(Men-at-Arms) Jack Cassin-Scott, Jack Cassin-Scott-The Greek and Persian Wars 500-323 BC-Osprey Publishing (1977) PDF
(Men-at-Arms) Jack Cassin-Scott, Jack Cassin-Scott-The Greek and Persian Wars 500-323 BC-Osprey Publishing (1977) PDF
THE GREEK
AND PERSIAN WARS
EDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW
THE GREEK
AND PERSIAN WARS
kilonlctres -
attic sladcs
0 4 6 1 2
l i a r i ~ t h r )n1li.rc.d
~~ thr riqht r.ontli~ion.i ti)r thr c;~lltd i t p ~ l ~ ~ r t t t r t -itr~rl lt nrw tnilititry It-a<lc.rs
Pcrsian ra\.;llr.y. ;~q;iinst tc-l~irh t l ~ t *:'ct hc-nian I r/rfltr,pib of tllr Kv1,11l>Firwlln wrrt. rlrtcrnrinrd to
~~~~~~~~y \rnt~ldhc inc.lli.c.tivc. mainr;~iti thr intlrprr~clr-nrc ol' :\thc.ns; rhr
'171~invasion flrcr 11r;lc-hc.tlon ill(. s;tnrly short-, cr,t~~m;inder-in-r:hirf' was (.:i~llim;lchus nl' :lpliiclna
ha~rlrclu p 111(. ships xtlrl <liscml)arktrl ~ h 1lorsr.s. c anrl thc c~vt-riil!pli~rrt~rr ant1 stratr,qisr was X~lil-
'l'l~csitv cl~cl\;rnwas trl the t~orth-c.;~sr 01' t tiv t i i i c l r . ~I althclugli hc :~lsr)st.nlccl :is ontmof' thc ten
t>ct\\-.rt.~~ tllr. rn;~rsht.snntl i r k r l ~ t .protvrrion 01' t h t tli\.isional ct)rnmanrlt.rs,.
prnmontory, .r.;~llcvl (I~I-tosura,on t h r latltlw;~rtl E l a r i n ~1w;nc-ons \r;lrtlc-ct t hc :\thr=tli;inx that thr
sidr. 'l'llr c ; ~ n ~ pw : ~rit~~;l!c.daicar ~ h rX1;~karia 13c.rsi;~ninv:ision t r m p s 1l;td landtul. ' 1 1 ~icrvs ~ was
spring tc~l~ich pmvi(ltul ~ C K K I graxinr: Tor IIIV hrmcs tirkrmn a h s t runllt-r 10 Sp:trt;\ ; rhc Spa~.tat~r;,
aucl a plrntihrl s~rpplyol'z*~atrr. i ~ l t t ~ ~St ~ ~ c hI ~ ~t i ~c .;~nnouncrd
T !I ~ ~ t l ~ a ttheir rc-
111 :\tlit*ns the sittl;ilinn r u m vcrv di tlimr.etltrrom li~fouscotlsr-ic-nrrlosl,;ldr rhcir [ m o p firm cmtrr-
111;11wl.tic.11had prt.zliiilv<P irk the d;tys 01.1-lil~pins.In inq inlo r l ~ t .fivltl oI'I)atrl~until alirr t11v tilt1 1 1 1 o o n .
pmvtAr t ~ o \ v was :III ~ l v c ~ ~r- oc n l ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ t ~ i I t ~ r - i:I$
~ ~i -t c - I ~.ji c:lugrist.
f this mr;lnt n wait ol'sis to srvrn
cl;~yshrlhrc. I hc. ;~rri\.;~l r l l ' rt.it~forct.mt~t~ts. Another
3. &tad frum an ampham *hawing a mouatd warriar in full rr*qurl;t lo Pl;ltat.a, a small Rocoi i a t ~~ ( I M ' T \vhi~61 I lay
a n n w r , a r c a m p m i d hy his servant. ( N o t i o n a l Mu-,
Yaplei) to rhr nnl-rll of :\itir;i. \tr:as answr.rt.tl wirh ;I
volunteer forcr oI'qrv~ralhunclrcd m m . Miltiadex t h c cngaqrrnmt must hr f i s u ~ h tanrl won in r11n.c.
gave thc first instruction Tor battlc, 'contain rile hours. ' I ' i r n ~was short and thc order tn a t t a r k was
invadinq rorccs nn thr \)c*achr's ancl resist an ~ivrn.
advance on .4thms'. It'itliin a few hut~rsor thr Tkr A~heniantmopswrrt:drawn up in thr hattlr
alarm, some ro,ooo hcavily armccl infitntryrnet~. ordcr Miltiadcs had plannrcl. 'l91r:commanrlrr-in-
mainly hoplitcs, wrro on the march to thc plain or' chicf, C:alIimacllus csmmaorlnl tlic r i ~ h tflank,
Marathon thrrlugh the H yncttus-t'cw t c.lr gal>. and thc lcfi flank was Iicld 1 ~ ) - the Platacans. ' 1 ' 1 1 ~
'I'hr Athenians took up thcir position at thr centre, which was to takc thr l ~ r u t ~otf thc first
sonthern end of thc plain with Mount A~riclikicJn anstaught, was under t l ~ r+joint cornrnenci ol'
thcir l e l i flank and the sea to the right ; the Rrvxisa Themistoclm and Rristrides. 'l'ht. Athenian tartic.
marsh lay slightlv to thc war. 'I'hr ccjastal road to was to wcakcn the ccntrc hy widen in^ thc space
Athrns was tiow efictivclv scalrd. J'rrm rverc cut 'bctwcen cacli man ancl to rcrlucr rhe ranks t o tibur
down and man-hauled into drfrnsivc p s i tions with instcad of thr usual r i ~ h a .'Tltc chance r ~ l
thc branrlles licing the Pcrsian linrs, a prccal~tion 131.eakthrough was a caltula~cd risk. Thc rnairt
atpinst thr Prrsiat~cavalry!..From 7 to I r .August strcngth wi~gmassed on thc flanks which i l was
thc front lincs rrrnained static, five kilomctrcs
apart, ncithrr side willing to rnakr thr first mnvc.
