Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Part Vi Legpro Cases
Part Vi Legpro Cases
1. Guevarra v. Eala
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Immorality; Adultery; Pleadings and Practice; Negative
Pregnant; Words and Phrases; Adultery is defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as
that “committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the
marriage be subsequently declared void”; A negative pregnant is a form of negative expression
which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse
party—it is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the plead-ing.—
From respondent’s ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
“adultery” being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that “committed by any
married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man
who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void.” (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he
maintaining that it was “low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective
families.” In other words, respondent’s denial is a negative pregnant, a denial pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It
was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication
of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying
language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
2. Belo-Henares v. Guevarra
The Philippines Supreme Court upheld a ruling suspending the law license of an attorney for one
year following Facebook remarks he posted containing defamatory statements about a cosmetic
surgeon. The medical director of Belo Medical Group Inc., Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares, had
applied to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to have Roberto Guevarra disbarred for the
insulting and threatening remarks he posted on Facebook about her and her company.
“By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent
disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in
his public or private life,” lamented the court. “Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used
words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling
insults and maligning complainant’s and BMGI’s reputation.”
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good
character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for
continuance of such privilege.—“Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in
their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,
a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for
continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court
speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers any misconduct,
which — albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession — would show them to be unfit
for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.”
Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, as originally recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
3. Figuerroa v. Barranco
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Gross Immorality; Words and Phrases; A person’s engaging in premarital
sexual relations with another, making promises to marry, suggests a doubtful moral character but
the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct; A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.—Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971
because of the charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore
an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his
promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations. We find that these facts do not
constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal
profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry
suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral
conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.” It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community.
4. Pomperada v. Jochico
Legal Ethics; Successful Bar Candidate; Charge of grossly immoral conduct, proved; Admission to
the Bar denied; Respondent, who made a mockery of marriage, does not meet the standard of
moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.—It is evident that respondent fails to meet
the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. Whether the marriage was a
joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak
well of respondent’s moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social
institution, which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code)
Same; Same; Same; Same; A long and clear admission of illicit liaison by respondent with
complainant for 9 years and before that with another woman, and of the filing of false income tax
returns, renders respondent unfit to aspire for membership in the bar.—Respondent’s testimony
was a long and clear admission of illicit liaison with Complainant for nine years, and before that
with another woman, and of the filing of false Income Tax Returns. Those actuations do not conform
to the standard norms of honesty, decency and moral conduct required of an aspiring member of
the legal profession.
5. Bitangcor v. Tan
Attorneys; It is established in evidence that respondent had sullied the honor of two women—by
failing to marry as promised after he had intercourse with the two women.—All the above
circumstances, however, will not prevent a determined man from taking a woman, especially his
sweetheart who must have been so in love and had been promised marriage. Furthermore, the
testimonies of the witnesses should be taken with caution, since they are all close friends and either
townmate or boardmate of the respondent. Their testimonies could be biased to prevent
respondent’s disqualification from the practice of law. The same motivation could have prompted
Mrs. Miquiabas, a childhood friend and townmate of respondent to testify against Peredo, her co-
boarder, when she said the latter had been seeing other men aside from respondent. There was,
however, nothing in her testimony nor in the testimonies of the other witnesses for respondent, to
suggest that Peredo was a woman of loose morals.
Same; Same.—In the same way that We give weight to the findings of fact of a trial court,
considering the better position of the latter to decide the question of credibility for having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial
(People vs. Laguisma, 98 SCRA 69 [1980]; People vs. de la Cruz, 97 SCRA 386 [1980]; People
vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA 465 [1979]), We cannot but believe that the respondent had indeed indulged
in pre-marital relations with Peredo. Besides, respondent himself admitted that they were
sweethearts (t.s.n., Sept. 6, 1972, p. 15) and that they used to go out together (t.s.n., Sept. 6, 1972,
p. 9), which closeness could lead to physical intimacy. In any case, no sensible woman—a college
graduate at that—will openly admit having been sexually intimate with a man if it were not true.
From all the circumstances, the inescapable conclusion is that the respondent had fallen short of
the requisite morality for admission to the Bar (Section 2. Rule 138, Rules of Court). He violated
the honor of, not one. but two women.
Same; A successful bar candidate, who was barred from taking his oath due to indiscretions
committed against two women to whom he had promised marriage after a period of cohabitation,
may be allowed to take his oath after 10 years during which no offense has been attributed to
him.—Ten years have gone by since the 1971 Bar examinations which qualified respondent to be
a lawyer, and nine years since he was denied the privilege to practice his profession. There appears
to be no other indiscretion attributed to him in the meanwhile.
