jp2 01 3 PDF
jp2 01 3 PDF
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21 May 2014
PREFACE
1. Scope
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and
performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides
the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in
multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by
combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint
doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by
the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this
publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing
the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the
accomplishment of the overall objective.
3. Application
a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders
of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.
i
Preface
doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not
ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational
command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law,
regulations, and doctrine.
ii JP 2-01.3
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 2-01.3
DATED 16 JUNE 2009
• Establishes separate chapters for discussing each of the four steps in the
JIPOE process.
• Clarifies the roles and responsibilities between a “red cell” and the
“combatant command red team” within the JIPOE process.
iii
Summary of Changes
Intentionally Blank
iv JP 2-01.3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEW OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
CHAPTER II
DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT—STEP 1
· Overview ....................................................................................................................II-1
· Identify the Joint Force’s Operational Area...............................................................II-2
· Analyze the Mission and Joint Force Commander’s Intent .......................................II-3
· Determine the Significant Characteristics of the Operational Environment .............II-3
· Identify the Limits of the Joint Force’s Area of Interest ...........................................II-5
· Determine the Level of Detail Required and Feasible Within the Time Available ...II-6
· Determine Intelligence and Information Priorities, Gaps, and Shortfalls ..................II-7
· Collect Material and Submit Requests for Information to Support Further
Analysis......................................................................................................................II-7
CHAPTER III
DESCRIBE THE IMPACT OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT—
STEP 2
v
Table of Contents
CHAPTER IV
EVALUATE THE ADVERSARY AND OTHER RELEVANT ACTORS—
STEP 3
CHAPTER V
DETERMINE ADVERSARY AND OTHER RELEVANT ACTOR
COURSES OF ACTION—STEP 4
CHAPTER VI
SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATION PLANNING, EXECUTION, AND
ASSESSMENT
Section A. Planning
· Overview .................................................................................................................. VI-1
· Planning Initiation .................................................................................................... VI-3
· Mission Analysis ...................................................................................................... VI-5
· Course of Action Development ............................................................................... VI-5
· Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming ............................................................ VI-6
· Course of Action Comparison ................................................................................. VI-9
· Course of Action Approval .................................................................................... VI-10
· Plan or Order Development ................................................................................... VI-10
Section B. Execution
· Overview ................................................................................................................ VI-12
· Shape Phase ........................................................................................................... VI-13
· Deter Phase ............................................................................................................ VI-14
· Seize Initiative Phase ............................................................................................. VI-14
· Dominate Phase ..................................................................................................... VI-15
· Stabilize Phase ....................................................................................................... VI-16
· Enable Civil Authority Phase................................................................................. VI-16
vi JP 2-01.3
Table of Contents
Section C. Assessment
· Overview ................................................................................................................ VI-16
· Assessment Process ............................................................................................... VI-17
· Support to Assessing Performance ........................................................................ VI-18
· Support to Assessing Effectiveness ....................................................................... VI-19
CHAPTER VII
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
APPENDIX
vii
Table of Contents
GLOSSARY
FIGURE
viii JP 2-01.3
Table of Contents
ix
Table of Contents
x JP 2-01.3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW
xi
Executive Summary
xii JP 2-01.3
Executive Summary
Develop a Geospatial The second step in the JIPOE process evaluates and
Perspective of the OE describes broad COAs and the impact of the OE on
adversary, friendly, and neutral military capabilities.
All relevant physical and nonphysical aspects of the OE
are analyzed by JIPOE analysts, combatant commander
(CCMD) personnel, and geospatial intelligence analysts
to produce a geospatial perspective. Likewise, a
systems perspective is developed through the analysis
of relevant sociocultural factors and system nodes and
links. Products developed during this step might
include overlays, diagrams, and matrices that depict the
military impact of geography, network analysis,
meteorological and oceanographic factors,
demographics, and the information environment. Other
products include assessments of sociocultural factors
and network analysis diagrams associated with
adversary and neutral PMESII and other systems.
xiii
Executive Summary
Describe the Impact of the The evaluations of all the individual aspects of the OE
OE on Adversary and and the systems perspective are ultimately combined
Friendly Capabilities into a single integrated assessment that focuses on the
overall impact of the OE on all joint COAs available to
both friendly and adversary forces. This product is
designed to support the development and evaluation of
friendly joint COAs by providing an evaluated and
prioritized set of land, sea, and air avenues of approach,
potential engagement areas, key terrain and maritime
geography, key nodes and links, and an analysis
identifying periods of optimal weather conditions for
specific types of military operations.
xiv JP 2-01.3
Executive Summary
xv
Executive Summary
xvi JP 2-01.3
Executive Summary
Special Considerations
xvii
Executive Summary
CONCLUSION
xviii JP 2-01.3
CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEW OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION
OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
“Nothing is more worthy of the attention of a good general than the endeavor to
penetrate the designs of the enemy.”
Niccolo Machiavelli
Discourses, 1517
1. Introduction
(4) Determine the course of action (COA) for adversary and other relevant
actors, particularly the most likely COA and the COA most dangerous to friendly forces
and mission accomplishment.
c. JIPOE’s main focus is to provide predictive intelligence designed to help the JFC
discern the adversary’s probable intent and most likely future COA. The JIPOE process
identifies adversary and other relevant actor centers of gravity (COGs) and determines
their capabilities to operate within the OE. JIPOE also helps the JFC gain information
I-1
Chapter I
d. J-2s at all levels manage the JIPOE effort to support joint operation planning,
enable commanders and other key personnel to visualize the full range of relevant aspects
of the OE, identify adversary COGs, conduct assessment of enemy actions, and evaluate
potential adversary COAs. The JIPOE effort needs to be coordinated, synchronized, and
integrated with the separate intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) efforts of the
component commands and Service intelligence centers. Additionally, JIPOE relies
heavily on inputs from several related, specialized efforts, such as geospatial intelligence
(GEOINT) preparation of the environment (GPE) and medical intelligence preparation of
the operational environment (MIPOE). All staff elements of the joint force and
component commands, to include non-intelligence entities from the joint force and
participating United States Government (USG) departments and agencies such as the
Department of State (DOS) and the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), fully participate in the JIPOE effort by providing information and data relative
to their staff areas of expertise. However, JFCs and their subordinate commanders are
the key players who plan and guide the intelligence effort, and JIPOE plays a critical role
in maximizing efficient intelligence operations, determining an acceptable COA, and
developing a concept of operations (CONOPS). Therefore, commanders should integrate
the JIPOE process and products into the joint force’s planning, execution, and assessment
efforts.
Refer to Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and JP 2-01, Joint and National
Intelligence Support to Military Operations, for specific procedures on requesting
collection, exploitation, or production to support JIPOE. For further information
regarding GEOINT, GPE, and MIPOE in joint operations, refer respectively to JP 2-03,
Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations, and JP 4-02, Health Services.
Understanding the OE requires a holistic view that encompasses the physical areas
and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information
environment (which includes cyberspace). Included within these are the adversary,
friendly, and neutral PMESII systems, subsystems, objects, and affiliated attributes, and
their relationships and interdependencies that are relevant to a specific joint operation.
Understanding the OE is fundamental to identifying the conditions required to achieve
stated objectives; avoiding the effects that may hinder mission accomplishment
(undesired effects); and assessing the impact of friendly, adversary, and other relevant
I-2 JP 2-01.3
An Overview of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
actors, such as the local populace, on the commander’s CONOPS and progress toward
attaining the military end state. Figure I-1 graphically conceptualizes a holistic view of
the OE.
a. Physical Areas and Factors. The physical areas include the assigned operational
area and the associated areas of influence and interest necessary to conduct operations
within the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment. The
OE includes numerous factors the JFC and staff must consider such as terrain,
topography, hydrology, hydrography, meteorology, oceanography, and space, surface,
and subsurface environmental conditions (natural or man-made); distances associated
with the deployment and employment of forces and other joint capabilities; the location
of bases, ports, and other supporting infrastructure; and friendly, adversary, neutral, and
other combatant, or hostile, forces and capabilities. Combinations of these factors greatly
affect the operational design and sustainment of joint operations.
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critical that JIPOE analysis of the information environment include support to cyberspace
operations (CO) and the identification of key individuals and groups having influence
over the indigenous population as well as the source of their influence (e.g., social,
financial, religious, political).
d. Other Factors. Some factors exert direct or indirect influence throughout all
aspects of the OE. These other factors help compose a holistic view of the OE and
include blue force status and location, meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) and
climatology effects, sociocultural factors, and time as it relates to an adversary’s ability to
decide and react. In some types of operations, such as foreign humanitarian assistance,
counterinsurgency, and nation assistance, some of these factors reach critical importance.
Overlaying these factors is the mindset of the adversary and other relevant actors. This
mindset incorporates the ambitions of key personalities, national/ethnic/sectarian
aspirations, historical grievances, cultural or emotional reactions to recent events and
changing conditions, the effects of information manipulation, and similar intangible
motivators. A combatant command (CCMD) red team, if established, is a valuable
resource in assessing the adversary mindset and estimating its impacts on the OE.
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An Overview of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
a. JIPOE and IPB products generally differ in purpose, focus, and level of detail.
The purpose of JIPOE is to support the JFC by determining the probable intent and most
likely COA for the adversary and other relevant actors throughout the OE, whereas IPB is
specifically designed to support the individual operations of the component commands.
During operational-level, force-on-force confrontations, JIPOE utilizes a macro-analytic
approach that identifies an adversary’s strategic vulnerabilities and COGs, whereas IPB
generally requires micro-analysis and a finer degree of detail in order to support
component command operations. However, in some situations (especially during
military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations, or crisis response
and limited contingency operations), both JIPOE and IPB will require the highest
possible level of detail. JIPOE and IPB analyses support each other while avoiding a
duplication of analytic effort.
b. Furthermore, the JIPOE process emphasizes a more holistic approach than IPB by
analyzing and integrating a systems perspective and geospatial perspective along with the
force-specific IPB perspectives of the component commands, multinational partners, or
other organizations (see Figure I-2). This holistic approach creates an analytic synergy
that helps JIPOE analysts assess the adversary’s diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic options, as well as the impacts and effects of all relevant actors on threat and
friendly operations. The JIPOE process also provides a methodology for refining the
assessment of the adversary’s military option and for hypothesizing the adversary’s most
likely and most dangerous COAs. Once the JIPOE analyst has identified a likely military
COA, the same analytic techniques can be used to identify the adversary’s most likely
CONOPS.
JIPOE is a dynamic process that both supports and is supported by each of the
categories of intelligence operations that comprise the intelligence process (see
Figure I-3).
a. JIPOE and Intelligence Planning and Direction. The JIPOE process provides
the basic data and assumptions regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the
OE that help the JFC and staff identify intelligence requirements, information
requirements, and collection requirements. By identifying known adversary capabilities
and applying those against the impact of the OE, JIPOE provides the conceptual basis for
the JFC to visualize and understand relevant aspects of the OE. It also depicts how the
adversary and other relevant actors might threaten the joint force or interfere with
mission accomplishment. This analysis forms the basis for developing the commander’s
priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), those questions the JFC considers vital to the
accomplishment of the assigned mission. Additionally, by identifying specific adversary
COAs and COGs, JIPOE provides the basis for wargaming in which the staff “fights”
each friendly and adversary COA. This wargaming process identifies decisions the JFC
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Chapter I
Economic
Social Meteorology
Military
Topography
Infrastructure GEOINT
Systems
Hydrography Preparation of the
and
Subsystems Environment
Political
Informational Oceanography
Other
Systems Geospatial
Perspective Perspective
JIPOE
Component Command
and Other Perspectives
IPB
Space Land
Air Maritime
Information Environment
(Cyberspace)
Legend
GEOINT geospatial intelligence IPB intelligence preparation of the
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment battlespace
must make during execution and allows the J-2 to develop specific intelligence
requirements to facilitate those decisions. JIPOE also identifies critical information gaps
regarding the OE in order to synchronize and prioritize collection needs and resources.
See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for a more in-depth discussion of the relationship between
intelligence requirements and information requirements. See JP 2-01, Joint and National
Intelligence Support to Military Operations, for detailed discussion of PIRs.
I-6 JP 2-01.3
An Overview of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
Evaluation
Dissemination Planning
and and
Integration Direction
Analysis
Mission
and Collection
Production
Processing
and
Exploitation
and Feedback
may occur. JIPOE matrices are also produced that describe the indicators associated with
each specified adversary activity. In addition to specifying the anticipated locations and
type of adversary activity, JIPOE templates and matrices also forecast the times when
such activity may occur, and can therefore facilitate the sequencing of intelligence
collection requirements and the identification of the most effective methods of
intelligence collection.
d. JIPOE and Analysis and Production. JIPOE products provide the foundation
for the J-2’s intelligence estimate. In fact, the JIPOE process parallels the paragraph
sequence of the intelligence estimate format (see Figure I-4). As shown in Figure I-4, the
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Chapter I
Legend
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
Figure I-4. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment and the
Intelligence Estimate
I-8 JP 2-01.3
An Overview of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
Likewise, the analysis of adversary COAs, prepared during the fourth JIPOE step, is used
in paragraphs 4, “Analysis of Adversary Capabilities,” and 5, “Conclusions,” of the
intelligence estimate.
f. JIPOE and Evaluation and Feedback. Consistent with the intelligence process,
the J-2 staff continuously evaluates and updates JIPOE products to ensure that they
achieve and maintain the highest possible standards of intelligence excellence as
discussed in JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. These standards require that intelligence products
anticipate the needs of the JFC and are timely, accurate, usable, complete, objective, and
relevant. If JIPOE products fail to meet these standards, the J-2 should take corrective
action. The failure of the J-2 staff to achieve and maintain intelligence product
excellence may contribute to the joint force’s failing to accomplish its mission.
(1) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The Joint Staff (JS) J-2
[Directorate for Intelligence], in coordination with DIA, is the focal point for tasking the
production of baseline strategic intelligence analysis in support of current and planned
joint operations. DIA, through the JS J-2, provides direction and deconfliction for JIPOE
intelligence production support by Service intelligence centers. DIA also supports the JS
J-2 in facilitating a combatant commander’s (CCDR’s) request for federated intelligence
support in response to both deliberate and crisis action planning. Through the JS J-2,
DIA receives and validates all requests for information (RFIs) and collection
requirements submitted by the CCMDs and tasks national-level organizations for
collection or production in response to intelligence requirements. Additionally, through
the JS J-2, DIA initiates and produces all-source, finished intelligence production in
support of the JFC’s JIPOE processes consistent with its Defense Intelligence Analysis
Program responsibilities and JFC requests.
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For more detailed guidance on RFIs and DIA support to JIPOE, see JP 2-01, Joint and
National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
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An Overview of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
continued exploitation of the critical factors of the threat network operations while
integrating the operational capabilities available to the commander, the COIC can provide
timely support, including requests for service and requests for discovery of exploitation
support.
For additional information on DTRA capabilities, see DODD 5105.62, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency.
c. CCDR. Via the intelligence planning process, the CCDR, through the CCMD J-
2, ensures the standardization of JIPOE products within the command and subordinate
joint forces, and establishes theater procedures for collection management and the
production and dissemination of intelligence products. The CCDR, through the CCMD
J-2, also identifies requirements for federated intelligence support to the JS J-2, which
will facilitate the establishment of a federated intelligence support architecture.
d. Joint Force J-2. The J-2 has the primary staff responsibility to plan, coordinate,
and conduct the overall JIPOE analysis and production effort at the joint force level.
Through the JIPOE process, the J-2 enhances the JFC’s and other staff elements’ ability
to visualize all relevant aspects of the OE. JIPOE products usually reflect cross-
functional participation by other joint force staff elements (e.g., GPE and MIPOE) and
collaboration with various intelligence organizations, USG departments and agencies,
and nongovernmental centers that possess relevant expertise. The J-2 uses the JIPOE
process to formulate and recommend PIRs for the JFC’s approval, and develops
information requirements that focus the intelligence effort on questions crucial to joint
force planning. To enhance the joint force’s common operational picture (COP), the J-2
should integrate component and supporting command IPB products with the joint force’s
JIPOE products in order to form a more complete and detailed picture of an adversary’s
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and potential COAs and promulgate these updated products
as required. The J-2 also incorporates the available intelligence capabilities of supporting
national agencies and joint commands into the JIPOE process, particularly in the areas of
GI&S, weapons technical intelligence (WTI), METOC, medical intelligence,
sociocultural factors, and strategic targeting. Additionally, the J-2 disseminates JIPOE
products in time to support planning by other joint force staff sections and component
command staffs, and ensures such products are continuously updated. Due to lack of
information, it may be necessary for the J-2 to formulate and propose to the JFC
assumptions regarding adversary capabilities. In such cases, the J-2 should ensure that all
assumptions are clearly understood by the JFC and the joint force staff to be only
assumptions, while at the same time striving to collect the requisite intelligence needed to
confirm or deny those assumptions. Most importantly, the J-2 should ensure that possible
adversary COAs are not dismissed as “impossible” simply because of their relative
degree of difficulty. On the other hand, if a combination of limiting factors associated
with OE characteristics and adversary capabilities truly makes a COA physically
impossible to accomplish, then the J-2 must identify it as such.
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An Overview of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
h. Red Teams. CCMD red teams are organizational elements comprised of subject
matter experts who provide an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in
plans and operations in the context of the OE and from the perspective of adversary and
other relevant actors. The use of red teams may facilitate the ability of commanders and
their staffs to better understand the adversary and visualize the relevant aspects of the
OE. Each CCMD should employ red teams, if established, to address the commanders’
most pressing intelligence and operational issues from alternative perspectives, to include
assumptions, second-order effects, and unintended outcomes. The red team contributes
to each step of the JIPOE process. Ideally, the critical aspects of JIPOE production
should undergo red team review to provide an external vantage to help reduce groupthink
and other forms of institutional bias.
i. Joint GEOINT Cell. The JFC can establish a GEOINT cell to access
authoritative GEOINT data and enhance the joint force’s COP. GEOINT support
includes imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information across all functions
and activities within the organization.
For more detailed guidance, see JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support in Joint
Operations.
k. JIPOE Coordination Cell. The JFC may establish a JIPOE coordination cell (or
similarly named entity) to integrate and synchronize the JIPOE effort with various
supporting organizations, related capabilities, and appropriate staff functions. The
organizational relationships between the JIPOE coordination cell and the organizations
that support the cell should be per JFC guidance. Normally, a J-2 representative will
chair the JIPOE coordination cell. Organizations participating in the cell provide advice
and assistance regarding the employment of their respective capabilities and activities.
Figure I-5 is intended as a guide in determining possible cell participants that could help
coordinate the JIPOE effort, provide input, or assist in obtaining external support. The
JFC should tailor the composition of the cell as necessary to accomplish the mission.
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Organizational and functional representation in the JIPOE coordination cell may include,
but is not limited to, the following personnel:
DNI
Representative
CSA STO
Representatives Representative
JIAGG J-7
Representative J-2/JIOC Representative
Representative
Core
Component J-6 JAG
Threat Finance Command Group Representative Representative
Representative Representatives
OPSEC Engineer
Representative Representative
J-2E CBRN
Representative Representative
Legend
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
nuclear J-6 communications system directorate of a
CMO civil-military operations joint staff
CSA combat support agency J-7 operational plans and interoperability
DFE Defense Intelligence Agency forward directorate of a joint staff
element J-9 civil-military operations directorate of a
DNI Director of National Intelligence joint staff
DOS Department of State JAG judge advocate general
GEOINT geospatial Intelligence JCC joint cyberspace center
IO information operations JIACG joint interagency coordination group
J-2E joint force exploitation staff element JIOC joint intelligence operations center
J-2X joint force counterintelligence and human METOC meteorological and oceanographic
intelligence staff element OPSEC operations security
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff SOF special operations forces
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff STO special technical operations
J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
Figure I-5. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Coordination Cell
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An Overview of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
(3) The Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-4) Representative. The J-4
staff assists the JIPOE effort by analyzing specific factors that may affect both friendly
and adversary sustainment capabilities, reinforcement, and intertheater and intratheater
lines of communications (LOCs). Additionally, access considerations are critical to
analyze for logistics areas, airfields, and ports of debarkation. The J-4 should also
provide specific contracting related information requirements related to the operational
area.
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(8) GEOINT Officer. The GEOINT officer manages the GEOINT cell to
ensure all information fusion, visualization, and analysis are geospatially enabled. The
GEOINT officer provides advice and assistance regarding geospatial issues including
registering data to a common reference system, and assists JIPOE analysts with map
backgrounds and data overlays.
(9) METOC Officer. The METOC officer advises the cell regarding the
current and predicted METOC environment and the impact of METOC on the
employment of friendly and adversary capabilities to enable JOPP, commander’s
situational awareness, and decision making.
(12) Red Team. The CCMD red team supports the JIPOE process by
promoting critical thought and encouraging alternative perspectives, and by enhancing
understanding of the operational environment and adversary perspective.
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An Overview of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
(18) Joint Force CI and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Staff Element (J-2X)
Representative. The J-2X representative coordinates CI and HUMINT input to JIPOE
regarding force protection concerns and foreign intelligence collection capabilities and,
with the assistance of HUMINT and CI analysts and planners, recommends ways to
collect intelligence and detect, identify, assess, exploit, counter, or neutralize foreign
intelligence threats.
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(26) DOS Representative. The DOS representative to the joint force can
coordinate DOS support to the JIPOE effort, particularly regarding political intelligence,
diplomacy, and cultural factors.
(30) CSA Liaison Officers. The CSA liaison officers facilitate national-level
support for the JIPOE effort from their respective organizations.
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An Overview of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
liaison officers, and DFE provide mechanisms for obtaining other USG department or
agency support for the JIPOE effort.
b. Whenever possible within security guidelines, the JIPOE effort should include
participation by the HN and multinational partners. Multinational partners may possess
robust intelligence resources, or at least niche capabilities, that may provide invaluable
insight regarding particular aspects of the OE. Many of these countries may have
extensive regional expertise based on their historical experience (e.g., colonial or trade
relationships, past military occupation).
For further information regarding GEOINT support, see JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence
in Joint Operations.
The basic JIPOE process remains the same across the range of military operations,
regardless of the level of warfare. JIPOE production will typically integrate planning
considerations from each level of warfare. Nevertheless, specific JIPOE planning
considerations may vary considerably between strategic, operational, and tactical levels
due to differences in mission, available resources, and size of the operational areas and
AOIs. Strategic-level JIPOE examines the instruments of national power: diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic. JIPOE support at the operational level analyzes
the operational area, provides an understanding of the perceptions and decision-making
processes of the adversary and other relevant actors, facilitates the flow of friendly forces
in a timely manner, helps sustain those forces, and then integrates tactical capabilities at
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the decisive time and place. JIPOE support to tactical operations generally requires a
greater level of detail over a smaller segment of the OE than is required at the strategic
and operational levels. However, under certain circumstances tactical operations can
assume strategic importance and may constitute a critical part of joint operations, as
during some types of crisis response and limited contingency operations or military
engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations.
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An Overview of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
balance of these considerations will vary according to the nature and phase of the
operation.
(a) The capability of road, rail, air, and sea transportation networks to
support the movement of, and logistic support to, large military units, to include seasonal
climatic impact.
(b) Zones of entry into and through the operational area and AOI.
(c) Levels of third-party nation support adjacent to the operational area (for
allies and adversaries).
(e) The adversary’s doctrine for C2, logistic support, release and use of
CBRN threats and hazards, ballistic missile forces, special operations, and paramilitary
forces.
(f) The adversary’s historical adherence to, and policy for, application of
the law of war, and their status regarding international conventions and protocols relevant
to the law of war.
(2) In operations where the focus is on the relevant population, the ability to
understand, predict, respond to, or influence the decision making and behavior of relevant
actors, in addition to the adversary, is often of greater importance than military and
infrastructure systems. While irregular warfare (IW) always requires an understanding of
the adversary’s military capabilities, additional social, economic, diplomatic, and
informational considerations often have increased relevance. Sociocultural analysis
(SCA) is particularly useful for understanding these aspects of the OE. Some of these
considerations may include:
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(c) An analysis of the culture of the society as a whole and of each major
group within the society.
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An Overview of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
nontraditional network nodes, such as corrupt border control officials, bribed HN law
enforcement actors, or black market actors who funnel funds to adversary operations.
b. Since potential adversaries have access to US doctrine, they will probably attempt
to exploit the JIPOE process, either through deception or by deliberately adopting a COA
different than the one the JIPOE analyst might normally identify as “most likely.” The
JIPOE analyst needs to be aware of the relative importance a specific adversary may
place on the principle of surprise. The JIPOE analyst should analyze the probability that
the adversary may engage in deception by deliberately avoiding the most operationally
efficient (and therefore most obvious) COA in order to achieve surprise. To accomplish
the deception, the adversary will most likely deliberately provide or highlight expected
“indicators” or information to reinforce what our intelligence analysts and forces expect
for the “most likely” adversary COA. Additionally, an adversary may deceive the JIPOE
analyst regarding the timing of an otherwise “obvious” COA, through asynchronous
attack preparations and by psychologically conditioning the JIPOE analyst to accept
unusual levels and types of activity as normal. For example, an adversary may choose to
prepare for an attack over a deliberately extended period of time. In this case the JIPOE
analyst may be able to correctly identify the adversary’s intent and most likely COA (i.e.,
attack), but will find it more difficult to estimate the actual time of the attack. Analysts
may also use a “reverse JIPOE” process to assess their own forces from their opponent’s
perspective and thereby “reconstruct” their opponent’s probable JIPOE assessment. This
use of red team threat emulation techniques will help yield insight into an adversary’s
probable ISR collection strategy and thereby assist planners in determining the best times
and locations to plant deceptive information designed to mislead the opposing JIPOE
analyst. The red team plays a key role in countering adversary deception efforts and in
developing friendly deception plans by providing insight into the adversary’s
perspectives and mindset and by exploring potential unintended consequences and
second- and third-order effects of proposed deception COAs.
d. JIPOE is not a panacea for faulty strategic guidance or poor operation planning.
JFCs and their staffs must understand that JIPOE is a useful methodology for analyzing
the impact of the OE and adversary patterns of operation, and for formulating a
hypothesis regarding the adversary’s possible adoption of various COAs (i.e., what the
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“The commander must always meticulously think out how to mislead the
enemy in regard to the true intentions of the troops. In order to achieve
surprise [the commander] may consciously work out some problems of
the battle plan in a way different from the obvious solutions demanded by
the situation.
enemy may do). It therefore provides a starting point for planning the intelligence
collection effort and for formulating and wargaming friendly COAs. JIPOE should not
be considered a “crystal ball” for determining with absolute certainty the adversary’s
actual intentions (i.e., what the enemy will do). JFCs and their staffs must understand
that the JIPOE analyst estimates the most likely adversary COA based largely on factors
and conditions in the OE that may change, and on assumptions about the adversary that
may later prove invalid. Operation planning based solely on countering the most likely
COA will leave the joint force vulnerable to other less likely COAs that the adversary
may choose to adopt in order to maximize surprise.
The JIPOE process provides a disciplined methodology for applying a holistic view
of the OE to the analysis of adversary capabilities and intentions. This process consists
of four basic steps (depicted in Figure I-6) that ensure the systematic analysis of all
relevant aspects of the OE. Each step in this process is discussed in detail in the
following four chapters. The process is both continuous and cyclical in that JIPOE is
conducted both prior to and during a joint operation as well as during planning for
follow-on missions. The most current information available regarding the adversary
situation and the OE is continuously integrated throughout the JIPOE process. Although
some aspects of the JIPOE process may require adjustment depending on the type of
mission, the basic process remains the same throughout the range of military operations.
Appendix A, “The Leyte Campaign—A Case Study of Support to Major Operations and
Campaigns,” illustrates the basic JIPOE process in a historical context. Military
operations that may require slightly different techniques and areas of emphasis are
addressed in Chapter VII, “Special Considerations,” and are illustrated in Appendix B,
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An Overview of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
Step 4 Step 1
Determine Define the
adversary and operational
other relevant environment.
actor courses
of action.
Holistic View
of the
Operational
Environment
Evaluate the
adversary and Describe the impact
other relevant of the operational
actors. environment.
Step 3 Step 2
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Intentionally Blank
I-26 JP 2-01.3
CHAPTER II
DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT—STEP 1
1. Overview
In the first step of the JIPOE process, the joint force staff assists the JFC and
component commanders in defining the OE by identifying those aspects and significant
characteristics that may be relevant to the joint force’s mission (see Figure II-1). The J-2
staff works with other joint force and component command staff elements to formulate an
initial survey of adversary and other relevant characteristics that may impact both
friendly and adversary operations. This cursory survey of general characteristics is used by
the JFC and joint force staffs to visualize the OE, delineate the AOI, determine information and
intelligence gaps and collection requirements, develop realistic assumptions, and provide
guidance and direction to the JIPOE effort.
(1) The geospatial aspects of the OE are defined within the common World
Geodetic System reference framework in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3900.01C, Position (Point and Area) Reference Procedures.
Any associated GI&S products developed or used should meet the standards and
guidelines of the NGA.
(2) The joint force staff must also recognize and understand those aspects of the
OE that transcend the physical characteristics and elements. A holistic view of the OE
includes nonphysical aspects that may directly affect, but extend well beyond, the
designated operational area. Examples of these nonphysical aspects include the cognitive
dimension of the information environment, international public opinion, economic
policies, CO, and sociocultural factors and relationships.
II-1
Chapter II
Holistic View
of the
Operational
Environment
Evaluate the
Describe the impact
adversary and
other relevant of the operational Define the operational environment.
actors. environment.
b. Failure to focus on the relevant characteristics of the OE leads to wasted time and
effort. A poorly focused JIPOE effort may result in the collection and analysis of
unnecessary information. More importantly, the failure to identify all relevant
characteristics may lead to the joint force’s being surprised and unprepared when some
overlooked aspect of the OE exerts an influence on the accomplishment of the joint
force’s mission.
II-2 JP 2-01.3
Define the Operational Environment—Step 1
specially designated boundaries and elements of the force that are linked by the
CONOPS. The higher headquarters is responsible for the areas between noncontiguous
operational areas.
Mission analysis is normally accomplished under the leadership of the JFC and in
cooperation with the joint force staff as part of the commander’s planning process. The
JFC’s stated intent and all characteristics of the mission that could influence the JFC’s
decisions or affect the COAs available to the joint force or the adversary are of special
significance to the JIPOE process. In many situations, those characteristics of the joint
force’s OE will extend far beyond the designated limits of the operational area. For
example, in order to protect the force, the JFC should conceptualize the OE as including
the surface-to-air missiles, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles possessed by any third-
party nations or potentially hostile groups that could threaten friendly operations, even
though they may be located outside the designated boundaries of the operational area.
