Landmine Monitor 2018
Landmine Monitor 2018
2018
ISBN: 978-2-9701146-4-2
Preface
PREFACE
Preface
the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations. Today, the
campaign also encourages States Parties to complete their major treaty obligations by 2025,
a target agreed in the 2014 Maputo Declaration.
The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use and advocates for countries
who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign also urges non-state
armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty.
Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on
all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim
assistance.
The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message
and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective
partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.
In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) to become
the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and the ICBL remain two distinct and strong campaigns.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Preface
A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations produced this report. It
was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support
of a significant number of donors.
Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org.
The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish
to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field
practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are
grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for their review of the content of the report, and their crucial
assistance in the release, distribution, publication, and promotion of Monitor reports.
Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and
Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board
comprised of five NGOs as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff.
The committee’s members include: DanChurchAid (Charlotte Billoir), Danish Demining
Group (Richard MacCormac), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Humanity &
Inclusion (Alma Taslidžan Al-Osta), Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon), Loren Persi
Vicentic (casualty and victim assistance team coordinator), Amelie Chayer (ICBL-CMC
government liaison and policy manager), and Jeff Abramson (Monitor program manager)
and ex officio member Hector Guerra (ICBL-CMC Director). From January to October
2018, the Monitor’s Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and
produced thematic overviews for Landmine Monitor 2018. The Editorial Team included:
Ban policy: Mark Hiznay, Stephen Goose, Marta Kosmyna, Yeshua Moser-
Puangsuwan, and Mary Wareham;
Contamination, clearance, and support for mine action: Jennifer Reeves, Amelie
Chayer, and Marion Loddo; and
Casualties and victim assistance: Loren Persi Vicentic, Jennifer Reeves, Farzana
Mursal Alizada, Éléa Boureux, Clémence Caraux-Pelletan, Michael Moore, and
Marianne Schulze, with assistance from Clémentine Tavernier.
The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.
mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and
shared all its country-level landmine reports (from Clearing the Mines 2018) and country-level
cluster munition reports (from Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018) with the Monitor. The
Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publication.
Jeff Abramson of ICBL-CMC provided final editing in October and November 2017 with
assistance from Morgan McKenna (publications consultant).
Report formatting and cover design was undertaken by Lixar I.T. Inc. Pole Communication
printed the report in Switzerland. This report was also published digitally at www.the-monitor.org.
We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors*.
Government of Australia
Government of Austria
Government of Belgium
Government of France
Government of Germany
Government of Luxembourg
Government of Norway
Government of Sweden
Government of Switzerland
Government of the United States of America**
UNICEF
The Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse,
the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the
organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating
organizations..
* List accurate as of November 2018.
** Specifically for research on mine action, support for mine action, casualties, and victim assistance.
GLOSSARY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents
MAJOR FINDINGS 1
BAN POLICY 7
7 Banning Antipersonnel Mines
8 Use of Antipersonnel Landmines
12 Universalizing the Landmine Ban
14 Production of Antipersonnel Mines
15 Transfers of Antipersonnel Mines
16 Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines
17 Stockpile destruction by Mine Ban Treaty States Parties
18 Mines retained for training and research (Article 3)
20 Transparency Reporting
21 Map—1997 Mine Ban Treaty: Status 2018
CASUALTIES 49
49 Overview
50 Casualty Recording for 2017
52 Casualty demographics
52 Mine/ERW types resulting in casualties
55 Annex—Mine/ERW types causing casualties
57 Map — Landmine, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), and Cluster Submunition
Casualties in 2017
VICTIM ASSISTANCE 59
59 Introduction
60 Victim Assistance Under the Maputo Action Plan
69 Broader Frameworks for Assistance
Major Findings
MAJOR FINDINGS
Landmine Monitor 2018, the 20th annual Landmine Monitor publication examining progress
toward a mine-free world, continues to find that the Mine Ban Treaty regime is a resounding
success. After two new states acceded in late 2017, 164 countries are now bound by and
dutifully implementing the treaty’s provisions. The stigma against landmines remains strong.
Only a small number of non-state armed groups use the banned weapons, often in the
form of improvised mines. These have again resulted in a high number of casualties in
2017, with the majority of victims being civilians, nearly half of whom were children. As
countries continue to work to clear mine-contaminated land, the Monitor identifies much
that remains to be done, including to support the needs of landmine survivors and their
communities. Countries both inside and outside the regime are contributing record high
resources toward mine clearance and other mine action activities, affirming the impact that
this first humanitarian disarmament treaty continues to have after 20 years.
TREATY STATUS
There are 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and one signatory—Marshall Islands—
that has yet to ratify.
Two countries joined the treaty in 2017, both in December: Sri Lanka acceded on 13
December, while the State of Palestine acceded on 29 December.
USE
From October 2017 through October 2018, Landmine Monitor has confirmed new use of
antipersonnel mines by the government forces of one country—Myanmar, which is not party
to the Mine Ban Treaty.
There have been no allegations of the use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties
to the treaty in the reporting period.
Landmine Monitor has not documented or confirmed any use of antipersonnel mines
by Syrian government forces during this reporting period.
CASUALTIES
2017 was the third year in a row with exceptionally high numbers of recorded casualties due
to landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)—including improvised types that act as
antipersonnel mines (also called improvised mines), cluster munition remnants, and other
ERW.
In 2017, the Monitor recorded 7,239 casualties by landmines/ERW—2,793 people
were killed, 4,431 people were injured, and for 15 casualties the survival status was
unknown.
The continuing high total was influenced by casualties recorded in countries facing
armed conflict and large-scale violence, particularly Afghanistan and Syria, as well as
Ukraine, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, Myanmar, Libya, and Yemen. Accurate data gathering
for active conflicts, however, remains challenging.
The casualty count for 2017 was a decrease on that of 2016, which had marked the
highest number of annual recorded casualties in Monitor data since 1999, but the
total remained far higher than the annual casualty rate of five-years ago.
For a second year in a row, the highest numbers in Monitor history were recorded
for annual casualties caused by improvised mines (2,716) and for child casualties
(2,452).
Casualties in 2017 were identified in 49 countries, of which 35 are States Parties to the Mine
Ban Treaty, and in four other areas.
The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW casualties were civilians (87%) where
their status was known, an even higher ratio than in recent years.
In 2017, children accounted for 47% of all civilian casualties where the age was
known, an increase of 5 percentage points from the 2016 annual total.
Women and girls made up 13% of all casualties where the sex was known.
The Monitor has recorded more than 122,000 mine/ERW casualties since its global
tracking began in 1999, including some 86,000 survivors.
Major Findings
contributions of the US ($309.0 million total, a $156.6 million increase) and Germany
($84.4 million total, a $47.1 million increase).
Mine action in five states—Iraq, Syria, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Lao PDR—received
$435.4 million, or 65% of all international support in 2017.
The largest increases were for activities in Iraq and Syria, receiving respectively
$120 million ($207.0 million total) and $70.8 million ($89.4 million total) more than
in 2016.
Donor support explicitly dedicated to victim assistance remains low and difficult to
track, representing only 2% of identifiable international support in 2017.
Ten affected states reported providing $98.3 million in national support for their own mine
action programs, an increase of $13.3 million (16%) compared with 2016.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE
In 2017–2018, most States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine
victims lacked suitable resources and practices to fulfill the commitments they have made
in the 2014–2019 Maputo Action Plan. Findings below relate to 33 States Parties with
significant numbers of mine victims. The needs for assisting victims remain great, including
in the newest States Parties Palestine and Sri Lanka.
In most States Parties, some efforts to improve the quality and quantity of health
and physical rehabilitation programs for survivors were undertaken.
Nevertheless, following reductions in resources in recent years, many countries saw
near-stagnation in the remaining core assistance services for mine/ERW victims.
Survivor networks also struggled to maintain their operations as they faced
decreased resources.
Services remained largely centralized, preventing many mine/ERW survivors who
live in remote and rural areas from accessing those services. Shortages of raw
materials and financial resources were an obstacle to improvements in the physical
rehabilitation sector in several countries.
Only 14 of the 33 States Parties had victim assistance or relevant disability plans in
place to address recognized needs and gaps in assistance.
Approximately two-thirds of the States Parties had active coordination mechanisms,
and survivors’ representatives participated in 18 of the coordinating processes
among those 21 States Parties. State initiatives for capacity-building toward
increased participation of mine victims were almost never reported.
Significant gaps remain in access to employment, training, and other income-
generation support activities in many of the States Parties where opportunities for
livelihoods were most needed.
Major Findings
Korea.
NSAGs produce improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen.
Houthi forces in Yemen were “mass producing” landmines, including victim-
activated IEDs (improvised mines).
At least nine states not party to the ban have formal moratoriums on the export of
antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South
Korea, and the US.
Ban Policy
BAN POLICY
1 The Mine Ban Treaty defines an antipersonnel landmine as “a mine designed to be exploded by the
presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or booby-traps that are victim-activated fall under this definition
regardless of how they were manufactured. The Monitor frequently uses the term “improvised landmine”
to refer to victim-activated IEDs.
Landmine Monitor has not documented or confirmed during this reporting period any
use of antipersonnel mines by Syrian government forces or by Russian forces participating
in joint military operations in Syria. NSAGs likely continued to use improvised landmines to
defend its positions against attack as in previous years, but access by independent sources
to territory under NSAG control made it difficult to confirm new use.
Landmine Monitor was also unable to confirm new antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs in
Cameroon, Iraq, Mali, Libya, Philippines, Tunisia, and Ukraine in the reporting period. However,
in many cases, a lack of available information meant that it was not possible to determine if
mine incidents and casualties were the result of new use of antipersonnel mines or due to
legacy contamination of mines laid in previous years.3
2 NSAGs used mines in at least nine countries in 2016–2017, 10 countries in 2015–2016 and 2014–2015,
seven countries in 2013–2014, eight countries in 2012–2013, six countries in 2011–2012, four countries
in 2010, six countries in 2009, seven countries in 2008, and nine countries in 2007. In the reporting period,
there were also reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon,
Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen.
3 New use resulting in casualties is confirmed to have occurred in 2017 earlier than October in Iraq and
Syria, and was suspected earlier than October 2017 in Cameroon and Saudi Arabia, as reported in
Landmine Monitor 2017. These findings are listed in this year’s Contamination and Clearance chapter,
which reports on the entirety of 2017.
9
areas.4 Previously, in September 2016, Deputy Minister of Defense Major General Myint Nwe
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informed parliament that the army continues to use landmines in internal armed conflict.5
In September 2018, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar
reported, following their investigations into mine use allegations in September 2017, that it
had “reasonable grounds to conclude that landmines were planted by the Tatmadaw, both in
the border regions as well as in northern Rakhine state, as part of the ‘clearance operations’
with the intended or foreseeable effect of injuring or killing Rohingya civilians fleeing to
Bangladesh. Further, it seems likely that new antipersonnel mines were placed in border
areas as part of a deliberate and planned strategy of dissuading Rohingya refugees from
attempting to return to Myanmar.”6
In June 2018, the 20th Battalion of NSAG Kachin Independence Army (KIA) shared
photographs with Landmine Monitor that it said showed mines its forces cleared from the
villages of Gauri Bum, Man Htu Bum, and Uloi Bai in Danai township. The photographs show
around 80 antipersonnel mines, all M14 and MM2 types, with marking indicating Myanmar
manufacture. The KIA alleged that Tatmadaw forces laid these mines in April and May, when
the government forces left villages after occupying them. The KIA stated that two of their
soldiers were injured while clearing the mines.7
Landmine Monitor subsequently showed the photographs to an official at the Myanmar
Ministry of Defense in June 2018 and requested comment. The official noted that one mine
shown in a photograph was an antivehicle mine and said that government forces do not use
antivehicle mines against the insurgents as the NSAG do not use vehicles. He said that the
antipersonnel mines could be copies of Myanmar-made mines that a NSAG planted as he
said the Myanmar army does not leave landmines behind after an operation.8
Afghanistan
NSAG use of improvised mines in Afghanistan in 2017 and 2018 resulted in numerous
casualties.9 The use of improvised mines in Afghanistan is mainly attributed to the Taliban,
4 Landmine Monitor meeting with Col. (rtd) Min Htike Hein, Deputy Permanent Secretary for the Minister of
Defense, Ministry of Defense, Naypyitaw, 29 June 2018.
5 “Pyithu Hluttaw hears answers to questions by relevant ministries,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 13
September 2016, www.burmalibrary.org/docs23/GNLM2016-09-13-red.pdf. The deputy minister stated
that the Tatmadaw used landmines to protect state-owned factories, bridges, and power towers, and its
outposts in military operations. The deputy minister also stated that landmines were removed when the
military abandoned outposts, or warning signs were placed where landmines were planted and soldiers
were not present.
6 Human Rights Council, “Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding
Mission on Myanmar,” A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 17 September 2018, p. 288, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.
int/files/resources/A_HRC_39_CRP.2.pdf.
7 The photographs and some documentation were originally published by the Free Burma Rangers.
Landmine Monitor subsequently sent questions regarding the mines to the KIA for clarification. See, Free
Burma Rangers, “Burma Army Laying Landmines in Civilian Areas,” 23 June 2018, www.freeburmarangers.
org/2018/06/23/burma-army-laying-landmines-civilian-areas/. The KIA states that the Tatmadaw lay
mines when they abandon an area, which has led to both civil and military mine casualties. The KIA
claim to conduct mine-checks on the village path, in and nearby a village before allowing villagers to
return after the occupation and abandonment by the Tatmadaw. At about the same time, the KIA says
some of their units lifted 20 landmines deployed by the Tatmadaw in Injang Yang township from a road
and nearby post and village administrative office, which had been planted by Tatmadaw Light Infantry
Division 33 before they abandoned a village. Landmine Monitor cannot verify this allegation.
