EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-23233. September 28, 1967.]

LUIS ENGUERRA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANTONIO DOLOSA, defendant-

appellee.

Esteban Escalante, Jr. for plaintiff-appellant.

Ruben M. Paps for defendant-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; COMPUTATION OF TIME. — Rule 23 of the

Rules of Court adopts the exclude-the- rst and include-the-last day method for
computing any period of time.
2. ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; WHEN NOT PRO FORMA; EFFECT ON PERIOD
FOR FILING ANSWER. — A motion to dismiss is not pro forma where it expresses, not
only the legal grounds for the motion, but, also, the particular and concrete facts upon
which said grounds rely, and its presentation suspended the running of the period for
the filing of defendant's answer.
3. ID.; SPLITTING A CAUSE OF ACTION. — Where the alleged violations spring
from one and the same breach of the contract of employment, then there is only one
cause of action. Hence only one suit should have been filed.

DECISION

CONCEPCION , C.J : p

Appeal, by plaintiff Luis Enguerra, from an order of dismissal of the Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon.
Plaintiff Enguerra was chief baker for the De Lux Bakery and Grocery, in
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, from June 18, 1959 to October 8, 1961. On December 14, 1961,
he led with the municipal court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, a complaint, against defendant
Antonio Dolosa, as owner of said establishment, to recover the sum of P4,056.00, for
unpaid overtime services allegedly rendered during said period. The court having later
dismissed said complaint, Enguerra appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1800.
Soon thereafter, or on January 24, 1963, Enguerra led, with the same Court of
First Instance, another complaint against Dolosa, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
1804, to recover the following:
"1. Termination Pay P 392.74
2. Underpayment of wages 64.20
3. Compensatory Damages, unearned
income from unjustified dismissal 6,363.22
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 4. Compensatory Damages, unpaid overtime 4,347.89
5. Moral Damages 5,000.00
Exemplary Damages 2,500.00
Attorney's fees 3,500.00"
On Motion of Dolosa, he was granted, on February 6, 1963, an extension of 30
days, "counted from to-day," to submit his answer. On March 8, 1963, he led, instead, a
motion to dismiss, upon the ground that said pending case No. 1800 is an action
between the same parties, for the same cause of action, and that the complaint in case
No. 1804 violates "the rule against splitting a cause of action." Subsequently, or on
March 12, 1963, Enguerra sought to have Dolosa declared in default, upon the ground
that his motion to dismiss had been led one (1) day late, and that it was merely pro
forma, because of which it did not suspend the running of the period to le his answer.
The Court of First Instance granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion to
declare Dolosa in default. A reconsideration of the orders to this effect having been
denied, Enguerra interposed the present appeal, directly to the Supreme Court, alleging
that the lower court had erred (a) in not declaring Dolosa in default, and (b) in
dismissing the complaint herein.
As regards the rst alleged error, Enguerra maintains that the extension of 30
days granted in the order of February 6, 1963, expired on March 7, 1963, because the
order stated that said period should be "counted from today," which, Enguerra
maintains, should be understood to mean from February 6 to March 7, 1963. An
identical theory was rejected in Ulpiando vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, 1 in the
following language:
"The petitioners raise procedural questions. On 2 August 1957 the
respondents received a copy of the decision dated 22 July 1957 (See Annexes E &
F). On 15 August they led a 'petition for extension of time to le motion for
reconsideration,' dated 13 August, because of lack of material time to read the
voluminous transcript of stenographic notes and for that reason they could not
readily formulate their arguments in support of the motion for reconsideration
(Annex F). On the same day, 15 August, the Court entered an order granting the
respondents ' fteen (15) days counted from today within which to le their
motion for reconsideration of the decision rendered on July 29, 1957 (should be
22) in the instant case.' (Emphasis supplied). On August 30, the respondents
mailed their motion for reconsideration in the post o ce of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.
The petitioners claim that counting from 15 August, the day the 15-day period
commenced to run, to 30 August, when the respondents mailed their motion for
reconsideration, 16 days already had elapsed, and contend that the Court had
already lost jurisdiction of the case and could no longer reconsider its decision
dated 22 July.

xxx xxx xxx

"Rule 28 of the Rules of Court provides:

"In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by
order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default
after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The
last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a
legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which
is neither a Sunday nor a holiday.

