Respondents 1. The Representation of People's Act (Third Amendment) Ordinance 2014 Does Not Violate Art 14 of Constitution of India
Respondents 1. The Representation of People's Act (Third Amendment) Ordinance 2014 Does Not Violate Art 14 of Constitution of India
1. The Representation of People’s Act (third Amendment) Ordinance 2014 does not violate
Art 14 of Constitution of India1.
i. That The Representation of People’s Act (third Amendment) Ordinance 2014 does not
violate art 14 of Constitution of India and hence is not arbitrary. Article 14 declares that
‘the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of law
within the territory of India. The equal protection of laws guaranteed by Article 14 does
not mean that all laws must be general in character. It does not mean that the same laws
should apply to all persons. The varying needs of different classes of persons often
require separate treatment.
ii. That from the very nature of society there should be different laws in different places and
the legislative controls the policy and enacts laws in the best interest of the safety and
security of the state. In fact identical treatment in unequal circumstances would amount to
inequality. So a reasonable classification is not only permitted but is necessary if society
is to progress. Thus what Article 14 forbids is class-legislation but it does not forbid
reasonable classification. The classification however must not be “arbitrary, artificial or
evasive” but must be based on some real and substantial bearing on a just and reasonable
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation. In the present matter the
ordinance 2014 introducing the eligibility criteria for contesting MP election by providing
that the candidate must have passed class 10 of the board of Secondary Education or its
equivalent2 is not arbitrary and does not violate art 14.
iii. In the case of Javed v. State of Haryana 3in which it upheld the constitutionality of a
provision that stipulated that a person having more than two children could not be elected
as the panch or sarpanch of a panchayat. The Supreme Court added that, reasonable
classification based on intelligible differentia distinguishing persons or things grouped
together from others left out of the group, was permissible for the purpose of legislation
and that there needs to be a rational nexus between the law and the purpose it is supposed
to achieve. Thus, applying the logic used in the case, even the current provision can be
said to be constitutional, because there is an intelligible differentia and one can easily
divide the groups on the basis of their education. The law has also somewhat nexus with
the purpose i.e. promotion of education.
1
Laws of Pammu are in pari materia to the Laws of India
2
Para 2,factsheet
3
2003 (8) SCC 369,
iv. UNESCO defines literacy as the development of oral and written expression and
communication. Language is viewed from a broad perspective (speaking, listening,
reading, and writing). Learning these skills is a lifelong process which involves both
traditional and modern instruments (paper and pencil, keyboards, digital technology,
etc.)4. According to this new vision, the social environments in which interpersonal
practices and interactions take place are essential to understanding and developing
literacy as both a personal skill and a prerequisite for the development of society. Studies
have been carried out on this subject in a number of countries, including Brazil, India, the
United States and several African countries. Adult literacy programmes have been found
to have a positive effect on the self-esteem of participants.5 These benefits are particularly
significant among women.6The quality of learning has a significant impact on earnings,
and emphasizes its importance for economic growth in developing countries.7. Given their
intrinsic value, these benefits may produce others directly or indirectly related to literacy,
as stated by the UNESCO report on Education for All. Such benefits include improved
health and increased political participation or social integration. 8
v. The countries in the world that have become prosperous fall into two categories. The first
category includes those nations that have possessed (or acquired by force) large amounts
of a valuable natural resource. .
The second group of countries—a much larger one—is composed of countries that have
educated their citizenry into prosperity. Nearly all of the countries that have long been
the wealthiest in the world reached, or have maintained, that status by having universal
pre-college education, along with a strong commitment to higher education.
Consider Japan: It possesses few natural resources, consists of a handful of densely-
populated islands that are remote from Europe and the United States, and came out of the
4
Torres, R.M. (2006), “Literacy and Lifelong Learning: The Linkages”. In ADEA 2006 Biennial Meeting,
Libreville, Gabon, March (pp. 27-31).
5
Abadzi, H. (2003), Improving Adult Literacy Outcomes: Lessons from Cognitive Research for Developing
Countries. Washington, DC. World Bank (“Directions in Development Series” Collection).; Beder, H. (1999),
NCSALL Report No. 6., The Outcomes and Impacts of Adult Literacy in the United States. Cambridge,
Massachussets. National Center for the Study of Adult Literacy and Learning, January 1999.
http://gseweb.harvard.edu/~ncall/research/report6.pdf (Accessed 11 Oct 2015); Bingman, M. (2000), “‘I’ve
Come a Long Way’. Learner-Identified Outcomes of Participation in Literacy Programs”. NCALL Report No.