8 Landmine Monitor meeting with Col. (rtd) Min Htike Hein, Ministry of Defense, Naypyitaw, 29 June 2018.
9 In June 2018, Afghanistan stated that that new use of improvised mines and explosive remnants of war
(ERW) were responsible for killing approximately 171 civilians every month. Statement of Afghanistan,
Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/AfgISM18.
Colombia
Government forces reported several seizures or recoveries of antipersonnel landmines
from NSAGs in Colombia during the reporting period.11 A Colombian Presidential Program
for Comprehensive Mine Action (Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal-Descontamina
Colombia, PAICMA) country-wide review of records of landmines cleared by the Colombian
army during military operations reported landmine casualties and Colombian army seizures
of improvised landmines. In doing so, it attempted to attribute responsibility for new mine
use in 2017 and the first half of 2018.12 It found that residual or dissident forces from the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC) were responsible
for 306 mine incidents in 2017 and 341 incidents in the first half of 2018, while Unión
Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Naciona (ELN) forces were responsible for 219 mine
incidents recorded in 2017 and 48 in the first half of 2018. It also attributed new mine use
to criminal groups or paramilitaries, often working with drug traffickers.
India
The police in India attributed new use of improvised antipersonnel mines to the Communist
Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army.13
In January 2018, a wild elephant was injured by landmines in the Latehar district, Jharkhand
state, allegedly laid by the CPI-M.14 Previously, in September 2017, an elephant was killed
after it stepped on a landmine also attributed to the CPI-M in the same area of Jharkhand
state.15 In July 2017, the Deputy Inspector General of Police in Chhatisgarh state told the
state news agency, “Pressure IEDs planted randomly inside the forests in unpredictable
places, where frequent de-mining operations are not feasible, remain a challenge.”16
Myanmar
NSAGs in Myanmar used antipersonnel mines in the reporting period. In June 2018, villagers
in Kyaukme township of Shan state attributed landmine use, which caused civilian casualties,
to the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and claimed that the TNLA had warned locals
10 UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2017,” Kabul, February 2017,
p. 31, bit.ly/AfgUNAMA2017; UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict mid-year
report 2018,” Kabul, July 2018, p. 5, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_poc_midyear_
update_2018_15_july_english.pdf.
11 See, for example, Ejercito National,“Ejército destruye 100 minas antipersonal del grupo armado organizado
residual Frente Primero en el Guaviare,” 9 June 2018, www.ejercito.mil.co/?idcategoria=437712 (100
mines found in dissident FARC cache); “Ejército desmantela taller de fabricación de explosivos, en
Chocó,” El Tiempo, 12 June 2018, www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/ejercito-localiza-taller-de-
explosivos-ilegal-en-choco-229562 (177 mines found in ELN cache); and “Armada decomisa 444 minas
antipersonal en Putumayo,” El Colombiano, 3 October 2017, bit.ly/Colombiano2017Oct3 (444 mines found
in a dissident FARC cache).
12 Information provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Mariany Monroy Torres, Advisor, Acción Integral
Contra Minas Antipersonal-Descontamina Colombia, 30 July 2018.
13 The CPI-M and a few other smaller groups are often referred to collectively as Naxalites. The Maoists also
have a People’s Militia with part-time combatants with minimal training and unsophisticated weapons.
14 “Hurt tusker hints at rebels,” The Telegraph, 15 January 2018, www.telegraphindia.com/states/jharkhand/
hurt-tusker-hints-at-rebels/cid/1361047.
15 A.S.R.P. Mukesh, “Blast in tiger turf kills tusker,” The Telegraph, 21 September 2017, www.telegraphindia.
com/1170922/jsp/frontpage/story_174397.jsp.
16 Tikeshwar Patel, “IEDs pose huge challenge in efforts to counter Naxals: police,” Press Trust of India, 24
July 2017, www.ptinews.com/news/8915393_IEDs-pose-huge-challenge-in-efforts-to-counter-Naxals--
police.
11
not to travel in the area.17 In January 2018, KIA Information Chief Colonel Naw Bu admitted
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use by the KIA, stating, “We use mines on paths approaching our frontline camps and around
our headquarters. We only plant mines in the conflict area and do not plant mines in places
where civilians move.”18 In March–April 2018 the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) laid
new mines in areas Kay Pu and Ler Mu Plaw in response to increased Tatmadaw activity in the
area. Villagers lost several livestock as a result.19 In April 2018, the KIA stated that they would
launch an operation to lay mines in the Hukawng Valley in Tanai township of Kachin state.20
Nigeria
In Nigeria, NSAG Boko Haram has used improvised landmines since mid-2014.21 In September
2018, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) issued a report detailing significant new use of improvised
antipersonnel landmines by Boko Haram and its splinter groups on roads, in fields, and in
villages, mostly in Borno state, but also in Yobe and Adamawa states.22
On 6 March 2018, four loggers were killed when they stepped on landmines reportedly
laid by Boko Haram near Dikwa, 90 kilometers east of Maiduguri in Borno state, after they
went to retrieve a vehicle abandoned the previous day during a Boko Haram attack.23
Previously, in early 2017, UNMAS reported extensive use of improvised mines by Boko Haram
in northern areas of Nigeria.24
Pakistan
In December 2017, Pakistan told Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that NSAGs are using
antipersonnel mines throughout the country.25 NSAGs in Balochistan, the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa used antipersonnel landmines
during the reporting period. Public rallies in Pakistan called for the clearance of landmines
in the country.26
In 2017, landmines were reportedly used by NSAG Tehrik Taliban Pakistan and Balochistan
groups as well as by various clans.27 Sometimes improvised antipersonnel mines were used
as detonators for larger explosive devices, or one initiator would set off multiple explosive
devices.28
17 Lawi Weng, “3 Civilians Reportedly Killed by Landmines in Shan State in June,” The Irrawaddy, 8 July 2018,
www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/3-civilians-reportedly-killed-landmines-shan-state-june.html.
18 Nang Lwin Hnin Pwint, “Mined areas increase to 11 Townships-original in Burmese language,” The
Irrawaddy, 13 January 2018, https://burma.irrawaddy.com/news/2018/01/12/149510.html.
19 Unpublished KHRG submission to Landmine Monitor, September 2018.
20 Lawi Weng, “KIA Raids Tatmadaw Base, Claims to Detain More than a Dozen Troops,” The Irrawaddy, 9 April
2018, www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/kia-raids-tatmadaw-base-claims-detain-dozen-troops.html.
21 See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Nigeria: Mine Ban Policy,” 2017, 2016, 2015, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/
reports/2017/nigeria/mine-ban-policy.aspx.
22 MAG, “Out of Sight: Landmines and the Crisis in Northeast Nigeria,” September 2018, p. 4, bit.ly/
MAGNigeria2018. MAG states that their research revealed that almost 90% of victims of explosive
incidents were from antipersonnel landmines, with a casualty rate of almost 19 per day during 2017 and
early 2018.
23 “Boko Haram terror continues, 10 killed in fresh attacks,” Telangana Today (AFP), 7 March 2018, https://
telanganatoday.com/boko-haram-kills-nigerian-attacks.
24 UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria, 3 to 14 April 2017,” p. 2.
25 Statement of Pakistan, Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 19 December 2017,
bit.ly/Pak16MSP. See also, CCW Amended Protocol II, Article 13 Report, Form B, 31 March 2017, bit.ly/
PakCCWII2017.
26 In April 2018, an estimated 60,000 people joined a rally organized by the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement in
Peshawar calling for the removal of landmines from war-torn provinces along the Afghan frontier as one
of their main grievances. For more read Pakistan, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Pakistan: Mine Ban Policy,”
www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/pakistan/mine-ban-policy.aspx.
27 Email from Raza Shah Khan, SPADO, 21 September 2017.
28 Presentation given by Pakistani delegation to the CCW Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts, 6 April
2016, bit.ly/PakistanCCW6Apr2016; and Landmine Monitor interview with Pakistani delegation to the
CCW Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 8 April 2016.
Yemen
Houthi forces in Yemen used antipersonnel and antivehicle mines during 2017 and 2018,
primarily on the west coast of the country near the port of Hodeida. The Yemen Mine Action
Center (YEMAC) reported that Houthi forces laid more than 300,000 landmines between
2016 and 2018.30 International media reported that mine clearance teams funded by the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) cleared and destroyed hundreds of Houthi-laid mines in 2018.31
Houthis forces are reported to have used landmines in the past along the coast, along the
border with Saudi Arabia, around key towns, along roads, and to cover retreats.
There is no evidence to suggest that members of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition have
used landmines in Yemen.
29 Teeranai Charuvastra, “Landmine Wounds Deep South Farmer,” Khaosod, 2 July 2018, www.khaosodenglish.
com/news/crimecourtscalamity/2018/07/02/landmine-wounds-deep-south-farmer/; and Mariyam
Ahmad, “Thailand: Landmine Injures Fifth Rubber Farm Worker in a Week,” Benar News, 5 July 2018, www.
benarnews.org/english/news/thai/another-landmine-07052018154012.html. See also, Human Rights
Watch, “Insurgents Use Landmines in South,” 4 July 2018, www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/04/thailand-
insurgents-use-landmines-south; and ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Thailand: Mine Ban Policy,” www.the-
monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/thailand/mine-ban-policy.aspx.
30 Conflict Armament Research, “Mines and IEDs Employed by Houthi Forces on Yemen’s West Coast,”
September 2018, p. 4, www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-
yemens-west-coast/.
31 See for example, @LostWeapons, “another couple weeks, another thousand mines cleared in yemen. TM62
anti tank mines, press plates, cylinder IEDs,” 12 October 2018, Tweet, https://twitter.com/LostWeapons/
status/1050646259185242112/photo/1; and @BrowneGareth, “UAE soldiers prepare a cache of Houthi
landmines and IEDs for a controlled explosion near Mokha today #Yemen #hodeidah #Aden #IEDS,” 17
July 2018, Tweet, https://twitter.com/BrowneGareth/status/1019296299391373312/photo/1.
32 The 32 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of
“succession.” These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and
South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before
entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.
13
dozen countries have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of consecutive
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UNGA resolutions.33
On 4 December 2017, UNGA Resolution 72/53 calling for universalization and full
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 168 in favor, none against,
and 16 abstentions.34 This is an increase in votes in favor from the 2016 resolution (164) and
the lowest number of abstentions ever recorded.
A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions,
most of them since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia,
South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, the United States (US), and Vietnam.35
33 This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia,
Finland, FYR Macedonia, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.
34 The 16 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Oman initially abstained but
later corrected its vote.
35 Uzbekistan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.
36 As of October 2015, 45 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 19 by self-declaration, and four by
the Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). See, Geneva
Call, “Deed of Commitment,” undated, www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/. Prior to
2000, several declarations were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, some of whom later signed the
Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.
37 See, “Acuerdo y comunicado sobre el cese al fuego bilateral y temporal entre el Gobierno y el ELN,” Oficina
del alto comisionando para la paz, Quito, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/AcuerdoELN2017.
38 Adriaan Alsima, “Colombia’s ELN rebels blame government for failure to agree to ceasefire,” Colombia
Reports, 2 July 2018, https://colombiareports.com/colombias-eln-rebels-blame-government-for-failure-
to-agree-to-ceasefire/.
39 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that
some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and
Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.
40 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine
Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom (UK), and Zimbabwe.
41 For example, Singapore’s only known producer of antipersonnel landmines, ST Engineering, a
government-linked corporation, said in November 2015 that it “is now no longer in the business
of designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines.” Local Authority Pension Fund, “ST
Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions,” 18 November 2015, www.lapfforum.org/wp-content/press/
files/20151118SingaporeTechnologiespressreleasefinal.pdf. However, Singapore is still listed as a
producer as it has not formally committed to not produce landmines in the future.
42 In February 2018, Supreme Industries Ltd was listed as having concluded a contract for production of
material for antipersonnel mines on the Indian Ordnance Factories Purchase Orders, http://ofbindia.gov.
in/index.php?wh=purchaseorders&lang=en. However, no other orders were listed as concluded between
December 2017 and September 2018 for antipersonnel mines. Components and materials for directional
mines and antivehicle mines were listed.
43 Landmine Monitor meeting with Commodore Nishant Kumar, Ministry of External Affairs, and Col. Sumit
Kabthiyal, Ministry of Defense, CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), Geneva, 27 August 2018.
44 The following companies were listed as having concluded contracts listed for production of components
of antipersonnel mines on the Indian Ordnance Factories Purchase Orders between October 2016 and
November 2017: Sheth & Co., Supreme Industries Ltd., Pratap Brothers, Brahm Steel Industries, M/s
Lords Vanjya Pvt. Ltd., Sandeep Metalkraft Pvt Ltd., Milan Steel, Prakash Machine Tools, Sewa Enterprises,
Naveen Tools Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd., Shyam Udyog, and Dhruv Containers Pvt. Ltd. In addition, the following
companies had established contracts for the manufacture of mine components: Ashoka Industries,
Alcast, Nityanand Udyog Pvt. Ltd., Miltech Industries, Asha Industries, and Sneh Engineering Works.
Mine types indicated were either M-16, M-14, APERS 1B, or “APM” mines, http://ofbindia.gov.in/index.
php?wh=purchaseorders&lang=en. Indian Ordnance Factories website, http://ofb.gov.in/vendor/general_
reports/show/registered_vendors/820.
45 Previous lists of NSAG producing antipersonnel mines have included Iraq and Syria. However, with the
loss of territory by the Islamic State, it was not possible to confirm that this activity continued in the
reporting period
15
standardization and production of explosive charges, pressure plates, and passive infrared
Ban Policy
sensors.46
Previously, in January 2017, MAG reported that Islamic State in Syria and Iraq produced
near-factory quality improvised landmines on a large scale.47
46 Conflict Armament Research, “Mines and IEDs Employed by Houthi Forces on Yemen’s West Coast,”
September 2018, www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-
yemens-west-coast/.
