that he indeed handled
complainant’s labor cases but averred that it was terminated on June 13, 2008,9
and that complainant did not have any monthly retainer contract.10 He likewise
explained that he did not see the need to discuss complainant’s labor cases with
the other lawyers as the issue involved was very simple,11 and that the latter did
not confide any secret during the time the labor cases were pending that would
have been used in the criminal case with FEVE Farms. He also claimed that the
other lawyers were not aware of the details of complainant’s labor cases nor did
they know that he was the handling counsel for complainant even after the said
cases were closed and terminated.12 The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated September 26, 2011, the IBP
Commissioner found respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest
and recommended that they be reprimandedtherefor, with the exception of Atty.
Dabao, who had died on January 17, 2010.14 The IBP found that complainant was
indeed represented in the labor cases by the respondents acting together as a law
firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there was a conflict of interest
in this case, as respondents, through Atty. Peñalosa, having been retained by FEVE
Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant in the qualified theft
case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification
for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the
former client.
In a Resolution16 dated February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with
modification. Instead of the penalty of reprimand, the IBP Board of Governors
dismissed the case with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration17 thereof, which the IBP Board of
Governors granted in its Resolution18 dated March 23, 2014 and thereby (a) set
aside its February 12, 2013 Resolution and (b) adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, with modification, (1) reprimanding
the respondents for violation of the rule on conflict of interest; (2) dismissing the
case against Atty. Dabao in view of his death; and (3) suspending Atty. Dionela
from the practice of law for one year, being the handling counsel of complainant’s
labor cases.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents are guilty of
representing conflicting interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of the
CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN
ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF
HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,19 the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest
in this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two
or more opposing parties.1âwphi1 The test is "whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not
only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is
conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney
to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to
use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.20
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests
oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in
the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the
principles of public policy and good taste.21 In this case, the Court concurs with
the IBP’s conclusions that respondents represented conflicting interests and must
therefore be held liable. As the records bear out, respondents’ law firm was
engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor cases instituted against
him. However, after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a
new client, FEVE Farms, in the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against
complainant, its former client, and his wife. As the Court observes, the law firm’s
unethical acceptance of the criminal case arose from its failure to organize and
implement a system by which it would have been able to keep track of all cases
assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others, ensuring that every
engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest. As an
organization of individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns
legal work to a corresponding handling lawyer, it behooves the law firm to value
coordination in deference to the conflict of interest rule. This lack of coordination,
as respondents’ law firm exhibited in this case, intolerably renders its clients’
secrets vulnerable to undue and even adverse exposure, eroding in the balance
the lawyer-client relationship’s primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and
confidence. Had such system been institutionalized, all of its members, Atty.
Dionela included, would have been wary of the above-mentioned conflict, thereby
impelling the firm to decline FEVE Farms’ subsequent engagement. Thus, for this
shortcoming, herein respondents, as the charged members of the law firm, ought
to be administratively sanctioned. Note that the Court finds no sufficient reason as
to why Atty. Dionela should suffer the greater penalty of suspension. As the Court
sees it, all respondents stand in equal fault for the law firm’s deficient organization
for which Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR had been violated. As
such, all of them are meted with the same penalty of reprimand, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with
more severely.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not
altered by the fact that the labor cases against complainant had long been
terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that
of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested
by mere expiration of professional employment.22
WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-
Valencia, Joey P. De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K.
Rubica, and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa are found GUILTY of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and are therefore REPRIMANDED for said violations,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would
be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip Dabao is
DISMISSED in view of his death.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents' personal records as attorneys. Further, let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

January 19, 2016

A.C. No. 10912
PAULINA T. YU, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PERCURIAM:
Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2014 Resolution1 of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) which adopted and approved
the findings and the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner for the
disbarment of Atty. Berlin Dela Cruz (respondent lawyer).
It appears from the records that respondent lawyer agreed to represent Paulina T.
Yu (complainant) in several cases after having received various amounts as
acceptance fees, to wit:
Case Title Acceptance Fees

People v. Tortona for attempted homicide (Case

No. 06-359) filed with the Metropolitan Trial P20,000.00
Court, Bacoor, Cavite

Paulina T. Yu v. Pablo and Radel Gamboa for

qualified theft/ estafa (LS. No. XV-07-INV-116- P8,000.00
05339) filed with the City Prosecutor of Manila

Paulino T. Yu v. Roberto Tuazon et al. (Civil Case

No. LP-00-0087) filed before the Regional Trial P15,000.00
Court of Las Piñas2
On November 29, 2011, while the lawyer-client relationship was subsisting,
respondent lawyer borrowed pieces of jewelry from complainant and pledged the
same with the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. for the amount of P29,945.50, as shown
in the Promissory Note with Deed of Pledge.3 Respondent lawyer appropriated
the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to facilitate the
redemption of the said jewelry, respondent lawyer issued to complainant,
Citystate Savings Bank Check No. 0088551, dated August 31, 2011, in the amount
of P34,500.00. Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn
that the check was dishonored for the reason, "Account Closed. " 4 Complainant
immediately notified respondent lawyer of the dishonor of the check.
In a letter,5 dated March 23, 2012, complainant demanded for the refund of the
acceptance fees received by respondent lawyer prior to the "abandonment" of the
cases and the payment of the value of the jewelry, but to no avail.
In another letter,6 dated April 18, 2012, this time represented by another lawyer,
Atty. Francisco C. Miralles, complainant yet again demanded the redemption of
the check in cash within five days from notice; the refund of the paid acceptance
fees, in exchange for which no service was rendered; the payment of the value of
the pledged jewelry in the amount of P100,000.00 in order to avoid the interests
due and the possible foreclosure of the pledge; and moral damages of
P300,000.00.
For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City,
against him.7
On June 7, 2012, a verified complaint was filed with the IBP-Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),8 where complainant prayed for the disbarment of
respondent lawyer on account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer and commission of acts in violation of the lawyer's oath. The IBP-CBD
required respondent lawyer to submit his answer to the complaint.9 Despite
having been duly served with a copy of the complaint and the order to file his
answer, as shown in a certification10 issued by the Post Master of the Las Piñas
Central Post Office, respondent still failed to file an answer.
Respondent lawyer was likewise notified of the scheduled mandatory
conference/hearing on November 23, 2012, but only the complainant and her
counsel appeared on the said day.1âwphi1 The IBP-CBD then ordered the
resetting of the mandatory conference for the last time to January 11, 2013 and the
personal service of the notice thereof to respondent lawyer's given
address.11 Notwithstanding the receipt of the notice by respondent lawyer's
mother,12 he still failed to appear during the conference, prompting complainant
to move for the termination of the conference and the submission of the case for
report and recommendation.
On June 7, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of
respondent lawyer from the practice of law.13 Based on the evidence on record,
respondent lawyer was found to have violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which proscribed the borrowing of money from
a client, unless the latter's interests were fully protected by the nature of the case
or by independent advice. Worse, respondent lawyer had clearly issued a
worthless check in violation of law which was against Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
CPR stating that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral
or deceitful conduct."
On September 28, 2014, the IBP-BOG affirmed the said recommendation in
Resolution No. XXI-2014-698.14
Neither a motion for reconsideration before the BOG nor a petition for review
before this Court was filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the entire
records of the case for appropriate action with the IBP Resolution being merely
recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b),
Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.15
The Court acknowledges the fact that respondent lawyer failed to refute the
accusations against him despite the numerous opportunities afforded to him to
explain his side. All means were exhausted to give respondent lawyer a chance to
oppose the charges against him but to no avail and for reasons only for known to
him. Whether respondent lawyer had personally read the orders by the IBP-CBD
or his mother failed to forward the same for his personal consideration may only
be an object of surmise in which the Court cannot indulge. "Disbarment of lawyers
is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of
the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal
profession."16 Surely, respondent lawyer's failure or refusal to participate in the
IBP-CBD proceedings does not hinder the Court from determining the full extent
of his liability and imposing an appropriate sanction, if any.
After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no reason to deviate from
the findings of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent
lawyer's violation of Canons 1,17 16,18 17,19 and Rules 1.01,20 16.04,21 of the CPR.
In the case at bench, the complaint stemmed from the use by respondent lawyer
of his client's property. He had, indeed, come into possession of valuable pieces of
jewelry which he presented as security in a contract of pledge. Complainant
voluntarily and willingly delivered her jewelry worth Pl35,000.00 to respondent
lawyer who meant to borrow it and pawn it thereafter. This act alone shows
respondent lawyer's blatant disregard of Rule 16.04. Complainant's acquiescence
to the "pawning" of her jewelry becomes immaterial considering that the CPR is
clear in that lawyers are proscribed from borrowing money or property from
clients, unless the latter's interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or
by independent advice. Here, respondent lawyer's act of borrowing does not
constitute an exception. Respondent lawyer used his client's jewelry in order to
obtain, and then appropriate for himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so
doing, he had abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his client.
That he might have intended to subsequently pay his client the value of the
jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves detestation was the very act of his
exercising influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue benefits
from the latter's property. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and
confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and confidence"
is prone to abuse.22 The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his
client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence
over his client.23 The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's
ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.24 Suffice it to
say, the borrowing of money or property from a client outside the limits laid down
in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.
Due to complainant's respect for respondent lawyer, she trusted his
representation that the subject jewelry would be redeemed upon maturity. She
accepted respondent lawyer's check, which was eventually dishonored upon
presentment. Despite notice of the dishonor, respondent lawyer did not take steps
to remedy the situation and, on the whole, reneged on his obligation, constraining
complainant to avail of legal remedies against him.
Given the circumstances, the Court does not harbor any doubt in favor of
respondent lawyer. Obviously, his unfulfilled promise to facilitate the redemption
of the jewelry and his act of issuing a worthless check constitute grave violations
of the CPR and the lawyer's oath. These shortcomings on his part have seriously
breached the highly fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients. Specifically,
his act of issuing worthless checks patently violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
CPR which requires that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." This indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action,25 and thus seriously and irreparably tarnishes the
image of the profession.26 Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed
to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when exhibited by a member of
the Bar.27 In this case, respondent lawyer turned his back from the promise that he
once made upon admission to the Bar. As "vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings
with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach."28
As to the penalty commensurate to respondent lawyer's actions, the Court takes
heed of the guidepost provided by jurisprudence, viz.: "Disbarment should not be
decreed where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or
fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be considering the
consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of the erring
person."29 Hence, caution is called for amidst the Court's plenary power to
discipline erring lawyers. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,30 the Court finds it
proper to impose the penalty of three-year suspension against respondent lawyer,
with a stem warning that a repetition of any of the infractions attributed to him in
this case, or any similar act, shall merit a heavier penalty.
Anent the monetary demands made by complainant, the Court reiterates the rule
that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the
officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the
Bar.31 Thus, the Court is not concerned with the erring lawyer's civil liability for
money received from his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. Accordingly, it cannot order
respondent lawyer to make the payment for the subject jewelry he pawned, the
value of which is yet to be determined in the appropriate proceeding.
As to the return of acceptance fees, a clarification is in order. The Investigating
Commissioner erred in referring to them as "attorney's fees"-
As to the charge that respondent abandoned the cases he accepted after
payment of attorney's fees, this commission is not fully satisfied that the
complainant was able to prove it with substantial or clear evidence. It was not fully
explained in the complaint how or in what manner were the cases "abandoned"
by the respondent; and what prejudice was caused to the complainant. This
Commission noted that not a single document or order coming from the court of
prosecutor's office was appended to the Complaint-Affidavit that would at least
apprise this body of what the respondent actually did with the cases he
represented.32
There is a distinction between attorney's fee and acceptance fee. It is well-settled
that attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary
concept.33 In its ordinary sense, attorney's fee refers to the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered.
Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fee is awarded by the court to
the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for
damages.34 On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by
the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because once the lawyer agrees
to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the opposing party
based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus, this incurs an opportunity
cost by merely accepting the case of the client which is therefore indemnified by
the payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only seeks to
compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by the nature
and extent of the legal services rendered.35
In the case at bench, the amounts of P20,000.00, P18,000.00, and P15,000.00,
respectively, were in the nature of acceptance fees for cases in which respondent
lawyer agreed to represent complainant. Despite this oversight of the
Investigating Commissioner, the Court affirms the finding that aside from her bare
allegations, complainant failed to present any evidence showing that respondent
lawyer committed abandonment or neglect of duty in handling of cases. Hence,
the Court sees no legal basis for the return of the subject acceptance fees.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz GUILTY of violating
Canons 1, 16, 17, and Rules 1.01 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for THREE YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
act would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be entered in the
personal record of the respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

January 19, 2016

A.C. No. 10912
PAULINA T. YU, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION

PERCURIAM:
Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2014 Resolution1 of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) which adopted and approved
the findings and the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner for the
disbarment of Atty. Berlin Dela Cruz (respondent lawyer).
It appears from the records that respondent lawyer agreed to represent Paulina T.
Yu (complainant) in several cases after having received various amounts as
acceptance fees, to wit:
Case Title Acceptance Fees
People v. Tortona for attempted homicide (Case No. 06-359) filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Bacoor, Cavite P20,000.00
Paulina T. Yu v. Pablo and Radel Gamboa for qualified theft/ estafa (LS. No. XV-
07-INV-116-05339) filed with the City Prosecutor of Manila P8,000.00
Paulino T. Yu v. Roberto Tuazon et al. (Civil Case No. LP-00-0087) filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas2 P15,000.00
On November 29, 2011, while the lawyer-client relationship was subsisting,
respondent lawyer borrowed pieces of jewelry from complainant and pledged the
same with the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. for the amount of P29,945.50, as shown
in the Promissory Note with Deed of Pledge.3 Respondent lawyer appropriated
the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to facilitate the
redemption of the said jewelry, respondent lawyer issued to complainant,
Citystate Savings Bank Check No. 0088551, dated August 31, 2011, in the amount
of P34,500.00. Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn
that the check was dishonored for the reason, "Account Closed. "4 Complainant
immediately notified respondent lawyer of the dishonor of the check.
In a letter,5 dated March 23, 2012, complainant demanded for the refund of the
acceptance fees received by respondent lawyer prior to the "abandonment" of the
cases and the payment of the value of the jewelry, but to no avail.
In another letter,6 dated April 18, 2012, this time represented by another lawyer,
Atty. Francisco C. Miralles, complainant yet again demanded the redemption of
the check in cash within five days from notice; the refund of the paid acceptance
fees, in exchange for which no service was rendered; the payment of the value of
the pledged jewelry in the amount of P100,000.00 in order to avoid the interests
due and the possible foreclosure of the pledge; and moral damages of
P300,000.00.
For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City,
against him.7
On June 7, 2012, a verified complaint was filed with the IBP-Commission

on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),8 where complainant prayed for the disbarment of

respondent lawyer on account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer and commission of acts in violation of the lawyer's oath. The IBP-CBD
required respondent lawyer to submit his answer to the complaint.9 Despite
having been duly served with a copy of the complaint and the order to file his
answer, as shown in a certification10 issued by the Post Master of the Las Piñas
Central Post Office, respondent still failed to file an answer.
Respondent lawyer was likewise notified of the scheduled mandatory
conference/hearing on November 23, 2012, but only the complainant and her
counsel appeared on the said day.1âwphi1 The IBP-CBD then ordered the
resetting of the mandatory conference for the last time to January 11, 2013 and the
personal service of the notice thereof to respondent lawyer's given address.11
Notwithstanding the receipt of the notice by respondent lawyer's mother,12 he
still failed to appear during the conference, prompting complainant to move for
the termination of the conference and the submission of the case for report and
recommendation.
On June 7, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of
respondent lawyer from the practice of law.13 Based on the evidence on record,
respondent lawyer was found to have violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which proscribed the borrowing of money from
a client, unless the latter's interests were fully protected by the nature of the case
or by independent advice. Worse, respondent lawyer had clearly issued a
worthless check in violation of law which was against Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
CPR stating that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral
or deceitful conduct."
On September 28, 2014, the IBP-BOG affirmed the said recommendation in
Resolution No. XXI-2014-698.
Neither a motion for reconsideration before the BOG nor a petition for review
before this Court was filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the entire
records of the case for appropriate action with the IBP Resolution being merely
recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b),
Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The Court acknowledges the fact that respondent lawyer failed to refute the
accusations against him despite the numerous opportunities afforded to him to
explain his side. All means were exhausted to give respondent lawyer a chance to
oppose the charges against him but to no avail and for reasons only for known to
him. Whether respondent lawyer had personally read the orders by the IBP-CBD
or his mother failed to forward the same for his personal consideration may only
be an object of surmise in which the Court cannot indulge. "Disbarment of lawyers
is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of
the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal
profession."16 Surely, respondent lawyer's failure or refusal to participate in the
IBP-CBD proceedings does not hinder the Court from determining the full extent
of his liability and imposing an appropriate sanction, if any.
After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no reason to deviate from
the findings of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent
lawyer's violation of Canons 1,17 16,18 17,19 and Rules 1.01,20 16.04,21 of the CPR.
In the case at bench, the complaint stemmed from the use by respondent lawyer
of his client's property. He had, indeed, come into possession of valuable pieces of
jewelry which he presented as security in a contract of pledge. Complainant
voluntarily and willingly delivered her jewelry worth Pl35,000.00 to respondent
lawyer who meant to borrow it and pawn it thereafter. This act alone shows
respondent lawyer's blatant disregard of Rule 16.04. Complainant's acquiescence
to the "pawning" of her jewelry becomes immaterial considering that the CPR is
clear in that lawyers are proscribed from borrowing money or property from
clients, unless the latter's interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or
by independent advice. Here, respondent lawyer's act of borrowing does not
constitute an exception. Respondent lawyer used his client's jewelry in order to
obtain, and then appropriate for himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so
doing, he had abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his client.
That he might have intended to subsequently pay his client the value of the
jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves detestation was the very act of his
exercising influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue benefits
from the latter's property. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and
confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and confidence"
is prone to abuse.22 The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his
client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence
over his client.23 The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the
lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.24
Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or property from a client outside the
limits laid down in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.
Due to complainant's respect for respondent lawyer, she trusted his
representation that the subject jewelry would be redeemed upon maturity. She
accepted respondent lawyer's check, which was eventually dishonored upon
presentment. Despite notice of the dishonor, respondent lawyer did not take steps
to remedy the situation and, on the whole, reneged on his obligation, constraining
complainant to avail of legal remedies against him.

Given the circumstances, the Court does not harbor any doubt in favor of
respondent lawyer. Obviously, his unfulfilled promise to facilitate the redemption
of the jewelry and his act of issuing a worthless check constitute grave violations
of the CPR and the lawyer's oath. These shortcomings on his part have seriously
breached the highly fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients. Specifically,
his act of issuing worthless checks patently violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
CPR which requires that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." This indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action,25 and thus seriously and irreparably tarnishes the
image of the profession.26 Such conduct, while already off-putting when
attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when exhibited by a
member of the Bar.27 In this case, respondent lawyer turned his back from the
promise that he once made upon admission to the Bar. As "vanguards of the law
and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in
their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity
in a manner beyond reproach."
As to the penalty commensurate to respondent lawyer's actions, the Court takes
heed of the guidepost provided by jurisprudence, viz.: "Disbarment should not be
decreed where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or
fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be considering the
consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of the erring
person."29 Hence, caution is called for amidst the Court's plenary power to
discipline erring lawyers. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,30 the Court finds it
proper to impose the penalty of three-year suspension against respondent lawyer,
with a stem warning that a repetition of any of the infractions attributed to him in
this case, or any similar act, shall merit a heavier penalty.

Anent the monetary demands made by complainant, the Court reiterates the rule
that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the
officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.31
Thus, the Court is not concerned with the erring lawyer's civil liability for money
received from his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically
linked to his professional engagement. Accordingly, it cannot order respondent
lawyer to make the payment for the subject jewelry he pawned, the value of which
is yet to be determined in the appropriate proceeding.
As to the return of acceptance fees, a clarification is in order. The Investigating
Commissioner erred in referring to them as "attorney's fees"-
As to the charge that respondent abandoned the cases he accepted after
payment of attorney's fees, this commission is not fully satisfied that the
complainant was able to prove it with substantial or clear evidence. It was not fully
explained in the complaint how or in what manner were the cases "abandoned"
by the respondent; and what prejudice was caused to the complainant. This
Commission noted that not a single document or order coming from the court of
prosecutor's office was appended to the Complaint-Affidavit that would at least
apprise this body of what the respondent actually did with the cases he
represented.32
There is a distinction between attorney's fee and acceptance fee. It is well-settled
that attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept.33
In its ordinary sense, attorney's fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to
a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary
concept, attorney's fee is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid
by the losing party as indemnity for damages.34 On the other hand, acceptance
fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This
is because once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from
handling cases of the opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of
interest. Thus, this incurs an opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the
client which is therefore indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. Since the
acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is
not measured by the nature and extent of the legal services rendered.35
In the case at bench, the amounts of P20,000.00, P18,000.00, and P15,000.00,
respectively, were in the nature of acceptance fees for cases in which respondent
lawyer agreed to represent complainant. Despite this oversight of the
Investigating Commissioner, the Court affirms the finding that aside from her bare
allegations, complainant failed to present any evidence showing that respondent
lawyer committed abandonment or neglect of duty in handling of cases. Hence,
the Court sees no legal basis for the return of the subject acceptance fees.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz GUILTY of violating
Canons 1, 16, 17, and Rules 1.01 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
THREE YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be entered in the
personal record of the respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 10378, June 09, 2014 ]
JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JONATHAN T. SEMPIO,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative case, seeking the disbarment of Atty.
Jonathan T. Sempio (respondent), for violation of Canons 15,[1] 17,[2] 18[3] and
Rule 18.03[4] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), commenced thru a
complaint-affidavit[5] filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Jose Francisco T. Baens (complainant).
This legal battle stemmed when the complainant engaged the services of the
respondent to represent him and file a case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against his wife, Lourdes V. Mendiola-Baens. In his complaint-affidavit dated
March 15, 2010, the complainant alleged, among others, that the respondent: (1)
despite receiving the sum of P250,000.00 to cover for the expenses in the said
case,[6] failed to file the corresponding petition, and it was the complainant's wife
who successfully instituted Civil Case No. 2463-08,[7] for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on December 8, 2008; (2) even with the complainant furnishing him a
copy of the Summons dated December 15, 2008,[8] belatedly filed an Answer[9]
and was able to file it only on March 13, 2009 which was after the 15-day period
stated in the Summons; (3) failed to make an objection on the petition on the
ground of improper venue as neither the complainant nor his wife were and are
residents of Dasmariñas, Cavite; (4) never bothered to check the status of the case
and thus failed to discover and attend all the hearings set for the case; and (5) as
a result, Civil Case No. 2463-08 was decided[10] on October 27, 2009 without the
complainant being able to present his evidence.
In his Answer,[11] the respondent denied the allegations in the complaint, and
explained that: (1) after a meeting with the complainant, he drafted the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and asked the complainant to go over said draft
after which he proceeded to file the same with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malabon City; (2) the complainant was aware that said petition will be filed in
Malabon City as the latter had signed the verification and certification of the
petition; (3) the case became pending and was later on withdrawn because of the
complainant's refusal to testify; (4) what contributed to the delay in filing the
Answer was the fact that he still had to let the complainant go over the same and
sign the verification thereof; (5) he was not able to attend the hearings for the
case because he did not receive any notice from the trial court; and (6) it was only
on December 2, 2009 when he found out that the trial court has already rendered
its decision and that the complainant had changed counsels.
In the mandatory conference held before the IBP-CBD on October 29, 2010, only
the complainant appeared; thus, the respondent was declared as having waived
his right to further participate in the IBP proceedings. Nonetheless, in the interest
of justice, both parties were required to submit their respective position
papers.[12]
The Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report and Recommendation[13]
dated October 22, 2011, finding the respondent guilty of violation of the Code and
recommended that the respondent be suspended for six (6) months from the
practice of law. Specifically, the Investigating Commissioner found that the
respondent failed to diligently attend to the case and was grossly negligent in
discharging his responsibilities considering the fact that he has already been fully
compensated. The Investigating Commissioner said that the respondent should
have manifested or made known to the trial court that he was not receiving any
notice at all since it behoves upon him to make a follow-up on the developments
of the cases he is handling.
As to the respondent's argument that he indeed filed a Petition for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage for the complainant, the Investigating
Commissioner held that it cannot be taken at face value absent the presentation
of the pleading itself which by a perusal of the records of the case was not
submitted to the IBP-CBD. Moreso, the veracity of the Certification attached to the
respondent's answer was highly questionable because it failed to state when the
said petition was filed. Lastly, the Investigating Commissioner faulted the
respondent for not sufficiently explaining to the complainant the consequences of
the petition being filed in the RTC of Malabon City since it was the respondent's
duty and responsibility to explain the complexities of the same to his client for he
is the one tasked with the technical know-how in the field of law.
On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the
Investigating Commissioner's report but deemed it proper to increase the
recommended period of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year.[14] On
February 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD transmitted the notice of the resolution and the
case records to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.[15]
The Court finds it fitting to sustain the IBP's findings and the recommended
sanction of suspension from the practice of law since the attendant facts of the
case show substantial evidence to support the respondent's delinquency.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust
and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be
ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of
diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain
at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention,
skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.[16] Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in
which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.[17]
It is beyond dispute that the complainant engaged the services of the respondent
to handle his case. The records, however, definitively bear out that the respondent
was completely remiss and negligent in handling the complainant's case,
notwithstanding his receipt of the sum of P250,000.00 for the total expenses to be
incurred in the said case.
The excuse proffered by the respondent that he did not receive any orders or
notices from the trial court is highly intolerable. In the first place, securing a copy
of such notices, orders and case records was within the respondent's control and
is a task that a lawyer undertakes. Moreso, the preparation and the filing of the
answer is a matter of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and
responsibility of the respondent. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts
and procedures necessary and incidental to the advancement of his client's cause
of action.
Records further disclose that the respondent omitted to update himself of the
progress of his client's case with the trial court, and neither did he resort to
available legal remedies that might have protected his client's interest. Although a
lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case
entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the authority of
law to support his client's interest. When a lawyer agrees to take up a client's
cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter's
rights.[
Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his lack of candor,
fairness, and loyalty to his client as embodied in Canon 15 of the Code. A lawyer
who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of
his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[19]
In this case, the respondent's reckless and inexcusable negligence deprived his
client of due process and his actions were evidently prejudicial to his clients'
interests. A lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also
consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending
scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings,
prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their
termination even without prodding from the client or the court.[20]
Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17, and Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code which states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him." It further mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence," and that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."[21]
It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle the
complainant's case, he became duty-bound to serve his client with competence
and diligence, and to champion his cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to
afford his client every remedy and defense that is authorized by law, the
respondent fell short of what is expected of him as an officer of the Court.[22]
Thus, for the respondent's negligence and inadequacies in handling his client's
case, the recommendation of the IBP to suspend the respondent from the practice
of law is well-taken. While the IBP Board of Governors increased the period of
suspension to one year, the Court finds the period of six months as recommended
by the Investigating Commissioner commensurate to the facts of the case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolution dated
June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors in CBD
Case No. 10-2673. The Court hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio from
the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective immediately upon receipt of this
Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Jonathan T.
Sempio as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
[1] CANON 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his clients.
[2] CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
[3] CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
[4] Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 5408, February 07, 2017 ]
ANITA SANTOS MURRAY, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. FELICITO J. CERVANTES,
RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:

We sustain, with modification, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of

Governors' Resolution No. XVI-2004-481[1] and Resolution No. XVIII-2008-711.[2]
Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 modified the Board of Governors' Resolution No.
XV-2002-599.[3] The latter ruled that respondent Atty. Felicito J. Cervantes must
be reprimanded and ordered to return to complainant Anita Santos Murray the
sum of P80,000.00.[4] Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 modified this with the penalty
of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law, with an additional three (3)-
month suspension for every month (or fraction) that respondent is unable to
deliver to complainant the sum of P80,000.00.[5] Resolution No. XVIII-2008-711
denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.[6]
On February 2, 2001, complainant filed before this Court a Complaint[7] charging
respondent with violating Canon 18[8] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleged that sometime in June 2000, she sought the services of a
lawyer to assist in the naturalization (that is, acquisition of Philippine citizenship) of
her son, Peter Murray, a British national. Respondent was later introduced to her.
On June 14, 2000, she and respondent agreed on the latter's services, with
complainant handing respondent the sum of P80,000.00 as acceptance fee.[9]