Same; Same.—He has expiated for his offense. It is understandable that the bitterness in the heart
of complainant cannot easily be erased, but that should not prove decisive. Even the most heinous
of crimes prescribe after a certain period. Moreover, as the transgression resulted from the frailty
of flesh, the sociologist MacIver referring to it as ‘so powerful an appetite,’ an imperative of life
closely associated with the ‘recklessness and the caprice of desire,’ this Court feels that all the
years he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer would satisfy the requirement that failure
to live up to the requisite moral standard is not to be taken lightly. It could also be said that in
offenses of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone. In the same way, We hold
that the respondent herein has sufficiently suffered for his immoral conduct. Bitangcor vs. Tan, 112
SCRA 113, Adm. Case No. 528-SBC, Adm. Case No. 529-SBC February 25, 1982
6. Lorenzana v. Fajardo
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Attorneys; The practice of law by attorneys employed in the
government, to fall within the prohibition of statutes has been interpreted as customarily habitually
holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services.—We
now determine whether respondent engaged in the practice of law while employed as Legal Officer
V in the Manila Urban Settlement Office. Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts
of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action a succession of
acts of the same kind. The practice of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within
the prohibition of statutes has been interpreted as customarily habitually holding one’s self out to
the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services.
7. Ting-Dumali v. Torres
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyer’s Oath; The Lawyer’s Oath, to which all lawyers have subscribed
in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards, nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a
sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times.—We fully agree with the
Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of culpability. The respondent
has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and
honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten
his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all
lawyers that pledge; thus: “LAWYER’S OATH: I, .........................., do solemnly swear that I will
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. SO HELP ME GOD.” This oath to which all
lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is
not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words,
drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By
swearing the lawyer’s oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as
instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice. This oath is firmly echoed and reflected
in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Same; Same; Disbarment; Dishonesty; Falsification; Where, instead of advising another to secure
a written special power of attorney and against committing falsification, a lawyer presented such
document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor of said person and said
lawyer’s wife, the lawyer himself may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document
to the damage of the complainant and her other co-heirs.—It also bears noting that the respondent
was consulted regarding the falsification of complainant’s signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement
dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by the complainant of
her right over the property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainant’s name in that
document. Such act of counterfeiting the complainant’s signature to make it appear that the
complainant had participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to falsification of a
public document. Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and
against committing falsification, he presented such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a
new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife. He himself, therefore, may also be held liable
for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the complainant and her other co-heirs.
Notably, he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal documents
for the transfer of Lot 1603.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which
society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice—he should make
himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and he should not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.—Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing
acts which are contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer,
which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey
the laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such duty
by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for law and legal processes. For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to
a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.
As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate. He should not, therefore,
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. He makes himself unfit to remain in
the profession who commits any such unbecoming act or conduct.
Same; Same; Same; Same; False Testimony; A lawyer, in knowingly offering in evidence a false
testimony, may himself be punished as guilty of false testimony.—The respondent allowed
Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony in court, and he never corrected the same
despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the case. Moreover, in knowingly
offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony.
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor,
fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall “not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.” This Rule was
clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that
she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for
reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.
Same; Same; Same; Misconduct; Any act on the part of a lawyer that obstructs and impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.—The
respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon to assist
in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For
this reason, any act on his part that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice constitutes
misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.
Same; Same; Same; The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and member of the bar.—In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an
erring lawyer, we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence. While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our
sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously
guard the purity and independence of the bar. Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted
out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney
from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. Verily, given the peculiar
factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondent’s gross misconduct calls for
the severance of his privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty
recommended by the Investigating Commissioner. Ting-Dumali vs. Torres, 427 SCRA 108, Adm.
Case No. 5161 April 14, 2004
8. In Re Tagorda
A. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION; SECTION 21 OF THE CODE
OF ClVIL PROCEDURE AS AMENDED BY ACT No. 2828, AND CANONS 27 AND 28 OF
THE CODE OF ETHICS ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION CONSTRUED AND APPLIED; SOLICITATION OF
CASES BY AN ATTORNEY AS GROUND FOR DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION.—
Application is given to section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2828, providing: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice," and to Canons 27
and 28 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the
Philippine Bar Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer.
B. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The law is a profession and not a business.
C. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment
or suspension.
D. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional, and
the commission of offenses of this character amply justifies permanent elimination from the
bar. But as mitigating circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his
intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future
As a result the respondent attorney is suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law
for the period of one month. In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, March 23, 1929
9. Khan v. Simbillo
Administrative Law; Attorneys; The practice of law is not a business; Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits; Elements distinguishing the legal profession from a business.—It has been repeatedly
stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital
that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The
duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The
following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business: (1) A duty of public service, of
which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without
making much money; (2) A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability; (3) A relation to clients in the highest degree of
fiduciary; and (4) A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their
practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
Same; Same; Solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed for solicitation to be proper,
it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession.—The solicitation of legal business is
not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the
dignity of the legal profession. If it were made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no
injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the
lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable.
Same; A lawyer is duty-bound to protect his client’s interest and the degree of service expected of
him is his entire devotion the interest of the client.—As his client’s advocate, a lawyer is duty-bound
to protect his client’s interests and the degree of service expected of him in this capacity is his
“entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights
and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability.” The lawyer also has a fiduciary duty, with the
lawyer-client relationship imbued with utmost trust and confidence.
Same; A lawyer must, at no time, lack probity and moral fiber.—A lawyer must, at no time, lack
probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the bar but are
likewise essential demands for his continued membership.
Same; A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body.—“A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.” Further, “a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able
to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.” Plumptre vs. Rivera, 799 SCRA 639,
A.C. No. 11350 August 9, 2016