Mission characteristics that could be important include the type of military operation
being considered or planned; the purpose of the operation; the amount of time available
for planning and execution; the expected duration of the operation; the risks to be
managed; and whether multinational forces will be involved. The analyst must also
consider the operational limitations (constraints and restraints) levied upon the JFC by the
national military leadership which would impact the conduct of operations. For example,
restrictions on civilian casualties and declarations of no-strike objects or entities will
provide a framework for the scope of the JFC’s mission and directly influence the JIPOE
effort. JIPOE efforts during mission analysis begin to reveal gaps in understanding of the
OE and the adversary, and help to identify initial intelligence requirements to support the
commander’s decision-making needs.
II-3
Chapter II
b. When identifying the significant characteristics of the OE, all aspects that might
affect accomplishment of the joint force’s mission must be considered. Depending on the
situation, these might include the following:
(11) Criminal and legitimate networks that could be leveraged by the adversary.
II-4 JP 2-01.3
Define the Operational Environment—Step 1
a. Physical Areas. The pertinent physical areas in the OE include the assigned
operational areas and the associated areas of influence and AOIs described in the
following paragraphs. Designation of the areas of influence and interest help
commanders and staffs order their thoughts during both planning and execution, and help
focus the JIPOE effort.
(2) AOI. An AOI is that area of concern to the commander, including the area
of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives
of current or planned operations. An AOI serves to focus intelligence support for
monitoring adversary, neutral, or other relevant actor activities outside the operational
area that may affect current and future operations. The AOI can extend well outside of
the area of influence and is not restricted by political boundaries. In combat operations
for example, the AOI normally extends into enemy territory to the objectives of current
or planned friendly operations if those objectives are not currently located within the
assigned operational area. Likewise, if a neighboring country’s political developments or
support for the adversary might affect the joint force’s mission accomplishment, the JFC
should include that country within the AOI. The commander can describe the AOI
graphically, but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary or other control
measure.
II-5
Chapter II
located outside the JOA would be inside the AOI if they could be used to launch sea and
air attacks against the joint force, or resupply and/or reinforce the adversary’s forces.
Likewise, it is important to consider all possible locations from which an adversary or
third party may launch terrorist or unconventional warfare attacks against friendly forces
or LOCs. Possible launch sites for ballistic missiles belonging to a country friendly to the
adversary that are capable of striking or influencing targets within the operational area
should be included in the AOI.
b. Nonphysical Aspects. The joint force staff should also look beyond the
geospatial limits of the AOI to identify any nonphysical factors that may impact the
accomplishment of the joint force’s mission. Many of these factors transcend the
traditional concept of physical boundaries and have worldwide implications and
relevance. Nonphysical aspects may make the AOI noncontiguous. The information
environment allows instantaneous decision making from across the globe. For example,
a key decision maker for an adversary or other relevant actor may be in a different
country or continent than those for which he makes decisions. Cyberspace facilitates a
COP for our adversaries, which allows them to leverage nonphysical aspects of the OE to
their advantage. Likewise, the friendly and adversary use of the EMS, time as it relates to
decision making, friendly and adversary information systems capabilities and
vulnerabilities, the perceptions and attitudes of other relevant actors both inside and
outside the operational area, and the relationships (links) among various adversary
PMESII system nodes are some examples of nonphysical aspects of the joint force’s AOI
that should be considered.
6. Determine the Level of Detail Required and Feasible Within the Time Available
The time available for completion of the JIPOE process may not permit each step to
be conducted in detail. Overcoming time limitations requires focusing the JIPOE process
on the information that is most important to the JFC and subordinate commanders in
planning and executing the joint mission. Identifying the amount of detail required to
answer the JFC’s PIRs avoids wasting time on developing more detail than necessary on
any one step of the process.
II-6 JP 2-01.3
Define the Operational Environment—Step 1
a. Some situations may not require an analysis of all adversary forces or other
aspects of the OE. For example, those adversary forces within the AOI that cannot
interfere with the joint operation may require only a summary of their capabilities. In
some cases, only select aspects of the OE may require detailed analysis based on the type
of assigned mission or other planning considerations.
b. The J-2 consults the JFC and other staff elements to determine the amount of
detail regarding the OE that is required to support operation planning. The J-2 plans,
prioritizes, and structures the JIPOE effort by balancing the level of detail required with
the amount of time available.
The J-2 staff evaluates the available intelligence and information databases to
determine if the necessary information is available to conduct the remainder of the JIPOE
process. Red teams assist the commander and staff by conducting critical reviews to
identify gaps in data and alternative interpretations of the available data relevant to the
OE. In nearly every situation, there will be gaps in existing databases and shortfalls in
the ability of the J-2 to fill all of these gaps. These gaps and shortfalls must be identified
early in order for the joint force staff to initiate the appropriate intelligence requirements.
The J-2 will use the JFC’s stated intent, commander’s critical information requirements,
and initial PIRs to establish priorities for intelligence collection, processing, production,
and dissemination.
a. The J-2 must identify and inform the JFC and appropriate staff elements of any
intelligence and information gaps that cannot be filled within the time allowed for JIPOE.
b. When necessary, the J-2 staff should formulate reasonable assumptions based on
historical or current facts to fill in the gaps. During the remainder of the JIPOE process,
and during the commander’s decision-making process, the J-2 must ensure that any
assumptions that have been made are clearly identified as such.
c. Intelligence analysts should review web-based sites (at all available classification
levels) and databases for information that may be applicable to the JIPOE effort. For
example, Intellipedia is an Intelink-based encyclopedia of intelligence-related articles and
information. Intellipedia articles may provide a listing of, and hyperlinks to, current
databases which may be of interest to JIPOE analysts. These databases should be
reviewed and evaluated to determine the availability of current data, information, and
intelligence products relative to the joint force’s OE and mission.
a. Collecting data and incorporating it into the JIPOE process is a continuous effort.
The J-2 staff initiates collection requirements and issues RFIs to fill intelligence gaps to
the level of detail required to support the JIPOE effort. As additional information and
intelligence is received, the J-2 staff or JIPOE coordination cell (if established) update all
JIPOE products.
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b. When new intelligence confirms or repudiates assumptions, the J-2 informs the
JFC and component commanders and their staffs. If any assumptions are repudiated by
new intelligence, the commander, the J-3, and other appropriate staff elements should
reexamine any evaluations and decisions that were based on those assumptions.
II-8 JP 2-01.3
CHAPTER III
DESCRIBE THE IMPACT OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT—STEP 2
“Know the enemy, know yourself—your victory will never be endangered. Know
the ground, know the weather—your victory will then be total.”
Sun Tzu
The Art of War, C. 500 B.C.
1. Overview
The second step in the JIPOE process evaluates and describes broad COAs and the
impact of the OE on adversary, friendly, and neutral military capabilities (see Figure III-
1). All relevant physical and nonphysical aspects of the OE are analyzed by JIPOE
analysts, CCMD personnel, and GEOINT analysts to produce a geospatial perspective.
Likewise, a systems perspective is developed through the analysis of relevant
sociocultural factors and system nodes and links. Products developed during this step
might include, but are not limited to, overlays, diagrams, and matrices that depict the
military impact of geography, network analysis, METOC factors, demographics, and the
information environment. Other products include assessments of sociocultural factors
Holistic View
of the
Operational
Environment
Evaluate the
adversary and Describe the impact
other relevant of the operational
environment.
actors. Step 2
III-1
Chapter III
and network analysis diagrams associated with adversary and neutral PMESII and other
systems.
a. The Land Domain. Analysis of the OE’s land domain concentrates on terrain
features such as transportation systems (road and bridge information), surface materials,
ground water, natural obstacles such as large bodies of water and mountains, the types
and distribution of vegetation, and the configuration of surface drainage. Terrain analysis
must always consider the effects of weather as well as changes that may result from
military action. For example, freezing temperatures may eliminate the obstacle value of
rivers or marshes by freezing the surface sufficiently to allow operational maneuver.
Likewise, the mobility characteristics of the operational area can be affected by military
actions that may reduce built-up areas to rubble, destroy dams and bridges, and possibly
create large concentrations of refugees blocking LOCs. It is also important to analyze the
combined effects of wind, temperature, humidity, sunlight, topography, and precipitation
on the potential use of chemical and biological weapons and their associated hazards in
order to take appropriate passive defense measures. The first step in this process is to
analyze the military aspects of the terrain (observation and fields of fire, concealment and
cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach). This analysis is followed by an
evaluation of how the land domain will affect military operations. It is important to
remember that terrain analysis is not the end product of the JIPOE process. Rather,
terrain analysis is the means to determine which friendly COAs can best exploit the
opportunities the terrain provides and how the terrain affects the adversary’s available
COAs.
III-2 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
(1) Observation and Fields of Fire. “Observation” is the ability to see (or be
seen by) the adversary either visually or through the use of surveillance devices. A “field
of fire” is the area that a weapon or group of weapons may effectively cover with fire
from a given position. Areas that offer good observation and fields of fire generally favor
defensive COAs. Factors that hinder observation and fields of fire include: the height
and density of vegetation and buildings; relief features such as hills and defiles;
obstructions to specific lines of sight (LOSs); target acquisition and sensor capabilities;
and visibility, precipitation, and cloud cover. The analysis of each limiting factor should
be combined into a single product. If time permits, LOS overlays should be prepared to
assist the joint force staff in evaluating potential friendly or adversary COAs, operational
avenues of approach, and the employment of LOS ground and aerial joint sensors and
communications networks. The evaluation of observation and fields of fire facilitates the
identification of:
(c) Areas where maneuvering forces are most vulnerable to observation and
fire.
III-3
Chapter III
“Success in the preservation of secrecy had been a major factor in surprising the
French High Command in May 1940. The point on which the main weight of the
German offensive would fall had been concealed up to the last moment. By the
time French forces had reached the Meuse between Givet and Namur, the
German armored divisions were already in sight of the Semois and the French
had been surprised while still on the move. But this had happened in the spring
and French general staff theory had been that the Ardennes were impassable.
Guderian’s breakthrough at Sedan had shown up the fallacy of the theory of the
Ardennes ‘fortress’. But four years later no one imagined that the same blow
would be repeated. The American generals may have been inexperienced on the
battlefield, but they had almost certainly studied the 1940 operation.”
radius); the lethality and area of predicted CBRN hazard dispersal patterns; and the
effects of current or projected METOC conditions. These factor overlays are then
combined to form a single product known as the combined obstacle overlay (see Figure
III-2).
(b) The combined obstacle overlay is used to depict areas where mobility
can be categorized as unrestricted, restricted, or severely restricted. Unrestricted areas
are free of any obstacles or restrictions to movement. Restricted areas are usually
depicted on overlays by diagonal lines to indicate terrain that hinders movement to some
degree. Severely restricted areas are usually depicted by crosshatched diagonal lines to
indicate terrain that severely hinders or slows military movement unless some effort is
made to enhance mobility. These terrain mobility classifications are not absolute but
reflect the relative effect of terrain on types of forces and combat maneuver formations.
They are based on the ability of a force to maneuver in combat formations, usually linear,
or to transition from one type of formation to another, as opposed to simply moving
through a piece of terrain. Identifying an area as “severely restricted” terrain, for
example, does not imply that movement through that area is impossible, only that in some
military operations it may be impractical. Units moving in column formations along
roads generally have little trouble traversing severely restricted terrain.
(4) Key Terrain. Key terrain is any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of
which affords a marked advantage to either force. Therefore, it is often selected as a
decisive point and a tactical-level or operational-level objective. Certain key terrain, such
as an airport or seaport, could be designated as an operational-level objective if it
significantly affects the JFC’s ability to deploy or employ joint force components. For
example, an operational commander may consider as key terrain an urban complex that is
an important transportation center, a road network providing passage through restrictive
terrain, or a geographic area that provides critical agricultural, industrial, or natural
III-4 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
Vegetation
Surface Drainage
Others
Combined Obstacles
Legend
resources. Key terrain is evaluated by assessing the impact of its seizure by either force
upon the results of battle. There are two suggested techniques to assist this analysis.
(a) Evaluate the other four military aspects of the terrain first; then
integrate those results to identify and assess key terrain. For example, key terrain might
include a range of hills with good observation and fields of fire overlooking an area
providing adversary forces a number of high-speed avenues of approach.
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1. Key terrain varies with the level of command. For example, a large
city may represent an important objective to an operational-level commander, whereas a
tactical commander may consider it to be an obstacle.
3. Major obstacles rarely constitute key terrain. Thus, the high ground
dominating a river, rather than the river itself, is considered key terrain.
4. Key terrain may include areas and facilities that may have an
extraordinary impact on mission accomplishment (e.g., ballistic missile launch facilities,
cruise missile launch sites, airfields).
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Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
DIV REGT
REGT Objective
DIV REGT
Legend
DIV division mobility corridor
REGT regiment restricted terrain REGT (regimental size)
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Chapter III
(6) Evaluate the Impact of the Land Domain on Military Operations. The
final step in analyzing the land domain is to relate the evaluation of the military aspects
of the terrain to the various broad COAs available to friendly and adversary land forces.
For this purpose, COAs are usually identified for offense, defense, reinforcement, and
retrograde operations. The possible impact of the terrain on each COA is analyzed to
identify areas along each avenue of approach that are suitable for use as potential
engagement areas, ambush sites, battle positions, and immediate or intermediate
objectives. Engagement areas and ambush sites are usually located in areas with minimal
cover and concealment where a maneuvering force will be vulnerable to fire from an
opposing force’s weapons. Conversely, battle positions are usually selected based on the
availability of cover and concealment as well as good observation and fields of fire. The
terrain rarely favors one type of operation or COA throughout the entire width and
breadth of the OE. For example, areas with poor battle positions and minimally
acceptable engagement areas usually favor the offense, whereas the defense is facilitated
by good battle positions. Areas of the OE where the terrain predominantly favors one
COA over others should be identified and graphically depicted. The most effective
graphic technique is to construct a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) by
depicting (in addition to the restricted and severely restricted areas already shown) such
items as avenues of approach and mobility corridors, countermobility obstacle systems,
defensible terrain, engagement areas, and key terrain (see Figure III-4). The results of
terrain analysis should be disseminated to the joint force staff as soon as possible, and
made available to subordinate and supporting commanders and their staffs, by way of the
intelligence estimate, analysis of the operational area, and the MCOO.
b. The Maritime Domain. The maritime domain—the world’s oceans, seas, bays,
estuaries, islands, coastal areas, littorals, and the airspace above them—is a vast
maneuver space that allows for tactical maneuver in the air, on the surface, and beneath
the surface of the water. However, even in open ocean areas, distant land masses and
supporting shore infrastructure may impact naval operations primarily due to the range of
an adversary’s weapons systems and sensors. Littoral areas may contain geographic
features such as straits or chokepoints that restrict tactical maneuver or affect weapon and
sensor effectiveness. Both the open ocean and littoral portions of the operational area
and AOI should be analyzed. Key military aspects of the maritime domain can include
maneuver space and chokepoints; natural harbors and anchorages; man-made
infrastructures; sea lines of communications (SLOCs), whether the nation is a signatory
to the UN Convention on the Law of Sea, and ocean surface and subsurface
characteristics.
(1) Maneuver Space and Chokepoints. Surface ships compensate for the
sea’s lack of cover and concealment by utilizing maneuver to reduce an adversary’s
ability to locate them at a specific time and place. Confined ocean space limits the ability
to maneuver a maritime force, thus increasing the danger that it can be located and
engaged. Additionally, the proximity of a maritime force to land increases the potential
threat from an adversary’s antiship missiles and aircraft. A maritime force operating in
III-8 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
y
Arm
Arm
y
Corps
Corps
K
K
s
Corp K
K K
Corps
K Grey
Pithian Sea Land
Corps
(Neutral)
Division
Army
Corps
Amphibious
Border Demilitarized Zone Operations
(Occupied by Red)
South Islands
Border (Occupied By Red)
lt
Be
se
fe n
De
ic
te g
tra
dS
Re
Red Land
Legend
confined waters near an adversary’s shore-based air or missile assets may have
insufficient warning time available to counter an incoming air threat. This is because the
effectiveness of a maritime force’s air defense system is largely dependent on the range at
which an air threat can be detected. Chokepoints such as straits or narrows are extremely
hazardous areas due to their ability to severely limit tactical maneuver. This effect is
magnified for task force operations, as some ship formations may be forced to “close up”
III-9
Chapter III
in a confined water space and the area required for a multiship formation to maneuver is
significantly greater than for an individual ship. Finally, the effectiveness of sea mines
can be greatly enhanced in confined waters.
(2) Natural Harbors and Anchorages. Natural harbors and anchorages may
be exploited by friendly or adversary naval forces and should be identified and analyzed.
Depending on the surrounding terrain, some natural harbors and anchorages, such as
fjords, may offer limited cover and concealment for naval combatants and may afford the
adversary an opportunity to launch unexpected sorties against friendly ships. Likewise,
friendly forces may utilize these areas as havens to frustrate an adversary’s attempts to
locate and target them.
(4) SLOCs. SLOCs should be identified and analyzed with regard to their
relative importance to adversary, friendly, and neutral countries in the AOI. Potential
interdiction areas (such as chokepoints) along SLOCs should be identified along with the
naval bases, coastal defense facilities, and airfields from which such interdiction
operations might originate. Additional factors for consideration include the type, density,
and ease of identifying shipping along the SLOCs.
III-10 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
ocean. Warfighters also need to have knowledge of the optical properties of the water
column in order to assess surface and sub-surface non-acoustic detection vulnerability,
laser scan system effectiveness, and diver vulnerability/visibility during diver operations.
This includes an understanding of the bioluminescence potential in an area that can light
up an adversary and/or friendly forces at night. Bathymetry can provide submarines with
a maritime version of terrain masking and avenues of approach. Ocean depth is another
example of a subsurface METOC characteristic vitally important to naval operations. For
example, availability of convergence zone acoustic propagation path requires depth
excess. Ocean depth is also particularly crucial when conducting underice operations, as
the varying thickness of ocean ice creates a ceiling that may severely restrict a
submarine’s vertical maneuvering room. In addition, utilization of oceanographic models
that provide bathymetric estimations and oceanic feature forecasts can be used to
advantage by the warfighter during operational planning and decision-making processes.
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features such as chokepoints, canals, rivers, harbors, ports, air bases, and islands. The
evaluation of potential key geography must be based on the degree to which such
maritime features control or dominate the OE or give a marked advantage to either
adversary or friendly joint COAs; for example, the Strait of Gibraltar and Suez Canal
control the ability to reinforce or resupply operations in the Mediterranean Sea and
Persian Gulf, air bases in Iceland dominate the North Atlantic shipping lanes in mid-
ocean, and Diego Garcia serves as a maritime pre-positioning base to support joint
operations in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. During amphibious operations, the
evaluations of the maritime and land domains should be combined to identify amphibious
landing areas that not only can be supported from the sea, but also connect with
advantageous land avenues of approach leading to key terrain objectives. Other
environmental characteristics to consider include the degree to which areas with limited
sea room may limit naval capabilities, areas where ocean subsurface characteristics may
degrade sonar or facilitate the use of naval mines (e.g., currents, temperature gradients,
and bottom geography), and areas within range of an adversary’s land based antiship
missile sites and airfields. The locations of the adversary’s naval bases should be
evaluated in relation to how well they support adversary joint force capabilities to attack,
defend, reinforce, or retrograde. Adversary axis and avenues of approach, high-risk
areas, low-risk areas, and potential naval engagement areas should be identified. All
significant characteristics of the maritime domain should be graphically portrayed on a
MCOO (see Figure III-5). The end result should be an evaluation of how the maritime
domain helps or hinders forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, or
amphibious operations in and around the key geographic areas identified as crucial to
adversary and friendly joint COAs.
c. The Air Domain. The air domain is the operating medium for fixed-wing and
rotary-wing aircraft, air defense systems, unmanned aircraft systems, cruise missiles, and
some ballistic and anti-ballistic missile systems. Aerial avenues of approach are different
from maritime and ground avenues. Nevertheless, the air domain is partially influenced
by surface characteristics. For example, some military air operations may take advantage
of terrain masking. The location or potential location of airfields, missile sites, aircraft
carriers, cruise missile submarines, and hardened launch silos also affect air operations
and should be considered when analyzing the air domain. Surface characteristics such as
triple canopy jungle and dense urban areas may present difficulties for collection and
target recognition/acquisition. Similarly, urban environments present greater risk of
unwanted collateral damage and civilian casualties resulting from lethal operations.
Additionally, the effects of METOC conditions on the air domain are particularly crucial.
For example, the combination of mountain peaks and a low cloud ceiling may make air
operations hazardous or unfeasible for some types of aircraft and optically guided
weapons.
III-12 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
K Blue Fleet
Headquarters
Naval Mine K
Fields K
Shoals
Port
Pithian
Sea
Red Fleet South Islands K
Border Headquarters (Occupied by Red)
Port
1st Florida
Flotilla
Red Land
Legend
aircraft to defend their own high-value facilities; such infrastructure would therefore
constitute an adversary’s “defensive” air posture target set. Likewise, assets critical to
friendly forces would constitute an adversary’s “offensive” air posture target set. These
target areas are then analyzed in relation to various factors that may influence how they
are attacked and from which direction. These factors may include whether the target is
III-13
Chapter III
hard or soft, the presence of nearby air defenses, and the characteristics of surrounding
terrain features. For example, some deep underground facilities may require the use of
deep earth penetrators dropped from a higher altitude than would otherwise be necessary
for a low-altitude attack against a soft target, or may require functional defeat by
attacking the target’s links to the outside world. Air defense system capabilities may
drive the air attack profile to high-, medium-, or low- profile. Consequently, factors such
as terrain masking and potential air defense envelopes are crucial considerations in
analyzing potential air attack profiles in the target area. The ultimate purpose of this type
of target analysis is to determine the optimal air attack heading and profile. The attack
heading can then be combined with an analysis of airfield locations and an evaluation of
the terrain to determine appropriate air avenues of approach. Analysts conducting JIPOE
should maintain a relationship with targeteers at both the JTF and component command
levels.
(2) Airfields and Support Infrastructure. All current and potential airfields
within range of identified target areas should be identified and analyzed. These should
include not only military airfields, but also civilian or abandoned airfields capable of
being rapidly modified to support air operations. Additionally, potential tactical aircraft
landing zones such as stretches of highway, soccer fields or stadiums, or dirt landing strip
locations should be assessed. Also, terrain should be evaluated to locate potential sites
for future air bases, and to determine whether elevation will be a limiting factor to the
type of aircraft staging out of a specific airfield. Airfield analysis should include all those
able to host rotary-wing, fixed-wing, or tiltrotor aircraft. The analysis of current and
potential military airfields should consider factors such as:
(c) Amount of space available to park military aircraft and their requisite
support infrastructure, to include materials handling equipment.
(3) Missile Launch Sites. Maximum range arcs should be drawn from all
known adversary ballistic and cruise missile launch sites. These should include fixed
III-14 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
sites as well as garrison locations of mobile missile units. The terrain surrounding mobile
missile garrison locations and likely missile operating areas should be analyzed to
determine possible pre-surveyed launch, hide, and reload locations. Cross-country
movement analysis should be conducted to determine likely operating areas for mobile
systems. Likely deployment locations should also be identified for mobile missile units
accompanying forward ground forces. Possible hide and reload locations for forward-
deployed mobile missiles might include forested areas with good access roads, highway
underpasses, warehouses, and possibly urban areas. Friendly forces and critical resources
within range of the adversary’s potential launch sites should be identified. This in turn
will facilitate the determination of likely adversary ballistic missile trajectories and
launch azimuths.
(4) Surface Features and Service Ceilings. The analysis of surface features
and service ceilings between the airbase and target area will facilitate the identification
and evaluation of air avenues of approach. Terrain is critical to air route planning. Both
man-made and natural features can represent obstacles to low-flying aircraft, especially
those using a terrain corridor as an air route. Flight obstacles could include objects or
features such as high-tension power lines, bridges, high-rise buildings, dams, towers, or
bends in the terrain corridor too sharp for high-performance aircraft to negotiate. Service
ceilings are another aspect of the environment that are crucial to route planning.
Operations at extreme altitudes (in some mountain ranges or highland plateaus) will often
preclude the effective use of rotary-wing aircraft. This may be due to an inability to carry
sufficient amounts of ordnance, inadequate environmental support for aircrews, or
exceeding the aircraft’s operational ceiling.
(5) Air Avenues of Approach. Air avenues of approach differ from ground
avenues of approach in that the former are three-dimensional and are often unconstrained
by geographical features. Air avenues of approach consider nongeographic aspects of the
environment, such as overflight restrictions, aircraft performance characteristics,
counterair capabilities, early warning radar coverage, and the locations of air defense
envelopes. The availability of vertical and horizontal airspace for deconfliction between
aircraft is also a factor. Under certain circumstances terrain, in combination with
adversary capabilities, can influence the choice of particular routes. For example, terrain
corridors are usually desirable for rotary-wing aircraft, because they afford some defilade
from air defense systems located outside the corridor. Conversely, air avenues of
approach in an urban environment are often restricted due to man-made obstacles (e.g.,
power lines, building height and the possibility of man-portable defense systems) hidden
within the city. The evaluation of terrain corridors for potential use by rotary-wing
aircraft as air avenues of approach must pay particular attention to the location of any
natural or man-made obstacles to flight within the corridor. Depending on aircraft
vulnerability to detection, terrain masking may be desirable to provide concealment from
ground observation or radar acquisition. Additionally, areas along potential air avenues
of approach that provide good terrain background (ground clutter) against look-down and
shoot-down radar are particularly important to low-flying aircraft.
(6) Evaluate the Impact of the Air Domain on Military Operations. The
final step in the process is to evaluate the overall impact of the air domain on adversary
III-15
Chapter III
and friendly capabilities to conduct offensive and defensive air operations and to support
broad multi-Service or joint COAs such as to attack, defend, reinforce, or retrograde. All
militarily significant characteristics of the surface and air environments that may
constrain or facilitate air operations should be graphically portrayed on a MCOO (see
Figure III-6).
(b) Operating Altitudes and Ranges. Air operations will utilize a wide
variety of aircraft performing many types of missions, to include counterair, air
interdiction, close air support, strategic attack, airlift, special operations, intelligence
collection, air refueling, and combat search and rescue. In performing these missions,
aircraft will have to operate at different altitudes and ranges for different periods of time.
The JIPOE analyst must therefore be thoroughly familiar with terrain elevations and
seasonal variations in air density in the operational area, as well as with overflight
restrictions and adversary air and/or air defense capabilities and envelopes. In this way,
the analyst will be able to identify and propose appropriate locations to establish
assembly areas, penetration axes, and orbit points.
(d) Air Engagement and Ambush Areas. Combat air patrol areas, air
defense sites, and early warning and passive detection system locations are greatly
influenced by terrain. These assets will usually be positioned to maximize optical and
radar LOS and avoid terrain masking. The analyst should be prepared to identify those
areas of the OE where air defense systems and terrain features can be integrated to form
optimal air engagement areas and ambush sites.
d. The Space Domain. Forces that have access to the space domain are afforded a
wide array of options that can be used to leverage and enhance military capabilities.
Every country has access to either its own satellites or to those of another country or
commercial entity through the purchase of services. Thus the monitoring and tracking of
friendly, hostile, and even neutral space assets is necessary for a complete understanding
of the OE.
III-16 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
Objective
Blue Land
Border
Neutral Zone
Border (Occupied by Red)
South Islands
(Occupied By Red)
Concentrations at
these airfields indicate
enemy attack course Concentrations at
of action. these airfields indicate
Mobile enemy defense course
Missile of action.
Red Land Garrison
Legend
range arc from friendly critical infrastructure (enemy)
friendly air defense
critical assets (MiG-25 envelope
low-high-low flight profile) critical infrastructure (friendly)
enemy airfield
major urban area
pre-surveyed mobile
missile launch (enemy) amphibious redeployment of
landing site enemy aircraft
III-17
Chapter III
characteristics have the greatest potential for affecting the military use of space for both
friendly and adversary forces:
(a) Orbital Mechanics. Earth satellites are subject to physical laws that
constrain their orbits, and their orbital parameters are governed by somewhat predictable
forces. Thus, a satellite’s orbit must be known to allow the JIPOE analysts to determine
its impact on supporting operations. These constraints and parameters can be used to
predict satellite locations and to assess satellite functions and capabilities based on their
association with various types of orbits. Factors that constrain satellite orbits include
inclination and launch location, orbit type and altitude, and orbital plane and launch
windows.
(c) Orbit Density and Debris. Depending on their relative utility for civil
and military applications, some orbits contain greater numbers of satellites than others.
This “clustering tendency” presents a wide range of problems for space operations
planners related to launch window planning, satellite positioning, and space control. A
related problem to orbital density is the increasing amount of space debris in orbit.
See JP 3-14, Space Operations, for additional information on space characteristics. See
JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, for additional information on
METOC.
III-18 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
mission capabilities. For example, high-resolution weather satellites are normally placed
in low-Earth orbits, while communications and weather satellites that must continuously
view a given area are most efficiently operated at very high altitudes in geosynchronous
orbits. Likewise, highly elliptical orbits that provide long dwell times over the Northern
Hemisphere are useful for communications and other satellites. Additionally, the limited
number of space launch facilities in the world, combined with predictable launch
windows for specific orbital planes, facilitate the prediction of pending satellite launches.
Once a satellite is tracked and its orbit determined, space operations and intelligence
crews can usually predict its function and future position (assuming it does not
maneuver). The path a satellite makes as it passes directly over portions of the Earth can
be predicted and displayed on a map as a satellite ground track, assuming the satellite is
not maneuvered. Planners should note that in times of increased tensions, satellite-
owning entities may determine it worthwhile to maneuver a satellite to complicate timely
tracking by potential adversaries. This predictability allows JIPOE analysts to warn
friendly forces about upcoming gaps in friendly space system coverage or mission
capabilities (such as changes in global positioning satellite accuracy), as well as
upcoming windows of vulnerability to adversary space systems. Conversely, adversary
space forces are able to do the same. The predicted ground tracks and surveillance areas
of adversary reconnaissance satellites, as well as the locations of space-related
infrastructure (e.g., space launch facilities, satellite ground control stations), should be
depicted on the space MCOO (see Figure III-7). The JIPOE analyst should use this
overlay to identify gaps in the adversary’s space-based reconnaissance capabilities.
