Session 1 - 2. Bagajo V Marave
Session 1 - 2. Bagajo V Marave
BAGAJO VS MARAVE shown in the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma, the protestation of good
faith on the part of appellant had, for me, lost its persuasiveness.
Page 1 of 9
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of with the observation that although “petitioner is not criminally liable for her
Misamis Occidental. Marave, J. conduct, she may still be held accountable for her conduct administratively.”
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. In the school premises and during school activities and affairs, the
Diosdado Bacolod for petitioner. teacher exercises substitute parental authority over the students. (Article
Office of the Solicitor General, for respondents. 349, Civil Code.) More specifically, according to Article 352, “The relations
between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government
BARREDO, J.: regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal
punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the
Petition for certiorari to review, under Republic Act 5440, the decision of best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student.” And pursuant
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental in to this provision, Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual
Criminal Case No. OZ-95 affirming the judgment of conviction rendered enjoins:
against petitioner by the Municipal Court of Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental “The use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing pupils
and imposing upon her the penalty to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary about), imposing manual work or degrading tasks as penalty, meting out cruel and
unusual punishments of any nature, reducing scholarship rating for bad conduct,
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs, for the crime of slight
holding up a pupil to unnecessary ridicule, the use of epithets and expressions
physical injuries. tending to destroy the pupil’s self-respect, and the permanent confiscation of personal
The background facts as found by the trial court as follows: effects of pupils are forbidden.”
In the afternoon of April 1, 1970, at about 2 o’clock, petitioner who was a
teacher, left her classroom to go to the principal’s office. While the teacher In other words, under the foregoing Civil Code and administrative injunctions,
was thus out of the room, complainant Wilma Alcantara, one of her pupils, no teacher may impose corporal punishment upon any student in any case.
left her desk and went to chat with Lilibeth Purlas, a classmate, while leaning But We are not concerned in this appeal with the possible administrative
over the desk of Ponciano Navarro, another classmate. At that juncture, a liability of petitioner. Neither are we called upon here to pass on her civil
fourth classmate, Benedicta Guirigay passed near Wilma, who suddenly liability other than what could be ex-delicto, arising from her conviction, if that
raised her leg causing the former to stumble on it and fall down, her head should be the outcome hereof. The sole question for Our resolution in this
hitting the edge of the desk, her stomach a sharp pointed umbrella and her appeal relates exclusively to her criminal responsibility for the alleged crime
knee a nail of the desk. She fainted. At that precise moment, petitioner was of slight physical injuries as defined in Article 266, paragraph 2, of the
entering the room. She asked Wilma what happened but the latter denied Revised Penal Code, pursuant to which she was prosecuted and convicted in
having anything to do with what had just taken place. Petitioner thereupon the courts below.
became angry and, with a piece of “bamboo stick” which she was using as a In this respect, it is Our considered opinion, and so We Hold that as a
pointer whipped Wilma behind her legs and her thigh, thereby causing the matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of
following injuries, according to the medical certificate presented in evidence: whipping her pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-stick-pointer, in the
“1. Linear bruises at the middle half of the dorsal surface of both legs. it is about four circumstances proven in the record. Independently of any civil or
inches in length and 1/4 centimeter in width. There are three on the right leg and two administrative responsibility for such act she might be found to have incurred
on the left leg.
by the proper authorities, We are persuaded that she did not do what she
“2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the had done with criminal intent. That she meant to punish Wilma and somehow
dorsal surface of the right thigh. “The above lessions, if without complication, may make her feel such punishment may be true, but We are convinced that the
heal in four to six days.” (Pages 26-27, Record.) means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by
ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent. The nature of the injuries actually
Upon the foregoing facts, petitioner claims in her appeal that respondent suffered by Wilma, a few linear bruises (at most 4 inches long and 1/4 cm.