Thc .4thvni;trus wcrv loath to commit thrir tmops
to hat tlc, as thc advantap lay wi tk thc Pcrsians in
an open -plain con flirt. A q i n s t thr superior Pcrsian
force of cavalry and arrhcrs, thr Athrnians had
only inrantrymen.
The Pcrsians remained irnmobilc hccause r hrv
had II(F wish to engage tthcir own weak and i n h i o r
infantry agains~thc Grcck hoplitrs in thcir prc-
p a r d position ; thcy wcrc also hoping for ;t s i ~ n a l
from Hippias' ii-iends within Athens itscll: Rut thr
stalemate could not last indefinitely and Datis
finally put Iiis own battlc plans into action. Under
mver of darkncss on thr nigIlt of I I 112 August h r
reem barked most oft hc cavalry as well as his task
force and, slipping out, sai1r.d Tor Phalrran nay
leaving behind Artaphernm with a holdinq force
facing thc Athenians. Thc departure of' D a ~ i sdid
not ga z~nnoticecl and Milliadcs' scouts wrsc
quick to iniirrn him of thc h r t . ?he r l ~ h c n i a n
commanders were surnnlonccl and Miltiadcs out-
Iind the only posible chancc of a Greek victory :
the Persians could not passi1)ly react1 Phalcron by
sea in less than tw hours; 1,eashing and d iscmhark-
ing would take a frw more hours, by which timr it
would be late aFtrrnoon or early eveninq; in thc
immediate vicinity, on the plain of Marathon,
Artaphernm had lost a large part of the cavaliy and
tmp, but would still have his archrrs. Thr
quesrion waq whcther thc Aihenians shnulcl risk an
engagemcnt with the Pcrsian forces; if they did,
ant1 clefeated thcm, there was still timr to doubIt
back Tor the defence of Athens. It was 5.30 a.m., so
11q~d U'C)IIICI complctc at1 rnrirrlinfi movement. rhrir strcngth was a littlr orrcr half' that of thv
"I'hr Pcrsian li>rrcs were drploycd as Miltiadcs Persian cen trc, and tIlr opcn qround to hc covcrrd
anticipatrd : thc crntrr was stalIi.cl with the rriitk put thr Greeks at the mprcy of thc rlitr Pcrsinrr
troops ar~tl thc flanks wrrr helcl 11y interior arrhcrs.
hartalions drawn fmnl thc conscripts oft hc clnpirr. At almut 6 a.m. otl 12 August the distance
'IBc risks Ihr thc Athenians wcre great, howcvrr; l>ctweetlt11etwo armics was apprclxirnately nnr anrl
a halr kilornetres; t11r lrtrrnpet wunded thr con-
5. D c d I from a p i mof d f i g t u t Attic bowl (fithcmtury kc), mand and thr Alhcnian ranks movcrl forward. T h e
showing m~ Athenian boplite w n m o r mttncking n Fersipp
stmdard-befrrr. (LOIMP, P u r i ~ J acivance start cd briskly, drveloperl into a trot, thcn
hrokc into thr. clnublc as thcy rushrtl thc last 140
rnctrcs to avnirl thc hail arrows. T h e Persian
royal coneinqc'ents put up a stronq resistance, the
centre standinq its ground, forcing t h r Athcnian
hoplitrs t ~ ~ c kMranwhilc,
. on cither flank the
Athenians wit11 thrir slronE concentration uf troops
carried all ihcforc ~ h c mant1 ptlt the P&rsi;~n flanks tn
i n ~thc Great M;irsh whew
fliqht, man?) ~ ~ r t r r a t to
they drtmned. Ot hcrs retrratcd along ~ h sllorr c tr,
thcwaiting ships in thc I~eof'tbcpronlontow. Zlr'ilh
thc Pcrsian flanks in cornplcte disarray, tl~r
rlthcnian ancl l'latacan flar~ krrs dimgaged thc
pursuit accol-ding to plan. Regroupi nx, thry
rclturnrd to thr sccnc of thc batrlc whcrc thc
remain in^ Prrsiarls wcrc out flanked in r douhir
pincer rnovcmcnt. Thc rctn8at in^ Persians rouxht L Pi-orl-d sbot which w e r t t t n d am rnimdtun
their way back in the dirrction ol'thcir s h i p along with the d d or n leather s l i a ~ .T h e sling m n
a w u q ~mund, d niter aomc turn8 n wider
the narrow gap Ir~twcon thc marsl~csand thr nwep m ar ucctrrnplirhd and one cad of the
beach. Thrv werr closrly pursrlcd l)y t l ~ Athrn- r lrmthrr sling w a n r r l r n u t d , b u r l k ~the 1cmd shot
vwuy with qrtat momrrrtum. 'IXe *hot warn o f t e n
ians, who were drtr*rrninc.clto dcs~rovt hc enemy i n s c r i h r l with mrk.iaEts. (Rritinh Museum,
Lnndon)
forces and fleet. 'I'hc I'ailurc at' t h e Persians to
envisaqc surh a contingcncv was qui tc astonish in^,
especially 21s t h r d>vious Athenian preparations drtachmcnt. Thcir arrival: i l l a dvplrtrtl and
can hartlly h a w mrapcd rhcit notice. 1)atrrrecI condition Idi only orw rollrsc Ibr thc
Ry a.m. on r l r \ ~ p ; r l ~ t~ h surviving
c Pcrsian Prrsiati inval;icln rot-cv, il stra~eqicwirhdrawal. l,;lck
roval trmps ancl the ships of khr Mararhon task to Asia.