(1) The actors in the information environment include military and civilian
leaders, decision makers, individuals, and organizations. Resources include the
information itself and the materials and systems employed to collect, analyze, apply,
disseminate, and display information and produce information-related products such as
reports, orders, and leaflets. Significant characteristics of the information environment
can be further evaluated within physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions (see
Figure III-8).
III-19
Chapter III
Blue
K Land K
K
K K
K
Pithian Sea
Grey Land
(Neutral)
Border
19/16
7 02Z O
19/16 C T 00
701Z Border
OC T 00
South Islands
(Occupied By Red)
lt
Be
se
fe n
De
ic
te g
tra
dS
Re
C Red
Red Space Launch Land
and Tracking Facility
Legend
III-20 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
Populace
Rely heavily on word of mouth
to exchange information;
Populace Informational biggest topics with populace
are justice, economics, and
safety.
Unreliable infrastructure
makes communication slow
Communication
Informational and puts increased reliance
Structure on nontechnical information
exchange.
Limited ground
communications networks;
Physical using cellular as
replacement.
rules, policies and processes, and heuristics that guide, inform, and potentially bind
decision makers within the OE.
III-21
Chapter III
a given environment is critical for understanding how to best influence the mindset of the
decision maker and create the desired effects. As such, this dimension constitutes the
most important component of the information environment. The analysis of the cognitive
dimension is a two-step process that identifies and assesses all human characteristics that
may have an impact on the behavior of the populace as a whole, the military rank and
file, and senior military and civil leaders, and evaluates the influence these human
characteristics have on military operations.
III-22 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
The physical network component consists of hardware, infrastructure (to include wired
and wireless, satellite and optical linkages) and nodes/connections (to include
wired/wireless routers, switches, servers, repeaters, and hosts). This layer is a primary
target for intelligence to include SIGINT, HUMINT, and open source intelligence, and is
a primary layer for GEOINT and targeting.
(b) The logical network layer is the virtual space abstracted from
geography that is characterized by data, applications, network communications protocols
and topologies that facilitate the creation, storage, transfer, processing, and display of
information in and through the physical network layer to network users and operators.
The logical layer represents how the network works. The elements within the logical
layer are not necessarily related to specific individuals or physical nodes. This layer is
also critical from intelligence and targeting standpoints and can be very dynamic in
character.
(c) The cyber-persona layer is a higher abstraction of the logical layer that
is a digital representation of a user or entity identity in cyberspace. The cyber-persona
layer consists of people actually on the network. Some examples of cyber-personas may
include email addresses, social networking identities, web forum or chat room aliases, or
voice over Internet protocol telephone numbers. A user may have multiple cyber-
personas and a cyber-persona may have multiple users. Because cyber-personas may not
be tied to a geographic location or physical node, significant intelligence collection and
analysis is required to effectively target in this layer of cyberspace.
III-23
Chapter III
Legend
coaxial cable node
C2 command and control key node
LOC line of communications information flow (capital city)
key node
roads
III-24 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
military operations that may last days, weeks, or months. The relative vulnerability of
each critical system should also be assessed: first, by evaluating the strengths and
weaknesses of each of its cyberspace aspects, and second by identifying any backup
systems, “work arounds,” or redundant links. Those systems that are assessed to be most
important and most vulnerable should be identified as likely targets for cyberspace attack,
electronic warfare (EW), or physical attack. This analysis can be graphically portrayed in
the form of an information system vulnerability assessment matrix. Figure III-10 is an
example of a matrix that assesses the vulnerability of several notional information
systems listed in order to determine their overall vulnerability. In the example shown, the
INTECH system is more vulnerable to cyberspace attack than the KEYLINK system.
The overall vulnerability of a network/system, however, doesn’t necessarily determine
the criticality of the system or likelihood of an attempted attack. Risk to operations is
Hardware
Networks
Software
Data
Procedures
Operators
Backup or
Alternate Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
System (PROLOG) (PrimeNet) (KEYLINK) (VANTAG)
Available?
Legend
III-25
Chapter III
f. Other Relevant Aspects of the OE. Other aspects include all those
characteristics of the OE that could affect friendly or adversary COAs that fall outside the
parameters of the categories previously discussed. The following are some additional
aspects that should be addressed when evaluating the OE:
III-26 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
(e) Skip Zones and Skip Distances. Sky waves are bounced off the
ionosphere to extend communications up to 2,500 miles per “hop.” A skip zone is
essentially a communications “deadspace” between the transmitter and point where the
sky wave returns to Earth. The size of the skip zone is related to the frequency of the sky
wave, the take-off angle, and the constantly changing characteristics of the ionosphere.
In general, lower frequencies bounce off the ionosphere at lower altitudes than higher
frequencies, and therefore return to Earth a shorter distance from the transmitter. Factors
that influence the ionosphere include the time of day, the season, solar flares,
geomagnetic storms, and nuclear detonations.
III-27
Chapter III
Blue Objective
Land
Grey Land
(Neutral)
Pithian Sea
Border Amphibious
Operations
Demilitarized Zone
(Occupied by Red)
South Islands
Border (Occupied by Red)
Red
Land
Legend
moderate road/rail network
electromagnetic
attenuation potential civil
electromagnetic major urban area
interference
severe (radio/TV)
electromagnetic avenue of approach
attenuation
operations; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); and intelligence collection. The
effects of potential interference, skip zones, radio deadspace, and radio wave attenuation
on specific types of military operations should be evaluated. For example, geographic
areas or periods of weather that degrade radio communications can hinder an attacking
force due to the necessity of displacing transmitters. Conversely, a defending force may
be able to shift to alternate communications such as landlines.
III-28 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
Frequency Spectrum
Friendly Neutral Neutral Friendly Neutral
Military Military Civilian Radar Radar
Voice Voice Voice
Legend
GHz gigahertz MHz megahertz
III-29
Chapter III
Atmospheric aerosols (particulates such as smoke, dust, or haze) can also affect
transmissivity: offensive smoke operations, using specifically sized particulates, are
designed to degrade sensors. Obviously, target visibility can be affected by available
light, but ambient light is a function of atmospheric transmissivity and obstructions
(clouds shielding moonlight) as well as terrain obstructions (mountains creating shadows
to the rising/setting moon) or causing an earlier/later onset of twilight, depending on the
physical environment’s geometry. Other major factors include the rising, setting, and
phases of the moon (thin high cirrus cloud cover actually enhances nighttime ambient
light), as well as the times associated with the begin morning nautical twilight/begin
morning civil twilight, sunrise, sunset, and end of evening nautical twilight/end evening
civil twilight. Low visibility is beneficial to offensive and retrograde ground operations.
In the offense, it conceals the concentration and movement of military forces, thus
enhancing the possibility of achieving surprise. Conversely, low visibility hinders the
defense because cohesion and control become difficult to maintain, and reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition are degraded. Air operations are typically adversely
affected by poor visibility. The exceptions to this are those missions that are not
dependent upon visual references.
(b) Winds. Winds of sufficient speed can reduce the combat effectiveness
of a force downwind as the result of blowing dust, smoke, sand, or precipitation. The
upwind force usually has better visibility. CBRN operations also usually favor the
upwind force. Once an area is contaminated, wind changes such as shifts and shears can
cause areas previously free of contamination to quickly become hazardous. Structures
can form into barriers that keep agents in place as well as form channels that create new
and unique agent spread patterns. Strong winds and wind turbulence, especially those
caused by funneling or channeling through terrain features or other obstacles, such as
those features in today’s urban environments, can limit aircraft performance as well as
airborne and theater missile force operations. The evaluation of weather in support of air
operations requires information on the wind at the surface as well as at varying altitudes.
High winds near the ground increase turbulence, may inhibit aircraft maneuvering, and
can prevent air mobility forces from conducting airdrop or landing operations. High
winds at greater altitudes can increase or reduce aircraft fuel consumption, potentially
limiting aircraft range or loiter time. Varying wind directions and speeds in different
layers between the surface and aircraft altitude can greatly affect the trajectories of
unguided munitions. Wind-blown sand, dust, rain, or snow can reduce the effectiveness
of radars and communications systems. Strong winds can also hamper the efficiency of
directional antenna systems by inducing antenna wobble, or damage/destroy the antenna.
On the oceans, winds create swells and waves that can become significant hazards to
operations and to logistic efforts. Furthermore, storms (e.g., hurricanes, typhoons, and
intense winter storms) affecting ports/harbors and airbases can have disruptive effects on
operations by forcing ships and aircraft to sortie to avoid the direct effect of the storm.
Winds also have a significant effect on sea surface current variances and pose significant
impacts to littoral operations.
III-30 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
terrain and generalized flooding over broad areas that may significantly affect surface
transportation. When rain falls into snowpack, it hastens melting and avalanche/flooding
potential. Heavy snow cover can reduce the efficiency of many communications systems
as well as degrade the accuracy and effects of many types of munitions. Freezing rain
and accumulating ice cause significant impacts on surface transportation, including roads
and maritime/port operations, and severely affect aircraft operations both in flight and on
the ground. Depending on the commander’s mission focus, flooding rains (or long-term
lack of rain) in agricultural areas can be a significant factor in CMO. Where a
commander is responsible for city infrastructure functions, rain and flooding can present
serious challenges to water treatment/sanitation and result in medical issues.
(d) Cloud Cover. Heavy cloud cover can degrade the effectiveness of
many target acquisition and surveillance systems by concealing military forces and by
reducing the solar heating of some targets. Cloud cover can therefore reduce the
effectiveness of IR-guided munitions. Low ceilings can prevent aircraft from taking off,
landing, conducting low-level missions, employing weapons, or conducting airdrops.
III-31
Chapter III
For further information on the effects of weather and climate on military operations, see
JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations. For more information on how
temperature and humidity affect CBRN hazards, see JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.
(a) The decision and reaction time of an adversary is a crucial factor and
will directly impact the resources an adversary can bring to bear in a given situation. For
example, a friendly operation, if planned and executed relatively quickly, may constrain
the adversary’s ability to reinforce or redeploy military units in time to counter the
operation. In this scenario, the adversary’s potential COAs would be considerably more
limited than if the same operation was preceded by a lengthy period of friendly
preparations.
Air
Martitime
Land
Chemical
Amphibious
Legend
III-32 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
effective today. The adversary concentrates on surviving and inflicting casualties over
time. Although the military balance may not change, this creates opportunities to affect
the way domestic and international audiences view the conflict. Conversely, an
adversary may attempt to mass effects and achieve decisive results in a short period.
(e) The perception and experience of time are among the most central
aspects of how groups function and interact. When people experience time differently,
tremendous communication and relationship problems typically emerge. Cultural
awareness includes sensitivity to how cultures in the operational area perceive time.
III-33
Chapter III
Informational
Node Infrastructure
Social
Military
Economic
Link
Operational
COG
Weakness
Strength
Strategic
COG Political
Legend
COG center of gravity decisive point COG node node link
III-34 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
(a) Who the individuals and groups are that make up the adversary;
(j) Relations with other local and transnational non-state actors (such as
criminal groups, diaspora communities, terrorist networks, and global religious
authorities);
(d) Economic base and systems for revenue collection and distribution;
III-35
Chapter III
(e) Structure, roles, and political interests of different institutions and levels
of government;
(g) Formal processes for making, enforcing, and reforming laws and
policies;
(i) Factions/divisions among the political elite and within civil service
institutions;
(a) The people and groups that make up the relevant populations;
(d) Demographics;
(e) Geography;
III-36 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
(i) The identity and selection criteria for political and social elites at local,
provincial, and national levels;
(a) Diaspora networks, which may back or partner with the adversary;
III-37
Chapter III
(5) Regional State Actors. Regional state actors can be pivotal to the
dynamics and outcomes of a joint operation. If supporting the adversary, they can
provide critical access to sanctuary areas and resupply, as well as a scale and scope of
resources otherwise typically unavailable to non-state armed groups. Conversely,
regional state actors allied with the joint force can coordinate the control of borders, cut
adversary logistic networks, interdict illicit activities, and counter the exploitation of
border areas as sanctuaries.
(6) IGOs. IGOs, formed when two or more national governments sign a
multilateral treaty to form such a body and finance its operations and possess legal
personality in international law. Most IGOs are regionally focused, and when IGO
member states could be adversely affected by a conflict in their region, the organization
may act collectively to deny legitimacy, sanctuary, and support to an adversary. IGOs
can act as important facilitators for cooperation among states, pressure the HN
government to make difficult but necessary political reforms, impose sanctions on the
adversary and their supporters, and in some cases muster and deploy multilateral
expeditionary civilian and military capacities to support stabilization efforts. IGOs can
also play an important role in humanitarian assistance and development.
III-38 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
will depend upon the specific situation associated with each mission, there can be no
definitive listing of all characteristics appropriate under all circumstances. For example,
some of the characteristics that may be considered significant during a sustained
humanitarian relief operation may receive slightly less emphasis during combat
operations against a conventional adversary. The analysis of an adversary’s and other
relevant actors’ PMESII systems could provide significant indications regarding the
circumstances (ideals, goals, territory) that may cause that country to resort to the use of
military force or to exercise other policy options. For example, some nations may be
willing to use military force to protect international principles such as freedom of
navigation, while others may fight only to protect their own national borders. PMESII
factors and characteristics can provide important clues as to where a nation may use
military force and to what degree. For example, a country will probably make an all-out
effort to defend areas it deems politically, culturally, or economically critical, while other
less crucial portions of its territory might be used to trade space for time. Additionally, a
thorough understanding of the PMESII systems and relationships of all relevant actors in
the OE is vital to mission success. The following variables are examples of the types of
PMESII factors and characteristics that could be considered by the JIPOE analyst (a more
extensive discussion of these factors is contained in Chapter VII, “Special
Considerations,” and Appendix D, “Analyzing and Depicting a System”):
(2) Economic Characteristics. Considerations may include but are not limited
to the strength/weakness of the adversary’s monetary elements (such as currency or
electronic transfers); the financial systems (such as banking or informal financial
institutions); rate of inflation; key commercial areas; the labor market; laws and
regulations impacting business; work permit/visa requirements; and strength of trade
unions. Industrial considerations should include bulk fuel storage and transport systems;
natural resources; industrial centers; scientific and technological capabilities; nuclear
facilities; and toxic industrial material (TIM). Analysts should also consider agricultural
factors such as land use patterns; major crops; planting and harvesting seasons; land
ownership; availability of commodities and services related to imports/exports; and the
food distribution system.
(3) Social Characteristics. Considerations may include but are not limited to
the cultural impact of past wars and military conflicts; territorial claims and disputes;
history of colonial exploitation or foreign interference; ethnic or social strife; geographic
or regional patterns of religious affiliation; past and present religious conflicts among
population groups; religious peculiarities and sensitivities; and the relationship of religion
III-39
Chapter III
to other sources of social affiliation (e.g., ethnicity, economic class, political ideology,
family clans, sects, tribes). The health of the population should also be considered and
should include determining the presence of communicable diseases; TIM hazards;
locations of epidemics; methods of disease transmission; and the location, type, and
extent of environmental pollution (radiation, oil spills, and contamination of drinking
water).
(1) A system consists of interconnected nodes and links. Nodes represent the
elements within a system that can be targeted for action, such as people, organizations,
governments, facilities, rights-of-way, virtual locations, companies, natural resources,
knowledge, municipalities, software, equipment, or law. Links are the technical,
human/social, functional, organization, and thought/intent relationships between nodes,
such as the command or supervisory arrangements that connect a superior to a
subordinate; the relationship of a vehicle to a fuel source; and the ideology that connects
III-40 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
a propagandist to a group of terrorists. Links help the JFC and staff visualize how
various systems work internally and interact with each other. They establish the
relationships and interdependencies between nodes that allow them to work together as a
system—to behave in a specific way (accomplish a task or perform a function). Both
nodes and links are symbolic representations meant to simplify the complexity of the real
world, and are useful in identifying COGs and other things the JFC may wish to influence
or change during an operation.
(2) Figure III-15 shows a simple example of nodes and links in an adversary’s
military system. The air defense system (a node in the military system) and its radars and
missiles (nodes in the air defense system) are linked to each other and to the maneuver
divisions and corps headquarters by their role and ability to protect these nodes from air
attack. If the system’s radars are vulnerable to friendly antiradiation missiles, then using
this advantage to attack and destroy the air defense radars eliminates the electromagnetic
relationship (link) between the radars and air defense missile, degrading the air defense
system’s ability to function effectively. This reduces the level of air defense protection
for the maneuver divisions and makes them more susceptible to friendly forces’ attack.
In other words, it could be unnecessary to attack all nodes in the air defense system in
order to degrade its primary function. In this example, JIPOE analysts designate the air
Maneuver Division
Missiles
Corps
Headquarters
Radar
Air Defense
System
Legend
III-41
Chapter III
defense radars as a key node—a node that is critical to the functioning of the air defense
system.
e. Identify Relevant Nodes. Analysis of all possible nodes and links in the OE
would be an insurmountable task. However, not all nodes and links are relevant to the
JFC’s mission. JIPOE analysts should develop their understanding in sufficient detail to
identify relevant systems, subsystems, nodes, and potential key nodes. The identification
of relevant nodes should be based on the evaluation of a variety of characteristics
(including those already discussed in paragraph 2, “Develop a Geospatial Perspective of
the Operational Environment”) combined with an understanding of friendly strategic
objectives, the joint force’s mission, and the JFC’s intent, objectives, conditions required
to achieve objectives, and tasks.
(1) The following examples illustrate types of nodes that could be relevant to
joint operations. At the lowest level, nodes are discrete persons, places, or things—such
as a country’s leader, an ammunition supply point, or a rocket launcher—that typically
are not divided into subordinate parts. However, whether something is considered a node
or a system typically depends on the perspective at a particular level of command. The
CCDR might think of the air defense system in Figure III-15 as a single node in the
military’s system, while the operational-level JFC and component commanders would
think of it as a system composed of subordinate nodes (missiles, radars, etc.).
(b) Sample Military Nodes: individual leaders at all levels, plans and
orders, defense ministry, C2 headquarters, air defense system, artillery maintenance
facility, ammunition storage point, key terrain.
(d) Sample Social Nodes: ethnic groups, clans, tribes, religious groups,
unions, associations, schools, cultural centers, health and welfare facilities.
III-42 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
(2) Related functional groupings of nodes and links have both horizontal and
vertical aspects. Their relevance often depends on the required scale (breadth and depth)
of the analysis as determined by the JFC’s needs and the level at which the JFC operates.
For example, Figure III-16 shows nodes and links in the OE that the CCDR, subordinate
JFC, and Service component commanders might focus on relevant to their specific
objectives, assigned tasks, and the higher commander’s intent. The CCDR’s OE in a
specific operation can encompass an entire geographic region composed of many nation
states. Thus, the CCMD’s systems network analysis would focus on upper-level aspects
of the specific systems relevant to the CCDR’s strategic objectives and missions (the top
tier in Figure III-16) and “drill down” to more detailed aspects of these systems as
required. For example, from the CCDR’s perspective an enemy armored corps could be a
single node in the adversary’s military system. But to the operational-level JFC and
component commanders, the corps likely would be a separate system composed of
President Defense
Minister
Combatant
Commander Army
Commander
Radars
Service
Component Maneuver
Divisions
Commander
Missiles
Legend
III-43
Chapter III
(3) All systems in the OE can be complex. For example, a typical social
system consists of numerous subsystems, each having additional subordinate layers.
There can be hundreds of nodes and links at different levels that compose the entire
social system. However, many or all of these nodes and links might not be relevant to
strategic objectives and the JFC’s mission. For example, the J-2 might determine that a
small-scale, focused operation such as evacuation of US citizens from an embassy will
have little impact on a nation’s and region’s systems. But large-scale US and
multinational military operations in a country will affect all major systems to a greater or
lesser degree, and the impact likely will extend across the broader region as well. JIPOE
analysts must identify likely undesired effects of large-scale military operations on these
systems, such as the impact on the welfare, attitudes, and behavior of the population.
While undesired effects might not jeopardize the JFC’s accomplishment of near-term
tasks and objectives, they could have long-term unintended consequences associated with
the region’s or country’s attitude toward the US, the GCC’s theater campaign plan, USG
strategic themes and messages, and the USG’s strategic end state. The JFC and planners
must consider these potential undesired effects during COA comparison and selection.
Appendix D, “Analyzing and Depicting a System,” provides generic examples of the
major systems and possible subsystems.
III-44 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
Legend
Colors may be used to denote nodes associated with various categories of systems:
political nodes military nodes economic nodes
Variation in size of nodes/links may be used to depict relative centrality of a node or strength of a link:
average centrality strong link
III-45
Chapter III
(a) Nodes are represented by circles, color coded to depict association with
a specific system. The size of a node may vary to depict its relative centrality.
(b) Links are represented by lines between nodes. Solid lines indicate
confirmed relationships, dashed lines indicate suspected relationships. Arrows may be
used to characterize the relationship (e.g., subordination, flow of information).
g. Identify Key Nodes. Key nodes exist in every major system and subsystem and
are critical to the functioning of their associated systems. For example, a hydroelectric
plant could be the key node in a metropolitan area’s power grid (a subsystem of the
infrastructure system). Some may become decisive points for military operations since,
when acted upon, they could allow the JFC to gain a marked advantage over the
adversary or otherwise to contribute materially to achieving success. Weakening or
eliminating a key node should cause its related group of nodes and links to function less
effectively or not at all, while strengthening the key node could enhance the performance
of the subsystem and larger system. Key nodes often are linked to, or resident in,
multiple systems. For example, a country’s religion subsystem could be central to the
functioning of the country’s social system, and the core group of religious leaders (or a
single leader) could be the religious system’s key node. Depending on the country’s
social and political structure, this same group of religious leaders also could be a key
node in the political system. Since each PMESII system and subsystem is composed of
nodes and links, the capabilities of US instruments of national power (diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic) can be employed against selected key nodes to
create operational and strategic effects. Although largely influenced by subjective
judgment, the identification of a potential key node may be facilitated through an analysis
of node centrality (i.e., how individual entities fit in the systems network). Node
centrality can highlight possible positions of importance, influence, or prominence, and
patterns of connections. A node’s relative centrality is determined by analyzing three
measurable characteristics: degree, closeness, and betweenness (see Figure III-18).
(1) Degree examines a node’s centrality in terms of its direct links with other
nodes (i.e., its local position in the network). As indicated in Figure III-18, node D has
the highest number of direct links to other nodes (high degree centrality), and is an
example of what may be termed a “hub.” A network centralized around a well-connected
hub may be efficient but can fail abruptly if that hub is disabled or removed. In this
example, node D likely would be designated a key node. Nodes with low-degree
centrality (few direct links) are sometimes described as peripheral nodes (e.g., nodes I
and J in Figure III-18). Although they have relatively low centrality scores, peripheral
nodes can nevertheless play significant roles as resource gatherers or sources of fresh
information from outside the main network.
III-46 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
A F
D H I J
B G
Node D is an example of a “hub” and has the highest measure of “degree centrality”
(i.e., number of direct links).
Nodes F and G have fewer direct links than D but occupy positions with shorter direct
and indirect paths within and between constituencies A-G and H-J (i.e., high measures
of “closeness centrality.”)
Node H is an example of a “broker” between two constituencies (Nodes A-G and
Nodes I-J), and has the highest measure of “betweenness centrality.”
(2) Closeness examines a node’s overall position in a network (i.e., its global
position). The difference between degree and closeness is an important distinction,
because an individual entity may have many direct contacts, but those contacts may not
be well connected to the network as a whole. Consequently, although an individual may
have a high level of degree centrality, power and influence might only be exerted locally,
not throughout the entire network. Closeness is calculated by adding the number of hops
between a node and all others in a network (e.g., adding the number of hops from node A
to node B, node A to node C, and node A to node D). A lower score indicates that an
individual needs fewer hops to reach others in the network, and is therefore “closer” to
others in the network. For example, nodes F and G in Figure III-18 have fewer direct
links than node D, but have shorter paths to the other nodes. Nodes with high closeness
centrality are in excellent positions to monitor the overall activity flow within the
network.
III-47
Chapter III
(3) Betweenness measures the number of times a node lies along the shortest
path between two others. For exchange of information or services a node with high
betweenness may play an important “brokerage” or intermediary role. For example, in
Figure III-18, node H would occupy one of the most important locations in the network
by serving as the only link between nodes I, J, and the remainder of the network. Node H
is an example of a broker node and (assuming nodes I and J were sufficiently important
to the network as a whole) it might also be designated as a key node. The elimination of
a broker node can fragment a network into several subcomponents.
(2) Distance. Network distance measures the number of hops between any two
nodes in a network. For example, there is one hop between two nodes that are directly
connected; there are two hops between nodes that are separated by one intermediary
node. Evaluating network distance aids in understanding how information and influence
flow through a network and determining a network’s cohesiveness. Larger distances can
inhibit the dissemination of information because each hop diminishes the probability of
successful interaction. In political, social, and possibly military networks, larger
distances may also decrease the ability of individuals to influence others.
The evaluations of all the individual aspects of the OE and the systems perspective
are ultimately combined into a single integrated assessment that focuses on the overall
impact of the OE on all joint COAs available to both friendly and adversary forces. This
assessment may take the form of a briefing, set of overlays, written analysis of the OE,
intelligence estimate, or any other format the JFC deems appropriate. Regardless of
format, this product is designed to support the development and evaluation of friendly
joint COAs by providing the J-3 and J-5 with an evaluated and prioritized set of land, sea,
and air avenues of approach, potential engagement areas, key terrain and maritime
III-48 JP 2-01.3
Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2
geography, key nodes and links, and an analysis identifying periods of optimal weather
conditions for specific types of military operations. Likewise, the product enables the J-2
to evaluate the OE from the adversary’s perspective, and to express this evaluation in
terms of a prioritized set of adversary military COAs, to include any related diplomatic,
informational, or economic options. In order to accomplish this, the J-2 must remember
to consider the general military capabilities of the adversary force as well as the other
characteristics of the OE. For example, the OE may contain several excellent amphibious
landing sites, but if the adversary does not have access to amphibious support ships, then
an amphibious attack should not be listed as a viable adversary COA. The J-2 should
also consider the amount of military force normally located at each of the adversary’s
naval, ground, and air bases and should assess whether this constitutes an offensive or
defensive posture. The final result of step two of the JIPOE process is a preliminary
prioritization of adversary COAs based on how well each is supported by the overall
impact of the OE. This preliminary prioritization of COAs will be further refined and
adjusted during step four of the JIPOE process, as discussed in Chapter V “Determine
Adversary and Other Relevant Actor Courses of Action—Step 4.”
III-49
Chapter III
Intentionally Blank
III-50 JP 2-01.3
CHAPTER IV
EVALUATE THE ADVERSARY AND OTHER RELEVANT ACTORS—STEP 3
Winston Churchill
The World Crisis, 1911-1918
1923
1. Overview
The third step in the JIPOE process identifies and evaluates the adversary’s
capabilities and limitations, current situation, COGs, and the doctrine, patterns of
operation, and TTP employed by adversary forces, absent those constraints identified
during step two (see Figure IV-1). During this step, models are developed that portray
how adversary forces normally execute military operations or how they have reacted to
specific military situations in the past. Adversary systems are also analyzed to develop
candidate indicators (hypothesized anticipated changes to normal node-link relationships)
associated with various COAs.
a. The JIPOE analyst must take care not to evaluate the adversary’s joint capabilities
by mirror-imaging US joint and Service doctrine. Effective red teams serve as a check on
Holistic View
of the
Operational
Environment
Evaluate the
adversary and Describe the impact
other relevant of the operational
Step 3 actors. environment.
IV-1
Chapter IV
the analytical effort to avoid mirror imaging, to include identifying COAs not considered.
In many cases the joint doctrine of potential adversaries may be embryonic or
nonexistent. Although an adversary’s components may operate in the same geographic
area and may try, more or less, to support each other, joint operations, as practiced by US
forces, are rarely conducted. Nevertheless, in virtually all cases, the Service components
of an opposing force will at some level of command coordinate their operations
according to a set of ad hoc or established procedures. The JIPOE analyst must try to
discern the adversary’s ability to integrate their capabilities in combined arms operations,
no matter how rudimentary it may appear.
Adversary and relevant actor models can depict either an opponent’s doctrinal way
of operating or their observed patterns of operation under similar conditions. They serve
the JFC best when they are not only based on a detailed study of the adversary’s normal
or “doctrinal” organization, equipment, operational procedures, and node-link
relationships, but also take into account how the adversary will react to a specific military
situation. Adversary models are normally completed prior to deployment, and are
continuously updated as required during military operations. The models consist of three
major parts: graphical depictions of adversary patterns of operations related to specific
COAs (adversary templates); descriptions of the adversary’s preferred tactics and
options; and lists of high-value targets (HVTs).
IV-2 JP 2-01.3
Evaluate the Adversary and Other Relevant Actors—Step 3
Bomber Wing
240 km
XXXX 200 km
Fighter Wing Fighter Wing
XX XX XX
120 km
Follow-
on
Divisions
XXX XXX 80 km
Second X X X XX XX
Echelon
Divisions X
X 30 km
X X X X X
First XX
Echelon
Divisions
X X 15 km
0 km
80 km 40 km
Legend
km kilometers
IV-3
Chapter IV
Naval Temporary
Base Naval
3/4 of Fleet Redeploys Base
240
Surface
Patrols Surface km
Patrols
XXX XXX
3 Submarine Mi
ne
Patrols 3 Submarine s
Patrols
Ocean
Legend
km kilometers
IV-4 JP 2-01.3
Evaluate the Adversary and Other Relevant Actors—Step 3
Supreme Council
Ministry of Defense
Alliance Shipping
Export Bank
National
Telecom
Legend
anticipated new anticipated modification anticipated break in
relationship in existing relationship existing relationship
IV-5
Chapter IV
(1) Identify a specific type of joint operation, such as an amphibious attack, and
then analyze how each of the adversary’s service components contributes or provides
support to that operation. In other words, identify the types of supporting operations each
component is likely to conduct as part of the adversary’s overall joint plan.
(3) Annotate the adversary template with marginal notes that are tagged to key
events or positions on the template. For example, marginal notes might describe how an
adversary normally reallocates air assets if a breakthrough is achieved during a ground
offensive.
(4) Identify and list any decision criteria known to cause the adversary to prefer
one option over another. This information will aid in wargaming adversary and friendly
COAs, targeting, and deception planning.
(5) Describe the actions of each component of the joint force in sufficient detail
to facilitate the later identification of HVTs and high-payoff targets (HPTs). An HVT is
a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. An
HPT target is a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success
of the friendly COA. Since the target’s value usually varies with its role in each phase of
the operation, each phase should be examined and described separately.
