RP V Gallo
RP V Gallo
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
Gallo has never been known as "Michael Soriano Gallo." She has always been female. Her
parents, married on May 23, 1981, have never changed their names. For her, in her petition
before the Regional Trial Court, her Certificate of Live Birth contained errors, which should be
corrected. For her, she was not changing the name that was given to her; she was merely
correcting its entry.
To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the Regional Trial Court
of Ilagan City, Isabela in for the correction of her name from "Michael" to "Michelle" and of her
biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"; her mother's middle
name, "Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her parent's marriage date, May
23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not recorded.
As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official
transcript of records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage
certificate.
The RTC having found Gallo's petition sufficient in form and substance and ordered the
publication of the Notice of Hearing once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Province of Isabela.
The RTC granted her petition however the OSG appealed alleging that Gallo did not comply
with the jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and the
published Order did not state her official name, "Michael Gallo." Furthermore, the published
Order was also defective for not stating the cause of the change of name.
The Court of Appeals denied the OSG’s appeal and found that Gallo availed of the proper
remedy under Rule 108 as the corrections sought were clerical, harmless, and innocuous.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in alleging that
the change sought by Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and not a mere correction of
error; and
2. Whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and
observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
HELD:
1. NO.
In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of evidence as
determining whether or not the change sought is a typographical error or a substantive change
requires looking into the party's records, supporting documents, testimonies, and other evidence.
Republic Act No. 10172/9048 defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded mistake,
"which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding." Thus:
"Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of
clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that
is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, mistake
in the entry of day and month in the date of birth or the sex of the person or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, or status of the petitioner.
By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual determination made after
reference to and evaluation of existing documents presented.
Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is "obvious to the
understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate
was ever used.
The Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court's determination, concurred in by the Court of
Appeals, that this case involves the correction of a mere error.
2.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all
administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative
officer concerned must be given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her
jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects the party's cause of action as these
remedies refer to a precedent condition which must be complied with prior to filing a case in
court.
Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to
take cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, it cannot be waived.
However, for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled that
failure to raise the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction at an opportune time may bar a subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on
that ground by way of laches.