About three (3) months passed without respondent doing "anything

substantial."[10] Thus, on September 11, 2000, complainant wrote respondent to
inform him that she was terminating his services. She explained:
I am not satisfied with the way things are going regarding my petition. I am
expecting that you keep me abreast of your activities but I am left in the dark as to
what have you done so far. You do not show up on our scheduled appointments
nor do you call me up to let me know why you cannot come. You stood me up
twice already which shows that you are not even interested in my case.
....
Since I already paid the P80,000.00 acceptance fee in full, I expect to get a refund
of the same from you.
As respondent failed to return the P80,000.00 acceptance fee, complainant
instituted the Complaint in this case. She also instituted criminal proceedings
against respondent for violation of Article 315(1)(b)[12] of the Revised Penal Code.
This case was subsequently referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
investigation, report, and recommendation.
After the proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Investigating
Commissioner Demaree J.B. Raval (Commissioner Raval) furnished a Report [15]
dated September 9, 2002 recommending that respondent be reprimanded and
required to return the sum of P80,000.00 to complainant. In its Resolution No. XV-
2002-599,[16] the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted
Commissioner Raval's recommendations.
Respondent filed before this Court a Motion for Leave to Admit Additional
Evidence with Motion to Dismiss.[17] He asserted that he never required
complainant to immediately pay him P80,000.00 as acceptance fee.[18] This
Motion was forwarded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines[19] and was treated
as respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.[20] For her part, complainant filed
several manifestations and motions asking that a heavier penalty be imposed on
respondent.[21]
Acting on the pending incidents of the case, Investigating Commissioner Dennis
A.B. Funa (Commissioner Funa) furnished a Report[22] recommending that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, with an
additional three (3)-month suspension for every month (or fraction) that
respondent fails to deliver to complainant the sum of P80,000.00.
Commissioner Funa justified the penalty of suspension by emphasizing that, in a
hearing conducted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on August 18, 2004,
respondent was "orally directed" to return the P80,000.00 not later than the end
of August 2004.[23] Respondent acceded to this; however, he failed to return the
P80,000.00.[24]
In its Resolution No. XVI-2004-481,[25] the Board of Governors adopted
Commissioner Puna's recommendation.
The Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008-711 later denied respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration.[26]
It is evident from the records that respondent failed to deliver on the services that
he committed to complainant despite receiving the amount of P80,000.00 as
acceptance fee. Although respondent asserted that he did not actively solicit this
amount from complainant, it remains, as Commissioner Funa underscored, that
respondent accepted this amount as consideration for his services.[27] Moreover,
following complainant's engagement of his services, respondent failed to
communicate with complainant or update her on the progress of the services that
he was supposed to render. Not only did he fail in taking his own initiative to
communicate; he also failed to respond to complainant's queries and requests for
updates.
Respondent's failure to timely and diligently deliver on his professional
undertaking justifies the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' conclusion that he must
restitute complainant the amount of P80,000.00.
Luna v. Galarrita[28] has explained the parameters for ordering restitution in
disciplinary proceedings:
In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar, the parties entered a Deed of Assignment after which
respondent received P937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for the
townhouse and lot. However, respondent did not turn over this amount to
developer Crown Asia, and no copy of the Contract to Sell was given to
complainant. This court suspended Atty. Cezar from the practice of law for three
(3) years, but did not grant complainant's prayer for the return of the P937,500.00.
Ronquillo held that "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a
trial of an action, but rather investigations by the court into the conduct of one of
its officers." Thus, disciplinary proceedings are limited to a determination of
"whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of
the Bar."
Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability determination
from disciplinary proceedings "remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which
are purely civil in nature — for instance, when the claim involves moneys received
by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement." This court has thus ordered in
administrative proceedings the return of amounts representing legal fees.
This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative
proceedings when respondent's civil liability was already established:
Although the Court renders this decision m an administrative proceeding primarily
to exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court's
silence about the respondent lawyer's legal obligation to restitute the complainant
will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct
concerning the client's funds or property should be required to still litigate in
another proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already established as
the respondent's liability. That has been the reason why the Court has required
restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in the cited cases of
Mortera v. Pagatpatan, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, Small v. Banares.[29] (Citations
and emphases omitted)
It is proper, in the course of these disciplinary proceedings, that respondent be
required to return to complainant the amount of P80,000.00. This amount was
delivered to respondent during complainant's engagement of his professional
services, or in the context of an attorney-client relationship. This is neither an
extraneous nor purely civil matter.
By the same failure to timely and diligently deliver on his professional undertaking
(despite having received fees for his services), as well as by his failure to keep
complainant abreast of relevant developments in the purposes for which his
services were engaged, respondent falls short of the standards imposed by Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should
know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if,
with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who
is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
(Emphasis supplied)
Disciplinary sanctions more severe than those considered proper by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines are warranted.
We emphasize that, during the proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, respondent acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for
the amount of P80,000.00. He then made a commitment to return that sum to
her. To date, however, he has failed to deliver on the commitment made almost
twelve and a half years ago.
We clarify that the oral instruction given to respondent in the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines' August 18, 2004 hearing was not a juridically binding order. Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court sanctions and spells out the terms of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines' involvement in cases involving the disbarment and/or
discipline of lawyers. The competence of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
only recommendatory. Under Article VIII, Section 5(5)[30] of the 1987 Constitution,
only this Court has the power to actually rule on disciplinary cases of lawyers, and
to impose appropriate penalties.
Rule 139-B merely delegates investigatory functions to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. With the exercise of its delegated investigatory power, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines refers proposed actions to this Court. Recognizing the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines' limited competence in disciplinary cases impels a
concomitant recognition that, pending favorable action by this Court on its
recommendations, its determinations and conclusions are only provisional.
Therefore, rulings on disciplinary cases attain finality and are enforceable only
upon this Court's own determination that they must be imposed.
The oral instruction given to respondent in the August 18, 2004 hearing has, thus,
not attained such a degree of finality as would immutably require him to comply,
such that failure to comply justifies additional or increased penalties. Penalizing
him for non-compliance is premature.
Nevertheless, respondent acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for
the amount of P80,000.00 and made his own commitment to make this
compensation.[31] He may not have been bound by a juridical instruction, but he
was certainly bound by his own honor. That he has failed to adhere to his own
freely executed commitment after more than a decade speaks volumes of how he
has miserably failed to live up to the "high standard of ... morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing"[32] that is apropos to members of the legal profession.
For this reason, we exact upon respondent a penalty more severe than that
initially contemplated by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.
Moreover, to impress upon respondent the urgency of finally returning to
complainant the amount he received, we impose on him an additional penalty
corresponding to the duration for which he fails to make restitution. We adopt the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors' position in Resolution No.
XVI-2004-481 that an additional period of suspension must be imposed on
respondent for every month (or fraction) that he fails to pay in full the amount he
owes complainant. However, instead of a three (3)-month suspension for every
month (or fraction) of non-payment or incomplete payment, he is to be
suspended for one (1) month for every such period of failure to make full
payment.
This approach hopefully underscores the burden that respondent must justly
carry. By automatically extending his suspension should he not return the amount,
we save complainant, the victim, from the additional costs of having to find and
retain another counsel to compel the return of what is due her. Counsels who
have caused harm on their clients must also suffer the costs of restitution.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Felicito J. Cervantes is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year and six (6) months. He is ORDERED to restitute
complainant Anita Santos Murray the sum of P80,000.00. For every month (or
fraction) the he fails to fully restitute complainant the sum of P80,000.00,
respondent shall suffer an additional suspension of one (1) month.
He is likewise WARNED that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal
record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.

[ AC. No. 5736, Jun 18, 2010 ]

RURAL BANK OF CALAPE v. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO
635 Phil. 176
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of
Directors[1] of the Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against respondent Atty.
James Benedict Florido (respondent) for "acts constituting grave coercion and
threats when he, as counsel for the minority stockholders of RBCI, led his clients in
physically taking over the management and operation of the bank through force,
violence and intimidation."

The Facts
On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent.[2]
RBCI alleged that respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code).
According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients, Dr. Domeciano
Nazareno, Dr. Remedios Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel
(Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force and intimidation, with the use of
armed men, forcibly took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They
also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the
bank's vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank.
In his comment, respondent denied RBCI's allegations. Respondent explained that
he acted in accordance with the authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-
Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of Directors of RBCI.
Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and valid change of
management. Respondent alleged that a termination notice was sent to Garay but
he refused to comply. On 1 April 2002, to ensure a smooth transition of
managerial operations, respondent and the Nazareno-Relampagos group went to
the bank to ask Garay to step down. However, Garay reacted violently and
grappled with the security guard's long firearm. Respondent then directed the
security guards to prevent entry into the bank premises of individuals who had no
transaction with the bank. Respondent, through the orders of the Nazareno-
Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the bank's vault.
Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against
him by RBCI was already dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was
ordered suspended because of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed against him in retaliation
for the administrative cases he filed against RBCI's counsel and the trial court
judges of Bohol.
Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove
their allegations. Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint
were never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the
documentary exhibits were originals or certified true copies.
The Ruling of the IBP
On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner
Villadolid, Jr.) submitted his report and declared that respondent failed to live up
to the exacting standards expected of him as vanguard of law and justice.[3]
Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. recommended the imposition on respondent of a
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months to one year with a
warning that the repetition of similar conduct in the future will warrant a more
severe penalty.
According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or ought to have
known that his clients could not just forcibly take over the management and
premises of RBCI without a valid court order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. noted
that the right to manage and gain majority control over RBCI was one of the
issues pending before the trial court in Civil Case No. 6628. Commissioner
Villadolid, Jr. said that respondent had no legal basis to implement the take over
of RBCI and that it was a "naked power grab without any semblance of legality
whatsoever."
Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative complaint against
respondent before the IBP is independent of the dismissal and suspension of the
criminal cases against respondent. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. also noted that
RBCI complied with the IBP Rules of Procedure when they filed a verified
complaint and submitted duly notarized affidavits. Moreover, both RBCI and
respondent agreed to dispense with the mandatory conference hearing and,
instead, simultaneously submit their position papers.
On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-
120 which declared that respondent dismally failed to live up to the exacting
standards of the law profession and suspended respondent from the practice of
law for one year with a warning that repetition of similar conduct will warrant a
more severe penalty.[4]
On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 December
2008 Resolution, the IBP denied respondent's motion.[5]
The Ruling of the Court
We affirm the IBP Board of Governors' resolution.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[6] Likewise,
it is the lawyer's duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to
abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the
legal system.[7]
Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a
lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and principles of
fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client.[8] It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and
lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to
their adversaries.[9]
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.'s conclusion:
Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their
professional oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily,
when they appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as representatives of a
party but, first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to protect
their clients' interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. While they are obliged to present every available
legal remedy or defense, their fidelity to their clients must always be made within
the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of truth, the law, and the
fair administration of justice.[10]
A lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end,
his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always
be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.[11] Any means, not honorable,
fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his
devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.[12]

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating

Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for one year
effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and in all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 183385, Feb 13, 2009 ]
EVANGELINA MASMUD v. NLRC
598 Phil. 971