Judge erred in convicting her of the crime of slight physical injuries. She wide) and the fact that petitioner whipped her only behind the legs and thigh,
maintains that as the teacher, she was just trying to discipline her pupil show, to Our mind, that indeed she intended merely to discipline her. And it
Wilma for tripping her classmate and for denying that she did so. She cannot be said, that Wilma did not deserve to be discipline. In other words, it
contends she was not actuated by any criminal intent. And she is joined in was farthest from the thought of petitioner to commit any criminal
this pose by the Solicitor General, who recommends her acquittal, coupled offense. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
Page 2 of 9
Nothing said above is intended to mean that this Court sanctions I find myself in sympathy with the approach taken in the dissenting opinion of
generally the use of corporal punishment by teachers on their pupils. All that Justice Makasiar not only in view of the humanity that should permeate the
We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances of the instant case before law but also in accordance with the tendency much more manifest of late in
Us, there is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before international law to accord greater and greater protection to the welfare of the
the trial court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the young, as an aspect of human rights. Moreover, it is well-settled that the
injuries suffered by complainant as a result of her being whipped by doctrine parens patriae calls for the state exercising the utmost vigilance to
petitioner. What appears is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief as a assure that teachers and educators should refrain from the infliction of
teacher exercising authority over her pupil in loco parentis, she was within corporal punishment which for me at least is a relic of the past. This is not to
her rights to punish her moderately for purposes of discipline. Whether or not lose sight of the significance of the view stressed in the opinion of Justice
she exceeded the degree of moderation permitted by the laws and rules Barredo that criminal intent must be shown to justify a finding of guilt.
governing the performance of her functions is not for Us, at this moment and Nonetheless, considering the nature and extent of the physical injuries
in this case, to determine. sustained, as shown in the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma, the
Absent any applicable precedent indicative of the concept of the protestation of good faith on the part of appellant had, for me, lost its
disciplinary measures that may be employed by teachers under Section 150 persuasiveness. The leading case of People v. Cagoco, where the accused
1
of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted above, We feel it is approached the victim from behind and suddenly struck him with his fist on
wiser to leave such determination first to the administrative authorities. the back part of his head causing him to fall backwards, his head striking the
After several deliberations, the Court has remained divided, such that the asphalt pavement as a result of which he died a few hours later comes to
necessary eight (8) votes necessary for conviction has not been obtained. mind. It was the ruling of this Court that murder was committed as there
Accordingly, the petitioner-accused is entitled to acquittal. was alevosia, although appellant was entitled to the mitigating circumstance
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio, without of lack of intention to commit so great a wrong as that inflicted.
2
prejudice to her being dealt with administratively or in a civil case for Thus I find myself unable to yield concurrence to the acquittal of the
damages not resulting ex-delicto. accused.
Castro, C.J., Concepcion Jr, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., dissents in a brief opinion.
Teehankee, J., concurs with the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz SEPARATE OPINION
Palma and adds brief remarks in a separate opinion.
Makasiar, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Antonio, J., concurs. The effectiveness of a teacher to exercise
authority over her pupil in loco parentis depends on her ability to enforce
I concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma and vote for
discipline. Petitioner had authority to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil, if
affirmance of the judgment of conviction which liberally imposed a mere fine
the punishment is moderate, not prompted by bad motive, and is of such a
of P50.00 notwithstanding the physical injuries requiring four to six days’
nature that the parent of the child might expect the child would receive if she
healing time inflicted upon the victim.
did wrong.
I only wish to stress that Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code expressly
Muñoz Palma, J., dissents for reasons stated in a separate opinion.
penalizes the offense of slight physical injuries and maltreatment, while
Aquino, J., concurs. The teacher, who inflicted corporal punishment,
Article 352 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that “(T)he relations between
should be disciplined administratively. In people vs. Javier, CA 40 OG 12th
teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government
Supp. 150, the Court of Appeals, per Melencio, J., Briones, Montemayor and
regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal
Enage, JJ., concurring, held that a teacher, who inflicted moderate corporal
punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the
punishment, was not criminally liable because he had no criminal intent,
best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student,” even as
citing Mansell vs. Griffin, 1 K. B. 160. (Justice Torres dissented.)