47 MAG Issue Brief, “Landmine Emergency: Twenty years on from the Ottawa Treaty the world is facing a new
humanitarian crisis,” January 2017.
48 Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were
clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped
1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor
and the ICBL by HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian
antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the
coast of the Gaza Strip.
49 Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yemen, to Human Rights Watch, 7 September 2016,
bit.ly/YemenHRWSept2016.
50 Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yemen, to Human Rights Watch, 2 April 2017,
bit.ly/YemenLetterApr2017HRW.
51 Upon being alerted to Ashoka’s presence at the Eurosatory military trade fair, the ICBL contacted the
French government regarding the sale catalogue’s antipersonnel mine. The brochure was observed on
display at Eurodatory by Omega Research in June 2018. Emails from Omega Research, 11 & 12 June
2018. See also, Rachida El Azzouzi, “La planète guerrière défile à Eurosatory,” Mediapart, 15 June 2018,
www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/150618/la-planete-guerriere-defile-eurosatory.
52 Ashoka Manufacturing Limited, “Marketing Brochure,” undated. Brochure was observed on display at IDEX
by Omega Research in February 2017. Email from Omega Research, 7 November 2017.
53 Three states not party, all in the Pacific, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Marshall
Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga.
54 In 2014, China informed Landmine Monitor that its stockpile is “less than” five million, but there is an
amount of uncertainty about the method China uses to derive this figure. For example, it is not known
whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are
counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China
was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.
17
them from corrupt officials, or removing them from minefields. Most that use mines appear
Ban Policy
to make their own improvised landmines from locally available materials.
The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces, reports of significant
use, or verified photographic evidence from journalists to identify NSAGs possessing mine
stockpiles.
55 Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines. Somalia
acknowledged that “large stocks are in the hands of former militias and private individuals,” and that it is
“putting forth efforts to verify if in fact it holds antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.” No stockpiled mines
have been destroyed since the treaty came into force for Somalia, which had a destruction deadline of
1 October 2016. It has not provided an annual update to its transparency report since 2014. Mine Ban
Treaty Initial Article 7 Report (for the period 16 April 2012 to 30 March 2013), Sections B, E, and G, bit.ly/
MBTSomalia2013Art7.
56 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (in Arabic), 6 June 2018, p. 6. Translation by the Monitor. In 2017, 377 No.
7 antipersonnel mines, 3,468 PRBM-409 mines, and 733 DM31mines were destroyed.
57 Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.
58 “Misión de la ONU concluyó hoy la inhabilitación de armas de las Farc,” Radio Nacional de Colombia, 22
September 2017, www.radionacional.co/noticia/paz/mision-de-la-onu-concluye-hoy-la-inhabilitacion-
de-armas-de-las-farc.
59 Geneva Call, “Destruction of 2,500 Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines in Western Sahara,” 30 May 2018,
https://genevacall.org/destruction-of-2500-stockpiled-anti-personnel-mines-in-western-sahara/
60 On 4 November at Tifariti in Western Sahara. The Polisario destroyed 2,300 VS-50 (Italy), 100 SB-33 (Italy),
and 100 M-966 (Portugal) antipersonnel mines. Also destroyed were eight BPRB-M3 antivehicle mines
used as an explosive booster for the demolition. International Campaign against the Wall of Moroccan
Occupation in Western Sahara, “The Frente POLISARIO destroys 2500 mines,” 11 November 2017, http://
removethewall.org/the-frente-polisario-destroys-2500-mines/.
61 International Campaign against the Wall of Moroccan Occupation in Western Sahara, “The Frente
POLISARIO destroys 2500 mines,” 11 November 2017, http://removethewall.org/the-frente-polisario-
destroys-2500-mines/.
62 Three states have not submitted initial transparency reports, which would indicate whether they retain
antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes: Tuvalu (late) and Sri Lanka and Palestine (due
date not reached).
63 Netherlands (974), Angola (972), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Honduras (826), BiH (811), Mauritania (728),
UK (724), Cambodia (720), Portugal (694), Italy (620), Germany (592), South Africa (576), Zimbabwe (450),
Cyprus (440), Togo (436), Nicaragua (435), Congo (322), Slovenia (299), Cote d’Ivoire (290), Uruguay (260),
Argentina (212), Bhutan (211), Cape Verde (120), Ethiopia (107), Eritrea (101), Jordan (100), Gambia (100),
Ecuador (90), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Benin (30), Guinea-Bissau (9), and Burundi (4).
64 Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, and
Serbia.
19
Ban Policy
Year of last Total quantity
Last declared Initial Consumed
State declared reduced as
total (for year) declaration during 2017
consumption excess to need
Finland 16,192 (2017) 16,500 100 2017 -
Bangladesh 12,050 (2016) 15,000 0 2013 -
Turkey 9,313 (2017) 16,000 0 2017 5,159
Sweden 6,014 (2017) 13,948 30 2016 -
Greece 5,627 (2017) 7,224 23 2017 -
Croatia 5,050 (2017) 17,500 477 2017 -
Venezuela 4,875 (2011) 4,960 N/R 2010 -
Belarus 4,505 (2016) 7,530 0 2017 1,484
Tunisia 4,460 (2017) 5,000 49 2017 -
France 3,941 (2017) 4,539 0 2016 -
Yemen 3,760 (2016) 4,000 0 2008 -
Nigeria 3,364 (2011) 3,364 N/R None ever -
Bulgaria 3,324 (2017) 10,466 96 2017 6,446
Thailand 3,162 (2017) 15,604 217 2010 4,517
Serbia 3,134 (2017) 5,000 15 2017 1,970
Djibouti 2,996 (2004) 2,996 N/R Unclear -
Indonesia 2,454 (2015) 4,978 N/R 2009 2,524
Romania 2,395 (2016) 4,000 0 2013 1,500
Czech Rep. 2,206 (2017) 4,859 11 2017 -
Chile 2,197 (2017) 28,647 227 2017 23,694
Belgium 2,118 (2017) 5,980 170 2017 -
Peru 2,015 (2017) 9,526 0 2012 7,487
Oman 2,000 (2017) 2,000 N/R None ever -
Canada 1,878 (2017) 1,781 10 2017 -
Denmark 1,783 (2015) 4,991 N/R 2013 2,900
Tanzania 1,780 (2008) 1,146 N/R 2007 -
Uganda 1,764 (2011) 2,400 N/R 2003 -
Namibia 1,634 (2009) 9,999 N/R 2009 -
Spain 1,547 (2017) 10,000 66 2017 6,000
Mozambique 1,355 (2017) 1,427 0 2012 260
Japan 1,048 (2017) 15,000 214 2017 -
Brazil 1,204 (2017) 17,000 555 2017 -
Slovakia 1,087 (2017) 7,000 42 2017 5,500
Sudan 1,024 (2017) 10,000 100 2017 -
Kenya 1,020 (2007) 3,000 N/R 2007 -
Botswana 1,019 (2011) 1,019 N/R Unclear -
Partial total 125,295 294,384 2,402 69,441
Note: N/R = not reported.
TRANSPARENCY REPORTING
Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary
General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180
days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken
to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30
April, on the preceding calendar year.
Sri Lanka and Palestine are required to submit an initial report by 28 November 2018.
Only one State Party has an outstanding deadline for submitting its initial report: Tuvalu
(due 28 August 2012).
As of 17 October 2017, 47% of States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar
year 2017. A total of 85 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2017. Of
this latter group, most have failed to submit an annual transparency report for two or more
years.65
Iraq, Tunisia, Nigeria, Yemen,
and other states with recent
allegations or confirmed
reports of use of improvised
landmines by NSAGs have failed
to provide information on new
contamination in their annually
updated Article 7 reports.
Morocco, which is currently
not party to the treaty, submitted
a voluntary report in 2017 (as
well as in 2006, 2008–2011,
and 2013). In previous years,
Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Lao Young Women Leaders delivered a statement at the 16th
PDR (2010), Mongolia (2007), Meeting of States Parties in Vienna.
Palestine (2012 and 2013), and © Mark Hiznay, December 2017
Sri Lanka (2005) submitted
voluntary reports.
65 States that have not submitted reports for two or more years are noted in italics: Andorra, Antigua and
Barbuda, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo (Rep of), Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark,
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia,
Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta,
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova (Rep of), Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines,
São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.
1997 MINE BAN TREATY: STATUS 2018
Marking contamination in Vista Hermosa, Colombia.
© J. M. Vargas/HI, November 2017
23
Ten States Parties have residual or suspected contamination (Algeria, Cameroon, Djibouti,
Kuwait, Mali, Moldova, Namibia, Palau, the Philippines, and Tunisia) and state not party
Saudi Arabia is also suspected to be contaminated.
1 The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org),
which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine
reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing
Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented
online and in its print publications.
2 This year’s Ban Policy chapter reports findings from October 2017 to October 2018, listing a slightly
different set of countries where landmine use was confirmed or suspected. New use resulting in new
contamination is confirmed to have occurred earlier in 2017 in Iraq and Syria, and was suspected earlier
in 2017 in Cameroon and Saudi Arabia, as reported in Landmine Monitor 2017. Those countries are also
here because this chapter reports on the entirety of 2017.
3 Four small suspected mined areas with a combined size of 1,881m2 remain submerged under water.
These areas are “suspended” and Mozambique plans to address them once the water level has receded
and access can be gained. See, Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5, submitted by
Mozambique, 16 December 2015, p. 5; and statements of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional
Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017, and 8 June 2018.
4 Response by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN in New York, 9 May 2006; and K. Chang-
Hoon, “Find One Million: War With Landmines,” Korea Times, 3 June 2010.
25
No estimate provided
Nigeria Cuba China Georgia*** Egypt
Senegal India Kyrgyzstan Iran
Korea, North Russia Israel
Korea, South Ukraine Libya
Lao PDR Uzbekistan Morocco
Myanmar Oman
Pakistan Syria
Vietnam
Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics.
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain
mined areas.
** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.
*** The known area in Georgia is small, but there also may be mined areas in South Ossetia.
5 In some cases, the Monitor records casualties in countries not listed as having confirmed landmine
contamination. This happens when the casualties are due to ERW rather than landmines (Indonesia,
Kenya, Poland, Tanzania, and Uganda), or when it has not been possible for the precise nature of the
contamination causing casualties to be conclusively verified with regard to Article 5 obligations (Algeria,
Cameroon, Kuwait, Mozambique, Philippines, and Tunisia).
6 From January to October 2017, 137 “isolated” antipersonnel mines were destroyed. See, Mine Ban Treaty
Article 7 Report 2018, Form C, p. 26.
7 In Cameroon, allegations of use by Boko Haram of improvised antipersonnel mines have been reported.
8 Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a
military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be
mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict in June 2008. Djibouti has not
made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.
9 Antipersonnel mine casualties were reported in Kuwait in 2017.
10 In Mali, there are unconfirmed allegations of use of antipersonnel mines.
11 Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, made a statement in June 2008 that suggested
it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic
of Transnistria, where it continues to assert is jurisdiction. However, this statement was later disavowed
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 2 June 2008,
bit.ly/MoldovaNSA2008.
12 Despite a statement made by Namibia at the Second Review Conference that it was in full compliance
with Article 5, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for
example, in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.
13 Palau may have residual antipersonnel mine contamination.
14 The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups over recent
years, has not formally reported the presence of mined areas.
15 There were casualties from victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Tunisia in 2015, 2016,
2017, and 2018. It is likely that these devices were recently laid when they exploded.
16 Reports of mine use and seizures have occurred in southern Saudi Arabia on its borders with Yemen, in
Aseer and Jazan provinces.
17 See Mine Action country profiles available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp.
27
Of the 11 states and one other Reported mine clearance in 2013–2017 (km2)
area that are massively contaminated
with more than 100km2 of mine Mined Antipersonnel
Antivehicle mines
contamination, three States Parties Year area mines
destroyed
reported very low clearance results cleared destroyed
of less than 1km2 in 2017: Angola,
2017 128 168,000 7,500
BiH, and Chad.
2016 145* 232,702 29,000
No mine survey or clearance
occurred in States Parties Chad 2015 171 157,672 14,000
and Niger, nor in states not party 2014 201 231,708 11,500
Armenia and Myanmar. Only survey 2013 185 275,000 4,500
was conducted in Serbia, during
Total 830 1,065,082 66,500
which three antipersonnel mines
were destroyed. No systematic mine * The total amount of land cleared in 2016 has been corrected down
survey or clearance occurred in state from 170km2. This is because the 2016 global figure included 22.1km2 of
clearance in Afghanistan of land that only contained antivehicle mines, and
not party Lao PDR, although 23 because 3.3km2 of the clearance reported for Turkey, on the Syria border as
antipersonnel mines were destroyed part of construction of a border defense, was subsequently revealed to be
during EOD operations. overwhelmingly cancellation by non-technical survey.
29
No mine survey or clearance results were reported for States Parties Eritrea, Ethiopia, and
IMPROVISED MINES
An improvised explosive device (IED) is a device produced in an improvised manner
incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. IEDs that are designed to be exploded by the
presence, proximity, or contact of a person meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine, and
therefore fall under the Mine Ban Treaty. When victim activated, these devices are known as
improvised mines.
29 For further details, see individual country profiles on Mine Action and Casualties on the Monitor website,
www.the-monitor.org.
30 Afghanistan uses the term Abandoned Improvised Mines (AIM), instead of the previously used term
“Pressure Plate IED,” (PPIED). Email from Habib Khan, Head, Victim Assistance Department, DMAC, 21
June 2018. See, Directorate of Mine Action (DMAC), “Policy on Abandoned Improvised Mines Demining in
Afghanistan,” May 2018.
31 Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018; DMAC, “MAPA Fast Facts, Quarterly Update, 4th Quarter
1396 (January−March 2018).”
32 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.
33 Emails from Ahmed Al Jasim, Manager, Information Department, DMA, 6 April 2017; and from Khatab
Omer Ahmed, Planning Manager, Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), 8 April 2017.