IV-6 JP 2-01.3
Evaluate the Adversary and Other Relevant Actors—Step 3
Introduce Persistent
CBRN Chemical Agents
Legend
C2 command and control CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
c. List of HVTs. The adversary model should also include a list of HVTs. These
targets are identified by combining operational judgment with an evaluation of the
information contained in the joint adversary template and description. Assets are
identified that are critical to the success of the adversary’s mission, that are key to each
adversary component’s supporting operation, or that are crucial to the adversary’s
adoption of various branches or sequels to the operation. For example, an adversary
ground force defending a front across a peninsula may be vulnerable to amphibious
flanking attacks in its rear area. In this situation, the adversary’s ability to deny access to
its rear area coastal waters may be crucial, and therefore its coastal defense assets
(artillery, antiship cruise missiles, local surface and subsurface combatants) may
constitute HVTs. SCA can be useful to identify and broaden the JFC’s understanding of
HVTs as well as potentially revealing additional options for lethal and nonlethal actions
against them and determining second- and third-order effects of those actions. Within IW
environments, adversary HVTs may include keys nodes within the associated human
IV-7
Chapter IV
threat network. For example, the adversary may be dependent on support from local
tribal/village leaders, or transnational criminal/drug trafficking organizations to operate in
the local vicinity, town, village, or sub-province, or to gain access to friendly bases
through contract or local national employees. Either of these groups may also exert
influence with regional or international violent extremist organizations, and they all may
provide either direct or indirect support to adversary operations. In this instance, the
individuals used as middlemen to communicate or coordinate among tribal/village elders
or criminal organizations may constitute HVTs. The JFC, in conjunction with the
national IC, collaborates to identify HVTs with appropriate analytic production centers.
This collaboration should be conducted by any available secure communications means.
The following techniques may be useful in identifying and evaluating HVTs:
(1) Identify HVTs by mentally wargaming and thinking through the joint
operation under consideration and how the adversary will use the assets of each
component to support it.
(2) Determine how the adversary might react to the loss of each identified HVT.
Consider the adversary’s ability to substitute other assets (from another component or a
different operational area), or to adopt a different option.
(3) Evaluate and rank order all HVTs according to their relative worth to the
adversary’s operation. Also, analyze whether a target’s value depends on, or changes
with, each phase of the operation.
IV-8 JP 2-01.3
Evaluate the Adversary and Other Relevant Actors—Step 3
Effect on Adversary
Relative
Target Set
Worth
Disrupt Delay Limit
Command, Control,
X X and Communications X X X
1st Army Main Most important
X Command Post (CP) during initial phase
of air campaign:
X X National Air Defense CP No backup CP
available
X State Defense CP
Lines of
X Communications X Delays
reinforcements
X Bridge Highway 102 during Phase 2
and resupply
during Phase 3
X Main Railyard
(1) Composition;
(2) Disposition;
(3) Strength;
(4) TTP;
(6) Logistics;
(7) Effectiveness;
(9) Personalities;
IV-9
Chapter IV
c. In some situations, for example when dealing with asymmetric threats, traditional
adversary OB models may not be sufficient. In these situations it is particularly
important to analyze the situation not just for the adversary, but for all other relevant
actors. The current situation for friendly, neutral, and threat actors is based on
assessments of the following capabilities:
(1) Logistics;
(2) Leaders;
(3) Ideology;
(4) Fighters;
(5) Training;
(6) Weapons;
(9) Intelligence;
(11) Finance.
4. Identify Adversary and Other Relevant Actor Centers of Gravity and Decisive
Points
a. COGs. One of the most important tasks confronting the JIPOE analyst is the
identification of adversary COGs. A COG is the source of power that provides moral or
physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act. A COG is always linked to the
objective. If the objective changes, the COG could also change. At the strategic level, a
COG could be a military force, an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of critical
capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level a COG often is
associated with the adversary’s military capabilities—such as a powerful element of the
armed forces—but could include other capabilities in the OE. Since the adversary will
protect the COG, the COG most often is found among strengths rather than among
weaknesses or vulnerabilities. JIPOE analysts continuously assess the adversary’s
leadership, fielded forces, resources, intelligence capabilities, infrastructure, population,
transportation systems, and internal and external relationships to determine from which
elements the adversary derives freedom of action, physical strength, or the will to fight.
A determination is made to see if candidate COGs are truly critical to the adversary
strategy and must include a thorough examination of the mechanisms and linkages by
which COGs affect adversary strategy and potential COAs. Figure IV-7 shows a number
of characteristics associated with COGs.
IV-10 JP 2-01.3
Evaluate the Adversary and Other Relevant Actors—Step 3
(1) The most effective method for JIPOE analysts to identify adversary COGs is
to visualize each COG’s role/function relative to each of the various systems and
subsystems. For example, the leader of an adversary nation could be a strategic COG in
the military and political systems as well as a key node in the nation’s social system.
Analysts also can visualize a COG as a system (nodes, links, functions, etc.) to analyze
what elements within this system protect, sustain, integrate, or enable its various elements
or components. In this context, a COG might be composed of nodes and links entirely
within a single system, which is more often the case in the seize initiative and dominate
phases of large-scale combat operations. However, a COG can also be composed of a set
of cross-system nodes and links that might encompass key nodes of one or more systems.
This distinction provides visibility to these nodes in the targeting process and emphasizes
their potential importance to the operation.
(2) A COG typically will not be a single node in the system, but will consist of
a set of nodes and their respective links. However, a single node might be considered a
COG as an exception, such as when the adversary senior military leader is also the
political leader and the nature of the adversary’s political and military systems is such
that the leader’s demise would cause support for the conflict by other leaders in these
systems to collapse. Also, systems are viewed differently at different levels. For
IV-11
Chapter IV
example, the CCDR might consider an adversary critical capability (such as an armored
corps) to be a single node in the adversary’s military system, while a JFC who must
attack this capability would analyze it as a system of nodes and links in an effort to
determine its critical capabilities and vulnerabilities.
(3) A proper analysis of adversary critical factors must be based on the best
available knowledge of how adversaries organize, fight, think, make decisions, and on
their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. JIPOE analysts must
understand their adversaries’ capabilities and vulnerabilities, and factors that might
influence an adversary to abandon or change strategic objectives. They must also
envision how friendly forces and actions appear from the adversaries’ viewpoints.
Otherwise, they may fall into the trap of ascribing to an adversary’s particular attitudes,
values, and reactions that mirror their own.
(4) The JIPOE staff should analyze COGs within a framework of three
factors—critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. Critical
capabilities are those means that are considered crucial enablers for a COG to function as
such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary’s specified or assumed
objective(s). Critical requirements are the conditions, resources, and means that enable
a critical capability to become fully operational. Critical vulnerabilities are those
aspects or components of critical requirements that are deficient, or vulnerable to direct
or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results. However, in
identifying critical vulnerabilities, JIPOE analysts must also compare their criticality with
their accessibility, vulnerability, redundancy, ability to recuperate, and impact on the
civilian populace. JIPOE analysts use a systems perspective to identify the critical
factors associated with each adversary COG. For example, Figure IV-8 depicts the
critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities associated with two
of the adversary’s strategic and operational COGs.
IV-12 JP 2-01.3
Evaluate the Adversary and Other Relevant Actors—Step 3
Economic
Launcher Air Defense HQ
Link System
Operational
COG
(Critical
Vulnerability) Radar Corps
Strategic
COG HQ
Political Weakness
Strength
Corps
Commander
Coalition Strategic
Partner
COG
(Critical
Vulnerability) (Critical
Capability)
Economic President
Relationship
Defense
Minister
World Bank
Legend
COG center of gravity HQ headquarters
IV-13
Chapter IV
(1) The most important decisive points can be determined from analysis of
critical factors. As part of the node-link network analysis associated with a systems
perspective, understanding the relationship between a COG’s critical capabilities,
requirements, and vulnerabilities can illuminate decisive points.
(2) JIPOE analysts should identify and study potential decisive points and
determine which of them offer the best opportunity to attack the adversary’s COGs
indirectly, extend friendly operational reach, or enable the application of friendly forces
and capabilities.
Adversary capabilities are expressed in terms of the broad COAs and supporting
operations that the adversary can take to interfere with the accomplishment of the
friendly mission. In conventional operations, these are generally defined as offense,
defense, reinforcement, and retrograde. Each of these broad COAs can be divided into a
variety of more specific COAs. For example, a retrograde might take the form of a delay
or withdrawal, while an offensive operation might consist of an envelopment or
penetration. Other significant capabilities may include the use of CBRN weapons,
amphibious assaults, EW, and deception operations. CBRN weapons may be employed
to cause casualties, limit movement (area denial), and/or force individuals to don
protective equipment thereby potentially limiting their mission effectiveness. Deception
can involve misinformation, disinformation, or propaganda targeting specific or general
audiences. IO and public affairs staffs collaborate and synchronize their respective
information activities to counter adversary information influence efforts. An example of
this synchronization could include development and execution of an IO plan to counter
adversary propaganda efforts that could prevent friendly use of technologies such as
nonlethal weapons and directed energy systems. When appropriate, the techniques
described in the following paragraphs should also be applied to relevant actors capable of
influencing the friendly mission.
(1) “The adversary has the capability to attack with up to six divisions
supported by 150 daily sorties of fixed-wing aircraft, but is capable of
penetrating no further than line BRAVO due to insufficient fuel reserves.”
(2) “The adversary has the capability to interdict friendly sea lines of
communications at chokepoints GREY and BLUE after repositioning units
of the 4th Fleet. Current naval deployments preclude an attack before 4
August.”
Various Sources
IV-14 JP 2-01.3
Evaluate the Adversary and Other Relevant Actors—Step 3
a. Adversary and relevant actor capabilities are determined by comparing the current
situation with each of the models already constructed. Based on the current situation, the
ability of the adversary and relevant actors to actually meet the criteria described by each
model is evaluated. Usually, the adversary’s and relevant actors’ actual capabilities will
vary from the ideal capabilities represented by a model. Adversary and relevant actors’
capabilities that fall short of requirements reflected in previous patterns of operation or
adversary doctrine should be identified as vulnerabilities, while capabilities that meet or
exceed requirements are listed as strengths. When time or some other factor is assessed
to be a critical element in an adversary or relevant actors’ capability, it should be
explicitly stated in the overall capability statement.
b. The J-2 should disseminate the evaluation of adversary capabilities, strengths, and
weaknesses to the other joint force staff sections as soon as possible. The intelligence
estimate is the traditional vehicle for disseminating this type of evaluation. However, in
order to facilitate operational planning, the evaluation may be disseminated by any means
and in any form deemed appropriate by the JFC.
IV-15
Chapter IV
Intentionally Blank
IV-16 JP 2-01.3
CHAPTER V
DETERMINE ADVERSARY AND OTHER RELEVANT ACTOR COURSES OF
ACTION—STEP 4
“Gentlemen, I notice that there are always three courses [of action] open to an
enemy, and that he usually takes the fourth.”
1. Overview
The first three steps of the JIPOE process help to provide JFCs, subordinate
commanders, and their staffs with a holistic view of the OE by analyzing the impact of
the OE, assessing adversary doctrine and capabilities, and identifying adversary COGs
and decisive points. The fourth step of the JIPOE process builds upon this holistic view
to develop a detailed understanding of the adversary’s and other relevant actors’ probable
intent and future strategy. The process for step 4 (see Figure V-1) provides a disciplined
methodology to analyze the set of potential adversary COAs in order to identify the COA
Holistic View
of the
Operational
Determine adversary and other Environment
relevant actor courses of action.
Evaluate the
adversary and Describe the impact
other relevant of the operational
actors. environment.
1. Identify the adversary’s and other relevant actor’s likely objectives and
desired end state.
2. Identify the full set of adversary and other relevant actor courses of action.
3. Evaluate and prioritize each course of action.
4. Develop each course of action in the amount of detail time allows.
5. Identify initial collection requirements.
V-1
Chapter V
the adversary is most likely to adopt, and the COA that would be most dangerous to the
friendly force or to mission accomplishment.
2. Identify the Adversary’s and Other Relevant Actors’ Strategy, Likely Objectives,
and Desired End State
The likely objectives and desired end state of the adversary and other relevant actors
are identified by analyzing the current military and political situation, strategic and
operational capabilities, and the sociocultural characteristics of the adversary and other
actors. The JIPOE analyst should begin by identifying the overall strategic objectives of
all relevant actors, which will form the basis for identifying likely objectives and desired
end states. The J-2 should identify likely objectives for all major adversary military
forces operating in the joint force’s AOI and for all other actors capable of influencing
friendly mission accomplishment. Usually there will not be sufficient information
available to state adversary objectives as fact. In such cases, the J-2 will postulate likely
adversary objectives and will identify them as assumptions. These assumptions should
be coordinated with the JFC and J-3. Due to the importance of correctly identifying the
adversary’s strategy, likely objectives, and desired end state, command red teams should
concurrently perform independent analysis of these subjects, and, when appropriate,
propose alternatives for consideration by the JIPOE coordination cell. Adversary
objectives may be expressed in terms of the echelon or type of military force to be
decisively engaged (such as aircraft carriers, operational reserves, or lift capabilities) or
as key geographic features to be seized or retained. Sometimes objectives will have dual
purposes. During World War II, the Japanese attack against Midway was designed not
only to seize key military geography, but also to force a situation in which US Pacific
Fleet assets (especially aircraft carriers) could be decisively engaged and destroyed. At
times, refined information regarding the adversary’s OB and military situation may
remain elusive. However, an understanding of the adversary’s doctrine and mindset to
include likely perceptions regarding the overall situation and environment, may provide a
sufficient basis to make useful estimates regarding the range of options that the adversary
believes are open. Appendix C, “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM—A Case Study in
Determining Relevant Actor Courses of Action,” illustrates the importance of analyzing
relevant actors and their COAs.
3. Identify the Full Set of Adversary and Other Relevant Actor Courses of Action
During this step, a consolidated list of all potential adversary COAs is constructed.
At a minimum this list will include all COAs that the adversary’s doctrine or pattern of
operations indicates are appropriate to the current situation and accomplishment of likely
objectives; all adversary COAs that could significantly influence the friendly mission,
even if the adversary’s doctrine or pattern of operations indicates they are suboptimal
under current conditions; and all adversary COAs indicated by recent activities or events.
(1) Suitability. An adversary COA must have the potential to achieve the
adversary’s likely objective or attain the desired end state.
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Determine Adversary and Other Relevant Actor Courses of Action—Step 4
(2) Feasibility. The adversary must have sufficient time, space, and resources
to successfully execute the COA. However, a COA should not be assessed as unfeasible
until all actions the adversary may take to overcome resource shortfalls are considered.
Actions and reactions between the adversary and all relevant actors in the OE may help to
better determine feasibility. For example, an adversary may make up for insufficient
force ratios by conducting an economy of force operation in another sector. Always try
to anticipate innovative or seemingly radical measures the adversary may adopt.
(3) Acceptability. The amount of risk associated with the COA should not
exceed the level of risk acceptable to the adversary. The JIPOE analyst should determine
the adversary’s level of risk acceptance by analyzing past adversary military activity,
current OB factors, interactions amongst relevant actors, and the psychological profiles of
adversary leaders. In some instances, however, an opponent may be willing to tolerate a
higher level of risk than normal, particularly if a risky COA is the only means of
accomplishing the objective. The increasing use of suicide attacks by terrorists and the
proliferation of WMD and CBRN technology illustrate the increased levels of risk now
acceptable to potential adversaries.
(4) Uniqueness. Each adversary COA must be significantly different from the
others; otherwise it should be considered a variation rather than a distinct COA. Factors
contributing to the uniqueness of a COA may include its effect on the friendly COA, use
of reserves, location of the main effort, scheme of maneuver, or task organization.
c. The adversary templates (created during JIPOE step three) associated with each of
the remaining COAs are analyzed relative to the impact of the OE (described during
JIPOE step two). The JIPOE analyst will assess how the OE may constrain or modify the
actual implementation of the adversary models for each COA. Usually the OE will either
V-3
Chapter V
d. Each of the remaining broad COAs is refined into more specific COAs by adding
details such as the timing or phasing of operations and the location of the adversary’s
main and supporting efforts.
e. All factors that may lead the adversary to adopt “wildcard” COAs should be
considered. These factors may include:
(5) Desperation.
(6) Other actors’ actions and reactions within the OE that affect the adversary’s
decision making and capabilities.
The full set of identified adversary COAs is evaluated and ranked according to the
likely order of adoption. The purpose of the prioritized list of adversary COAs is to
provide JFCs and their staffs with a starting point for the development of a plan or order
that takes into consideration the most likely adversary COA as well as the adversary
COA most dangerous to the friendly force or mission accomplishment.
a. Caution should be exercised to remember that these COAs are only estimates of
an adversary’s intentions, not facts. It should also be kept in mind that actions associated
with a friendly COA may cause the adversary to change to a different COA than the one
originally adopted. Therefore, the adversary’s reaction to changes in friendly force
dispositions as well as relevant actors’ actions should be continuously analyzed to
determine if the adversary has changed to a different COA. This, in turn, may require a
reprioritization of the initial list of adversary COAs and result in the joint force staff
developing branch plans.
b. The JIPOE analyst must also be constantly on guard against possible adversary
deception efforts. The adversary may deliberately adopt a less than optimum COA in
order to maximize surprise. Additionally, the adversary may gradually increase
preparations for a specific COA over a lengthy period of time, thereby “psychologically
conditioning” the JIPOE analyst to accept a level and type of adversary activity,
V-4 JP 2-01.3
Determine Adversary and Other Relevant Actor Courses of Action—Step 4
previously considered to be abnormal, as a new norm. Finally, the JIPOE analyst should
understand that the adversary’s intelligence capabilities may not present the same picture
to adversary decision makers as JIPOE analysts perceive.
(1) Analyze each COA to identify its strengths and weaknesses, COGs, and
decisive points.
(2) Evaluate how well each COA meets the criteria of suitability, feasibility,
acceptability, uniqueness, and consistency with doctrine. The JIPOE analyst should
avoid cultural bias by considering these criteria in the context of the adversary’s culture.
(3) Evaluate how well each COA takes advantage of the OE.
(4) Compare each COA and determine which one offers the greatest advantages
while minimizing risk.
(5) Consider the possibility that the adversary may choose the second or third
most likely COA while attempting a deception operation portraying adoption of the best
COA.
(6) Analyze the adversary’s current dispositions and recent activity to determine
if there are indications that one COA has already been adopted.
5. Develop Each Course of Action in the Amount of Detail that Time Allows
Subject to the amount of time available for analysis, each adversary COA is
developed in sufficient detail to describe: the type of military operation; the earliest time
military action could commence; the location of the action, and the objectives that make
up the COA; the OPLAN to include scheme of maneuver and force dispositions; and the
objective or desired end state. Each COA should be developed in the order of its
probability of adoption, and should consist of a situation template, a description of the
COA, and a listing of HVTs.
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Chapter V
situation template (usually depicting the most critical point of the adversary’s operation)
or a series of situation templates depicting points where the adversary might adopt
branches or sequels to the main COA. A systems perspective situation template should
be constructed by comparing the consolidated systems overlay with the modified
association matrix that depicts anticipated network changes for specific COAs. Situation
templates are designed to facilitate wargaming by the JFC and joint force staff. The
following techniques (see Figure V-2) should be used when constructing situation
templates:
Maritime
+
Doctrinal
Template
Attack
Situation
Template
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Determine Adversary and Other Relevant Actor Courses of Action—Step 4
Analyze and wargame the adversary’s likely scheme of maneuver from current
dispositions to the objective. Identify how each of the adversary’s force components fits
in and supports the scheme of maneuver. Based on adversary movement doctrine,
patterns, and capabilities as well as time and space factors, time phase lines should be
placed on the situation template to depict the expected progress of adversary force
movements. Modify time phase lines as necessary based on the anticipated effects of
friendly military action and the current situation on adversary force movement
capabilities (see Figure V-3).
(3) Based on the relative complexity of some types of joint operations, some
adversary COAs may be better presented in a matrix vice overlay format. A situation
matrix may be particularly useful in depicting the phasing of the supporting operations
conducted by each of the adversary’s force components (see Figure V-5).
c. HVTs. The decisive points identified during COG analysis, and the HVTs listed
on the doctrinal templates associated with each COA, should be refined and reevaluated.
The relative worth of each HVT will vary with the specific situation under consideration
and over the duration of the COA’s execution. Each COA should be mentally wargamed
to determine potential deployment locations for each HVT, and the point in time when
each target is most valuable to the COA’s success. Those areas where the adversary is
most likely to deploy HVTs at the time when they are most crucial to the adversary’s
operation should be identified and passed to the joint force’s targeting element. These
areas should be designated as target areas of interest (TAIs) and can be annotated on the
situation template or maintained on a separate list and overlay.
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D+6
Pithian Sea
D+4 Grey
Land
D+2 (Neutral)
Border D-0
Demilitarized Zone
(Occupied by Red)
D-5
D-4
Border South Islands
D-6
D-3
Red
Strategic Red Land
Defense Belt
Legend
aircraft
ground force redeployment
restricted terrain movement
naval/amphibious enemy airfields
severely restricted force movement
terrain
road/rail network
time phase line
major urban areas
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Determine Adversary and Other Relevant Actor Courses of Action—Step 4
Program
1256
Supreme
Council
Export Bank
Legend
anticipated
anticipated modification to
existing link new link existing link
these activities or indicators are expected to take place are designated as NAIs. The NAIs
and their associated indicators are depicted on the event template and event matrix.
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Situation Matrix
Time
Red Fleet
Red Fleet commences sea
2/3 of Red Fleet redeploys screens maritime
Maritime to temporary DMZ naval denial operations
approaches to in the West
facility. DMZ. Pithian Sea.
b. The Event Matrix. The event matrix supports the event template by providing
details on the type of activity expected in each NAI, the times the activity is expected to
occur, and the COAs with which the activity is associated. Although the primary purpose
of the event matrix is to facilitate intelligence collection planning, it can also serve as a
useful aid in situation development and wargaming (see Figure V-8 and Figure V-9).
V-10 JP 2-01.3
Determine Adversary and Other Relevant Actor Courses of Action—Step 4
COA 1
Situation Template 1 COA 1
COA 2
+
Situation Template 2 COA 2
COA 3 +
Situation Template 3 COA 3
Consolidated
Situation Template
NAI 2
NAI 1
NAI NAI 3
NAI Event Template NAI 5
NAI NAI 4
NAI 6
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Event Template
Pithian Sea 18
Grey
Demilitarized Zone Land 19
(Neutral)
2 15
3 16
1 Border
4 17
Border
South
9 Islands
6 13
5 8
7
11
14
10 12 Red Land
Legend
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Determine Adversary and Other Relevant Actor Courses of Action—Step 4
Integration of Indicators
Legend
COA course of action NAI named area of interest
V-13
Chapter V
Event Matrix
Time Indicate
NAI Event
Earliest Latest
COA
5 Northward movement of red corps size force. D-3 D-1 Attack (in West)
6 Northern movement of two more corps. D-3 D-1 Attack (in West)
10 Departure of mobile missile units from garrison and D-3 D-1 Attack
local dispersal areas.
15 Northward transit of amphibious task force. D-6 D-3 Attack (in Center)
16 Eastward transit of amphibious task force. D-6 D-4 Attack (in East)
19 Northward transit of amphibious task force. D-5 D-4 Attack (in East)
Legend
COA course of action NAI named area of interest
V-14 JP 2-01.3
CHAPTER VI
SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATION PLANNING, EXECUTION, AND
ASSESSMENT
“A general should say to himself many times a day: ‘If the hostile army were to
make its appearance to my front, on my right, or on my left, what would I do?’
And if he is embarrassed, his arrangements are bad; there is something wrong;
he must rectify his mistake.”
Napoleon Bonaparte
1769-1821
1. Introduction
The primary purpose of JIPOE is to support joint operation planning, execution, and
assessment by identifying, analyzing, and assessing the adversary’s COGs, critical
vulnerabilities, capabilities, decisive points, limitations, intentions, COAs, and reactions
to friendly operations based on a holistic view of the OE. JIPOE analysis assists the JFC
and joint force staff to visualize and understand the full range of adversary capabilities
and intentions. JIPOE analysts identify, describe, and compare the opposing advantages
and disadvantages of all relevant aspects of the OE, and assist in determining how to gain
strategic or operational advantage and initiative over the adversary. Although JIPOE
support is both dynamic and continuous, it must also be “front loaded” in the sense that
the bulk of JIPOE analysis must be completed early enough to be factored into the JFC’s
decision-making effort. Furthermore, prepared or “on the shelf” JIPOE products will
provide the foundation on which JIPOE support in a time-constrained environment is
based. JFCs and their staffs are responsible for ensuring that all JIPOE products and
analyses are fully integrated into the joint force’s operation planning, execution, and
assessment efforts.
SECTION A. PLANNING
2. Overview
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Chapter VI
COA
Mission COA COA COA Plan or Order
Initiation Analysis and
Analysis Development Comparison Approval Development
Wargaming
Prioritized
Significant Impact of the List J-2 Support Decision Prioritized List
Characteristics Operational of to Support of Intelligence
of the Environment Adversary Wargames Template Requirements
Operational COAs
Environment
Updates
Intelligence
Estimate
Legend
COA course of action JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff operational environment
a. The JIPOE effort should facilitate parallel planning by all strategic, operational,
and tactical units involved in the operation. JIPOE products developed to support
strategic-level planning should also be simultaneously disseminated to all appropriate
operational and tactical headquarters. This is especially true during initial planning
periods when headquarters at intermediate echelons may tend to filter information as it
travels down to tactical units.
b. The integration of Service component IPB products with the JFCs’ JIPOE effort
creates a synergy in which an adversary’s COAs may provide indicators as to the
adversary’s overall capabilities, intentions, desired end state, and strategy. Specifically,
JIPOE products facilitate operation planning by determining the following:
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Support to Joint Operation Planning, Execution, and Assessment
(4) The adversary’s principal strategic and operational objectives and lines of
operation.
(6) COGs and decisive points throughout the adversary’s operational and
strategic depths.
(7) The adversary’s ability to create effects in the information environment and
use or access data from all systems.
(11) The adversary’s relationship with possible allies and the ability to enlist
their support.
3. Planning Initiation
VI-3
Chapter VI
President can respond with all the appropriate instruments of national power. The JFC
typically will provide initial guidance (not to be confused with the JFC’s planning
guidance that is a product of mission analysis), which could specify time constraints,
outline initial coordination requirements, authorize movement of key capabilities within
the JFC’s authority, and direct other actions as necessary.
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Support to Joint Operation Planning, Execution, and Assessment
the J-2’s responsibility to lead the staff’s effort and manage and develop products that
provide a systems understanding of the OE as part of JIPOE. Thus the J-2 is a core
player in the early design effort and must be responsive to the commander’s operational
design priorities. The JFC can help the J-2 by specifying critical information
requirements early in the process to focus JIPOE toward specific products that support
the design effort. These products help the commander understand how the joint force’s
actions might affect the relevant political, social, economic, informational, and other
factors that comprise the current environment and affect the end state.
4. Mission Analysis
In order for the joint force staff to identify potential COAs, the JFC formulates
planning guidance based on an analysis of the friendly mission. This analysis helps to
identify specified, implied, and essential tasks, any constraints on the application of
military force, the JFC’s task and purpose (restated mission), and possible follow-on
missions. JIPOE supports mission analysis by enabling the JFC and joint force staff to
visualize the full extent of the OE, to distinguish the known from the unknown, and to
establish working assumptions regarding how adversary and friendly forces will interact
within the constraints of the OE. JIPOE assists JFCs in formulating their PIRs and other
planning guidance by identifying significant adversary capabilities and by pointing out
critical factors, such as adversary intelligence activities, the locations of key geography,
attitudes of indigenous populations, and potential land, air, and sea avenues of approach.
Mission analysis and JFC guidance form the basis for the subsequent development of
friendly COAs by the joint force staff. It is therefore imperative that an initial version of
the impact of the OE, evaluation of the adversary, intelligence collection plan, and
adversary COAs be briefed to the JFC at the mission analysis briefing. This is critical to
enabling the JFC to provide sufficient guidance for friendly COA development.
The J-3 and J-5 develop friendly COAs designed to accomplish the joint force’s
mission within the guidelines established by the JFC. In developing friendly COAs, the
J-3 and J-5 take into consideration factors such as relative force ratios, initial force
dispositions, and possible schemes of maneuver. The number of friendly COAs
developed should remain manageable while still addressing each adversary COA. The J-
2 identifies, evaluates, and prioritizes all adversary COAs (JIPOE step four) in sufficient
time for them to be integrated into the friendly COA development effort. Additionally,
the evaluation of the adversary (JIPOE step three) is used by the J-3 and J-5 to estimate
force ratios. The process of estimating force ratios may be complicated due to wide
disparities between friendly and adversary unit organization, equipment capabilities,
training, and morale. In such situations, the J-2, J-3, and J-5 may choose to develop local
techniques and procedures for evaluating adversary units and equipment in terms of
friendly force equivalents. The J-3 also depends heavily on JIPOE products prepared
during the analysis of the adversary situation and the evaluation of other relevant aspects
of the OE in order to formulate initial friendly force dispositions and schemes of
maneuver. Additionally, the JIPOE analysis of HVTs is used by the J-3 and J-5 to
identify targets whose loss to the adversary would significantly contribute to the success
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Chapter VI
of a friendly COA. These targets are refined through wargaming and are designated as
HPTs. JIPOE also provides significant input to the formulation of deception plans by
analyzing adversary intelligence collection and analytical capabilities and activities, and
the perceptual biases of adversary decision makers.
All joint force staff sections participate in an analysis of the friendly COAs
developed by the J-3 and J-5. The purpose of this effort is to identify any aspects of a
particular COA that would make it infeasible, and to determine which COA best
accomplishes the joint force’s mission. The best method to analyze friendly COAs is
through wargaming and the construction of a decision support template.
(b) Time limits must be established for wargaming each part of the
operation. If time limits are not established, the staff may spend too much time
wargaming specific aspects of the operation at the expense of others.
(c) The J-2 must ensure that the adversary situation, force dispositions,
analysis of HVTs, and adversary doctrinal templates are current prior to the start of
wargaming.
VI-6 JP 2-01.3
Support to Joint Operation Planning, Execution, and Assessment
adversary COA may be the one actually adopted precisely because it is the least likely,
and therefore may be intended to maximize surprise.
(e) All known critical events that may require a decision should be
identified. Critical events identified before the wargame are usually specified or implied
tasks that are essential to mission accomplishment. Other critical events will become
apparent during the wargame. The joint force staff should agree to explore and preplan
decisions that the JFC might have to make during the operation.