forcc wrrr out at sra and heading for PhaErron. In Marathon had provcul that the hpavy troops of
the final count ol'c;~-ualtiwthr Pcrsians had lost the hoplirr inrantry cottld cornprrc succrssli~lly
6400 nlrn and an unrt.c.orclcd num hcr 01' prisoners ag;Jnst supcrioritv of numbem, particularly whcn
and ~vounrl~*d ;*long with scvrn ships. "I'hc ?t~Fic- tlicir opponrnts wcrr only liqhtly arrnccl, hut [hc
nians suni~mrtsurprisin~lyfew castmities with on iy Circck victory should not bc o\~rrcstirnattd.Thc
192 dead, inclucl ing: t hcir commander-in-chief Pet-siitn losse~;wrrc c;lsiIv I W ~ ~ R Cl ~ SO
y l i ~ ;1r~ W~C T ~
Callirnachus. and scnrct only to emphasize thr nccd Ibr a
In orcler to cornplvtc his ovcrall stl-aregic plan, prnprrly pwparcd rxywdition il'Gwrcr was za br
l\liltiadcs had to clernand fmm his mcn ionr more suhjigarrcl. 'I'h;~trite Pt-rsians woriltl rrtllrn was
H e ~ u l c a ncndravour, tht- march l ~ a c kto Athens, incvitahIt*, ancl it was clcartv t-ssrntial h r thr
'as bst as thrir feet could carry them'. Commander Grcrks to rralizc thar, dmpitr t h e glov of Ma-
Aristeidrs and one division wcrc left lwhind to rathon. they had done Iittlr- morc than I~uvlimr in
guard thr prisoners of war and raptured cquip- wliich to prcparr t Iicmsrlvcs for t h r rrsurnption or
mrnt. 7'hr rcttrrn ol'the Athenian army, quick in the con flick.
comparison with thc slower naval squadrnns of In 4W.9 w:. Miltiad-, rotnmanrling tthv A1hr.n-
D;itis, had to take fill1 advantage of surprise iT iarl flvrr, attrmptcd to regain cnt~~rt)l of rhost-
h'liltiades' plan was to take elrecl, GIfhen thc Persian Aegean islands which had capitz~latcd to thc.
invasion task iorce arrived, the Athenians were Persians, hut his naval forcc insufTicirnt to
alrcacly in thrir delinaivc posirions at C y n o s a r g ~ , accomplih this task and his hlockadc of Parm
muth or thr. citv ancl fiicin~tlw st:;t. And, whcn bitcrl ;I dcl'cat which let1 tn his imprisonment ar
Dalis arrived in Phalcron Bay, hc founcl the citv Athcns, whew h c d i d smn after ol' a wound
wrll drfended. Attcrnpis t o I;~ndwoultl have h e n rcceivcd ar Paros. Thc Ath~niansncxt tried LO
tlscl~ssso hc allcharmi and awairtd Arrapllcrnrs' obtain mastpry of thc Saronic CuIi'by ovcrpoww-
7-. C r o m r u t p f d r q a h o w k ~ a nA l h t n i a n horseman,
475 m.c. The h m m i s without *ndrElc or stirrups hut with full
head hmeuzrs. 'Fht horwman wrar.c a lonq, hiahly-patlrrnrtl,
rtiArlnak and r a m r n the -hart j ~ v e i i n s (Villa
. Ciiulira, Hornr)
in^ rhc pro-l'rrsian island oT:\r.@qina whusc raiders By this tirne Gr~rccbhad rcrcivrd alarming relxlns
mntinually ravagrd rhc shorm ot'tittica. This too ol' cxtrnsivc I'rrsian inv;~sirln pl.c.parnlit)ns, rum-
w;rs n f;lilurt, ant1 i t llccamc ob\pious that rhc o t ~ r spr<~pagali~l l>y D ~ I - ~ Ison.
I s ' S v t * x v s ~[hr new
Arl~rnianflrr~raulrl o&r little pmtrction ;qainst a I'crsian kin^, who apprrriatrd t hc psychalqical
11mlil~S V ; ~powrr. v[Ti.cl o f w~chstorirs, prrhaps haping thcrrhy to
'l'llevacancy crrnlcd 1)y thc fall of h4iltiadr.swas Entlucc selmc areas o ~ G r r ~ 10r t c. i l l ~ iul;itc
l without a
frllrd '1'hc.rnislr~:lr-s,who rully apprrciatrd nht fish t .
nclvl fir a stronq naval ti~rcc; thc discovr~yof nrw To facilitarr thr rnclvrrncnt ~f his army into
s chc Lauricln mining district placed Grcecc. Serscs had orrlerrd thr I)rid~ingof the
silvrr d r p ~ i t it)
surplus capital (hr dispjsal of' thr A~semblyand Hellcspcmt, a maqnificcnt achivvvrnrnt on thr part
enal>lr(l thc Athtbt~ians, ~rcrsuaclcd by 'I'hrrnis- a l his rnqinccrr; who t~seclavtSrsix hunclrcrl ships to
toclrs, ~ r stommcncr a shiphuildinq programrnt. construct two huge pontoon brirlqcs. I n order to
inrrnrlrcl t o prodrice [wnhuntlrrcl new triremes filr avnLI risking his fleet arountl thc d;ingcrous cape of
thc Athrniat~fleet. Moutrt rlthrrs hc tlihrl acannl (lug r:at.rtnsthc isthmus.
and rracm ol'this canal can stillt 3 idrntificd.