34 Email from Ahmad Al Jasim, Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 13 September 2018.
35 Email from international mine action operator on condition of anonymity, 3 May 2018.
36 DMAC, “Policy on Abandoned Improvised Mines Demining in Afghanistan,” May 2018.
37 Interview with Baker Saheb Ahmed, DMA, Baghdad, 5 September 2018.
31
Mauritania completed clearance in December 2017 and, as of July 2018, the mine action
program had submitted a proposal to the government that a declaration of compliance with
their Article 5 obligations be made.38
In addition, state not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of
known mined areas since 1999. El Salvador, a State Party, completed clearance in 1994
before the Mine Ban Treaty was created.
Jordan declared completion of clearance under the Mine Ban Treaty in 2012 but is still
finding antipersonnel mine contamination and therefore does not appear in the table.
Nigeria declared completion of clearance in 2011, however there have been reports of new
contamination resulting from use of antipersonnel mines by a non-state armed group. It
therefore does not appear in the table.
38 Email from Alioune ould Menane, National Coordinator, National Humanitarian Demining Programme for
Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), 23 July
2018.
States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations, their deadlines, and status of
any deadline extensions as of October 2018
Original On track to meet
States Parties Extension period Deadline
deadline deadline
Afghanistan 1 March 2013 10 years 1 March 2023 Not on track
Angola 1 January 5 years (1st extn.) 31 December 2025 Unclear
2013 8 years (2nd extn.)
Argentina 1 March 2010 10 years 1 March 2020 No change since
extension granted
BiH 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Interim extension request
submitted to 2021
Cambodia 1 January 10 years 1 January 2020 Not on track
2010
Chad 1 November 14 months (1st extn.) 1 January 2020 Not on track
2009 3 years (2nd extn.)
6 years (3rd extn.)
Chile 1 March 2012 8 years 1 March 2020 Unclear
Colombia 1 March 2011 10 years 1 March 2021 Not on track
Croatia 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Extension request
submitted to 2026
Cyprus 1 July 2013 3 years (1st extn.) 1 July 2019 Extension request
3 years (2nd extn.) submitted to 2022
DRC 1 November 26 months (1st 1 January 2021 On track
2012 extn.)
6 years (2nd extn.)
Ecuador 1 October 8 years (1st extn.) 31 December 2022 Unclear
2009 3 months (2nd extn.)
5 years (3rd extn.)
Eritrea 1 February 3 years (1st extn.) 1 February 2020 Not on track
2012 5 years (2nd extn.)
Ethiopia 1 June 2015 5 years 1 June 2020 Not on track
Iraq 1 February 10 years 1 February 2028 Not on track
2018
Jordan 1 May 2009 5 years 1 May 2012 Should submit extension
Declared request
completion in 2012,
but contamination
still found
Mauritania 1 January 5 years (1st extn.) 1 January 2021 Ready to declare
2011 5 years (2nd extn.) completion
Niger 1 September N/A* (1st extn.) 31 December 2020 Unclear
2009 1 year (2nd extn.)
4 years (3rd extn.)
Nigeria 1 March 2012 Declared Should submit extension
completion in 2011, request
but contamination
still found
Oman 1 February N/A N/A Unclear
2025
33
In 2017, five States Parties submitted requests for extended deadlines to complete
their Article 5 obligations that were granted at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in
December 2017.
Angola requested until 1 January 2026 with the goal of eliminating 1,465 mined
areas totaling 221.4km2. It is in the process of completing national non-technical
survey across the country.39 In granting the extension, States Parties requested
Angola provide an updated and detailed workplan providing greater clarity on the
amount of remaining contaminated land and milestones for completion.40 Angola
pledged to submit this updated workplan by the 17th Meeting of States Parties in
November 2018.41
39 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), November 2017, pp. 6 and 11.
40 “Decisions on the request submitted by Angola for an extension of the deadline for completing the
destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Mine Ban Treaty
Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 21 December 2017.
41 Statement by Amb. Maria de Jesus Dos Reis Ferreira, Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties,
Vienna, 21 December 2017.
50 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, September 2018, pp. 22 and 27; and “BIH Statement
on Interim Request for Extension to the Deadline for Fulfilling Obligations as per Article 5,” Mine Ban
Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 June 2018.
51 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, September 2018, pp. 22 and 27; and “BIH Statement
on Interim Request for Extension to the Deadline for Fulfilling Obligations as per Article 5,” Mine Ban
Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 June 2018.
52 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 44; and addition information submitted on 21
June 2019, p. 2.
53 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2015.
54 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 March 2018, pp. 8, 9, 31, and 32.
55 ICBL comments on Serbia’s extension request to the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, 7–8 June
2018.
56 Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 28 March 2018, pp. 8 and 11.
57 Mine Ban Treaty deadline Extension Request, 1 November 2018, pp. 1-3.
58 Mine Ban Treaty deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2018, pp. 7 and 14.
59 Ibid., p. 4.
60 Ibid., pp. 14 and 15.
61 Maputo Action Plan, 27 June 2014, bit.ly/MaputoActionPlan.
62 Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 7–8 June 2018,
bit.ly/MBT2018ISM.
37
The Committee on Article 5 Implementation assessed the degree of clarity of the
63 Ibid.
64 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8; and email from Gerhard Zank, Programme
Manager, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.
65 Emails from Claus Nielsen, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 22 March and 10 September 2018.
66 Email from Alistair Moir, Country Director, MAG, 27 September 2017.
67 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC), 17 May 2018; BHMAC,
“Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Annual Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 21; and revised Mine Ban
Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, September 2018, pp. 6 and 20–21.
68 Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), “National Mine Action Strategy 2017–
2025,” May 2018, pp. 8–9.
69 Responses to questionnaire by Romain Coupez, MAG, 3 May 2017; and by Benjamin Westercamp and
Seydou N’Gaye, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 22 March 2017.
70 “Preliminary Observations, Committee on Article 5 Implementation,” Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional
Meetings, 7–8 June 2018.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
Almost all States Parties with mine contamination have a national mine action program or
institutions that are assigned to fulfill the state’s clearance obligations.
In Cyprus, the mine action program is managed by UNMAS.72
In Somalia, there was no government funding for the Somalia Explosive Management
Authority (SEMA), and UNMAS stopped funding SEMA at start of 2016, in expectation that its
legislative framework was due to be approved by the Federal Parliament and that funding
for SEMA would be allocated from the national budget.73
In South Sudan, while it is planned that the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) will
ultimately assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, UNMAS has reported that
the NMAA’s continued serious financial and technical limitations challenged the effective
management of operations in 2017.74 In 2018, UNMAS stated that reversing a change in the
71 See summaries above, and detailed country profiles for further information at www.the-monitor.org/cp.
72 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich
Pearce, UNFICYP), 11 September 2018.
73 Emails from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June and 14 June 2016. A seven-month grant from UNMAS expired in
December 2015 under which SEMA was expected to have established itself as a sustainable government
entity. Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.
74 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
39
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate that halted the capacity-building
CLEARANCE IN CONFLICT
In 2017 and 2018, conflict affected land release operations in 11 States Parties (Afghanistan,
Cameroon, Colombia, Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen)
and four states not party (Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria). Insecurity also restricted
access to some areas that are or may be antipersonnel mine-affected in States Parties Chad,
Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, Jordan, Senegal, Thailand, and Turkey.79
In Afghanistan, some provinces are inaccessible to mine action operators. In 2017, three
humanitarian deminers were killed and one injured in conflict-related attacks.80
In Colombia, although the 2016 peace deal resulted in an agreement by the government
and the FARC on demining, by August 2018, the election of a new president made the status
of some of the pillars of the peace deal uncertain. In some locations, this has had an effect on
the ability of operators to conduct land release.81 In 2017 and 2018, humanitarian demining
operators had vehicles seized and damaged by FARC dissidents, in some cases resulting in
the suspension of operations.82
75 Ibid.
76 “Mine Action Activities,” Side-event presentation by Amb. Vaidotas Verba, Head of Mission, OSCE Project
Coordinator in Ukraine, 19th International Meeting, 17 February 2016.
77 Email from Miljenko Vahtaric, OSCE PCU, 30 April 2018.
78 Interviews with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, and Stephen Bryant, Chief Technical Adviser, UNDP, in Geneva, 17
February 2016; and UNDP, “Support to eliminate the impact from mines and ERW − Phase IV, Annual
Progress Report 2014,” undated but 2015.
79 See Mine Action country profiles available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp.
80 UNAMA, “Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2017,” February 2018.
81 International Crisis Group, “Risky Business: The Duque Government Approach,” 21 June 2018; and
interviews with Pauline Boyer and Aderito Ismael, HI, Vista Hermosa, 8 August 2018; with Esteban Rueda,
and Sergio Machecha, NPA, Vista Hermosa, 9 August 2018; with Hein Bekker, and Emily Chrystie, HALO
Trust, San Juan de Arama, 10 August 2018; and with John Jimenez, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines
(CCCM), Vista Hermosa, 11 August 2018.
82 Email from Vanessa Finson, NPA, 11 May 2018; interviews with Alejandro Perez, CCCM, Bogota, 14 August
2018; and with Hein Bekker and Emily Chrystie, HALO Trust, San Juan de Arama, 10 August 2018; and
“Hombres armados detienen equipo de The HALO Trust en Uribe, Meta; amenazan al personal y queman
una camioneta,” Descontamina Colombia, 19 July 2018.
83 Emails from Tim Lardner, Chief, Mine Action, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
84 Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 June 2018; and from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1
March 2018.
85 Interview with Baker Saheb Ahmed, DMA, Baghdad, 5 September 2018; and, UNMAS in Iraq website,
unmas.shorthandstories.com/unmas-in-iraq/index.html.
86 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.
87 UNDP, “YEMAC productivity, January to May 2018,” received by email from Stephen Bryant, UNDP, 15 July
2018; and Minutes of Yemen Mine Action Technical Working Group Meeting, Amman, 24 July 2018.
88 Libya: UNMAS, “Programmes: Libya,” March 2018; emails from Lyuba Guerassimova, Programme Officer,
UNMAS, 28 February 2017; and from Dandan Xu, Associate Programme Management Officer, UNMAS, 12
July 2017; and Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Support Mission in Libya, UN Doc. S/2018/140,
12 February 2018, p. 12; email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, 21 June 2018; DCA website, www.danchurchaid.
org/where-we-work/libya; telephone interview with Darren Devlin, DDG, 20 June 2018; and email, 4 July
2018; Syria: Telephone interview with Luke Irving, Specialist Training and EOD Manager, Mayday Rescue,
28 March 2018; Mayday Rescue, “Syria Civil Defence, Explosive Hazard Mitigation Project Overview, Nov
2015–Mar 2018,” 1 March 2018; email from international mine action operator on the basis of anonymity,
3 May 2018; interview with Tim Porter, Regional Director for the Middle East, HALO Trust, in Geneva, 15
February 2018; emails from Adam Boyd, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Syria/Jordan, and Rob Syfret,
Deputy Programme Manager and Operations Manager, HALO Trust, 18 May, 13 and 21 June 2018; and
HALO Trust, “Survey and Explosive Hazard Removal in Dar’a and Quneitra Governorates, Southern Syria,”
undated but 2018.
89 Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018.
41
not currently have access to some mined areas.90 In Azerbaijan, Armenian forces occupy a
COUNTRY/AREA SUMMARIES
Below are brief summaries of contamination and clearance efforts in countries with massive
contamination of more than 100km2, in addition to Syria where the scale of the extensive
contamination is not known. (For complete information on all states, see the online mine action
country profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.)
Afghanistan
The Department of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) reported that State Party Afghanistan
had 205km2 of areas containing antipersonnel mines at the end of 2017.92 Surveys continue to
find new areas of legacy contamination, and mine/ERW contamination continues to increase.
The DMAC reported an additional 20km2 of improvised mine contamination, and it has yet
to reach a reliable estimate of the much larger areas also thought to be contaminated by
such mines.93 Afghanistan now identifies improvised mines as the greatest challenge for the
mine action sector.94 Mine clearance is conducted by six national and three international
NGOs.95 Since 2012, land release has been affected by a sharp downturn in funding as well
as security constraints.96
Angola
As of April 2018, State Party Angola reported a total 147.6km2 of mined areas: 89.3km2 of
confirmed hazardous areas and 58.3km2 of suspected hazardous areas. All 18 provinces still
contain mined areas.97 As of September 2018, national re-survey had been completed in 15
provinces. Of the remaining provinces, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul were due to be completed
in 2018, while re-survey had yet to commence in Cabinda.98 Clearance is conducted by four
Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) operators—
the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the
Police Border Guard,
as well as commercial companies, and three international NGOs—the HALO Trust, Mines
Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Angola faces severe funding
constraints to achieving its new Article 5 deadline of 2025.99
90 Letter to the UN Secretary General from Ukraine, 1 June 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline
Extension Request, 1 November 2018, p. 3.
91 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), September 2017, pp. 3 and 21.
92 Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018. However, the Article 7 Report (for 2017) states that 2,088
antipersonnel mine hazards covering 223km2 remained at the end of 2017.
93 Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018.
94 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Background, p. 5.
95 National NGOs: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine
Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC), Organization for Mine Clearance
and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR), AREA. International NGOs: Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust,
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), and Janus Demining Afghanistan (previously Sterling International).
96 Interview with Mohammad Shafiq Yosufi, DMAC, in Geneva, 8 June 2018; email from DMAC, 1 April 2018;
and UN Mine Action Gateway, “Survey and Clearance of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)
in 1397 (April 2018–March 2019),” undated.
97 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8.
98 Ibid.; and email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.
99 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from
Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.
BiH
State Party BiH has provided conflicting estimates of the extent of contamination at the end
of 2017, the lowest figure being 1,056km2.105 BiH expects that not all suspected hazardous
areas are in fact contaminated by mines and that clearance will only need to be conducted in
relatively small areas.106 An 18-month country-wide assessment is planned for 2018–2019.