Article 349 recognizes teachers and professors as among those who
Santos, JJ., concurs in the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar.
exercise substitute parental authority. Section 150 of the Bureau of Public
Schools Service Manual further categorically forbids “the use of corporal
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking or pushing pupils about).”
Page 3 of 9
It cannot be contended then that teachers in the exercise of their The Solicitor General recommends the reversal of the decision of the
authority in loco parentis may without incurring criminal liability inflict court below. Accordingly, the majority returns a judgment of acquittal.
moderate corporal punishment. The power to inflict moderate punishment on WE dissent.
children is vested by Article 316 of the Civil Code exclusively in the parents. I
The petitioner might be entitled to the appreciation of mitigating Criminal intent is presumed in every criminal act. But the Solicitor General
circumstances in her favor such as having acted with obfuscation, but in the practically argues that a good motive negatives criminal intent. Motive may
face of the express provisions of law she may not be absolved of the proven mitigate, but does not totally exculpate, criminal liability.
charge. Motive, in criminal law, consists of the special or personal reason which
The statement in the main opinion (at page 4) that “whether or not may prompt or induce a person to perform the act constituting a crime
(petitioner) exceeded the degree of moderation permitted by the laws and (Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, 9th ed., 1964, p.
rules governing the performance of her functions is not for Us, at this 41). It is the moving power which impels one to act for a definite result, as
moment and in this case, to determine” (but that “We feel it wiser to leave distinguished from “intent” which is the purpose to use a particular means to
such determination first to the administrative authorities”) appears to be effect such result (People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 297; 61 N.E. 286, 296;
contrary to the laws and rules which do not permit the infliction of corporal 62 L.R.A. 193). The foregoing distinction has gained wide acceptance among
punishment, moderate or otherwise, by teachers on their pupils but provide our criminal law commentators (see Francisco, The Revised Penal Code,
for criminal, civil and administrative sanctions, and contrary to the proven Annotated and Commented, 2nd ed., 1954, Book One, p. 38; Reyes, the
facts, which as pointed out by Justice Muñoz Palma, show that the physical Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, 6th ed., 1965, Book One, p. 60;
injuries inflicted by petitioner on her pupil could by no means be described as Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 3rd ed., 1971, p. 16). In
“moderate” (even assuming that teachers had the authority to inflict moderate relation to the “particular means” employed—the overt acts committed by a
corporal punishment). person—motive, unlike intent, is quite materially removed. One motive can
SEPARATE OPINION give rise to one of several possible courses of action, lawful or unlawful, as
one act could have been actuated by one of several possible motives, good
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting: or bad. That is why in our law on evidence, no unlawful motive is presumed
from the proof of commission of an unlawful act. Nor would such
The facts in this case are as follows. presumption, if there was, be of any use, for materially unrelated as motive is
Inside a classroom while the teacher was away, an eleven year old girl- to the prohibited overt act, it is not essential to the determination of a crime.
pupil tripped a girl-classmate, causing slight physical injuries to the latter. Since acts are equivocal as to motive, it is often impossible to ascertain
Upon being questioned by the teacher in charge who just then came back, the reasons which moved a person to commit an act. This finds excellent
the erring child denied authorship of the misdeed. The teacher became angry example in the case at bar. While the accused stoutly asserts that her motive
and, with a bamboo stick, whipped the erring child on the buttocks, thighs, was to discipline the child, the trial court and the lower appellate court hold
and legs with such violence as to leave on the punished limbs, not welts, but differently. Their unanimous finding is that the accused committed the act in
bruises requiring some four to six days to heal. The medical certificate the heat of anger—a state of mind which could hardly harbor a good motive.
described the injuries thus: The Court of First Instance expresses its findings thus—
“1. Linear bruises at the middle of the dorsal surface of both legs. It is about four “It appears that x x x (a)t this precise moment, the accused entered the room and
inches in length and 1/4 centimeters in width. There are three on the right leg and 2 asked Wilma what had happened. Wilma answered that she had nothing to do with
on the left leg. the falling down of Benedicta. Ponciano reported to the accused that Wilma purposely
“2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of blocked Benedicta with her legs and she fell to the floor. The accused became
the dorsal surface of the right thigh. angry and whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick (at pages 1 and 2).