(a) Avoid comparing one COA with another during the wargame. The
comparison of friendly COAs should wait until after all COAs have been wargamed.
(b) Each friendly COA should be wargamed first against the adversary’s
most likely COA and then against the most dangerous adversary COA. The other
adversary COAs should be wargamed in accordance with the JFC’s guidance.
(c) Ensure that each friendly COA remains feasible. If for any reason
during the wargame a friendly COA is determined to be infeasible, the wargame should
be stopped and that COA should be revised or rejected.
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Chapter VI
b. Decision Support Template. The decision support template (see Figure VI-2) is
essentially a combined intelligence estimate and operations estimate in graphic form. It
relates the detail contained on the event template (prepared during JIPOE step four) to the
times and locations of critical areas, events, and activities that would necessitate a
command decision, such as shifting the location of the main effort or redeploying forces.
D+6 TAI
TAI
D-0
TAI
D-0 D-4
TAI
Pithian Grey
D+4 Sea Land
D-1 (Neutral)
D+2
D-2
Demilitarized Zone
Border (Occupied by Red) D-2
Amphibious
Operations D-3
D-0
Border D-3
D-2 D-4
South Islands
(Occupied by
Red)
Red
Strategic Red Land
Defense Belt
Legend
target area of
TAI interest road/rail network
restricted terrain
decision point avenue of
approach
severely restricted
terrain major urban area time phase line
VI-8 JP 2-01.3
Support to Joint Operation Planning, Execution, and Assessment
Although the decision support template does not dictate decisions to the JFC, it is a useful
tool for indicating points in time and space (decision points) where action by the JFC
may be required. The decision support template is constructed by combining the event
template with data developed during the wargame. The J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and J-6
collaborate in the production of the decision support template, which is fully coordinated
with all joint force staff elements. The decision support template displays TAIs, avenues
of approach, objectives, and time phase lines derived from the JIPOE event template.
(1) TAIs. Each of the TAIs identified during the fourth step of JIPOE are
displayed on the decision support template. Each of these locations is associated with a
corresponding decision point that, if activated, will confirm the adversary’s intention to
move into the TAI. This relationship is crucial and mirrors the relationship between
intelligence and operations. Thus, intelligence collection against the decision point is
designed to provide the J-3 with the necessary tip-off information to engage the adversary
force in the TAI.
(2) Decision Points. A decision point is a point in space and time when the
commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific COAs. A
decision point should be located to provide sufficient time for friendly forces to engage
the adversary in a specific TAI. The locations of decision points depend both on the
availability and response time of friendly forces as well as the anticipated activity,
capabilities, and movement rates of adversary forces. The J-2 will assist the J-3 and J-5
in identifying decision points that support the overall CONOPS. Both staff elements
must work together to ensure that the distance between decision points and their
associated TAIs permit sufficient time to synchronize friendly actions before the
adversary reaches the engagement area. Specifically, the distance between a decision
point and its associated TAI must permit sufficient time and space for:
(d) The movement of the adversary from the decision point to the TAI.
Following wargaming, the staff compares friendly COAs to identify the one that has
the highest probability of success against the full set of adversary COAs as depicted on
the decision support template. Each joint force staff section uses different criteria for
comparing friendly COAs, according to their own staff area of expertise. For example,
the J-3 and J-5 compare friendly COAs based on the friendly force’s ability to defeat
each adversary COA, whereas the J-2 assesses the overall capabilities of intelligence
collection and production to support each friendly COA. Additionally, each staff section
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must ensure that they have fully considered the JFC’s initial planning guidance for COA
selection.
After comparing friendly COAs, each joint force staff element presents its findings
to the remainder of the staff. Together they determine which friendly COA they will
recommend to the JFC. The J-3 then briefs the COAs to the JFC using graphic aids, such
as the decision support template and matrix. The JFC decides upon a COA and
announces the CONOPS.
Using the results of wargaming associated with the selected COA, the joint force
staff prepares plans and orders that implement the JFC’s decision. The J-2 prioritizes
intelligence requirements and synchronizes intelligence collection requirements to
support the COA selected by the JFC.
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Support to Joint Operation Planning, Execution, and Assessment
GEOINT X X
SIGINT X X X
HUMINT X X
MASINT X X
TECHINT X X
OSINT X X
CI X X
Legend
CI counterintelligence OSINT open-source intelligence
GEOINT geospatial intelligence PIR priority intelligence
HUMINT human intelligence requirement
IR information requirement SIGINT signals intelligence
MASINT measurement and signature intelligence TECHINT technical intelligence
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Chapter VI
SECTION B. EXECUTION
10. Overview
Execution begins when the President decides to use a military option to resolve a
crisis. Only the President or SecDef can authorize the CJCS to issue an execute order
(EXORD). The EXORD directs the supported commander to initiate military operations,
defines the time to initiate operations, and conveys guidance not provided earlier. The
CJCS monitors the deployment and employment of forces and advises the SecDef on
actions to resolve shortfalls and the actions needed to ensure successful completion of
military operations. Execution continues until the operation is terminated or the mission
is accomplished or revised. JIPOE support is a particularly important prerequisite for
military success throughout all phases of a joint operation regardless of how the battle
evolves (see Figure VI-4).
a. The purpose of phasing is to help the JFC organize operations by integrating and
synchronizing subordinate operations. Phasing helps JFCs and staffs visualize and think
through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces,
resources, time, space, and purpose. Phases are distinct in time, space, and/or purpose
from one another, but must be planned in support of each other and should represent a
natural progression and subdivision of the campaign or operation. From a strategic
perspective, a joint operation can be described using the six primary phases depicted in
Figure VI-4 and discussed later in this chapter. The activities that predominate during a
JIPOE Activities
High-Value Target Development Archive JIPOE
Data
COA Analysis
Legend
COA course of action JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the
COG center of gravity operational environment
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Support to Joint Operation Planning, Execution, and Assessment
given phase, however, rarely align with neatly definable breakpoints. The need to move
from one phase into another is normally identified by assessing that a set of objectives are
achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change in focus
for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. Within the
context of these phases established by a higher-level JFC, subordinate JFCs and
component commanders may establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS. For
example, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or a subordinate
commander might have the following four phases inside the CCDR’s seize initiative
phase: deploy, forcible entry, defense, and offense. The JFLCC could use the offense
sub-phase as a transition to the CCDR’s dominate phase.
b. During execution, the JIPOE effort must stay at least one step ahead of operations
by simultaneously supporting the current phase of the operation and laying the
informational groundwork required for subsequent phases. JIPOE analysts must
continuously evaluate how the execution of each operation phase may require the
modification of preplanned intelligence collection and production requirements and CI
activities. Optimizing the use of limited intelligence collection assets and maximizing
the efficiency of intelligence production resources require constant anticipation of
operational change by JIPOE planners.
Before committing forces, JFCs are able to take actions to help shape the character of
potential future operations. In many cases, these actions blind or exploit an adversary’s
intelligence, enhance bonds between future partner nations, increase understanding of the
region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and
prevent crises from developing. Intelligence activities conducted during the shape phase
help lay the groundwork for the JIPOE effort in all subsequent phases of the operation.
Specifically, the JIPOE effort during the shape phase should focus on OE
characterization and initial target development resulting in target lists and target material
production, identification of adversary COGs, vulnerabilities and susceptibilities to IO,
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key nodes, LOCs, and potential adversary COAs that would deny friendly access to bases
and lodgment areas. A no-strike list and restricted target list should also be developed
during target identification and analysis. Early identification of targets is a critical factor
in friendly COA development. Whenever possible, HN and multinational participation in
the JIPOE effort should be encouraged.
Before the initiation of hostilities, the JFC should work to gain a clear understanding
of the national and military strategic objectives; desired and undesired effects; actions
likely to create those effects; COGs and decisive points; and required joint, multinational,
and nonmilitary capabilities matched to available forces. The J-2 assists the JFC in
visualizing and integrating relevant considerations regarding the OE into a plan that will
lead to achievement of the objectives and accomplishment of the mission. During the
deter phase, the ongoing JIPOE effort is accelerated to focus on monitoring the current
situation while simultaneously assessing adversary capabilities to affect subsequent
phases of the operation. JIPOE analysts support indications and warning by looking for
specific indications of imminent adversary activity that may require an immediate
response or an acceleration of friendly decision-making processes. JIPOE efforts also
concentrate on confirming adversary COGs and support the continuous refinement of
estimates of adversary capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within
the context of the current situation. At the same time however, JIPOE analysts must look
ahead to prepare threat assessments that support planning for operations in subsequent
phases.
VI-14 JP 2-01.3
Support to Joint Operation Planning, Execution, and Assessment
During the dominate phase, operations should be designed to: support the JFC’s
objectives; obtain the highest probability of success; mitigate risk to the force and
mission to an acceptable level; place the force in the best posture for future operations;
and provide the flexibility to meet unexpected threats and opportunities. JFCs conduct
sustained combat operations by simultaneously employing conventional, SOF, and
information-related capabilities throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area.
CMO are executed to preclude civilian interference in attainment of operational
objectives or to remove civilians from operational areas. Some missions and operations
are executed concurrently with other combat operations to deny the enemy sanctuary,
freedom of action, or informational advantage. JFCs may design operations to cause the
enemy to concentrate their forces, thereby facilitating their attack by friendly forces, or
operations may be designed to prevent the enemy from concentrating their forces, thereby
facilitating their isolation and defeat in detail. Operations may be linear (i.e., combat
power is directed toward the enemy in concert with adjacent units) or nonlinear (i.e.,
forces orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces). During this
phase, the JIPOE effort must be equally prepared to support linear and nonlinear
operations. The complexity of nonlinear operations places a premium on a continuous
flow of accurate and timely intelligence to help protect individual forces and support
precise targeting. JIPOE also provides JFCs and component commanders with
assessments of an enemy’s capability, willingness, and intent to employ WMD, which
can quickly change the character of an operation or campaign, threaten the cohesion of
alliances and coalitions, and cause large-scale shifts in strategic and operational
objectives, phases, and COAs. These assessments should identify known and suspected
locations of enemy WMD stockpiles and delivery systems, anticipate the conditions
under which the enemy is most likely to use WMD, and analyze the effects of WMD use
on the OE. Intelligence must not only support operations during the dominate phase, but
also anticipate and address the information requirements for the subsequent stabilize
phase. For example, JIPOE analysts support target development by identifying the
adversary’s key infrastructure. This analysis should include consideration of what
specific infrastructure will be required in the post-combat period to meet the requirements
of the stabilize and enable civil authority phases. These infrastructure targets may
warrant attack by nonlethal means in order to avoid the impact of their permanent
damage or destruction on friendly operations. Additionally, JIPOE analysts must be
prepared to assist the JFC in determining how to fill the power vacuum after the
conclusion of sustained combat operations. In order to set the groundwork for stability
operations, the JFC will require detailed intelligence regarding the status of key
infrastructure, enemy government organizations and personnel, and anticipated
humanitarian needs.
VI-15
Chapter VI
SECTION C. ASSESSMENT
17. Overview
VI-16 JP 2-01.3
Support to Joint Operation Planning, Execution, and Assessment
include combat, assessment of progress is just as important and can be more complex
than traditional combat assessment. Finally, assessment data provides the rationale for
institutional and programmatic changes at the Service levels. The JIPOE process
supports assessment by helping the commander and staff decide what aspects of the OE
to measure and how to measure them to determine progress toward accomplishing tasks,
and setting conditions necessary to achieve an objective. Specifically, JIPOE supports
assessment by establishing baselines, tracking key conditions related to measures of
effectiveness (MOEs), analyzing COAs, identifying COGs and decisive points,
nominating and monitoring HVTs, and establishing measures of adversary activities
(indicators) associated with a specific COA or reaction to friendly operations related to
MOEs (see Figure VI-5).
Tactical Mission
Objectives
Tasks Combat tasks (particularly fires) use
combat assessment
VI-17
Chapter VI
means, and measures do not apply. MOEs help answer questions such as, are we doing
the right things, are our actions contributing to the conditions necessary to achieve the
objective, or are alternative actions required? Well-devised measures can help the
commanders and staffs understand the relationship between specific actions and resulting
effects. Both MOPs and MOEs can be quantitative or qualitative in nature, but
meaningful quantitative measures are preferred because they are less susceptible to
subjective interpretation. MOEs are based on observable and measurable indicators.
Indicators provide evidence that a certain condition exists or certain results have or have
not been attained, and enable decision makers to assess progress toward the achievement
of the objective. Several indicators may make up an MOE, just like several MOEs may
assist in measuring progress toward achievement of an objective. Both MOPs and MOEs
should be developed as early as possible to ensure that data collection can be optimized
during the entire course of the operation.
(1) Relevant. MOPs and MOEs should be relevant to the task, effect,
operation, the OE, the end state, and the commander’s decisions. This criterion helps
avoid collecting and analyzing information that is of no value to a specific operation. It
also helps ensure efficiency by eliminating redundant efforts.
The assessment process is explained in greater detail in JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, JP 3-0,
Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.
The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the
impact on specific functions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may include
assessing progress by phase lines; neutralization of enemy forces; control of key terrain,
VI-18 JP 2-01.3
Support to Joint Operation Planning, Execution, and Assessment
For further information on combat assessment, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, and JP 5-0,
Joint Operation Planning.
VI-19
Chapter VI
matrix. The event matrix summarizes the anticipated events in time and space that would
indicate changes in adversary behavior, systems, or the OE in response to friendly
military operations. Additional refinement of these events results from the wargaming
effort during joint operation planning. These events, or indicators of change, may be
assigned qualitative or quantitative thresholds and are used to support the development of
MOEs.
(5) Higher headquarters policy changes or directives that change the desired end
state.
VI-20 JP 2-01.3
Support to Joint Operation Planning, Execution, and Assessment
e. The J-2 has an important role in helping the J-3 and J-5 develop or redesign
MOEs, determine relevant and available ways and means for their assessment, and
interpret the results. Some of these MOEs will necessarily focus on nodes and links
outside the adversary’s military system, requiring the J-2’s interpretation of second- and
third-order effects in order to anticipate the adversary’s potential reaction to events.
VI-21
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Intentionally Blank
VI-22 JP 2-01.3
CHAPTER VII
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
“Not a Frenchman then doubted that such rapid victories must have decided the
fate of the Spaniards. We believed, and Europe believed it too, that we had
only to march to Madrid to complete the subjection of Spain…The wars we had
hitherto carried on had accustomed us to see in a nation only its military forces
and to count for nothing the spirit which animates its citizens.”
1. Introduction
In its most basic sense, the JIPOE process simply combines an understanding of the
constraints and influences imposed by the OE with the normal modus operandi of an
adversary or relevant actors in order to forecast that adversary’s or actors’ future actions.
This basic JIPOE process is relevant throughout the range of military operations.
However, some types of missions, operations, and situations may require a more tailored
JIPOE approach that places greater emphasis on specific aspects of the OE. For example,
stability operations, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and IW require an approach
that places far greater emphasis on SCA—a better understanding of the civil population
and critical infrastructure. Likewise, the contribution of the JIPOE effort to countering
asymmetric approaches requires techniques and products that are specifically tailored to
the types of joint operations capable of defending against and defeating asymmetric
threats. This chapter discusses some of the special considerations, procedures, and types
of products that JIPOE planners and analysts may find useful in specific situations. The
discussion is intended only as a point of departure for JIPOE analysts to further develop
specific techniques and products based on their initiative, imagination, and innovation.
2. Overview
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, describes both traditional
warfare (a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states)
and IW. Traditional warfare typically involves small-scale to large-scale, force-on-force
military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military
capabilities against each other. By contrast, IW, which has emerged as a major and
pervasive form of warfare, typically involves a less powerful adversary that seeks to
disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful,
conventionally armed military force, which often represents the nation’s established
regime. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full
range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence,
and will. What makes IW “irregular” is its focus—a relevant population—and its
strategic purpose—to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of that
VII-1
Chapter VII
3. Sociocultural Factors
VII-2 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
dynamic and heterogeneous. JIPOE must consider societies or societal links to groups
outside the operational area and the impact of society on the overall OE.
(1) Races and ethnic groups are key aspects of social structure. A race is a
human group that is different by virtue of innate physical characteristics. An ethnic
group is a community whose learned cultural practices, language, history, ancestry, or
religion distinguish them from others. Religious groups may be subsets of larger ethnic
groups. Racial or ethnic groups are often key sources of friction within societies.
(4) JIPOE analysts must understand the dynamic interaction among social
groups to include formal relationships (such as treaties or alliances), informal
relationships (such as custom or common understanding), divisions or cleavages, and
cross-cutting ties (such as religious alignments that cut across ethnic differences).
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Chapter VII
(5) Another factor that must be assessed by the JIPOE analyst is the means in
which the subgroups within the cultural landscape communicate and receive information.
On the surface, it may seem obvious for the joint force to communicate to the populace
through established media such as newspapers or broadcast. However, in some societies
the populace may not have broad access to these sources of information, or may even
have a cultural or historical mistrust of established media sources of information.
(6) JIPOE analysts must also understand the importance of roles, status, and
norms within the society. Members of a society interact with social positions, and these
social positions are referred to as status. For example, most societies associate particular
statuses with particular social groups, such as family, ethnicity, or religion, and every
social status has a corresponding cluster of expected behaviors (roles) that dictate how a
person is expected to think, feel, or act. The standard of conduct for given roles and
status is known as a social norm. A social norm is what people are expected to do or
should do, rather than what people actually do. Norms may be either moral or customary.
When a person’s behavior does not conform to social norms, it will result in social
disapproval. Social status and roles dictate social norms that may significantly impact
stability operations.
(7) JIPOE products should inform the planning process by identifying historical
patterns of crime in local areas as well as locations of police stations and jails. The
JIPOE effort should also address the relationship between the population and police, the
current or past methods of justice, how stability operations may drive criminal activity,
and who will be the perpetrator or victim of crimes.
c. Culture. Once the social structure has been thoroughly assessed, the JIPOE
effort should identify and analyze the culture of the society as a whole and of each major
group within the society. Culture is a system of shared beliefs, values, customs,
behaviors, and artifacts that members of a society use to cope with their world and with
one another. Culture is habitual and perceived as “natural” by people within the society.
Culture conditions an individual’s range of action and ideas; influences how people make
judgments about what is right, wrong, important, or unimportant; and dictates how
members of a society are likely to perceive and adapt to changing circumstances. Where
social structure comprises the relationships within a society, culture provides meaning
within the society. JIPOE should identify and analyze the culture of the society as a
whole and of each major group within the society.
(1) Identity. Primary identities can be national, racial, and religious (specific
examples could be tribe and clan affiliation). Secondary identities include past times or
personal preferences. Individuals belong to multiple social groups which determine their
cultural identities. Furthermore, people tend to rank order these identities depending on
the importance they place on different groups. As a result, an individual’s cultural
identities may conflict with one another, such as when tribe loyalty may conflict with
political affiliation.
(2) Beliefs. Beliefs are concepts and ideas accepted as true. Core beliefs are
part of an individual’s primary cultural identity and are highly resistant to change.
VII-4 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
Examples include religious beliefs, the importance of individual and collective honor,
and the role of the family. Attempts to change the central beliefs of a culture may result
in significant unintended second- and third-order consequences.
(4) Attitudes and Perceptions. Attitudes are affinities for and aversions to
groups, persons, and objects. Attitudes affect perception, which is the process by which
an individual selects, evaluates, and organizes information from the external
environment.
(5) Belief Systems. The totality of the identities, beliefs, values, attitudes, and
perceptions that an individual holds (and the ranking of their importance) constitutes that
person’s belief system. Belief systems act as filters through which individuals process
and adapt to new information.
(6) Cultural Forms. Cultural forms are the concrete expression of the belief
systems shared by members of a particular culture. These forms include language,
rituals, symbols, ceremonies, myths, and narratives and are the medium for
communicating ideologies, values, and norms that influence thought and behavior. A
culture’s belief system can be decoded by observing and analyzing its cultural forms.
(e) Myths. Myths serve to explain some phenomena which to the populace
can have a great influence on the perceived truth. The counterinsurgent must understand
that some myths are as resilient as the truth, and can influence the target audience either
negatively or positively.
VII-5
Chapter VII
(f) Narratives. Narratives are the means through which ideologies are
expressed and absorbed by members of a society. The most important cultural form for
counterinsurgents to understand is the narrative.
d. Power and Authority. The JIPOE effort should identify how both formal and
informal powers are apportioned and used within a society. In some operations, informal
power holders, such as social elites, ethnic leaders, and religious figures, are more
important than formal power holders. Often, the key power holders with connections and
influence in a society operate behind the scenes, and are therefore difficult to identify and
assess. JIPOE products should identify these key individuals and assess their motivations
and strategies. The JIPOE effort should also identify current and emerging parties;
formal and informal leaders; party and leader influence on local, regional, and national
levels; ties to threat or religious entities; facilities; and financial means of support. The
JIPOE process also identifies previous actors and influencers as well as current political
parties and their agendas; analyzes the local, regional, and national concept of what
constitutes a legitimate government, and determines any political grievances that the
population may have had locally, regionally, or nationally. A complete JIPOE analysis
will inform not only the potential timing for establishing a civil government, but also the
nature of the government that should be established and the political personalities who
should (or at least should not) establish it and occupy key offices. For example,
conducting elections in Bosnia prior to the establishment of viable institutions resulted in
the return of officials who were tied to or were of like mind to those who had initiated the
conflict. JIPOE analysts must understand the types of influence each group has, what it
uses that influence for, and how it acquires and maintains its influence. Five major forms
of influence in a society include coercive force, social capital, economic power, authority,
and persuasive communication.
(1) Coercive Force. Coercion is the ability to compel a person to act through
threat of harm or by the use of physical force. Coercive force can be positive or negative.
Groups may use coercive means for a variety of purposes such as protecting their
community, carrying out vendettas, and engaging in criminal activity. One essential role
of government is providing physical security for its citizens by monopolizing the use of
coercive force for legitimate purposes.
(2) Social Capital. Social capital refers to the ability of individuals and groups
to use social networks of reciprocity and exchange to accomplish their goals. In many
societies, patron-client relationships are an important form of social capital. In a system
based on patron-client relationships, an individual in a powerful position provides goods,
services, security, or other resources to followers in exchange for political support or
loyalty, thereby amassing power.
VII-6 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
networks through patronage systems. JIPOE must analyze how groups use economic
power with the OE and how that power can be exploited.
(4) Authority. In some societies substantial power stems from the authority
associated with a social position. Authority may be grounded in law and contract and
codified in impersonal rules. Alternatively, authority may be exercised by leaders who
have unique, individual charismatic appeal, whether ideological, religious, political, or
social. Authority may also be invested in a hereditary line or particular office by a higher
power.
e. Interests. Interests refer to the core motivations that drive behavior. During
times when the government does not function, groups and organizations to which people
belong satisfy some or all of their interests that the government does not. The interests of
civil populations usually include physical security, essential services, economic well-
being, and political participation.
VII-7
Chapter VII
4. Infrastructure Analysis
VII-8 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
(skilled, unskilled, educated) on third-country nationals seeking work; local laws and
regulations impact on conducting business; business climate (friendly or hostile);
currency preferences (local or external); barriers to external and internal trade;
availability of visas and work permits; and commodities and/or services available on the
local market.
JIPOE analysts must use information from a variety of intelligence and non-
intelligence sources and methods and use appropriate analytical strategies to develop the
detailed knowledge required for SCA. Determining the sociocultural landscape of an
operational area is the result of a fused intelligence effort and normally requires a heavy
reliance on information from open sources, such as other USG departments and agencies,
NGOs, IGOs, academic institutions, and HN authorities. In combination, HUMINT,
GEOINT, and other sources enable the creation of products invaluable during IW. For
example, US and multinational forces operating in an urban environment will require the
ability to correctly orient their forces against specific street addresses based on local tip-
off information. Operations directed against the wrong building or dwelling may have
unintended and/or undesired consequences. In many situations, however, street addresses
in foreign urban areas do not use conventional numbering or structured identification
systems. In these situations, HUMINT and information derived from open sources and
local postal officials may be combined with GEOINT to produce accurate street address
maps. Likewise, local law enforcement officials are crucial sources of information
regarding criminal organizations, individuals, activities, areas, and methods. Employing
biometrics can greatly assist US, HN, and multinational forces in authenticating and
confirming the identity of individuals. During IW, insurgents, terrorists, and criminals
seek to blend into the local populace and may carry false documentation. Biometrics can
VII-9
Chapter VII
establish the true identity of these individuals and can link them to networks and past
events. Mapping relevant sociocultural and environmental factors utilizes information
and intelligence from multiple sources (intelligence disciplines, WTI, biometrics-enabled
intelligence, forensic-enabled intelligence, police units, military patrols, civil affairs
units, provincial reconstruction teams, etc.) to produce network analysis diagrams and
corresponding geospatial products. Using reported data, Figure VII-1 depicts both a
network perspective and a geospatial perspective to understand the sociocultural and
environmental factors of the OE.
Reported Data
1. Hazad tribe
a. Abu Hazad is new sheik.
b. Rashid Hakim owns Abu Trucking.
c. Ali Hazad (son of sheik) injured in improvised
explosive device (IED) attack.
d. Samar Hakim married Mumar Wahad.
2. Aziri tribe
a. Mumar Wahad (sheik’s son) manufactures
IEDs.
b. Mokmud Aziz (uncle) leads smuggling ring.
c. Sheik Wahad recently returned from exile.
d. Akmar Wahad (eldest son) manages Abu
Trucking.
VII-10 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
CCMDs, and multinational and HN forces in order to form a common point of reference
and framework for JIPOE. The accuracy and scale of foreign maps and charts may vary
widely from US products. Additionally, release of US geospatial and JIPOE products
and information may require foreign disclosure approval. While joint operations graphics
are often used as the standard scale for joint plans and operations, IW requires extremely
accurate geospatial products and information with significantly greater detail. The JFC
should work to ensure that all subordinate commands utilize compatible GEOINT
products, data, and standards to ensure JIPOE processes and products developed by the
joint force J-2 adequately support the mission. The joint force GEOINT staff officer will
assist all units and activities participating in stability operations to acquire all GEOINT
products prescribed by the JFC.
b. HUMINT and CI. Due to the emphasis placed on understanding the civil
population, force protection concerns, and foreign intelligence threats, both CI and
HUMINT assume increased importance during IW and often provide the most valuable
sources of information. However, CI and HUMINT infrastructure may not be in place
when US forces initially arrive. Appropriate liaison channels need to be established as
quickly as possible with interagency, multinational partners and appropriate elements
within the HN while HUMINT and CI operations are established. This will require early
planning and release authority for exchanging intelligence with the HN and other
multinational partners. Operational circumstances may also require the insertion of
HUMINT and CI personnel into the operational area ahead of a joint force. HUMINT
and CI can provide ground truth reporting, intentions, support to route reconnaissance,
and enabling support (e.g., cross cueing) for other intelligence disciplines. In addition,
HUMINT collection and CI activities provide intelligence on foreign intelligence entities
in the operational area that allow CI to detect, identify, assess, exploit, counter, or
neutralize an adversary’s capabilities and activities. HUMINT and CI can also be a
critical element in supporting special operations and PR.
For more information on WTI, see JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to
Military Operations, and JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations.
VII-11
Chapter VII
a. During IW, the joint force will usually operate in a complex international
environment alongside other actors that will have a need for JIPOE products. They are
also likely to possess valuable information they can provide the joint force that is unique
to their own mission and sources. The J-2 must have a process in place to exchange
information with external sources and assess the validity of information supplied by
mission partners. This process should include foreign disclosure officers, delegated with
the proper authority to disclose classified military information to foreign government and
international organizations in accordance with legal and policy guidelines. Mission
partners may include USG interagency members, UN organizations, partner nations,
allied military and security members, local indigenous military and security forces,
NGOs, and private companies and individuals providing contract services within the
operational area. Although the joint force may have organic intelligence capabilities
assigned, the aforementioned mission partners may provide the bulk of information for
analyzing the OE. The J-2 may find the information coming from these disparate entities
just as valuable, or more so, for assessing the overall situation than traditional
intelligence sources.
The primary difference between the basic JIPOE process during traditional warfare
and the JIPOE effort during IW is one of focus, particularly in the high degree of detail
required, and the strong emphasis placed on SCA. JIPOE products must be tailored to
the situation and focus on analyzing the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure,
understanding the motivations of the adversary, and identifying any shared aspirations,
values, or outlooks that link the adversary to the general population. Due to the fluid and
dynamic nature of operations, commanders and their staffs are often overwhelmed with
details and can quickly reach information overload. The JFC and supporting units,
multinational forces, and local officials and law enforcement personnel should have
access to continuously updated situational depictions of the OE in order to help them be
more effective. In this type of environment, written products are less likely to be used
unless they are of critical importance. In some operations, the JIPOE effort will be
graphic intensive and use techniques that can easily and rapidly update and summarize
VII-12 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
relevant aspects of the OE. The following discussion describes some of the specific
types of information that should be considered during the JIPOE process. Techniques for
graphically depicting this information are illustrated in Appendix E, “Joint Intelligence
Preparation of the Operational Environment Specialized Products.”
(2) During IW, the single most important aspect of the OE will usually be the
civil population. The role of the JIPOE analyst is to anticipate natural and human
impediments to fulfilling the joint mission. There are instances in which the mission will
be opposed by groups or individuals using political or violent means of resistance. In
other cases, the population will welcome outside assistance but the geography, climate,
infrastructure, or nature of the mission itself will present challenges that must be
anticipated and overcome. The JIPOE process in support of nontraditional missions will
necessarily involve the identification and complex examination of all relevant factors—
environmental and human—that help define the OE.
b. Describing the Impact of the OE. The JIPOE effort during IW should be
focused on detailed analysis of all the relevant sociocultural aspects previously described,
and should portray the current state of government services, transportation system, LOCs,
public utilities, finance, communication, agriculture and food distribution, health care,
and commerce. In doing so JIPOE analysts are able to determine what exists versus what
does not exist. The analyst can then recommend what is most critical immediately and
over time, and enable commanders to tailor operations according to the situation. In
addition to the types of templates and overlays discussed earlier, JIPOE products
supporting IW may include graphic depictions of infrastructure status and sociocultural
characteristics of the OE. These graphic products are a key visualization aid for
commanders and their staffs, and should be designed with the perspective of the joint
force mission in mind. For instance, during a mission in support of a natural disaster,
such as a flood or earthquake, overlays should be produced depicting the condition of
existing road and rail infrastructure and locations of displaced persons.