13, February. Boston, Massachussets. National Center for the Study of Adult Literacy and Learning.; Egbo, B.
(2000), Gender, Literacy and Life Chances in Sub-Saharan Africa. Cleveland/Buffalo/Sydney. Multilingual
Matters.;
6
Stromquist, N. (2006), “The Political Benefits of Adult Literacy”. Background paper for EFA Global
Monitoring Report.
7
Bedi, A. (1997), “The Importance of School Quality as a Determinant of Earnings in a Developing Country:
Evidence from Honduras”. International Journal of Educational Development, Vol. 17, No. 4
8
UNESCO (2005), EFA Global Monitoring Report. The Quality Imperative
Second World War with its industrial base all but destroyed. Even so, the Japanese
people committed themselves to building a first-class education system.
The result was decades of impressive economic growth, during which Japan became an
economic power and the world’s second-largest economy (only recently surpassed by
China, which has a population ten times the size of Japan’s, and is building an impressive
education system of its own). Japan’s stagnation in recent years has been caused by other
factors, especially the aging of its population that are beyond the power of even an
excellent education system to reverse.
Other countries have wisely followed Japan’s lead. Taiwan, for example, is another
resource-poor nation that has become an economic powerhouse. Indeed, a Taiwanese
diplomat recently wrote that “Taiwan’s economic achievement is based on education.
[We] believe that education is the bedrock of a nation’s competitiveness.” 9 Therefore the
educational qualifications introduced for the election of the MP will encourage more
prospective candidates to get educated and will increase the abysmally low literacy levels
in the Country of Pammu. It is also argued that by having a minimum educational
qualification, the elected members will be able to understand and implement the schemes
more efficiently. Politicians contesting elections should have a minimum qualification to
be able to put forward his/her views effectively and contribute to the policy formulation
and implementation processes. To have a clear understanding of the functioning of
democracies, constitutional provisions and role of bureaucracy, it always helps to have a
certain level of literacy among the candidates.10Therefore the Representation of People’s
Act (third Amendment) Ordinance 2014 introducing educational qualifications for
contesting MP election is therefore valid and not unconstitutional.
2. It is well settled that legislation can be declared invalid or unconstitutional only on two
grounds namely, (i) lack of legislative competence and (ii) violation of any fundamental
rights or any provision of the Constitution.11
9
https://verdict.justia.com/2012/03/29/an-educated-population-is-essential-to-a-nations-prosperity-yet-some-
politicians-are-demonizing-our-educational-system-for-political-advantage(Accessed on 2nd Oct 2015)
10
http://www.elections.in/political-corner/should-candidates-meet-educational-criteria-to-contest-
elections/(Accessed on 2nd Oct 2015)
11
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr. (1978) 1 SCC 248
exercise of the powers conferred on the Parliament under Article 246 read with Articles
84 and 327 and Entry 72 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
i. That the Ordinance making power of the President under Art 123 of the constitution is
a legislative power, comparable to the legislative power of the Parliament and the
ordinance may relate to any subject the parliament has power to legislate on.
Therefore Article 84 of the Constitution of India (dealing with the legislature) requires
candidates “possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by
or under any law made by Parliament”, thus expressly envisaging the possibility that
Parliament may pass a law limiting the entitlement to participate in the democratic
process on the basis of certain qualification and in the present case the amendment is
in consonance with Art 84 the Constitution of India.
ii. That the language of Clause (c) of Article 84 creates a power and not a duty12. The
Constitution by Article 84 has prescribed qualifications for membership of either
House of Parliament. Article 84 (c) does not make it compulsory for Parliament to
prescribe any qualification other than those prescribed by Clauses (a) & (b).
Parliament may or may not prescribe some such qualifications, and having prescribed
some may repeal them whenever it so desires. There is no such limitation on
Parliament's legislative power, which is confirmed by Entry 72 of the Union List in
the Seventh Schedule. The amendments in of the Representation of the People Act,
1951 by the Representation of the People (third Amendment) Act, 2014) has been
made in exercise of the powers conferred on the Parliament under Article 246 read
with Articles 84 and 327 and Entry 72 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to
the Constitution. The impugned amendment does not infringe any Constitutional
provision. It cannot be found to be violative of fundamental rights in Part III of the
Constitution. It is not disputed that Parliament has legislative competence to enact the
amending Act. In these facts and circumstances, the impugned legislation13 cannot be
struck down as unconstitutional.