~
Set-xcsdrrnantluu!rcln t ir~grt~ls
lkom vvrysatrapy
of the Persian Empire ant1 the rmponse enabled
him to amam an imposing lbrrc. Ry 48 I KC. he had
set up his I~eacEquancrs,
at Sardcs in 1,ydia ancl sent C;~rlhaginianswho wrrc tn pin clown thc wt=qtcmrn
out toall t11eGrrpk stat(%rxccpl Athens ancI Sparta Grrrks ol' Sirily whilst S c r x r s attack(.cl from the.
for thc carth and wa'tcr of submission. Tlrc sizt. (IT vast.
the Persian arm?;has htcn a clurstion ofrlispn~rand Hy tlie spring of 480 R.C. [he huge itmy I ~ a d
conjccturr cvcr since Horoclot us' c~rifinal figusc. crossvd ~ h Mrllrsl~lr~t
r w h ~ r ri t was-joinecl by the
gros4y exaggrratccl, of ovrr two millicin com- flcrt, and was making its way. in 111rce separate
txttants. More realistic latter-day commrntators columns, rc~warclsThrssaly, prt-c*r.rl(*dby alarrning
estimatr Xrrxm' forcr at some r jo.ooocomhatants, rumnurs that i t was drinking [hv ri\.ecs dry.
approximately half OF which arc thought to havc Mranwhilc, thr I;rtr.h, in the autumn of 481
h e n Prrsian troops, and i t i n c l u d ~ d thc hcst R.c., rrummnntd to thr Isthmus of' Crlrirlth 1rpt.r-
cavalry available li-orn t h r Mditrrranean arca. srnta1ivt-s c~l'allthtsc statrs which hacl nnt at ready
His fleet, said by Hrrodot~rsto nurnl~crabout I ,200 subniittcd t o Pcrsia. and an alliancr, lrrl hv Alllens
vessels, many of which werc snlall t ranslxlrts. ancl Spart;i, was Srwrnt-c!. I-lowtvrr. a s~~clclcr~ blow
hasted a contingent o f skilled Phoenician svilrnrn was rlc-alt to Crrvk rrcolution 11y ~ h voicr r of thr
and forces from E4ypt,Carin and Ionia. Sinrr :in Tlrlphic. orarlt., which prr~lictc.rl rlisast~rfor ~thc
army of such a size coulcl nor hope to live off so arid Grccks and arlviscd thr Athrnilins in particular ta
a land as Gmrcr it nepdpd to be provisionrd rrrlrn flcr For thrir livtx. 'Thv oraclr rlairn~tlthat the only
the sca as i t prncccclcd around thc shows of thr hopr lay in a wtrdr-n wall, and although (his
Thracian scil ancl into ccntral Gwccr. T h r Hvvt prtw~rnahll;indica~c.rithc wrmclen rlcfcnces oi' t hc
would also ~>mvidra mili rer? bar-k-1111w1icnt.w.r :Ir.rt~polis, ir wiu i n ~ ~ r p r e t ~hy
r l 'I'hernistoclm to
necessan. mran tllr Grt-ck f1t.t-t.
Serxrs clrarly intrndecl the subju~atinnn f tlic On the qucstion nf strate,:, opinion ar thc
whalcofGrrcce ifpossible Tor he harl to~nmittrrfan Isthmi;tii cc~nfi*rc.nc-c-was dividrtl. 'I'he Spartans
rnnrrnous numbrr of troops and had mad(. rxtcmn- and rhrir l'(-lr~~~r~ri~ic.siiirinrighhours hclcl tcn-
sire ~~rcl)arations,inr:ludinq an aLwr.rntLntwith 11rc ;~ciouslyt o ~hr:view [hat tlie main d~renccsbould
GEPIERAL S U R V E Y
-
-
Road
Trsci
----- Goat r r x k
MT AEGALEUS
SALAMIS CHANNEL
~LIPSOKOUTALII
t TAlANTONESIk
11.. h n i l from Crrtk vase p i n t b g q50 ns, shmving an
lrrbtr n t z i n f i n ~M u bow.
mad(*allint~cpsw i ~'Illrss;ily
l~ ;~ntlh~Irg;waant1 with
Rrqcls, a ~ m ~ . ~ r 1'~Fnponnt~ii~n
fi~l rival of r hu
Spartans. rls rrlations worst-nr-rl with .~Leginaancl
Corinth. who wrrrb+j(maln~rs c ~ t z' h r rr:ldinq potenrial
01' Piracus. hy now tltc c-llirf'6 r c r k Iwrt. tcnsion in
thr I't.lopnnt~cserapidly l~rramt-ac-utc..
'lhc pmmincnr figure in r\tIlcnian politirs at this
t i n ~ ewas Prrirlrs, who \vasdrtrrminrrl to unitr thr
w l l a l ~of Grcccc under rlthrnian rvli~iousIradrl--
ship. I n 457 n.c., Ilc completrrl tllr lbrlifira~icmof'
ITraeus and linkrcl i t tr, :\rIicns \vith il wiillcil
c.orridor almu t seven kilomrt rtms w i r l ~ . , ;tnrl hir
command was 10 scr* thc city reach thc hcigl~lofits
imperialist aspirat ions.
Athenian expansionist polirv had hecnrnr sn
obvious [ha! S p r r a scnt an I I ,mu-s~rongarmy lo
Rocotia to prrsztarlc. its inhahitants to join E ~ P
Pcloponnesian L v a ~ l i c -and rtmsist Arhrns. and this
fclrcr drl'eatsd an Akhrnian army at 'I'anagra, ens1
or Thehes; hut i t thcsn withc!rcw IO the IstEirnrts
I r n v i n ~the hroriitns ;it thr mt-rry 01' t h r 111hrn-
inns. who took c o l ~ ~ r oofl t l i r wholv arm, rxct-pr
Thrhcs i twff, two months later. Evcnt~rallya five-
year pvac*c treaty w a s n c g o t i a t ~ d I j t - t w ~ ~tlw
n
rZItl~cniansancl thc Prlopnnnrsian I,c:lgvr in ,ls'z
R.c., I)ut i t was t101 until ++5 n.c. that a c l r f i n i ~ i ~ r
trtt~c'. intrrldrrl tcl last liu- (lrirty yrnrs. rr'as aqrt.c*d Prl-ic-1w dircl in .y2g Bar:. and thc. rlrw Iradlr-,
1
.\lt~;tntvi.liilc.thr 1niUn l)nd!' 111 2 1 ~ flvrt
. maclr lor
C;nlr?1.a otirc Inrarr. Ilc*nirfitl~er~~\'
I ~ ; I I I w:~q to
insiiyatc atlrl nljlltr)l-t I+L'VOIT i n .\!csEvII~;~.i l t ~ ~t IICl
S l ~ ~ t i trrspnnst.
