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(Oxford Studies in Digital Politics) David Tewksbury, Jason Rittenberg - News On The Internet - Information and Citizenship in The 21st Century (2015, Oxford University Press) PDF
(Oxford Studies in Digital Politics) David Tewksbury, Jason Rittenberg - News On The Internet - Information and Citizenship in The 21st Century (2015, Oxford University Press) PDF
The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam
Philip N. Howard
News on the Internet
Information and Citizenship in the
21st Century
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Acknowledgments vii
1. Introduction 3
2. Shifting Audiences 18
3. Offline and Online News Content 41
4. News Specialization and Segmentation 63
5. Selecting News Online 83
6. Learning from Online News 105
7. Fragmentation and Polarization of the Audience 119
8. Information Democratization 144
9. Conclusion: Online News and Public Affairs 160
Notes 179
References 181
Index 193
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
David thanks Risa, Neil, and Maggie for their patience and encouragement.
They make everything possible.
Jason would like to thank his wife, Lori, for all of her support and
patience while working on this book. He would also like to thank his chil-
dren, parents, friends, and colleagues for their encouragement during the
process.
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News on the Internet
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CHAP TER 1
Introduction
I magine, if you can or if you remember, the days before the internet.
Most people received the bulk of their news from local and national
television news broadcasts. The number of news stories contained in 30 or
even 60 minutes of news was relatively small, and most stories ran for a
minute or two at most. What is more, television news stories were pro-
grammed to run in a particular order. To get to information about sports
or weather, people had to wait through lead stories on a variety of topics
(mostly local, national, and international public affairs). There was a
thriving newspaper industry in those days—even as the number of people
reading daily newspapers had been steadily falling for decades. Listening
to radio news and reading magazine news accounted for some news con-
sumption, but broadcast television news and newspapers were king.
Much of the news that audiences received in the 20th century was based
on a model of objective reporting. That model did not guarantee perfectly
neutral or balanced news, as many critics and observers convincingly
argued (e.g., Bennett 1996), but journalists and others in the business said
that objectivity was both a format for news presentation and a goal for
news content. Of course, the news business of the 20th century was largely
built on profit incentives, and those incentives led to the production of a
relatively homogeneous product much of the time (Bennett 1996).
The world of news that we are describing is very different from the one
we now inhabit. Indeed, the news business of the recent past is already
coming to seem a little fantastical. Today, audiences for broadcast televi-
sion news and newspapers are experiencing steep and steady declines. The
audience for news on the internet has grown from nothing in 1993 to sec-
ond behind only television (Pew Research Center 2010). These and other
changes in the media marketplace have been accompanied by a number of
changes in the content and presentation of news. Cable television news
has become segmented into topically and ideologically discrete channels,
the number of print newspapers continues to dwindle, and the number of
internet-based news sources has mushroomed.
Perhaps most important for the future of the news business, the very
meaning of news is shift ing. Large corporate news divisions based in New
York and Washington still produce quite a bit of content about public
affairs, but the nature of that content is rapidly changing. Pressures on the
news business have led news providers to expand the commentary they
produce as they shrink their newsroom staffs. Journalists cover more top-
ical ground than they did before, and they often are expected to interact
with audiences in online discussion environments. Increasingly, news
consumers are also the creators. Online and mobile technologies allow
them to feed information into the news stream and the public conversa-
tion. Almost anyone with internet access can break a story or even create
the news, at least in principle.
Changes in the news business are challenging the old defi nitions of
press and audience. On the one hand, the dividing line between journalist
and citizen is becoming particularly fuzzy, as more people become
involved in the creation of news. On the other hand, the current technolo-
gies have facilitated a change in the meaning of an audience. The domi-
nant media of the 20th century operated within a system of centralized,
largely one-way news dissemination. To consume the news was to ingest
a diet of information selected by news professionals. What is more, the
major media determined the flow of news. Even a newspaper, always the
most customizable news format, contains a structure that largely organ-
izes news for audiences. Today, the receivers of the news exert substantial
control over their news diet. They can choose among numerous outlets,
preselect specific topics, and focus their time and attention on the mes-
sages they prefer.
Twenty years ago, it would have been hard to predict the transforma-
tions that have passed through the news business. Th ings look very differ-
ent today. Of course, some things remain the same. People are still people,
wars are still wars, and much of what has reliably drawn audiences to the
news continues to do so. Nonetheless, much about online news is novel
and emergent. Researchers in communication and allied fields have been
speculating about the political and social effects of all of the changes in
the nature of news and audiences.
Our goal in this book is to organize and review what is known and said
about news on the internet. We look at news and audiences online, describ-
ing how audiences approach the news and influence its content. We look
at the kind of news that appears on the internet, compare it with what
shows up elsewhere, and speculate about the meanings of these patterns.
Political scientist Bruce Bimber argues that information and the tech-
nology of its control and dissemination form a central pillar of power in a
democratic society. Indeed, he notes that information and its control are
at the core of the relationship between citizen and state and the interme-
diaries between them. A relatively stable set of relationships between in-
formation flows and political institutions constitutes what he calls an
“information regime.” When the nature of information structures change,
political relationships also change: “Information regimes in the United
States have been interrupted by information revolutions, which involve
changes in the structure or accessibility of information. These revolutions
I N T RODUCT ION [ 5]
may be initiated by technological developments, institutional change, or
economic outcomes. An information revolution disrupts a prior informa-
tion regime by creating new opportunities for political communication
and the organization of collective action” (Bimber 2003, p. 18).
Changes in information regimes are consequential because “. . . demo-
cratic power tends to be biased toward those with the best command of
political information at any particular stage in history” (Bimber 2003, p.
18). The media system of the 20th century was very hierarchically organ-
ized. As we have noted, news and other information flowed downstream
from centralized news organizations to audiences. Political and economic
leaders had ready access to journalists and news providers, exercising
power, in part, through their control of information.
Of course, centralized control of news and information is still the rule
in much of the American political system, but things are changing. In part
through harnessing the properties of the internet, audiences have more
input into the news system and more control over the flow of news. As we
note in this book, some people use their control to avoid news about pub-
lic affairs entirely, but others use it to expand their knowledge of issues
and other topics. Some members of the news audience prefer a one-way
flow of news, but others are using the internet to expand the reach of their
voices.
I N T RODUCT ION [ 7]
For example, when television was widely adopted in American house-
holds in the period after World War II, the industry in the United States
largely moved successful content from radio programs to television
(Sterling and Kitt ross 2002). The new technology let people do what
they already did (e.g., enjoy drama and comedy programming). But tel-
evision proved to be more than radio with pictures. It facilitated the
development of a number of new kinds of programming (e.g., the “Spec-
tacular” of the 1950s and 1960s; Sterling and Kitt ross 2002) that moved
broadcast entertainment content beyond what had been popular on
radio. Similarly, the internet was primarily a product of government
researchers and other scientists seeking to improve computing power
and efficiency (Margolis and Resnick 2000). It ably accomplished that
mission for early users of the system in the 1970s. But, as we know, wide-
spread diff usion of the internet in the 1990s and today has inspired a
number of additional uses. These examples illustrate that communica-
tion technologies satisfy existing needs and help generate new ones at
the same time.
Sometimes theory and research on new technologies can seem to imply
that technologies cause change or even that people are helpless to resist
inevitable effects of technology. Most researchers today try to avoid that
perspective, often pejoratively labeled “technological determinism” (e.g.,
Williams 1974), because it does not grant people much agency in the crea-
tion and shaping of technologies. A number of researchers examining new
technologies have advocated a perspective closer to social shaping of
technology. They suggest that people get the technology they want (e.g.,
Williams 1974), shape how it is used (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985),
and help determine its effects (Winner 1985).
We come down prett y close to the social perspective. We do not
assume that new technologies such as the internet impose changes on
people and political systems. Rather, we assume that social, economic,
and political changes happen in concert with technological change. They
facilitate one another. Which factor exerts the greater influence likely
evolves over the course of a process of change. So, it may appear at times
that the internet is driving social and political revolution. We prefer to
think—taking the long view—of transformation in the role of citizens in
a democracy as a joint product of technological and other changes. We
try to implement that perspective in our discussion of the relationship
between news and audiences. We describe what audiences do with the
news and how they select news outlets, choose stories, and process infor-
mation. We will similarly describe how news outlets present information
and build audiences. The relationship between information and people is
necessarily interactive.
The central focus of this book is the study of the potential effects of inter-
net presentation of news. It is worth considering the particular way we
approach theory and research on this topic. There are many paths to
knowledge; the longer one engages in research, the more confidence one
develops in the notion that many paths may lead to truth. Nonetheless,
researchers (and authors of books like this one) make choices about how
they will approach concepts and their study. The theory and research we
review in this book come from different traditions. For example, we rely
on analyses from political economy and theory from a number of domains.
Underlying the bulk of our discussion and analysis, though, is the tradi-
tion of media effects research.
The media effects approach is grounded in the idea that social phenomena—
such as media content and audience reactions—are open to observation and
measurement. What is more, the dominant social-scientific strain of media
effects research suggests that the effects of exposure to media content are
unknown until they can be measured and tested. The tradition is not wholly
yoked to empirical research norms, but they certainly define the parameters of
much of the research in this area.
The media effects approach is one of several ways to study social phe-
nomena. The study of media is replete with research that focuses on the
social context of messages and audiences, the linguistic power of words
and images, and the sociology of power within societies and institutions
(such as news organizations). Some of these research traditions suggest
that media effects research is too closely wedded to linear (i.e., cause leads
to effect), empirical research (McQuail 2010). Critical theory, for exam-
ple, suggests that media, messages, and audiences are all situated within
power hierarchies that circumscribe and defi ne communication and its
outcomes (McQuail 2010). An empirical cause-and-effect orientation
toward media necessarily omits important, underlying elements of social
communication.
The media effects approach, largely centered in social-scientific
research, retains several advantages for the aims of this book. Among
them is the muscle it provides analysts wishing to compare media and
messages across topical, national, and cultural boundaries. Researchers
studying the content of the media might claim that they can identify the
core elements of news from across the globe and within the various strata
and social groups found in any one society. Likewise, media effects
research can build and test theory that helps researchers understand and
predict the outcomes of exposure to specific and general classes of media
content. It is the generalizability of the fi ndings of media effects research
I N T RODUCT ION [ 9]
that makes them most useful for studying the potential personal and
social role of the media.
Taking the media effects perspective, our efforts to describe the con-
tent of news online involve empirical analyses of sites and messages. Like-
wise, we summarize what theorists and other observers have predicted
about the effects of exposure to news online and subject their expecta-
tions to empirical scrutiny. Anecdotal evidence is useful, to be sure, and
we appreciate the heuristic power of exemplars and focused case studies.
Nonetheless, we foreground empirical research when it is available. When
it is not, we rely on theory, the available evidence we have, and a skeptical
brand of common sense. We also willingly conclude that many research
questions are still unanswered. That is what makes research fun.
In many ways, the internet is the sum of all other media. When trying to
describe it, its uses, and its effects, one must set parameters. There are a
few primary features of news on the internet that take center stage in this
book. They represent some of the most exciting developments with the
technology and its use, and they have implications for how information
and citizenship operate in advanced democracies. We briefly preview
them here, noting how these characteristics generate certain themes that
run through this book.
The technology of the internet allows individuals to post their own con-
tent and repurpose what has been posted by others. The concept of citizen
journalism illustrates the fragility of the distinction between audience
I N T RODUCT ION [ 11 ]
and journalist online. The composition and meaning of audiences on the
internet are changing in other ways, too. The adoption of subscription
media—such as cable or satellite television, in the past—naturally raises
questions about how people think about the audience for a medium and
its messages.
Internet access and use are costly, on a number of dimensions. To use
the internet, people need a device (such as a computer or a smartphone)
and a way to connect it to the network. Th is may be done very cheaply,
such as by using workstations at a public library or accessing a free Wi-Fi
signal at a public location, but the inconvenience of those methods limits
the medium’s accessibility. The costs in time and money for easy internet
access are not small. Some people can afford the costs, but others cannot.
The distance between these two kinds of people is called the digital divide.
There are additional divisions between people who have facility with the
internet and those who do not.
Gaps in internet access and skill prompt questions about the effective
audience of news online. If the medium can empower people to control
and parse the flow of news, some parts of the audience have access to that
power, and others do not. It could be that younger people in a society have
the upper hand with the internet. As a result, their relatively low offl ine
political power—represented in low voter-turnout rates for young voters
in the United States—could be partially offset by their ability to receive
and influence online news.
As the audience for online news has evolved since news started going
online in the mid-1990s, so have audiences for the traditional media
(newspapers, magazines, and broadcast radio and television). An ongoing
topic for study has been the effect of internet news adoption on use of
traditional news media. Audiences have been moving away from newspa-
pers and broadcast television for some years, so it is not clear how much
the internet is responsible for their declines. Nonetheless, there is clear
evidence that use of new media is tied to use of the older ones. There are
several ways to conceptualize that relationship, from replacement to com-
plementary use. We will discuss their relevance in this context.
A key point with respect to news exposure in one or several media is
that much exposure happens as a function of audience habit (Diddi and
LaRose 2006). As a general rule of thumb, people develop their media-
exposure patterns as they reach early adulthood—although they are influ-
enced by factors experienced earlier in life—and tend to retain them over
Some news that appears online is no different in form and content from
what one might fi nd in the traditional media. But some news organiza-
tions and news providers take advantage of the technologies of the World
Wide Web to present information in novel ways. Journalists and citizens
can link concepts and stories through hyperlinks, embedded computer
language that allows for easy user navigation from one set of information
to another.
A central question for news providers, audiences, and researchers is
whether consuming news online is better than consuming it through
other media. A dominant frame for that question is to ask whether people
learn more from the news online than from the news offline. Hyperlinks
can serve as a way for audience members to explore the many dimensions
of a topic, but they can also confuse a news reader, essentially offering
more information than can be easily consumed. It is hard to imagine the
internet without hyperlinks, but it is not clear how much they help people
learn.
The internet allows and even forces people to make choices. With the
news, this has meant that audiences can choose the sites, topics, stories,
posts, and images they prefer. Consuming news online is often far from a
passive experience. People do not need to be active in their selection and
consumption of the news, but scholars and observers often assume that
they are. Indeed, an active audience orientation to news consumption
runs through much of the literature in this area.
Researchers often assume that people will take advantage of the capac-
ity for choice that the internet provides. Audiences will be selective with
what they choose and will focus on the topics and stories that suit their
I N T RODUCT ION [ 13 ]
tastes and predispositions. Indeed, online news providers offer a number
of ways for people to limit their exposure to unwanted information and
ideas. Th is sort of selective exposure can limit the variety of information
that people receive.
People who are exposed to a narrow range of information about public
affairs might develop topical blind spots. With a great many news topics
and entertainment options from which to choose, people might not be
exposed to the important public affairs news of the day. Such a frag-
mented state of affairs, many observers say (e.g., Katz 1996; Webster and
Phalen 1997), can affect how well people can function as citizens. They
might not know enough about things in the political realm to function
effectively. As we have noted, “functioning effectively” is a loaded con-
cept, but at the very least, a fragmented citizenry has fewer things to talk
about and perhaps fewer things in common (Sunstein 2001).
Not everyone assumes that people will naturally initiate processes of
fragmentation by being highly selective. Regarding the lure of selectivity
in cable television, Neuman wrote: “Some amount of fi ltering and skipping
of news will continue to take place, but such fi ltering is balanced against
the convenience and habitual reliance of the half-attentive audience mem-
ber on the editorial judgment of news professionals. The average citizens
want to review headlines to make sure they are at least aware of the basic
events and issues everyone else is likely to know about” (1986, p. 156).
The offl ine media changed substantially over the course of the 20th cen-
tury. They once were largely mass media, which is what we call media
when many or most of the outlets in an industry seek to att ract large het-
erogeneous audiences (McQuail 1997). When pressured by other media
and other forces, all except newspapers became specialized. Th at is, the
majority of outlets in media industries defi ned their target audience in
terms of stable characteristics such as demographic features (e.g., age, sex,
race, ethnicity) or predispositions (e.g., political party or issue interest).
They created content for the target and benefited from efficiencies of de-
livering well-defi ned, segmented audiences to advertisers.
The internet did not go through an evolution from mass to specialized
medium. The specialized media environment into which the internet
grew and its ability to support many content producers and consumers
made it particularly suitable for news segmentation from the start of its
public phase in 1993 (Margolis and Resnick 2000). Some news outlets
provide content constructed for specific segments of the audience, and
I N T RODUCT ION [ 15 ]
We start in chapter 2 with a look at how people use media and become
an audience. We note that people can be passive or active members of an
audience and that the internet forces us to think about audience activity
in a new way. A primary focus of the chapter is on the identification of how
audience activities influence the content and operation of media. We turn
next, in chapter 3, to describe how news is generated and presented online.
We compare content created for the offl ine media with that created for the
internet—and the diminishing meaning of such distinctions. In chapter
4, we continue with a focus on online content, looking at how media con-
ceive of content breadth and audience segments and how the two interact.
We look at the extent to which online news sites tailor their content to
specific audience characteristics and interests.
We return to a central focus on audience activity in chapter 5, where we
examine the concept of audience selectivity. How much news audiences
focus their internet time on the news and on specific topics might affect
news outlets and the content they provide. From a normative perspective,
the primary function of the news is informing people about political
affairs. What people learn from the online news and how are the topics of
chapter 6. We review what researchers have discovered about how people
learn from the news, and we observe that consuming the news online
might offer new ways for people to think about politics.
We next consider some of the substantial normative implications of
online news provision and consumption. In chapter 7, we review two
much-prophesied outcomes of online news consumption: fragmentation
and polarization. We discuss the conditions under which they may occur,
and we note that there is some evidence, though not yet a lot, that they are
developing. Chapter 8 turns the table on the previous chapter a bit; we
look at the normatively positive implications of how news appears and is
consumed online. If more people feed information into the news stream
and if this level of activity increases broad public engagement with poli-
tics, the internet is a democratizing force. It helps shed light on dark cor-
ners of public affairs. Once again, the internet has many faces. We conclude
in chapter 9 with a brief summary and discussion of the ideas and evi-
dence we have presented, looking ahead to news in the future.
CONCLUSIONS
Widespread adoption and use of the internet for news dissemination and
consumption has prompted some questions about the meaning of citizen-
ship and its relationship to information. Some conceptions of democracy
suggest that people need to consume information and make informed
I N T RODUCT ION [ 17 ]
CHAP TER 2
Shifting Audiences
SH I FT I NG AU DI ENCES [ 19 ]
Liberal pluralism, our second form of democratic theory, is a group-
centric model of democracy. In terms of media, this means that news out-
lets are more oriented to specific interests than the population as a whole
(Baker 2002). Liberal pluralism also defi nes audience behaviors in terms
of groups. Instead of needing to participate directly, individuals are
expected to affi liate with organizations, which are themselves capable of
expressing members’ needs to government. The expectation for individ-
ual citizens is therefore much lower than under republicanism, because
liberal pluralism does not require nearly the same degree of information
or involvement.
Complex democracy is essentially a combination of the fi rst two mod-
els. Complex democracy envisions vocal groups operating within a gov-
ernmental system that is largely geared toward individuals (Baker 2002).