2.2 The right to stand for election is a statutory right and the statute can therefore
regulate the manner in which the right has to be enforced or the remedy for enforcing
12
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1
13
Representation of People’s Act (third Amendment) 2014
it. Therefore the Representation of People’s Act (third Amendment) Ordinance 2014 is
constitutional.
i. The modalities of voting (procedural regulations dealing with the time, place and
manner of voting, and substantive regulations dealing, for example, with age
eligibility) could be regulated by statute, but the act of voting itself is protected by
19(1)(a) therefore the Ordinance 2014 is constitutional.
ii. In a catena of cases14 the Supreme Court has observed that the right to stand as a
candidate and contest an election is not a common law right. It is a special right
created by statute and can only be exercised on the conditions laid down by the statue.
The Fundamental Rights Chapter has no bearing on a right like this created by statute.
Therefore the promulgation of the ordinance15 is not unconstitutional and therefore
valid.
iii. Arguendo even if there is a contention based on Art 14, the Ordinance 2014 satisfies
the tests of intelligible differentia and rational nexus to the Statute’s object i.e.
promotion of education thereby improving the literacy levels. Similar stance was
16
taken in a case where the Court rejected a challenge to a statutory provision
disqualifying potential Panchayat election candidates with more than two children.
The Court first rejected contention based on Article 14 (equality before law) by
reasoning that it satisfies the tests of intelligible differentia and rational nexus to the
Statute’s object. The logic was that a person is otherwise free to exercise his or her
fundamental rights, but if he or she wants to contest elections, the rules must be
followed. In other words, the only protection that is available against statutes creating
the right to contest is the test for reasonable classification and rational nexus. It must
be reiterated that there are two aspects here: one, the substantive
fundamental/constitutional right to contest and two, the consistency of the statute
creating the right to contest with other fundamental rights. 17. The Ordinances recently
passed by the Governor of Rajasthan were challenged 18 However, the Court
14
Jumuna Prasad Mukhariya v Lachhi Ram ((1955) 1 SCR 608); NP Ponnuswami v Returning Officer ((1952) 1
SCR 218) and Jyoti Basu v Debi Ghoshal ((1982) 3 SCR 318). ; Hariprasad Mulshanker Trivedi vs V. B. Raju
And Others 1974 SCR (1) 548; Rama Kant Pandey v. Union of India [(1993) 2 SCC 438]; Jagan Nath v.
Jaswant Singh [1954 SCR 892]; Bharamu Subrao Patil vs Narsingrao Gurunath PatilAIR 2001 Bom 104
15
Representation of People’s Act (third Amendment) Ordinance 2014
16
Javed v State of Haryana ((2003) 8 SCC 369),
17
Vasujith Ram, The Case of the Rajasthan Panchayats and the Right to Contest, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Jan. 7,
2015, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/01/the-case-of-the-rajasthan-panchayats-and-the-right-to-contest
18
Aruna Roy v State of Rajasthan (WP (C) D No. 1 of 2015).
disposed (on procedural grounds), granting liberty to the petitioners to approach the
High Court first.
3. The Ordinance making power of the President is a legislative power, comparable to the
legislative power of the Parliament and hence the motive behind the exercise of this
power cannot be questioned, just as is the case with legislation by the Parliament and
state legislatures.
i. Ordinance making power of the President and the Governor was a legislative power,
comparable to the legislative power of the Parliament and state legislatures
respectively. This implies that the motives behind the exercise of this power cannot be
questioned.19
ii. That promulgating of an Ordinance by the Governor is purely upon the Subjective
Satisfaction of him and he is the sole Judge to consider the necessity to issue the
Ordinance and “his satisfaction is not a justiciable matter”20
iii. That the Power of making Ordinances is a legislative action so the same grounds as
related to the law making should be challenged than challenging the executive or
judicial grounds.21
iv. That the rights and obligations which are created by the Ordinance came into effect as
soon as the Ordinance is promulgated and the same cannot be extinguished until a
proper legislature by a legislative body extinguishes those rights and obligations of
the Ordinances.22 In the present matter the govt of SBP supports the ordinance and
therefore the obligation of having a minimum qualification of passing the 10th
Standard is still in effect.
v. That there is a need to exercise judicial review over the President’s decision only
when there were substantial grounds to challenge the decision, and not at “every
casual and passing challenge.23
vi. That an ordinance would be made open to challenge on the following grounds:
19
T Venkata Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (1985)
20
S.K.G.Sugar Ltd v. State of Bihar AIR 1974 SC 1533
21
K.Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka1993 (4) SC 27
22
State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose1962 AIR 945
23
AK Roy vs. Union of India (1982)
3. It is violative of substantive provisions of Our Constitution such as an Article 301; or
Manoj narula