“The above lesions, if without complications, may heal in four to six days” (page 2. “x x x x x.
Brief of Solicitor General). “From the evidence it has been duly proved that while Benedicta Guirigay was
passing near Wilma Alcantara, the latter suddenly raised her leg and Benedicta
Convicted by the municipal court for slight physical injuries, the accused stumbled on it and fell to the floor. She fainted and suffered some injuries. The
appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction. Hence, accused became very angry; got her piece of bamboo stick which she was using as a
this appeal direct to this Court. pointer stick and with it whipped Wilma several times, thereby causing on Wilma the
Page 4 of 9
physical injuries described by Dr. Ozarraga in his medical certificate” (at page page 4; But “administering corporal punishment” is a felony, although the Code
italics in both paragraphs supplied). categorized it under the more graphic term “slight physical injuries”. The
pertinent provision is stated as follows:
In the same manner, the municipal court finds that— “Art. 266. Slight physical injuries x x x—The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
“x x x (I)n the instant case, it would appear that the accused Marcela M. Bagajo, was punished:
carried away by her passion or anger in whipping to such an extreme Wilma
Alcantara with a bamboo stick not really apt for the purpose. The victim of Wilma “x x x x x.
Alcantara’s mischief or naughtiness was Benedicta Guirigay, a working pupil actually
living with her (the accused) for some years. x x x” “2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the
offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from
The motive of the accused was to avenge the injury to the victim who, as engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance.
found by the trial court, has been living with (and working for) the accused “x x x x” (italics supplied).
teacher. Will vengeance justify the act?
But assuming that the motive of the accused was really good, does this In fact, even if no visible injury were caused by the act of administering
mean that criminal intent on her part is thus completely ruled out? WE do not punishment, it would still be punished as an ill-treatment by deed under
believe so. A good motive, as we have earlier intimated, is not incompatible paragraph 3 of the same Article 266.
with an unlawful intent. One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive From the facts found by the trial court, the following material points
appears to be good or bad or even though no motive is proven. A good appear: (1) the teacher beat the child with a bamboo stick, and (2) the
motive does not prevent an act from being a crime. (People ex rel, Hegeman beating caused physical injuries on the child, consisting of linear bruises
v. Corrigan, 87 N.E. 792, 796; 195 N.Y. 1, quoting People v. Molineux, supra; requiring some four to six days to heal. The act of the accused, no doubt,
Clark, Cr. Law, sec. 14; People v. Weiss, 300 N.Y.S. 249, 255; 252 App. Div. constitutes the very offense penalized by the cited provision.
463). A classic example is euthanasia or mercy killing. It is condemned by Commission of a prohibited act having been indubitably shown, no proof
law although the motive may be to spare a hopeless patient prolonged of criminal intent is necessary. For, “from the felonious acts (of the accused),
suffering. And if a father drowns his child who is five years of age to save it freely and deliberately executed, the moral and injurious intent arises
from starving, he is guilty of parricide though he was actuated by a good conclusively and indisputably, in the absence of evidence to the contrary”
motive—love for the child (People v. Kirby, 2 Parker Cr. R., N.Y., 28. See (People v. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52, 53. See also U.S. v. Apostol, 14 Phil.
also U.S. v. Marmon, 45 Fed. 414. Both are cited in The Revised Penal 92; People v. Abando, 2 CA Rep. 205; paragraph [b], section 5 of Rule 13,
Code, Francisco, supra). The father or brother of a rape victim, who kills the Rules of Court; 16 C.J. 81).