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2]
dated October 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 96279.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On July 9, 2003, Evangelina Masmud's (Evangelina) husband, the late Alexander J.
Masmud (Alexander), filed a complaint[3] against First Victory Shipping Services
and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. for non-payment of permanent disability benefits,
medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees. Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. (Atty.
Go) as his counsel.
In consideration of Atty. Go's legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorney's
fees on a contingent basis, as follows: twenty percent (20%) of total monetary
claims as settled or paid and an additional ten percent (10%) in case of appeal. It
was likewise agreed that any award of attorney's fees shall pertain to respondent's
law firm as compensation.
On November 21, 2003, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision granting the
monetary claims of Alexander. The dispositive portion of the decision, as quoted
in the CA Decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is rendered finding the [First
Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A.] jointly and severally liable to
pay [Alexander's] total permanent disability benefits in the amount of
US$60,000.00 and his sickness allowance of US$2,348.00, both in Philippine
currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment; and to pay
further the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages and attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary
award.
[Alexander's] claim for payment of medical expenses is dismissed for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Alexander's employer filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). During the pendency of the proceedings before the NLRC,
Alexander died. After explaining the terms of the lawyer's fees to Evangelina, Atty.
Go caused her substitution as complainant. On April 30, 2004, the NLRC rendered
a Decision dismissing the appeal of Alexander's employer. The employer
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. The NLRC denied the same in an
Order dated October 26, 2004.
On appeal before the CA, the decision of the LA was affirmed with modification.
The award of moral and exemplary damages was deleted.[5] Alexander's
employers filed a petition for certiorari[6] before this Court. On February 6, 2006,
the Court issued a Resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit.
Eventually, the decision of the NLRC became final and executory. Atty. Go moved
for the execution of the NLRC decision, which was later granted by the LA. The
surety bond of the employer was garnished. Upon motion of Atty. Go, the surety
company delivered to the NLRC Cashier, through the NLRC Sheriff, the check
amounting to P3,454,079.20. Thereafter, Atty. Go moved for the release of the
said amount to Evangelina.
On January 10, 2005, the LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount of
P3,454,079.20 to Evangelina. Out of the said amount, Evangelina paid Atty. G the
sum of P680,000.00.
Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorney's lien
alleging that Evangelina reneged on their contingent fee agreement. Evangelina
paid only the amount of P680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the award as
attorney's fees, thus, leaving a balance of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the
counsel as attorney's fees.
In response to the motion filed by Atty. Go, Evangelina filed a comment with
motion to release the amount deposited with the NLRC Cashier. In her comment,
Evangelina manifested that Atty. Go's claim for attorney's fees of 40% of the total
monetary award was null and void based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.
On February 14, 2005, the LA issued an Order[7] granting Atty. Go's motion, the
fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and further considering the substitute
complainant's initial payment of 20% to movant-counsel of the monetary claims
as paid, let the balance or unpaid twenty (20%) per cent of attorney's fees due
movant-counsel (or the amount of P839,587.39) be recorded as lien upon all the
monies that may still be paid to substitute complainant Evangelina Masmud.
Accordingly, the NLRC Cashier is directed to pay movant-counsel the amount of
P677,589.96 which is currently deposited therein to partially satisfy the lien.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Evangelina questioned the February 14, 2005 Order of the LA before the NLRC.
On January 31, 2006, the NLRC issued a Resolution[9] dismissing the appeal for
lack of merit.
Evangelina then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari.[10] On
October 31, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision[11] partially granting the petition.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January
31, 2006 and July 18, 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
Attorney's fees of respondent Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. is declared fully
compensated by the amount of P1,347,950.11 that he has already received.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Evangelina filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on June 6, 2008, the CA
issued a Resolution[13] denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition.
Evangelina presented this issue, viz.:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW IN ITS DECISION DATED 31 OCTOBER 2007 AND RESOLUTION DATED 6
JUNE 2008 INSOFAR AS IT UPHOLDS RESPONDENT LAWYER'S CLAIM OF FORTY
PERCENT (40%) OF THE MONETARY AWARD IN A LABOR CASE AS ATTORNEY'S
FEES.[14]
In effect, petitioner seeks affirmance of her conviction that the legal compensation
of a lawyer in a labor proceeding should be based on Article 111 of the Labor
Code.
There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees
represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal
services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept,
attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid
by the losing party to the prevailing party,[15] such that, in any of the cases
provided by law where such award can be made, e.g., those authorized in Article
2208 of the Civil Code, the amount is payable not to the lawyer but to the client,
unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof.[16]
Here, we apply the ordinary concept of attorney's fees, or the compensation that
Atty. Go is entitled to receive for representing Evangelina, in substitution of her
husband, before the labor tribunals and before the court.
Evangelina maintains that Article 111 of the Labor Code is the law that should
govern Atty. Go's compensation as her counsel and assiduously opposes their
agreed retainer contract.
Article 111 of the said Code provides:
ART. 111. Attorney's fees. -- (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the
culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the
amount of the wages recovered.
Contrary to Evangelina's proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the
extraordinary concept of attorney's fees. It regulates the amount recoverable as
attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the
prevailing party. It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable
to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered.[17]
In this regard, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court should be observed in
determining Atty. Go's compensation. The said Rule provides:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to fees. -- An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as
expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such
testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by
the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.[18]
The retainer contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent
fee. The contract shall control in the determination of the amount to be paid,
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.[19] Attorney's
fees are unconscionable if they affront one's sense of justice, decency or
reasonableness.[20] The decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of a
stipulated amount in a contingent fee contract will not preclude recovery. It
merely justifies the fixing by the court of a reasonable compensation for the
lawyer's services.[21]
The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be
considered in assessing the proper amount of compensation that a lawyer should
receive. Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the said Code provides:
CANON 20 -- A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01. -- A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his
fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
Chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the
court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges.[22] The amount
of contingent fees agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that
counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A
much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that
the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails.[23] The Court finds nothing illegal in
the contingent fee contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina's husband. The CA
committed no error of law when it awarded the attorney's fees of Atty. Go and
allowed him to receive an equivalent of 39% of the monetary award.
The issue of the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a question of fact. Well-
settled is the rule that conclusions and findings of fact of the CA are entitled to
great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent
reasons which are absent in the case at bench. The findings of the CA, which are
supported by substantial evidence, are almost beyond the power of review by the
Supreme Court.
Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that
he should receive adequate compensation for his efforts. Even as we agree with
the reduction of the award of attorney's fees by the CA, the fact that a lawyer
plays a vital role in the administration of justice emphasizes the need to secure to
him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and
respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial
protection against injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the
client is against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not
alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see
that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital consisting of his brains and with
his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time
and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any
attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. It
would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client,
he himself would not get his due.[25]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 31, 2007 and
the Resolution dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
96279 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 7474, September 09, 2014 ]
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51,
SORSOGON CITY, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the
respondent, a law practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing
frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the courts because
the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case.
Hence, the complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of
respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Antecedents
On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S. Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case
No. 2006-6795, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then
pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided
by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid. [1] Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty.
Vicente Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But
aside from entering his appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also
moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the
RTC "[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge
and the undersigned," where "he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding
Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned."[2]
Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca's motion to re-raffle through an order issued
on February 14, 2007,[3] viz:
xxxx
This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the
personal sentiments of counsel who was not even the original counsel of the
litigant.
Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court
and the other Courts in this province as he would like it to appear that jurisdiction
over a Family Court case is based on his whimsical dictates.
This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases
against this Presiding Judge which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court
for utter lack of merit. This is why he should not have accepted this particular case
so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions
for inhibition. It is the lawyer's duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but
not to appear for a client to remove a case from the Court. This is unethical
practice in the first order.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby
DENIED.
Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty.
Vicente C. Judar dated January 29, 2007, the same is hereby DENIED for being
violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip
William Arsenault is likewise DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint[4] in the Office of the Bar
Confidant citing Atty. Dealca's unethical practice of entering his appearance and
then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous
adverse incidents between them.
On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint,
and required Atty. Dealca to submit his comment.[5]
In his comment-complaint,[6] Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid's issuance
of the February 14, 2007 order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the
accused of the right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and impartial trial;
that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion to lift and set
aside the warrant of arrest issued against the accused; and that it should be Judge
Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the
Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.
On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate
investigation, report and recommendation.[7] Several months thereafter, the Court
also indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-
RTJ, entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court Stenographer
Merlyn D. Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon
City" (Yap v. Judge Madrid). [8]
On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madrid dismissed for its lack of merit
the administrative complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil Case No.
2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to file administrative or criminal
complaints against judges and court personnel whenever decisions, orders or
processes were issued adversely to him and his clients.[9]
In compliance with the referral, the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report
with the following findings and recommendation:
xxxx
The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty.
Juan S. Dealca filed by himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for
the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-
0478-E; (4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI
No. 05-2191-RTJ. These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that
respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the complainants against court
officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents
in cases that respondent had handled as counsel for the parties in the said cases.
It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge
Jose L. Madrid & Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon
Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the court, and the case aroused (sic) out of
the unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members that was adverse to the
position of the respondent. The other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the cases
handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to secure a favorable
action from the court.
Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before
the sala of Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo
Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and Damages, that was handled by
respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez.
OMB-L-C-0478-E was an offshoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D.
Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for: Support pending before the
sala of complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51). Respondent, after an
unfavorable decision against defendant Joseph H. Yap III, entered his appearance
and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order, this ombudsman case
arose.
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case
No. 5403 entitled "Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our
Lady's Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party
defendant that was heard, tried, decided and pending execution before the sala of
Judge Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil
Case No. 2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H.
Yap III" for Support pending before the sala of complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid
(RTC 51).
All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the
court against the clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to the
remedies available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in
filing administrative and criminal case against the judges and personnel of the
court.
The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED
COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003 in Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-
DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINAS-CARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF RESOLUTION on
October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334 entitled "SOFIA JAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA
RUBY VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92 provides: "RESOLVED to
ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the
Third Division of the Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case
No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida) The notice of resolution
dated October 22, 2005 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dismissing
the case for lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated
February 17, 2004 entitled "Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida" for:
Malpractice (Forum Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by Acting
Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical
Records" which provides for the dismissal of the cases against all the accused, do
not show participation on the part of the respondent that he signed the pleadings,
although the verified complaint is one executed by the wife of the respondent.
Moreover, these cases are pertaining to persons other than judges and personnel
of the court that are not squarely covered by the present investigation against
respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact that respondent had appeared for
and in behalf of his wife, the rest of the complainants in the Civil Service Case and
Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter case resulted in the
administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondent's sister
member of the Bar. All these documentary evidence from (a) to (e) are helpful in
determining the "PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a member of the bar in
resorting to harassment cases instead of going through the procedures provided
for by the Rules of Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of the
court.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-
foregoings [sic], a penalty of SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months from finality of the decision be ordered against respondent Atty. Juan
S. Dealca.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and
Recommendation[11] finding Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and
criminal complaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the
practice of law for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was
devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on purely personal whims.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,[12] the IBP Board of Governors modified the
recommendation and dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of merit,
thus:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled
case for lack of merit.
Judge Madrid filed a petition,[13] which the IBP Board of Governors treated as a
motion for reconsideration, and soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-
545.[14]
Issues
(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against
judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge
Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?
Ruling of the Court
We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.
I
Atty. Dealca must guard against
his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits
Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he
filed against judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that
as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute cases against
unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel.[15]
We see no merit in Atty. Dealca's arguments.
Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a
high sense of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and
inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should
be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self-interest. The noble cause of
cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason
that Atty. Dealca's complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious
scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruism in the
motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for
vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP
Commissioner Hababag pointed out,[16] his bringing of charges against judges,
court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed
from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew,
therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither
vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting to the
appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every
lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass
them.[17]
The Lawyer's Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any
violation thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension,
or other disciplinary action.[18] The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not
to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit."
These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be
upheld and keep inviolable.[19]
As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer's Oath
not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly
embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
thuswise:
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the
orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must
resist the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his clients' propensities to
litigate,[20] so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating
unfounded suits. While it is the Court's duty to investigate and uncover the truth
behind charges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them
from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other
things.[21]
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the
proper administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of
the unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the
workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the
exercise of the right to litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in good
faith.[22] Atty. Dealca's bringing of the numerous administrative and criminal
complaints against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince
any good faith on his part, considering that he made allegations against them
therein that he could not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous
and unworthy of the Court's precious time and serious consideration.
Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca
had the temerity to confront even the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to
wit:
With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases
filed against erring judges and court personnel 'for lack of merit', i.e. without even
discussing the facts and the law of the case.[23]
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could
have promulgated in frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His
arrogant posturing would not advance his cause now. He thereby demonstrated
his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the Court. The minute
resolutions have been issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the
Court.[24] Whenever the Court then dismisses a petition for review for its lack of
merit through a minute resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or
order, together with all its findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or
upheld,[25] and the minute resolution then constitutes the actual adjudication on
the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or its denial of due course
indicates the Court's agreement with and its adoption of the findings and
conclusions of the court a quo.[26]
The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute
resolutions that the Court issues in disposing of a case. The Court explained why
in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: [27]
The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions
and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without
merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed
from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the
case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is
filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance
with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always
gives the legal basis.
The Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal
basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu
Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[28] The petitioner contended that the
minute resolutions violated Section 14,[29] Article VIII of the Constitution. The
Court, through Justice Regalado, declared that resolutions were not decisions
within the constitutional contemplation, for the former "merely hold that the
petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all
this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no
need to fully explain the Court's denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law
are already mentioned in the Court of Appeal's decision." It pointed out that the
constitutional mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e.,
given due course to and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other
pleadings, but not where the petition was being refused due course, with the
resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of the refusal. Thus, when the
Court, after deliberating on the petition and the subsequent pleadings, decided to
deny due course to the petition and stated that the questions raised were factual,
or there was no reversible error in the lower court's decision, there was a sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.[30]
II
Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited
himself" upon his motion to inhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary."[31] However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has
recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit
considering that the motion, being purely based on his personal whims, was
bereft of factual and legal bases.[32]
The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend the legal causes for their clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their
membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.[33]
In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
pertinently state:
Canon 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxxx
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.
In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of
justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial
institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.[34]
The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to
wit:
Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and
the undersigned, he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and
the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned x x x.[35] (Bold
emphasis supplied)
Atty. Dealca's averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by
him directly insinuated that judges could choose the cases they heard, and could
refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges and the
litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been
assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only Judge
Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that
could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it.
Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or
disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter's
sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent
upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of
bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a
particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel.[36] The latter's
bare allegations of Judge Madrid's partiality or hostility did not suffice,[37]
because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to
dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor
should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.[38] As
such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in
Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.
On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first
administrative complaint to be ever brought against Atty. Dealca. In Montano v.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines,[39] we reprimanded him for violating Canon 22
and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned
him that a repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more severely.
Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers found
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03,[40] and Canon 11, Rule 11.04[41] of the Code, we
deem appropriate to suspend Atty. Dealca from the practice of law for a period
one year.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S.
DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for one year effective from notice of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that
any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to Atty. Dealca's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance. SO ORDERED.
[ AC. No. 7421, Oct 10, 2007 ]
ELISA V. VENTEREZ v. ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME +
RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Complaint filed by complainants Eliza V. Venterez, Genaro de Vera,
Inocencia V. Ramirez, Pacita V. Mills, Antonina V. Palma and Ramon de Vera
against respondent Atty. Rodrigo R. Cosme, charging the latter with
Abandonment, Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.
Complainants contracted the legal services of respondent in Civil Case No. 981
entitled, "Sps. Daniel and Lolita Oviedo, et al. v. Eliza de Vera, et al.," for
Declaration of Ownership with Damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan. Respondent represented the complainants, who
were defendants in said case, until a Decision thereon was rendered by the MTC
on 25 February 2004. The MTC ruled against the complainants. Respondent
received a copy of the said Decision on 3 March 2004.
Complainants alleged that they directed the respondent to either file a Motion for
Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal, but respondent failed or refused to do so.
The 15-day period within which to file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration
of the MTC Decision expired on 18 March 2004. Complainant Elisa V. Venterez was
constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the Motion for Reconsideration
which was filed on 19 March 2004. It must be stressed that the said motion was
signed by complainant Elisa V. Venterez herself as the said lawyer did not enter
his appearance.
On 23 March 2004, the said Motion for Reconsideration was denied[1] by the
MTC. Respondent was not furnished a copy of the denial of the motion per a
Certification[2] issued by Clerk of Court II Zenaida C. de Vera. On 31 March 2004,
a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution[3] was filed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 981 but respondent never bothered to file an opposition to or any comment
on the said motion despite receipt thereof. The motion was eventually granted[4]
by the MTC on 23 April 2004. On 28 April 2004, a Writ of Execution[5] was issued
and on 26 April 2004, an Entry of Judgment[6] was made in the said case.
Two months after respondent received a copy of the Decision, the respondent
filed his Notice of Retirement of Counsel with the MTC on 3 May 2004.
Feeling aggrieved by respondent's actuations, complainants filed the instant
administrative complaint against him.[7]
In his Answer,[8] respondent denied the claim of complainants that soon after the
Decision was rendered by the MTC, they (complainants) directed him to file an
appeal or a motion for reconsideration thereof. For his defense, respondent
averred that Salvador Ramirez (the son of one of the complainants, Inocencia V.
Ramirez), informed him that "he [was] withdrawing the case from the respondent
because he already engaged another lawyer to take over the case, so respondent
gave the records of the case to him." Respondent explained that "after Salvador
Ramirez withdrew the case from the respondent, and engaged another lawyer,
the respondent turned over the records of the case to him and the respondent
ceased as the counsel of the complainants." Respondent further alleged that the
said Motion for Reconsideration was already prepared by another lawyer. He
denied being furnished a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration allegedly
prepared and filed by another lawyer engaged by complainant Elisa V. Venterez
and that he was served with a copy of the denial of the said Motion by the MTC.
Respondent also clarified that the "last day of the 15-day period for the perfection
of the appeal is 19 March 2004 since a copy of the decision was served on the
respondent on 4 March 2004." Finally, respondent argued that "when the
respondent was served a copy of the Motion for Writ of Execution, he
immediately notified Salvador Ramirez about said Motion but Salvador Ramirez
came to see the respondent only on 3 May 2005, when the respondent asked him
to sign a Notice of Retirement of Counsel signed by Salvador Ramirez which
respondent immediately filed in court."
Pursuant to the complaint, a hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City, on 15 February 2006.
On 11 April 2006, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his
Report and Recommendation,[9] finding respondent liable for gross negligence
and recommending the imposition upon him of the penalty of three months
suspension, to wit:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that Respondent is GUILTY of Gross
Negligence and should be given the penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION.
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution[10] No. XVII-2006-457
dated 8 September 2006, approving and adopting the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross
negligence, Atty. Rodrigo Cosme is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) months.[11]
We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in
handling complainants' case, as would warrant disciplinary action.
No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his
client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity
to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.[12]
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until
the case becomes final and executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his
client and withdraw his services without reasonable cause and only upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances.[13] Any dereliction of duty by a counsel affects
the client.[14] This means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense.[15]
The Decision in Civil Case No. 981 was rendered by the MTC of Calasaio,
Pangasinan, on 25 February 2004. Respondent admitted[16] that he was served a
copy of the said Decision on 4 March 2004. After having received a copy of the
MTC Decision, respondent did not bother to file a Motion for Reconsideration or a
notice of appeal with the proper courts. Thus, complainants were compelled to
engage the services of a new counsel to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the
MTC who did not, however, enter his appearance as new counsel. It bears
stressing that during this time, respondent had not yet filed any notice of
withdrawal as counsel for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981. Respondent only
formally withdrew as counsel for complainant in Civil Case No. 981 when he filed
with the MTC his Notice[17] of Retirement as Counsel on 5 May 2004, on the
ground that "he was also retired as Counsel for the [complainants] two days after
he received copy of the decision rendered in this case when SALVADOR RAMIREZ,
a representative of the [complainants], withdrew all the records of the case from
[respondent] to be given to his new counsel."
We cannot accept respondent's defense that he had already withdrawn from the
case two days after his receipt of the MTC Decision and that he had allegedly
communicated this withdrawal to Salvador Ramirez, son of one of the herein
complainants, Inocencia Ramirez. It is an apparent attempt on the part of
respondent to wash his hands of any liability for failing to pursue any of the
available remedies to complainants from the adverse MTC Decision.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the
attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause.[18] The right of an
attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is,
however, considerably restricted.[19] Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the
principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.[20] He is not at liberty to abandon it without
reasonable cause. A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final
adjudication arises only from the client's written consent or from a good cause.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 26. Change of attorneys -- An attorney may retire at any time from any action
or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may
also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent
of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing,
determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name
of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in
place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the
adverse party.
A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the
written consent of his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the
adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an
application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party,
shall determine whether the lawyer ought to be allowed to retire. The application
for withdrawal must be based on a good cause.
What constitute good cause for the withdrawal of services by the counsel are
identified under Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides:
CANON 22 -- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD
CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Rule 22.01 -- A lawyer may WITHDRAW his services in any of the following cases:
a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection
with the matter he is handling;
b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons
and rules;
c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of
the client;
d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him
to carry out the employment effectively;
e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to
comply with the retainer agreement;
f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
g) Other similar cases.
The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds aforementioned. Neither
can the circumstances of this case be considered analogous to the grounds thus
explicitly enumerated. Contrary to respondent's contention, his professional
relations as a lawyer with his clients are not terminated by the simple turnover of
the records of the case to his clients. Respondent's defense completely crumbles
in face of the fact that Salvador Ramirez is not even a party in Civil Case No. 981
and, hence, had no authority to withdraw the records of the said case from
respondent or to terminate the latter's services.
Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his services,
he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainants in the cold, unprotected.
The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted
by the court.[24] Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer
remains counsel of record who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court,
to do what the interests of his clients require.[25] He must still appear before the
court to protect the interest of his clients by availing himself of the proper remedy,
for the attorney-client relations are not terminated formally until there is a
withdrawal of record.
Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel,
respondent remains counsel of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981;
and whether he has a valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot
immediately do so and leave his clients without representation. An attorney may
only retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by permission
of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event, the attorney should see
to it that the name of the new attorney is recorded in the case.[26] Respondent
did not comply with these obligations. Therefore, he remains the counsel of
record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981 with the duty to protect
complainants' interest. Had he made the necessary inquiries as to the status of the
case, he would have known that he was still the counsel of record as no entry of
appearance was ever made by another counsel. It would have been easily
discernible on his part that there was no change in his status as complainants'
lawyer. As of that time, their client-lawyer relationship was still subsisting.
Therefore, he would have known that the Motion for Reconsideration was denied;
and a writ of execution had been issued under the circumstances.
All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondent's failure to protect the
interest of complainants, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable." Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the
members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence of the public.
The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant lawyer
involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the
case.[27] In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted of
reprimand,[28] fine of five hundred pesos with warning,[29] suspension of three
months,[30] six months[31] and even disbarment[32] in an aggravated case.
The facts of the case show that respondent failed to live up to his duties as a
lawyer pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility. We conclude that a 3-
month suspension from the practice of law is a just penalty under the
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and
adopting the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner is
hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent's personal record with the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorneyin
the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court
139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension
for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to
maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and
to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the
above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay
his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a
member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely
optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one
of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his
annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further
the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services,
may require thet the cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is
not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over
matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus
the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court, Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 10911
VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR … Complainant
 versus
ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ … Respondent
Promulgated: June 6, 2017