The results of this re-survey will enable BiH to plan for the realization of the new National
Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 and preparation of its final Article 5 extension request
through to completion.107 In 2017, land release of mined areas was conducted by the BiH
Armed Forces, Federal Administration of Civil Protection, the Civil Protection of Republic of
Srpska, 10 NGOs, and four commercial demining companies.108
Cambodia
State Party Cambodia’s antipersonnel mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to,
21 northwestern districts along the border with Thailand. As of the end of 2017, the total
known or suspected contamination is 895km2.109 In 2018, Cambodia launched a new National
Mine Action Strategy to complete clearance of mines by 2025, beyond Cambodia’s current
Article 5 deadline of 2020.110 This is dependent on increased donor funding. The strategy
emphasizes more efficient use of clearance assets.111 Land release is undertaken mainly by
the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) and two NGOs, HALO Trust and MAG.
100 Email from Tural Mammadov, Operations Officer, Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), 19
October 2016.
101 ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2018,” undated, p. 5.
102 See report on Nagorno-Karabakh on Monitor website.
103 Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 2 May 2018.
104 ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2018,” undated, p. 14.
105 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 7 September 2018, pp. 5, 17,
and 18. It also reports 1,080km2. See p. 4. The Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C, reports
1,061km2 of suspected hazardous area.
106 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 7 September 2018, p. 19.
107 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 17 May 2018; BHMAC, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Annual
Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 21; and Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request
(Revised), submitted September 2018, pp. 6 and 20–21.
108 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 17 May 2018; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017),
Form F; and BHMAC, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Annual Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 14. The
national NGOs are: DEMIRA, Dok-ing Deminiranje N.H.O., EDD Training Centre, Eko Dem, Pro Vita, Stop
Mines, Udruga “Pazi Mine Vitez,” and, Association UEM. The international NGOs are MAG and NPA. The
commercial operators are: Detektor, N&N Ivsa, Point, and UEM.
109 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), p. 9.
110 CMAA, “National Mine Action Strategy 2017–2025,” undated May 2018, p. 9.
111 Ibid., pp.8–9.
43
Chad
Croatia
At the end of 2017, State Party Croatia reported a total of 411km2 of mined area, of which
270km2 was suspected hazardous area and 142km2 was confirmed hazardous area.117 A
further 33km2 of confirmed hazardous areas were under military control. Eight of Croatia’s
21 counties are mine affected.118 Almost all civil clearance is conducted by local companies
competing for tenders. Twenty-one companies conducted demining in 2017.119 Croatia aims
to complete clearance by March 2026, according to its second extension request submitted
in 2018.120
Iraq
The full extent of contamination in State Party Iraq is unknown. The Directorate of Mine
Action (DMA) and Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) reported a total of 1,219km2.
However, this is not consistent with the figures provided in the Article 7 report.121 In addition,
the DMA reported 185km2 of IED contamination, much of which may in fact be antipersonnel
mines. In 2017 and 2018, Iraq’s priority is the clearance of massive contamination by IEDs,
including improvised mines from areas liberated from non-state armed group Islamic State,
in order to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of people displaced by conflict, the
restoration of public services, and economic recovery. Mine action in Iraq is managed along
regional lines. The DMA coordinates and manages the sector in central and southern Iraq.
IKMAA manages mine action in the four northern governorates that fall under the Kurdish
Regional Government. Land release in 2017 was conducted by army engineers, the civil
112 Email from Soultani Moussa, Manager/Administrator, National High Commission for Demining (Haut
Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND), 19 June 2018.
113 HCND, “Plan d’action prévisionnel 2014–2019 de mise en œuvre de la composante déminage et
dépollution de la Stratégie de l’action contre les mines au Tchad” (“Mine Action Plan 2014–2019”), May
2014.
114 M. P. Moore, “This Month in Mines, February 2017,” 7 March 2017, https://landminesinafrica.wordpress.
com/2017/03/07/the-month-in-mines-february-2017/; “This Month in Mines: April, May and June,”
https://landminesinafrica.wordpress.com/2017/07/25/the-months-in-mines-april-may-and-june/; “This
Month in Mines, September and October 2017,” 30 November 2017, https://landminesinafrica.wordpress.
com/2017/11/30/the-months-in-mines-september-and-october-2017/.
115 HI, “Country Profile Chad,” September 2017, www.handicapinternational.be/sites/default/files/paginas/
bijlagen/201710_fp_tchad_fr.pdf.
116 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 14 September 2018.
117 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C; and email from Davor Laura, Head of
Quality Control, Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC), 6 April 2018.
118 In Croatia’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C, this was reported to be
32.66km2; and in Croatia’s 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, as 32km2.
119 Email from Davor Laura, CROMAC, 6 April 2018. See the country profile for the full list of operators in 2017.
120 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2019, p. 8.
121 This is the recent estimate of contamination as of the end of 2017, provided by email from Ahmad Al
Jasim, DMA, 13 September 2018; and email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018. The Article 7
report for 2017 reported 1,072km2 at the end of 2017.
Syria
State not party Syria is contaminated by landmines left by successive Arab-Israeli wars since
1948 but particularly by the conflict since 2011. All regions are affected. Ongoing hostilities
and reports of continuing use of landmines have prevented systematic survey to determine
the extent and types of contamination.123 Improvised mines have been used extensively.
Syria does not have a national mine action authority or a national program for survey and
clearance. UNMAS operates from Gaziantep, Amman, and Beirut to coordinate support to
mine action.124 In July 2018, UNMAS signed a memorandum of understanding with the Syrian
government, which was reported to enable UNMAS to conduct mine risk education.125 In 2017,
mine action was conducted by a wide range of organizations, including military engineers of
parties to the conflict, civil defense organizations, humanitarian demining organizations, and
commercial companies. However, no land release results were available.
Thailand
By the end of 2017, State Party Thailand reported 391km2 of suspected hazardous area.126
However, it expected that, based on previous survey results, almost 87% of this area would
be cancelled.127 A potential obstacle to completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations is
the high proportion—around 90%—of remaining contamination located in border areas that
are subject to demarcation disputes or security issues.128 In 2017, clearance was conducted
by the Thailand Mine Action Center’s (TMAC) four Humanitarian Mine Action Units and NPA.
The Thai Civilian Deminers Association conducted non-technical and technical survey.
Turkey
State Party Turkey reported 164km2of contamination across 3,061 confirmed hazardous areas,
with a further 701 suspected hazardous areas, for which no estimate of size is available. The
majority of contamination is along the border with Syria and some sections of the borders
with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Azerbaijan.129 Mines have also been laid inside the country
around military installations, while improvised mines and other IEDs have been used by
non-state armed groups.130 In 2017, Turkey completed Phase 1 of the European Union Eastern
Border Mine Clearance Project on the eastern border with Iran, with clearance conducted
by commercial company MECHEM.131 The Turkish armed forces also conducted land release
along the borders with Iran and Syria, including to support the construction of the Border
Security Surveillance System along the Syrian border.132
122 Iraq Mine and UXO Clearance Company, al-Safsafah Mine Action Company, Akad International Company
for Mine & UXO Clearance, Al-Fahad Co. for Demining, and Al-Danube.
123 Email from Gilles Delecourt, Senior Programme Manager, UNMAS, 22 May 2018.
124 Interview with Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, Geneva, 16 February 2018; and email, 22 May 2018; and UNMAS,
“Programmes in Syria,” updated March 2018.
125 “Syria, UN Mine Action Service, Sign MoU,” Syrian Arab News Agency, 8 July 2018, www.syrianews.cc/syria-
un-mine-action-service-sign-mou/.
126 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form D.
127 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), September 2017, pp. 5 and 6.
128 Ibid., pp. 3 and 21.
129 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.
130 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Re quest, 29 March 2013, pp. A-1 and A-5.
131 Email from Lt.-Col. Halil Şen, Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC), 21 June 2017; interview with Col. Zaki
Eren, and Maj. Can Ceylan, TURMAC, in Vienna, 20 December 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report
(for calendar year 2017), Form A.
132 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form A; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report
(for calendar year 2017), Forms A and D.
45
Yemen
Western Sahara
The exact extent of mine contamination across other area Western Sahara is not known,
although the areas along the Berm136 are thought to contain some of the densest mine
contamination in the world.137 To the east of the berm, mine action is managed by the
Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Center (SMACO) with the support of UNMAS. The primary
mine threat east of the Berm, excluding both the Berm itself and the buffer strip, is from
antivehicle rather than antipersonnel mines; cluster munitions are also a major hazard.138
During 2018, non-technical survey efforts east of the berm greatly reduced the extent of
suspected contamination to an estimated 120km2 by September 2018.139 Areas located
within the 5km-wide buffer strip are inaccessible for clearance.140 Land release east of the
berm in 2017 was conducted by Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML) and NPA. The area west
of the berm is under Moroccan control, and land release is conducted by the Royal Moroccan
Army. 141 There the extent of contamination west of the berm is unknown.
133 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017), Forms D and L.
134 Conflict Armament Research, “Mines and IEDs Employed by Houthis on Yemen’s West Coast,” September
2018, pp. 5−6, 11.
135 UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 9.
136 A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm, was built during the conflict, dividing control of the territory
between Morocco on the west, and the Polisario Front on the east. The Berm is 12-times the length of the
fromer Berlin Wall and second in length only to the Great Wall of China.
137 See UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Western Sahara,” updated May 2015; and Action on Armed Violence (AOAV),
“Making life safer for the people of Western Sahara,” London, August 2011.
138 Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March 2018.
139 Ibid., 14 September 2018. The buffer strip is an area 5km wide east of the Berm. MINURSO, “Ceasefire
Monitoring Overview,”undated,https://minurso.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11421&language=en-
US.
140 Clearance of the buffer strip of mines ERW is not foreseen in MINURSO mission agreements. See, “Report
of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” UN doc. S/2017/307, 10 April 2017,
p. 8.
141 “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” UN doc. S/2018/277, 29
March 2018, para. 43.
Casualties
CASUALTIES
OVERVIEW
High numbers of casualties continued to be recorded in 2017, following the sharp rise in
2015, with a total of at least 7,239 people killed or injured by antipersonnel and antivehicle
landmines, including improvised landmines, as well as unexploded cluster submunitions,1
and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—henceforth mines/ERW. However, it is certain
that numerous casualties went unrecorded. Some of the most mine/ERW-affected countries
do not have national casualty surveillance systems in place, nor do other forms of adequate
reporting exist.
While remaining very high, the total for 2017 marks a decrease on the casualties recorded
for 2016. The casualty database for Landmine Monitor Report 2018 includes an updated total
of 9,437 casualties for 2016 (2,472 killed, 6,937 injured, and 28 unknown). At the time of the
publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2017, 8,605 casualties had been recorded for 2016
(2,089 killed, 6,491 injured, and 25 unknown).
More than 120,000 casualties have been included in the Landmine Monitor database in
the period 1999–2017.
Of the total of 7,239 mine/ERW casualties the Monitor recorded for 2017, at least 2,793
people were killed and another 4,431 people were injured; for 15 casualties it was not
known if the person survived or was killed.2
For a second year the highest number of annual casualties caused by improvised mines
and the most annual disaggregated number of child casualties were recorded.
1 Casualties from unexploded cluster submunitions (unexploded submunitions), which are cluster
munition remnants, are included in the Monitor global mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualty
data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however,
they are reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties
caused by unexploded submunitions for the year 2017, see ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2018,
www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/cluster-munition-monitor-2018.aspx.
2 As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the numbers of people indirectly impacted
as a result of mine/ERW casualties and this information was not included in the Monitor mine/ERW
casualty database.
3 The category “military” includes police forces and private security forces when active in combat as well as
members of non-state armed groups and militias. Direct participation in armed conflict, also called direct
participation in hostilities, distinguishes persons who are not civilians in accordance with international
humanitarian law, whereby “those involved in the fighting must make a basic distinction between
combatants, who may be lawfully attacked, and civilians, who are protected against attack unless and for
such time as they directly participate in hostilities.” ICRC, “Direct participation in hostilities: questions &
answers,” 2 June 2009, bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipationFAQ.
4 In 2017, casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and
Zimbabwe, and four other areas Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.
5 Casualties were identified in the following States Parties in 2017, as well as Palestine and Sri Lanka
which were not yet State Parties, but are now: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Chad, Chile, Colombia, DRC, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland,
Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
6 The Monitor database includes 122,288 casualties for the period 1999–2017.
7 However, cumulative national casualty figures are sometimes multi-annual aggregates or based on
extrapolations of survey results and therefore may not be included in the Monitor casualty dataset for
the period 1999–2017.
8 The data collected by the Monitor is the most comprehensive and widely-used annual, and global, dataset
of casualties caused by mines/ERW. The casualty total for 2017 included datasets or reporting from the
following types of sources: international organizations, UN and national mine action centers, other UN
agencies, humanitarian mine action operators, ICBL members, and other NGOs, as well as media scanning.
51
The Monitor identified 1,906 mine/ERW States with the most recorded
Casualties
casualties in Syria from multiple sources for
2017.9 However, since the conflict began in 2011,
mine/ERW casualties in 2017
annual recorded totals of mine/ERW casualties Country Casualties
are thought to be an undercount. It is certain
that the actual number of casualties occurring in Afghanistan 2,300
Syria in 2017, as in past years, was significantly Syria 1,906
higher than the annual total recorded.
Ukraine 429
As in previous years, it is certain that there are
Iraq 304
many more mine/ERW casualties that occurred
in Iraq in 2017 that have not been identified. It is Pakistan 291
particularly apparent that improvised landmine Nigeria 235
casualties that occurred in Mosul in 2017 are so Myanmar 202
far vastly underreported.10 It was reported that
large sections of Mosul were mined and booby- Libya 184
trapped by the non-state armed group Islamic Yemen 160
State. In August 2017, the United Nations Mine Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty
Action Service (UNMAS) was reported as stating are indicated in bold.
that since clearance operations began in October
2016, some 1,700 people had been killed or injured by such explosive hazards.11 The 2017
total number of mine/ERW casualties recorded for Iraq was 304, with 124 of that number
occurring in Mosul.