rapist long after the commission of the rape, to avenge the victim’s In claiming that she merely acted within the limits of her authority in
defloration, is not exempt from penal liability. A son killing his sleeping father, punishing the child as the latter’s teacher and substitute parent, the accused
who used to beat up his hardworking mother, to relieve his good mother from in effect invokes the defense of having acted in the lawful exercise of a right
so much misery, does not justify the parricide. So also, if a person cuts off under paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
the foot of a mischievous child to prevent if from doing further mischief with The “right” or authority claimed by the teacher is that which supposedly
its foot, and thus save it from possible criminal liability, that person stands flows from the civil law concept of “substitute parental authority” exercised by
liable for physical injuries. True enough, the act involved in the instant case, teachers over their pupils. The argument is that since under Article 349 of the
which is the beating of a child, is less serious than those involved in the Civil Code, teachers exercise substitute parental authority, and under Article
above-cited cases, but the fact that an act is less serious than another does 316, parents have the power to correct their children and punish them
not mean that it is not criminal. Other examples can be catalogued ad moderately, it follows logically that teachers can likewise punish the pupils
infinitum. Thus, our penal code provides specific penalties for specific crimes, under their charge. And if parents, in the exercise of their authority, can inflict
depending, generally, on their seriousness. corporal punishment on their children, so can teachers on their pupils.
II The right of parents to chastise their troublesome, mischievous or
The Solicitor General further maintains that the act committed by the disobedient children must be conceded as it is necessary to the government
accused is not unlawful. “Administering moderate corporal punishment,” he of families, and to the good order of society. However, this right was not
says, “is not so defined as felony by the Revised Penal Code.” meant to be a license for manhandling or physically chastising a misbehaving
child. At the same time that the law has created and preserved this right, in
Page 5 of 9
its regard for the safety of the child, it has prescribed bounds beyond which it Needless to emphasize, the authority delegated to teachers cannot be
shall not be carried (Johnson v. State, 2 Hump., Tenn., 283; 36 Am. Dec. greater than that conferred on parents. Truly, the power exercised by
332). Thus, Dean Francisco, commenting on Article 316 of the Civil Code, teachers over pupils is more restrictively, if not more clearly, defined in law.
observes: “It is to be noted that the law provides for ‘moderate’ The very chapter which gives teachers and professors substitute parental
punishment. Since modern educational system forbids the use of corporal or authority explicitly denies them the power to administer corporal punishment.
physical punishment, this would be a good test in determining the limitation The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is of the following tenor:
of the power of parents to correct and punish their children moderately. “Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed
Parents should never exceed the limits of prudence and human sentiments in by government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall
proceeding against their children” (Francisco, Civil Code of the Philippines, corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the
Annotated and Commented, 1953 ed., Book One, pp. 846-857; citing 2 best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student” (italics supplied).
Manresa 22-23; 5 Sanchez Roman 1140; Decision of the Supreme Court of
Said admonition is felicitously incorporated in the government regulations
Spain, November 26, 1901).
promulgated pursuant to law, namely, the Bureau of Public Schools Service
This observation is shared by Professors Garcia and Alba, who maintain
Manual, the pertinent provision of which reads as follows:
that: “The power to correct and to punish children moderately should be
understood as not including corporal or physical punishment, for otherwise it “Sec. 150. The use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing
will be against modern trends in education and a violation of the provision of pupils about), imposing manual work or degrading tasks as penalty, meting out cruel
the Revised Penal Code. Prudence and moderation should be the rule” (Civil and unusual punishments of any nature x x x are forbidden” (Third Revision, 1959
Code of the Philippines, 1950 ed., Vol. I, p. 535). ed.).