~b \\-as ~ \ v i ! i - 'TIlc* I,ulk ol' IIIV
I'rlo~nwt~csiattal+ln!*withdrrw frc~rn:\ttica. \r*l~ic.h
liad oncc aq;tirl I x ~ r t i nrr.~~l~ir.rl, ancl ~ ~ ~ ~ t . t * l i r c l
t l i r r c ~ lt ~( ~I'! 10s. Tt~rS C ~ ~ I ~ I I I I . ;I[ ~ ) ~C:~II.(.~IX
~ W;IS
iristnrctetl to sail i~tlr~lrtli;tfr.ly klr tllr samt. spot.
n r n ~ o s t h c ~ l t - sLEP.C'EC
. \\.it11 lhr ~i-Q.09131'Ct ol' a t !;irk
frrlln land ant1 %-;I. reel i~c.stc.tlinimrrlinlv wicl frcim rrf tllr ;irtnihticr h a d hrrn violatrd, rcfil.;ccl to hand
t hr rlthcniat~H(-c.1, tlow at %;rt.~;nthirs. Iliic k thra Sj3i1rln11 s l ~ i l illl~!
~ . 1>1~1~kit(l~'~I Sphac~rriii
T h r Spartans prcl>at*rult o track tllr garrison at clrlct- nrorr. 'l'hr c*?rpc=c-rirt inn was r l i i l t the garristrn
13!mlus, prrli.r.it11ly hclkrr 11ic. rcttll-ll ol'111c.:tlhrnian o n Spl~;ic-trrinwoultl I)c s t a r ~ r r into l surrender. Ijut
llt-ct, l ~ i tliit~n{I 1 h a ~thi. i1111y l~rat-~i(+itl~li- ap- S ~ ; I I ' Lp lAt r~i f Ii t ~ n l a n ; l ~ ~loE run rtn;dl S I I ~ P s~ h) i j ~
prcr;~chrsw r r r ;I! rliose ~ x l i n i sirlrriltl) limi fit-rl by ;islirrre rln ~ l i cseawartl sicle ol' Spl~uc.tc-ria.w11r.n
Dr*n~osthrt~es. Hrqlinq to prriprnt:2tl1r1iiail ~ t s rr d stt-onewincl.; k v p ~ttlr A ~ I i ~ n i a t ~ ~the i t ilmy.
~ i ~and
I~~
~ h rirlancl
. nl'Sph;wrrria, ~llr.Sparlans Ia~~rlrtl t h ~ r ;~~ f t c srvrs;~l
r wccks ic W;IS rvIc1~11tll~attlw zarrisnn
;\ garrison (11' 420 11r;lviiv ar~nc-rlnlrn, of'\ \ , I w m ;I U.~AIICI l i o t st;In.e.
litili. 11ndr.r a 11ii3r wcre rl-uc6 'Spartialvq', t'l'i~vk D~rnosthc.11c.r was tuakillq plans filr arr assault nn
Sp;u-tan trrwps. 'I'ltr attack rlri l'!,lte was pnrti- Spliac t r r i ; ~whvn C:Ert)~iirjipc.i~rcd.h a v i r ~I~oi~stcd ~
czilal.ly rlilljcul~ 1 w . c . a ~ti!' ~ ~ 11s strctiqth as ;r Ir, tl~rh ~ ~ ~ - r ninl ~:\lllrns ly thal Ile coultl 1;1kc the
fior~ific-i~tion. ;\a(! ~ h Spart;~"'
r \wrc coi~iitrti;~ll\ i.;l;rnd in twc-nt y clays. :In initial a s ~ ~ u Ewiis r niatl~
;Iwanhof T he possil iiit y o I ' a ~ t a c krrtlni t h r :ltl~t.rii;in with 8on Iurplizcs a1 rhc. sclr~~hcrn eml ol*thc idand
I1rt.t t hrnugh thr. sot~tht-rrl t.litr;tncc to 111t. I)ay, i ~ n r la S p a r l ; ~ n o u t p s r ht.lrl I>? tllit.2~ 1 ~ 1 c . n rsaq
which it was i ~ i ~ ~ ~ c hto~ I~loc-k;itlc iblr succ*qf'irlly. r)\*r-rlmwt-i=vrI; rt>,t)uo rl~ol-rmrn ii~llowrd.tntnrly
1:or thc clcl'rl~rt-ol' hi5 posilicln D r r n n s ~ l ~ r r i t r P i ~ h rtroops itlrlrwling; ahnlil 80n a r c h r ~ WIIO s h i ~ dil
~ m ~ Icl . 1d~qrratcr ~>;irt "This Eirst-r. a t tE?r Iandwalr3 c.onridrr:iI)l~.ittlvan t R ~ tP1 ~ ~ 111'a~ily 1 ' a1-mvC1 hop-
f o r ~!it-a~ions
i wliilq~111m l i i ~ ~ ~ s ~ l l a' l5tmall ~ ~ ~11r)cIv
~ ~ ~ l litc.;
r c ~in tht. nrr.kl; tcrrai~l.Ut.rncathcnrs' tacticbwas
ot'hoplitrs to fight tJr:~ssnu!~ 1)). sim;l. Thc lat~<lu.:~rrl t o {ill-m L I ~ S111t. hoplit(-s Ihritlq t h r Spartans hut tn
tl~Srnrt.s wvrr. as 1111- Spa rt a l a di\;c.c)vrqr~d. im - rt-trvnt tr-l~rtt l);lltlr ivas IIILLTCCI, It.a\.ing thr
p o s i i ~ l tt t~) hl-racl~.and t h r y had nrl n-tnrc szlcct-ss Sp;mr:ins 13 rry tn t hc largcs t1~1rnht.1-s r l f ligh1 trrlr)ps
w h r n thry trircl lo sitrl ihcbir ships r~vl-rthc rock) p ~ ~ r ncr ol ~ u ~ tlicir il flatrks ancl war whn assaiftd
i~pprnachr t , t l ~ cIlearEl at ~ h ~r o ~ t t t l - ~ r~~~~~~I. + r s ~ CII thrm wit 11 rni~silt.rS r n t ~a~clistat~c-c*. \ t ' < ~ r tclown
~ hy
thc hratllancl. :\tirr a day of' f ~ ~ r i o ufigl1tin.q s thc this lactic and u n a h l r to ~ltnkt.n succcsqf~ilcountrr-
Prlopnrrt-sians wit!>rlrt-w to await tltt- i~rl.ivnlol at lilt-k. tl~nsc.Sliartans who ha(I not fillell I-rtrr;rtrd
m i t i c r i ~ lilrl ~ ~llc.buildin!: ofsieqe rt~ginvs. ill lhcir tratlititmally t l i ~ c i p l j t ~ iil'iliiol~
r~l to thr rot-!