Th is duality helps protect potentially marginalized concerns while still
expecting most citizens to participate actively in government. The media
for a complex democracy need to provide both a level of information that
is sufficient for individual participation and information sources that can
cater to special interests. Audiences are also more complicated under this
model, because multiple norms of viewing behavior will exist. For exam-
ple, strongly committed members of political groups will consume most
of their media from related, trusted sources. Weak members may lean on
supportive media but spend some time with broader content, and non-
members may use a wide variety of media. The simultaneous presence of
these political—and media—tendencies is the defi ning characteristic of
the aptly named complex democracy.
These three normative defi nitions of audiences may seem abstract, but
they can be practically applied. The mass-media system of newspapers
and network television largely provides objective information aimed at
individuals, which maps closely to the republican ideal. The alternative
media today tend to provide content that is primarily aimed at particular
interests (as we discuss later), which suits the liberal-pluralism form of
democracy. Because both of these media exist today, it could be easily
argued that the current media system is that of a complex democracy.
Th is would seem to suggest that we should anticipate that citizens will
match these expectations, which are to be individually informed and
capable of participating in government if possible. If they do not partici-
pate, they must at least be informed and involved on some specific, impor-
tant subject. However, even though our current media seem to fit this
description, it is still possible to argue for other normative expectations.
As we will see (particularly in chapters 6 and 7), it is still common for
social observers to evaluate the role of audiences with the loft y standards
of republicanism.
There are many ways to defi ne audiences in terms of who they are or what
they do (instead of what we think they should do). These forms do not
help us create expectations about how people, journalists, or media orga-
nizations should behave, but they can do more to reveal the media and
audience as they actually are than can be achieved by applying normative
expectations. There is an almost overwhelming number of profi le-based
categorizations available. We focus here on some of the more informative.
Diffusion-based Profiles
These profi les take their general name from diff usion research (Rogers
2003), which developed an early taxonomy categorizing people on the
basis of their propensity to adopt certain behaviors, ideas, or technologies.
Diff usion-based profi les, whether tied to the theory directly or indirectly,
focus on categorizing people based on their tendency to use one news
platform versus another. Such profi les are useful in that they help reveal
not only what type of people are likely to use a given news format but also
when or if nonusers are likely to adopt the technology in question.
Diff usion research has largely focused on an S-shaped curve to describe
the spread of concepts and technologies (Rogers 2003). The curve, which
is based on the percentage of people using a technology at any given time,
defi nes early adopters as the people who enjoy getting to a new product
fi rst so they can be the ones to test and review it. Next come the opinion
leaders, who learn about the product from early adopters and decide
whether it is worthy of adoption. If so, then the product goes out to the
early and late majorities. The fi nal group, which may never even use the
technology, includes the laggards. These profi ling categories can be
applied to specific news formats, facilitating predictions of whether and
when the format is likely to reach acceptance from the masses.
One of the more recent and useful diffusion-based profiles was presented
by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2008b). Th is scheme
categorized people based on their adoption of internet news. Pew essentially
applied a sliding scale of traditional-media and new-media use, labeling exclu-
sive users of old media as “traditionalists” (46 percent of American respond-
ents), blended users as “integrators” (23 percent), and exclusive users of the
internet as “net-newsers” (13 percent; the remaining percentage either could
not be defined or did not use news at all). Taken together, diffusion-based
profiles reveal the life cycle of the adoption of a technology and can also high-
light which specific groups are making full or partial use of internet services.
SH I FT I NG AU DI ENCES [ 21 ]
Marketing-based Profiles
SH I FT I NG AU DI ENCES [ 23 ]
watch, and read. Audience activity plays a central role in the consumption
and effects of online news by largely defi ning the diet of news that people
receive. Given the abundance of content online, an active audience can
exert substantial control over what news it consumes and—most impor-
tant—what it comes to believe and feel about the world.
How people select media and messages is rarely random. People base their
exposure decisions on things they want from the media. The uses and
gratifications approach pays substantial attention to the concept of audi-
ence activity, which emphasizes the “voluntaristic and selective nature of
the interaction between audience and mass media” (Levy and Windahl
1984, p. 51). By considering the exposure process as an interaction, the
concept of audience activity encompasses both the sequence of media
consumption (content selection, message exposure, and postexposure
reactions) and the levels of audience involvement in the process.
The uses and gratifications approach suggests that social and psycho-
logical forces combine with the availability of media options to affect
how people select news content (Katz, Gurevitch, and Haas 1973). Social
forces (e.g., demands from other people) and psychological forces (e.g.,
beliefs, likes, and dislikes) continue to act on audiences as they consume
messages, affecting the level of attention they pay to messages, how exist-
ing sets of knowledge and att itudes (often called schemas in the research
literature) help them interpret messages, and, fi nally, how they store
information, impressions, and feelings in long-term memory. People are
also active in interpreting the outcomes of their media use. They decide
whether the media supplied what they wanted, and they form impres-
sions about what particular media, outlets, and messages can do for
them.
“Activity” is a very broad term that can be applied to multiple loca-
tions in the interaction of media and audiences. The primary concept we
will employ in this book is selectivity. Rubin and Perse describe selectiv-
ity as “an individual’s initiative in linking perceived needs and commu-
nication choices” (1987, p. 62). We will consider a number of needs that
can influence how people choose media, outlets, and messages. The
most common use of the term is in the context of selective exposure to
messages (Klapper 1960), the desire to consume messages that will be
consistent with our preconceptions (e.g., our political opinions). We
return to selective exposure and how it is affecting online news expo-
sure in chapter 5.
The models defi ned above demonstrate that media choices do not occur in
a vacuum. Th is is particularly true when considering a new medium, which
involves (usually) both acquiring new equipment and adjusting extant
media habits. Before addressing how audiences responded to the introduc-
tion of the internet, we should fi rst turn to the history of American media
adoption. Not too surprisingly, several consistent patterns have emerged
around each medium, and these patterns will inform our expectations for
internet adoption. Th is section, therefore, offers a much-abbreviated media
history, with an emphasis on audience responses to the introduction of
new media, dating to the fi rst American newspaper.
SH I FT I NG AU DI ENCES [ 25 ]
approximately 1.36 newspaper subscriptions per household (DeFleur and
Ball-Rokeach 1989). Th is level had fallen to 1.24 per household by 1950,
the beginning of the television era (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1989). By
1970, the proportion was close to one newspaper for each household and
has continued to decline steadily (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1989). In
2006, about 52 million daily newspapers were bought by 114 million
American households (46 percent; Project for Excellence in Journalism
2008; U.S. Census Bureau 2006). The overall picture these data present is
that of a gradual shift in audience attention away from newspapers and
toward other media. Radio, from the early 1920s through the early 1940s
and television, through the end of the 20th century, have steadily eroded
the audience for newspapers.
In contrast, the magazine industry has remained relatively robust over
the past century (Campbell, Martin, and Fabos 2010). Subscriptions have
been relatively stable for several decades. However, the success of televi-
sion affected a number of prominent magazines in the United States,
largely by drawing away their major advertisers. Magazines such as Life
and Look folded in the 1970s as advertisers seeking large, broad audiences
saw television as the more efficient medium (Campbell, Martin, and
Fabos 2010). Perhaps surprisingly, the collapse of general magazines after
the coming of television did not result from a dearth of readers (e.g., Life
magazine had more than 5 million subscribers when it folded in 1972). It
was the loss of advertising revenue that did them in. Specialty magazines
were less affected by television, which was less efficient at reaching the
smaller, more segmented audiences that specialized advertisers sought
(Campbell, Martin, and Fabos 2010).
The success of television also affected the radio and fi lm industries.
While the penetration of televisions was rising from less than 1 percent of
American households in 1946 to more than 87 percent in 1960, weekly
fi lm attendance was falling from 2.37 tickets sold per household to 0.53
per household over that period and has remained close to 0.25 since 1970
(DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1989). Television was not the only reason fi lm
attendance fell in the 1950s (Gomery 1991), but, at minimum, it appears
to have drawn some of the people who abandoned movie theaters.
The case for television’s impact on radio is less dramatic but more clear-
cut. Th ree of the largest radio networks of the 1940s (CBS, NBC, and
ABC) moved much of their programming to television (or other televi-
sion networks stole it; Sterling and Kitt ross 2002). National advertisers
moved their fi nancial support, and audiences shifted their use from radio
to television. In an average home in 1950, radio was used for four hours
and 19 minutes a day, and television was used for 35 minutes; in 1959,
radio use was 1:54 per day, and television was 5:29 (Schramm 1960).
SH I FT I NG AU DI ENCES [ 27 ]
Son and McCombs (1993) note that the diff usion of videocassette
recorders in the United States failed to follow the relative-constancy prin-
ciple. Spending on VCRs appears to have largely been in addition to exist-
ing patterns of media spending. Noh and Grant (1997) explain this
apparent aberration through an analysis of media functions. They argue
that the extra income devoted to the VCR would otherwise have been
spent on non-media-related communication and interaction. Their analy-
sis suggests that the zero-sum situation described by the principle of rela-
tive constancy needs to be placed in the overall context of consumer
activity.
Choosing Nonreplacement
De Facto Replacement
Sometimes new media are not chosen by current audiences at all, but they
nonetheless replace the previous media over time. Witnessing this pattern
requires moving from the individual level, where our conversation has
focused thus far, to the societal level. Instead of looking at what happens
when an individual faces options, the emphasis becomes what happens
when the entire society faces options. At this macro level, one can discern
patterns of media use among (usually age-based) segments of society to
determine how the adoption of some new medium affects use of older media.
At this level of analysis, focusing on the differences between the people
entering society and the existing members reveals how replacement hap-
pens over time. As groups, or cohorts, enter society and mature, it becomes
SH I FT I NG AU DI ENCES [ 29 ]
possible to see both how the cohorts differ from one another and how the
new cohorts change society as a whole. Applying this principle to media
adoption suggests that even if individuals do not immediately choose a
new medium, replacement may still be observed in the use patterns of new
cohorts entering the overall American media audience (Basil 1990). The
crucial point for understanding media development is the fact that the
constellation of media choices available to any one cohort (e.g., everyone
born from 1980 to 1990 might be considered as a members of a cohort) is
unique. There are particular options available to that cohort that will
influence how it develops its media-use patterns, and each cohort faces a
slightly different constellation of choices.
The cohort process is evident in the overall adoption of television.
Peiser (2000) studied cohort trends in the exposure to television and
newspapers. He observed that Americans who developed their media
habits when television was common in the household (the vast majority of
American households after 1955) held more positive attitudes toward tel-
evision over time than did older cohorts who had adopted the medium
into their households. Furthermore, his analysis showed that newspaper
reading was declining in a way that reflected a cohort process. After the
adoption of television in America, fewer people in succeeding cohorts
developed newspaper-reading habits. Th is resulted in a substantial overall
decline in newspaper reading in America. The evidence suggests that the
decline was not caused primarily by people dropping newspapers as they
spent more time watching television. Rather, it was a gradual process of
fewer people developing newspaper-reading patterns as they matured.
A cohort perspective suggests that changes in media use in a society
can occur even if the habits of individuals (or within cohorts) remain
unchanged throughout their lifetimes (i.e., as long as people are making
media-consumption choices). Even if each cohort remains perfectly sta-
ble, which seems unlikely, change can come to society as new cohorts
enter adult society and older ones exit. Obviously, the cohort-replacement
process can be very slow, but its impact on how media are used can be
substantial.
SH I FT I NG AU DI ENCES [ 31 ]
of American internet users (e.g., Kaynay and Yelsma 2000; Dimmick,
Chen, and Li 2004). For example, from 1995 through 2004, Pew Research
Center (2004) asked national samples of internet users whether their
adoption of online news had prompted them to use “other sources of news
more often, less, often, or about the same.” Although a large majority of
people in each of seven surveys over that period reported that their use of
the other media was unchanged, in almost every survey, slightly more
people reported using other sources less often than more often (e.g., 15
percent versus 9 percent in 2004). When combined with substantial evi-
dence that local and network television and newspaper audiences have
been falling (Pew Research Center 2004), it is not hard to conclude that
internet adoption is driving audiences away from other media.
Reality turns out to be more complicated. Some studies of internet news
have found that users and nonusers differ litt le in their exposure to newspa-
pers and television news (e.g., Ahlers 2006; Stempel, Hargrove, and Bernt
2000). An analysis of news audiences (Online Publishers Association
2004) identified four basic categories: people who receive news from
online sources only (12.2 percent of Americans), those who use offl ine
sources only (42.7 percent), those who get news consistently from both
online and offl ine sources (21.5 percent), and “dabblers” who receive news
infrequently from either source (23.6 percent). These data suggest that
there are few people who have completely given up on newspapers, televi-
sion news, and radio news for the internet. What is more, some studies
have observed positive correlations between self-reports of online news
use and newspaper-reading frequency (e.g., Althaus and Tewksbury 2000).
Th is fi nding seems to be describing the multichannel users in the Online
Publishers Association analysis and suggests that replacement might not
(yet) be the best way to think about the effect of online news adoption.
SH I FT I NG AU DI ENCES [ 33 ]
media will continue to exert an influence on—and adjust in response
to—the internet. Th is section focuses on how older media are likely to
adjust their content and economics, both of which will, in turn, affect
online news.
It may not be obvious why content producers and advertisers are willing
to make the transition to niche content. The answer lies in traditional
economic theory. Hotelling’s Law tells us that companies perform best in
the long run when they position themselves close together near the cen-
ter of their customers (Hotelling 1929). In other words, when there are
few media organizations, they will all provide content that is of interest
to the largest group (Mangani 2003). As more companies enter the media
SH I FT I NG AU DI ENCES [ 35 ]
market, it becomes more difficult for any given outlet to succeed by com-
peting for the attention of the largest group. Companies become increas-
ingly likely to differentiate themselves from the mainstream and begin
serving increasingly specialized interests. The notion that there is eco-
nomic value in reaching niche audiences is popularly known as “the long
tail” (Anderson 2004).
Th is economic explanation neatly describes the changes within the
current media market. It is primarily the smaller, newer outlets that are
willing to target niche audiences. With less overhead to consider, Web
logs (i.e., blogs) and cable programs can be successful without the same
level of revenue required by expensive newspapers and broadcast net-
works. The lower fi nancial imperatives mean that it is less risky to target a
smaller overall audience. When successful, the result is an audience that is
more homogeneous and more interested in the media product, which, in
turn, has its own fi nancial benefits.
A close match between audience interests and content means that
advertisers can also do a better job of targeting their products. Th is is
known as advertising relevancy (Baker and Lutz 2000). The relevancy of
niche-content advertising is a clear improvement over broad content,
where a company may need to reach only part of the audience for a given
program. In this case, the company is essentially wasting money by adver-
tising to the remainder of the viewers, and audience members are also
more likely to be annoyed by the commercials in this case. Content
matching means that advertisements are more likely to be successful
(Whitney 2008), and companies can use the internet (or cable boxes) to
track effectiveness far better than before. Narrow content, therefore,
means more effective advertisements and higher advertising rates.
The way forward for news media is clearly perilous. Journalism has
been largely conducted by traditional media organizations. It is not yet
clear whether the fall of old media will mean the death of traditional
reporting or if it can be resurrected in some new form or venue. As we
discuss in later chapters, new media organizations are not yet ready to fi ll
the possible void, given that they are also largely reliant on the reporting
of old media. In any event, moving all news content online will contribute
to another set of social and democratic problems.
SH I FT I NG AU DI ENCES [ 37 ]
Unfortunately, the problem of equitable internet access is likely to
worsen in the foreseeable future. Technology experts expect mobile
devices soon to become the primary means of access for the majority of
Americans (Anderson and Rainie 2008). Mobile devices are already used
to make contributions (10 percent of mobile data users), post to Twitter
(20 percent), and watch videos (40 percent). An advantage of mobile
access in this context is that up-front costs can be lower (e.g., a subsidized
smartphone may cost $99 versus a basic $399 desktop computer), poten-
tially allowing low-income citizens access to the internet. However,
mobile internet plans are necessarily tied to voice plans in the United
States (and also conventionally tied to texting plans), and the costs of
mobile access per bit are particularly high. For example, AT&T’s cheapest
wireless plan currently charges $15 per month (on top of a minimum $40
voice plan) for just 200 megabytes of data, while the cheapest high-speed
access plan is $35 per month for 250,000 megabytes. If we wanted to step
into consumer theory, we would argue that despite the promise of the up-
front costs, the pricing model (higher cost for a quantitatively worse prod-
uct) suggests that mobile internet access is a luxury good (demand is
particularly high as income increases), rather than a normal (demand
increases in step with income) or inferior (demand is higher as income
decreases) good. Perhaps we fi nally draw the line and say that mobile
access is in that “Mercedes” category. Nonetheless, there should be a con-
cern if affluent members of society are better able to increase their politi-
cal knowledge and engagement while other citizens are left behind.
Another form of the digital divide occurs between the skill levels of
established and new or infrequent users. Web browsing is a computer
skill, and research (e.g., Hargitt ai 2002) has found that even basic actions
such as typing a Web address or using the back button challenge some
users. For people who struggle to stay on top of page links and other inter-
active features, the internet can quickly become disorienting (Eveland
and Dunwoody 2001b) and frustrating (Sundar, Kalyanaraman, and
Brown 2003), rather than informative and useful. Such experiences may
create a cycle in which less frequent users become unwilling to experi-
ment with the more valuable content available online. Indeed, users from
higher socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely to use the internet to
build social capital (Hargittai and Hinnant, 2008), leaving users already
on the short end increasingly far behind.
It is worth noting that any serious attempt to correct one of the various
digital divides will have to be led by public policy. Internet service provid-
ers (ISPs) have consistently demonstrated that improvements in the scope
or quality of internet access and infrastructure do not have a place in their
business models. America has fallen considerably in the global rankings
CONCLUSIONS
SH I FT I NG AU DI ENCES [ 39 ]
Models of audience activity focus on individuals and how their experi-
ences and att itudes influence their media choices. Such choices are criti-
cal to understanding contemporary media and their effects. Democratic
theory looks at audiences as public citizens and considers what individu-
als need to do and what they need from media in order to participate in
government. These perspectives help establish standards for what society
should expect from news media. The more concrete perspectives on audi-
ences look at how different groups use media in different ways, which
helps to identify which types of people are active users of various services.
Regardless of the form of conceptualization, media scholars seek to defi ne
audiences at least partly according to their relationships with media.
Such relationships are particularly important during the introduction
of a new medium. Typically, American audiences have chosen either to
replace the old media with the new or to use both side-by-side. Sometimes
that replacement occurs only as older audiences die off, taking their media
use habits with them. How the internet fits these patterns remains unclear,
as evidence points to both replacement and simultaneous use. Nonetheless,
the effects of the introduction of the internet on print and broadcast are
clear: those media are experiencing declines in both advertising revenue
and content quality. The next few decades will tell us whether this is the
start of a cohort-replacement process or simply growing pains.
All of this information sets the stage for the discussion of online news
in the following chapters. Without this background, it would be much
harder to appreciate that—particularly as far as news content is con-
cerned—the internet is far more an integrated and evolutionary medium
than an autonomous and revolutionary system. The continuing chal-
lenges of quality reporting and equitable access (the digital divide) are
just two signs of the internet’s codependency with other media. The next
chapter further develops these relationships by focusing on the form of
news as it goes from old media to the internet (and back again).