The abiding love which reigns over families, the native respect which
children bear towards their parents, and the moral ascendancy which parents Under the aforecited rule, the teacher cannot even require the erring pupil to
have over their children, should give parents enough force to maintain the clean the room or mow the lawn in the campus to discipline him, although
prestige of their parental authority. Even if these fail, the law affords parents these penalties do not involve physical injury. Neither can the teacher order
recourse to the courts under Act 4002. Under said law, minor children guilty the child to stand at the corner of the classroom as it would degrade or
of disrespect or disobedience may be held criminally liable upon the humiliate the child. He cannot even push the pupil about to remind him that
complaint of parents. This law is a strong suggestion that parents are not to his conduct is reproachable. By what twist of reasoning can we then uphold
take the law in their hands. In our republican set-up, even the government of the power to apply corporal punishment as a legitimate means of correction?
families is not beyond the pale of the rule of law. In the case at bar, the teacher clearly overdid herself. In whipping the
Indeed, sanctions are provided in Article 332 of the Civil Code when child several times with a bamboo stick, an instrument liable to cause, as in
parents, hiding behind the cloak of the parental privilege, “treat their children fact it caused, physical injuries, the accused could not have meant to give
with excessive harshness” which is a cause for deprivation or suspension of expression to a feeling of nobility. More than inflicting bodily injuries, the
their parental authority (see Perez v. Samson, CA, 48 O.G. No. 12, p. 5368). punishment humiliated the child in front of her classmates. In its execution, it
The procedure therefor is laid down by Rule 99, section 7 of the Rules of was plainly and simply excessive and brutal. The most that the teacher could
Court, which includes as grounds for such deprivation or suspension when have done under the circumstances was to admonish the child, if she was
the parents “unlawfully beat or otherwise habitually maltreat” the child. certain of her guilt. She could have reported her to her parents and to the
Moreover, abusive parents may be proceeded against criminally. It must parents of the pupil who was tripped, and in turn, the parents to the injured
be observed that our general law on physical injuries does not exempt child could have reported the tripping incident to the police authorities for the
parents (much less teachers) from criminal liability for bodily harm inflicted on institution of the proper criminal charges or could have sued the parents of
children or pupils as punishment for misconduct. The only concession given the erring pupil for civil liability. The teacher pursued none of these available
to the parents by law, under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, is that, in courses of action. Instead, she chose to take the law in her hands and, in the
case of serious physical injuries inflicted in the course of a filial correction, process, arrogated unto herself the prerogatives of a prosecutor, judge and
the circumstance of relationship shall not be considered for the purpose of executioner.
imposing the greater penalty. This means that parents shall suffer only the From the facts of the case, we therefore cannot find any justification for
ordinary penalty provided for assailants who are not related to the offended the acts of the teacher. The acts committed are not only unauthorized even
party within the specified degrees. under the concept of the substitute parental authority behind which the
Page 6 of 9
accused seeks refuge, but they are precisely the acts teachers are expressly punishment was the basic factor of discipline in the schools has passed, and
forbidden to do. The accused acted not to discharge the function of a a teacher who has to resort to violence to enforce discipline among his
teacher, but rather, acted forgetting that she was a teacher. pupils, not only forfeits his right to be their mentor, but practically confesses
Parenthetically, the Solicitor General noted that the beating was his inability and utter failure to act as such, in which case he should choose
administered on “parts of the body which are not vulnerable to any serious another profession or activity” (40 O.G. 18th Supp. 159).