DECISION

TIJAM, J:

This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint for disbarment dated
October 16, 2009 filed by complainant Virgilio Mapalad, Sr. against respondent
Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).1

The Facts

Complainant alleged that in an action for Recovery of Possession and Damages

with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 1635-1-
784 before the Municipal Trial Court in Santiago City, Isabela, complainant was
one of the plaintiffs while respondent was the defendants' counsel therein. As the
said case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs, respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal dated May 22, 2009, in which respondent indicated his Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance No. II-0014038 without indicating
the date of issue thereof.2 On appeal, respondent filed the appellants' brief, again
only indicating his MCLE Compliance Number.3

In another case docketed as Special Civil Action No. 3573, respondent, for the
same clients, filed a Petition for Injunction wherein he once again only indicated
his MCLE Compliance Number.4 Respondent also filed a Motion for Leave of
Court dated July 13, 2009 in the said special civil action, indicating his MCLE
Compliance Number without the date of issue.5

Upon inquiry with the MCLE Office, complainant discovered that respondent had
no MCLE compliance yet. The MCLE Office then issued a Certification dated
September 30, 2009, stating that respondent had not yet complied with his MCLE
requirements for the First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 to April 14, 2004) and
Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007).6

Hence, this complaint. Complainant argues that respondent's act of deliberately

and unlawfully misleading the courts, parties, and counsels concerned into
believing that he had complied with the MCLE requirements when in truth he had
not, is a serious malpractice and grave misconduct.7 The complainant, thus,
prayed for the IBP to recommend respondent's disbarment to this Court.8

In a resolution dated February 10, 2010, this Court required the respondent to file
a comment on the complaint within 10 days from notice.9 Despite receipt thereof,
however, respondent failed to comply with the said resolution.10 This Court, thus,
issued another resolution dated July 11, 2011 requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure and, again, to file a comment to the complaint.11 However, the respondent
again failed to comply.12

On August 14, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) issued a
Notice of Mandatory Conference/ Hearing.13 On the date of the hearing,
however, none of the parties appeared despite due notice.14 Nonetheless, the IBP
directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 10 days from
notice.15 Only the complainant filed his position paper, reiterating the allegations
and arguments in his complaint.16

After investigation, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD rendered a

report17 dated December 17, 2013 with the following recommendation, to wit:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation of the pieces of evidence submitted by the

complainant, it is recommended that ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ be
DISBARRED and that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys upon finality
of the decision.

SO ORDERED.18

On September 28, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-
2014-685, adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the CBD-
IBP Investigating Commissioner, viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable
laws, and for Respondent's violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he falsified
his MCLE Compliance Number and used it in his pleadings in Court, including his
having ignored the Orders and notices of the Commission on Bar Discipline and
his having been previously sanctioned twice by the IBP, Atty. Anselmo Echanez is
hereby DISBARRED and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.19
No motion for reconsideration was filed by either party.

The Issue

Should respondent be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the

complaint and evidence on record?

The Ruling

We answer in the affirmative.

Preliminarily, let it be stated that there. is no denying that the respondent was
given ample opportunity to answer the imputations against him and defend
himself but he did not do so despite due notices.

At any rate, respondent's acts of misconduct are clearly manifest, thus, warranting
the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.

First. It was clearly established that respondent violated Bar Matter No. 85020. No
less than the MCLE Office had issued a certification stating that respondent had
not complied with the first and second compliance period of the MCLE.21

Second. Despite such non-compliance, respondent repeatedly indicated a false

MCLE compliance number in his pleadings before the trial courts.22 In indicating
patently false information in pleadings filed before the courts of law, not only
once but four times, as per records, the respondent acted in manifest bad faith,
dishonesty, and deceit. In so doing, he indeed misled the courts, litigants-his own
clients included-professional colleagues, and all others who may have relied on
such pleadings containing false information.23

Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false information
is a mockery of the courts, especially this Court, considering that it is this Court
that authored the rules and regulations that the respondent violated.24

The Lawyer's Oath in Rule 138, Section 3 of the Rules of Court requires
commitment to obeying laws and legal orders, doing no falsehood, and acting
with fidelity to both court and client, among others, viz.:

I, x x x do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according
to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these, voluntary obligations
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (emphasis
supplied)

Also, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR likewise states:
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice.

In using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings, respondent also put
his own clients at risk. Such deficiency in pleadings can be fatal to the client's
cause as pleadings with such false information produce no legal effect.25 In so
doing, respondent violated his duty to his clients.26 Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR
provide:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Third. The respondent also repeatedly failed to obey legal orders of the trial court,
the IBP-CBD, and also this Court despite due notice. In the special civil action
above-cited, the trial court directed the respondent to file a comment on a
motion which raised in issue respondent's use of a false MCLE compliance number
in his pleadings but he did not file any.27 This Court also directed respondent to
file a comment on the instant complaint but he failed to do so.28 We then issued
a show cause order against the respondent to explain why he should not be
disciplined or held in contempt for failing to file the required comment but again,
respondent did not heed this court's order.29 The IBP-CBD also notified the
respondent to appear before it for mandatory conference/ hearing but the said
notice was also ignored.30
Court orders should be respected not only because the authorities who issued
them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that
should be extended to the judicial branch of the government, which is absolutely
essential if our government is to be a government of laws and not of men.31

Clearly, respondent's act of ignoring the said court orders despite notice violates
the lawyer's oath and runs counter to the precepts of the CPR. By his repeated
dismissive conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for
the authority of the Court.

Respondent's culpability is further highlighted by the fact that, as cited by the IBP
Board of Governors in its resolution, respondent had already been sanctioned by
the IBP twice. In a decision dated April 11, 2013 by this Court en banc, respondent
was found guilty of engaging in notarial practice without a notarial commission,
and was thus suspended from the practice of law for two years with the warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe
sanction.32 In another decision dated May 31, 2016, this Court en banc again
found respondent guilty of performing notarial acts without a notarial commission
and was thus suspended from the practice of law for two years and barred
permanently from being commissioned as notary public with a stem warning that
a repetition of the same shall be dealt with severely.33 It is noteworthy that in
both cases, respondent already manifested his lack of regard, not only for the
charges against him, but most importantly to the orders of the IBP and the courts.
In the said cases, the respondent likewise failed to file answers, comments, or
position papers, or attended mandatory conferences despite due notices.34

Taken altogether, considering respondent's act of using a false MCLE compliance

number in his pleadings35, his repeated failure to obey legal orders36, and the
fact that he had already been sanctioned twice by this Court on separate cases37,
We are constrained to affirm the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution No. XXI-
2014-685, recommending his disbarment to prevent him from further engaging in
legal practice.38 It cannot be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the
administration of justice.39 As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to
maintain legal proficiency and a high standard of honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing.40 Also, of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound
to uphold the laws.41 He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the
world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and ignore
the very bonds of society, is unfaithful to his position and office and sets a
detrimental example to the society.42

WHEREFORE, respondent Anselmo S. Echanez is hereby DISBARRED from the

practice of law, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of
the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
FACTS: Before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is a disbarment case filed
by Virgilio J. Mapalad, Sr. against respondent-lawyer Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez, for
failure to comply with the MCLE requirements. The respondent’s act of
deliberately and unlawfully misleading the courts, parties and counsels concerned
into believing that he had complied with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirements, when in truth he had not, is a serious malpractice
and grave misconduct in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Canon 1, /Rule 1.01 and
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he falsified
his MCLE Compliance Number. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),
after thorough investigation, and careful evaluation of pieces of evidence
submitted by the complainant (respondent opted not to heed the directive of the
Commission to file comment and position papers), recommended that Atty.
Anselmo S. Echanez be disbarred and his name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys, which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.
ISSUE:Whether or not the respondent be administratively disciplined based on the
allegations in the complaint and evidence on record?
HELD: YES. Respondent violated Bar Matter No. 850. The Lawyer’s Oath in Rule
138, Section 3 of the Rules of Court requires commitment to obeying laws and
legal orders, doing no falsehood, and acting with fidelity to both court and client,
among others. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes (Canon 1), he shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01), he owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court (Canon 10), he shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be
mislead by any artifice (Rule 10.01), he owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him (Canon 17), and he
shall serve his client with competence and diligence (Canon 18).

EN BANC

[ AC. No. 5482, Feb 10, 2015 ]

JIMMY ANUDON v. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA +

RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:

Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the
document be present. Otherwise, their participation with respect to the document
cannot be acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the absence of the
parties is a breach of duty.

Complainants Jimmy Anudon (Jimmy) and Juanita Anudon (Juanita) are brother-
and sister-in-law.[1] Complainants and Jimmy's brothers and sister co-own a
4,446-square-meter parcel of land located in Sison, Pangasinan covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 69244.[2]

Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra (Atty. Cefra) is a distant relative of Jimmy and
Juanita. He was admitted to the bar in 1996. He practices law and provides
services as notary public in the Municipality of Sison, Pangasinan.[3]

On August 12, 1998, Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale[4] over a land
covered by TCT No. 69244. The names of Johnny Anudon (Johnny), Alfonso
Anudon (Alfonso), Benita Anudon-Esguerra (Benita), and complainants Jimmy and
Juanita appeared as vendors, while the name of Celino Paran, Jr. (Paran) appeared
as the vendee.[5]

Jimmy and Juanita claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was falsified. They
alleged that they did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Moreover, they did not
sign it before Atty. Cefra.[6] The National Bureau of Investigation's Questioned
Documents Division certified that Jimmy and Juanita's signatures were
forged.[7] This is contrary to Atty. Cefra's acknowledgment over the document,
which states:

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the Munici[pa]lity of Sison, personally
appeared JOHNNY ANUDON, ALFONSO ANUDON, BENITA ESGUERRA, JIMMY
ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON, who exhibited to me their respective
Community Tax Certificates as above-indicated, known to me and known to be
the same persons who executed the foregoing Deed of Absolute Sale and
acknowledged to me that the same is their free act and voluntary deed.

This instrument, which refers to a Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of lot,
consists of two pages and have [sic] been signed by the parties and the respective
witnesses on each and every page thereof.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 12TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1998.

(Sgd.)
ARTURO B. CEFRA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1999
PTR NO. 2461164; 1-7-98
SISON, PANGASINAN[8]

In addition to the forgery of their signatures, Jimmy and Juanita stated that it was
physically impossible for their brothers and sister, Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita, to
sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Johnny and Benita were in the United States on
the day the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, while Alfonso was in Cavite.[9]

Due to the forgery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, with Jimmy and Juanita as witnesses, filed a case of falsification of
public document against Atty. Cefra and Paran.[10]

Jimmy and Juanita also initiated a disciplinary action by filing a Complaint [11] with
this court on August 6, 2001 questioning the propriety of Atty. Cefra's conduct as
lawyer and notary public.