I n some ways, it is difficult to overstate the level of change that the news
industry has experienced in the last 20 years. The content media shift
from print or broadcast to the internet is only one, relatively small aspect
of this transition. The industry’s patterns of ownership, modes of opera-
tion, customer bases, employees, and products have all shifted. Faced
with new competitors and a shrinking advertising base, the news industry
appears to be in the midst of radical changes in the way it reports and pre-
sents the news.
Appearances can be deceiving, of course, and highly visible changes in
the news business may obscure a number of stable features. How journal-
ists interact with sources and think about their audiences may be chang-
ing only gradually, and audience demand for new ways to consume
information is still split. Certainly, some members of the audience appear
to be demanding features such as automated news feeds, social media
connections, and breaking news from blogs. But there may be just as many
people comfortable with the traditional ways of producing and presenting
the news. Th is split means that the news industry is not a uniform entity.
New components of the business and large traditional players are compet-
ing for the future of the industry, but often they are working together.
Indeed, the news that audiences receive today is a clear mixture of old and
new approaches.
In this chapter, we look at the news as it appears online. We look at how
(and how often) news produced for the offl ine media makes its way to the
internet. We also examine news and news sites that don’t have a compo-
nent offl ine, considering whether the distinction between offl ine and
internet-based news remains a meaningful one. Of note here are two-way
flows of influence concerning the content and form of news. We then turn
to the form of news that appears online. The issue there is with the extent
that news online mirrors traditional notions of the importance of issues
and events. The technologies of the internet appear to offer a number of
novel ways that news content can be communicated to audiences. The
chapter, as a whole, suggests that how news is created and presented
online could have far-reaching effects on how citizens come to under-
stand events, issues, and public policy.
On the surface, the transition from print news to the internet seems nat-
ural. After all, these media require a particularly careful consideration of
layout, and early websites were primarily text- and image-based. How-
ever, similarity does not always guarantee effectiveness. Scholars assess-
ing the visual success of news organizations moving online have found
that print sites are likely to develop text-dominated sites (Li 1998; Cooke
2005). More specifically, the websites of newspapers have tended toward
large blocks of text with a limited amount of additional information or
features pushed to the margins of the page. Th is is an effective layout for
focusing attention on the story and for maintaining visual clarity. Because
OFFLI N E A N D ON LI N E N E WS CONTENT [ 43 ]
biases seem to be reflected in the thoughts of internet editors, who have
reported that investigative journalism is less important to them than it is
to print editors (Cassidy 2005).
There are two noteworthy exceptions to the “internet content replicates
print content” rule. The first is that online news does, at times, incorporate
more local content than the paper includes (Singer 2001). However, the
nature of these additions might be limited to additional wire copy (Gasher
and Gabrielle 2004) and articles, such as event announcements, that are
not entirely news. Some papers also add locally produced videos to support
reposted wire service stories (Thurman and Lupton 2008). In other words,
although this is material not available in print, the value of this original
online content may be limited. These minor adjustments may nevertheless
suit the readers, who tend to be predominantly local and may therefore
appreciate the stronger emphasis on their area (Chyi and Sylvie 2001).
The second exception to the content replication rule occurs with edito-
rial content. As early as 2001, observers (e.g., Macht 2001) were already
fi nding more opinion pieces online. Th is trend continued, apparently
modestly, for several more years (Singer 2006). Although specific analy-
ses of more recent online papers have not specifically tested the observa-
tion, it seems that the addition of opinion content online has expanded.
Beyond the number of professionally produced items, the growing popu-
larity of user comments and other forums expands the traditional “letters
to the editor” space (Boczkowski 2004). Furthermore, the widespread
adoption of journalist blogs provides a mix of news and opinion that is not
typically paralleled in print. As with the relatively recent acceptance of
layout alternatives, the online versions of newspapers seem to be fi nally
adapting to the benefits of the newer media.
The Relationship Between Television and Radio News and Online News
Although television news outlets may not have been wedded to a linear
layout style, this does not mean that these organizations have produced
comparatively better websites. The online presence of television stations
tends to take a more chaotic approach to design (Siapara 2004), which
might be overwhelming to many users (Eveland and Dunwoody 2001b).
Part of the explanation for television organizations’ general inability to
produce effective websites might be the pressures that journalists face
when adapting to a converged newsroom. Managers and editors have to
adopt new styles (e.g., Aviles and Carvajal 2008), and the end product thus
far has tended toward limited quality and creativity (e.g., Huang et al. 2004).
Although converging newspaper organizations face similar challenges,
OFFLI N E A N D ON LI N E N E WS CONTENT [ 45 ]
The origin of the news ticker on a television screen has been traced to
the modular design of most websites (Cooke 2005). Networks that were
worried about declining news audiences hoped that even if viewers did
not fi nd the main story compelling, the presence of stock prices or scroll-
ing headlines would keep eyes on the screen. The use of tickers in cable
news is a remediation of the web. Furthermore, the automated news feeds
(particularly RSS, Really Simple Syndication) and widgets remediate the
appearance and content of news tickers back to the computer. These con-
cepts help us see that while newspapers have largely limited the influence
of internet advances to their online versions, television outlets seem to be
more engaged in a give-and-take with the medium.
The sharing of news formats has affected not only tickers and RSS but also
graphic incorporation and photo size (Cooke 2005). The accelerating ef-
fects of digital media are similarly increasing the pace of this visual con-
vergence, and the internet is increasingly taking the lead. Th is is true
partly because of special features that are really only available online. The
other reason for the internet’s dominance of news formats is that advances
in digital technology mean that the internet can even do old media (i.e.,
print and broadcast) content better than the old media.
The growing leadership of internet news sources can be seen in the
growth of the online news audience. The use of the medium as a primary—
or at least secondary—source of news is growing. As of May 2010, 43
percent of internet users—a large majority of respondents—reported
gett ing political news online daily (Pew Internet and American Life
Project 2010b). Th is increasing popularity at a time of smaller traditional
news audiences alone helps guarantee that print and television news will
at least pay attention to advances in online formats. Relatively recent
studies (e.g., Tewksbury 2006) have also found that people now go to the
internet fi rst when a big event happens. The September 11, 2001, att acks
were one of the fi rst such events (Althaus 2002; Salaverria 2005), but
similar spikes in traffic have been witnessed during the 2008 election
night and the 2010 World Cup. Some may argue that the internet’s fast
response (Dessauer 2004) leads to problematic content errors (Cohen
2002), and these might scare off the relatively conservative traditional
media (e.g., McChesney 2008). However, the presence of features that
can att ract and maintain audiences seems sufficient to win the replica-
tion of mainstream media (e.g., CNN’s social-media slot in its afternoon
programming).
INTERNET-ONLY NEWS
There are several original and significant formats for delivering the news
online. Blogs are the best known. Frequent internet news readers, and
perhaps more general users, too, will probably also be familiar with RSS
feeds, news aggregators, and even news wikis. Earlier, we noted that much
of the content available online is similar to, or even a mere replica of,
offl ine content. What is interesting about these formats is that audiences
use each type of source in a manner that is quite different from how they
use traditional news. In looking at the connections between the original
formats and traditional media, along with the features of the new styles,
the significance of original internet news becomes apparent.
OFFLI N E A N D ON LI N E N E WS CONTENT [ 47 ]
Online-only News Providers and the Mainstream
The initial reaction of most media sectors has been to ignore or attack
online activity. The music industry allowed Napster to become a major
phenomenon before initiating a legal battle. Television studios ignored the
internet’s ability to deliver on-demand content, instead allowing cable and
satellite companies to provide these services. Traditional news outlets have
followed a similar path, taking years to allow user comments and journalist
blogs, while frequently questioning (although not without merit) the ve-
racity of internet-originated news. The times are changing, however, and
mainstream news media have become more open to online formats, as can
be seen in the blossoming relationships between the formats.
A hyperlink connection directly ties one story or idea to another and may be
the most significant difference between the Web and print.1 Links represent
a physical point of connection between news organizations and therefore
serve as a point of analysis for intermedia relations. In this case, we are con-
sidering the connections between blogs and traditional news media online.
Linking is a particularly important att ribute of the blogosphere. Hyper-
links provide a form of citation that is more immediately useful to readers
than a standard reference. A print journalist can only say, “according to
this source,” but an online writer can use links to direct readers to the
reference material, which essentially allows readers to re-create the writ-
er’s train of thought (Manovich 2001). Links also help generate a sense of
community among different blogs, and different groups of bloggers can
develop distinct norms for linking standards. For example, even among
political blogs, conservative blogs are more likely to link to one another
than are liberal blogs (Adamic and Glance 2006). Th is translates into a
tighter community on the right side of the spectrum than on the left, but
linking practices suggest that bloggers of any ideology are more con-
nected than are mainstream writers.
On the new media side of the relationship, popular political blogs link
to the mainstream news more than to any other category of website (Reese
et al. 2007). Even if smaller blogs are somewhat less likely to link to the
traditional news with this same frequency, it is safe to say that blogs are
more generous than their counterparts. Singer (2005) analyzed the web-
sites of news outlets and found that the majority of links went to other
mainstream sites, rather than to bloggers. Once again, this practice may
be shift ing, as the New York Times reports mainstream sites beginning to
OFFLI N E A N D ON LI N E N E WS CONTENT [ 49 ]
BlogPulse, a blog tracking site, has identified more than 154 million blogs in
existence, with another 91,000 created every day. These numbers include
blogs by professionals, groups, and individuals; blogs can be hosted indepen-
dently or as part of a corporate portal. Technorati provides a useful categori-
zation of blogs. The site assigns a credibility rating to each blog, largely on the
basis of the number of other sites linking back to it. Along these lines, when
we speak of blogs, we are referring to sites that are fairly well read and linked
to by other publishers. Furthermore, unless otherwise noted, we are discussing
political or news blogs that are not part of mainstream-media sites.
Th is explanation does litt le to clarify what makes a blog unique from
other online presentations of news media. Structure is typically the factor
that jumps into people’s minds. Reverse chronological ordering is the
trademark ordering of a blog. Individual authorship used to be a key char-
acteristic, but this is no longer necessarily the case (e.g., FiveTh irtyEight
and the Monkey Cage are group-authored). The relative speed of blog-
based news is another intriguing characteristic, although typical blogs no
longer seem much, if any, faster than mainstream sites. In fact, mobile
devices and micro-blogging services such as Twitter are now the fast pro-
viders of information on emerging situations. These tools have been
shown to be particularly effective at facilitating citizen journalism during
crises (Thelwall and Stuart 2007), because the format encourages brief
posts from people in the area. Again, multimedia styles have become more
popular on both mainstream sites and citizen blogs (PC Magazine 2006).
In short, few of the original characteristics of blogging still apply with any
clarity.
The natural question, then, is what does separate news “blogs” from
“sites”? Structurally, one of the most distinguishing facets of contempo-
rary blogs may be the use of links. On the whole, blogs tend to link to news
stories, other outlets, and internal content differently from mainstream
news sites. For example, topic tags, which some scholars have described as
a grassroots organization system (Hayes and Avesani 2007), provide
more useful access to related articles than either archives or search alone
can provide. Analyses of the cross-site linking practices of blogs indicate
that a substantial portion of posts use mainstream news as a starting point
(Project for Excellence in Journalism 2010b).
The natures of the content creators are also likely to be different. Main-
stream sites are more likely to feature professional journalists, while “reg-
ular” citizens are more likely to be creating independent blogs. More
specifically, bloggers tend to represent younger, more urban areas than do
typical reporters (Lin and Halavais 2006) and are more likely (along with
creators in other internet formats) to reach groups whose interests are not
served by mainstream media (e.g., Lynch 2005). Given these different
When citizens who are not professional journalists create and publish
original news content, this is generically called citizen journalism. As dis-
cussed above, news blogs can be a source of citizen journalism, although
they often trend toward providing litt le more than opinions or links to
mainstream news. In addition to blogs, citizens can contribute news to
specific citizen journalism sites (e.g., chicagotalks.org) or to content mills
(e.g., examiner.com, ehow.com).
An effects-based perspective on these types of news content has yet to
emerge. Citizen journalism and content mills may affect news agendas by
OFFLI N E A N D ON LI N E N E WS CONTENT [ 51 ]
covering topics not typically addressed by professional journalists. How-
ever, it may be at least equally likely that mainstream news would not be
affected by these sources. Some citizen platforms are heavily influenced
by political perspective—something that most mainstream journalism
has deliberately refused. In the case of content mills, the content fre-
quently lacks news value (instead focusing on reviews or instructions)
and is often of comparatively poor quality. The fact that Google began
deliberately adjusting its search algorithm to limit the profi le of content
mills does not bode well for the future of these sources. In any event, very
litt le hard evidence exists for effects by nonblog audience-created news.
News Feeds
News feeds are another format that is unique to the internet. The main
type of feed is Really Simple Syndication, or RSS (which is actually RSS2;
Atom feeds operate too similarly to distinguish here). RSS provides a flex-
ible code capable of taking the posts or stories from a website and syn-
chronizing them on another website or device (Kennedy 2004). Th is
development allows individuals to create personal pages or “readers”
loaded with several selected feeds. The primary benefit of this format for
users is the convenience of access to the headlines of many stories on one
simple page.
RSS-style news feeds bear many functional similarities to Facebook,
Twitter, and other social-networking services. These services allow users to
follow the postings of liked others. When those others are news services, or
at least people posting news, the result is rather like an RSS feed. Social
media are far more popular than RSS feeds, however, and Facebook was
even driving more traffic to news websites than any other single service,
including Google, in 2009 (Hopkins 2010). When users receive their news
from social-media feeds, the end product is particularly filtered: first through
editors, second through citizens, and third through the following process,
described below. Th is structure has significant implications for both frag-
mentation (chapter 7) and information democratization (chapter 8).
News Aggregators
We have been describing content and layout in online news. In part, what
we have been describing is the agenda for news on the Web. A news agenda
is a news producer’s representation of the relative importance of events
and issues in the news. A central part of the job of journalists and editors
OFFLI N E A N D ON LI N E N E WS CONTENT [ 53 ]
is sift ing through everything that could be in the news. In that process,
they decide, in essence, what stories should be in the news and how prom-
inently they should be displayed (White 1964). When cable television and
the internet began changing how people consumed the news, researchers
and observers started speculating that the process by which audiences
learn about important issues was also changing (McCombs 2004).
In this section, we describe how agenda sett ing works and whether the
process operates differently online from how it operates offl ine. We start
with a brief description of how print newspapers, television news pro-
grams, and other traditional media communicate story importance. We
move to an exploration of how online news outlets present the media
agenda and whether that presentation is markedly different from the case
in the traditional media. Ultimately, the evidence is going to point to both
continuity and change in the news agenda online. Some att ributes of the
online news environment inhibit uniformity in online agendas, while oth-
ers seem to encourage its perpetuation.
News Agendas
Media researchers have assumed that the relative prominence that journal-
ists and editors assign to a story reflects their judgment of the importance of
the issue or event it concerns. Taken in the aggregate, the stories that are most
prominent in the media are those that are highest on the “media agenda.” A
long line of research in communication and political science has documented
how the media agenda can influence the agenda of news audiences (McCombs
2004). Citizens use importance cues from the media agenda to infer the rela-
tive importance of issues (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). These inferences can
influence a number of perceptions and judgments, including evaluations of
how well political leaders do their jobs (Krosnick and Kinder 1990).
Researchers and observers often talk about the media agenda in aggre-
gate terms, assuming the presence of general agreement among journalists
about what is important. Journalists go through a socialization process in
journalism schools and newsrooms that tends to produce a shared set of
standards for evaluating newsworthiness (Shoemaker and Reese 1996). As
a result, what reporters and editors at a large city newspaper consider
important issues may closely jibe with what their counterparts at a network
television news program believe. There is a fair amount of evidence for such
an assumption. For example, looking at newsmagazine and network-news
journalistic practices in the 1970s, Gans (1979) was able to identify a
number of story types that journalists thought deserved prominent atten-
tion (e.g., presidential election campaigns are perennial top stories).
OFFLI N E A N D ON LI N E N E WS CONTENT [ 55 ]
Research has suggested that people are willing and able to use story
repetition, placement, and attributes in their decisions about what to con-
sume. In a groundbreaking study of newspaper audiences, Graber (1988)
asked print-newspaper readers why they read what they did. Their
responses suggest that people use the importance cues that editors pro-
vide with their own intrinsic interests when deciding whether to read a
story. Graber observed that her respondents “were more likely to notice a
story that appeared on prominent pages of the paper, was characterized by
large headlines or pictures, and was given lengthy and repeated exposure”
(p. 97). Scores of studies of agenda sett ing have confi rmed these observa-
tions (McCombs 2004). People exposed to the news acquire at least part
of the media agenda. They perceive problems that receive prominent cov-
erage to be pressing issues. They also typically rank-order the issues simi-
larly to how stories about them appear in the news.
There are several ways to compare the online and offline agendas. The var-
ious approaches can be grouped into two camps. The first asks whether the
number and type of news providers in a medium and the volume of content
they supply might affect how agendas are presented. The second asks whether
an audience’s experience of the news might affect how agendas are encoun-
tered. If either or both of these approaches demonstrate that the reception of
news differs substantially across media, it would suggest that the aggregate
operation of agenda setting is changing with adoption of online news.
OFFLI N E A N D ON LI N E N E WS CONTENT [ 57 ]
The result of audiences having more options is that they receive either
fewer importance cues or a different set of them.
Many of the most basic importance cues that are characteristic of tradi-
tional news presentation migrate directly to the internet. Story selection
and repetition, for example, should be just as operative on Google News as
they are on the Fox News Channel on cable television. Other importance
cues are less likely to make the transition. Researchers have argued that
the presentation of news on many sites seems to offer fewer signals about
the relative importance of stories (e.g., Althaus and Tewksbury 2002). For
example, the most important two or three stories in a print newspaper
appear on the top half of the front page. On a typical news site, on the
other hand, as many as a dozen stories might have links near the top of the
home page. As a result, online audiences are given less information about
the relative importance of the stories. Similarly, news websites typically
use a small number of headline font sizes on their sites. If many stories
start on the home page, quite a few might share a headline font size. Again,
readers have less information about which stories are more important
than others. Grouping stories by subject, as some sites do, rather than by
their ultimate importance, could have a similar effect.
One possible outcome of the muting of some traditional importance
cues is that audiences might increase their reliance on the cues that do
operate online or on cues unique to the internet. Indeed, the internet
introduces a number of new ways to think about such cues. One funda-
mental characteristic of many online news stories is the inclusion of
hyperlinks. News stories that focus on common topics might carry hyper-
links to previous reporting on the issue or to third-party (e.g., government
or interest-group) information on the topic. Readers could use the number
of links in a story as a cue about its importance. That is, readers could
assume that an issue with a deep background (one with many links) is
connected to many sectors of society or government. If so, such a story
must be important, they may assume. Th is potential audience inference
has not been explored empirically, and litt le is known about its possible
operation.