The ongoing conflict in Yemen prevented the operation of a national casualty
surveillance mechanism. The 160 casualties identified by the Monitor for 2017 is certainly
an underreporting of the annual total and is much less than the 2016 total of 2,037. In
2017 and 2018, various Yemeni authorities and human rights organizations reported annual
totals and cumulative totals for all time. However, their reports rarely describe the source
or methodology used to compile these figures, and in some cases, do not specify the time
period. The figures provided differ widely, indicating the challenge of collecting reliable data
in a context of ongoing conflict. Thus, no significant quantity of disaggregated annual data
was available for Yemen for 2017.
Due to the continuing conflict, the national casualty surveillance system in Libya was
not truly functional. The Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC) and the UN Support Mission
in Libya (UNSMIL) collected information on casualties, but these were not in an integrated
database. Furthermore, two key sources for Monitor data in previous years were no longer
available. Therefore, the significant decrease to 184 casualties identified in 2017 from the
1,610 casualties reported for 2016 may not be indicative of the nature of a trend or scale.
New information on casualties in Nigeria (235 in 2017) was recorded by Mines Advisory
Group (MAG), resulting in an improved understanding of the extent of the impact of
improvised mines in that State Party.
CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS12
There were at least 2,452 child casualties in 2017. Child casualties in 2017 accounted for
47% of all civilian casualties for whom the age group was known (5,183).13 Children were
killed (773) or injured (1,679) by mines/ERW in 38 countries and other areas in 2017.14
As in previous years, in 2017 the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was
known were boys (84%).15
ERW caused the most child casualties (1,332, or 54% of child casualties). Child casualties
made up more than half (48, or 52%) of all casualties caused by unexploded cluster
submunitions. (For more information on child casualties and assistance see the annual Monitor
publication on landmines/ERW and children.)
In 2017, men and boys made up the vast majority of all casualties, with 87% of all
casualties for which the sex was known (4,874 of 5,614). Women and girls made up 13% of
all casualties for which the sex was known (740).
Civilians represented 87% of casualties in 2017 where the civilian/military status was
known (5,802 of 6,701).
There were 839 military casualties. The country with the most recorded military casualties
of mines/ERW in 2017 was Ukraine, with 189; followed by Nigeria, with 151 military and
combatant casualties (including militia); and Pakistan with 93 military casualties recorded
(including soldiers, militia, and militants).
In 2017, the Monitor identified 60 casualties among deminers in 14 countries (18 deminers
were killed and 42 injured).16
12 The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties to the extent
that data is available and disaggregated.
13 Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is less than 18-years of age at the time of
the incident. Child casualties made up 40% of the total recorded casualties.
14 In 2017, child casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC,
India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Russia, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania,
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen, and two other areas, Kosovo and Somaliland.
15 There were 1,775 boys and 329 girls recorded as casualties in 2017; the sex of 348 child casualties was
not recorded.
16 In 2017, casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chile, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon,
Libya, Russia, Serbia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen.
17 In 2017, antipersonnel mine casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia,
Chile, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, Senegal, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan,
Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen, and other areas, Kosovo and Western Sahara.
53
Casualties
4,000
3,500
Number of casualties
2,716
3,000
2,500
2,038
2,000
1,500
843
1,000 748
488
313
500
93
0
Unknown mine/ERW item
ERW
Unexploded cluster submunition
Other unspecified mine
Improvised mine
Antivehicle mine
Antipersonnel mine
were identified in 18 states in 2017.18 Most improvised mine casualties in 2017 occurred in
Afghanistan (1,093) and Syria (887).
For 16 countries and areas, 862 casualties were recorded under the category of other
unspecified mine types.19 Some three quarters of those casualties were recorded for Syria
(1,208, or 74%).
In 2017, antivehicle mines caused at least 488 casualties in 20 states and areas.20 The
states with the greatest numbers of casualties reported from antivehicle mines were
Pakistan (132) and Ukraine (103).21
18 In 2017, improvised mine casualties were recorded in 17 states: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cameroon, Colombia,
India, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen.
Additionally, improvised mine casualties were known to have occurred in Myanmar, but these are
undifferentiated from other mine casualties in data. Among sources used by the Monitor for calendar
year 2017 data on improvised mine casualties included data from among the casualties of explosive
incidents categorized as “victim-activated” in the Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) explosive violence
data set for 2017. AOAV casualty data for 2017 provided by email from Jennifer Dathan, Researcher, AOAV,
29 August 2018; and Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) data
for calendar year 2017. Approved citation: Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim
Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research, Issue
47(5), 2010, pp. 651–660.
19 In 2017, unspecified mine casualties were recorded in Algeria, Armenia, Cameroon, Chad, Iran, Iraq,
Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, Yemen, and other area Nagorno-Karabakh.
20 In 2017, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Angola,
Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, South Sudan, Sudan,
Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and other areas, Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara.
21 The Monitor shares, cross-references, and compares data with the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Anti-
vehicle mines (AVM) project. That project recorded 491 casualties from both confirmed and suspected
antivehicle mines in 24 countries in 2016. GICHD-SIPRI casualty data provided by email from Ursign
Hofmann, Policy Advisor, GICHD, 22 February 2018. See also, GICHD-SIPRI, “Anti-Vehicle Mines,” undated,
www.gichd.org/avm. Monitor and GICHD-SIPRI methodologies used to enter data differ, resulting in
the differences in annual casualties reported. For example, Monitor data does not include casualties
that occur to persons engaged in laying or emplacing mines. Monitor reporting does include politically
disputed geographic “other areas” in reporting, and tends to use the definitions employed in original
whole data sets when possible. In some cases, when an incident was attributed to both antivehicle mines
and improvised mines in different sources, the Monitor included those as improvised mine casualties.
22 In 2017, Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines,
Poland, Russia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, and other
areas Kosovo, Somaliland, and Western Sahara. In addition to other types of ERW in 2017, casualties of
unexploded submunitions were identified in Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Serbia, Syria, Vietnam,
Yemen, and other areas Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara. For more information on casualties
caused by unexploded submunitions and the annual increase in those casualties recorded for the year
2017, see ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2018.
23 Of the total ERW casualties in 2016, 586 were adults.
24 Casualties from unknown mine/ERW items were recorded in: Angola, Azerbaijan, DRC, Lebanon, Libya, Mali,
Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, and Yemen.
55
Casualties
Category of mine/
Term Description
ERW
Mines* Antipersonnel mines A munition designed to be exploded by the
presence, proximity, or contact of a person,
and therefore prohibited under the Mine
Ban Treaty
Antivehicle mines Also referred to as “antitank mines,”
and included among Mines Other Than
Antipersonnel Mines (MOTAPM), these
are designed to be detonated by the
presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle
as opposed to that of a person and tend
to contain a larger explosive charge than
antipersonnel mines. Antivehicle mines are
not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty
unless they are fitted with fuses that can
be detonated by the presence, proximity, or
contact of a person
Improvised mines Improvised mines are types of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs are
“homemade” explosive weapons that
are designed to cause death or injury.
Improvised mines are IEDs that are
detonated by the presence, proximity, or
contact of a person or a vehicle. These are
landmines and are sometimes referred to
as artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs
(VO-IEDs), or by the type of construction,
such as pressure plate IEDs (PP-IEDs)
Antipersonnel improvised mines, including
booby-traps (also included among
“improvised mines”)**
Antipersonnel improvised mines, including
booby-traps that can be detonated by
the presence, proximity, or contact of a
person, fit the definition of antipersonnel
landmines and are therefore prohibited
under the Mine Ban Treaty. A booby-trap
is an antipersonnel explosive device
deliberately placed to cause casualties
when an apparently harmless object
is disturbed or a normally safe act is
performed
Other unspecified mine When reported as a “mine” or “landmine”
type incident, lacking other details regarding the
mine type or its construction
Category of mine/
Term Description
ERW
Unexploded cluster Unexploded Submunitions or bomblets dispersed or
submunitions and submunition released by, or otherwise separated from,
bomblets a cluster munition and failed to explode
or that have not been used and that have
been left behind or dumped
Explosive ERW Unexploded ordnance (UXO): Explosive
remnants of war weapons that have been primed, fused,
(ERW), including armed, or otherwise prepared for use or
abandoned and used. It may have been fired, dropped,
unexploded launched, or projected yet remained
command- unexploded
detonated IEDs Abandoned ordnance (AXO): Explosive
weapons that have not been used during
an armed conflict, that have been left
behind or dumped
Explosive items, Unknown mines/ERW Unknown mines/ERW are explosive items
type unknown item causing casualties that were detonated
by the presence, proximity, or contact of a
person or a vehicle that were not attributed
to a specific mine/ERW type either because
it was not known what type of mine or ERW
caused the casualty when information was
recorded, or due to a lack of disaggregation
between mines explosives and ERW
causing casualties within a dataset,
including when mine/ERW casualties are
differentiated from other weapon victims
Note: * The use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel IEDs are prohibited under the
Mine Ban Treaty. According to the Mine Ban Treaty definition, a mine is “placed under, on or near the
ground or other surface area” and an antipersonnel mine is a munition “designed to be exploded by
the presence, proximity or contact of a person…” Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under the Mine
Ban Treaty unless the fuzing allows them to be activated by a person.
** In most cases, it is not possible to distinguish between antivehicle and antipersonnel improvised
mines that caused casualties because reporting does not provide a clear means of determining the
sensitivity of fuzes after an explosion.
LANDMINE, EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (ERW), AND
CLUSTER SUBMUNITION CASUALTIES IN 2017
Technician at the Artificial Limbs and Polio Centre prepares prosthetic legs in the Gaza strip,
Palestine.
© Alamy Live News, April 2018
59
Victim Assistance
VICTIM
ASSISTANCE
INTRODUCTION
The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty was the first disarmament convention committing States Parties to
provide assistance to the victims of a specific weapon. The components of victim assistance
include, but are not restricted to: data collection and needs assessment with referral to
emergency and continuing medical care; physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics and
other assistive devices; psychological support; social and economic inclusion; and relevant
laws and public policies.
The definition of “landmine victim” was agreed by States Parties in the Final Report of
the First Review Conference (paragraph 64) formally adopted at the Nairobi Summit in 2004
as based on the then generally accepted understanding as “those who either individually
or collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or substantial
impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to mine utilization.”
Landmine victim, according to this widely accepted understanding of the term, includes
survivors,1 as well as affected families and communities.2
In the penultimate year for the Mine Ban Treaty’s Maputo Action Plan 2014–2019, this
chapter principally takes stock of changes, progress, and challenges to the provision of
assistance in States Parties with significant numbers of survivors and needs. It draws from
reporting on the activities and challenges of hundreds of relevant programs implemented
through government agencies, international and national organizations and NGOs, survivors
networks and similar community-based organizations, as well as other service providers.
In most States Parties some efforts to improve the quality and quantity of health and
physical rehabilitation programs for survivors were undertaken. However, after a trend
of large reductions in services available in recent years due to decreases in resources, in
2017–2018 many countries saw near-stagnation in the remaining core assistance services
for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) victims. Services remained largely centralized,
1 A “survivor” is a person who was injured by mines/explosive remnants of war (ERW) and lived.
2 See, “Final Report of the First Review Conference,” APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005; and “Nairobi
Action Plan 2005–2009,” www.icbl.org/media/933290/Nairobi-Action-Plan-2005.pdf.
Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with victims and needs highlighted in
this section5
Middle
East and Europe, the
East and
Sub-Saharan Africa Americas South Asia, Caucasus, and
North
and Pacific Central Asia
Africa
Angola Guinea- Colombia Afghanistan Albania Algeria
Burundi Bissau El Salvador Cambodia Bosnia and Iraq
Chad Mozambique Nicaragua Sri Lanka Herzegovina Jordan
Democratic Senegal Peru Thailand (BiH) Palestine
Republic of the Somalia Croatia Yemen
Congo (DRC) South Sudan Serbia
Eritrea Sudan Tajikistan
Ethiopia Uganda Turkey
Zimbabwe
3 Country profiles are available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp. Findings specific to victim
assistance in states and other areas with victims of cluster munitions are available through Landmine
Monitor 2018’s companion publication, Cluster Munition Monitor 2018, www.the-monitor.org/CMM18.
4 See, the Monitor, “Victim Assistance Resources,” undated, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/
victim-assistance.aspx.
5 In addition, States Parties Mali and Ukraine, both of which have had hundreds of mine/ERW casualties
in the past two years, may be considered to have significant numbers of survivors with great needs for
assistance that remain unreported.
6 “MAPUTO +15: Declaration of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” adopted 27 June
2014, www.apminebanconvention.org/eu-council-decision/maputo-15.
61
Ensure the inclusion as well as the full and active participation of mine victims and
Victim Assistance
their representative organizations in all matters that affect them; enhance their
capacity.
Increase the availability of and accessibility to services, opportunities, and social
protection measures; strengthen local capacities and enhance coordination.
Address needs and guarantee rights in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.
Develop time-bound and measurable objectives and communicate progress annually.
Enhance plans, policies, and legal frameworks.
Report on measurable improvements in advance of the next review conference.
States Parties commit to addressing victim assistance objectives “with the same precision
and intensity as for other aims of the Convention.”7 The plan also affirms the need for States
Parties to continue carrying out the actions of the previous Cartagena Action Plan in order
to make assistance available, affordable, accessible, and sustainable.8
Victim Assistance
assistance plans or relevant disability plans in place.14
Sudan adopted a victim assistance plan in 2017 through an approval process that started
in 2016. Through 2017 in Colombia, some 19 municipalities had adopted area official plans
for assistance for mine/ERW victims, and 20 municipalities had mapped out specific referral
“pathways,” guiding survivors to their rights, services, and benefits available. This almost
already reached the planned target for 2014–2018 of 22 municipal pathways for assistance.