This rule adopts the exclude-the- rst and include-the-last day method for
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 computing any period of time. Therefore, excluding the day when the order
granting their petition for extension of time to le motion for reconsideration was
entered by the Court (15 August) and including the day the respondents mailed
their motion for reconsideration (30 August), only 15 days had elapsed. Hence,
the respondents' motion for reconsideration was led within the extension of time
granted by the Court."

No reason has been advanced, and we nd none, to depart from this view, which
is in line with the spirit and the letter of our laws and the rules of Court, and is,
accordingly, reiterated.
As regards the second procedural ground of the objection to the motion to
dismiss, it should be noted that a motion is said to be pro forma when it is apparent
therefrom that the movant has not endeavored to make it reasonably persuasive or
convincing, his purpose being merely to gain time or to delay the proceedings. In the
case at bar, the motion explicitly states "that there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause, namely: Luis Enguerra vs. Antonio Dolosa — Civil
Case No. 1800, now pending before this Honorable Court;" and "that the ling of the
above-entitled case is a violation of the rule against splitting a cause of action."
Having thus expressed, not only the legal grounds for the motion, but, also, the
particular and concrete facts upon which said grounds rely — with speci cation of the
title and number of the case on which the motion was based and of the court before
which the case is pending, coupled with the other circumstances hereinafter adverted
to and appearing in the records of both cases — said motion, manifestly, is not pro
forma, 2 and its presentation suspended the running of the period for the ling of
defendant's answer.
The next and most important question for determination is whether or not Civil
Case No. 1800 is for the same cause of action as Civil Case No. 1804, both being
admittedly between the same parties. In this connection, it should be noted that the
basis of the complaints in both cases is the same, namely: that Enguerra's rights as
Dolosa's chief baker, from June 18, 1959 to October 8, 1961, have been violated by the
latter. The alleged violations may have several aspects, such as: 1) underpayment of
wages; 2) non-payment of overtime; 3) transfer, allegedly equivalent to unjusti ed
dismissal, and, hence, the claim for separation pay; and 4) damages (compensatory,
moral and exemplary and attorney's fees). Yet, the cause of action — the spring from
which the right to sue emanates — was only one and the same breach of their contract
of employment, without which none of the claims made by plaintiff would have no leg to
stand on.
The statutory provisions regarding termination pay, minimum wage, overtime and
damages are as much a part of said contract of employment, as the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code on obligations and contracts, in general, and on lease of
services, in particular. The difference between underpayment of wages on a given day
and non payment of overtime for work done on the same day, is not — insofar as the
cause of action therefor is concerned — materially at variance from that which exists
between said underpayment of wages for the day given and the similar underpayment
of wages for the next day. Indeed, if one month later, the aggrieved laborer should
decide to sue the employer for breach of contract, it is obvious that the former cannot
le a complaint for some effects of such breach, and another complaint for its other
effects. He must include in the complaint his claim for underpayment for the
aforementioned two (2) days, both being overdue at the time of the commencement of
the action. 3 Similarly, if underpayment of the minimum wage for a given day or month
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 were coupled with failure or refusal to pay overtime, for the same day or month, a
complaint led thereafter should include both, underpayment of wages and overtime
pay. In other words, Courts should not sanction a complaint for one, and another action
for the other. Hence, in his own complaint herein, plaintiff has, in fact, included his
claims for alleged underpayment of wages, overtime, compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, under one cause of action.
He is in estoppel, therefore, to deny that the cause of action asserted in both
cases is one and the same. At any rate, it is clear that the overtime claimed in the
present case is the very object of Case No. 1800. Moreover, it is well settled that
damages incidental to a cause of action cannot be made the subject of a suit
independent from the principal cause. 4
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be, as it is hereby, a rmed, with
costs against plaintiff, Luis Enguerra. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. L-13891, 109 Phil. 964; 60 O.G. 6196.

2. See Arnaldo vs. Bernabe, 87 Phil. 374; Ylana vs. Mercado, 94, Phil. 769 and People vs.
Narsolis, 85 Phil., 798.

3. Larena vs. Villanueva, 53 Phil. 923. See also, Lavarro vs. Labitoria, 54 Phil. 791; De
Goma vs. De Goma, et al., L-18739, December 28, 1964; Rheems of the Philippines, Inc.
vs. Ferred, et al., L-22979, January 27, 1967.
4. Valencia vs. Cebu Portland Cement Co., 57 O.G. 2135.

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