Many prominent news sites provide information about how other
users have reacted to stories, and it seems very likely that this informa-
tion can guide audience perceptions. Research has demonstrated that
people can use news popularity rankings in their story-selection deci-
sions (Knobloch-Westerwick et al. 2005). It may also be that they will
use those ratings in judgments about importance. Most members of the
news audience know that they select stories, in part, because they are
important (Graber 1988). If audience members believe that other people
do the same, then popularity rankings provide a possible proxy for how
The source of the news agenda is an enduring concern for researchers and
other observers. Ideas about what the news media should cover do not
spring out of the heads of journalists, of course. Reporters and editors
OFFLI N E A N D ON LI N E N E WS CONTENT [ 59 ]
rely on people as sources of information about issues and their impor-
tance. Therefore, part of agenda sett ing research has examined how jour-
nalists’ sources influence the news agenda (e.g., Salwen 1995). Perhaps
not surprisingly, government officials and fellow media outlets appear to
exert considerable influence over how journalists cover issues and policy
debates. For much of the latter half of the 20th century, it appeared that
major news outlets such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, and
CBS News substantially affected the news agenda in other outlets
(Graber 1997). In the 1990s and the fi rst part of the 21st century, cable-
television news outlets such as CNN appeared to exert some influence.
As the fi rst decade of the century turns into the second, the question is
whether those older media and outlets will continue to influence others’
agendas.
Some researchers have looked at how online news outlets use sources.
In a content analysis of six popular political blogs (e.g., Daily Kos, Insta-
pundit), Leccese (2009) found that links to mainstream news sites
accounted for almost half (46.5 percent) of all links; links to other pages
within a blog or to other blogs accounted for 38 percent. A recent
Project for Excellence in Journalism (2010b) study found a rate of blog-
to-mainstream linkage closer to 100 percent. The news-media sites
most frequently linked were nytimes.com, msnbc.com, washingtonpost.
com, and cnn.com. These results suggest that political blogs were rely-
ing on other media, rather than primary sources, for information. These
results belie the picture of an online environment in which original idea
generation is the norm.
Considering the increasing prominence of political blogs, McCombs
(2005) speculated, “If blogs have an agenda setting role, it is likely to be an
influence on the media agenda” (p. 549). Empirical research in this area has
tested this perspective against one that claims that blogs reflect the values
and content of the traditional press. Studies that compare mainstream
(offline) agendas with blog agendas show rather mixed results. One study
examined the content of popular political blogs with topical coverage in the
print New York Times in late 2004 (Wallsten 2007). For many of the topics
in the news, there seemed to be little relationship between the agenda of the
Times agenda and that of the blogs. For other topics, some of the cross-
lagged correlations indicated that the agenda moved from the blogs to the
Times, and some indicated the reverse (Wallsten 2007). A more recent anal-
ysis by the Project for Excellence in Journalism (PEJ) (2010b) suggests that
there are vast differences in coverage, at least at the broad topic level. The
PEJ found that blogs covered technology and international (non-U.S.) news
far more than traditional media did, but blogs gave less attention to the U.S.
economy. It is certainly true that the economic and access pressures on the
OFFLI N E A N D ON LI N E N E WS CONTENT [ 61 ]
CONCLUSIONS
The online news industry is not the news business of old. New and
emerging online news sources have already changed the aggregate-level
content and form of news online. There is certainly a broader defi nition of
news today than was used in the years before the internet. And in many
ways, the news business is using the internet to test new formats of news
creation and presentation. Interestingly, though, some of that change is
aimed at extending the livelihood of the traditional media. Th is might
reflect the split in the news audience. For all of the citizens who prefer to
get their news and information online, there are others who stay with the
traditional media (and there are many people, as we shall see, who use
both). So, the news industry appears to be struggling to fi nd a way to
incorporate new technologies into how they do business and maintain
their connection with the largest audiences they can fi nd.
Observers and critics have suggested that online news will present
audiences with a new agenda of issues and policies. In some cases, people
have speculated that the diff use and diverse nature of news online will
increase the diversity of the national agenda. As a result, there may be sub-
stantial heterogeneity in the agenda that audiences encounter online.
Similarly, some features of news presentation online may mute the agenda
that is constructed by journalists. The result of both features of online
news could be substantially reduced public agreement about the most
importance issues facing the nation. If so, widespread reliance on the
internet for news could fundamentally change the relationship between
citizens and their political leadership.
The evidence thus far suggests that news on the internet might bring a
number of changes to how audiences receive the news and the overall
agenda of issues. The organization and technology of online news are cer-
tainly different from parallel technologies in the traditional media. News
feeds and hyperlinks for organizing content represent substantially differ-
ent ways to present the news. At the same time, however, research has dem-
onstrated substantial continuity between the traditional news agendas
and those found online. Audiences might not be exposed to diverse and
novel agendas online. As a result, the future of the agenda-communication
process is unclear.
F rom the vantage point of today’s media environment, we can say that
the old news media were built largely on a model of providing general
news content to general audiences. To be sure, ethnic newspapers, spe-
cialized magazines, and format radio stations have targeted focused audi-
ences for many years. But the bulk of the news business has relied on a
model of news for everyone. In contrast, the news environment today is
one that increasingly is based on the provision of specialized content for
focused audiences. The change has come in part from a perception by
many in the media industries that audiences want to make choices about
what they receive from the media, and it comes in part as a reaction to the
capabilities of the underlying media technologies today. The shift in the
underlying model of the press to specialized delivery of the news might
prolong the lives of news outlets and larger media companies—at least,
that is what they hope. It might also change the way people learn about
public affairs and other topics.
In chapter 2 , we talked about the concepts of audience activity and
selectivity. We noted that people are often quite intentional in their selec-
tion of news outlets and stories. In chapter 3, we described the many forms
of news on the internet. Now we bring the themes from those chapters
into a discussion of how online news providers are taking advantage of
technological interactivity and audience selectivity. We begin with a
review of how media tend to evolve; in the process of doing that, we intro-
duce an organizing structure of media evolution. The structure suggests
that content and audience specialization (i.e., segmentation) are an almost
inevitable result of media competition and development. Inevitable is a
strong word, of course, so we note some forces that will tend to restrain
the segmentation of online news content and audiences into discrete
units. We turn next to a discussion of online news structures and defi ne
specialization a bit more precisely. It turns out that there are different
kinds of specialization, and there are structures in the online news envi-
ronment that support them. Among the ways that news can be separated
into categories is through the production of hard and soft news. We sug-
gest that this is one way to examine online news, but we supplement that
with analyses of content and audience segmentation along more specific
topical lines. Ultimately, not much data are available for examining seg-
mentation. What we do have suggests that some people may be selecting
news and sites in ways that may facilitate the development of news and
audience segments.
We are fortunate to have tools for analyzing how news operates online
and how it will evolve. These tools are derived from observation of how
older media have evolved. As is typically the case with the internet, the
new medium seems to break some of the rules set by its predecessors.
Nonetheless, the patterns set by the older media provide considerable
insight into some elements of the internet and the news outlets that
operate there.
Media historians have noted that national media systems and individual
media appear to pass through a fairly standard three-part—elite, popular,
specialized (EPS)—cycle of development (Maisel 1973; Merrill and
Lowenstein 1979; Wilson and Wilson 2001). Within each stage, typical
outlets of a medium offer content geared toward a particular type of audi-
ence. Members of the audience, in turn, appear to choose media and out-
lets on the basis of their content and availability. Not all media in the
United States and other developed countries follow the EPS cycle, but
most do so relatively closely.
In their initial stage, media often appeal to elite audiences. Typically,
because of barriers of medium cost or audience characteristics, media
usually att ract small audiences of people who have some elite position in
society. For example, most newspapers in the United States att racted pri-
marily wealthy, educated social elites in the 18th and early 19th centuries
(Campbell, Martin, and Fabos 2010). Similarly, only some government,
corporate, and academic researchers had access to the internet in the
The internet does not seem to have followed the EPS cycle as closely as
other media have. The initial years of internet development—from 1969
through the early 1990s—certainly fit the pattern of an elite stage. Its ad-
herence to the popular stage is more questionable. When Web browsers
made access to the internet easier and more rewarding, popular use of the
medium rose dramatically (Margolis and Resnick 2000). According to sur-
vey data from the Pew Internet and American Life Project (2010a), about
14 percent of the American population used the internet in 1995, and about
67 percent did so 10 years later. So, the size of the potential audience for a
website certainly increased dramatically after the end of the elite stage.
The defi nition of the popular stage of the cycle, though, includes the
requirement that a typical outlet in a medium carries content for a broad
audience and is used by such an audience. There is not much evidence to
support that description for the internet. From early in its public phase,
there have been relatively general-interest sites that have tried to att ract a
large audience. America Online (AOL), Yahoo! and a host of other portal
sites in the late 1990s sought to be the entry points for audiences’ use of
the Web. They offered a range of content, including email services, news
headlines, weather, shopping, and chat, all designed for a general audi-
ence. These sites have been successful in att racting broad audiences. For
example, in August 1999, AOL websites were visited at least once by 55
percent of home users of the internet (Nielsen//NetRatings 1999). That
level of centralized use of some sites continues today. Google, for instance,
is visited by about 70 percent of home and work users in a typical month
(Nielsenwire 2010).
What prevents Web use in the 1990s or today from being termed popu-
lar in character is the division of audience attention across multiple sites,
most of which are not general in focus. The average American internet
user visits dozens of websites in a typical month (Nielsenwire 2010). If
some of the sites he or she visits are general-interest sites such as Google
or Yahoo! this still leaves quite a bit of internet activity spent at smaller,
potentially more specialized sites. Since the mid-1990s, the vast majority
of websites have been focused on particular topics. These sites fit the
defi nition of specialized outlets. In sum, the evidence suggests that the
internet simultaneously contains elements of both the popular and spe-
cialized stages of the EPS cycle.
Site element CNN USA Today New York Times ABC News
Note: Cell entries are percentages of all news topic views. The “other news” category captured URLs that could
be identified only to the point of having news content. Topic-selection percentages may not add up to 100 be-
cause of rounding.
Source: Tewksbury 2005 .
of readers at each. For many years, researchers have noted that interest in
different news categories varies by age, sex, education, and other demo-
graphic features of audiences (e.g., Bogart 1989; Schramm and White
1949). There is no reason to expect that news readers selecting news sites
somewhat randomly—that is, for reasons other than expectations about
the sorts of news they will find on sites—should distribute themselves
across news sites on the basis of demographic differences. But, of course,
differences among sites do appear to exist. An analysis (Tewksbury 2005)
of the profiles of specific sites’ users shows substantial variation across
sites.
Table 4.2 shows user demographic data for the national news outlets
discussed previously. The data suggest that the demographic profi le of
visitors across sites differs markedly. In the time frame studied here, CNN
online readers were better educated and less often female than were read-
ers of ABC News online. USA Today readers were also typically male and
were particularly likely to be African-American. New York Times online
visitors were uniquely well educated and were often female. In sum, the
data in tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that news readers are not randomly distrib-
uted across major online news sites and seem to cluster in ways that sug-
gest some correspondence between audience characteristics and the
Note: Cell entries for age are mean and standard deviation (in parentheses). Entries for all other demographic
items are the percentages of nonmissing data. Entries are weighted by demographic weights and by number of
site views.
Source: Tewksbury 2005 .
kinds of news that sites feature. Taken together, this is tentative evidence
of site segmentation: the division of sites along content lines and audience
characteristics.
More recent data concerning self-reported site use reveal complemen-
tary patterns. In their 2008 media use national survey, the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press asked internet news readers which
sites they tended to visit most often. The respondents volunteered the
names of as many as three sites. Later in the survey, these people were
asked to report how closely they tended to follow specific categories of
news in “newspaper, on television, radio or the internet” (Pew Research
Center 2008b). The overlap in responses to these two sets of questions
might illustrate how specific news topics can be connected with specific
sites in the minds of audiences. If people who follow one type of news tend
to say that they visit a certain site most often, it could be that they tend to
look at that site for the information they typically follow. If there is no
connection between the kinds of sites they use and the news they tend to
Note: The number in each news-topic cell is the percentage of visitors to each site who reported following the
topic very closely or somewhat closely. Because of the Pew Research Center’s use of randomly applied form
splits in the survey, twice as many people were asked about political fi gures and events, business and fi nance,
and international aff airs as were asked about the other topics.
Source: Pew Research Center 2008b.
The segmentation of news sites into distinct categories might appear in-
evitable from a historical perspective, but there are a number of reasons
researchers remain cautious about the idea. When satellite-distributed
cable television channels appeared in the 1980s, a number of researchers
started asking whether the mass medium of television would become a
specialized medium (e.g., Becker and Schoenbach 1989). In his 1991
analysis, The Future of the Mass Audience, Neuman considered whether
proliferation of cable-television channels would increase the diversity of
content on television. He reasoned that diversification of content on
cable would come as a result of audience demand. Therefore, he exam-
ined the evidence of audience diversity. He concluded that in spite of the
many ways one can defi ne and observe diversity in American society,
media-content preferences are rather homogeneous. He noted the pres-
ence of technological and economic factors that facilitate and drive con-
tent specialization, but he questioned audience demand for that
specialization. In sum, he wrote, “The future of specialized media and the
possible fragmentation of the mass audience remain unsett led questions”
(Neuman 1991, p. 128).
One of the factors that might inhibit audience demand for diversification
of content—through the provision of specialized content channels—is audi-
ence perceptions of news accessibility. Neuman argued that “people are pas-
sive and only partially attentive to what they see and hear from the media.
For most of the people for most of the time, the psychological costs and
inconvenience of finding special-interest information and entertainment
outweigh their desire to find it” (1991, p. 146). If this is true, the convenience
CONCLUSIONS
F rom the way most of us talk about media audiences, one might decide
that people are active selectors of news. They carefully survey the
news environment, going online and scanning the available choices as
they home in on the sites and news topics that provide the best fit with
what they want. In this picture that we often paint of the news audience,
people appear quite deliberate but not very human. The true picture is
more complex. People resort to a mixture of habit and reasoned selectivity
as they choose the news.
In this chapter, we focus on the concept of selectivity. We look at what
researchers have learned about how people select the news. We fi rst con-
sider selectivity as a general concept, describing how people choose media
and messages. We then focus the discussion on the internet. The Web car-
ries much more than news, so a primary choice that people make is among
types of content online. We describe how people select online news sites
and stories. Finally, we consider the extent to which people carry selectiv-
ity practices online to the point of content specialization. We report the
evidence we have for the often-heard claim that the internet will inspire
and allow people to focus exclusively on the few news topics that interest
them.
Out of this discussion of audience selectivity emerges a picture of both
audience specialization and broad news browsing. The research results
suggest that news audiences are not acting in concert. Some people engage
in very intentional selection of news sites and topics, others seek specific
topics but seem to care litt le about the sites from which they choose, still
others carefully choose sites but then browse widely within those sites,
and still others choose to ignore news entirely. There is no simple answer
to questions about the future of news audiences, but we see some signs of
what could be.
HOW PEOPLE SELECT NEWS
SEL ECTI NG N E WS ON LI N E [ 85 ]
available. People are not perfectly autonomous in their selection of the
news but will choose among the options their environment offers
(Prior 2007).
Selective Exposure
Before the news can have any direct influence on an individual, that per-
son must fi rst choose to experience it. Th is may seem painfully obvious,
but the process by which people choose between news and other content
in the media has received relatively litt le academic attention over the
years. The rise of high-choice media—fi rst cable television and then the
internet—has increased the importance of initial media selection (Prior
2007). As all types of content become more plentiful, the news accounts
for a decreasing portion of all available content, which means that people
need to use an increasingly deliberate process to access news content.
Th is, in turn, makes it more likely that news viewers will develop mean-
ingful differences from people who do not choose news content. Th is pos-
sibility has led a growing number of scholars to take note of media
selection processes not only within the news genre but also between news
and other genres (e.g., Prior 2007).
SEL ECTI NG N E WS ON LI N E [ 87 ]
the respondents overall—and 34 percent of people older than 24—reported
zero news use the day before the survey (Pew Research Center 2008b).
Prior (2007) similarly finds that the relatively old, educated, wealthy, and
male are more likely to prefer news, but Prior finds that all demographic
indicators taken together are only weak predictors of a preference for enter-
tainment over news (accounting for only 13 percent of the patterns of con-
tent selection). The evidence from these sources suggests that there are
certainly demographic cleavages to news viewing, but these characteristics
alone are fairly poor indicators of individuals’ selection of news content. We
should therefore consider the role of personal preference in media choice.
Preference can exert an influence on news selection in a number of
ways. The most direct would be to say that some people prefer news con-
tent and some people prefer other content. Th is direct-preference per-
spective is often assumed in studies that use some type of news preference
measure as a predictor of other factors (see Price and Zaller 1993). A more
complex approach is suggested by uses and gratifications. Applying this
framework to news selection would consider the more basic preferences of
individuals, such as surveillance versus parasocial interaction, as reasons
for consuming news (Kaye and Johnson 2002) and then determine
whether news content met the needs behind those underlying prefer-
ences. For example, a person who wanted to know about the world around
him or her would achieve gratification through news consumption,
whereas a person who wanted to spend time with others would be better
served by watching sports or a popular drama. These are two methods for
defi ning how personal preference could lead to news selection.
Prior (2007) suggests a subtler way to think about the connection
between personal preference and content selection. His argument is
that people have innate preferences for some types of content over oth-
ers (applying the more direct defi nition), but these preferences are moot
unless the media environment offers adequate choices. In other words,
a person might want to watch a comedy program but will nevertheless
watch news if every station broadcasts the news. Th at preference for a
comedy is meaningless until one station decides to air a comedy while
the other stations air their news programs. Only at this point can the
individual make a choice that exhibits the preference for comedy. Prior
labels this the “Conditional Political Learning” model, which essen-
tially states that content preferences exist, but they are not observable
in behavior unless individuals are operating in a high-choice media
environment.
Survey research generally supports the premise of the Conditional
Political Learning model. Prior fi nds overall support for the idea that peo-
ple who prefer entertainment content are less likely to watch the news but
Incidental Exposure
Preferences for nonnews content appear prevalent, but this does not mean
that people always perfectly select their preferred content. Everyone has
experienced incidental—or at least unplanned—exposure to media con-
tent. Surfi ng between E! and Bravo on American television may take a
viewer past CNN, and perhaps an interesting graphic will encourage him
or her to pause. Similarly, an individual who uses Yahoo! to fi nd sports
scores may also view an interesting news headline, or a Facebook user
may follow a news link posted to a friend’s wall. In each of these examples,
people with entertainment preferences could be incidentally exposed to
news content. The scenarios certainly seem plausible, and so the question
is whether this type of exposure occurs with any meaningful frequency.
Research suggests that the answer is both yes and no. One study found
that participants certainly did click on news links even when they were
not deliberately seeking that type of content (Tewksbury, Weaver, and
Maddex 2001). However, these “accidental” exposures were more likely
to occur with people who otherwise preferred news content—not with
the people who normally avoid it. Pew surveys tell a similar story (see Pew
Research Center, 2008b). The item of interest in this case asks respond-
ents whether they ever come across news when they were online for a dif-
ferent purpose. The frequency was only slightly above 50 percent in the
late 1990s, but more than 70 percent of respondents in each survey since
2004 have reported experiencing this incidental exposure. Although a 70
percent rate of incidental exposure may help alleviate fragmentation con-
cerns in some ways (see chapter 7), the research to date primarily suggests
that such exposure serves to expand the discrepancy in news exposure
between people who prefer news content and those who do not.