In the Resolution[12] dated September 19, 2001, this court required Atty. Cefra to
comment on the administrative complaint. Atty. Cefra filed multiple Motions for
Extension of Time,[13] which this court granted.[14] Despite the allowance for
extension of time, Atty. Cefra did not comply with this court's order to file a
Comment. This court fined Atty. Cefra in the Resolutions dated March 12,
2003[15] and November 17, 2003.[16] In both Resolutions, this court directed Atty.
Cefra to file his Comment.[17]

Atty. Cefra's continued refusal to file his Comment caused this court to order his
arrest and commitment.[18] Thus, the National Bureau of Investigation's agents
arrested Atty. Cefra at his residence on January 14, 2007.[19]

Atty. Cefra finally submitted his Comment[20] on January 15, 2008.

In his defense, Atty. Cefra stated that Jimmy and Juanita were aware of the sale of
the property covered by TCT No. 69244. He narrated that on July 10, 1998, Juanita
and Jimmy's wife Helen Anudon went to his residence to consult him on how they
could sell the land covered by TCT No. 69244 to Paran.[21] Atty. Cefra claimed that
he assisted in the preparation of the documents for the sale, which included the
deed of sale and the acknowledgment receipts for payment.[22]

On August 13, 1998, Paran's relatives, Viola Carantes and Lita Paran, brought the
Deed of Absolute Sale to the residences of Jimmy, Juanita, and Johnny's son,
Loejan Anudon (Loejan) to have the document signed.[23] Viola Carantes and Lita
Paran informed Atty. Cefra that they witnessed Jimmy, Juanita, and Loejan sign
the document.[24] Loejan affixed the signatures for his father, Johnny, and his
uncle and aunt, Alfonso and Benita.[25]

Atty. Cefra admitted knowing that Loejan affixed the signatures of Johnny,
Alfonso, and Benita "with the full knowledge and permission of the three[.]"[26] He
allowed this on the basis of his belief that this was justified since Loejan needed
the proceeds of the sale for the amputation of his mother's leg.[27] It clearly
appeared that Loejan forged the three (3) signatures. Loejan did not have formal
authorization to sign on behalf of his father, uncle, and aunt.

According to Atty. Cefra, he "notarized the questioned document in good faith,

trusting in [complainants'] words and pronouncements; with the only purpose of
helping them out legally and financially[.]"[28]

After receiving Atty. Cefra's Comment, this court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.[29]

During the investigation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Juanita appeared
without any counsel and manifested her intention to solicit the services of the
Public Attorney's Office.[30] She also informed the Investigating Commissioner that
her co-complainant, Jimmy, had already passed away.[31] The mandatory
conference was held on February 20, 2009.[32] On the same day, the Investigating
Commissioner issued an Order[33] terminating the mandatory conference and
requiring the parties to submit their respective Position Papers.

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cefra's conduct in notarizing the
Deed of Absolute Sale violated the Notarial Law.[34] In addition, Atty. Cefra
violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[35] which requires that
"[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes."

Hence, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the revocation of Atty.

Cefra's notarial commission and the disqualification of Atty. Cefra from
reappointment as notary public for two (2) years. The Investigating Commissioner
also recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6)
months.[36]

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-249[37] dated May 14, 2011, the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines resolved to adopt the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[38] However, they
recommended that the penalty imposed on Atty. Cefra be modifed:

Atty. Arturo B. Cefra is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year and immediate Revocation of his Notarial Commission and Perpetual
Disqualification from re-appointment as Notary Public.[39] (Emphasis in the
original)

Atty. Cefra filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[40] asking the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to temper the recommended penalty against him.[41] In Resolution No.
XXI-2014-93[42] dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines proposed to lower its original penalty against Atty. Cefra:

Atty. Arturo B. Cefra [is] SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, his
notarial practice, if presently existing, immediately REVOKED and his notarial
practice SUSPENDED for two (2) years.[43] (Emphasis in the original)

On September 9, 2014, the Office of the Bar Confidant reported that both parties
no longer filed a Petition for Review of Resolution No. XXI-2014-93.[44]

We agree and adopt the findings of fact of the Investigating

Commissioner. Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra violated the Notarial Law and
the Code of Professional Responsibility in notarizing a document without
requiring the presence of the affiants.

The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a

document. As this court previously explained:

Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one,

and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages
public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires
preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public
from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices
generally.[45] (Citation omitted)

The earliest law on notarization is Act No. 2103.[46] This law refers specifically to
the acknowledgment and authentication of instruments and documents. Section
1(a) of this law states that an acknowledgment "shall be made before a notary
public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is
done."

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the
affiant to appear in person before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1 states:

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an

individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally
complete instrument or document;

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the

notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or
document was voluntarily affixed by himfor the purposes stated in the instrument
or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his
free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative
capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further:

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. . . .

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to
the instrument or document

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the
document voluntarily affixes his or her signature. Without physical presence, the
notary public will not be able to properly execute his or her duty under the
law. In Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons Officials,[47] we stated that "[i]t is obvious
that the party acknowledging must . . . appear before the notary
public[.]"[48] Furthermore, this court pronounced that:

[a] document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are
the very same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public. The
affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document
and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature. Notaries
public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. In fact, it is
their duty to demand that the document presented to them for notarization be
signed in their presence. Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal
deeds.[49] (Citations omitted)
Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document
express the true agreement between the parties. Transgressing the rules on
notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents. It is the notary
public who assures that the parties appearing in the document are the same
parties who executed it. This cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically
present before the notary public acknowledging the document.

Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land. Even if this is
true, Jimmy and Juanita, as vendors, were not able to review the document given
for notarization. The Deed of Absolute Sale was brought to Atty. Cefra by Paran's
representatives, who merely informed Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the
document. Atty. Cefra should have exercised vigilance and not just relied on the
representations of the vendee.

It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be
in the document submitted by the vendee for notarization. In addition, the
possibility of forgery became real.

In Isenhardt v. Atty. Real,[50] Linco v. Atty. Lacebal,[51] Lanuzo v. Atty.

Bongon,[52] and Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe,[53] the respondent notaries were all guilty
of notarizing documents without the presence of the parties. In Linco, Lanuzo,
and Bautista, the respondents notarized documents even if the persons executing
those documents were already dead at the time of notarization. In Bautista, the
respondent, like Atty. Cefra, also allowed another individual to sign on behalf of
another despite lack of authorization.[54] In these cases, this court imposed the
penalty of disqualification as notaries for two (2) years and suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.

In the recent case of De Jesus v. Atty. Sanchez-Malit,[55] the respondent-lawyer

notarized 22 public documents even without the signatures of the parties on
those documents.[56] This court suspended the respondent-lawyer from the
practice of law for one (1) year and perpetually disqualified her from being a
notary public.[57]

Aside from Atty. Cefra's violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also
guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon
requires "[a] lawyer [to] uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes." He contumaciously delayed
compliance with this court's order to file a Comment. As early as September 19,
2001, this court already required Atty. Cefra to comment on the Complaint lodged
against him. Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order until he was arrested by
the National Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on
January 15, 2008, more than seven years after this court's order. Atty. Cefra's
actions show utter disrespect for legal processes.

The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon 11[58] of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to "observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts[.]"

Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 1[59] of the Rules of Court, "wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court" constitutes a ground for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cefra's disobedience to
this court's directive issued in 2001 was not explained even as he eventually filed
his Comment in 2008. Clearly, his disobedience was willful and inexcusable. Atty.
Cefra should be penalized for this infraction.

In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,[60] this court suspended a lawyer who refused to comply
with this court's directives to submit a Rejoinder and to comment on
complainant's Manifestation.[61] The lawyer complied with the order to file a
Rejoinder only after being detained by the National Bureau of Investigation for
five (5) days.[62] Likewise, she complied with the order to comment through a
Manifestation filed after four (4) months without explaining her delay.[63] This
court found that the lawyer's "conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. .
. . [Her] obstinate refusal to comply with the Court's orders 'not only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court's
lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.'"[64]

We thus find that the penalty recommended against Atty. Cefra should be
modified to take into account all his acts of misconduct.

WHEREFORE, this court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra GUILTY of

notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 12, 1998 in the absence of the
affiants, as well as failure to comply with an order from this court. Accordingly,
this court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years, REVOKES his
incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from
being commissioned as a notary public. Respondent is also STERNLY
WARNED that more severe penalties will be imposed for any further breach of the
Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 7054, November 11, 2014 ]

CONRADO N. QUE, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR.,

RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency [1] filed
by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a
member of the Philippine Bar.

Factual Background

n a Decision[2] dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from
the practice of law on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and
processes; filing of multiple actions and forum-shopping; willful, intentional and
deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before the courts; maligning the
name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.

The material portions of the subject Decision provide:

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts
of professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical
standards imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot, agree, however, that only
a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed.
Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of
suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondent's multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed,
and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court
rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we
believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the
respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant
role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk,
too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and
overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at
the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the
orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent's first

ethical infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and
Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay
the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension
for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear
that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has
exhibited traits of incorrigibilily. It is time to put a finis to the respondent's
professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest
of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-

164 dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December
11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar
as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional
misconduct for violations of the Lawyer's Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03,
Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed,
and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion[3] praying that his license to practice law be restored based on
humanitarian considerations, but the Court En Banc resolved to deny the petition
for lack of merit.
The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for Grace,
Succor, and Mercy[4] asking the Court to take a second look at the penalty
imposed upon him. He maintained that Conrado N. Que (complainant) failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed grossly immoral
conduct meriting the severe penalty of disbarment. He also attempted to pass the
blame on another individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager of
Kalayaan Development Corporation) to free himself from liability by claiming that
one of the charges leading to his disbarment was not of his own doing.

In a Resolution[5] dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.

The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his pleas for the
Court's compassion and mercy.[6] He sought the Court's forgiveness stating that
he has learned his lesson; but at the same time, questioning the Court's finding for
lack of factual support. He appended to his appeal proofs of his updated payment
of IBP membership dues,[7] MCLE compliance,[8] and a letter from the Bishop of
Marinduque.[9] His appeal, however, was denied by a Resolution[10] dated August
2, 2011.

On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter[11] addressed to the Members of the
Court En Banc once again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He
alleged among others that for more than three years that he has been disbarred
in the practice of law, he has never been involved in any immoral or illegal
activities, has devoted himself in the services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine,
Commonwealth Avenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted regular
monthly lectures on the subject of marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches, and has
participated as monthly financial contributor to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena
City. He also begged the Court to no longer prolong his penalty since it had
already served its purpose. The plea was also denied on July 3, 2012.[12]

On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement
professing repentance and remorse for what he did.[13] He pleaded for the Court's
consideration, and vowed that he will no longer misuse the rules of procedure but
instead, devote his time and energy for its proper observance and
implementation. He also stated that for almost three years of being disbarred
from the practice of law, he has never been involved in any unlawful, dishonest,
and immoral activities. He promised to maintain at all times a high degree of legal
proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal
profession in accordance with the values and morals embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In a Resolution[14] dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition for lack of
merit.

Aggrieved, the respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a letter[15] pleading the Court
to revisit his previous requests for reinstatement.

Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions dated
August 2, 2011, July 3, 2012, and October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013
denied the motion with finality.[16]

On July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial
Clemency[17] reiterating his apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty of
disbarment has already taken its toll on his health; he has now become most frail
and weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five
(5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he
had been excluded from the practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian and
charity pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on
Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.

The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law
again, but to be made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have
peace of mind. He expressed his sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking
full responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be
lifted and that he be reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his
petition, he submitted a Medical Abstract[18] evidencing his diagnosis for chronic
kidney disease, and a certification[19] from St. Peter Parish, Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family are dedicated parishioners.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the present appeal.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.[20] It is not a

natural, absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but
rather, a special privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate
special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character.[21] The same
reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those
who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be
readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never
permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal
profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened,
it is done so only as a matter of justice.[22]

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether
the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and
character.[23] Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys
rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court.[24] The lawyer has to
demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again
worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her
character and standing prior to the disbannent, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement.[25]

In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent
had demonstrated an active involvement and participation in community and
church activities by joining Youth For Christ, Catechism, and Bible Study and
Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to the Bar, the respondent worked as Municipal
Attorney in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque rendering free legal assistance to his town
mates who were in need of legal service. Thereafter, the respondent was
appointed as a Municipal Administrator and had continued extending assistance
to the indigent residents.

The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community

projects, through the Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as President from
1980 to 1981, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Marinduque Chapter,
where he served as a member, Director, and President from 1982 to 1987.

In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his
indiscretions and claimed to have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor.
Unlike in his previous petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent no
longer questioned the Court's decision. According to him, he has long expressed
deep remorse and genuine repentance.

The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him
sufficient time to reflect on his professional conduct, to show remorse and
repentance, and to realize the gravity of his mistakes. After his disbarment, the
respondent continued lending assistance, and deviated his time and effort in
pursuing civic and religious work that significantly contributed to his character
reformation. He professed that during his almost five (5) years of disbarment, he
has been an active member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage Encounter, and
Knights of Columbus; and through his affiliations with these groups, he had served
in the ecclesial affairs in his parish as an Extraordinary Minister for Holy
Communion and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage
Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St. Peter in Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City.

Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral
fiber as shown by his conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that
he had sufficiently achieved moral reformation.

In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,[26] the Court, in deciding whether

or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from
the time he was disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his
infractions and to repent. The Court also took into account the fact that Atty.
Mejia is already of advanced years, has long repented, and suffered enough. The
Court also noted that he had made a significant contribution by putting up the
Mejia Law Journal containing his religious and social writings; and the religious
organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart
and Mind." Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no
other transgressions since he was disbarred.

Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Court granted the
reinstatement of the disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a
material fact in a CA decision) and considered the period of three (3) years as
sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove that he is worthy to practice law.
In that case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred lawyer's sincere
admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion.

Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,[28] the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found
guilty of malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently
introducing the document in court) after considering the long period of his
disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniw's
disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies to the Court, has
engaged in humanitarian and civic services, and retained an unblemished record
as an elected public servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous civic
and professional organizations, government institutions, and members of the
judiciary.

In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney
before and after his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment
and the application for reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred
attorneys' sincere realization and acknowledgement of guilt.

In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four
(4) years is sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his
professional transgressions.

We emphasize that this is the second time that the respondent was accused and
was found guilty of gross misconduct. The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus
Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,[29] was likewise found guilty of gross
misconduct for committing willful and intentional falsehood before the court;
misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment;
and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law - mostly the same
grounds on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was
based. In Plus Builders, we granted the respondent's motion for reconsideration
and reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two (2) years
to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.