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Chapter VII
c. Evaluating the Adversary and Other Relevant Actors. The adversary may
include other potentially hostile actors who may interact with the joint force and could
potentially hamper mission accomplishment. During IW, the adversary may range from
loosely organized networks or entities with no discernible hierarchical structure to highly
structured organizations with centralized C2. Regardless of structure, the adversary must
usually rely on the civil population for its sustainment—a critical vulnerability that may
be exploited within the country’s interconnected systems. This type of adversary often
wages a protracted conflict in an attempt to break the will of the nation-state and
sometimes employs tactics (such as terrorism) that may alienate the civil population.
Threats to completion of the mission can also come from a variety of physical,
environmental, or sociocultural factors.
(2) The identity and general uniformity of a military threat is often absent in an
IW operation. When potentially violent groups exist in the operational area, the
environment becomes even more complex with rapidly shifting, self-proclaimed group
titles, multiple memberships by individual terrorists or cells, and blurred connections
between groups, political movements, and communities. In many cases, the adversary is
described in terms of individuals or small cells that are disaffected and prone to violence.
These individuals may be terrorists and criminals that use illicit activities to finance
terrorist activities in support of political goals. The roles of private organizations, such as
contract security personnel, NGO service providers, indigenous neighborhood
associations, religious communities, and other local actors must also be assessed.
(3) In addition, the potential criminal threat must be assessed. JIPOE analysts
must determine who the criminals are, how they are organized, where they are located,
and what their historical patterns of activity were. Beyond organized crime and its
associated hierarchy, methods, and focus, the JIPOE effort should address what the
environment will look like for crime following combat operations. For example, what
are the needs and shortages of the local population that will drive crime and who are the
likely targets? What will be the likely targets of looting? What are the capabilities of
local police?
(4) The identities of individual actors, when known, may help intelligence
organizations determine what type of threat or criminal activity may occur in the OE as
well as who may be involved. I2 that is enabled with biometric and forensic technologies
will facilitate the tracking of potentially hostile individuals and their potential
involvement in threat or criminal activities.
VII-14 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
8. Overview
The adversary may use asymmetric means to counter friendly intelligence collection
capabilities and complicate friendly targeting efforts through MILDEC, camouflage and
concealment, frequent repositioning of mobile infrastructure, and the selective use of air
defense systems to force airborne ISR assets to less than optimum flight profiles. For
example, Serbian forces in Kosovo made extensive use of camouflage, concealment, and
decoys to mitigate the effectiveness of allied air strikes during Operation ALLIED
FORCE. JIPOE helps to counter the effectiveness of these asymmetric techniques by
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Chapter VII
JIPOE
Legend
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the WMD weapons of mass destruction
operational environment
supporting the joint force’s ISR and targeting efforts. JIPOE support to ISR is designed
to optimize the employment of ISR and target acquisition assets by forecasting the times
and locations of anticipated adversary activity. Additionally, ISR collects the
information required to update the joint force’s JIPOE products. ISR is therefore both a
consumer and provider of JIPOE data.
a. Define the OE. The OE must encompass all aspects relevant to adversary
capabilities to counter friendly ISR and target acquisition efforts. Conversely, the JIPOE
effort must also include all aspects and measures that would increase the efficiency of
VII-16 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
friendly ISR and target acquisition assets. In addition to the locations of all adversary
military forces, the OE should include the following:
(1) Identify and analyze potential deployment locations for land-, air-, and sea-
based ISR assets. Consider factors such as:
(c) Optical and radio LOS from the ISR site to adversary locations.
(b) Objects that may interfere with ground, airborne, and naval ISR
operations, such as high-power transmission lines, jungle vegetation, buildings,
mountains, reefs, sandbars, defensive obstacles, and barriers.
(3) Evaluate how environmental conditions will affect both friendly and
adversary ISR systems. Consider how extreme temperatures, winds, humidity, dust,
cloud cover, atmospheric conditions, solar flares, and geomagnetic storms will affect:
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Chapter VII
(c) LOS observation for optical, IR, millimeter wave, and other sights and
sensors.
(5) Determine those areas where the effectiveness of adversary air defense
systems is optimized.
(6) Identify areas where adversary air defense systems are least effective due to
factors such as terrain masking or ground clutter.
c. Evaluate the Adversary and Other Relevant Actors. Analyze the standard OB
factors for each adversary unit, concentrating on how the adversary will appear to
friendly ISR systems.
(1) Identify signatures for specific adversary units and items of equipment.
(4) Analyze the adversary’s potential use of air defense assets in new or
innovative ways to locate and destroy friendly ISR assets.
(6) Analyze hard and deeply buried targets for points of vulnerability to
precision munitions.
VII-18 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
(9) Analyze the ability of the adversary and other actors to blend into the local
population and/or exploit local identity management systems (e.g., government-issued
credentials).
(2) Specific types of lethal and nonlethal operations to counter friendly ISR
(e.g., CI and HUMINT activities, SOF, global positioning system denial, OCO, lasers,
CBRN).
(4) Deception of ISR assets through disguise or disinformation so that they fail
to track or identify the correct target (e.g., adversary changes name, flag, and paint of
ship carrying sanctioned cargo; or adversary gives false indications of a sanctioned
shipment or impending nuclear test for counter ISR purposes).
For further information regarding IO and public affairs, see JP 3-13, Information
Operations, and JP 3-61, Public Affairs.
a. Define the OE. The general characteristics of the OE, as it pertains to IO, will
vary depending on factors such as the following:
(1) The capabilities and geographic reach of the friendly and adversary
information-gathering systems.
(2) The sources of information upon which friendly and adversary forces base
significant decisions.
VII-19
Chapter VII
(4) The strategic goals, political motivations, and psychological mindset of the
targeted country or group.
b. Describe the Impact of the OE. The physical, informational, and cognitive
dimensions of the information environment could impact both friendly and adversary
forces and should be analyzed in order to:
(4) Evaluate the level of adversary and friendly OPSEC and communications
security discipline.
(5) Assess to what degree the values, beliefs, and motivations of key adversary
population groups and military forces coincide or conflict with those of political leaders
or may influence decision making.
(7) Assess the effectiveness of MIS messages and actions in the OE.
(1) Identify and assess adversary capability to conduct CO to include DCO and
OCO.
(2) Identify adversary information themes and techniques for exploiting friendly
and international public opinion.
(3) Identify potential “key communicators” that could be used by the adversary
to influence friendly public opinion or decision making.
VII-20 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
(1) Identify which friendly information systems are most likely to be targeted
by adversary information capabilities. Correlate specific adversary information
capabilities with indicators of other likely adversary activity (e.g., special operations,
sabotage, conventional attacks).
(2) Postulate how the adversary will exploit any loss or degradation of specific
friendly information systems at critical junctures during an operation.
11. Terrorism
Adversaries may commit terrorist acts against the joint force and JIPOE helps
combat terrorism by supporting force protection measures, CI, and other security-related
activities. Combating terrorism consists of actions, including antiterrorism (defensive
measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (actions
taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global
environments inhospitable to terrorist networks), taken to oppose terrorism throughout
the entire range of possible threats.
a. Define the OE. The OE, relative to combating terrorism, may involve an area
larger than that associated with traditional types of operations. Since the operating area
for some terrorist groups may not be restricted geographically, the AOI pertaining to the
terrorist threat to the joint force may be worldwide.
(2) Consider which terrorist groups are most likely to attack friendly personnel,
equipment, and assets. Determine where they are normally based, and what third parties
may provide them with sanctuary and support (training, logistics, etc.).
(3) Anticipate how additional missions such as a NEO may affect force
protection.
VII-21
Chapter VII
(4) Assess the access to conventional weapons and the ability to obtain or create
improvised weapons.
(1) Identify the stated and unstated strategic goals or desired end state of
terrorist leaders.
(2) Determine the demographic issues that make protected areas or personnel
attractive as potential terrorist targets.
(3) Evaluate the potential for terrorist attack on infrastructure targets such as
local sources of drinking water, stockpiles of supplies, arms depots, transportation
systems, communications infrastructure, and electrical power facilities.
(4) Assess the vulnerability of specific targets to attack. Consider both physical
security issues and time constraints that might limit the availability of a target to terrorist
attack.
(1) Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of terrorist ISR capabilities against
force protection-related targets. Determine all available sources of the adversary’s
information.
(2) Assess the degree of risk the terrorist group is willing to take in order to
attack various types of force protection targets. Determine which types of targets the
adversary considers most valuable.
(5) Assess any variations in terrorist organization, methods, and procedures that
may be unique to specific types of terrorist actions (e.g., ambushes, assassinations,
bombings, hijackings).
VII-22 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
(7) Identify the adversary’s leaders; the location, disposition, and number of
terrorist personnel; and the number and type of weapons available.
(2) Assess the status of specific types of terrorist support activities that may
indicate the adoption of a specific COA.
(3) Identify likely terrorist activity along infiltration routes, assembly areas, and
surveillance locations near each of the adversary’s likely objectives.
12. Insurgency
a. Define the OE. The AOI for special operations and CMO should encompass:
(4) Military, paramilitary, governmental, and NGOs that may interact with the
friendly force;
VII-23
Chapter VII
(5) The extent to which international law may constrain special operations and
CMO activities both during and after hostilities;
(6) Sources of food and water, pattern of population distribution, and locations
of critical infrastructure;
(7) The attitudes of the population toward relevant actors as well as how those
attitudes are likely to change during the course of friendly operations.
(1) Evaluate how METOC affects SOF capabilities to conduct infiltration and
exfiltration operations, with particular attention to factors such as the following:
(a) Surface and upper air winds on SOF airborne, aerial leaflet, and
loudspeaker operations.
(b) Benefits of clouds and low visibility on SOF air operations and special
reconnaissance.
(d) Tides, currents, and sea state as well as water temperature and
bioluminescence on waterborne operations.
(e) Illumination.
(3) Assess how the attitudes, values, and motivations of the civil populace will
facilitate or constrain CMO activities. For example, nationalism or religious beliefs may
cause the population to resent or resist certain types of CMO activities.
(4) Analyze the attitude of the local populace toward the existing or pre-
hostilities civil government. Assess how this may affect CMO activities conducted
through or in conjunction with local civil officials.
(5) Survey the extent of damage to local infrastructure, estimate the level of
infrastructure capacity required to support the populace (including additional DCs), and
determine if local sources of repair materials are sufficient.
VII-24 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
(6) Estimate how and where the weather and environment might help or hinder
insurgent forces. For example, drought may exacerbate food shortages, while flooding
may increase the number of DCs and create shortages of shelter. These factors may help
insurgents recruit additional members but could also reduce their access to necessities.
(1) Assess the capabilities and procedures of the insurgent’s military, political,
and internal security forces.
(3) Identify the motivations and potential sources of discord within the
insurgent force.
(4) Identify the adversary’s leaders; the location, disposition, and number of
insurgent personnel; and the number and type of weapons available.
(1) Identify how the adversary will attempt to counter special operations or
CMO missions. Determine to what degree the adversary’s likely response will include
political, economic, social, or military countermeasures.
(2) Assess the insurgent’s capability to secure all identified infiltration and
exfiltration routes. Determine to what degree the adversary’s strengthening of internal
security in one area will detract from security in a different area.
(3) Postulate how the civil populace may respond to various types of CMO
activities, and how insurgents may attempt to exploit such responses. For example, the
adversary may attempt to use propaganda against a vaccination program or try to gain
control over food distribution centers.
(4) Consider the effect that the insurgent’s perception of friendly forces may
have on COA selection. If friendly forces appear overwhelmingly powerful, non-
confrontational COAs may be preferred, whereas the appearance of weakness may invite
insurgents to pursue higher risk COAs.
VII-25
Chapter VII
WMD operations. JIPOE analysts help mitigate these threats by assessing the
adversary’s WMD-related activities and supporting the joint force’s counter-WMD
activities. The potential for accidental or deliberate release of CBRN hazards within the
operational area is also a major JIPOE analytic concern. JIPOE must provide the JFC
with an awareness of the capabilities and limitations of adversary CBRN weapons and
delivery systems, their command, control, and release procedures, and the indicators of
intent to employ CBRN weapons. JIPOE also plays a key role in cases where nation-
state stability is threatened and there is the potential loss of positive control of WMD to
non-state actors (e.g., insurgents, terrorists, criminal organizations, former regime
members, former military members). The goal is to give the JFC an understanding of the
implications to the joint force of an actual or threatened CBRN environment.
a. Define the OE. With regard to CBRN threats and hazards, the OE should
encompass the following:
(2) All current and potential locations of adversary and potential belligerent
WMD delivery systems (e.g., missiles, artillery, aircraft, mines, torpedoes, and forces).
(3) All adversary known and suspected CBRN capabilities, and their storage,
movement, and production facilities.
(5) CBRN threats and hazards, capabilities, expertise, and sensitive and dual-
use technologies.
(1) Identify and assess key friendly logistic facilities and infrastructure
vulnerabilities to CBRN threats and hazards.
(2) Identify all known and suspected CBRN threats and hazards.
(3) Identify critical METOC, climatological, and terrain effects on the use or
release of WMD or CBRN hazards.
(4) Analyze the terrain to identify potential target areas for WMD attack, such
as chokepoints, key terrain, and transportation nodes.
VII-26 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
(1) Analyze adversary capabilities, TTP, and will to proliferate and/or employ
specific types of WMD. Determine the locations, volume, and conditions of adversary
WMD/CBRN materials, agents, devices, and stockpiles.
(2) Identify the specific types and characteristics of all adversary WMD
delivery systems, with special attention to minimum and maximum ranges.
(4) Assess the level and proficiency of adversary CBRN operations training and
protective measures.
(7) Analyze the will and ability of non-state actors to seize CBRN stockpiles or
program elements from a nation state.
(8) Identify US or partner actions that are likely to deter the adversary from
employing CBRN materials.
(1) Identify friendly assets that the adversary is most likely to target for WMD
attack.
(2) Determine those locations where the adversary is most likely to deploy
WMD delivery systems. These locations should be within range of potentially targeted
friendly assets, yet still consistent with the adversary’s deployment doctrine.
(3) Evaluate those characteristics of the adversary’s WMD stockpile that may
dictate or constrain WMD use. These may include factors such as the quantity and yield
of nuclear weapons, the age and shelf life of stored chemical munitions, and the
production and handling requirements for biological agents.
(5) Determine vulnerable locations where non-state actors are most likely to
seize WMD stockpiles or program elements from a nation-state.
VII-27
Chapter VII
An adversary may use ballistic and cruise missiles to directly threaten friendly forces
or to provoke political situations that may have strategic ramifications. For example,
Iraqi Scud missile launches against Israeli targets during Operation DESERT STORM
were intended to provoke an Israeli attack that could have had negative consequences for
the coalition. Ballistic missile defense and counterair operations help protect the force
from these types of asymmetric threats.
a. Define the OE. The OE for ballistic defense and counterair operations should
incorporate portions of the air, land, maritime, and space domains. Consider factors such
as the following;
(2) Ballistic and cruise missile launch locations, potential hide sites, forward
operating locations, related locations, garrison locations, and associated infrastructure.
(4) Range characteristics and flight profiles of adversary ballistic and cruise
missiles.
(1) Determine the locations of targets within range of specific adversary missile
launch sites or airfields. Analyze the geography between the target and adversary base to
determine potential missile trajectories and air avenues of approach for unmanned aircraft
and cruise missiles.
(2) Identify areas for likely standoff attack orbits, SLCM launch locations, and
aircraft carrier operating areas.
(3) Determine optimal times on target based on METOC conditions over the
target area and METOC/climatological effects on platforms, sensors, and weapon
systems to be employed over the target area; adversary launch and attack cycles; and light
data.
VII-28 JP 2-01.3
Special Considerations
(4) Determine LOS from friendly air and missile defense systems and radar.
(1) Assess the adversary’s launch procedures, resupply operations, and target
selection priorities.
(3) Evaluate the threat to friendly air defense systems, to include adversary
artillery, unconventional forces, and EW assets.
(4) Determine the adversary’s requirements for air and missile base
infrastructure, navigation aids, and communications system support equipment.
(6) Analyze potential for modification to adversary ballistic and cruise missiles
to accommodate chemical agent payloads and resulting impact on missile range.
(5) Friendly air defense locations and coverage, and their likely effect on
adversary missile operations.
VII-29
Chapter VII
The parameters under which DOD intelligence components operate are different
when operating within the US territorial jurisdiction than they are overseas. Use of DOD
intelligence component capabilities within the US territorial jurisdiction receives
heightened scrutiny by the public, media, and higher headquarters. This affects the role
of intelligence during JIPOE efforts in the United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) areas of
responsibilities.
c. Commanders and staffs must carefully consider the legal and policy limits
imposed on intelligence activities in support of law enforcement agencies, and on
intelligence activities involving US citizens and entities by intelligence oversight
regulations, policies, and executive orders. This oversight includes incident awareness
and assessment products. No intelligence activities should take place while conducting
defense support of civil authorities unless authorized by appropriate authorities in
accordance with Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, and DODD
5240.1-R.
VII-30 JP 2-01.3
APPENDIX A
THE LEYTE CAMPAIGN—A CASE STUDY OF SUPPORT TO MAJOR
OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS
“In considering the enemy’s possible lines of action, the commander must
guard against the unwarranted belief that he has discovered the enemy’s
intentions, and against ignoring other lines of action open to the enemy.”
1. Operational Background
a. By the summer of 1944, the Allied offensive against Japan had reached a crucial
decision point (see Figure A-1). The Allies had conducted a two-prong strategic offensive in
the Pacific during the previous year. As part of his island-hopping campaign in the central
Pacific, Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPOA), conducted
landings in the Gilberts, Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas, with landings in the Palaus
scheduled for September 1944. Meanwhile, General MacArthur, Commander in Chief,
Southwest Pacific (CINCSOWESPAC) drove west along the New Guinea coast with
landings at Morotai and Mindanao scheduled for mid-September and mid-November 1944,
respectively.
Nimitz
Mac
A rthu
r
A-1
Appendix A
b. The next objective would merge the two drives as the Allied offensive completed
its goal of isolating Japan from its source of oil and seizing advanced bases in preparation
for the eventual invasion of the Japanese home islands. The question was whether
Formosa (followed by a landing on the Chinese coast) or the northern Philippines should
be the objective of the coming offensive. Nimitz favored the Formosa strategy, while
MacArthur favored the recapture of all of the Philippines. The debate centered on a
number of points, to include: the potential for higher casualties in the Philippines; a
friendly and supportive native population in the Philippines vice Formosa; the recent loss,
due to the summer Japanese offensive, of Allied air bases in mainland China (for
attacking Japan); and the political imperatives for recapturing the Philippines, an
American possession. The debate was essentially decided in favor of the Philippine
strategy during a meeting in Hawaii among President Roosevelt, General MacArthur, and
Admiral Nimitz on 26-27 July. By early September, a target date for a landing on Leyte
had been set for 20 December 1944 to be followed by landings on heavily defended
Luzon in February.
a. The OE Defined
(1) Mission Analysis. The landing at Leyte was to be the first step to retaking
the Philippines. Leyte would be seized in order to establish a centrally located air and
logistic base from which the recapture of the rest of the Philippines, to include the heavily
defended northern island of Luzon, could be accomplished. Control of the Philippines,
especially Luzon, would enable the Allies to cut Japanese SLOCs, which ran through the
South China Sea, and deny Japan access to its primary source of crude oil in the East
Indies. US aircraft based in the Philippines would reinforce ongoing submarine
operations and completely sever this vital supply link. Finally, the Philippines would
provide an advanced base to support the eventual invasion of Japan. Japanese forces
deployed outside the Philippines that were capable of interfering with the mission
included: aircraft based in China, Japan, Okinawa, and Formosa; the surface fleet based
at Singapore; and the carrier fleet based in Japan.
A-2 JP 2-01.3
The Leyte Campaign—A Case Study of Support to Major Operations and Campaigns
Asian mainland (Japanese held) to the west, New Guinea (Allied held) to the south, and
the Marianas (Allied held) to the east. The JOA cut across two US theaters of operation,
MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area (the supported command) and Nimitz’s Central
Pacific Area (the supporting command). MacArthur’s operational area for the Leyte
landing was the Philippine Archipelago, centered on the objective (the island of Leyte),
its surrounding waters, and accompanying air space.
(1) Maritime Domain. The Philippine Archipelago, which extends for over
1,000 miles from north to south, restricted naval operations in the otherwise open ocean
environment of the Western Pacific. It separated the Philippine Sea to the east from the
South China Sea to the west. The Philippine Archipelago, Formosa, and the Ryukyu
Islands formed a physical barrier that protected SLOCs linking the East Indies (present-
day Indonesia) and China with the Japanese home islands via the South China and East
China Seas. There were only four maritime avenues of approach for naval formations
transiting the Philippine Archipelago from the South China Sea to the Philippine Sea:
north of Luzon; the San Bernardino Strait; the Surigao Strait; and south of Mindanao (see
Figure A-2). Additionally, within the South China Sea there were areas of water along
the Philippine Archipelago that were unnavigable due to uncharted rocks and shoals,
further constraining maritime operations. While the Philippines would serve to
channelize naval operations, they could also provide concealment from enemy
observation for smaller ships (amphibious shipping, coastal freighters, patrol boats, etc.)
hugging the extensive coastline. The large number of widely dispersed potential
amphibious landing sites along the Philippine coast severely complicated the viability of
ground defenses. Finally, the Philippines had a number of fine natural harbors that
supported a thriving network of interisland trade and commerce. Since road networks on
some islands were limited, interisland shipping was the primary means of moving bulk
cargoes. Leyte Gulf provided sheltered waters large enough to accommodate an
extremely large amphibious task force, and was capable of protecting shipping from the
effects of bad weather (see Figure A-3). Its deep water approaches to the east made it
easily accessible from the Philippine Sea, while the adjacent land mass restricted
maritime avenues of approach from the north, south, and west. The eastern approach to
Leyte Gulf was protected by Japanese naval minefields and was dominated by two small
islands south of the gulf’s mouth.
A-3
Appendix A
San
Bernardino
Strait
Surigao
Strait
(3) Land Domain. The island of Leyte dominated the central portion of the
main Japanese LOC connecting the strategic islands of Luzon and Mindanao. Leyte’s
exposed eastern coastline offered excellent beaches to support an amphibious landing and
the subsequent offloading of supplies. The adjacent coastal plain, the Leyte Valley, held
the majority of the island’s 900,000 native population, along with most of the towns and
roads. The terrain within the Leyte Valley favored offensive operations. Additionally, it
A-4 JP 2-01.3
The Leyte Campaign—A Case Study of Support to Major Operations and Campaigns
restricted
mobility
severely
restricted
mobility
Airfields
Ormoc
Valley
Naval
Mines
would provide the space necessary to establish the base infrastructure needed to support
follow-on operations in the Philippines. The island, which was only 50 miles wide at it
greatest width, was dominated by a heavily forested north-south central mountain range
of up to 4,400 feet in height. Consequently, Japanese forces based in the mountains
could threaten any build-up in the Leyte Valley. The west side of the island contained
the Ormoc Valley and the port of Ormoc City. However, the remainder of the western
side of the island was mountainous, sparsely populated, and had poor land LOCs. The
terrain in the west favored defense, while the port of Ormoc City offered a resupply point
for Japanese reinforcements arriving by sea from nearby islands. Thus, to secure control
of the vital Leyte Valley, the entire island would have to be captured.
A-5
Appendix A
(4) Weather. The tropical weather found year-round in the Philippines, with its
autumn monsoon rains, would significantly impact military operations. It could seriously
hamper land mobility and the rapid construction of bases and supporting logistic
infrastructure. This could be critical as carrier-based air power would be forced to
remain close offshore supporting the landing force and protecting it from air attack, until
land-based air power could be established in strength on Leyte. This would rob US
aircraft carriers of one of their primary strengths—mobility—by fixing them in place,
making them more vulnerable to attack.
(c) For Japan, the importance of the continued flow of crude oil from the
East Indies could not be overstated. It was access to oil that was the casus belli for Japan
and directly led to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Japan was already suffering a shortage of
fuel because of aggressive submarine attacks on its SLOCs to the East Indian oilfields.
c. Evaluation of the Adversary. The Japanese 14th Area Army was responsible
for defending the Philippine operational area with a total of 432,000 troops (with between
180,000-200,000 on Luzon) and over 800 aircraft (from the 4th Air Army and 1st Air
Fleet) (see Figure A-4). The 35th Army was assigned to defend the Visayas (including
Leyte) and Mindanao. This included the 16th Division (controlling approximately
20,000 troops), which was responsible for defending Leyte, and the 30th Division,
located nearby on Mindanao. As early as April 1944, Japanese forces began constructing
additional defenses on Leyte as one of several anticipated US landing sites. Additional
Japanese aircraft (Army and Navy) were located on Okinawa, Formosa, and Japan. The
Japanese aircraft carriers were also located in Japan in order to train replacements for
their badly attrited air crews. The remainder of the Japanese surface fleet was anchored
off Singapore at Lingga Roads due to the shortage of fuel in Japan.
A-6 JP 2-01.3
The Leyte Campaign—A Case Study of Support to Major Operations and Campaigns
Southern Combined
Army Fleet
unacceptable damage and casualties upon US forces in the hopes of opening peace
negotiations. Operational Japanese objectives were to retain control of the Philippines,
destroy or severely damage US forces, and defeat the amphibious operation.
(1) Based upon Japanese objectives and the disposition of Japanese forces
immediately following the landing, broad Japanese COAs included the following:
(a) COA 1. Defend Leyte with the forces on hand (see Figure A-5). Past
Japanese practice, as well as their military doctrine, made this COA likely. However,
given the immense superiority of US military power in the area of operations, this COA
would only delay an inevitable Japanese defeat, albeit at a cost to the US in the form of
casualties.
(b) COA 2. Reinforce land forces on Leyte and committed air units in the
Philippines (see Figure A-6). This COA would enable the Japanese to prolong the battle,
increase US casualties, and/or prepare for a future attack. However, given US air and
naval superiority, Japanese forces would suffer severe attrition as they moved en route to
Leyte, thus increasing Japanese losses, while at the same time enabling the US buildup on
Leyte to continue.
A-7
Appendix A
Aircraft
redeploy to
Leyte forward
airfields
Additional defensive
positions prepared
on Leyte
(c) COA 3. Attack in order to disrupt the landing and isolate the landing
force (see Figure A-7). While Japanese land forces on Leyte were too weak to conduct a
full-scale ground offensive without reinforcement, Japanese air and naval units could
conduct offensive operations to destroy US naval forces off Leyte. This would isolate the
landing force and facilitate its subsequent destruction by a (reinforced) ground offensive.
A-8 JP 2-01.3
The Leyte Campaign—A Case Study of Support to Major Operations and Campaigns
Movement of
additional 35th
Army units to
Leyte
Japanese naval doctrine of the decisive battle argued for this COA. However, Japanese
naval forces had been severely attrited (especially their carrier air crews) and had not
recovered from their defeat at the Battle of the Philippine Sea. As a result, this COA
risked the permanent destruction of Japanese naval power. Neither MacArthur nor
Nimitz considered this COA likely, due to the weakened state of the Japanese Navy.
A-9
Appendix A
Commitment of
Combined Fleet
aircraft carriers
Commitment of
additional 4th
Air Army assets
to Leyte
Commitment of
Singapore-based
naval task forces
Commitment of
35th Army
Reserve to Leyte
A-10 JP 2-01.3
The Leyte Campaign—A Case Study of Support to Major Operations and Campaigns
Consolidation of 4th
Air Army assets at
Luzon airfields
Deployment
of 35th Army
to Luzon
Figure A-8. Situation Template for Course of Action 4 (Withdrawal from Leyte)
(2) Analysis of COAs. Based upon doctrine, relative force ratios, past practice,
and the Japanese cultural mindset, COA 1 (to defend Leyte with the forces on hand) was
considered the most likely. However, such a defense would only delay defeat and was
unlikely to achieve Japanese objectives unless it was augmented by elements of the other
COAs. COA 2 (to reinforce Leyte with additional land and air units) was a medium risk
and medium gain means of augmenting the defensive COA. COA 3 (a counteroffensive),
A-11
Appendix A
although a high-risk and high-gain option, was the only COA capable of fully meeting
the desired Japanese end state and objectives. A counteroffensive was also the most
dangerous Japanese COA for US forces, but was not considered likely by the US because
of the risks involved and the weakened state of the Japanese Navy. COA 4 (a withdrawal
from Leyte) was the least likely option based upon past Japanese practice and the
strategic significance of Leyte. Figure A-9 summarizes these COAs in the order of their
projected probability of adoption.
(3) Event Template and Matrix. The following event template (Figure A-10)
combines the hypothetical NAI portrayed on the situation templates associated with each
of the COAs identified above. The event matrix (Figure A-11) lists the indicators for
each NAI that would confirm Japanese intentions to adopt a specific COA.
a. The United States gained air and naval superiority in the immediate vicinity of
Leyte following a series of devastating carrier and land-based air strikes on targets in the
Philippines, Okinawa, and Formosa. On 20 October 1944, the US Seventh Fleet began
Ground Forces Defend Leyte with Same as COA 1 and Same as COA 2 but Withdraw from Leyte.
forces on hand in reinforce Leyte with with goal of conserving Consolidate on Luzon.
decisive battle of troops based in and/or building up
attrition. Philippines and China. combat power for future
Goal of prolonging offensive operations.
battle of attrition.
Air Forces Engage with aircraft Same as COA 1 and Reinforce as in COA 2 Same as COA 1 but
already assigned to reinforce committed air and conduct all-out with goal of supporting
Philippines. Conserve units with aircraft from attacks. Goal of withdrawal of ground
air strength for future Formosa, China, supporting naval attack forces from Leyte.
battles. Okinawa, and Japan. and isolating
beachhead.
Naval Forces Avoid combat with Same as COA 1 plus Engage US naval Support of withdrawal of
surface fleet. Use transport ground forces forces with all available ground forces from
land-based naval air to to Leyte and provide naval and naval air Leyte.
support air attacks. land-based naval air to forces in accordance
support air attacks. with decisive battle
doctrine.