Taken as a whole, the current media environment offers an abundance
of news content, but it is critical to consider directly the implications of
choosing news versus any of the other plentiful types of content. Audi-
ence demographics, personal preferences, and available choices are all
important factors in the selection of news content—whether deliberate or
SEL ECTI NG N E WS ON LI N E [ 89 ]
not. The story does not stop here, however. News content is not all equal,
and not everyone arrives at content in the same way. It is essential to con-
sider the people who do choose news media and determine how they
arrive at different types of news.
The internet makes the news-selection story far more complicated than
just the decision about whether to watch the news or to watch entertain-
ment. When a user opens a Web browser, he or she can point it to any
desired (non-)news site. On the one hand, choosing among literally thou-
sands of options is a daunting task. On the other hand, the abundant
availability of sources means that choosing to view a particular type of
news is easier with a medium that provides more choices and a high
degree of user control. Chapter 4 discussed the existence of different
types of audience-segmented news that people can consume (e.g., spe-
cialized by topic or style). Th is section more explicitly addresses the
choices that online news audiences must make: which site to visit and
which story to read. Even at these seemingly fi ne levels of media selection,
there is a great deal of potential variability in the content that different
people will experience.
Choosing a Website
The task of selecting a single source out of the collection of news online
would be almost impossible without assistance; there are literally thou-
sands of online news sources. Deciding whether to use a specific website
for access to the news is the product of two primary factors. The fi rst is
learned. Th is factor comes into play when a person chooses a site on the
basis of past experiences with media. The second factor is reputation,
which plays a role when the user makes an evaluation on the basis of the
popularity or perceived credibility of a site. Considering experience and
reputation can help individuals successfully select a satisfying news
source.
Learned media use occurs when a person relies on past experience to
guide current media choices. For example, a person who has previously
preferred the news analysis of a magazine such as Time may select slate.
com (an online newsmagazine) rather than Google News. Lessons learned
from past use commonly play a role in theories of media selection. Selective
exposure (Klapper 1960) predicts that people will learn to choose media
sources that express agreeable viewpoints. The uses and gratifications per-
spective argues that individuals learn from experience about which media
can best serve specific needs and that people are likely to return to media
that have proven satisfying (McLeod, Bybee, and Durall 1982). As with
many things in life, when people are happy with the consequences of their
current actions, they are not likely to make significant changes to their
future behaviors.
SEL ECTI NG N E WS ON LI N E [ 91 ]
Of course, experience and habits cannot entirely explain media selec-
tion, as many people will eventually adopt new interests, goals, and
sources. Multiple factors can influence whether a person decides to try a
new outlet. An individual may fi nd that his or her news outlet of choice
poorly covers a topic of interest or does not provide content in a new for-
mat. Regardless of the circumstances, reputation is a core component of
which outlet will be adopted next. When we talk about the reputation of a
news outlet, we are referring to its popularity and/or credibility. Ideally,
these would be equivalent; that is, the most reliable content would be read
by the most people. In practice, of course, this is not necessarily the case.
Popularity can be—and often is—the result of factors such as brand
recognition, advertising placement, and reporting style more than the
quality or reliability of the content. Perhaps more than in other media, the
line between popularity and credibility is often blurred online. The Drudge
Report provides a clear example of this problem, as it is one of the most
popular online news websites (Pew Research Center 2008b) but is also
notoriously unreliable. Broad news sites attached to major offl ine brands
present a similar challenge. These types of sites are often among the most
read on the internet, but it is difficult to determine whether CNN and USA
Today are read online because of their names or because their informa-
tional quality is high. In fact, focused news blogs with sophisticated writers
(e.g., fivethirtyeight.com) may be some of the best sources of information
about very specific topics, but these sites may never be able to garner much
attention. Even more vexing is the role of repurposed content online,
which is particularly responsible for blurring the line between popularity
and credibility online. For example, three of the most popular news out-
lets—Google News, Yahoo! News, and Facebook—generally do not do
their own reporting. When Americans had the option to choose among
only one or two major newspapers and three television networks, it was
likely that any choice would be at least relatively popular. However, the
dominance of a few news outlets on a medium that features thousands of
them certainly raises questions about the degree to which source popular-
ity matters over substance.
Despite the apparent importance of source popularity, people probably
do not completely ignore information credibility when they choose outlets.
Credibility is a highly variable concept for many different online news out-
lets, because the internet audience is particularly segmented. Some news
outlets might be deemed credible go-to information source by liberals,
whereas other sites are recognized as such by conservatives (Pew Research
Center 2010). Similarly, some sites will be seen as the credible voice for for-
eign affairs reporting, some for tech reporting, and some for reporting top-
ics of interest to East European immigrants currently residing in America
The demands that the internet places on potential news readers do not
end with a source selection. Whereas a television news viewer can
choose a channel and then sit back and absorb what comes, the internet
user has more work to do before receiving the news. Th is is because most
news sites (smaller blogs being the prime exception) offer a home page
with litt le more than a headline and a blurb for each story. In order to
fi nd a news article, the user must decide which of these articles to select.
Once again, this choice is informed by many factors, although these are
generally divided into two broad modes of story discovery: deliberate
and serendipitous.
Deliberate story selection refers to times when the reader enters a site
with a somewhat specific interest in mind. Th is does not have to be as
specific as “I am going to fi nd story X” but can instead be more along the
lines of “I feel like reading about topic X.” When a user enters a site with
this mind-set, his or her story-selection process is likely to be far more
direct than that of other users. Th is is demonstrated in studies of brows-
ing behavior that fi nd that users who are either strongly interested in a
topic or are given directions on what news to fi nd browse news sites in a
relatively linear fashion (Rittenberg and Tewksbury 2007). Th is means
that the users go directly to their topic of interest rather than clicking
around through more popular or prominent articles. Th is type of pur-
poseful behavior suggests that users with this approach will give a greater
level of attention to and consideration of the news content they select than
other users will.
Serendipitous story selection comes into play when an individual is
more interested in reading simply any news than in reading a particular
type of news. The uses and gratifications approach to media exposure
might suggest that such individuals are using the news for personal enter-
tainment or environmental surveillance (Levy and Windahl 1984), rather
than to learn about a given subject. Browsing studies fi nd that users with-
out a goal are more likely to click back and forth through a site, visiting
SEL ECTI NG N E WS ON LI N E [ 93 ]
stories but constantly backtracking to earlier menus (Catledge and Pitkow
1995). Th is method means that such users can be, at least theoretically,
exposed to a wider variety of stories than deliberate browsers. The major
question with the serendipitous approach is how the users determine
which stories are worthy of selection. Broadly speaking, article worthi-
ness most likely comes down to either the interests of the individual (e.g.,
“Is this a topic I care about?”) or the estimations of others (e.g., “Is this
article popular?”) (Knobloch-Westerwick et al. 2005). When personal
interest dominates the selection mechanism, the individual will browse
until he or she sees an interesting story, checks on that article, and then
returns to the menu to fi nd another potentially interesting article. Graber
(1988) observed this pattern with print-newspaper reading.
When the user is focused on external evaluations, the process is more
complicated. The news editor is the traditional evaluator of worthy top-
ics, and editors have long held a great deal of sway in helping people
decide what stories to read (Graber 1988). Of course, the editor still
decides which stories are published and where they are placed (more on
this below)—both of which are important factors in determining article
selection. However, one of the things the internet changes about news
consumption is that editors no longer necessarily dominate (although
they are still obviously important) the article-evaluation process for the
public.
Many, if not most, major news sites provide some sort of peer recommen-
dation system that reveals which articles are the most read or most shared
on the entire news site. Facebook, for example, provides many news sites
with a plug-in that allows the outlet to reveal not only how many Facebook
users have shared which articles but also which articles have been shared
by people in a member’s networks. Research by Knobloch-Westerwick
and colleagues (2005) suggests that the presence of popularity indicators
at a site can increase the number of stories that people select and how long
they spend reading them.
Of course, news search algorithms can influence how news is pre-
sented and, therefore, what people read. As we noted, sites such as Google
News use proprietary formulas for selecting and prioritizing news from a
large number of sites. The selection and placement of news on a page will
likely influence news selection. One of the most reliable fi ndings in news-
reception research is that people will start reading at the top of a page and
work their way down (e.g., Adam, Quinn, and Edmunds 2007). Thus, the
seemingly simple process of prioritizing stories in a search result can
have substantial consequences.
Even subtler cues can influence what people read. Research in selective
exposure has found that the framing of story topics affects whether people
SEL ECTI NG N E WS ON LI N E [ 95 ]
same page. The eye-tracking fi ndings are confi rmed by other experi-
ments on online story selection (e.g., Knobloch-Westerwick et al. 2005).
For example, Eveland and Dunwoody (1998) found that people select
more topics from the top left corner of a science news page than from
other parts of the page. Thus, editorial decisions about what makes it to
which portion of a Web page affect the likelihood that a story is selected.
These studies offer an interesting perspective on broader news effects.
The information about article placement may not be surprising, but it is
helpful to have verification that placement affects article attention, as does
the inclusion of graphics. Th is knowledge can improve our ability to
understand news effects, because when we look at a website, we can pre-
dict likely news exposure partly based on placement, rather than simply
on what is available anywhere on that page.
What these fi ndings tell us about readers, however, may be both more
interesting and disturbing. People appreciate graphics, but mostly when
they are about weather, and people are very willing to read news articles
that they select, but probably only the summary information. The good
news is that online news readers are att racted to a fair amount of content,
and they may even be more likely than print readers to read the content
they select thoroughly (Adam, Quinn, and Edmunds 2007). The bad
news is that many seem hesitant to pay attention to the most useful con-
tent. The eye-tracking research, therefore, serves to supplement a meme
that is present throughout this book: the internet can provide excellent
news content, but the challenge is in getting the general public to use (or
see) that information.
The hopes and fears of a good many academic observers and news site op-
erators rest on the extent to which people specialize their news selection
online. Site operators hope that people will choose their sites exclusively,
spend a lot of time there, and select consistent (and advertiser-friendly)
patterns of news content. Communication researchers often fear that
people will limit their news exposure to a few content domains that limit
the range of what they learn and feel about public affairs. Thus, the extent of
news specialization online is the source of some trepidation and a central
topic for study. Fortunately, we have some data we can use to examine
whether site selection specialization is developing online. There are two di-
mensions to news site selection. Along the first, we can assess the number
of sites that people tend to use for news gathering. The second dimension is
the diversity of sites they select. We will start with the former.
People might not be limiting the number of news sources they use online,
but they might still be using the medium to focus on specific topics and
ideological positions in the news. Again, there are some survey data that
SEL ECTI NG N E WS ON LI N E [ 97 ]
may speak to this potential orientation to the news. The 2008 Pew survey
asked people to report whether they thought that the news media were all
about the same as one another or if they tended to trust some news sources
more than others. A slight majority of people (53 percent) agreed with the
statement “There are a few news sources I trust more than others.” Thus,
on the most basic level, at least half of Americans appear to have prefer-
ences among the sources they use. That is interesting, but it hardly sug-
gests that many people have strong feelings about the superiority of some
news outlets over others.
One way in which people might specialize their news exposure online is
through the selection of news outlets along ideological lines. This has been
the concern of political communication researchers, certainly. If people are
consciously concerned about ideology in the news, we can expect them to
say that they seek out ideologically consonant news. Fortunately, the 2008
Pew survey asked a question about this issue. About a quarter of the
respondents (23 percent) reported that they preferred to receive news from
sources that shared their political points of view, as opposed to the two-
thirds (66 percent) who said that they preferred news from sources that did
not have a political angle (the remaining people did not give an answer).
Thus, a general tendency to seek out like-minded news could be limited.
One caveat, though: the respondents to this survey might have been moti-
vated by social desirability concerns to avoid reporting ideological news
biases. It is hard to know how much confidence to place in responses to this
question, but we will assume that a majority of Americans believe that they
prefer nonbiased news.
The majority of Americans might prefer ideologically neutral news,
but perhaps there are differences among the media that people use. It
might be that people who use the internet are those most likely to seek
specialized news. Earlier, we noted that the 2008 Pew survey asked
people to report the medium they tended to use most often for news.
Among those who reported using television news and newspapers most
often, 24 percent said that they preferred news that shared their points
of view. Among those who used the internet most often, only 19 per-
cent reported that. Thus, inasmuch as this question is tapping actual
preferences and behavior—an open question, to be sure—it appears
that internet news users are no more likely to prefer ideologically con-
sonant news. They may even be slightly less inclined to choose news
outlets that way.
Another way to approach the question is to compare how people seek
ideologically slanted news in the traditional media with how they seek
it online. Whereas the Pew survey data suggest that relatively few peo-
ple see themselves specializing along ideological lines, there could still
Once people reach a news site, they still must choose the news stories and
topics they will consume. Do they tend to focus on specific topics over
time, or do they sample from the range of stories that sites carry? We will
examine this question in two parts. First, we can look at what people say
about their attention to different topics (as opposed to sites or sources) in
the news. Then we can examine some data from observations of what
people read when they visit news sites. Overall, the data will show that
content specialization is far from the rule. There are plenty of people who
seem to follow one or two topics exclusively. Yet there are ample signs that
many people are broad readers of news topics.
SEL ECTI NG N E WS ON LI N E [ 99 ]
Self-reported Attention to Specif ic Topics Online
We noted in chapter 4 that the April 2008 Pew survey asked people to
say how closely they followed different topics in the news, “either in the
newspaper, on television, radio, or the internet.” Not everyone was asked
about every topic, but the responses to these questions provide a rela-
tively clear picture of how people think about their interest in different
types of news. Within the topics that cover public affairs (i.e., interna-
tional affairs and domestic American national and local politics), the
people who followed one area tended to follow others to a moderate
degree. For example, the correlation between national political news
and international affairs was .51. With a possible absolute range of 0 to 1
(a perfect correlation would be 1.0), that is a prett y strong relationship.
Between local and national politics, it is .47, another relatively strong
relationship.
People who followed public aff airs did not always follow other top-
ics, however. For example, the data reveal weak relationships between
following national politics and following sports, entertainment, and
celebrity news (correlations all less than .15). What is more, among top-
ics outside of public aff airs, the relationships are relatively weak. For
example, among entertainment, consumer, travel, and environmental
news (one subgroup of the sample was asked about these topics), none
of the correlations is larger than .33. Still, there are positive relation-
ships, even if sometimes small, between all of the news topics in the
survey.
The data from this survey suggest that people who follow news generally
tend to follow multiple topics (at least in terms of what they report to sur-
vey interviewers). A fully specialized audience, in which each person fol-
lows one topic only, would reveal systematic patterns of negative
relationships among the variables in this analysis. People following one
topic would tend to avoid other topics. The universally positive relation-
ships, even if most are small to moderate in size, indicate that a good por-
tion of the people tended to report following multiple topics. Indeed, the
mean number of topics that people reported following at least somewhat
closely is 3.5 out of the eight questions on the survey (SD = 2.06). Thus,
these survey data suggest that for news across a range of media, audiences
are not as specialized as one might think.
A more focused analysis of whether people specialize their online news
exposure can be conducted with records of online behavior. Such an analysis
could determine how extensively people focus their news selection on specific
topics. If there are a good many highly specialized readers, they would read
only a few topics very extensively. One would not see them selecting news
Reader Group % of Sample Lead Topic Other Common Topicsa Mean News Views (SD)
Menu browsers 5.0 Home page/menub National, technology, business, 7.9 (11.7)
entertainment
Broad readers 30.4 U.S. national Technology, world, politics, entertainment, 66.9 (112.0)
business
Entertainment readers 7.9 Entertainmentb National 58.1 (116.4)
Weather readers 3.4 Weather b National 24.1 (37.6)
Features readers 3.0 Features Sports, entertainment 31.2 (37.0)
Politics readers 2.3 Politicsb Business, national, world 25.8 (34.7)
Health readers 1.6 Health National, technology, 19.3 (26.2)
entertainment, features
Style readers 1.6 Style/home Sports 58.3 (106.2)
Public aff airs readers 1.3 Opinion/editorial Politics, national 63.1 (98.4)
Local readers 1.0 Local/state National, technology, features, 28.3 (30.2)
business
b
Sports specialists 27.5 Sports 54.1 (76.2)
Business specialists 11.1 Businessb 35.6 (43.5)
U.S. news specialists 1.3 U.S. nationalb 9.4 (10.3)
Note: A total of 2,100 readers had page views on more than three days and fell into a cluster that contained at least 1 percent of the sample.
a
On average, these topics represented at least 5 percent of page views for readers in this group; shown in descending rank by percentage.
b
On average, this topic represented at least 55 percent of page views for readers in this group.
News Generalists in the Online Audience
Thus far, the evidence suggests that the online news audience is made up
of different sorts of news consumers. Some are inclined to limit their news
exposure to specialized areas, but a good many people are willing to select
a broad range of news. Thus, there are a substantial number of news gener-
alists online, and the data suggest that exposure to national current events
topics forms the backbone of their news consumption. For the majority of
people, the selection of national news is linked with the selection of a
range of other topics.
The presence of news generalists online fits nicely with survey data that
show that a substantial majority of Americans believe that they have a
civic obligation to consume public affairs news. People who say that they
believe they have such an obligation are more likely to consume news,
both offl ine and online (Poindexter and McCombs 2001). There are addi-
tional reasons for the presence of relatively large numbers of online news
generalists. Internet technologies certainly make it easier to specialize
news exposure than was the case with television news, but browsing the
news at a major news site such as CNN or Yahoo! News is relatively effort-
less. A recent study of news audiences also found that people who browse
through a number of news topics do so, in part, because they are socially
efficacious (Tewksbury, Hals, and Bibart 2008). They read widely because
it facilitates their social relationships. Specialization may be functional
for some goals, but generalized news exposure is more useful for others.
CONCLUSIONS
Th is review of the online news selection process suggests that the internet
provides audiences with a daunting number of choice points and options.
People apply their preexisting needs, desires, and interests to the selection
of media, news outlets, and story topics. Of course, not all of the news-
consumption process is deliberate and conscious. People often follow
habits that they have developed over time (Diddi and LaRose 2006).
These habits lead them toward and away from the news and particular
topics. One habit that many people appear to have adopted is a pattern of
reading news headlines in a predictable order, starting and fi nishing from
particular points on a Web page. What is more, some news exposure is
accidental, largely a function of the variety of sites that carry news today.
The picture that emerges from this consideration of how people choose
the news is that selectivity occurs through a mixture of purposeful evalu-
ation of sites and topics and healthy doses of habit and chance.
W e know that people will choose and consume news online. The
next issue for discussion is what people learn from it. The literature
on medium differences suggests that people will process news content dif-
ferently through one medium from how they process it through another.
The evidence thus far points to some differences in how much people
learn about public affairs from exposure to different formats of online
news.
Learning from the media is an important topic for several reasons. The
most basic is that what people know about politics helps them understand
new information (see chapter 1 above for a discussion of information and
citizenship). Existing knowledge provides a context for interpreting novel
information and opinion. Thus, knowledgeable people are generally able
to do more with the news. Knowledge is also related to participation in
politics. Knowledgeable people are more likely to vote in an election,
donate their time and money to campaigns, and so on (Delli Carpini and
Keeter 1996).
