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PT&T Co. v. NLRC, GR No.

118978, May
23, 1997
FACTS:

Grace de Guzman was hired by PT&T as a Supernumerary Project Worker for


a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F.
Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever Agreement signed
by Grace, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration
of the agreed period. From June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19,
1991 to August 8, 1991, PT&T again engaged the services of Grace as
reliever for Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. On
September 2, 1991, Grace was asked to join petitioner company as a
probationary employee. In the job application form furnished to Grace, she
indicated in the civil status that she was single although she had in fact
contracted marriage on May 26, 1991. This meant she was not single, as she
had represented herself, when she signed the reliever agreements on June
10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. Petitioner dismissed Grace from the company after
learning about Grace’s real civil status and being unconvinced of Grace’s
explanation for the discrepancy. Grace immediately filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances
(COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in Baguio City. At the preliminary conference,
Grace volunteered the information that she had failed to remit the amount
of P2,380.75 of her collections, and executed a promissory note for that
amount in favor of petitioner. The Labor Arbiter handed down a decision
declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a
regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner and ordered her
reinstatement plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA. On
appeal, the NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter but modified the Labor Arbiter’s
decision with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be
suspended for three months due to the dishonest nature of her acts which
should not be condoned.

ISSUE:

Can the alleged concealment of civil status be a ground for terminating the
services of an employee?
HELD:

No. The Constitution provides a gamut of protective provisions due to the


disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and
political life. Article II Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution states that “The
State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.” Corollary to this is
Article XIII Section 3 which states that “The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all” and Article XIII
Section 14 which states that “The State shall protect working women by
providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their
maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their
welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the
nation.” Since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974, corrective labor
and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in
the years. Two of these are Republic Act No. 6727 which explicitly prohibits
discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of
employment, promotion, and training opportunities; and Republic Act No.
7192 or the Women in Development and Nation Building Act which, among
others, affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into
contracts. In the Labor Code, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination
merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee. The private
respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could
not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act
the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a
stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same
illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being
disqualified from work.

Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol | Puno Case Digest


Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol

487 SCRA 228

FACTS: Petitioner was the employer of the respondents. Under the policy of Star Paper the
employees are:

1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a relative, up to the 3rd
degree of relationship, already employed by the company.

2. In case of two of our employees (singles, one male and another female) developed a friendly
relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them
should resign to preserve the policy stated above.

Respondents Comia and Simbol both got married to their fellow employees. Estrella on the other
hand had a relationship with a co-employee resulting to her pregnancy on the belief that such was
separated. The respondents allege that they were forced to resign as a result of the implementation
of the said assailed company policy.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner. The decision was appealed to the Court
of Appeals which reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the prohibition to marry in the contract of employment is valid

HELD: It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found
fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show
how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of
the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners
explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the
Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy
is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold
the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an
unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of
tenure.

Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but
they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy may not facially
violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate
impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite
the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate
business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free
from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one
company.

Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot
benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we
cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature’s silence that married persons are not
protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus,
for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that
the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollary, the issue as to
whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.

In the case of Estrella, the petitioner failed to adduce proof to justify her dismissal. Hence, the Court
ruled that it was illegal.

Petition was denied.

Duncan vs. Glaxo Case Digest

Duncan Assoc. of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Phils., Inc.


G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004
FACTS:

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of employment
signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the existing
company rules; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or
affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should management
find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may
transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for
employment outside of the company after 6 months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition.
Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of
interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of
conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign
from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the
Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request against transfer was denied,
Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and while pending, he continued to act
as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid...

ISSUE:

Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying
employees of any competitor company is valid

RULING:

On Equal Protection

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and other
confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against pesonal or marital
relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under
the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the
company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied.
It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the
state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of US
Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely privately
conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.

The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with
the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner,
with due regard for the lot of the employee.

On Constructive Dismissal

Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued


employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is demotion in rank, or
diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case.

Art. 137. Prohibited acts.

a. It shall be unlawful for any employer:

1. To deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this Chapter or
to discharge any woman employed by him for the purpose of preventing
her from enjoying any of the benefits provided under this Code.

2. To discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy, or while on leave


or in confinement due to her pregnancy;

3. To discharge or refuse the admission of such woman upon returning to


her work for fear that she may again be pregnant.
What is Republic Act No. 7877?
RA 7877 is The Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. It addresses the issue of sexual harassment
committed in work and education or training environment.
It was signed into law on February 14, 1995 under former President Fidel Ramos’ administration.

What is sexual harassment?


Under the law, work, education or training related sexual harassment is “committed by an employer,
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or
any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training
or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of
said Act.”
How is work-related sexual harassment committed?
1. The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said Individual favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
2. The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
3. The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.
What about education- or training-related sexual harassment?
This is committed:
1. Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender;
2. Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the offender;
3. When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or the granting of honors
and scholarships, or the payment of a stipend, allowance or other, benefits, privileges, or
considerations; or
4. When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student,
trainee or apprentice.
1. A person who directs or induces another person to commit any act of sexual harassment or who
cooperates to commit the act, without which the said act would not have been committed, will also
be held liable under the law.
What is the duty of the employer or head of office in a work or
education/training environment?
The employer or head of office is required by the law to prevent the occurrence of sexual harassment
acts. If in case acts of sexual harassment were committed, the employer or head of office should:
1. Disseminate appropriate rules and regulations which are consulted from and jointly approved by
the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives. The said rules
prescribe the procedure for the investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions
applied for such.
1. Administrative sanctions shall not bar prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual
harassment.
2. The said rules and regulations should include guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and
educational or training institutions.
2. Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment. The committee
shall conduct meetings or as the case may be, with officers and employees, teachers, instructors,
professors, coaches, trainers and students or trainees to increase understanding and prevent
incidents of sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation of alleged cases constituting
sexual harassment.
0. In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1)
representative each from the management, the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory
rank, and from the rank and file employees.
1. In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be composed of at least
one (1) representative from the administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors, professors or
coaches and students or trainees, as the case may be.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a copy of RA
7877 to inform all concerned individuals.

What if the employer or head of office did not undertake any action
despite his/her knowledge of sexual harassment act/s?
The employer or head of an office, educational or training institution will be held liable for the damages
arising from acts of sexual harassment if they are informed by the offended party of the occurrence of
such acts, yet no action has been undertaken.

Can an offended party seek redress by taking independent action?


An offended party may take independent action for damages incurred in the act of sexual harassment.
She/He may also avail of relief.

What are the penalties applied to offenders?


Any person who violates the provisions of the law shall be penalized by imprisonment of not less than one
(1) month nor more than six (6) months, or a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (PI 0,000) nor
more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20.000), or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
Any action arising from the violation of the provisions of this Act shall prescribe in three (3) years.

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