In 2018, Albania was in the process of national plan review. In BiH, the Victim Assistance
Sub-Strategy 2009–2019 of the Mine Action Strategy remains in place, but a mid-way review
was not yet adopted. Iraq continued to report that it developed annual victim assistance
planning. Guinea-Bissau had reported on objectives of a victim assistance strategy in 2013,
but the objectives, including establishing a new victim assistance coordination mechanism,
were not reported against.
In 2018, victim assistance dialogues focused on the development of tangible strategic
planning were held in Iraq and Uganda, in September and October respectively, hosted by
national authorities with Implementation Support Unit (ISU) support and European Union
(EU) funding.15
Coordination
In 2017, 21 of the 33 States Parties had active victim assistance coordination mechanisms
linked with disability coordination mechanisms that considered the issues relating to the
needs of mine/ERW survivors.16
A coordination mechanism for victim assistance in BiH received an official mandate in
2018 for the first time, after having restarted informal coordination in 2017 after a long
pause.
Chad renewed victim assistance coordination in 2017.
Survivors networks
Country Examples of survivor networks
Afghanistan Afghan Landmine Survivor Organization (ALSO)
Albania Albanian Assistance for Integration and Development (ALB-AID)
Survivor Network
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AzBL) Survivor Network
BiH Organization of amputees UDAS Republic of Srpska (UDAS)
Cambodia Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munitions
(CamCBLCM) Survivor Network; Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS)
Cambodia
Colombia ADISMAM; the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM)
DRC National Association of Mine Survivors and Victims Advocacy
(ANASDIV)
El Salvador Foundation Network of Survivors and Person with Disabilities
Ethiopia Survivors Recovery and Rehabilitation Organization (SRARO)
Mozambique Network for Mine Victims (RAVIM)
Nepal Nepalese Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) Survivor Network
Senegal Solidarity Initiative for Development Actions (ISAD)
Serbia Assistance, Advocacy, Access Serbia (AAAS)
Tajikistan Tajikistan Survivor Network
Uganda Uganda Landmine Survivors Association (ULSA)
Vietnam Association for Empowerment of Person of Persons with Disabilities
(AEPD)
Western Sahara Sahrawi Association of Mine Victims (ASAVIM)
Yemen Yemen Association of Landmine Survivors (YALS)
Note: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated in italics.
Victim Assistance
survivors and needs.
Disability and victim assistance experts meet in Uganda with financial support from the
European Union.
© Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, October 2018
Ecuador, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, a central body for physical rehabilitation
actors was under development. In El Salvador, planning for the construction of a new satellite
prosthetics unit began.
In Albania, raw materials and components for the repair and production of prostheses were
secured for the rehabilitation center in the area where most survivors live. In BiH and Serbia,
while provision of orthopedic devices is mandated by law, access was sometimes impeded
by excessive procedural demands. Staff from municipal centers for physical rehabilitation in
BiH were introduced to the method of integrating peer support during the rehabilitation of
mine survivors.
In Algeria, mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities continued to have
access to most prosthetic and assistive devices free-of-charge. In Iraq, a 30% decrease in
the number of assistive devices between 2014 and 2017 was an indicator of the ongoing
necessity to enhance support to existing rehabilitation services for survivors. A much-needed
new rehabilitation center was launched in Mosul in 2018. In Palestine, the only prosthetic
center in Gaza faced significant strain on its limited resources while addressing an increase
in patients with amputations among protesters who had been shot in the legs. In Yemen,
increased support to the physical rehabilitation centers sector was reported in response to
the needs caused by ongoing conflict, but availability of assistance overall remained far from
adequate for meeting those needs.
Victim Assistance
services are virtually non-existent, some 40% of the population show psychological effects
of trauma from conflict and violence. South Sudan has one of the highest rates of suicides,
and suicide rates in the refugee camps have spiked, while the lives of survivors and other
persons with disabilities is increasingly precarious.20 Ethiopia launched safety net programs
intended to benefit persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors.
Afghanistan and Cambodia required planning and structures to make available
psychosocial support.
Psychological support was among the most serious needs of survivors in Albania, but no
recent progress was reported. The provision of continuing psychosocial support remained
weak in Croatia throughout 2017, despite there being 21 psychosocial centers.
The availability of psychological support and follow-up trauma care in Iraq, including for
internally displaced persons, remained inadequate to meet needs. At least two new projects
providing ongoing psychosocial support were reported in 2018. In Yemen, international
NGOs continued to provide some mental health and psychosocial support activities to the
war-wounded and their families. However, the national survivors’ network was only able to
provide psychological support to a very small number of survivors.
Since 2010, the WHO community-based rehabilitation (CBR) guidelines, and how they can
be used to start or strengthen CBR programs for victims of landmines, have been promoted
among victim assistance actors in States Parties.21 Monitor reporting includes many
examples of CBR programs that contribute to victim assistance implementation, including
the following:
In Peru, a regional-targeted program continued to improve the quality of life of persons
with disabilities and their families in the mine-affected Tumbes region in 2017.
In Angola, an NGO-run CBR program expanded to seven new provinces. In Ethiopia, an
NGO provides CBR in three regional states. In Eritrea, the CBR program is the main provider
of physical therapy and psychosocial support to landmine and ERW survivors and persons
with disabilities. In Senegal, a national CBR program was on the verge of being approved.
In Afghanistan, NGO-led CBR activities are implemented in 12 of 34 provinces. In
Cambodia, CBR services are available in 25 provinces.
Gender considerations
While men and boys are the majority of reported casualties, women and girls may be
disproportionally disadvantaged as a result of mine/ERW incidents and suffer multiple forms
of discrimination as survivors. To guide a rights-based approach to victim assistance for
women and girls, States Parties can apply the principles of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).23 Implementation of
20 South Sudan reported that landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities “now experience death
as a result of poverty.” Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), p. 13.
21 The WHO CBR Guidelines were the subject of focused training for government victim assistance focal
points at the Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of States Parties in 2010; a victim assistance experts’ program
was dedicated to their Geneva launch and training on their practical application, bit.ly/MBT10MSPVA.
22 Maputo Action Plan Action #17.
23 Of the 33 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, all except Somalia and Sudan are also States Parties to
CEDAW.
Age considerations
Child survivors have specific and additional needs in all aspects of assistance. In 2017 and
2018, inclusive education and age-sensitive assistance were far from adequate in most
countries. In this regard, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is particularly
relevant to the implementation of victim assistance with a rights-based approach.25
The annually updated Monitor factsheet on the Impact of Mines/ERW on Children contains
more details on issues pertaining to children, youth, and adolescents.26
24 The Committee of CEDAW General Recommendation 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and
post-conflict situations and General Recommendation 27 on older women and protection of their human
rights are also particularly applicable.
25 Some of the resources on children and victim assistance include: Sebastian Kasack, Assistance to Victims of
Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War: Guidance on Child-focused Victim Assistance (UNICEF, November
2014); Austria and Colombia, “Strengthening the Assistance to Child Victims,” Maputo Review Conference
Documents, June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Austria-Colombia-
Paper.pdf; and Colombia, “Guide for Comprehensive assistance to boys, girls and adolescent landmine
victims – Guidelines for the constructions of plans, programmes, projects and protocols,” Bogota, 2014, bit.
ly/ColombiaLandmineVA2014.
26 These factsheets, produced since 2009, can be accessed at the Monitor, “Victim Assistance Resources,”
www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/victim-assistance.aspx.
69
Victim Assistance
The Maputo Action Plan calls for activities addressing the specific needs of victims and also
emphasizes the need to simultaneously integrate victim assistance into other frameworks,
including disability, health, social welfare, education, employment, development, and poverty
reduction.27 It also recognizes that in addition to integrating victim assistance, States Parties
need to, in actual fact, “ensure that broader frameworks are reaching mine victims.”
Many of these frameworks have their own representative international administrations,
guidance documents, plans, and objectives that may also be reflected in national-level
activities that can reach survivors, families, and communities.
Since the emergence of victim assistance through the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, other weapons-
related conventions have adopted this rapidly emerging norm. The 2008 Convention on
Cluster Munitions codified the expanded principles and commitments of victim assistance
into binding international law; these were introduced into the planning of the Convention
on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V on ERW in 2008, and most recently included in
the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
The CRPD is the international human rights legal instrument that has been most discussed
in relation to the implementation of victim assistance. The linkages between rights-
based victim assistance and the CRPD are particularly useful for implementation through
integration and synergy. Only five States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant
numbers of survivors are not party to the CRPD. Three of those are signatories to the CRPD:
Chad, Somalia, and Tajikistan. Tajikistan signed in March 2018 and Somalia in October 2018.
Eritrea and South Sudan have not yet signed or acceded to the CRPD. Victim assistance
is very often linked with, or included in, the national CRPD coordination mechanisms of
countries that are party to both the Mine Ban Treaty and the CRPD. Furthermore, some states
initial reports submitted under Article 35 of the CRPD have referred to victim assistance and
landmine survivors. Although the CRPD does not establish new human rights, it does provide
much greater clarity to the obligations of states to promote, protect, and ensure the rights
of persons with disabilities and presents the concepts for those rights to become reality
through implementation of the convention.
Adopted 70 years ago this year, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
established for the first time the fundamental human rights to be universally protected.
The basis of many elements of the CRPD that inform understandings of the components, or
pillars, of victim assistance are found in the UDHR, including healthcare (and rehabilitation),
employment, education, and participation.28
30 Persons with disabilities are referred to directly in the SDGs: education (Goal 4), employment (Goal 8),
reducing inequality (Goal 10), and accessibility of human settlements (Goal 11), in addition to including
persons with disabilities in data collection and monitoring (Goal 17). With an emphasis on poverty
reduction, equality, and inclusion, the SDGs also recognize the need for the “achievement of durable peace
and sustainable development in countries in conflict and post-conflict situations.”
31 “Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action,” undated but 2016, http://
humanitariandisabilitycharter.org/.
32 Such an activation occurs when a humanitarian situation suddenly and significantly changes, and it is
clear that the existing capacity to coordinate and deliver humanitarian assistance and protection does
not match the scale, complexity, and urgency of the crisis. Based on an analysis of five criteria: scale,
complexity, urgency, capacity, and reputational risk. IASC, “L3 IASC System-wide response activations and
deactivations,” 4 April, 2017, bit.ly/IASCL3.
33 UNOCHA, “2018 Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview,” 1 December 2017,
bit.ly/2018AgfHumNeedsOCHA.
Abdullah Abdullah, Chief Executive of Afghanistan, Suraya Dalil, Ambassador of Afghanistan
at the United Nations in Geneva, and Juan Carlos Ruan, Director of the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, at the Third Pledging Conference for the
Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
© Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, February 2018
73
Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes
the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in
order to fulfill its treaty obligations. This chapter focuses on financial support for mine
action provided for calendar year 2017 by affected countries and international donors. It
also documents new funding announcements made by some donors in 2018 to support
mine action efforts. Cooperation and assistance, however, is not only limited to financial
assistance. Other forms of assistance can include the provision of equipment, expertise, and
personnel, as well as the exchange of experience, know-how, and best-practice sharing.
1
This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs
for calendar year 2017, as of October 2018. All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in
current dollars. Mine action support includes funding specifically related to landmines, cluster munitions,
explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) but is rarely disaggregated as
such. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail and some utilize a fiscal year rather
than the calendar year. The total amounts of international support between 2012 and 2016 were updated
to include revised contributions from the European Union (EU) and the United States (US).
2
In 2012, international and national support totaled US$756.2 million. Adjusted for inflation, 2012 global
support is $807.3 million in 2017 dollars, the highest annual total on record. The Monitor used the
annual average of US All Urban Consumers Price Index (for all items) to adjust data on support for mine
action for inflation. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: CPI-All
Urban Consumers (Current Series),” Data extracted on 4 November 2018, https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/
CUUR0000SA0.
700 673.2
Total contribution in US$ million
572.2
525 482.9
480.4 466.3
431.2 451.6 446.4 448.8 430.7
376.5
350
175
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
3 The Monitor maintains records of international support to mine action back to 1996, and national support
back to 2002. The 2017 international support total is the highest in nominal and inflation-adjusted terms.
4 Data for 2017 on international support to mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7
Reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Reports, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)
Amended Protocol II Annual Reports, ITF Enhancing Human Security Annual Report 2017, UNMAS Annual
Report 2017, and answers from donors to questionnaires. Thirteen of the 28 States Parties documented in
this chapter reported international funding for mine action in a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report for 2017,
compared to 16 out of 25 States Parties in 2016.
75
The 2017 rise is in large part due to the substantial increases in the contributions of the
PLEDGES IN 2018
At the Maputo Review Conference, in June 2014, States Parties committed to complete
their respective time-bound obligations by 2025. This commitment has led to a number
of initiatives and announcements aimed at strengthening international cooperation and
assistance, and promoting the need for predictable adequate funding in order to meet the
goal of a mine-free world by 2025.6
In February 2018, 33 States Parties, one state not party, the EU, as well as non-
governmental and international organizations attended the Third Pledging Conference for
the Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, hosted by Afghanistan in Geneva. In total, 11 States
Parties7 made pledges to the treaty’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and sponsorship
program. Four additional States Parties—Austria, Belgium, Canada, and Sweden—indicated
their intention to support the work of the treaty but were not in a position to pledge a
specific amount as their respective budgets were still under review.
In addition, some mine action donors renewed their commitment to providing financial
resources:
In March 2018, South Korea announced a pledge of $20 million to support clearance
and capacity-building activities in the provinces of Quand Binh and Binh Dinh as
part of the Korea-Vietnam Mine Action Project.8
5 Amounts indicate the country in which funds were to be used. Funds often are not used by the governments
in recipient countries, but instead by those providing services.