Considering the respondent's earlier disbarment case (and subsequent reduction

of the penalty imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case
against him still pending review by the Court, we are not fully and convincingly
satisfied that the respondent has already reformed. The period of five (5) years is
likewise not considerably long considering the nature and perversity of the
respondent's misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to consider the
respondent's reinstatement.

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in

acknowledging his guilt. While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken
full responsibility of his misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to
other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings,
contradicted his assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily
showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus entertain
serious doubts that the respondent had completely reformed.

As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate
physical condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement
to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has
established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of
sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement was not met. Until such
time when the respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has completely
rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our
decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency

filed by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

DIVISION

[ AC. No. 6368, Jun 13, 2012 ]

FIDELA BENGCO v. ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO +

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco

(Fidela) and Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita) against respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo
(Atty. Bernardo) for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the
Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer.

The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint are as follows:

That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty.
Pablo Bernardo with the help and in connivance and collusion with a certain
Andres Magat [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to
defraud herein complainants Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita N. Bengco by using
false pretenses, deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite the titling of
the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the
acquaintance of complainants herein and they convinced herein complainant[s]
that if they will finance and deliver to him the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance
money he would expedite the titling of the subject land and further by means of
other similar deceit like misrepresenting himself as lawyer of William Gatchalian,
the prospective buyer of the subject land, who is the owner of Plastic City at
Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is the one handling William
Gatchalian's business transaction and that he has contracts at NAMREA, DENR,
CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well knew were false,
fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainant[s] to give and deliver
the said amount ([P]495,000.00) and once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with his obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land,
[wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the
said amount to his personal use and benefit and despite demand upon him to
return the said amount, he failed and refused to do so, which acts constitute
deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation of
Duties and Oath as a lawyer.[2]

In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto Resolutions

dated December 7, 1998[3] and June 22, 1999[4] of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga, respectively, finding
probable cause for the filing of the criminal information[5] against both Atty.
Bernardo and Andres Magat (Magat) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48, charging them with the crime of Estafa
punishable under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The respondent was required to file his Comment.[6] On September 24, 2004, the
respondent filed an undated Comment,[7] wherein he denied the allegations
against him and averred the following:
2. He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April 15,
1997 to July 22, 1997 for purposes of getting from them the amount of
[P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom they contacted and who in turn sought
the legal services of the respondent. It was Andy Magat who received the said
money from them.

3. There was no connivance made and entered into by Andy Magat and
respondent. The arrangement for titling of the land was made by Teresita N.
Bengco and Andy Magat with no participation of respondent.

4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is legal and
allowed in law practice.[8]

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified
comment pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court as it appeared
that the respondent's undated comment filed with the Court was not verified. [9]

On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional

fifteen (15) days from March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005, within which to comply
due to his medical confinement.[10]

Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion[11] for extension
praying for another 20 days, or until April 22, 2005, alleging that he was still
recovering from his illness.

On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference.[12] The respondent
failed to appear; thus, the IBP considered the respondent in default for his failure
to appear and for not filing an answer despite extensions granted. The case was
then submitted for report and recommendation.[13]
Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-
Maala made the following findings:

[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent with the
help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat ("Magat"), by
using false pretenses and deceitful words, [wilfully] and illegally committed
fraudulent acts to the effect that respondent would expedite the titling of the land
belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City, who were the acquaintance of
complainants.

Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and deliver to
them the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money, they would expedite the
titling of the subject land. Respondent represented himself to be the lawyer of
William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City located at Canomay Street,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who was allegedly the buyer of the subject land once it
has been titled. Respondent and Magat also represented that they have contacts
at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation they
knew to be false, fraudulent and were only made to induce complainants to give
and deliver to them the amount of [P]495,000.00. Once in possession of the said
amount, far from complying with their obligation to expedite and cause the titling
of the subject land, respondent and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to their personal use
and benefit and despite demand upon them to return the said amount, they failed
and refused to do so.

In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants filed a

complaint for Estafa against the former before the Third Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary
investigation conducted by the said court, it finds sufficient grounds to hold
respondent and Magat for trial for the crime of Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case was transmitted to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for appropriate action as per
Order dated 7 December 1998.

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of

Pampanga conducted a re-investigation of the case. During the re-investigation
thereof, Magat was willing to reimburse to complainants the amount of
[P]200,000.00 because according to him the amount of [P]295,000.00 should be
reimbursed by respondent considering that the said amount was turned over to
respondent for expenses incurred in the documentation prior to the titling of the
subject land. Both respondent and Magat requested for several extensions for
time to pay back their obligations to the complainants. However, despite
extensions of time granted to them, respondent and Magat failed to fulfil their
promise to pay back their obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the offer of
compromise was construed to be an implied admission of guilt. The Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor believes that there was no reason to disturb the findings of
the investigating judge and an Information for Estafa was filed against respondent
and Magat on 8 July 1999 before the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando,
Pampanga.

The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due
notice on several occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his
flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his despiciency for
his oath of office as a lawyer which deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.

From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that respondent
committed a crime that import deceit and violation of his attorney's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which he was bound to 'obey
the laws of the land.' The commission of unlawful acts, specially crimes involving
moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty in violation of the attorney's oath, grossly
immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers
(Rule 138, Section 27, RRC).
The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case
only on 16 April 2004. As provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission of Bar Discipline, as amended, dated 24 March 2004, "A complaint
for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years
from the date of the professional misconduct" (Section 1, Rule VIII).[14]

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of

TWO YEARS from receipt hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer
and as a member of the Bar. [15]

On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2007-
065, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is
hereby ordered, the restitution of the amount of [P]200,000.00 within sixty (60)
days from receipt of notice with Warning that if he does not return the amount
with in sixty days from receipt of this Order then he will be meted the penalty
of Suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.[16]

On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for

Reconsideration[17] of the aforesaid Resolution of the IBP. The respondent averred
that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with the rules considering that the
complaint was filed more than two (2) years from the alleged misconduct and
therefore, must have been dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit any
misrepresentation in convincing Fidela to give him money to finance the titling of
the land; (3) he was hired as a lawyer through Magat who transacted with Teresita
as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement[18] signed by the latter; (4) he was
denied due process when the Investigating Commissioner considered him as in
default after having ignored the representative he sent during the hearing on
August 3, 2005; and (5) he long restituted the amount of P225,000.00 not as an
offer of compromise but based on his moral obligation as a lawyer due to
Teresita's declaration that he had to stop acting as her legal counsel sometime in
the third quarter of 1997. The respondent pointed out the admission made by
Fidela in her direct testimony before the RTC that she received the amount, as
evidenced by photocopies of receipts.

In an Order[19] dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant was required
to comment within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

In her Comment,[20] Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the
administrative case because they took into consideration the possibility of an
amicable settlement instead of a judicial proceeding since it would stain the
respondent's reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent went into hiding which
prompted them to seek the assistance of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas in order
to trace the respondent's whereabouts; that the respondent was duly accorded
the opportunity to be heard; and finally, that no restitution of the P200,000.00
plus corresponding interest has yet been made by the respondent.

On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation[21] stating that the RTC rendered a
decision in the criminal case for Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo and
Magat "guilty of conspiracy in the commission of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2(a)
of the Revised Penal Code and both are sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of Reclusion Temporal as maximum."[22]
In a Letter[23] dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the
resolution of the present action as she was already 86 years of age. Later, an Ex-
parte Motion to Resolve the Case[24] dated September 1, 2010 was filed by the
complainants. In another Letter dated October 26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years old,
sought for Atty. Bernardo's restitution of the amount of P200,000.00 so she can
use the money to buy her medicine and other needs.

The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.
It is first worth mentioning that the respondent's defense of prescription is
untenable. The Court has held that administrative cases against lawyers do not
prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending
act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the
administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only
be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from
the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward,
they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative
liability they ought to answer for.[25]

Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for
several extensions of time to file the same, the respondent failed to appear during
the mandatory conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is
considered as an officer of the court who is called upon to obey and respect court
processes. Such acts of the respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront
on the court's authority which can not be countenanced.

It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of

justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. In so doing, the people's faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined whether in their professional or in their
private capacity for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and
good demeanor.[26]
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.

There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He
himself admitted in his answer that his legal services were hired by the
complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of land supposedly
purchased. While he begs for the Court's indulgence, his contrition is shallow
considering the fact that he used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the
complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject
properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the
complainants in the amount of P495,000.00.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public

service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant
to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves.[27]

It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a

criminal action filed against a lawyer despite having involved the same set of facts.
Jurisprudence has it "that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily
result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the
respondent's acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively."[28]

In Yu v. Palaña,[29] the Court held that:

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not
constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are
attendant in the administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial policy
to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer
may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the
rules on admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal profession during
the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the
objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts
of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court.[30] (Citations omitted)

As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime
of Estafa for which he was meted the penalty of sentenced to suffer six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of Reclusion Temporalas maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly undermines
the respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Rule 138, Section 27
provides that:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the
punishment commensurate to all his acts and to accord the complainants,
especially the 88-year old Fidela, with the justice they utmost deserve.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is

found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice
hereof.

Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of
P200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from
receipt of this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom;
with a STERN WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him the additional
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 10240 November 25, 2014

[Formerly CBD No. 11-3241]
ESTRELLA R. SANCHEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NICOLAS C. TORRES, M.D., Respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint1 dated November 24, 2011 for disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Nicolas C. Torres (Atty. Torres) filed by Estrella R. Sanchez
(Sanchez) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 11-3241, now A.C. No. 10240, for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) and non-payment of debt.

In her complaint, Sanchez claimed that she is a friend and close acquaintance of
Atty. Torres. That in 2007, Atty. Torres asked Sanchez to lend him money in the
amount of Two Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱2,200,000.00), and
convinced her that he will pay the said amount within a period of one (1) month,
plus interest. On November 8, 2007, persuaded by Atty. Torres' promise that he
will pay immediately, Sanchez was convinced and handed him the cash
amounting to Two Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱2,200,000.00), which
Sanchez withdrew from the bank in Atty. Torres' presence. To bolster Sanchez's
trust and confidence, Atty. Torres issued two (2) Allied Bank checks with check
nos. 0109386 and 0109387, under Account No. 001941-01285-8, both dated
November 8, 2007, amounting to ₱1,200,000.00 and ₱1,000,000.00, respectively, or
in the total amount of ₱2,200,000.002

However, after one (1) month,Atty. Torres failed to pay his obligation as promised.
When Sanchez called Atty. Torres over the phone, she was told that she could
again deposit the check and assured her that the checks will be honored upon
presentment for payment.

On May 2, 2008, Sanchez deposited the said checks to her account, but the same
were returned due to "ACCOUNT CLOSED."

Despite repeated demands for the last three (3) years, Atty. Torres had yet to pay
his obligation since then, and thus, complainant sought legal assistance. As a
consequence, formal demand letters were sent by the complainant's lawyer which
respondent received on August 14, 20083 and November 17, 2008,4 respectively,
and the same proved futile as Atty. Torres failed and refused to pay his obligation.
Nonetheless, Atty. Torres, in his letter dated May 9, 2009,5 promised to pay anew
the amount of ₱2,200,000.00 in cash on or before May 15, 2009 as replacement
for the two checks he previously issued. But no payment whatsoever was made.
Hence, the instant complaint filed on November 28, 2011.

On November 28, 2011, the IBP–Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required Atty.
Torres to file an answer.6

On December 29, 2011, Atty. Torres moved for extension of time to file an answer.
He alleged that his bookkeeper was on a holiday leave and that the receipts of
payments and audit report were in the custody of the bookkeeper which will be
available only in the 1st week of January 2012.7 However, in an Order8 dated
March 2, 2012, the IBP-CBD noted that Atty. Torres had yet to file his Answer to
the complaint even after the expiration of the extension period earlier granted;
thus, a final extension was given anew and the case was set for mandatory
conference. Despite sufficient time for respondent Atty. Torres tofile his answer, he
failed to do so. Worse, he even failed to appear in the scheduled mandatory
conference despite due notice.

Thus, in its Report and Recommendation9 dated June 15, 2012, the IBP-CBD found
Atty. Torres guilty of willful dishonesty and unethical conduct for failure to pay just
debt and for issuing checks without sufficient funds. It recommended that Atty.
Torres be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for at least two (2)
years.

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Atty. Torres was ordered suspended from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and further ordered to return the
amount of ₱2,200,000.00 to Sanchez, with legal interest.10

On August 5, 2013, respondent, through counsel, filed a Manifestation with

Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration.11 He claimed
that he had proof of receipts to show that he had already paid his obligation to
Sanchez.12

However, despite the lapse of considerable time after the receipt of notice to
comply with the said Resolution, no motion for reconsideration was filed. Hence,
in a Resolution dated January 21, 2014, the Court resolved to note the Report
dated December 13, 2013, stating that records of the OBC showed that no motion
for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of November
22, 2013.
RULING

We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD and the IBP-Board
of Governors.

In the instant case, the existence of the loan obligation is undisputed. Sanchez was
able to discharge her burden of proving that she loaned ₱2,200,000.00 to Atty.
Torres as evidenced by the subject bank checks. Furthermore, backed by Atty.
Torres' admission in his letter dated May 9, 2009, his promise to pay the amount
of ₱2,200,000.00 in cash, as replacement for the two checks he previously issued,
is more than sufficient to establish a valid obligation of Atty. Torres to Sanchez.
Atty. Torres’ admission of the loan he contracted and his failure to pay the same
leave no room for interpretation. Likewise, other than his belated and empty
claims of payment, Atty. Torres failed to discharge his burden of proving that he
had indeed paid his obligation to Sanchez.

In Barrientos v. Atty. Libiran-Meteoro,13 we held that:

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay justdebts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society,
to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of
financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflect the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states: Canon 1— A lawyer shall upholdthe
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.

Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

We also note Atty. Torres' conduct in the course of the proceedings where he
repeatedly asked for extensions of time to file an answer and a motion for
reconsideration, which he failed to submit, and his failure to attend the disciplinary
hearings set by the IBP do not speak well of his standing as a lawyer. In Ngayan v.
Tugade,14 we ruled that "[a lawyer’s] failure to answer the complaint against him
and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance
to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in
violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court."

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Lao v. Medel,15 we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the
issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law. The same
sanction was imposedon the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Atty. Dino,16
having been found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment
of a piece of property, the title of which was only entrusted to him by the
complainant.

Following the penalty imposed in a similar situation in A-1 Financial Services v.