Th is chapter addresses several key components of the relationship
between learning and online news. We discuss the learning process and
how the internet facilitates (or disrupts) this process. Th is background
sets the stage for a review of online learning, in which we defi ne differen-
tial learning and its implications for society. Some of the available research
suggests that what people learn online is a function of how news sites
present stories. Audiences respond to how the news is presented in a very
sensible fashion; they use search functions, follow hyperlinks, and utilize
topical menus. What might be surprising is that reading a news story
online seems to be much the same as reading it on paper. The format of
news presentation, though, seems to allow audiences to build relatively
sophisticated mental models of concepts and their interrelationships.
Before turning to this evidence, however, we fi rst clarify how each medium
offers different opportunities for learning.
When it comes to potential knowledge gain, all news is not created equal.
Differences among stories can arise from many factors. One of the fore-
most is the medium used to deliver the news. Audiences do not have the
same experiences with—and, therefore, not the same effects from—print,
television, and the Web. A second factor is the type of news that a user
selects. Whether an individual selects hard news, soft news, or just poor-
quality news has a significant influence on the learning potential from
that content. Understanding these factors is a critical component of un-
derstanding how the news can inform people about public affairs.
The research suggests that people can learn about public affairs in varying
degrees. Information gain can range from mere familiarity with a topic
(e.g., knowing that government budget deficits are a political issue) to in-
depth knowledge (e.g., understanding the relationships among government
L E A R N I NG F ROM ON LI N E N E WS [ 107 ]
debt rates, trade balances, and budget deficits). For the barest knowledge
about an issue, people probably need go no further into a news website than
the home page. Headlines and subheadlines may provide enough informa-
tion to create some awareness that an issue, person, or event exists. In that
case, learning can occur in the absence of the selection and careful con-
sumption of a news story. Studies that show the effects of incidental expo-
sure to the news may be tapping just such a level of exposure (e.g.,
Tewksbury, Weaver, and Maddex 2001).
Researchers and other observers often think about news exposure
merely in terms of time spent with a medium or outlet. Such a level of
consideration distinguishes well between surface and in-depth news con-
sumption, but it does not allow for the comparison of effects of exposure
to different news topics. Looking at news exposure in terms of the topics
that people select reveals the interests they have, and—more important—
it allows for some predictability in what they learn. People who read solely
sports news can learn only so much about politics, and vice versa. For this
reason, we spent time in chapter 5 reviewing what research has shown
about online news-selection processes. Contemporary research on how
people learn from the news increasingly looks at what people want and
expect from the press.
News-consumption Skills
Research on learning from the news examines the skills that people bring
to news exposure. Skill is an umbrella term to represent basic att ributes of
an audience member. Under this heading, researchers consider how much
people know about a medium and a news topic. The more audience mem-
bers know about how a medium works, the better prepared they are to
understand and decode messages in it. For example, television news
stories often have a rather predictable set of elements. They typically start
L E A R N I NG F ROM ON LI N E N E WS [ 109 ]
with an introduction from a news anchor, proceed to a voice-over and
video images that bear on the central topic of the story, and fi nish with
some summative remarks about the future of the topic. Television
watchers are better able to understand the content of the story if they
know to expect these elements of the television format. Similarly, online
news audiences are most likely to process and retain news information
when they are familiar with the presentation of news online. The more
they know about how news sites are formatted and how hyperlinks work,
the more resources they can devote to the stories themselves (Eveland
and Dunwoody 2001a).
Researchers have also suggested that expertise in the domain of spe-
cific news topics can affect how much audiences learn. Not surprisingly,
the more people know about a topic, the more they are able to acquire
from exposure to a story (e.g., Graber 1988). Of course, there is an upper
limit to this effect. Particularly high levels of expertise might mean that
an audience member knows all of the information in a story before expo-
sure. These two elements of prior knowledge—format and content exper-
tise—play a role in the knowledge gap, described below.
L E A R N I NG F ROM ON LI N E N E WS [ 111 ]
the other hand, typically direct participants to news websites and measure
what they learn there. Often these studies will assign groups of partici-
pants to conditions that compare news sites with other media or compare
different versions of sites or online news formats.
The overall results of these studies are interestingly complex. The survey
results tend to support the notion that people acquire information when they
go online for news. The experiment-based studies are more mixed. What
people choose from news sites affects what they learn from the news, and site
design affects how people browse sites and select stories. The consumption
of the news is likewise influenced by how sites are constructed.
Survey-based Studies
On the whole, survey-based studies show that the frequency with which
people visit online news sites is positively related to how much they know
about public affairs. For example, using data from a large U.S. national
survey administered during the 2004 presidential election, Kenski and
Stroud (2006) found that people who reported being exposed to cam-
paign information online knew more about candidates and their posi-
tions. Kwak, Poor, and Skoric (2006) similarly found that people in a
local sample in Michigan who reported attention to domestic and interna-
tional news knew more about those topics. At a very basic level, these
studies show that people can learn from online news much as they do
from exposure to other news media.
Researchers have examined whether this positive relationship applies
to everyone receiving news online. There is some evidence that how much
people learn from online news sites depends on other things. For exam-
ple, one study of South Korean adolescents (Kim and Kim 2007) showed
that using online news for general information or for things to use in con-
versation with others was associated with learning about politics. Going
to online news for entertainment purposes was not associated with politi-
cal learning. So, what people want from the news appears to direct atten-
tion and exposure in a way that can influence how much they learn about
public affairs.
Experiment-based Studies
As we have noted, learning from the news begins with selecting sites and
stories. Studies that examine the effects of medium differences include
some that test whether people going online choose different news topics
from those chosen by offl ine audiences. Tewksbury and Althaus (2000a)
conducted an early study of this sort. In it, undergraduate students in
1998 read either print or online versions of the New York Times for five
days. Online readers were less likely to select public-affairs topics and
could recall less information from the news that week. A comparison of
learning from television news, print newspapers, and online news sites
during the 2000 U.S. presidential election (Eveland, Seo, and Marton
2002) revealed that audiences of online news recalled less political cam-
paign information than did audiences of the other media.
D’Haenens, Jankowski, and Heuvelman (2004) replicated the Tewks-
bury and Althaus study in 2000 in the Netherlands with two Dutch news-
papers. They found some differences in what readers of the online and
print versions of the papers read. Online readers spent less time with
international-news stories. Th is was not surprising, given that the online
version of one paper supplied a particularly large amount of national news
on its site (relative to what was in the print version). It might be that the
presence of so much national news diverted attention away from interna-
tional stories. Indeed, analyses of differences in the content of the online
and print versions of the papers suggest that news audiences encountered
different sets of stories there. Overall, this experiment revealed fewer
medium differences than did the Tewksbury and Althaus study.
The contradictory fi ndings described thus far bring up an important
caveat with studies of this sort: the design and content of news sites can
affect how people learn from them. Some sites present the news in essen-
tially the same format as newspapers, but differences in layout and site
content can affect how much people learn. Given that the mixture of sto-
ries and formats at news outlets can affect what people learn from the
news, researchers have devoted more attention to how specific att ributes
of the medium affect the consumption and recall of essentially the same
set of information.
L E A R N I NG F ROM ON LI N E N E WS [ 113 ]
Format Differences
Some studies in this vein compare how the attributes of online news can
exert different effects than the att ributes of television news and print
newspapers. The internet offers more space and interactivity—among
other features—but it is not obvious how these might affect user learning.
The question in this research is whether hyperlinks and other special fea-
tures of online news help audiences or—counterintuitively—create im-
pediments to learning. Research in this area tends to focus on the volume
of content, the interactivity of the site, or the inclusion of links.
The number of story options at a site can affect how people process the
news. The large number of stories available at news sites (relative to what
can be found at offl ine news outlets) is often identified as a positive feature
of online news. Aren’t more options always better? One experiment put
this suggestion to the test (Wise, Bolls, and Schaefer 2008). The study
participants were asked to choose and read unpleasant stories (e.g., stories
about bug infestations, child molestation, or addiction) from a set of
options hyperlinked on a Web page. Half of the people chose from a page
with five stories presented; the others chose from 15 stories. People who
had more options retained more information from the stories they read.
The study results suggest that the larger number of options increased
readers’ emotional arousal and elaboration during the reading task.
Bucy (2004) suggested that the level and type of interactivity at a news
site also might have a primary influence on audiences’ emotional reac-
tions to the site. The results of an experiment that manipulated the inter-
activity of a news site show that people like highly interactive sites and
activities (e.g., voting in a daily poll on the site), but they often fi nd these
activities more confusing and frustrating than simply reading the news on
a site (Bucy 2004). Th is means that the cognitive load imposed by some
types of interactivity could work against acquiring information from the
news. Indeed, this has been the conclusion of several studies of audience
use of multimedia and interactive elements at news sites (e.g., Sundar
2000; Sundar, Kalyanaraman, and Brown 2003).
At the same time, some studies have found that interactive features can
have positive effects that go beyond the amount of information people
acquire. Earlier, we noted that an important part of memory for informa-
tion is how concepts are mentally linked to one another. People are better
able to understand and interpret new information when they have well-
developed networks of knowledge. Dense structures have a good number
of redundant links among concepts, and these links help people integrate
new information with what they already know. Dense structures also help
them evaluate people and institutions.
We must highlight the fact that saying that audiences “learn” from the
news describes an overall effect, but in reality, some people learn more
than others. The knowledge gap refers to the hypothesis that there is a
large difference between people who know about politics and those who
do not. Th is idea is important, because it runs against the societal-level
patterns of many other phenomena. The standard expectation for any
given variable (e.g., height, SAT scores, media use) is that it will be nor-
mally distributed in society, which means that some people will be at one
of two extremes (high or low), but most people will be clustered around a
central value. The normal distribution offers a nice approximation for
many variables. Observers have long been concerned that political knowl-
edge is not a concept that fits a normal distribution. Instead, the fear is that
some people know quite a lot about politics, while many others know almost
nothing, with a smaller than anticipated group occupying the middle space.
The space between the peaks representing those with knowledge and those
without is the knowledge gap.
Two additional factors make the knowledge gap such a cause for con-
cern. The fi rst is that (a lack of) knowledge is not randomly distributed
across society, but it is instead concentrated in particular pockets of soci-
ety. More specifically, people with higher incomes and more education
are more likely to know a lot about politics (McLeod, Kosicki, and
McLeod 2008). Th is, in turn, suggests that the disadvantaged groups
might have a more difficult time voicing political opinions or selecting
adequate governmental representation. The second factor is that new
knowledge tends to spread faster among individuals who are already
L E A R N I NG F ROM ON LI N E N E WS [ 115 ]
knowledgeable than it does among other people. Th is means that most
informational messages simply widen the extant knowledge gap (Perloff
2007). These factors suggest that the knowledge gap is not only a concern
but also one that is difficult to address.
The problem posed by the knowledge gap for news scholars is that mass
media should be particularly ill suited to correcting the informational dis-
parity. Research demonstrates that this is indeed the case. Newspaper use
has been associated with knowledge increases only—or at least primarily
(Kim 2008)—for relative elites (the worst-case scenario), while television
has been found to add knowledge for both elites and nonelites, which
maintains the gap (Jerit, Barabas, and Bolsen 2006). Such fi ndings have
led to speculation that targeted campaigns are necessary for decreasing
the difference in knowledge levels (Perloff 2007), but mass media are
intended for broad audiences and are necessarily clumsy tools for deliv-
ering specialized messages.
The internet is much better suited for targeted campaigns than either
print or broadcast television. After all, the internet is not only effective at
matching specific messages to specific audiences, but it is also a relatively
inexpensive and accessible medium. Surprisingly, the research conducted
to date does not offer much hope. At times, people with low initial knowl-
edge can learn from internet messages (e.g., Kim 2008; Valentino, Hutch-
ings, and Williams 2004), but a common result is that more knowledgeable
individuals are more likely to fi nd online news (Prior 2007; Tewksbury,
Weaver, and Maddex 2001) and more likely to search for additional infor-
mation after that initial exposure (Valentino, Hutchings, and Williams
2004). These fi ndings strongly suggest that the mere existence of online
news is not going to help address the knowledge gap.
Structural components of the medium also appear to undermine the
ability of less knowledgeable citizens to use the internet for political
knowledge gain. The internet is a relatively accessible medium, but even
browsing the Web requires more skill and experience than people typi-
cally recognize (Hargitt ai 2002). Even when individuals without prior
political knowledge do successfully use the internet, the fact is that easy
content selection enables people to have access to different-quality
materials. The conditions reaffi rm the analysis that deliberate efforts are
a necessary precondition for addressing the knowledge gap, even when
considering the informative, accessible, and specialized media environ-
ment that currently exists.
L E A R N I NG F ROM ON LI N E N E WS [ 117 ]
of government. It might be worthwhile to risk the charges of elitism and
develop content (perhaps similar to soft news; see chapter 4) that will
appeal to the less politically knowledgeable audiences. Despite these pos-
sibilities and hopes, it is likely that online news will serve to widen the
knowledge gap in the long run, unless deliberate efforts are made to avoid
this outcome.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we review the state of what researchers know about two
phenomena: fragmentation and polarization. We both integrate research
from a variety of perspectives (e.g., surveys and audience analyses) and
defi ne fragmentation and polarization in specific ways. Our reading of the
extant literature suggests that observers have used these two terms to
cover relatively broad swaths of phenomena. For example, the single term
“fragmentation” has been used to refer to audience behavior (e.g., Webster
2005), media content and outlets (Hollander 2008), audience interests
(Neuman 1991), public discussion (Dahlberg 2007), and public agendas
(Lee 2007). Similarly, “polarization” has been used to refer to audience
behavior (e.g., Webster 2005; Webster and Phalen 1997) and group opin-
ion (e.g., Sunstein 2001). Each of these approaches has merit within the
context of individual studies, but forming generalizations across them is
challenging.
Our desire to evaluate current patterns of fragmentation and polariza-
tion and offer some predictions about future development motivates us to
be very specific about the phenomena under consideration. If fragmenta-
tion can refer to several different potential phenomena, we see the need to
evaluate the state of affairs within each of them. Th is means that we need
to draw distinctions—some of which might appear a little blurry—among
the different types of fragmentation and polarization. We realize that our
need to make distinctions among concepts that are very closely connected
(and may have been described with interchangeable terms in the past)
will bring us into some confl ict with the extant literature. We hope that
our framework will prove useful in the current context nonetheless.
For our purposes, fragmentation is the dissolution over time of audi-
ence news exposure, public affairs knowledge, and political beliefs into
smaller units in a society. Webster, describing the distribution of audiences
across television channels, describes fragmentation as “a process by which
the mass audience, which was once concentrated on the three or four news
options, becomes more widely distributed. As a result, the average channel
audience becomes smaller” (2005, p. 367). The online news environment
might be allowing, and even encouraging, people to focus on a wide vari-
ety of news topics. The wealth of information on these topics, coupled with
the user control that the technologies provide, means that people can
spread their time and attention across a wide range of topics and sites, both
news and entertainment. More important is that they may not be exposed
to any depth of information about consequential topics in the public
domain. Most topics in the news have an audience—we have talked about
how online news systems, in particular, allow news producers to adjust
Types of Fragmentation
We can speak about at least three types of fragmentation. These types are
related. Indeed, they can be arranged in a causal sequence of sorts. A simple
example of one person’s online news use may help illustrate the three
types. Imagine that someone—we will call him Dan—enjoys using the
internet for entertainment, news, and work-related information. On an av-
erage day, he may hear some news headlines on the radio or browse a cable-
television news channel for a few minutes. But for the most part, he gets his
news online. Typically, he receives a good amount of news from special-
ized sources and a few topics from the mainstream press. Over time, Dan
comes to know quite a bit about events and issues that touch on the topics
he follows at the specialized sites, but he sees and hears little about politics
and government. As a result, he knows enough about public affairs, per-
haps, to hold opinions about some issues in the news, but his knowledge is
not very deep. He also has perceptions, as most people do, about which is-
sues the government in his country should be addressing, but those per-
ceptions are based on his rather idiosyncratic browsing of the news.
Th is example illustrates that fragmentation has three primary levels.
The fi rst is the structure of audience members’ news consumption. An
environment in which few people are attending to news outlets that pro-
vide a broad cross section of the news but, instead, attend to a number of
specialized news sources represents the fragmentation of audience news
exposure. Th is is essentially the type we have been describing in earlier
chapters. When audience members consume news about only a few topics
that interest them, they may learn quite a bit about some topics but not a
lot about a broad range of other topics. Th is describes the fragmentation of
public-affairs knowledge (this is in contrast, by the way, with the polariza-
tion of knowledge—the development of segments of people with special-
ized knowledge; we will turn to that outcome below). When people are
consuming news and learning about current events, they are building
knowledge that they can use to assess the state of issues facing a country.
When people are exposed to only a narrow band of the news, they may
view the issues they encounter most often to be the issues that require the
most government attention. Th is represents the fragmentation of the public
agenda. We will review each of these, in turn, to determine whether they
are developing today.
Online, American audiences are using both broad and specialized news
sites. News aggregators such as Yahoo! and Google News and general pro-
viders such as CNN and the New York Times remain among the most pop-
ular sites (Pew Research Center 2010). In fact, the types of sites most
commonly reported for news consumption are aggregators and main-
stream news providers. A 2010 Pew survey reported that 28 percent of
self-professed internet news readers received news and information from
a Yahoo! site, 16 percent said they received it from cnn.com, 15 percent
said Google, and 14 percent said MSN. Thus, a good number of people say
that they receive their news and information from general-focus media.
At the same time, though, just a litt le farther down the top-20 list are
the more specialized Drudge Report and Wall Street Journal sites (Pew
Research Center 2010). Thus, some people also appear to fi nd relatively
specialized news outlets attractive. It is not clear that specialized sites and
segmented news will entirely replace general-news outlets, but they
appear to have made it more difficult for general-news providers to att ract
and hold audiences online.
There is also some evidence of countervailing use patterns among news
audiences. Hindman (2007) presents compelling evidence that there may
be more concentration of news reading online than offl ine. He examines
the level of audience concentration for the print and online audiences of
America’s largest 150 newspapers. He fi nds more evidence of concentra-
tion (a relatively small number of outlets garnering large audiences)
online than offl ine. He notes, for example, “The New York Times’ share of
online newspaper traffic is 3.5 times its share of the print newspaper mar-
ket” (p. 343). He fi nds similar results for the Washington Post, the Boston
Globe, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Washington Times. But “at the
other end of the scale, 126 of the 150 newspapers att ract a smaller portion
of online newspaper traffic than they do print circulation” (p. 343). That
is, a few newspapers garner larger audiences online, but most draw smaller
ones online. Th is belies some arguments about the proliferation of locally
distinct news providers splintering the national news audience along geo-
graphic lines.