Soon alirr rhr lull irt t l ~ vliqh tir~g,chr. i\theninri at thc norllrt-1.n cnd nPtElr islanil. t v h c r ~t h r y r;tngrd
ship$, no\\- n ~ ~ n t l ~ rfirfry, i n ~nr.ri\-r.d itnd ir~sprc.rt.d t hcrn.wli-t-s in ;I semi-cil+clr to f i t ~ cthe ent-my. :It
t31iasituation. Scrillq no nl)pi~rtut~it> ritht*rto ctltrt' t11c. s~rmntit01' a hill, rh~irflitnks prot~ctril.the
thi* bay, \vllic.li W ~ oS~ c i ~ ~ ) i r c ltlic S ~ ) ; ~ r f illrtat, ln tlrli-nrlcrs 11c.ltl ~ h c i rown urliil :t group of' liqhtlr
or to ~tlakc,a I;inrlitiq at Pylrls i t h ~ wo111~1 ~v 11;tt-1' armc.rl tnc.11, rommat~clrtlhy n h~lc-ssrniancaptain.
ht.rtl rln room l'nr sr, w;my \.c.sst.Ixl t!~c.yI . P ~ ~ F C * ~ !cntnt. 111) o1.t-r thc hill and 1i.H u p o t~h~r ~ nT~nm~ h r
rlrwtl~tcl ~ h isl;~tlrlr nl' Protv. rear. Yo.rr.I ha1 virton- tvas assu~=rd, t hc !tt henianr
Early ncxt morriin~the Sl>art;inswcrr pu(ting to l~rid off. p l ' ~ t \ ~ ) ~ i ftol g rhe Spartans that tbcy
sra, i t t i c a r h a v i n ; ~I,c-auhcd iht-ir ships Tor lhr. ~iight. sut.rr.rrdcr. Rlivr m u c h cliscussicm rhc remaining
W I I P I ~ t111- r\tllrtliilrls ~IISIIPCI in I I ~ H I I I 111r111: 111~' 2 9 2 mrn. I st) al' t E i r ~ rSpnrtiat~s. ~ g;~\~c* t hrmst*l\.n
S p a r t a n ships urr~+r p u s h ~ dhark 10i h r shnrc am!. 1" iitw'I wcrr takrw to ;lthet~s.
rx,r~~tuall?+, t hr ;!rheni;~n~ mrccrerlc+riin c;~ptusit~,q U r p i t c tilr I>rilliancco6l3emnsrl~c:ncs'tactics in
fivr \,ca~t-Is ancl cornplt-tc. mnlmaricl; I)T tlir Ila?., t r l i ~ s i n qtt, clllploy liis h o p l i t ~ rin ii s i t ~ ~ a t i owllrw n
liqht troops coi~ldbe u m I so much morc cKec lively, TR t h r s p r i n ~nf 414 B.C. an Athenian assault
it was C:l~onwho. o n returninq to Athens, took [lie gained po~qrssinno f t hr plntcau nrl.:pipoiat., which
praiu- fi~rso prrsrigious a victory. ancl it seclmcd commanded the city from the wmt, ancl thcv hcgan
that the roriuncs or (he warmongers in Athcnian huilclinq ;L wall running nnrth lo south ovpr the
politics werP irr thc. ascrnciant. RUL,two years laicr, pla~rauin an attcrnpt t o cut Syracuse o r rmm the
Cleon tlird in thc rout of thc Athcnian army at rPst or Sicily. Tlie Sywcusan op1msiltion was unallle
:\mphiupolis. and a fi rty-yeat peace treaty was to prcvent this ancl the siruarion was hecornins
t~ccntiatcdwhich called for Athcns to hand hack despcraw, when [he Corinthian fleet arrived,
thosc cities shc had annexed durinq the war, along: hackrd u p hv a hastily raiscd army of n,ono hop1itc.s
with t h c prisoners from Sphacteria. In return, she and light troops Icd bv Cylippus. This iirmv
rtqaincd nearly all the territories she had possessed manaarcl toseizr the nor1hern part orEpipolac and
a t the commrncrment ofhcrstilities. And so the war, to construct a counter wall wetwarcls across the
which had heen so acutely cxp-nsivc in h t h plateau, frustrating the Arhrnians and cutting;their
human and ctonomic tcrms, led only to a rc- land communications. This forced t hr: Athcnians to
sumption of thc sratus quo, as far as Athens and scnd for reinforcerncn ts, which wrrr dispalchtrl
Sparta wcrc cancerned. Rut Carinth, Boeotia and unrtrr thr mmmand nf Drrnasthcnrs and Eury-
Mcgara were so djssatisfiecl that the reopening of rncdon. Upon his arrival, Desrnosthcnes dccidcd
hnstflitirx was incvitablrr. that an irnmecliatc. attack offvrcd thc best chancc of
Scvcr;tI firmrr Spartan allics, Argra, Cot-inth, surrws. Hc midc a night attack o n Epipolac hut
Mantinca ant1 Elis, formrd an alliancc Indc- was t~ns~rcccssii~l and ~hvt-rfi,rc.dutidcd that with-
pt'wlrnlly orthc Laccclacrnonians and nrgotiatd a d r a w i ~ lwas t hc wisest c o r ~ w Drlayrcl
. by Nicias'
trr-atv with thc Athenians in 420 B.C. under the intlrcisinn, tht. hthrnian flrrt was aucldrnl y block-
acgis of a ncw ancl influential ilthcnian st rate go^, aclrd bv thc Syracl~sansin rhc Grrat Harbnur and,
