THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113592. January 15, 1998.]

INDUSTRIAL AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT, INC. and/or ANTONIO

JARINA , petitioners, vs . NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and LEOPOLDO MEDRANO , respondents.

Erlinda B. Espejo for petitioners.

Carlo L. Gallarita for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Private respondent was employed as a mechanic by petitioner corporation from

November 1974 up to his dismissal in July 1990. On May 31, 1990, he was granted an
indefinite leave of absence, during which period he was able to secure a temporary job as a
mechanic. When he reported for work on June 18, 1990, a supervisor confronted him for
having worked in another rm. Consequently, he was asked to resign. On July 2, 1990,
private respondent was not allowed to enter the company's premises allegedly because
his services had already been terminated. In a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioner corporation to
reinstate private respondent to his former position without backwages. Private
respondent led a motion to cite petitioner for indirect contempt for alleged refusal to
comply with the reinstatement order and for payment of backwages. The Labor Arbiter
issued an order nding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt and directed the
reinstatement of respondent with backwages. On appeal, said order was a rmed in toto
by the NLRC. Petitioner corporation argues that it could not be held guilty of indirect
contempt as it had faithfully complied with the order when it reinstated private respondent
to his former position on April 15, 1991.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. It must be noted that petitioner
corporation received a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision only on April 18, 1991.
Respondent could not have been reinstated prior to said date as claimed by petitioner
corporation.
The Labor Arbiter erred in omitting the award of backwages. The law provides that
an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
bene ts or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Having become nal and
executory, the Court is constrained to uphold this decision for failure of the respondent
himself to question the inadequacy of the remedy due him.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; NLRC; NEW RULES OF

PROCEDURE; INDIRECT CONTEMPT; DISOBEDIENCE OF OR RESISTANCE TO A LAWFUL
JUDGMENT, GROUND. — Section 2, Rule X of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
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 provides that the Commission or any labor arbiter may cite any person for indirect
contempt upon grounds and in the manner prescribed under Section 3(b), Rule 71 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 3(b), Rule 71 provides: "Section 3 — Indirect
contempt to be punished after charge and hearing — . . . a) . . . (b) Disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court . . . ."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner argues that it could not be
held guilty of indirect contempt as it had faithfully complied with the order when it
reinstated Medrano to his former position on April 15, 1991. Respondent allegedly
abandoned his work after initially reporting on April 15 and 16, 1991. It must be noted that
petitioner received a copy of the labor arbiter's decision only on April 18, 1991. It is,
therefore, clear that Medrano could not have been reinstated prior to said date as claimed
by petitioner. The Solicitor General, in his comment, explained clearly the implausibleness
of petitioner's assertion. Thus: "If Medrano was actually reinstated on April 15 and 16,
1991, it would be absurd for him to simply walk away from his job unmindful of the
consequences of his act and considering the sacri ces he had made to retrieve his post. It
should be pointed out that as early as May 3, 1991, private respondent led a Motion for
Execution in respect of the Labor Arbiter' s Decision which became nal and executory on
April 28, 1991. His act of seeking the execution of the decision ordering his reinstatement
is absolutely incompatible with an intention to abandon his job." DACTSa

3. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CONTEMPT; DEFINITION. —

Contempt is de ned as a disobedience to the Court by setting up an opposition to its
authority, justice and dignity. It signi es not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
court's orders. but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration
of justice. There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge
constitutes indirect contempt punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
4. ID.; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT EXCLUDING
AWARD OF BACKWAGES, UPHELD ON APPEAL. — Notably, the March 27, 1991 decision of
the labor arbiter, while ordering the reinstatement of respondent, excluded the award of
backwages. On this point, we rule that the labor arbiter erred in omitting such award. The
law provides that an illegally dismissed employee is "entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and to his other bene ts or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." Having
become nal and executory, however, we are constrained to uphold this decision, albeit
de cient, for failure of the respondent himself to question the inadequacy of the remedy
due him.
5. ID.; ID.; APPEALS; PERFECTION OF APPEAL WITHIN STATUTORY PERIOD,
JURISDICTIONAL; FAILURE TO DO SO RENDERS QUESTIONED DECISION FINAL AND
EXECUTORY. — In Asuncion v. NLRC, the Court ruled that perfection of an appeal within the
statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to
do so renders the questioned decision final and executory as to deprive the appellate court
of jurisdiction to alter the nal judgment, much less to entertain the appeal. In the recently
decided case of Aboitiz Shipping Employees Associated v. Trajano , it was pointed out
therein that, except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party or where the judgment is void, after the judgment
has become nal and executory, the same can neither be amended nor altered even if the
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 purpose is to correct a perceived conclusion of fact or of law. This is true regardless of
whether the modi cation is to be made by the magistrate that rendered the judgment, or
by the appellate magistrate that reviewed the same. Indeed, all litigation must come to an
end however unjust the result of error may appear. Otherwise, litigation would even be
more intolerable than the wrong or injustice it is designed to correct.