injury.” But precisely, the teacher stands accused only of slight physical The Court of Appeals in the 1952 case of People vs. Padua (Vol. 49,
injuries. O.G. No. 1, pp. 156, 161, citing the 1940 case of People versus
The doctrine enunciated by a division of the Court of Appeals in Javier, supra) in further stating that the authority to inflict moderate corporal
the 1940 case of People versus Javier (citing the 1908 case of Mansell v. punishment without causing any bodily harm “seems to be inherent in the
Griffin, 1 K.B. 160) that “a teacher in a public elementary school has authority position of a teacher, especially in the grade schools, is a competent of that
to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil” (40 OG 18th Supp. 150), has been old adage—‘spare the rod and spoil the child’, not only failed to consider the
expressly revoked by Article 352 of the New Civil Code which took effect on prohibition against the infliction of such corporal punishment of any degree
August 30, 1950 and Article 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the whatsoever by a teacher on his or her pupil, correctly expressed in Article
Bureau of Public Schools aforequoted. Moreover, in the Javier case, the 352 of the New Civil Code, and reenforced by Article 150 of the Revised
main reason of the Court of Appeals in acquitting the appellant therein was Service Manual of the Bureau of Public Schools but also is obiter dictum;
because the Court of Appeals because the said case involves assault by the appellant Padua against the
“cannot positively conclude that it was appellant’s blow that caused the serious injury. teacher for allegedly slapping the head of her niece with a notebook, for
An equally strong probability is that it was caused by the other boys during their which reason appellant Padua was prosecuted for assault upon a person in
boxing game. As a matter of fact, the physician who treated Bravo, testifying for the authority and was accordingly convicted by the court of first instance, which
prosecution, stated that the injuries suffered by Bravo ‘must have been caused by a conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is worthy to note that in
hard and blunt instrument.’ We are constrained, therefore, to doubt appellant’s guilt.
“We are inclined to believe appellant’s theory that the incident was magnified in
said case, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals found in the Padua case
order to find cause for removing him from the teaching staff of Quinalabasa, for that the appellant was infuriated by the act of the teacher in slapping her
reasons appearing uncontradicted in the record. He was disliked by the residents in niece, it did not consider said anger of the appellant as a mitigating
the barrio because he had been requiring his pupils to do plenty of extracurricular circumstance.
work in school, x x x. There was also the desire of Alejandro Payoyo, a sponsor in the It should be stressed that the Javier and Padua cases were decided by
marriage of Hilaria Bagaoisan, mother of Bravo, to put his niece, Joaquina Payoyo, a the Court of Appeals, whose opinion on questions of law is not binding on the
temporary teacher in another place, in appellant’s stead. That the barrio people Supreme Court.
desired to see appellant dismissed as a school teacher was also testified to by Elpidio The authority of the parent under paragraph 2 of Article 316 of the Civil
Doloctero” (Vol. 40 O.G., 18th Supp. p. 152, italics supplied). Code “to correct and punish moderately” an erring child, does not include the
infliction of corporal punishment. Neither does the power “to discipline the
It is clear, therefore, that the main ground for acquitting the appellant Javier
child as may be necessary for the formation of his good character” under
was that guilt was not demonstrated beyond moral certainty. Consequently,
Article 45 of the Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Youth
the additional reason that the teacher has the authority to inflict moderate
Welfare Code. Moderate punishment must be short of corporal punishment.
corporal punishment was purely obiter dictum, as it was not necessary to a
If the law intended to authorize the parent to inflict such moderate corporal
finding of acquittal.
punishment, it would have provided so expressly as is done in the statutes of
Furthermore, in the Javier case, the appellate court laid down limitations
Michigan and Virginia invoked by the Solicitor General, quoting Time
on the exercise of such authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment,
Magazine (July 12, 1972 issue) and relied on by the majority opinion.
namely, the teacher must not inflict any bodily harm and that he is not
The substitute parental authority granted to the teacher over the pupil,
dictated by any bad motive (Vol. 40 O.G. 18th Supp. pp. 153-154). In the
does not include all the rights comprehended in the patria potestas of the
case at bar, appellant caused bodily harm (slight physical injuries) on the
natural parent over the child. For one thing, certainly the teacher cannot
pupil to give vent to her anger as a measure of revenge for the injury caused
demand support and inheritance from the pupil in the same manner that the
by the erring pupil on another pupil, appellant’s ward and househelper.
teacher is not under obligation to support the pupil or to recognize the right of
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in the Javier case is further
the pupil to inherit from him or even to educate the child at his own expense.
weakened by the dissenting opinion of Justice Torres, which dissent
proclaims most accurately the present policy. “The age when corporal
Page 7 of 9
The third paragraph of paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Petitioner claims that she is not criminally liable as her act was without any
Code affirms the liability of the parent for serious physical injuries, and only criminal intent because she was simply trying to discipline her pupil Wilma
exempts the parent from the special aggravating circumstances mentioned in who tripped a classmate Benedicta Guirigay causing the latter to stumble
the second paragraph of said paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revised and fall down.