In total, some, but not all, of the evidence points to exposure fragmen-
tation. Analyses of the online audience continue to fi nd that search
Types of Polarization
If people choose news sources in ways that place them in a relatively stable
community of news exposure, they experience exposure polarization. In
some ways, polarization has occurred in news consumption for some
time, perhaps for as long as the press has sought to attract a wide audience
to its products. For many years, studies of newspaper reading observed
that different people learn different things from the news. For example,
Bogart showed that men devoted much more time and attention to sports
and business news and women spent more time with features and arts
news (Bogart 1989). Similarly, newspaper readers with higher levels of ed-
ucation have been shown to spend more time with news about govern-
ment and international affairs (Bogart 1989). Even race has been found to
be associated with news-reading patterns. One study found that more
African-American than white news readers expressed an interest in news
about religion, fashion, food, and celebrities (Bogart 1989). A new twist
on these well-established patterns comes with newer technologies. As is
the case with most effects of the internet, the technology appears to take
what people already do and magnifies it.
One way to think about how polarization of use has been observed in
the newer media is to count how many channels or outlets people visit.
Research on cable television has found that people react to sudden
increases in the number of channels from which to choose by adding only
a very small number to their existing exposure patterns (Neuman 1991).
Thus, content diversity does not necessarily lead to dramatic changes in
exposure diversity. Webster (2007) suggests that looking at the number of
cable stations a person visits in a time period (what he calls the horizontal
diversity of audience exposure) is different from examining how much
viewing time audience members spend with individual channels (i.e., ver-
tical diversity). A horizontally diverse exposure pattern might have a typi-
cal member of the audience viewing 15 or more channels in a week. Th is
suggests widespread exposure fragmentation of the audience but does not
reveal much about the potential for exposure polarization (Webster
2007). If, however, viewing data show that the typical audience member
spends most of his or her total viewing time on one or two channels in a
N = 3,006
* Responses to this question were “yes” and “no” only; “yes” responses are shown.
Source: Pew Research Center 2010.
would change over time. There was no clear pattern; the researchers
found no evidence of polarization.
In sum, it appears that there is only limited, very mixed evidence of
topical attention and knowledge polarization. Absent any direct stud-
ies of knowledge effects, very preliminary analyses of news attention
presented here showed some effects but not consistently. Once again,
Polarization of Opinion
100%
Republicans
90%
Democrats
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
No Reliance Low Reliance High Reliance
Figure 7.2. Support for government policies by party identification and reliance on individual-
ized news delivery.
Information Democratization
The fi rst point about the relationship between information and democ-
racy to consider is the extent to which citizen responsibility for political
information is a necessary, or even important, component of democratic
government. There are, of course, many versions of democracy (e.g.,
direct, republic, parliamentary), and observers vary greatly in their opin-
ions about how much information citizens must actually possess (Bennett
2003; Zaller 2003). If we are comfortable with minimal citizen knowl-
edge as the standard for successful democracy, then citizen control of in-
formation does not particularly matter. However, if we lean toward the
position that democracy functions best when citizens have substantial
knowledge of government officials and policies, then involvement with
political information is important. The argument for this perspective is
that knowledge helps citizens select the correct representation, monitor
current government officials, and therefore facilitate the enactment of de-
sirable policies. Th is is why observers typically assume that some level of
knowledge is essential for a properly functioning democracy.
The second point to consider is who bears the responsibility for originat-
ing and circulating political information. Citizens are responsible for much
of the work themselves. Members of the public cannot be self-reliant,
Opportunity or Hazard?
The shift from the mass public model to a more fragmented model of po-
litical communication does not just change the relative power of elites and
individuals. Communication is a critical component of society, and any
significant change to a communication system will necessarily affect so-
ciety as a whole. Knowing to look for change is easy, but recognizing and
evaluating the shifts are a challenge. We may be inclined to say that citizen
involvement is a social good, but the reality may be more complex. It is
therefore necessary to give greater consideration to the influence of infor-
mation democratization for society.
On the surface, citizen involvement with content does seem to offer
clear benefits. Increased political knowledge among the public may be
one of the positive outcomes. Knowledge could be increased in at least
two ways. One route could be that individuals who become involved
with political communication take it upon themselves to conduct the
research or investigation necessary to produce informed messages. Th is
possibility represents the highest hopes of those encouraging citizen
journalism. A second route could be that citizen-produced information
would appeal to people who never made regular use of traditional
reporting, much in the same way as the two-step political information
studies found that nonviewers of news become informed by friends
(Katz 1957).
Improved attention to government operations may be another posi-
tive outcome. As citizens become increasingly involved with political
The context for involvement with content refers to the factors that influ-
ence whether and how often individuals will participate in any compo-
nent of public information. If we equate the decision to participate in
content with the decision to participate in any economic market, we can
more readily identify the factors that are relevant to making the choice.
The fi rst factor is whether the costs are acceptably low to justify partici-
pation. The second factor is the likelihood that participation will yield a
satisfying effect. In short, people will want to participate with public
information when they can afford to do so and when they think that
their efforts will matter. The calculations for assessing the context for
participation have changed dramatically in the past two decades,
because digital media have changed both the costs and the effects of
information creation.
The internet has affected the costs of participation with information in
many ways. Among the most important are free or cheap access to gov-
ernment records, corporate documents, secondary sources, and publish-
ing tools. With these components available for the cost of internet access
alone, the cost of participation is reduced to almost nothing. As the cost of
participation in any market is reduced, the likelihood that more people or
companies will get involved in the market increases. The effect of lowered
costs in the area of public information is particularly pronounced, because
the costs have fallen from such a great height. Newspapers, magazines,
and television are all expensive ventures, but the internet and its corre-
sponding platforms enable citizens to produce comparable content on
relatively meager budgets. Lower costs for participation with information
typically lead to democratization, because more people are able to be
involved.
Social Factors
CONCLUSIONS
P eople create the news. That has always been the case, of course. Before
the birth of formal media organizations, the human hand was clearly
visible. News and other information spread from person to person, moving
through populations with alacrity, if not always accuracy. The institution-
alization of news in media organizations in the 19th and 20th centuries
hid that hand within layers of professionalization, hierarchy, and tech-
nology. News on the internet is returning the clear face of individual cre-
ation to some of the news while it adds a layer of mechanization to the rest.
The result is a novel mix of news and information about public affairs, one
that gives everyday individuals a stronger hand in the creation of the news.
It also gives them more opportunities to choose the news they prefer and
even to avoid it altogether. It is that mix of opportunities that embodies
the seeming contradictions of online news today.
Our assessment of the online news environment and audience has
identified a number of forces acting on the creation and consumption of
the news. Likewise, we have discussed how the dynamics of news tech-
nologies and audiences may be affecting people and social systems. Ulti-
mately, the technology of the news may be facilitating change in the
nature of citizens and politics in democratic systems. In this chapter, we
try to sort through apparent contradictions and balancing forces to build
some predictions and questions about how the online news environment
will evolve and how it will interact with other social institutions and
phenomena.
First, we review some of the larger patterns we discussed above. We
highlight how the news business operates online and how internet audi-
ences influence, create, and consume the news. Th is review sets the stage
for a discussion of a core set of seeming contradictions and confl icts in
how online news operates. These confl icts are tied to some of the most
important potential consequences of the evolution of news on the inter-
net. We fi nish with a consideration of where the news is going. We look at
some ways in which news may develop online and offl ine and consider
how these developments will interact with one another.
Recall that technologies such as the internet very rarely cause social, po-
litical, and economic change. Most often, they allow people and institu-
tions to make changes that they already desired, or they open opportunities
for new designs and developments to occur. We have tried to keep people
at the center of our discussion of online news. In this summary and review
of the ways in which internet technology, people, and news messages
interact, we try to focus on how human activities and desires have shaped
the news system and vice versa.
News-audience Activity
It seems rather obvious at times, but we still need to remark that the news
is a product of human activity. Creating news messages is an active
process. News professionals very intentionally gather, produce, and dis-
seminate information. In the 20th-century model of news media—one
built on newspapers, fi lm newsreels, radio, and television—news creation
largely ended there. But that is no longer the entire story.
Communication researchers have acknowledged for some time that
audiences are active, too. They choose among news outlets and stories,
so they inf luence news messages and organizations through their con-
sumption (and its connection to ratings, subscriptions numbers, etc.).
Internet news audiences have grown dramatically since news went
online after 1993. This growth has affected the size and nature of
audiences for the traditional news media, but the exact relationship
between online and off line news is not entirely hydraulic. Most people
use both online and off line news, others use one or the other, and some
use neither.
Audience activity is also seen in how people bring their individual
goals, feelings, and cognitions to their news consumption. People actively
interpret the news. Beliefs, att itudes, and behaviors that emerge from news
consumption are joint products of the news messages and the audience’s
C O N C L U S I O N : O N L I N E N E W S A N D P U B L I C A F FA I R S [ 161 ]
interpretations. Thus, today, as in the last century, audiences play a role in
their own interpretations of the news.
Finally, online audiences are active in a way that we did not see with
20th-century news media. Internet audiences are feeding content into the
news (both through the news produced by traditional press organizations
and via blogs, video fi le sharing, and other means). Thus, news audiences
seem particularly active. They create content, influence the behavior of
others online, and translate the content of news messages through their
preferences and other predispositions.
A sizable portion of the news that appears on the internet originates with
organizations that create content in the traditional media. Major origina-
tors such as the Associated Press, the New York Times, and CNN create
news stories that can appear online and in other media. The late 1990s
and early 2000s saw many of the traditional news organizations limiting
their online news to what they had created for their offl ine outlets. The
subsequent years have seen more original-content creation and presenta-
tion for the internet and mobile technologies. The major media are taking
advantage of the capacity of the internet for information storage and for
audience interaction with journalists and the news.
Perhaps more important is that the internet hosts a number of news
outlets that lack an offl ine component. These internet-only outlets are
often more focused than the major outlets. They carry news about a par-
ticular geography or topic, and they are often free of the traditions—such
as the objective-news form—of the offl ine news media. Ultimately, the
distinction between online and offl ine outlets will disappear as the media
evolve. As the technologies of the various media merge, the characteris-
tics of the news industry, as a whole, will outweigh issues particular to any
one medium.
As the content of the news online develops, so does the public agenda
that sites present. One of the most powerful social and political functions
of 20th-century news was the projection of a relatively uniform agenda of
issues facing a nation or other entity. Th is gave the news media signifi-
cant political power and often resulted in substantial public uniformity
of perception. Some observers of the online news environment suggest
that news on the internet is changing the political functions of the press.
They claim that the volume and diversity of news online and the control
that the technology provides the audience member reduce the uniform-
ity of the agenda that people receive. There is some empirical evidence to
C O N C L U S I O N : O N L I N E N E W S A N D P U B L I C A F FA I R S [ 163 ]
from other media encouraged attention to more focused, homogeneous
audiences. Today, the offl ine news business is increasingly dominated by
more specialized content.
The internet essentially skipped the mass audience phase of media evo-
lution. Online news providers are focused on specialized audiences via
two routes. First, the technologies of the internet allow news outlets to
offer their audiences very personalized experiences with the news. People
can customize news sites, from the outlets of major news providers to
news aggregators, to provide news and opinion on preselected topics. As a
result, people can sample from a relatively narrow set of topics online if
they wish.
News sites can also encourage audience segmentation in their content
provision. That is, some news sites will see the efficiencies of news produc-
tion and provision that are found in attracting only a select group of peo-
ple. By tailoring their content to specific segments of the audiences, sites
can package audiences for advertisers. Sharing characteristics such as age,
sex, political predispositions, and income, these homogeneous audiences
may be att ractive to specific advertisers. Part of such a segmentation strat-
egy by online news providers is the diversification of the overall news
diet. That is, the provision of novel kinds of news—infotainment is one
such type—under the banner of news can allow news providers to divide
audiences further into distinct segments.
Research on the development of site segmentation shows some limited
trends in this direction. Too litt le research examines how specific news
sites differ in their news content, but there are signs that sites are special-
izing. One development that followed the collapse of print newspapers in
2008 and 2009 was the creation of a number of news sites that focused on
the local news for specific geographical areas. Ongoing research will assess
whether news site specialization becomes a widespread phenomenon.
To observe that some sites are specializing their content with the hope of
attracting a homogeneous audience begs the question of whether news au-
diences will take the proffered bait. Online news segmentation is facilitated
by audiences whose members are willing to specialize their news consump-
tion around specific topics and perspectives. The evidence gathered thus
far tends to suggest that people can be quite selective with the news. Of
course, some news exposure happens accidentally, through well-developed
habit, or as a by-product of other media activity. Nonetheless, research
results point to a number of ways in which people select news online.
C O N C L U S I O N : O N L I N E N E W S A N D P U B L I C A F FA I R S [ 165 ]
patterns of how people learn about the political world. So, naturally, we
wonder what people learn when they use the internet.
There is ample evidence that people are able to acquire information
from the news that appears online. Studies of manipulated and naturally
occurring news flows suggest that people can learn from the news. In
many ways, learning from the news online largely mirrors what happens
offl ine. Some studies have shown that audience control of news selection
online determines what stories they encounter. Obviously, that affects
what people learn. Studies that directly compare learning from news
online with other media fi nd some differences, but few effects of medium
difference are large.
The presence of hyperlinks in news stories online can help audiences
navigate between and within news stories. Thus, they are a core element of
audience interaction with news sites. There is some evidence, though, that
the presence of too many links can create a burdensome cognitive load on
audiences. The load can overwhelm audiences, potentially interfering with
their mental processing of the information they encounter. Perhaps more
important is that some research has suggested that hyperlinks among con-
cepts in the news can suggest ways that concepts are connected with one
another. As a result, online audiences might develop more intricate mental
models of issues and events in news than other audiences might.
If people can acquire different information, and perhaps even more of
it, from the internet than from other media, online audiences may experi-
ence advantages that separate them from people who do not have access
to the internet. The presence of a digital divide in a population might
result in gaps between what different segments of a society know about
public affairs. Such knowledge gaps can affect how people think, feel, and
behave with respect to the political system. These gaps could serve to
reinforce preexisting social and economic inequalities.
C O N C L U S I O N : O N L I N E N E W S A N D P U B L I C A F FA I R S [ 167 ]
people adopt technologies (such as Twitter feeds and email lists) that
direct news to them from specific sources with specific agendas. Thus,
some news consumption patterns suggest the possibility of polarization.
There is some evidence, though not a lot, that public beliefs and att i-
tudes are becoming polarized. People appear to follow their partisan
political interests a bit more extensively when they use technologies that
permit substantial specialization. What is more, one tentative look at the
att itudes of online news audiences showed an association with news spe-
cialization. When people relied on customized news sources, they exhib-
ited more ideologically distinct opinions. Thus, there is some evidence of
polarization in American news audiences. It is not overwhelming, though.
Information Democratization
We have said that the internet is all media together and at once. The phrase
suggests the potential for the internet to change quite a bit about how media
and audiences interact. At the same time, it points to the fact that the internet
often carries content and perpetuates interaction patterns that characterize
the older media. If that is so, how new is the medium? This is an example of
the contradictions that seem unusually common regarding the internet.
Other media have potentially conflicting effects and social roles, but the size,
speed, and ubiquity of the internet seem to render its issues and questions
larger than those raised by other media. In this section, we discuss some of
the contradictions inherent in news delivery and consumption on the inter-
net. We try to offer some resolutions to the contradictions, when possible.
We hope, in the process, to highlight some of the things about online news
that make it a challenging and exciting area of study and engagement.
C O N C L U S I O N : O N L I N E N E W S A N D P U B L I C A F FA I R S [ 169 ]
have described how the amount of news content has increased with the
growth of the internet. The major news sites that dominated online
news in the late 1990s (e.g., CNN, MSNBC, or ABC News) continue to
do so and have been joined by blogs, news aggregators, content mills,
and other online-centric news providers. At the same time, the internet
offers contemporary audiences a number of ways to limit and control
their news exposure. Customized news sites, email news subscriptions,
and other technologies allow people to avoid news, if they wish, more
effectively than ever before. So, at a time when the marketplace of ideas
has approached an almost ideal level of information inclusion, people
are perhaps uniquely able to sidestep and limit their exposure to that
marketplace.
On further reflection, there is less contradiction in this situation than
meets the eye. User control is at the heart of both content proliferation
and tightened focus. Internet users exert a level of control over the flow of
information online that puts almost everyone in the position of adding to
an abundance of content. Th is is at the heart of information democratiza-
tion. At the same time, sites on the internet allow people to control their
online experiences. Site-customization options and other fi lters provide
people with tools to manage the excess of information.
The apparent contradiction of abundance and control raises an interest-
ing question about the concept of diminishing returns. In the traditional
meaning of the term, a quantity of something new in a relationship has an
effect related to the quantity of what had been present. In the realm of
news, we could say, for example, that 10 news stories on a page help readers
learn a certain set of facts. We may assume that more of that thing would
result in a proportionally larger effect. More news stories on a page means
that news readers learn proportionally more facts. Larger quantities do not
always have that effect, though. More of something can diminish the
impact of any one thing. A good example of this was observed in American
households that adopted cable television (Heeter and Greenberg 1985).
When households changed from five channels to 15, for example, people
would increase the number of channels that they watched. But when a sys-
tem would add many more channels to an already sizable number, people
would not add many more channels to their active repertoire. Ultimately,
each new bundle of channels added fewer channels to households’ actual
consumption.
In the context of online news, we might be tempted to assume that the
excess of content would follow a pattern of diminishing returns. But what
if it went beyond diminishing? What if adding more news online resulted
in negative returns? Perhaps when people had a limited number of news
options, they were willing to wade through a broad set of news topics in
C O N C L U S I O N : O N L I N E N E W S A N D P U B L I C A F FA I R S [ 171 ]
topics. Each of these pockets is an issue public. They likely follow news
reports about their focal issue and develop a substantial store of informa-
tion about it. Kim (2007) has shown that issue publics use specialized
news sources online to gather information relevant to their issue. For
example, people with an interest in abortion regulation might visit web-
sites of political groups active in abortion policy or search news sites for
information about it. The internet appears to be a near-ideal environment
for members of issue publics to develop their knowledge about an issue or
topic. From a pluralist perspective on politics, the action of issue publics
and other groups might adequately represent the diverse interests in a
population.
We might also think about learning about politics in terms of the devel-
opment of audience members’ knowledge structures. As noted in chapter 6,
hyperlinked news stories can suggest to audiences the presence of specific
connections among concepts and issues. People appear to process and
store information in this linked fashion. As a result, the knowledge struc-
tures they develop about issues in online news stories appear to be particu-
larly dense (Eveland, Marton, and Seo 2004). These dense structures
should help them process new information about topics, thereby improving
the efficiency and breadth of their overall body of knowledge.
Thus, on an atomistic level, the provision and consumption of online
news look like a boon to individual citizens. They have an opportunity to
learn about a broader rage of topics than they might fi nd in other media,
and the excess of information about most political topics means that inter-
ested people can acquire substantial depth in individual topics. Moreover,
the structure of some online news presentations might help people develop
more useful bodies of knowledge about the subjects they encounter.
C O N C L U S I O N : O N L I N E N E W S A N D P U B L I C A F FA I R S [ 173 ]
some comments on what seem to be likely or plausible developments in
the industry. We focus fi rst on the long-term prospects of news outlets
that predate the internet. We then turn to a discussion of the future of the
online news business.