A-12 JP 2-01.3
The Leyte Campaign—A Case Study of Support to Major Operations and Campaigns
NAI 1
(Japanese
Inland Sea)
located to
northeast
8 1
NAI 12
(Lingga Roads) 2
located to
southwest
3
12
6 4 7
5
10
11
landing the US Sixth Army at Leyte Gulf, while the US Third Fleet (including the fast
carrier striking force) provided the covering force protecting the amphibious operation
(see Figure A-12). The US Fifth Air Force provided long-range air support for the
operation from bases in Morotai and New Guinea and was preparing to deploy to airfields
on Leyte as soon as they were secured.
b. The Japanese, despite significant aircraft losses, believed that they had inflicted
severe damage upon the US Third Fleet during its preparatory carrier air strikes on
A-13
Appendix A
Time Indicates
NAI Event
Earliest Latest
COA
Legend
COA course of action NAI named area of interest
Japanese airfields in Formosa, Okinawa, and Luzon in the month prior to the landing. In
response to the US invasion of the Philippines, the Japanese chose to adopt COA 3 and
executed a previously prepared counterattack plan known as SHO-1, designed to destroy
the US fleet in a single decisive action. The Japanese aircraft carriers (nearly combat
ineffective due to inexperienced aircrews) would sortie from Japan and be used as a
decoy to lure the US Third Fleet away from Leyte Gulf. The Japanese surface fleet
would then attack and destroy the amphibious task force (US Seventh Fleet) off Leyte,
thus isolating the landing force (US Sixth Army). The attack would be supported by the
remaining Japanese aircraft (army and navy) based in the Philippines, Formosa, and
Okinawa using both conventional and kamikaze tactics. Meanwhile, Japanese ground
forces would reinforce Leyte and prepare to counterattack the US landing force as soon
as the amphibious task force had been destroyed.
c. The Japanese carrier task force (northern force) under Admiral Ozawa was not
limited by military geography, and approached on an axis moving south southwest from
A-14 JP 2-01.3
The Leyte Campaign—A Case Study of Support to Major Operations and Campaigns
Kurita reversed
course (noon 24 Oct) 3rd Fleet
(Halsey)
Battle off
Samar
(morning
25 Oct)
XX
Kurita’s center force XX
102
16
XXXX
6th Army Lands
Leyte (20 Oct)
Battle of
Nishimura’s Surigao
XX
southern force Strait
30 (0200 25
Shima’s 2nd XX Oct)
striking force 100 35th Army units
reinforce Leyte
(25 Oct – 11 Dec)
Japan into the Philippine Sea. This northern force was to act as a decoy by threatening
the US carrier striking force and drawing it away from Leyte.
d. In order to attack the amphibious task force, which was located to the east of
Leyte, the Japanese surface fleet had to transit through the Philippine Archipelago (see
Figure A-12). The surface fleet was organized into two task forces that would constitute
the center and southern forces of the overall Japanese strategy. The center task force,
under the command of Admiral Kurita, would use San Bernardino Strait to the north of
Leyte. The southern task force, under the command of Admiral Nishimura, would use
Surigao Strait south of Leyte. A smaller third task force of surface ships (Admiral
Shima’s 2nd striking force), which had sailed prior to the battle from Japan, was to
follow the southern task force through Surigao Strait.
e. Kurita’s center force was detected and heavily damaged by submarine attacks and
Third Fleet carrier air strikes on 23 and 24 October. This force was observed to reverse
its course as a result of these attacks. At the same time, the Seventh Fleet positioned its
battleships and cruisers to defend Surigao Strait from the approach of the two southern
task forces. Meanwhile, Ozawa’s northern force, with its decoy carriers, was detected in
the Philippine Sea. Admiral Halsey, believing reports that the Japanese center force had
turned back, responded to what he perceived to be the most dangerous threat by moving
Third Fleet northward to attack the Japanese carriers. This left the San Bernardino
A-15
Appendix A
approach uncovered, the 6th Army beachhead on Leyte vulnerable, and the amphibious
task force in Leyte Gulf virtually unprotected.
f. During the night of 24-25 October, the Seventh Fleet destroyed both Nishimura’s
southern force and Shima’s 2nd striking force in a surface action known as the Battle of
Surigao Strait. Meanwhile, to the north of Leyte, Kurita’s center force reversed course a
second time, transited San Bernardino Strait during the night, and was approaching Leyte
Gulf unopposed. On the morning of 25 October, Kurita’s force encountered Seventh
Fleet escort carriers and destroyers off Samar. The thin skins, lack of armament, and
slow speed of the escort carriers (converted merchant ship and tanker hulls), made them
sitting ducks for Kurita’s rapidly approaching force. Nevertheless, following two and a
half hours of desperate surface combat the Japanese center force (which became
disorganized and confused during the engagement) turned back, believing it had sunk a
number of fleet carriers and cruisers vice escort carriers and destroyers. Kurita’s
confusion proved to be the salvation of the defenseless US amphibious task force.
Meanwhile, Third Fleet, which was out of range and unable to support the escort carriers
off Samar, launched a series of air strikes throughout the day and sank Ozawa’s northern
force carriers in the Battle of Cape Engano, thus permanently destroying Japanese carrier
aviation for the remainder of the war.
g. Despite their heavy losses, the Japanese believed they had achieved a major naval
victory. Wildly exaggerated reports of damage from their air attacks and “victory” at the
Battle off Samar led them to conclude that the US Sixth Army had now been isolated on
Leyte. Using nine convoys between 23 October and 11 December, they reinforced their
forces on Leyte by committing elements of five divisions and one independent brigade to
the battle. MacArthur’s headquarters believed (correctly) that the Japanese had suffered
a defeat, and initially thought the purpose of the Japanese convoys was to evacuate vice
reinforce Leyte. Once their true purpose was discerned, these convoys were severely
attrited by US air attacks. However, the Japanese managed to land over 45,000 troops
and prolong organized resistance on Leyte until the end of December.
h. Throughout this period, the US Seventh and Third Fleets had to remain off Leyte
to protect the beachhead and the Sixth Army until sufficient airfields could be
constructed to enable land-based aircraft to take over the mission. Meanwhile, the
Japanese Naval Air Force continued to attack US vessels off Leyte using kamikaze
tactics for the first time. While these attacks added to US Navy losses, the battle had
already been decided.
“Of this plan [SHO-1] it can only be said that it was contrary to every principle of
naval tactics. When we could not possess adequate control of the air, to send
the main strength of our surface decisive battle force against the enemy landing
point, was a flagrant departure from military common sense. However, under
the existing circumstances there was no alternative unless, seeking safety in
retreat, we were to supinely sit by and watch the enemy carry out his invasion.”
A-16 JP 2-01.3
The Leyte Campaign—A Case Study of Support to Major Operations and Campaigns
4. Lessons Learned
The Battle of Leyte Gulf sealed the fate of the Japanese Empire. The Japanese Navy
was decisively defeated and was incapable of conducting further operations that would
endanger US naval superiority. However, the Japanese almost won a major victory with
Kurita’s center force snatching defeat from the jaws of victory due to its untimely
withdrawal. By using this historical example, several important points about JIPOE can
be made.
a. Prior to the battle, neither MacArthur nor Nimitz expected a significant offensive
reaction from the Japanese Navy. They focused upon what they expected the Japanese to
do (COA 1) vice what the Japanese were capable of doing (COA 3). US planners failed
to understand the perception of the Japanese leadership (albeit incorrect) that their forces
had the advantage due to “heavy” US losses. The JIPOE process, when correctly applied,
is designed to focus attention both upon what the enemy is expected to do and is capable
of doing, by identifying both the most likely enemy COA and the most dangerous COA.
b. Halsey was vulnerable to deception based upon his belief (backed up by his
previous 3 years of war in the Pacific) that the Japanese carriers were the primary threat.
In reality, the Japanese carrier-based air threat was negligible due to the heavy losses
incurred by Japanese naval aircrews and the lack of sufficient replacements. In JIPOE
terms, Halsey failed to anticipate how “wildcard” factors, such as desperation, can
modify an adversary’s past practices, such as the use of aircraft carriers as decoys.
Caution should always be exercised to avoid over-reliance on adversary templating
without rigorous all-source analysis to test if the threat remains valid. The use of a red
team by both the J-2 and the commander can help identify other alternative enemy COAs
viewed through the adversary’s cultural lens. JIPOE is not a panacea, and can lead to
pitfalls when applied without careful analysis.
5. Sources
b. Morison, Samuel Eliot. Leyte, June 1944-January 1945. Boston: Little, Brown,
& Co., 1958.
c. Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23-26 October 1944. New York:
Harper Collins, 1994.
A-17
Appendix A
d. Prados, John. The Combined Fleet Decoded, the Secret History of American
Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. New York: Random House, 1995.
e. Solberg, Carl. Decision and Dissent, with Halsey at Leyte Gulf. Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1995.
f. Thomas, Evan. Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval
Campaign 1941-1945. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.
A-18 JP 2-01.3
APPENDIX B
SOMALIA 1992-1993—A CASE STUDY OF SUPPORT
TO STABILITY OPERATIONS AND IRREGULAR WARFARE
Somali Proverb
1. Background
b. Exacerbating the situation was the extent to which the country was awash with
arms that had been provided to the Barre regime by the former Soviet Union.
Additionally, Somalia hosted one of the most active illegal arms markets in Africa.
Available weapons included vintage heavy weapons such as tanks and armored personnel
carriers, antiaircraft artillery, and shoulder-fired IR-guided surface-to-air missiles.
Additionally, small arms, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, small caliber antiaircraft
artillery, towed artillery, machine guns, and trailer-mounted multiple rocket launchers
were prevalent. “Technicals” (jeeps and light trucks indigenously modified to mount
machine guns, light antiaircraft artillery pieces, or recoilless rifles) were common and
owned by most clan militias. Technicals added mobility and firepower to the clan militia
arsenal, and were often used as a terrorism weapon against hostile clans or rival militias.
Additionally, over a million mines had been emplaced by the various clans to shield off
their territory.
B-1
Appendix B
d. In July, a US effort to airlift 28,000 tons of food and supplies directly to airfields
in the interior of the country in coordination with UNOSOM briefly improved the
situation, but looting and banditry continued to take a toll on the remaining relief
organizations. At most, only 40 percent of the food delivered actually reached the
intended population. Similarly, 500 Pakistanis airlifted to Mogadishu by the US were
unable to open LOCs from the port facility due to armed opposition. In the face of these
obstacles and the deepening humanitarian crisis, on 25 November 1992 President Bush
offered to lead a UN backed military force to protect international relief aid in Somalia.
The UN Security Council approved resolution 794 on 3 December creating the UN
Unified Task Force (UNITAF)—known in the US as Operation RESTORE HOPE—and
authorized it, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to “use all necessary means to
establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as
possible.”
Although a formal JIPOE process did not exist at the time, US forces operating with
UNITAF conducted an extensive IPB effort that included both geospatial and systems
perspectives. This analysis provided a holistic view of the OE and laid the groundwork
for sound, subjective advice to the RESTORE HOPE commander.
a. Define the OE
B-2 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
(c) Secure LOCs into the interior of the country for relief supplies to
traverse.
(d) Provide security escorts for relief supply convoys. After establishing
control, the JTF commander intended to turn over operations to the UN and withdraw.
The JTF purposefully deemphasized military operations against potential belligerents.
B-3
Appendix B
Discussions with local warlords revealed that the warlords would not oppose an expanded
humanitarian relief effort, but would view negatively an outside intervention in their
political struggles.
(1) Land Domain. Somalia is a land of few contrasts. Most of the country is
desert, and the dominant terrain features are flat plateau surfaces and plains. The only
significant mountains are the rugged east-west Karkaar mountain ranges in the far north.
Somalia has only two major rivers, the Webi Shabeelle and the Webi Jubba, both of
which are in the south. For this reason, the south is home to Somalia’s largest sedentary
population and the economy is a mixture of agriculture and livestock herding. Northern
Somalis are nearly all pastoral nomads or seminomads. This difference caused the
prolonged drought and famine of 1991-92 to hit southern Somalia much harder than the
north. It also drove the UN to focus its military relief operations in the south. The open,
level terrain and clear weather favored operations by heavily armed forces, and this
ultimately helped convince the Bush Administration to send ground forces. The biggest
problems facing US forces were the standard hardships of desert warfare (see paragraph
2.b.(5) “Weather”) and a number of dangerous diseases found in the region. These
include bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, typhoid fever, malaria,
dengue fever, schistosomiasis, tuberculosis, and rabies. A primary concern for JTF
RESTORE HOPE was the ability to transport relief supplies from ports and airfields,
where they arrived, to internally displaced populations residing in refugee camps.
Somalia had a very poor transportation and communication infrastructure. The ongoing
conflict had destroyed much of the country’s meager infrastructure. Furthermore,
because of continued civil unrest, travel within Somalia was very dangerous. Without a
strong central government to fund and oversee restoration, little was rebuilt; roads and
airfields remained in poor condition. Somalia’s ports and airfields were not under
government control; agreements with individual clans had to be secured for use of
transportation facilities. Access was subject to intermittent disruption as clans vied for
control. In 1991, Somalia had only 1621 miles of paved roads and 12,112 miles of
unpaved roads. In contrast, Texas, which is roughly the same size, has over 300,000
miles of roads. Existing roads were underdeveloped, normally very narrow (16 feet
wide), and travel required 4-wheel-drive vehicles. Roads connecting the ports with the
interior were not well maintained. As shown in Figure B-2, a paved road extended from
Mogadishu to Jilib in the south, 80 miles from the major southern port at Kismaayo.
Paved roads also ran from Mogadishu through Baidoa to Dolo Bay, and Mogadishu
through Buulobarde to Belet Huen in the southern interior of Somalia. An additional
paved road extended north to south through the interior of the country from Oddur
B-4 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
through Baidoa to Bardera. The remainder of the roads in the hard-hit south were
crushed bituminous or graded earth. With the government’s fall, the transportation
system’s quality declined. There was no reliable indigenous transport capability to
provide large-scale movement within the country. Compounding the problem, there was
no rail infrastructure.
B-5
Appendix B
(2) Maritime Domain. There was no organized naval threat in Somalia. The
only threats were militia attacks on ships in port or entering the harbors. The principal
maritime concern was a severe lack of port facilities. Somalia has a long coastline, but it
had only three deepwater ports (Berbera, Mogadishu, and Kismaayo) and a few smaller
ports. Shore facilities were poor, and crews had to accommodate all off-load
requirements with their own ships’ gear. More than 90 percent of aid to Somalia passed
through these ports. However, given Somalia’s instability and clans’ failures in managing
the ports, security was a concern. The port at Mogadishu, for example, could only handle
one ship at a time (see Figure B-3). These limitations seriously affected relief shipments.
Mogadishu Port
Mogadishu, the principal port of Somalia, is on the southeast coast. The port has a large, artificial break-water
providing six berths for deep-sea vessels. Three berths are along the inside breakwater to the south and the
remaining three are along the mainland quay to the north. Berths are 170 to 198 meters (560 to 650 feet) long.
With a reported depth of 8 to 11 meters (26 to 36 feet), the port is incapable of accepting fully laden fast sealift
ships or large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off vessels. Mooring and unmooring of vessels is restricted to daylight
hours.
The water shallows quickly on approach to the shore. The swell can lead to strong surging alongside and
moorings must be tended regularly. Anchorage is available 800 meters (2,600 feet) southwest of the breakwater
head in depths of 12.5 meters (41 feet). The winds and currents vary from southwest to northeast depending on
the season, and strong currents may be encountered. The tidal range is 2.5 meters (8.2 feet) maximum.
B-6 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
(3) Air Domain. Somalia’s air domain resembled its maritime domain. A lack
of significant air defenses and the desert climate meant that US airmen would have
excellent flying conditions almost year round. The problem for relief operations was a
lack of operational airport facilities, air control operations, or cargo handling equipment.
On paper, Somalia had eight airports with paved runways and 50-60 more with unpaved
strips. In reality, these facilities were in the same condition as the seaports (see Figure B-
4). For example, the Mogadishu airport was capable of handling no more than two
aircraft at a time. These space limitations were especially dangerous because there was
also no centralized airlift control provided for either international relief organizations or
US forces. Somalia’s degraded airfields also lacked navigational aids to facilitate
operations at night and in bad weather. As a result, airlift operations were limited to
day/visual flight rules/conditions only.
B-7
Appendix B
C-5
C-141
C-130
port
B-8 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
(5) Weather. As indicated in Figure B-5, Somalia is hot and arid for most of
the year. The mean daily maximum temperatures throughout the country range from 85
to 100 degrees Fahrenheit, except in the higher elevations and along the coast. There are
four seasons in Somalia, two wet and two dry. The seasons are marked by northeast and
southwest monsoon winds and the lulls that occur between them. The first season begins
in late December or early January and is marked by hot, dry, and dust-laden northeast
monsoon winds. It is considered the harshest season of the year. The second season runs
from March to May and is the lull between the monsoon seasons. It is the hottest period
of the year in southern Somalia and the period of heaviest rainfall. The third and longest
season extends from June through August. The southwest monsoon during this season
tempers the climate with cool breezes from the Indian Ocean. The fourth season runs
from September through December and is another lull between monsoons. Heat and
humidity can be expected along with light intermittent rains. Somalia’s desert climate,
combined with its open terrain, provide an ideal environment for military forces to
operate either in relief supply distribution or counterinsurgency. The main problem it
posed to US forces were those common to all desert areas: extreme heat, lack of water,
and blowing dust or sand. No one believed that these would be a “show-stopper” in
Somalia. Decades of training on military ranges in the southwestern US and the stunning
US victory over Iraq in 1991 left little doubt that US forces could handle desert warfare.
(a) Population. Somalia had an estimated 7.7 million citizens in 1991, not
including Ethiopian refugees. About three-fifths of the population were predominantly
Somalia Seasons
Monsoon Local
Season Climate
Pattern Name
B-9
Appendix B
nomadic herders; about one-fifth were farmers inhabiting the river areas of southern
Somalia; another one-fifth were urban (vast majority in Mogadishu). The urban
population of Mogadishu swelled during the civil strife in the late 1980s and early 1990s
to approximately two million. The extended drought, civil strife, and famine
disproportionately affected these urban dwellers, along with the farmers.
(d) Religion. Most Somalis believe they are descendants of noble Arabic
lineages and the family of the Prophet Mohammad. The former Somali state was
officially Islamic; the overwhelming majority of Somali nationals are Sunni Muslims.
Less than one percent are Christian. By the early 1990s the Salafist brand of fundamental
Islam had made inroads into Somali culture. An Islamist militant group known as al-
Itihaad al-Islamiya sought to create an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa, and was
partially funded by the al-Qaeda terrorist organization.
(e) Clan Structure. The history of the Somali people is inevitably tied to
the various tribes, or clans, and their subclans (see Figure B-6). Although Somalis are
homogeneous and tied to common ancestors that migrated from the Ethiopian highlands
thousands of years ago, they had been influenced by the trading communities of the
Indian Ocean, especially the Persians, Omanis, and Yemenis. Although the nomadic
clans, such as the Darood in central and southern Somalia, tend to be more broadly
dispersed, most clan groups have fairly well-defined geographical boundaries: the
Hawiye are located in the Mogadishu area; the Isaaq in the north, the Dir in the
northwest; and the Digil and Rahanwayn in the river areas of the south. The nomadic
clan families—the Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, and Darood—believe they are the “true Somali,”
and therefore have a higher status in Somali society. The southern riverine agrarian
groups only achieved a measure of political equality under Barre.
B-10 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
Somali
Sheikkel
Habr Gedir
Abgal
(1) Warring Factions. Overlaying the clan structure of Somalia in 1991 was a
complicated set of shifting alliances among various warring factions. These warring
factions, led in most cases by powerful warlords with well-armed militias, were
geographically based (see Figure B-8). Prior to the fall of Siad Barre regime in January
B-11
Appendix B
Islamic Factions
al-Itihaad al-Islamiya al-Queda
Clans
Abgal
Habr Gedir
Ogaden
IRCS
Warring
Factions NGOs
Majertain
SSDF (Yusuf) Doctors
Darood
USC (Mahdi)
SPM CARE
(Morgan) SNA
(Aideed)
Kuminta
Airfield SPM/SNA
Authority (Jess)
Port Locally
Authority Hired
Guards Murang
Local
Police Sorao
Infrastructure
Support Gangs
Legend
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross SPM Somali Patriotic Movement
NGO nongovernmental organization SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SNA Somali National Alliance USC United Somali Congress
1991, there were 84 districts organized into sixteen administrative regions and the capital.
Each region had three to six districts, with the exception of the capital, which was
subdivided into fifteen districts. There was no effective government after the fall of
Barre. Tribal clans dominated by local warlords occupied the former districts. The
central government authority at Mogadishu was immediately challenged by the Somali
National Front (SNF), which in June 1991 declared the independent Republic of
Somaliland in the former territory of British Somaliland in northern Somalia. The
constitution of 1979 was nominally in force pending a new constitution proposed by the
B-12 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
Dominant
Faction Leadership Numbers Weapons Location
Clan
B-13
Appendix B
B-14 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
Legend
postulated future modification
existing link
of existing link
B-15
Appendix B
Map of Mogadishu
Mogadishu
Soccer Stadium
US Embassy
Port
Airport
B-16 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
Stadium
US Embassy
Port
Airport
Legend
B-17
Appendix B
Mahdi
Office
Soccer
Stadium
Aideed Residence
Port
Airport
Legend
SNA Somali National Alliance SNA (Aideed) USC (Mahdi)
USC United Somali Congress
B-18 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
To
To Belet
Baidoa and Huen
Kismaayo
Soccer
Stadium
US Embassy
Port
Airport
B-19
Appendix B
AM
1520
MOGA TV
AM
1020 AM
870
Legend
B-20 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
Legend
nongovernmental United Nations United Nations United Nations
organization headquarters supply warehouse troops (Pakistan)
distribution point
B-21
Appendix B
with NGO personnel occurred frequently through interactions with the CMOC. Although
unable to levy collection requirements on NGO personnel, the CMOC obtained valuable
information through routine information exchanges in the normal course of conducting
NGO support coordination. Finally, some coalition partner members engaged in
Operation RESTORE HOPE had a unique understanding of the historical background of
the Somali nation and the current political situation in Somalia developed over time
through a long history of dealing with the local populace. This multinational analytic
effort with other coalition members enabled the JTF J-2 to estimate the most likely
perceived COGs for individual faction leaders, as shown in Figure B-16.
United Somali Mohammad Farrah Hassan l Control of Habr Gedir Clan (one of the
Congress/ AIDEED strongest and most prominent clans in
Somali National Somalia)
Alliance Oman Hassan Ali Atto l Reputation as a capable Somali general
l Access to weapons/resources to
maintain clan loyalty
Legend
NGO nongovernmental organization UN United Nations
B-22 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
Implication Least dangerous US/UN forces must Mission devolves into Increased force
COA for US/UN. increase peace peace enforcement. protection measures
enforcement NGO organizations draw resources away
activities. withdraw. from aid distribution.
Adversary/ Maintain control of Continuing unstable Gain the most Terrorist organization
Relevant Actor factions/clans/ humanitarian situation wealth/power from forces US/UN
Objective militias. benefits one or more instability. withdrawal garnering
factions. a propaganda coup.
Wait out international Emerge the dominant
community. Wealth, political faction in Somalia. Possibility of
power increased. establishing an
Islamic state.
Legend
COA course of action UN United Nations
NGO nongovernmental organization US United States
B-23
Appendix B
Additionally, the JTF RESTORE HOPE J-2 anticipated that the nascent Islamic violent
extremist movement in Somalia could oppose the US/UN presence. Although considered
small in numbers, the violent extremist movement in Somalia had a large population of
disaffected young, unemployed Somalis from which they could recruit and radicalize in
opposition to Western IGOs.
(1) Systems Network Analysis. In the first half of 1993, JTF analysts detected
changes in the normal interactions among system nodes as depicted in Figure B-24.
Among the primary factions existent in southern Somalia, information from numerous
sources indicated increased contact between Aideed’s SNA faction and the two dominant
B-24 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
Ogaden Abgal
Islamic ICRC
Habr
Factions
Gedir
NGOs
Clans SSDF
(Yusuf)
Doctors
Majertain
USC
(Mahdi)
CARE
Darood SPM
(Morgan)
Warring
SNA
Factions (Aideed)
Locally Hired
Gangs
Port
Authority Guards
Murang
Infrastructure Local Sorao
Support Police
Legend
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front
NGO nongovernmental organization USC United Somali Congress
SNA Somali National Alliance
SPM Somali Patriotic Movement new relationship
B-25
Appendix B
NGOs
Clans SSDF
(Yusuf)
Doctors
Majertain
USC
SPM (Mahdi)
(Morgan)
CARE
Darood
SNA
(Aideed)
Warring Factions
Kuminta
SPM/SNA
Airfield (Jess)
Authority
Gangs
Port
Authority
Locally
Hired
Murang
Infrastructure Guards
Sorao
Support Local Police
Legend
(2) Additional Indications of COA 2. During the first three weeks of April
1993, Aideed traveled extensively to Sudan, Yemen, Uganda, and Kenya reportedly to
garner personal political support, arms, and money. He also spent time in central
Somalia gathering up new fighters and previously stockpiled weapons that had been sent
out of Mogadishu during the UNITAF occupation. Starting in May, Radio Mogadishu,
controlled by Aideed, began an anti-UNOSOM II hate campaign that lambasted UN and
US forces as aggressors intent on colonizing Somalia and called on Somalis to resist
foreign domination. Concurrent with this increase in propaganda came reports from
B-26 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
NGOs
Clans SSDF
(Yusuf)
Doctors
Majertain Warring USC
Factions (Mahdi)
SPM CARE
Darood (Morgan)
SNA
(Aideed)
Kuminta
Airfield
Authority
SPM/SNA
(Jess)
Port Locally Gangs
Authority Hired
Guards
Murang
Infrastructure Sorao
Support Local Police
Legend
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front
NGO nongovernmental organization USC United Somali Congress
SNA Somali National Alliance
SPM Somali Patriotic Movement broken link
HUMINT and imagery intelligence sources that Aideed’s authorized weapons storage
sites in Mogadishu were becoming active. Most ominous, during the night of 6-7 May
1993, a UNOSOM II Belgian unit in Kismaayo came under coordinated attack by
SPM/SNA militia controlled by Omar Jess, an Aideed ally.
B-27
Appendix B
NGOs
Clans SSDF
(Yusuf) Doctors
Majertain
USC CARE
Darood (Mahdi)
SPM
(Morgan)
SNA
Warring (Aideed)
Kuminta
Factions
Airfield
Authority SPM/SNA
(Jess)
Legend
B-28 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
al-Itihaad
al-Islamiya NAI 5
al-Qaeda
NAI 4
ICRC
NAI 3 SSDF
(Yusuf)
NAI 2
NAI 1 NAI 7
NAI 6
USC NAI 8 CARE
NAI 9
SPM (Mahdi)
(Morgan)
NAI 12
SNA Kuminta
NAI 10 (Aideed)
NAI 11
SPM/SNA NAI 14
(Jess)
Locally NAI 15
NAI 13
Hired
Guards Murang
Sorao
Local
NAI 16
Police
Legend
B-29
Appendix B
Event Matrix
Legend
COA course of action ++ strong positive indicator
NGO nongovernmental organization + positive indicator
UN United Nations - negative indicator
B-30 JP 2-01.3
Somalia 1992-1993—A Case Study of Support to Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare
Morgan
Aideed
Jess
Kuninta
Airfield Locally
Hired
Guards
Port
Sorao Murang
Local
Police
Legend
nodes links
B-31
Appendix B
4. Lessons Learned
The result of this effort not only characterized the operating environment in Somalia
at the time, but incorporated information from a wide variety of sources to determine the
most probable COA by existing militia factions. Throughout Operation RESTORE
HOPE this information enabled UNITAF to maintain the peace by successfully
anticipating potentially hostile adversary actions. Although UNOSOM II expressed
surprise at the intensity of the 5 June 1993 attacks, UN forces had ample warning of
Aideed’s intent to test the military resolve of Operation CONTINUE HOPE.
Additionally, the analytic effort may have suffered as a result of the relatively inefficient
transfer of responsibilities from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. It should be remembered that
the JIPOE process is continuous and requires constant reassessment as the mission and
conditions on the ground change.
5. Sources
b. Hirsh, John L., and Oakley, Robert B. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope:
Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 1995.
B-32 JP 2-01.3
APPENDIX C
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM—A CASE STUDY IN DETERMINING
RELEVANT ACTOR COURSES OF ACTION
1. Background
This case study discusses some of the difficulties encountered by JIPOE analysts
charged with identifying relevant actors and determining potential opposition COAs
(JIPOE Step 4) during the post-combat phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).
Though planning for the combat phase of OIF began in late November 2001, planning for
the post-combat phase (phase IV) did not commence in an organized fashion until 20
January 2003 when President Bush issued a directive to establish the interagency Office
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) under the leadership of DOD.
In addition to coordinating the interagency planning effort, DOD was responsible for
supporting the provision of assistance during the transition from high-intensity combat to
the post-combat period, when the security environment was still uncertain and officials
had to deal with the immediate aftermath of the war—a time when it would be difficult
for civilian aid agencies, UN agencies, and NGOs to meet immediate humanitarian needs.
However, the sustained effort for relief and reconstruction fell outside of DOD’s sphere.
a. Identify Iraqi Strategy, Desired End State, and Likely Objectives. In 2002,
the 24 million people of Iraq were ethnically, religiously, and politically diverse. In
addition, a fractious political scene encompassed both secular and religious groups from
within the country as well as the diaspora community. The diversity of the Iraqi
population made it difficult for ORHA analysts to identify the potential opposition’s
likely objectives and desired end state as they varied greatly from one ethnic, religious, or
political group to another (see Figure C-1). Preconceptions about what the Iraqi
population would do led to the development of a number of assumptions. These
C-1
Appendix C
0 100 kilometers
0 100 miles
De Facto
Boundary
Majority Groups
Kurd
Sunni Arab
Sunni Arab/Kurd mix
Shia Arab
Shia/Sunni Arab mix
Sunni Turkoman
Sparsely populated
Boundary representation is
Sinjar Tribe name
not necessarily authoritative.