Valerio,17 we deem it proper to adopt the penalty of two (2) years suspension in
light of the amount involved and the brazen disregard by Atty. Torres of the
Orders of the IBP-CBDon the filing of an answer and appearance in the hearing.
We cannot sustain, however, the IBP’s recommendation ordering respondent to
return the amount of ₱2,200,000.00 to complainant. In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern isthe
determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no
material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose to file
against each other.18

However, we note that in CF Sharp Crew management, Inc. v. Nicolas C. Torres,19

the Court had already disbarred Torres from the practice of law for having been
found guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In view of the foregoing, we can no longer impose the penalty of suspension or

disbarment against Atty. Torres, considering that he has already been previously
disbarred. We do not have double or multiple disbarments in our laws or
jurisprudence.20 Nevertheless, considering that the issues and the infraction
committed are different from his previous infraction, we deem it proper to resolve
the instant case and give its corresponding penalty for purposes of recording it in
respondent's personal file in the Bar Confidant's Office.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XX-2013-202 dated March 20, 2013 of the IBP, which
found respondent Atty. Nicolas C. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and of
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED and respondent
Atty. Nicolas C. Torres is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of two (2) years from
the practice of law. However, considering that respondent has already been
previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the personal r.ecord of Atty. Torres as a member of the Bar; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for
circulation to all courts in the country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

January 26, 2016

A.C. No. 10868

[Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041]

CHERYLE. VASCO-TAMARAY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DEBORAH Z. DAQUIS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERCURIAM:

Pretending to be counsel for a party in a case and using a forged signature in a

pleading merit the penalty of disbarment.

Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-Tamaray) filed a ComplaintAffidavit before the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines on July 30, 2007, alleging that respondent Atty.
Deborah Z. Daquis (Atty. Daquis) filed, on her behalf, a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged her signature on the Petition.1
She also alleged that Atty. Daquis signed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage as "counsel for petitioner," referring to Vasco-Tamaray.2

Vasco-Tamaray stated that Atty. Daquis was not her counsel but that of her
husband, Leomarte Regala Tamaray.3 To support her allegation, she attached the
Affidavit4 of Maritess Marquez-Guerrero. The Affidavit states:
1. Sometime in October 2006, I accompanied Cheryl Tamaray in going to East
Cafe at Rustan's Makati to meet with her husband Leomarte Tamaray;

2. We arrived at the said place at around 7:00 pm and Leomarte introduced to us

(Cheryl and I) Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis as his lawyer. He further told us that Atty.
Daquis' husband also worked in Japan and that's how he got to know the latter
and got her services;

3. Among other things, Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting and
the presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had decided to file a case to annul
his marriage with Cheryl;

4. Cheryl was shocked and just cried. After awhile [sic], Leomarte's brother arrived
and shortly after, the group left;

5. The next instance that I saw Atty. Daquis was when we (Cheryl and I) went to
McDonald's-Greenbelt where Atty. Daquis tried to convince her not to oppose
Leomarte's decision to have their marriage annulled[.]5 (Emphasis supplied)

Vasco-Tamaray narrated that in December 2006, Atty. Daquis informed her "that a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City."6 In February 2007, Atty. Daquis asked her to appear
before the City Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa City.7

On March 5, 2007, Vasco-Tamaray appeared before the City Prosecutor's Office

and met Atty. Daquis. She asked Atty. Daquis to give her a copy of the Petition
but Atty. Daquis refused.

Vasco-Tamaray stated that she obtained a copy of the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage from Branch 207 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City. She was surprised to see that the Petition was allegedly signed and filed by
her.

Vasco-Tamaray alleged that she did not file the Petition, that her signature was
forged by Atty. Daquis, and that her purported community tax certificate
appearing on the jurat was not hers because she never resided in Muntinlupa
City.10 She attached a Certification issued by the Sangguniang Barangay of
Putatan, Muntinlupa City stating that she was "never . . . a resident of #9 Daang
Hari Street, Umali Compound, Summitville Subdivision, Barangay Putatan."11 She
also attached a Certification issued by Barangay Talipapa stating that she has
been a resident of "#484-J Saguittarius St., Solville Subd., Barangay Talipapa,
Novaliches, Quezon City... from 2000 till present."12

Vasco-Tamaray also alleged that the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
was Atty. Daquis' idea, consented to by Leomarte Tamaray.13

She further alleged that she had never received any court process. The Petition
states that her postal address is "09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville
Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City[,]"14 which is the address of her husband's family.
The return slips of the notices sent by the trial court were received by Encarnacion
T. Coletraba and Almencis Cumigad, relatives ofLeomarte Tamaray.

Atty. Daquis filed an Answer countering that her client was Vasco-Tamaray,
complainant herself, and not complainant's husband. She alleged that Vasco-
Tamaray knew of the Petition as early as October 2006, not December 2006.16

With regard to the community tax certificate, Atty. Daquis explained that when
she notarized the Petition, the community tax certificate number was supplied by
Vasco-Tamaray.17 Atty. Daquis' allegation was supported by the Joint Affidavit of
her staff, Ma. Dolor E. Purawan (Purawan) and Ludy Lorena (Lorena).18
Purawan and Lorena detailed in their Joint Affidavit that they knew Vasco-
Tamaray to be a client of Atty. Daquis and that they never saw Atty. Daquis forge
Vasco-Tamaray's signature. Purawan stated that she typed the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and that the community tax certificate was
provided by Vasco-Tamaray.19

Atty. Daquis alleged that Vasco-Tamaray wanted her to call and demand money
from Leomarte Tamaray but she refused to do so.20

Atty. Daquis argued that Vasco-Tamaray had a copy of the Petition. When Vasco-
Tamaray requested another copy on March 5, 2007, Atty. Daquis was unable to
grant her client's request because she did not have a copy of the Petition with her
at that time.

Atty. Daquis further alleged that Vasco-Tamaray conceived an illegitimate son

with a certain Reuel Pablo Aranda. The illegitimate son was named Charles Dino
Vasco. Reuel Pablo Aranda signed the Affidavit of Acknowledgment/ Admission of
Paternity portion of the birth certificate.22

The Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their position
papers,23 but based on the record, only Vasco-Tamaray complied.24

The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the Complaint

because Vasco-Tamaray failed to prove her allegations. The Commission on Bar
Discipline noted that Vasco-Tamaray should have questioned the Petition or
informed the prosecutor that she never filed any petition, but she failed to do so.

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline
in the Resolution dated September 27, 2014.26
The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis should be
held administratively liable for making it appear that she is counsel for
complainant Cheryl Vasco-Tamaray and for the alleged use of a forged signature
on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

This court finds that respondent violated Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The charge against respondent for violation of Canon
15 is dismissed.

By pretending to be counsel for complainant, respondent violated Canon 1, Rule

1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and failed to uphold her duty of
doing no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any falsehood in court as stated
in the Lawyer's Oath.27

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.

RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

In this case, respondent merely denied complainant's allegation that she was
Leomarte Tamaray's counsel28 but was unable to rebut the other allegations
against her.

Respondent admitted that she met complainant in October 2006,29 but did not
refute30 the statement in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit that Leomarte
Tamaray introduced her as his lawyer.31 Likewise, respondent admitted that she
met with complainant subsequently,32 but did not refute Maritess Marquez-
Guerrero's statement that in one of the meetings, she tried to convince
complainant not to oppose Leomarte Tamaray's decision to annul their
marriage.33

Respondent argued in her Answer that she was the counsel for complainant.34
Yet, there is no explanation how she was referred to complainant or how they
were introduced. It appears, then, that respondent was contacted by Leomarte
Tamaray to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. As stated in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit, "Leomarte told Cheryl
that the reason for that meeting and the presence of Atty. Daquis was because he
had decided to file a case to annul his marriage with Cheryl[. ]"35

Based on this, it seems Leomarte Tamaray intended to file the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. However, respondent made it appear that
complainant, not her client Leomarte Tamaray, was the petitioner. There is a
probability that respondent did not want Leomarte Tamaray to be the petitioner
because he would have to admit that he entered into a bigamous marriage, the
admission of which may subject him to criminal liability.

In addition, if it is true that complainant was respondent's client, then there

appears to be no reason for respondent to advise her "not to oppose Leomarte's
decision to have their marriage annulled."

The records of this case also support complainant's allegation that she never
received any court process because her purported address in the Petition is the
address of Leomarte Tamaray. The Petition states that complainant is "of legal
age, Filipino citizen, married with postal address at 09 Daang Hari St., Umali
Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City[.]"37

The Certificate of Marriage of complainant and Leomarte Tamaray states that

Leomarte's residence is at "Summitvil[l]e Subv [sic], Muntinlupa," while
complainant's residence is at "Hermosa St. Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila."38
Assuming that complainant lived with her husband after they were married,
complainant most likely did not receive court processes because she left their
home before the filing of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As
written in the Minutes of the meeting before the Office of the City Prosecutor:

P[etitioner] & R[espondent] met sometime in 1993 through his secretary. They
became sweethearts in 1993 and their relationship as steadies lasted until 1996;

During the 3 years of their union, petitioner knew respondent's family as she even
sleeps in their house; Theirs was also a long distance relationship as respondent
worked in Japan;

Upon respondents [sic] return to the Philippines they got married in Feb, 1996.
They had no children, as respondent immediately left for Japan on March 11, 1996;

Respondent returned to the Philippines but unfortunately he brought another

woman. As a result, petitioner left their house.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Further, complainant cannot be faulted for her failure to inform the prosecutor
that she did not file any petition for declaration of nullity of marriage because
during the meeting on March 5, 2007, complainant had no knowledge that the
Petition was filed in her name.40 She obtained a copy of the Petition after the
March 5, 2007 meeting.41

In Yupangco-Nakpil v. Uy,42 this court discussed Canon 1, Rule 1.01, as follows:

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the legal
professions, engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct,
viz:

CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct- determinative as it is of the errant lawyer's penalty-

depends on the factual circumstances of each case .

. . . .Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By no insignificant measure,
respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that
of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice.43

When respondent filed the Petition as counsel for complainant when the truth was
otherwise, she committed a falsehood against the trial court and complainant.

II

Respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 when she
allowed the use of a forged signature on a petition she prepared and notarized.44

Complainant alleged that her signature on the Petition was forged.45 Respondent
merely denied complainant's allegation.46
The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was signed by a certain
"CVasco."47 The records of this case show that complainant has used two
signatures. In her identification cards issued by the University of the East, she used
a signature that spelled out "CVasco."48 In her Complaint-Affidavit against
respondent, complainant used a signature that spelled out "CTamaray."49

A comparison of the signatures appearing on the Petition for Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage and on complainant's identification cards show a difference in
the stroke of the letters "c" and "o." Further, complainant's signatures in the
documents50 attached to the records consistently appear to be of the same
height. On the other hand, her alleged signature on the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage has a big letter "c."51 Hence, it seems that complainant's
signature on the Petition for Declaration ofNullity of Marriage was forged.

While there is no evidence to prove that respondent forged complainant's

signature, the fact remains that respondent allowed a forged signature to be used
on a petition she prepared and notarized.52 In doing so, respondent violated
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01. These canons state:

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.

RULE 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

....

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

RULE 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In Embido v. Pe, Jr.,53 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Salvador N. Pe, Jr. was found
guilty of violating Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and was meted the penalty of disbarment for
falsifying a court decision "in a non-existent court proceeding."54 This court
discussed that:

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent

transactions can justify a lawyer's disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent
was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the
act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the
purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the
personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a
member of the Bar.55

In a similar manner, respondent's act of allowing the use of a forged signature on

a petition she prepared and notarized demonstrates a lack of moral fiber on her
part.

Other acts that this court has found violative of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 are: engaging
in a scuffle inside court chambers;56 openly doubting paternity of his own son;57
hurling invectives at a Clerk of Court;58 harassing occupants of a property;59
using intemperate language;60 and engaging in an extramarital affair.61

Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition filed before a

court is tantamount to consenting to the commission of a falsehood before
courts, in violation of Canon 10.

In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera,62 this court discussed the importance of Canon

10, Rule 10.01, as follows:
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but
also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to
the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his
clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the
rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice."63 (Emphasis supplied)

III

This court further finds that respondent violated Canon 17, which states:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

Respondent failed to protect the interests of her client when she represented
complainant, who is the opposing party of her client Leomarte Tamaray, in the
same case.

The responsibilities of a lawyer under Canon 17 were discussed in Penilla v. Alcid,

Jr.:64

The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a
lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of
the client's interest. The most thorough groundwork and study must be
undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The honor bestowed
on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the Lawyer's
Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches to him for the
entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it the consequent
responsibility of not only satisfying the basic requirements but also going the extra
mile in the protection of the interests of the client and the pursuit of justice

Respondent is reminded of the duties and responsibilities of members of the legal

profession, as discussed in Tenoso v. Echanez:66

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with
public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but
also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes
part in one of the most important functions of the State-the administration of
justice-as an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain
not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. "67 (Citations omitted)

IV

This court notes that respondent may have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 when
she entered her appearance as counsel for complainant68 even though she was
engaged as counsel by Leomarte Tamaray.69 Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his client.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The rationale for Canon 15 was discussed in Samson v. Era:70

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations

wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse
to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be
allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter
that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to
it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the
facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the
case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must
be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The
nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree .

. . . The spirit behind this rule is that the client's confidence once given should not
be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment.1âwphi1 Even
after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will
injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously
represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client's
confidences acquired in the previous relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him."

The lawyer's highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all
hazards and costs even to himself. The protection given to the client is perpetual
and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the
client's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other
change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.71
The test to determine whether conflict of interest exists was discussed in Hornilla
v. Salunat:72

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two

or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is
the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for
the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed
by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform
an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another
test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.73 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Respondent was engaged by Leomarte Tamaray to be his counsel.74 When the

Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed, respondent signed the
Petition as counsel for complainant.75 If respondent was indeed engaged as
counsel by complainant, then there is conflict of interest, in violation of Canon 15,
Rule 15.03.

However, there is nothing on record to show that respondent was engaged as

counsel by complainant. Hence, this court finds that respondent did not commit
conflict of interest.
V

On a final note, Rule 139-B has been amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated
October 13, 2015. Section 12 of Rule 139-B now provides that:

Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

....

Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.

(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of
Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with
his report.

(b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership,
shall recommend to the Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the
imposition of disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, clearly and distinctly
stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based. The resolution shall be
issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the
Board following the submission of the Investigator's report.

(c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence
presented and submitted, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution.

(d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if
any.76

Under the old rule, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
was given the power to "issue a decision"77 if the lawyer complained of was
exonerated or meted a penalty of "less than suspension or disbarment."78 In
addition, the case would be deemed terminated unless an interested party filed a
petition before this court.79

The amendments to Rule 139-B is a reiteration that only this court has the power
to impose disciplinary action on members of the bar. The factual findings and
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are recommendatory, subject to
review by this court.80

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis is found GUILTY of violating

Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

The charge for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 against respondent Atty. Deborah
Z. Daquis is DISMISSED.

The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon respondent Atty. Deborah Z.

Daquis. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to remove the name of
Deborah Z. Daquis from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.

This Resolution takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.