The economic problems facing old-media outlets stem largely from a loss
of advertising revenue. Some advertisers scaled back all of their adver-
tising during the recession of 2007 to 2009, and some made particularly
significant cuts in newspaper advertising budgets. The online media
picked up some advertising expenditures during this period, largely in
niche markets. Whereas the transition of advertising dollars to niche out-
lets online may be a plus for people seeking analysis-based news on partic-
ular topics, it is not an encouraging sign for the overall news environment.
The fact that advertisements have not only decreased for traditional
sources but have also moved to new venues suggests that the plight of old
media is likely to be long-term. The problematic aspect of this is that blogs
and similar niche outlets are typically not generating original reporting. If
the traditional media fall away and nothing steps in to fi ll the function of
generating the news, then the consequences are likely to be severe across
the news spectrum. The necessary solution for all parties is a paradigm
shift for American news that will likely alter the responsibility of story
production and include at least one new business model for news outlets.
Th is is an imposing proposition, but so is the problem. Although it is
beyond the scope or purpose of this chapter to explore fully all plausible
business models, a few options are worth noting as they relate to news
development.
Something must fi ll the void created as traditional news media decrease
their reporting. One possibility is that the importance of wire services
(companies that create and distribute freelance news articles) will increase
dramatically. Th is is already occurring to some extent, as we have noted,
as papers have become increasingly reliant on the Associated Press (AP),
Reuters, and syndication services. The main strike against this potential
solution is that as demand for such services increases, so should the price.
Indeed, smaller newspapers in the United States are already fighting with
the AP over prices and publication policies (Perez-Pena 2008). Reuters
and Bloomberg, traditionally smaller wires, may have another solution:
becoming news services in their own right. Whereas the traditional wire
model has always been to provide content to news outlets—and therefore
only indirectly to the reader—these two organizations have been hiring
C O N C L U S I O N : O N L I N E N E W S A N D P U B L I C A F FA I R S [ 175 ]
the transition from professional to citizen journalism would be quite a
change for our conceptualization of news production, but it might be the
best way to harness the strengths of the new media environment.
The internet will certainly continue to drive change in news across the
board, but the face of online news itself is far from sett led. Many years into
the popular availability of the internet, two fundamental aspects of online
news remain open questions: how online audiences will consume polit-
ical news and how online news will become fi nancially viable. Answering
these questions is imperative in order for online news to play a significant,
lasting role in society.
Determining how audiences will consume the news really requires
dealing with several prerequisite issues. One of these is where news will
show up next. Google News, Facebook, and Twitter are all services that
(1) very rapidly became popular channels for news, (2) changed at least
one core aspect of news consumption (e.g., customization, source, speed),
and (3) will quickly become outdated. Online news fi rst reached audi-
ences through desktop computers, then laptops, and now mobile phones
and tablets.
Th is brings us to a second concern, which is how audiences will respond
to changes in the news environment. Twitter—which can offer instant
news, mobile access, and content customization—may seem like a perfect
vehicle for online news, but only a fraction of the public will ever really
use this service, and only another fraction of those people will use Twitter
for news. The same can be said for mobile devices or Second Life (Reuters
paid to have a “building” with this service) or whatever the “next thing” in
digital content will be. It is not enough to see what forms online news
might take, largely because the history of media choice suggests that hav-
ing more choices actually leads to a smaller overall news audience (Prior
2007). Observers need to decipher which forms of news might be actually
utilized by significant audiences.
Addressing the question of how online news will become fi nancially
viable is literally a million-dollar task. One obvious choice is charging for
content through paywalls (systems that require people to pay for access to
news stories). These were relatively popular in the 1990s, but they gave
way to ad-based models, and now the news industry is turning to them
again. Of course, the reason news companies are vacillating on this point
is that no solution has yet provided a level of revenue that can sustain a
quality news product online. The challenge that confronts news producers
C O N C L U S I O N : O N L I N E N E W S A N D P U B L I C A F FA I R S [ 177 ]
simultaneously. For example, heavy users, who are likely to subscribe, will
be asked to pay. Casual users will be forced to see ads (or fi ll out surveys;
data are valuable). Audience members who forward content to a specified
number of friends will be able to bypass a site’s paywall. Users entering a site
from a content partner will get free access to that article only. Sports articles
will always cost something—except for premium subscribers.
All of these options could be implemented for one site, and that com-
pany would be doing an excellent job of maximizing revenue. At least, this
would be true if—and this is a big if—the simultaneous options could be
implemented effectively from a technological and public-relations stand-
point. Only time will tell whether this type of solution is viable. Either
way, content providers will have to fi nd some means of fi nancial stability.
If they do not, then the future of online news content (and possibly all
news content) will be in serious jeopardy.
CONCLUSIONS
For the average visitor to news websites, the internet is much the same
from day to day. Th is veneer of continuity belies the very rapid change
roiling the news business in the 21st century. Big changes are afoot, to be
sure. The power of the traditional news providers is weakening. A prolifer-
ation of news sources has undermined the easy supremacy enjoyed by
print and broadcast news through much of the 20th century. Citizen-
driven news, entertainment-oriented news, and just plain entertainment
all are vying with traditional news product for audience attention.
The upshot of this competition and change in the news business is a
developing tension between the provision of news and the quality of dem-
ocratic participation. By some standards—fragmentation and polariza-
tion are prominent examples—changes in the landscape of information
mean that citizens will be ill prepared to debate and act on the important
issues facing a nation. By other standards—for example, the diversity of
content and contributors—online news presents a vibrant and rich set of
resources for active and involved citizenship. Both of these standards are
appropriately applied to the online news environment.
Running through predictions of change, utopian and dystopian, should
also be a measure of caution and even disinterest. Democracies have proven
to be resilient in the face of changes in the relationship between information
and citizenship. The intermediaries between government and the governed
may change, but many of the core institutions and social practices that
underlie democratic systems appear resistant to change. As usual, whether
their resilience is good or bad depends on one’s perspective. And time.
CHAPTER 3
1. HTML, the basic language of websites, stands for “hypertext markup language.”
CHAPTER 4
1. The sample of internet users was recruited and maintained by Nielsen//NetRatings
(now part of the Nielsen Company). In 2000, the company had recruited more than
50,000 people to participate in the panel and claimed that it represented American at-
home and at-work internet users. The company recorded the uniform resource locator
(URL) address for every page viewed by a member of the panel. In response to author
request, the company provided the URL for view pages of a select set of news sites in
March and May 2000. With each URL was included basic demographic information
about the site visitor and the date and time of the page view.
CHAPTER 5
1. Data for this study were taken from the Pew Research Center’s Biennial Media Con-
sumption Surveys from 2002, 2004, and 2006. The dependent variable in each analysis
was whether the respondent voted in the preceding presidential election. The indepen-
dent variables of interest were cable access, internet access (for both, 1 = access, 0 =
no access), and relative preference for societal news. This last variable is related to the
relative entertainment-preference measure introduced by Prior (2007), which essentially
measures entertainment-media consumption as a ratio of overall media consumption.
This study modified that concept by measuring users’ attention to crime, community,
and health news (4 = very closely, 3 = somewhat closely, 2 = not very closely, 1 = not at
all closely) as a ratio of their attention to these categories plus political figures, inter-
national affairs, and local government. Controls included in the analysis were news
exposure, political interest, and a thorough set of demographics. The statistical analysis
was conducted with a binary logistic regression model.
2. A binary logistic regression model was estimated with source number as the dependent
variable (1 = “get news from many different sources,” 0 = “mostly rely on a few sources”).
The model included control variables for respondent age, sex, education level, and
frequency of news exposure with television, newspaper, and radio (these were measured
in terms of exposure on the day before the survey interview, with responses coded 4 =
1 hour or more of use, 3 = 30–59 minutes, 2 = 15–29 minutes, 1 = less than 15 minutes,
and 0 = no use). The two variables of interest in the analysis are questions about the
internet. The first asked whether and how often the respondents got news online (5 =
“yes, every day,” 4 = “yes, 3–5 days per week,” 3 = “yes, 1–2 days per week,” 2 = “yes, once
every few weeks,” 1 = “yes, less often,” and 0 = “no, never”). The other question asked
which medium people used most over the course of an average weekday to obtain news
(1 = internet, 0 = other; 18 percent of the sample reported using primarily the internet
for news).
3. Nielsen//NetRatings provided the URL for each page visited on 13 selected national
and local news sites (ABC News, CNN, New York Times, USA Today, Chicago Sun-Times,
Dallas News, Detroit News, Louisville Courier-Journal, Oregonian, San Diego Union-Tribune,
San Jose Mercury-News, BBC, Nando Net). These sites covered national and local news
and included outlets of mainstream television and newspaper organizations. They were
selected for analysis on the basis of their audience size and geographical diversity and
how well their URLs facilitated topic identification.
4. The URLs identified the general topic for each news story. A classification of the URLs
grouped them into site home-page views and views of one of 21 major news topics.
CHAPTER 7
1. We offer this variable with some hesitation. We recognize that the use of some media
that we call general includes some specialized exposure (e.g., watching CNBC on cable
television), whereas the use of some customizable services can be rather general (e.g.,
receiving email updates from the New York Times national news feed). Nonetheless, we
believe that the bulk of the use of each type of outlet matches our conceptualization.
2. All group figures are the percentage of people saying that they follow the topic fairly or
very closely. A demographic weight supplied by Pew has been applied to all analyses.
3. For attention to Afghanistan, the interaction of party identification and level of reliance
in a logistic regression model is statistically significant, p < .001. It is not significant in the
other two topics.
4. The interaction of party identification and level of reliance in a logistic regression model
is statistically significant, p < .001.
5. Of course, the reverse is also possible. It might be that people with more polarized
attitudes seek more specialized content. If that is the correct interpretation, it would still
suggest an important connection between specialized content and audience beliefs, but
the implications for a polarization effect would be less clear.
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INDEX
[ 194 ] Index
journalism and, 11, 150–152; costs media system dependency, 85
of participation and, 153; definition Meng, Jingbo, 86
of, 146–147; economic forces and, Microsoft, 61, 125, 156
156–157; efficacy and, 154; impediments mobile devices, 4, 22, 38, 50, 70, 135,
to, 155–159; indirect channels of 162, 176
information influence and, 155; news movies, 25, 26
creation and, 147, 154; news curation MSNBC, 60, 67, 75–76, 81, 170
and, 147, 154; news distribution and, MTV, 134
147, 154; news exhibition and, 147, 154;
regulatory forces and, 157–158; social Napster, 48
factors and, 158; social networking sites National Enquirer, 77
and, 154–155; societal fragmentation National Public Radio (NPR), 49
and, 152; versus mass-public model of naturally occurring news, 113, 166
political communication, 148–152 NBC, 26, 61, 65, 124, 148. See also
Instapundit, 60 CNBC; MSNBC
interactivity, 8, 42–43, 59, 84, 107, Netherlands, 113, 129
114, 163 network neutrality, 39, 157–158
international news, 60, 75–77, 100, 113, Neuman, W. Russell, 14, 80–81, 124
128, 133, 165 New Voices, 175
internet. See online news. New York Times, 49, 60–61, 72–76, 93,
internet protocol (IP) addresses, 70 125, 156–157, 162
internet service providers (ISPs), 38–39, news agenda: audience and, 57–59,
157–158 162–163; fragmentation of, 123,
internet video, 45, 47, 110, 150, 157, 128–130, 167, 172–173; homogeneity of,
172–173 57, 61; offline news sources and, 54–57,
issue publics, 171–172 61, 128–129; online news sources and
54, 57–62, 128–130, 162–163; setting
J-Lab, 175 of, 54, 56–57, 128–129, 162–163
Jankowski, Nicholas, 113 news aggregators, 18, 47, 52–53, 59, 81,
122, 125–126, 164, 170
Kenski, Kate, 112 news popularity rankings, 58–59
Knobloch-Westerwick, Silvia, 86 news tickers, 45–46
knowledge gap, 115–118, 166 newspapers: audiences of, 56, 64, 125,
Kwak, Nojin, 112 133; compared to online news, 106, 113,
116; decline of, 3–4, 26, 30–34, 79,
learned media, 91 121, 124, 148, 164, 173; fragmentation
Leccese, Mark, 60 and, 125, 128–129; history of, 25–26;
liberal pluralism, 19–20 learning and, 113, 116, 129; mass media
Life, 26 model and, 20; news agenda and, 54,
long tail, 10, 36, 78 56; online presence of, 11, 33, 42–44,
Look, 26 79, 125
Lott, Trent, 57, 78 Nie, Norman, 99, 129, 140
Nielsen//NetRatings data, 101, 179n4.1,
MacGregor, Phil, 71 180n5.3
magazines, 3, 25–27, 34, 35, 153 nonreplacement of media, 28–29, 32–33
mass public model of political
communication, 148–152 O’Reilly Factor, 35
McCombs, Maxwell, 27–28, 60, 129 objectivity, 3, 19–20, 162
media ownership, 41, 49, 61, 157 online news, impact of: advertising
media replacement, 27–29, 32–33, 40 and, 174, 177; audience activity and,
media effects approach, 9–10, 23, 39 161–165; citizen journalism and, 168,
Index [ 195 ]
online news (continued) Peiser, Wolfram, 30
175–176; compared to offline news and, Perse, Elizabeth, 24
162–163; customization and, 168, Pew Research Center surveys, 21, 31–33,
170–171; fragmentation of knowledge 37, 66, 74–76, 87–90, 97–98, 100,
and, 166–167, 171–172; government 124–125, 135–141, 154, 177, 179n5.1
support of news creation, 175; podcasts, 47
hyperlinks and, 166, 172; ideological polarization: audience demographics and,
polarization and, 167–168; information 133, 138, 142; audience news exposure
democratization and, 168–169; and, 132–136; audience segments and,
news-site specialization and, 163–164; 130, 132; customization and, 135–138,
proliferation of content options and, 141; definition of, 121; horizontal
169–171; technological convergence diversity and, 133; online news use
and, 172–173; two-step flow of and, 134–136; political partisanship
communication and, 149, 151, 169 and, 134–135, 138–139, 141–142;
online news, learning from: audience political opinion and, 132, 140–142;
motivation and, 108–109; compared to public affairs knowledge and, 132,
newspapers, 106, 113, 116; compared 136–140; traditional media exposure and,
to television, 106, 116, 118; dense 133–134; vertical diversity and, 133–134.
structures and, 114; elaboration and, See also fragmentation
109; experiment-based studies and, Poor, Nathaniel, 112
111–113; hypertext links and, 110–111, positioning principle, 69
114–115; interactivity and, 107, 114; Powell, Michael, 37
knowledge gap and, 115–118; news- Prior, Markus, 88–89, 179n5.1
consumption skills and, 109–110; Project for Excellence in Journalism (PEJ),
number of stories and, 114; political 60, 79
knowledge and, 112, 115, 117–118; public affairs news, 14, 100, 103, 115,
political participation and, 105, 117; 117–118, 123, 126–128, 132–133,
presentation format and, 105–108, 136–140
113–115; surveillance and, 109;
survey-based studies and, 111–112; web radio: television and, 8, 26–27, 28–29;
navigation skills and, 116 specialization in, 29, 63, 65, 140, 148,
online news, presentation of: audience 163–164
agenda and, 57–59; blogs and, Rather, Dan, 57, 78
49–51; citizen journalism and, 51–52; Reddit, 53
commercial relationships and, 49; Republican Party, 138–141, 167
compared to offline news, 41–42, 55–57, republicanism, 19–20
59–62; filtering and, 53, 59; hyperlinks reputation, news outlets and, 91–92
and, 48–49, 58, 60; internet video Reuters, 49, 135, 174, 176
and, 45, 47; news agenda and, 53–62; RSS (Really Simple Syndication), 15, 43,
news aggregators and, 52–53; news 46, 47, 52, 135, 136, 137
feeds and, 52; news popularity rankings Rubin, Alan, 24
and, 58–59; news prominence and,
54–55; newspaper websites and, 42–44; San Francisco Chronicle, 125
podcasts and, 47; social media and, 49, Schudson, Michael, 6–7
52; television news websites and, 44–47; search algorithms, 52, 53, 59, 94
visual convergence and, 45–46 search engines and search results, 59, 94,
online video. See internet video 125–126, 171, 173
Second Life, 49, 176
paywalls, 176–178 segmentation: advertisers and, 85;
PBS, 148, 175 geography-based, 79–80; internet
peer recommendations, 94, 95 and, 66–68; medium-based, 64–65;
[ 196 ] Index
style-based, 77–79; topic-based, 4, mass-public model of communication
71–77, 82, 100–102, 121, 126, 139. and, 148–149, 163; news on, 3, 20, 32,
See also specialization 34, 109–110; news agenda and, 54–55;
selective exposure, 24, 86, 91, 165 news format and, 55, 77–78, 109–110;
selectivity: advertisers and, 85; audience specialization and, 35; websites and, 42,
demography and, 90–91; audience 44–48. See also cable television
desires and, 84–86, 103; audience Tewksbury, David, 113
ideology and, 98–99; credibility and, Thurmond, Strom, 57, 78
92–93; deliberate story selection and, Time Warner, 61, 156
93; diversity of news sources and, Time, 61, 91
97–99; incidental exposure and, 89–90; topic tags, 50
interactivity and, 84; learned media Twitter, 11, 38, 50, 52, 76, 135–136, 137,
use and, 91; news formats and, 90–91; 168, 176
news versus nonnews choice, 87–91;
personal preference and, 88; popularity U.S. Congress, 157
and, 92, 94; reputation and, 91–92, 98; U.S. elections: 2000, 113; 2004, 61, 112,
serendipitous story selection and, 93–95; 140–141; 2008, 35, 46; 2010,
topic selection and, 100–104; web page 138–139
layout and, 94–96 United Airlines, 53
serendipitous story selection, 93–95 USA Today, 72–74, 92
Shah, Dhavan, 51 uses-and-gratifications perspective, 24, 28,
Skoric, Mario, 112 88, 91, 93, 108–109
Slate, 49, 61
social media, 41, 46, 52, 59, 71, 136. Vevo, 156
See also Facebook, Twitter. Viacom, 150, 156
soft news, 64, 77–79, 81, 90–91, 106 videocassette recorders (VCRs), 28
South Korea, 61, 112 videotex , 31, 107
specialization: advertisers and, 67–68; visual convergence, 45–46
distribution and, 70; EPS cycle and,
64–67, 69, 81; internet and, 66–68; Walker, Dana, 51
large news sites, 69–70, 81; limits of Wall Street Journal, 125
80–81; mobile devices and, 70; news Washington Post, 22, 49, 60, 61, 125
blogs and, 68–69; radio and, 65. Washington Times, 125
See also segmentation. web browsers, 31, 66, 70
story prominence, 55, 165 web logs. See blogs
story repetition, 55–56 Webster, James, 120–121, 134
Stroud, Natalie Jomini, 112, 140 Wikipedia, 168, 169
wikis, 47, 154
technological determinism, 8 wire services, 34, 43–44, 135, 174–175
Technorati, 50 Wired, 22
techPresident, 68
television: adoption of, 8, 30; decline of, Yahoo! News, 53, 61, 75–76, 81, 92,
12, 31, 32; expansion of, 26–27, 28–29, 103, 125
65, 124; learning from, 106, 116, 118; YouTube, 150
Index [ 197 ]