DECISION

ROMERO , J : p

Petitioner Industrial and Transport Equipment Inc. (INTECO) seeks to set aside the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated February 23, 1993, a rming
the order of the labor arbiter declaring petitioner guilty of indirect contempt and ordering it
to reinstate private respondent to his former position with backwages from July 11, 1991
up to his actual reinstatement, and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. LLjur

Respondent Leopoldo Medrano was employed as a mechanic by INTECO from

November 1974 up to his dismissal in July 1990. On May 31, 1990, he was granted an
inde nite leave of absence, during which period he was able to secure a temporary job at
Porac, Pampanga as a mechanic. When he reported for work on June 18, 1990, a
supervisor confronted him for having worked in another rm, Consequently, he was asked
to resign. On July 2, 1990, respondent was not allowed to enter the company's premises
allegedly because his services had already been terminated.
In a complaint for illegal dismissal against INTECO, Labor Arbiter Felipe T. Garduque
II rendered a decision dated March 27, 1991, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents INDUSTRIAL AND
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT INCORPORATED and/or ANTONIO JARINA are hereby
ordered to reinstate within ten (10) days from receipt hereof herein complainant
Leopoldo C. Medrano to his former position without backwages, and to pay him
his proportionate 13th month pay for 1990 in the amount of P1,300.00.
Complainant's claim for damages including attorney's fee is hereby denied
for lack of merit." (Emphasis supplied)

The decision became nal and executory upon failure of petitioner to le an appeal
within the reglementary period. Consequently, respondent led on May 3, 1991, a motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was accordingly granted.
On August 1, 1991, the proportionate 13th month pay was fully settled. The aspect
of reinstatement, however, remained unsatis ed in view of the alleged refusal of petitioner
to comply with the said order. Accordingly, respondent led on November 11, 1991, a
motion to cite petitioner for indirect contempt and for payment of backwages.
On April 20, 1992, Labor Arbiter Garduque issued an order nding petitioner guilty of
indirect contempt with a ne of P100.00, and likewise directed the reinstatement of
respondent with backwages from July 11, 1991, up to his actual reinstatement. On appeal,
said order was affirmed in toto by the NLRC on February 23, 1993. Hence, this petition.
The petition must be dismissed.
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 Section 2, Rule X of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that the
Commission or any labor arbiter may cite any person for indirect contempt upon grounds
and in the manner prescribed under Section 3(b), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Section 3(b), Rule 71 provides:
"Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.
—...
a) ...

b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or

judgment of a court . . ."

Contempt is de ned as a disobedience to the Court by setting up an opposition to

its authority, justice and dignity. It signi es not only a willful disregard or disobedience of
the court's orders but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration
of justice. There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge
constitutes indirect contempt punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. 1
Petitioner argues that it could not be held guilty of indirect contempt as it had
faithfully complied with the order when it reinstated Medrano to his former position on
April 15, 1991. Respondent allegedly abandoned his work after initially reporting on April
15 and 16, 1991. dctai

It must be noted that petitioner received a copy of the labor arbiter's decision only
on April 18, 1991. It is, therefore, clear that Medrano could not have been reinstated prior
to said date as claimed by petitioner. The Solicitor General, in his comment, explained
clearly the implausibleness of petitioner's assertion. Thus:
"If Medrano was actually reinstated on April 15 and 16, 1991, it would be
absurd for him to simply walk away from his job unmindful of the consequences
of his act and considering the sacri ces he had made to retrieve his post. It
should be pointed out that as early as May 3, 1991, private respondent led a
Motion for Execution in respect of the Labor Arbiter's Decision which became
nal and executory on April 28, 1991. His act of seeking the execution of the
decision ordering his reinstatement is absolutely incompatible with an intention to
abandon his job." 2

Notably, the March 27, 1991 decision of the labor arbiter, while ordering the
reinstatement of respondent, excluded the award of backwages. On this point, we rule that
the labor arbiter erred in omitting such award. The law provides that an illegally dismissed
employee is "entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other bene ts or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up
to the time of his actual reinstatement." 3 Having become nal and executory, however, we
are constrained to uphold this decision, albeit de cient, for failure of the respondent
himself to question the inadequacy of the remedy due him.
I n Asuncion v. NLRC, 4 the Court ruled that perfection of an appeal within the
statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to
do so renders the questioned decision final and executory as to deprive the appellate court
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 of jurisdiction to alter the nal judgment, much less to entertain the appeal. In the recently
decided case of Aboitiz Shipping Employees Association v. Trajano , 5 it was pointed out
therein that, except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party or where the judgment is void, after the judgment
has become nal and executory, the same can neither be amended nor altered even if the
purpose is to correct a perceived conclusion of fact or of law. This is true regardless of
whether the modi cation is to be made by the magistrate that rendered the judgment, or
by the appellate magistrate that reviewed the same. Indeed, all litigation must come to an
end however unjust the result of error may appear. Otherwise, litigation would even be
more intolerable than the wrong or injustice it is designed to correct. (Emphasis supplied)
cdtai

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the
February 23, 1993 decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
AFFIRMED with the modi cation that the award of backwages be DELETED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., took no part. Former counsel of a party.

Footnotes
1. Abad v. Somera, 187 SCRA 75 (1990).
2. Rollo, p. 77.
3. Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended.

4. G.R. No. 109311, June 17, 1997.

5. G.R. No. 112955, September 1, 1997.

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