Estimated
Ethnic Group Also Found In Religion Language
Population
Arabs 16 to 20 million Throughout North Africa and 65-80 percent Shia, 20-30 Arabic (Iraqi dialect)
the Middle East, Iran percent Sunni, less than 5
percent Christian
Kurds 3.6 to 4.8 million Turkey, Iran, Syria, Armenia, Mostly Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish
Georgia, Azerbajan Yazidi minority
assumptions included opposition groups will work with the coalition; regional states will
not challenge US military operations with conventional forces; the DOS will promote the
creation of a broad-based, credible provisional government prior to D-day; and
C-2 JP 2-01.3
Operation Iraqi Freedom—A Case Study in Determining Relevant Actor Courses of Action
stabilization would take 2-3 months, and recovery 18-24 months, with the vast majority
of US military forces out of Iraq by December 2006. It was also assumed that most of
the Iraqi population wanted their situation to improve (or conversely, did not want their
situation to deteriorate), and that each ethnic, religious, and political group would try to
use the conflict to increase their political power. The desired end state of the Iraqi
population was assumed to be a free, independent, and self-sufficient Iraq with a
government that expressed the free will of the Iraqi people.
b. Identify the Full Set of Potential Iraqi COAs. By mid-March 2003, ORHA had
reviewed the vast majority of interagency plans and estimates as well as developed
additional potential opposition COAs as part of the JIPOE process. Once the review and
development of potential Iraqi COAs was complete, ORHA narrowed them down based
on the five criteria of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, uniqueness, and consistency
with potential Iraqi doctrine or patterns of behavior and then settled on the following
three possible Iraqi COAs:
c. Evaluate and Prioritize Each COA. The effort to evaluate and prioritize each
potential opposition COA was greatly influenced by external factors. Inaccurate
intelligence reports lent credence to the dubious views of Iraqi émigré groups such as the
Iraqi National Congress. Unrealistic assessments failed to predict the magnitude and
intensity of the resistance and provided US analysts with false assurances that coalition
forces would be embraced as liberating heroes by the Iraqi populace. These reports were
C-3
Appendix C
accepted by ORHA analysts who assumed that the transition to the post-combat
rehabilitation and reconstruction process would proceed easily with full Iraqi
cooperation. For primarily these reasons, COA 1 was determined to be the “most likely”
Iraqi reaction and was prioritized in first place. Despite being identified as the “most
dangerous” Iraqi reaction, COA 2 was deemed least likely and was prioritized last.
Finally, COA 3 was prioritized in second place as analysts expected some violence and
civil disorder among Iraqis but did not expect all Iraqis, Shi’ites in particular, to actively
oppose the US occupation.
d. Develop Each COA in the Amount of Detail Time Allows. Planning for Phase
IV of OIF did not commence until 20 January 2003, just two months before the outbreak
of hostilities. The decision by DOD and the Bush Administration to wait so long to begin
planning for Phase IV led to serious time constraints on ORHA as they began the JIPOE
process. Given the interagency nature of Phase IV planning, all COAs and
recommendations had to be vetted among the interagency participants, which also
significantly added to the time constraints. Even so, ORHA was able to conduct a
rehearsal or wargame of Phase IV to play out the various Iraqi COAs, develop timelines,
identify issues, and prepare an implementation plan for the friendly COA.
C-4 JP 2-01.3
Operation Iraqi Freedom—A Case Study in Determining Relevant Actor Courses of Action
scenario. As the situation became more dire and people behaved differently than
expected, the coalition’s ability to respond appropriately was limited.
b. It was not fully understood how the deteriorating situation on the ground would
create new divisions among Iraqis, inflame tensions that were already present, as well as
cause past internal Iraqi conflicts to reemerge. Regime adherents disappeared back into
the population but retained the means to intimidate it through threat, arson, and murder.
The Iraqi national identity was both fragmented and complicated. Profound tensions had
long divided Shiites, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds. Instability and the presence of coalition
forces within Iraq also reignited historical tensions between Iraqis and Americans, as well
as those rooted in a broader perceived conflict between Muslims and the West. Iraqis
were overwhelmingly Muslim, mindful of centuries of oppression by foreign powers, and
wary of, if not outright hostile to, a sustained US presence. In southern Iraq, the Shiites
well remembered their abortive uprising against Hussein following Operation DESERT
STORM and the subsequent massacres, which they blamed in part on the US’s failure to
provide assistance. They were understandably wary of cooperating too soon; Ba’athist
diehards would have to be rooted out and an expectation of personal security established
before Shiite cooperation could be expected. In central Iraq, Sunni Arabs had received
favored treatment from Saddam’s regime and therefore the number of his adherents was
larger and their grip on the population more profound than in the south. Only the Kurds
in the far north had already virtually extinguished the Ba’athists in their midst and
enthusiastically welcomed US forces as liberators.
c. The original plans for post-combat Iraq had envisioned a modest reconstruction
effort under retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner. As the scale and intractable
nature of the lawlessness, factional squabbling, and infrastructure collapse became clear,
however, the need for a more comprehensive reconstruction effort became clear as well,
and more resources were devoted to expand and accelerate the reconstruction effort.
Garner was replaced by L. Paul Bremer, and a political decision was made to disband the
Iraqi Army and to ban a large proportion of Ba’athists from government employment.
The short-term effect of these decisions was to leave large numbers of Iraqi soldiers
unemployed and Ba’athists desperate. Many of these Ba’athists had participated in
brutally suppressing the Iraqi people and knew what their fate would be if they gave up
local levers of power and perceived that they were literally fighting for their lives.
C-5
Appendix C
fight the West and protect Muslims from what they saw as Western oppression. Non-
adversarial actors within the Iraqi populace were also critical to understand, since the
instability left them vulnerable to joining one or several of the adversary organizations.
Former members of the Iraqi government, the religious leaders and the tribal leaders were
all important to understand as well, as they had the ability to influence elements of the
Iraqi population in different ways. Violence in the country took several forms. It often
proved more akin to terrorism tactics than to guerrilla warfare, but even acts of terrorism
tended to have political objectives. Foreign Islamic extremists flowed into the country to
join the fight and targeted Iraqi civilians as well as coalition forces, both to reinforce a
sense of insecurity and to promote trouble between ethnic groups. Horrific suicide
bombings of Shi’ite pilgrims and Kurdish well-wishers on respective religious holidays
were cases in point. Although US forces captured Saddam Hussein on 14 December
2003, it took until 31 December 2011—more than five years longer than originally
estimated—for the Iraqi situation to stabilize sufficiently to permit the complete
withdrawal of US forces.
a. JIPOE must seek to identify and understand all relevant actors. When identifying
the likely objectives and desired end state of adversaries and other relevant actors, it is
particularly important to assess their decision making and behavior as much as possible,
especially in relation to the desired end state of the operation. An in-depth understanding
of the potential opposition’s sociocultural characteristics, including the local politics,
beliefs, traditions, and religion can help with this. Better understanding the dynamic
quality of life factors and the relevant interwoven PMESII systems of the OE is also
useful. When planning for phase IV of OIF, a number of false assumptions were made
about how the relevant actors would react to coalition activity. This directly affected
COA development for all relevant actors and led to what was actually the least-likely
Iraqi COA being identified as the most likely.
C-6 JP 2-01.3
Operation Iraqi Freedom—A Case Study in Determining Relevant Actor Courses of Action
b. JIPOE doctrine cautions analysts that the potential opposition may deviate from
previously observed practices and that the JIPOE analyst should try to anticipate such
changes. This is particularly true when the potential opposition is not homogenous or
well-understood. Intelligence personnel supporting OIF planning reported that the phase
IV analysis was one of the weakest and least-developed aspects of the military
intelligence estimates. When identifying potential opposition COAs during phase IV,
analysts drew on Iraq’s post-DESERT STORM uprising for clues about the possible OE.
The 1991 uprisings had a strong sectarian component to them. The Kurdish population in
the north and the Shi’ite communities in the south rebelled against the regime, which had
a fundamentally Sunni and tribal-based identity. Particularly in the south, the uprising
was characterized by bloody retribution against the regime and a general decline in social
order, including looting and destruction. While the full collapse of the regime was
expected to trigger a similar wave of sectarian violence and lawlessness, few expected
that the massive instability in the wake of coalition major combat operations would create
the conditions for large-scale insurgency and widespread sectarian violence to develop
quickly and on the scale that it did.
d. JIPOE doctrine states that each COA should be developed in the amount of detail
that time allows. Unfortunately, the task to prepare for phase IV of OIF was only
assigned two months before the start of hostilities. However, DOD had been actively
planning for the combat phase for over a year at that point. Knowing that success during
phase IV would be critical to maintaining the peace and re-deployment, DOD should
have planned earlier for the post-combat environment. By waiting until there was an
explicit order to prepare for phase IV under the newly created ORHA, there was only
time to prepare for the best-case scenario. Even then, ORHA analysts should have
known better than to go into Iraq dependent on a rosy post-combat outcome and should
have better prepared for Iraqi COA 2, the worst-case or most dangerous scenario.
5. Sources
a. Hooker, Gregory. Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of
Military Intelligence Assessments. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, 2005.
C-7
Appendix C
g. Gordon, Michael R., and Trainor, Bernard E. (General). Cobra II: The Inside
Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. New York: Random House, 2006.
h. Phillips, David L. Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco. New
York: Westview Press, 2005.
C-8 JP 2-01.3
APPENDIX D
ANALYZING AND DEPICTING A SYSTEM
“Any attempt to reform the university without attending to the system of which it
is an integral part is like trying to do urban renewal in New York City from the
twelfth story up.”
This appendix contains two sections to help analysts think about how to analyze and
depict systems in the OE. Section A discusses one alternative for how JIPOE analysts
can provide a systems “visualization” to support a JFC’s counterdrug operations in a
hypothetical narcotics scenario. Section B contains six charts that list typical PMESII
subsystems.
1. Overview
When the US conducts combat operations, the impact of those operations is rarely
confined to a single country. In many cases, there are implications that cross regional
PMESII systems and subsystems, and could have global impact as well. Likewise in
operations such as counterdrug, combating terrorism, and counterinsurgency, the
adversary typically will act in ways and within networks that cross nation-state borders.
In fact, these networks can have a significant influence on the traditional, established
nation-state and regional systems. For example, a terrorist network can commit terrorist
acts in three countries, have a safe haven and base of operations in a fourth country, and
receive supplies and other aid from a fifth country.
The following series of figures uses a counterdrug operation vignette to show how
analysts can think about nodes, links, and the way a system works in order to identify key
nodes and the potential actions against them to create the desired effects relative to the
system to support achievement of the objectives. In this vignette, the CCDR has tasked
the J-2 to analyze an existing narcotics network and collaborate with the J-5 and
interagency representatives to determine how to ensure that a key country’s powerful
insurgent organization does not receive funding from the narcotics trade (the
CCDR’s objective). The J-2 develops an understanding of how the regional narcotics
system functions, and then determines the best way to present this to the J-5 and CCDR
so they can develop COAs and design a CONOPS. During this process, intelligence
analysts use tools such as association matrices and measures of node centrality described
in Chapter III, “Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment—Step 2.” The J-2
presents the results to the commander and staff graphically using a series of network
analysis diagrams to describe the narcotics network’s operations.
D-1
Appendix D
b. Figure D-2: The J-2 knows that the real money-making step in the narcotics
system is the conversion of opium to heroin. Opium is valuable as an ingredient of
heroin. The opium is converted to heroin in labs [3]. The term “lab” means any place
the precursors, opium, and chemists are. No sophisticated tools are required. A lab may
be a simple hut. Precursor chemicals must be smuggled into country and can be obtained
either directly from the smuggling networks [4] or often at local bazaars [2]. While
there are legitimate uses for many precursor chemicals worldwide, none exists in country.
“Chemists” [5] are the people with the knowledge of how to convert opium into heroin.
The J-2 knows that these are not chemists in any Western sense. Many have no idea
about chemistry at all, and may even be illiterate. They do, however, know the “recipe”
to convert opium to heroin, which is a limited skill in the region.
Opium Broker/
Local Bazaar
2
Opium Cash/Loan
Repayment
1
Opium
Farmer
Legend
node link
D-2 JP 2-01.3
Analyzing and Depicting a System
Smuggling
4 Networks
Heroin
Precursors
3
Opium Broker/ um Labs
O pi
Local Bazaar
2
Opium Cash/Loan
Repayment 5 “Chemists”
1
Opium
Farmer
Legend
node link
c. Figure D-3: There is little narcotics use in country (given the extreme poverty,
there would be little profit in that market). Therefore, heroin has to be smuggled to
overseas markets [6]. Narco-barons [7], typically based in country, are key individuals
who control vast segments of the country’s narcotics trade and have access to massive
wealth (probably 100s of millions to billions of US dollars). Many have sizable personal
militias. They are the primary profit makers from the sale of narcotics overseas. Their
primary means of getting money from the overseas’ markets is through banks [8] and the
use of the hawala [9]. Narco-barons may also exert direct control over the smuggling
networks [4], certain “chemists” [5], the labs [3], and opium brokers [2]. Additionally,
D-3
Appendix D
Smuggling
Networks Overseas
Heroin Market
4 6 (Europe)
Banks
Hawaldeer
8 9 (person)
Heroin
Political 10
Precursors Protection
Political
Leader
3 Cash
Opium Broker/ O pi
um Labs 7
Local Bazaar Narco-
barons
2
Opium Cash/Loan
Repayment 5
“Chemists”
1
Opium
Farmer
Legend
node link
by using their immense wealth narco-barons are often able to obtain political protection
from local and national politicians [10].
D-4 JP 2-01.3
Analyzing and Depicting a System
d. Figure D-4: Current intelligence supports the conclusion that the insurgents [11]
benefit indirectly from the narcotics trade. The insurgents almost certainly obtain funds
by “taxing” farmers [1] and opium brokers [2] in areas where they have a strong
presence. The insurgents also probably receive sizeable contributions from narco-barons
[7]. This may be a form of protection payments, but narco-barons may also seek to
perpetuate the lack of enforcement enabled by the continuing instability created by
insurgent operations. Also, the same smuggling networks [4] responsible for moving
narcotics out of country also are likely responsible for the “backflow” movement of arms
and personnel into country, directly benefiting the insurgents.
Smuggling
Networks
Heroin
Overseas
4 6 Market
(Europe)
Banks
Hawaldeer
8 9 (person)
Heroin
Political 10
Precursors Protection
Political
Leader
3 Cash
Opium Broker/ O pi
um Labs 7
Local Bazaar Narco-
barons
2
Cash/
Protection
Money
Weapons
Personnel
Opium Cash/Loan Movement
Repayment 5
“Chemists”
11 Insurgents
1
Opium
Farmer
Legend
node links
D-5
Appendix D
f. Figure D-5: How then can the joint force affect the ability of the labs to convert
opium to heroin? The J-2 identifies three factors that could limit lab operations. First,
the joint force can work with the host country to interdict the supply of opium ([1] and
[2]) to the labs. Second, interdicting the precursors ([2] and [4]) is likely to have a
significant impact on labs. Third, the knowledge of how to convert opium to heroin is
limited to the chemists, so identifying, locating, and confining a sufficient number of
chemists [5] should have a huge impact on labs. Success in these three areas should limit
heroin production and movement overseas, reduce the amount available in overseas
markets, and reduce or eliminate the flow of money to the insurgents from the sale of
narcotics. The J-2 also assesses that given the wide-ranging influence the narco-barons
[7] exert on the narcotics trade, interdicting them directly also is likely to have a
significant impact on the system. Since the labs and the chemists are commonly
collocated and vital to the production of heroin, the J-2 designates them as key nodes in
the network (see discussion of key nodes in Chapter III, “Describe the Impact of the
Operational Environment—Step 2”).
g. Figure D-6: Collaboration between the J-2, J-5, and other selected staff members
has increased as the J-2 develops a more comprehensive understanding of how the
narcotics network functions. In particular, the J-5 becomes fully involved at the point of
considering potential actions (to include all instruments of national power) that can
influence the network to create effects to support achievement of the objectives. The
CCMD’s JIACG likely will participate in this process. The process will evolve later to
development of potential COAs and a CONOPS, but the present focus is on identifying
discrete actions against specific nodes in the system. Once the J-2 briefs the participants,
this cross-functional group identifies a number of possible actions.
(1) Diplomatic. Apply pressure against political leaders [10] to cease their
political protection of narco-barons; share information with international banks [9].
(3) Military. Capture and arrest narco-barons [7]; capture chemists [5] and
destroy labs [3]; interdict smuggling networks [4] to cut flow of precursors.
D-6 JP 2-01.3
Analyzing and Depicting a System
Smuggling
Networks
Overseas
Heroin
4 6 Market
(Europe)
Banks
Hawaldeer
8 9 (person)
Heroin
Political 10
Precursors Protection
Political
Leader
3 Cash
Opium Broker/ O pi
um Labs 7
Local Bazaar Narco-
barons
2
Cash/
Protection
Money
Weapons
Personnel
Opium Cash/Loan Movement
Repayment 5
“Chemists”
11 Insurgents
1
Opium
Farmer
Nodes and links derived from intelligence and other sources and development
of node-to-node relationships.
Legend
node link
h. The J-5 can now develop alternative COAs based on the J-2’s systems analysis
and an understanding of potential actions against various nodes. Interagency
collaboration during COA development is essential in this example, because the
feasibility (and thus the validity) of a COA may depend on the agreement and capability
of one or more agencies to execute specific tasks. The J-5 also must consider potential
undesired effects. For example, the income alternative for opium farmers and brokers
D-7
Appendix D
Smuggling
Networks
Heroin Overseas
M 4 6 Market
(Europe)
Banks
Hawaldeer
8 9 (person) D
Heroin
D Political 10
Precursors M Protection
Political
Labs Leader
3 Cash
Opium Broker/ O pi
um E 7
Local Bazaar Narco-
barons
2 M
Cash/
Protection
Money
Weapons
Personnel
Opium Cash/Loan Movement
Repayment 5
I M
“Chemists”
11 Insurgents
1
Opium
Farmer
E
Potential diplomatic [D], informational [I], military [M], and economic [E] actions
to create desired effect.
Legend
must be achievable, or they will lose operating capital and their livelihood, perhaps
turning them against the larger multinational effort.
D-8 JP 2-01.3
Analyzing and Depicting a System
analysis as part of JIPOE, the effort is cross-functional in nature, with participation from
the rest of the joint force staff and various military and other agency representatives
based on the JFC’s desired effects to contribute the conditions necessary to achieve the
commander’s objectives. Clearly displaying the relevant networks and their key node-
link relationships and interdependencies in a graphical component of the intelligence
estimate and other intelligence products can greatly enhance the JFC’s and staff’s
understanding of how the networks function and how they can be affected.
Figures D-7 through D-12 in this section depict typical PMESII systems and
subsystems. Understanding the composition and interaction of systems relevant to the
joint operation at hand will help the JFC and staff determine how best to set the right
conditions to achieve objectives and accomplish the mission. The composition of
relevant systems will vary from country to country and from operation to operation. As
the examples in Section A demonstrate, some systems will be “transnational” rather than
purely “nation-state” in nature. Awareness of these variations from operation to
operation will help the JFC avoid the creation of undesired effects.
The political system is comprised of the central and local governments, political
organizations (including political parties and interest groups), and regional/international
actors who receive and process political system demands (see Figure D-7).
Considerations for analysis include:
a. The predominant political ideology and what and who constitutes its major
defining policies.
D-9
Appendix D
Political Subsystems
Political
Central Parties and Regional/
Government Local
Interest Governments International
Groups
Departments Security
Elements
Embassies
Corporations
Professional
Groups
Nongovernmental
Organizations
D-10 JP 2-01.3
Analyzing and Depicting a System
Military Subsystems
Military-
Leadership Armed Internal Industrial Sustainment
Forces Security Complex
Command and
Control Reserve Forces
Networks
Legend
OT&E operational test and evaluation R&D research and development
The analyst examines an economic system in regards to the sum total of production,
distribution, and consumption of all goods and services in a country (see Figure D-9).
That sum can be thought of as the combination of the formal and informal economies.
Considerations for analysis include:
c. Agriculture base.
D-11
Appendix D
Economic Subsystems
Informal
Production Distribution Consumption Economy
Exports
Foreign Unregulated
Investment Labor
Imports
d. Economic relationship with other countries and with international trade (imports,
exports, and the balance of payments).
The goal of the analyst is to identify the system’s framework (see Figure D-10) in
order to evaluate and dissect social interactions. Considerations for analysis include:
D-12 JP 2-01.3
Analyzing and Depicting a System
Social Subsystems
Affinity
Basic Needs Institutions
Groups
Identity
(tribe, clan, ethnic group, Religion Unions
caste, class)
Sustenance
Management Health Associations
Nongovernmental
Organizations Displaced
Food and Persons
Water Shelter (welfare, humanitarian,
Nutrition
and human rights)
Refugees
Leisure
Sanitation Security/
Safety Environment
Gangs and
Criminal
Education Enterprises
Critical
Resources
Insurgents/
Separatists
D-13
Appendix D
Infrastructure Subsystems
Public
Utilities Transportation Industry Facilities
Public
Water Rail Light
Gathering
Network Manufacturing
Places
Government
Waste Airports Services (nonmilitary)
Nongovernment
Seaports Agriculture Buildings
Inland
Waterways/ Mining
Ports
Nuclear
D-14 JP 2-01.3
Analyzing and Depicting a System
Information Subsystems
Defense
Global National Information
Information Information (Military
Systems)
International Regulatory
Information Agencies Broadcast Operational
Technology
Sources
Intelligence
Agencies Print
Tactical
Global Grid
Connectivity
Information World Wide Web
Operations
National
National Information
Architecture Technology
Sources
D-15
Appendix D
D-16 JP 2-01.3
APPENDIX E
JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT SPECIALIZED PRODUCTS
1. Overview
The basic JIPOE process provides a disciplined methodology for analyzing the OE
and assessing the impact of that environment on adversary and friendly COAs. The
process makes extensive use of graphic displays. Some of these graphics (such as
MCOOs, situation templates and matrices, and event templates and matrices) are integral
to the four-step process. However, depending on the situation, additional, specialized,
graphic displays may be developed to support and provide greater clarity to the JIPOE
effort. The following discussion illustrates some common JIPOE specialized products
currently in use. Additional products tailored to specific situations may be devised by
local JIPOE analysts limited only by their intelligence, imagination, and creativity.
2. Infrastructure Overlay
Infrastructure Overlay
Electric
Power
Sub-Stations
Main Highway
Vulnerable
Microwave
Dam Towers
Oi
lP
ipe
l in
e
Bridge
Unsecure
Pumping
Stations
E-1
Appendix E
identifying key infrastructure and their vulnerabilities in combination with the known
capabilities and intentions of adversaries and other actors, the JFC can employ security
countermeasures in an appropriate, cost-effective, and rational manner.
Pattern analysis plot sheets help distinguish patterns in activities associated with
particular days, dates, or times that are depicted by the rings and segments in Figure E-3.
Evacuation
Staging
Area Land Convoy
Police
Barracks
y
Potential
wa
Ambush
gh
Sites
Hi
in
Land
Ma
Convoy
Segment
Hospital
Air Segment
Airport
Legend
primary route secondary route
E-2 JP 2-01.3
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Specialized Products
0001-2400 ZULU 24
23 1
22 2
21 3
20
4
19 5
18 S M T W T F S 6
17 7
16 8
15 9
14 10
13 11
12
Legend
bombing demonstration
Analysts may choose to modify this product to track longer or shorter periods as
appropriate.
Quarantine or contaminated area overlays may be used to delineate areas that are off
limits or quarantined due to the presence of disease outbreaks, TIM hazards, or CBRN
contamination (see Figure E-4). Such overlays are useful during passive defense
measures such as avoidance, protection, and decontamination operations, and in CBRN
consequence management operations such as a response to pandemic disease outbreaks.
Population support overlays can graphically depict the sectors of the populace that
are pro-government, anti-government, pro-insurgent, anti-insurgent, uncommitted, and
neutral (see Figure E-5). These overlays are important because they help analysts
E-3
Appendix E
Quarantine Overlay
Reported Disease
Outbreaks
ay
hw
ig
Quarantine
H
n
Area
ai
M
Potential
Downwind
Contamination
Hazard
Off-Limits
Area
Nuclear
Reactor
determine whether the local populace is likely to support the HN government or support
the insurgency.
Religion, race, and ethnicity issues often contribute to conflicts. Religious, race, and
ethnicity overlays depict the current ethnic and religious makeup of an operational area.
These overlays can also display any specific religious-, racial-, or ethnicity-specific areas
and any zones of separation agreed upon by peace accords. These three overlays may be
separate or combined. Figure E-7 shows an example of an ethnicity overlay.
E-4 JP 2-01.3
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Specialized Products
Legend
supports insurgents supports host nation neutral
Relationships (links) in large data sets are established by similarities between the
nodes. Figure E-9 shows an example of an activities matrix. People are identified by
their participation in independent activities. When graphed, pairs who have engaged in
the same activity (columns with dots) are designated with a link on the network analysis
diagram.
E-5
Appendix E
Recognized Open
Territorial City
Limit
Main Highway
Claimed
Territorial
Limit
Golden
Shrine
Ancient
Monastery
E-6 JP 2-01.3
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Specialized Products
Ethnicity Overlay
y
Main H ighwa
Legend
c. Biometric focused area studies are biometric geospatial detailed analyses for a
known area. These products enhance operational planning and situational awareness of
what individuals are operating in an area. If appropriate, there will also be biometric
network analysis (link charts) to display individuals who are linked through biometric
matches. See Figure E-12.
E-7
Appendix E
Use of Criminal Confiscate Unfair; No Culture; criminal No; Military Civil unrest;
Firearms elements all weapons population not element provides population information armed
carry protected by a measure of and support backlash
weapons traditional security for friendly operations
openly means population forces at program;
risk weapons
turn-in
program
E-8 JP 2-01.3
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Specialized Products
Activities Matrix
Supports Terrorism
Arms Smuggling
Drug Trafficking
Death Squads
Name of
Politician
Individual
Remarks
Boaz
Constantly persecuted Brehany
Possible inside ally
Crafty and very Copeland
diplomatic
Grim
Kanakis
Manning
Warrant Norvell
Riley
Williams
Legend
confirmed suspected
E-9
Appendix E
Association Matrix
Argubright
Boaz
Brehany
Copeland
Grim
James
Kanakis
Manning
Norvell
Riley
Swansburg
Williams
Legend
E-10 JP 2-01.3
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Specialized Products
Link Diagram
Assassination (OPFOR)
Logistic Weapons
Dealer
W. Peterson
D. Wenyck M. Karloff
Local
Businessman
H. Arabal
Media L. Nadir
L. Deng
M. Tikriti R. Penh
Training Media V. Dnerst
Recruiter
M. N.
A.
Stephens Lafayette
Williams
L. Terrel
Trainer
Education
Cell Information Cell
(COE) (Propaganda)
Legend
COE common operating environment known linkages
OPFOR opposing force suspected or weak linkages
E-11
Appendix E
Link
Arrest 1
IED 1
Link Link
Female 1 Anonymous 1
Link
Mortar 1
Link
Insurgent 1
E-12 JP 2-01.3
APPENDIX F
REFERENCES
1. Department of Defense
3. Joint Publications
j. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.
F-1
Appendix F
4. Multi-Service Publication
F-2 JP 2-01.3
References
5. Army Publications
c. MCWP 2-12, Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Intelligence Analysis and
Production.
7. Navy Publication
a. Air Force Doctrine Annex 2-0, Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Operations.
9. General
b. Thomas, Troy S., Major, US Air Force, Beneath the Surface: Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlespace for Counterterrorism. Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic Intelligence Research, Joint Military Intelligence College, 2004.
F-3
Appendix F
Intentionally Blank
F-4 JP 2-01.3
APPENDIX G
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:
Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine
Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments
should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and
appearance.
2. Authorship
The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for
Intelligence (J-2).
3. Supersession
This publication supersedes JP 2-01.3, 16 June 2009, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.
4. Change Recommendations
c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and
other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source
documents reflected in this publication are initiated.
5. Distribution of Publications
G-1
Appendix G
a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are
available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp
(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).
b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and
Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign nationals must
be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense
Foreign Liaison/PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.
G-2 JP 2-01.3
GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
DC dislocated civilian
DCO defensive cyberspace operations
DFE Defense Intelligence Agency forward element
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DNI Director of National Intelligence
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DOS Department of State
DTA dynamic threat assessment
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
GL-1
Glossary
HN host nation
HPT high-payoff target
HSI hyperspectral imagery
HUMINT human intelligence
HVT high-value target
I2 identity intelligence
IC intelligence community
IED improvised explosive device
IGO intergovernmental organization
IO information operations
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IR infrared
IRC information-related capability
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW irregular warfare
GL-2 JP 2-01.3
Glossary
OB order of battle
OCO offensive cyberspace operations
OCS operational contract support
OE operational environment
OPLAN operation plan
OPSEC operations security
GL-3
Glossary
UN United Nations
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USG United States Government
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command
USPACOM United States Pacific Command
GL-4 JP 2-01.3
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
avenue of approach. An air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading
to its objective or to key terrain in its path. Also called AA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE:
JP 2-01.3)
begin morning civil twilight. The period of time at which the sun is halfway between
beginning morning and nautical twilight and sunrise, when there is enough light to
see objects clearly with the unaided eye. Also called BMCT. (Approved for
incorporation into JP 1-02.)
begin morning nautical twilight. The start of that period where, in good conditions and
in the absence of other illumination, the sun is 12 degrees below the eastern horizon
and enough light is available to identify the general outlines of ground objects and
conduct limited military operations. Also called BMNT. (Approved for
incorporation into JP 1-02.)
end evening civil twilight. The point in time when the sun has dropped 6 degrees
beneath the western horizon, and is the instant at which there is no longer sufficient
light to see objects with the unaided eye. Also called EECT. (Approved for
incorporation into JP 1-02.)
end of evening nautical twilight. The point in time when the sun has dropped 12
degrees below the western horizon, and is the instant of last available daylight for the
visual control of limited military operations. Also called EENT. (Approved for
incorporation into JP 1-02.)
GL-5
Glossary
event template. A guide for collection planning that depicts the named areas of interest
where activity, or its lack of activity, will indicate which course of action the
adversary has adopted. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
key terrain. Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked
advantage to either combatant. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-01.3)
line of communications. A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an
operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and
military forces move. Also called LOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-01.3)
mobility corridor. Areas that are relatively free of obstacles where a force will be
canalized due to terrain restrictions allowing military forces to capitalize on the
principles of mass and speed and are therefore relatively free of obstacles.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
GL-6 JP 2-01.3
Glossary
geography, and military objectives. Also called MCOO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE:
JP 2-01.3)
named area of interest. A geospatial area or systems node or link against which
information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected,
usually to capture indications of adversary courses of action. Also called NAI.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
order of battle. The identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the
personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. Also called OB; OOB. (JP 1-
02. SOURCE: JP 2-01.3)
sociocultural factors. The social, cultural, and behavioral factors characterizing the
relationships and activities of the population of a specific region or operational
environment. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-01.3)
target area of interest. The geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired
and engaged by friendly forces. Also called TAI. (Approved for incorporation
into JP 1-02.)
GL-7
Glossary
Intentionally Blank
GL-8 JP 2-01.3
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1
JOINT
DOCTRINE
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 2-01.3 is in the Intelligence series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:
Initiation
ENHANCED
JOINT JOINT
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
CAPABILITY PUBLICATION
Approval Development