6 In 2016, mine action donors reiterated their commitment to provide resources to support mine action
efforts in the coming years through three pledging conferences in support of: the implementation of the
Mine Ban Treaty (First Pledging Conference, Geneva, March 2016), Iraq (Washington, DC, July 2016), and
Colombia (in New York City, September 2016). In 2016–2017, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US announced significant increases in their funding to support
mine action efforts. See, Monitor factsheet, “Extraordinary Pledges to Support Mine Action in 2016,” 22
November 2016, www.the-monitor.org/media/2388355/2016-Pledging-Conferences-fact-sheet_final.
pdf; and Landmine and Cluster Munition Blog, “Pledges of New Funding in Support of Humanitarian Mine
Action,” 13 April 2017, bit.ly/MBT2017Pledgeblog.
7 Australia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, and
Thailand. Mine Ban Treaty, Third Pledging Conference Report, 27 February 2018, bit.ly/MBT3rdPledging.
8 UNDP, “Viet Nam: Mine Action Project launched with support from Korea,” Press release, 9 March 2018, bit.
ly/MaVietnamKoreaMar2018.
DONORS IN 2017
In 2017, 28 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, two states not party, the EU, and six other
institutions11 contributed a total of $673.2 million to mine action.
A small group of donors continued to provide the majority of international mine action
support with the five largest donors (the US, Germany, the EU, Norway, and Japan) accounting
for nearly four-fifths of all international support with a combined total of $532.7 million.
The US remained the largest mine action donor with $309 million and it alone provided
nearly half of all international mine action support in 2017. Germany ranked second with
$84.4 million, or 13% of all contributions, while the next three donors—the EU, Norway, and
Japan—provided more than $30 million
each.
Another 17 donors contributed less
than $1 million each, compared to 11
contributing in that range in 2016.
Support from States Parties in 2017
accounted for two-fifths of all donor
funding, with 28 countries providing
some $269.2 million. This represents
a 9% increase from the $246 million
recorded in 2015.
In 2017, the EU and its member
states12 contributed a total of $233.1
million and accounted for 35% of the
Carmen Magariños-Casal, Chargee d’Affaires total international support, up from
representing the European Union in Dakar, takes $194 million provided in 2016 (40% of
questions from the media at a meeting the EU the total international funding for that
supported in Senegal with more than 75 mine year).
clearance and mine action experts.
© Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation
Support Unit, October 2018
9 Statement of Australia, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Session on International Cooperation
and Assistance, Geneva, Switzerland, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/AustraliaISM2018. Exchange rate for June 2018:
A$1=US$0.7498. US Federal Reserve, “Foreign Exchange Rates (monthly),” 4 September 2018, www.
federalreserve.gov/releases/g5/current/default.htm.
10 Department for International Development, “UK aid will protect more than 820,000 people from threat
of lethal landmines,” Press release, 6 September 2018, www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-aid-will-
protect-more-than-820000-people-from-threat-of-lethal-landmines. Exchange rate for 6 September
2018: £1=US$1.2933. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Weekly),” 10 September 2018, www.
federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/20180910/.
11 South Korea and the US are the two states not party. The six institutions are Howard Buffett Foundation,
the Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development
(OFID), the Sudan Humanitarian Fund, the United Nations Association (UNA)-Sweden, the UN, and the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
12 Eighteen EU Member States provided funding in 2017: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, and the UK.
77
Fifteen donors contributed more in 2017 than they did in 2016; including a $157 million
increase from the US (103%), and a $47 million increase from Germany (126%). Additionally,
Norway increased its assistance by $7.5 million. Five new donors were also identified in
2017: Finland,14 Monaco, Portugal, the Howard Buffett Foundation, and the UN.
In contrast, 17 donors decreased their funding, led by the EU (down $9.3 million, a 12%
decrease) and Japan (down $8.3 million, a 20% decrease). Additionally, Australia, New Zealand,
and the Netherlands decreased their assistance by more than $6 million each.
13 The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The total amount of
international support for 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 were updated as a result of revised EU and US
funding totals.
14 Finland budgeted funding for mine action in 2016, but it was reported that payments could not be
executed due to changes in the administration and the extension of the tender-processes. As a result,
no support was reported in 2016, and the 2017 total included some of the funding initially budgeted for
2016.
The table below summarizes the changes in mine action funding from the top 15 donors,
expressed in their respective national currencies and US$ terms.
FUNDING PATHS
RECIPIENTS
A total of 38 states and three other areas received $627.3 million from 37 donors in 2017. A
further $46 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions,
NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area.
As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding. The
top five recipient states—Iraq, Syria, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Lao PDR—received 65% of
all international support in 2017.
Iraq received the largest amount of funding (30% of all international support) from the
largest number of donors (17).17 Eleven states and one area, or 29% of all recipients, had only
one donor.18
More than three-fifths of international support (63%, or $423.2 million) went to 16
countries or one other area with massive contamination ($320.2 million) and heavy
contamination ($103.0 million).19 Most of this funding went to clearance and risk education
projects.
In 2017, 29 states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared
to 2016, including 14 recipients receiving more support, and 15 recipients receiving less
support, four of which received no support. These fluctuations may be a reflection of shifts
in donor priorities and changes in local situations.
16 The small donors included Andorra, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, and Portugal, as
well as OCHA, the Sudan Humanitarian Fund, and UNA-Sweden.
17 Only Afghanistan had the same number of donors in 2017.
18 Recipients with one donor included: Albania, Azerbaijan, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Mozambique,
Nepal, the Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Thailand, and other area Somaliland.
19 Recipients of international support with massive contamination included: Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan,
BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Yemen, and the other area Western Sahara. Recipients with
heavy contamination included: Colombia, Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe.
Iraq and Syria were the recipients with the largest increases, receiving respectively $120
million and $70.8 million more than in 2016, notably following the massive increases in
the contributions of the US and Germany as previously detailed. In addition, three countries
saw a substantial increase in support received: Colombia ($39.3 million more), Chad ($25.3
million more), and Libya ($18.6 million more).
Support to Colombia ($65.5 million) more than doubled from 2016. In 2017, the
Howard Buffett Foundation made a $16.1 million donation to support clearance
activities in Colombia. Three donors considerably increased their contributions
compared to 2016: the US ($12.5 million more), Japan ($7.8 million more), and
Switzerland ($1.2 million more). These three countries participated in the Global
Demining Initiative for Colombia ministerial-level meeting in September 2016,
during which they pledged financial assistance to support Colombia’s mine action
activities in the context of the peace process.20
20 At the Global Demining Initiative for Colombia ministerial-level meeting, the US pledged $36 million
over 2016–2018, and Switzerland pledged $4.1 million over 2016–2020. Japan pledged $1.5 million
without specifying the timeframe, but this seems to correspond to the amount provided in 2016. See,
Monitor factsheet, “Extraordinary Pledges to Support Mine Action in 2016,” 22 November 2016, www.the-
monitor.org/media/2388355/2016-Pledging-Conferences-fact-sheet_final.pdf.
81
Support to Chad jumped from $0.4 million in 2016 to $25.7 million in 2017, following
Victim Assistance
$15.8 million / 4%
Advocacy
$3.6 million / 1% Capacity-building
$8.0 million / 2%
Various funding $249.9 million
21 In 2016, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education
($346.8 million, or 72% of total international support), victim assistance ($21.0 million, or 4%), capacity-
building ($12.5 million, or 3%), advocacy ($2.5 million, or 1%), stockpile destruction ($0 million, or 0%),
and various activities ($100.1 million, or 20%). Data for 2016 was revised—based on new figures that
detailed dedicated clearance and risk education funding as well as contributions that were not previously
reported by donors.
83
Clearance and risk education
Victim assistance
Direct international support for victim assistance activities remained below the level of most
previous years, and decreased significantly as a percentage of total mine action funding.
Based on information available as of October 2018, in 2017, $15.8 million was reported,
down from $21 million in 2016. This represents just 2% of all reported support for mine
action, in comparison, victim assistance funding ranged between 4% and 7% of all support
from 2013 to 2016. This estimate may be conservative in that some donors were not able to
provide specific details on dedicated victim assistance funding at the time of writing, but it
still provides an informative picture of the global victim assistance funding situation.
Fourteen25 donors reported contributing to victim assistance projects in 10 States
Parties, and four states not party.26 Most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct
international support for victim assistance. Funding for victim assistance activities, however,
is especially difficult to track because many donors report that they provide support for
victims through more general programs for development and for the rights of persons with
disabilities. Since such contributions are not disaggregated, it is not possible to include
them in Monitor reporting.
The top three victim assistance donors—Germany, Switzerland, and Norway—provided
60% ($9.5 million) of all victim assistance funding in 2017.
Eight donors reported contributing $12.3 million, more than three-quarters (78%) of
all support to victim assistance in 2017, through the ICRC or national Red Cross and Red
Crescent societies.
22 Albania, Chad, Nepal, Serbia, and Sudan were the five recipients which did not receive funding dedicated
to clearance and risk education in 2017. This does not mean that donors did not support activities related
to this sector, but that none of the contributions reported detailed specific funding going to clearance and
risk education only.
23 States Parties recipients of international assistance for clearance were: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH,
Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Iraq, Mali, Mozambique, Palau, Palestine, the Solomon Islands, Somalia,
South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. States not party that received
international assistance for clearance were: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Syria,
and Vietnam. Other areas that received international assistance for clearance activities were: Kosovo,
Somaliland, and Western Sahara.
24 Recipients of international assistance for risk education were: Cambodia, CAR, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Jordan,
Lao PDR, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.
25 Victim assistance donors included: Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, New
Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, the EU, and the OFID.
26 States Parties recipients of international assistance for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, BiH,
Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine. States not party that
received international assistance for victim assistance were: Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, and Nepal.
27 Advocacy activities generally include, but are not limited to, contributions to the Convention on Cluster
Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Units, the Gender Mine Action Programme
(GMAP), the Geneva Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva Call, and the ICBL-CMC and its
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
28 Two of the 10 affected states analyzed in this chapter reported national funding for mine action in a
Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2017: Cambodia and Zimbabwe. Four others provided details on their
national contribution for mine action in their extension requests: BiH, Croatia, Serbia, and Sudan. Lao PDR
and Lebanon reported their national contributions in their Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7
reports for 2017. Information on national mine action provided in 2017 by Angola and Chile is available
in their respective annual national budget laws.
29 Eleven affected states reported on their national contributions in 2016: Angola, BiH, Chad, Chile, Croatia,
Ecuador, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.
30 Chile has not received international support since 2007.
85
represented 77% of all support. Three donors—the US ($847.4 million), the EU ($301.5
800 771.5
Contribution in US$ million
649.8 624.3
600 567.9
507.7
448.8 673.2
400 430.7
376.5 482.9
200
201.0 193.6
131.2 85.0 98.3
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
STATES PARTIES
Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a) Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00 Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01 Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99 Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99 Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99 Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98 Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00 Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99 Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a) Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98 Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
SIGNATORY
Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97
NON-SIGNATORIES
Armenia Libya
Azerbaijan Micronesia, Federated States of
Bahrain Mongolia
China Morocco
Cuba Myanmar
Egypt Nepal
Georgia Pakistan
India Russia
Iran Saudi Arabia
Israel Singapore
Kazakhstan Syria
Korea, North Tonga
Korea, South United Arab Emirates
Kyrgyzstan United States
Lao PDR Uzbekistan
Lebanon Vietnam
PREAMBLE
The States Parties
Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel
mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless
civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction,
inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe
consequences for years after emplacement,
Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated
manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the
world, and to assure their destruction,
Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation,
including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,
Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important
confidence-building measure,
Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the
early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,
Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December
1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international
agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,
Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and
multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production
and transfer of anti-personnel mines,
Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced
by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end
undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around
the world,
Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27
June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally
binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel
mines,
Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention,
and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all
relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament,
regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
93
Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of
the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on
ARTICLE 1
General obligations
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
a) To use anti-personnel mines;
b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or
indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to
a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel
mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
ARTICLE 2
Definitions
1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity
or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines
designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to
a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel
mines as a result of being so equipped.
2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other
surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a
vehicle.
3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of,
linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is
made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.
4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into
or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not
involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.
5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected
presence of mines.
ARTICLE 3
Exceptions
1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a
number of anti- personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection,
mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall
not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
ARTICLE 5
Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas
1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than
ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or
control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall
ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction
or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to
ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein
have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as
amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or
to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of
all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit
a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the
deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to
ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
a) The duration of the proposed extension;
b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
(i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
(ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of
all the anti-personnel mines; and
(iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-
personnel mines in mined areas;
c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration
the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of
States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance
with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State
Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the
previous extension period pursuant to this Article.
95
ARTICLE 6
ARTICLE 8
Facilitation and clarification of compliance
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the
implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of
cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this
Convention.
97
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to
compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit,
ARTICLE 10
Settlement of disputes
1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that
may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State
Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by
whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the
States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending
a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and
clarification of compliance.
ARTICLE 11
Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the
application or implementation of this Convention, including:
a) The operation and status of this Convention;
b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
d) The development of technologies to clear anti-
personnel mines;
e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent
meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until
the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to
attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.
ARTICLE 12
Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations
five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be
convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States
ARTICLE 13
Amendments
1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose
amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated
to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views
on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a
majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation
that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an
Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited
to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of
Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States
Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held
earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of
the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall
communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this
Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments
of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any
remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.
ARTICLE 14
Costs
1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States
Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the
States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8
and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
101
ARTICLE 15
ARTICLE 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with
the Depositary.
ARTICLE 17
Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month
in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been
deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth
month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession.
ARTICLE 18
Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it
will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.
ARTICLE 19
Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.
ARTICLE 20
Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw
from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the
Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall
include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument
of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six- month period, the
withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect
before the end of the armed conflict.
ARTICLE 21
Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this
Convention.
ARTICLE 22
Authentic texts
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.