Altil,iadrs. This state of afiii',lirswas shortlivecl for, despit~a valiant attrmpr to smash thhr way
aftrr a Spartan victory at hIantinca in 418 n.c,, the through tn rrrrdorn, the armv was hrcetl t o makr a
I'rloponnmian statcs rcjoinrvl thc Spartan camp lanclwarcl retreat towtlrrls C a ~ a n i a nnrth
, ot'Syra-
and I,acdacmonian supremacy ovcr t hc Pclopon- cuse. 'I'hey mart-hetF in it hallow wltlarth, prnrrctrd
ncse was once morc cstahlishcd. around the outside by heavy infantry. Falrltv
Under hlcibiadr~thc Athcnian qumt for mas- communications Ird to thr separation ofthr lrading
tery of the Grwk worlrl found ncw inspiration ancl division, undrr Nicias, Tram thc r w r , I d bv
the :\ssernhly, despite the opposition oi'Rlcihiadrsl Demoslhenrs, and thr. fi~rcvw m sonn overtaken
fellow slrnt~gosNicinq, r a t i f ~d an amhitious scheme and massacred hy [he Syracusan army. Nicias and
toconquer Sicilv, in particular t h port ~ orSyracuse. Demmthrnm werr cxrcutcul and rhc 7,000 sur-
An impressive rorcr was rnustcrcd comprising 5 , m vivom were imprisonrd in ~ h cstone cluarries of
hopIitcs, 1,300 lighrly a m e d troop and a fleet of Svracusr, where thry sulI'errd rrrril>lleprivations in
t34 triremes with a complement of a b u t 20,000 thc merciless dimate.
men. In addition (0 this ~hcrttwere large numbers 'Thc Symrt~sandis:1stc.s was an irnmcnsr srthack
o f supply ships and attendant vessels. Although the to Athenian imperinlism and her enemies were
land force was rclativcly small, the supremacy of quick to lake aclvantag~of the situation. Several
her fleet ovcr any Syracusan opposition gave stales revdled, ancl Sparta kegan refurbishing her
Athens hope For victory in SiciIv. 'l'he expedition fleet with too ncw ships. Besides these develop-
was led by Nicias, AIcihiadcs and Lamachus; but ments within Greece itsell; thc Persians, on the
not lone: i t f i c r i~rrival in Sicily, Alcihiadcs was othcr side of the Aeqean, renewed their interest in
recallod ro face political charges, and chose instead thc Ionian Grcek states.
to cr;c.apeto the Peloponnesc. 1,arnachus ~avoureda Alcibiarlm, who had tcft just bcfbrc thc fateful
swift attack on Syracuse, hut Nicias wasted time in events at Syrarusc, was at thk timc busying himself
ft~tilc cxcrcises and the Svracusans took the with political machinations involving Athcns,
opp~rtunityto orgianizc thcir drfcnccs and srnd for Sparta and the satrap nS Lydia, Tissapht.rncs.
help to Corinth and Sparta. Puttinq hirnselrat thc tlisposal of the Athcnians,
Alcil~iaclrsIlvlprrl thr.rn ro rrqain tt~rHrlles~~orlr t h r Hclleslm~it,I.>~nonrclok I Ho ships anrl nIlit+ed
:~nrl I hc Ikq)l~orus1)ul. aftrr the clrii'at cr3' an hat r lc a[ :~cgosptharni.
:ltIirnian flc.c.t i l t Intiurn i r ~ ,l.oI; R.c., hr. was 'Thr t l ; y :ilirr he arsivvd C;c>r~c)rrlwvd n up
repl;~cvd1); Chlnot~.Hritsinq 1hn1lhc. Sl);~~-t;in llr-ct rowal-rls thc. Sp;trt;in flret at t,ntnpsacus only to find
unclpr L ~ ~ i l t l (W:IP
I t ' ~; ~ t r ~ n ~ p l i10l l disrupt
g .\11tct1- ~ h a lLys;mndt.r rt.fuscd t n engage. ;lncF so 111c
inn Ponlic. tr;itlr nnrl hat1 l~c~<it.qrrl 1,arnpsncits ill ;\I lirnians r c t u r n ~ r lro .2r.%osy,or;1mi,~)rtrsuculby
Sp;lrt;m rccounai~ssnccships. For ;I Khrthcr tour
clays this escrcisr was rrpr-a1rrl ; r hr nrst dav. I lie
t i t hvnians, relturnit~~ anotlrrr u n n ~ c c c ~ ~ f ~
li-om ?;(.I
challengr, put ashnrr in the hay oi'Aegcspotarni to t h m u ~ hthrir ~=anks
rrlativcl y harn~lrsslyand thvn
rallcc~supplies. Apprisrrt or this ;)1 his srnurs, i~rf\vinced on the. Prrsians, many nl- whom Ilrd
Lysander launchrcl a wrprise attack and captured immcdiatcl y. Cvrus' ~ i ~ v a l rthen
y charged. but in
all but nine of thr: Athcnian ships, massacring ovcr an attrmpt to rcach h i s hruthvr in ordrr to kill him
3.000 men. Connn escaped with cighl s h i p to ~wrsnna11yCyrtis was separa ted lkom t ht*suppnrt r ~ f
Cyprus, and a solitary dispatch tmar m a d r its way his army and lost his lifi-.