Penal Code. The parent “who shall inflict physical injuries upon his child by The Majority Opinion following the recommendations of the Solicitor
excessive chastisement”, does not incur the graver penalties imposed in the General sets aside the conviction and acquits petitioner, holding, inter alia:
penultimate paragraph of Article 263 by reason of the special aggravating “. . . All that We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances of the instant case
circumstances. before Us, there is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the
But such parent remains liable for the penalties imposed in paragraphs 1, trial court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries
2, 3 and 4 of said Article 263 for serious physical injuries. suffered by complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What appears
is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief that as a teacher exercising authority
No such leniency is provided for slight physical injuries and maltreatment over her pupil in loco parentis, she was within her rights to punish her moderately for
inflicted by the parent on the child under Article 266 of the Revised Penal purposes of discipline. . . .” (pp. 3-4, Majority Opinion)
Code.
The use of corporal punishment in the halls of learning is condemned. I am constrained to dissent from the majority, briefly for the following
Flogging, even of the most hardened criminals, has long been abandoned as reasons:
a form of punishment in penal institutions. So must it be in schools. Respect The act of inflicting physical injuries upon another is a felony, as it is
for human personality cannot be instilled in the minds of the children when punishable by law. Every felonious act is in turn presumed to be voluntary
1
teachers choose to defile the human body by whipping it. Beating a child to with all three elements present, to wit: freedom, intelligence, intent (dolus) or
make him remember his lesson well is reminiscent of the days when slavery fault (culpa). Freedom is overcome by evidence of force or
2
was fashionable and instruments of torture were symbols of authority. The threat; intelligence, by insanity or infancy; intent, by proof of mistake of fact,
3 4
inhumane dictum of eras past “Spare the rod and spoil the child” had been performance of duty, or the like. 5
Page 8 of 9
But a more basic reason for this dissent is that the legal presumption of
malice is not overthrown by protestation of good faith and honest belief of
petitioner that she was merely imposing discipline, for the findings of the trial
courts, viz: the Municipal Court and the Court of First Instance, attest that
petitioner herein whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick in the “heat of
anger” because Benedicta Guirigay, the victim of Wilma’s naughtiness or
6
mischief, was “a working pupil living in the house of the accused (petitioner
now) for several years.”7
Moreover, I simply cannot agree with the Majority that all that petitioner did
was to impose a “moderate penalty” on Wilma.
Petitioner did not whip or strike at Wilma once or twice, but several times
with such vehemence and force as to produce not one or two but seven
linear bruises on different parts of both legs and right thigh which according
to the doctor would heal barring complications from four to six days. Inflicting
physical injuries, to my mind, is not a “moderately penalty”. If an exercise of
discipline was necessary, petitioner could have employed methods short of
bodily punishment which would leave injuries on the person of the
recalcitrant pupil.
Wherefore, I vote for the affirmance of the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner acquitted.
Notes.—Dismissals of cases without prejudice due to failure to prosecute
is not a solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend a
deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual judges. They merely
postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of a
clear intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance.
(Abinales vs. CFI, 70 SCRA 590; Perez vs. Perez, 73 SCRA 517).
To constitute an irresistible force the accused must act not only without
will but against his will. Such force can never consist in anything which
springs primarily from the man himself; it must be a force which acts upon
him from outside and by means of a third person. (U.S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil.
209).
The requisites of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty are: (a)
that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right of office; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of right of office. (People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257).
Page 9 of 9