hack to Athrns with news of thr rlisastcr. T h e conclusion nl'thc hattlr left both Greeks and
'I'he Spartans followcd up this virtual annihi- Persians unsure oiwhat to rln next. Despite ~ h r i r
lation of the Athenian Ilect by hc*sir,qin~: Athens victory, thc Grccks wrrc faccd with attemptins a
with thc Pcloponnesian army, and, blockaded from withdrawal with many hmtile Bmians still in thv
thr sea hy the victorious Lysandrr, Athpns was arm. The Persians, for thrir part, wcre Inath ro
obliged to negotiate a wttlerncnt. The Spartans, in rngagc the Greeks but krcn to be rid or them. 'l'l~cy
a position to demand almost any terms, i n s i s t ~ l offrrrd tn escort them out of the country and hack
that the Long Walls and brtifications be pulled m Grcccc, hut soon after the march srartrd thc
down, a11 foreign possrssions ,@vcn up, ancl Athen- Grcck gcncrals were l u r ~ daway fmm the army ancl
ian control confincd to Atrira ancl Salamis. put t o dcath and the rctrcatine soldiers were thrn
Sparta. hitherto thr champion ofindividual state atkackrd. Quick to dercnd thrrnsrlvcs, tl~cygmup-
autonomy in Greece ancl thc vnrrny o f Athenian erl in *2 hox fnrmatinn with hop1irt.s munr1 t l ~ r
imperialism, now revealed thr vrry attitudes outside and, keeping the Persian cavalry and liqhr
against which she had nstensibly f c n ~ ~ h The t. tronps at hay with slingers, ~ h rGrccks. who had
oligarchic governments SIIP at~crnptcdlo impose maintained good order and quickly clcctrd new
upon sul!jcct states proved unpopular, and Sparta strate~oi,managed to reach Trapezos on thc Rlack
had considcrahle trouble maintaining her leader- Sra. This extraordinary rrlrtmatwrll illustratecl thr
ship in Grrrk politic?, in~cnuityof Grrrk soldirrs in maximizing thcir
11r the rnd at' thc Peloponnesian war thc city strrn~thin the race or Tar suprrior nurnl)rss.
militias which, during the years of mnff ict, had With Cyrus dead, Tissaphcrncs attcmprrd to re-
been almost permanently mohilizrd, wcrc disban- mtahlixh his rule in Iania, and thr Grrck cities there
ded. Largt* numhcrs of experjencccl wlclicrs were appraIcd to Sparta Sir pro~rction.A flcct com-
thus seeking employmenr of some kind, and, manded by Pisander was sent to thrir aid hut at thr
capitalizing on their capacity as fightinx mmcn, thcy battle of Cnidus in 394 R.C-it clashrd with a P<.rsian
hired thcmselvcs out to anyone who would pay we11 forcr undcr Conon, the Athmian cornmandcr who
for their services. In 401 s.c. an opportunity arose had rscaprd at Argospotami and had had a change
for many mercenaries to take up arms a ~ a i nin the oS l~eari.T11c Spartans lost ii fty trircmcs, and al t
pay of Cyrus, yorrngcr brother of the Pcrsinn king hope or naval suprcrnacv in the A c ~ c a n .Takinq
Artaxerxes. Intending to overthrow his hruthcr, advanza~e01' this dcfcat, the Greek ciry starcs
Cyrus induced the cities of lonia to revolt against handed ~ogrther in revol L. Suppnrbcd by the
the satrap Tjsaaphcmes, and rnustcrccl an infantry Persians, Thches, Athens, Corinth and Arxos
force aT 40,000 ( 1 o,ooo of whom wcm rnrrrcenary rrbclld, and although thcy wcrc dcfcated hy the
hoplites) together with about 3,000 cavalry. Spartans ncar Corinth in July 394 R.C, they
Included in this force were joo hoplitrs sent hv entered upon thc Corinthian war, c l u r i n ~which
Sparta, well aware that she was in debt to Cvrus for some notable succcsscr; were scored against thr
aid he had supplied during the Peloponnvsian war. Spartans hy tht alliecl generals. Even~ualsialcrnatt
After marching 2,400 kiIomctrrs, Cvrus con- led to Persian-inspired peace propnsds which
rronted Artaxcrxta' armv at Cunaxa, north of dernandrd thcl Forfrit o f Asiatic Greek citios to thc
Babylon. Artaxerxes' a m y was prnhably half ns Persians, and sc-cstahlishccl Spartan lradership in
stmng again as Cyrus' army and was rquippecl with Greece. I t was nor long hcfore the inevirat>le
the scytlird chariots upon which the Persians relied rebellion came. This timt. thc centre was "I'hrhrs,
to break up the cncm y's formation. Cyrus' trnops fortunate in her military commander Epam-
allowed thr I'rrsian chariots and cavalry to p:us inonclas, who is said to have introduced into Grrek
the old PeEopnnacsian IA-~RUCa ~ a i n s hcr,
t Icadinq
to a r o n ~ r o ~ ~ i a tor n Theban and allied armirs
l o the
at Manrinca. Roth lbrces were over 20,000 strong
and Eparninondas' tactics were the same as they
had been at Leuctra. The massed 'I'hehans broke
chuir oppencnts*right wing, hut Epaminondas was
killed, and without his grnius r h Thchan~ army
failed to push home for a cfccisivtt rrsult, AIicr that,
Thcban p w c r failecl, ancl the city states, squab-
blinx over poIitical control, Ijrtle st~sp~cteclthl:
radical changes which la): in the near liiture.
the 9~/7t
~A/XUIIAY-
On the death of his brother Perdiccas in 359 KC.
Philip I1 of Macedonia, then aged ~wcnty-thwe,
srizcd the throne. During his reign he created a
unificd national army such as had n w e r been seen
by thv volatilc alliances of Greek states. In the first
twu p a t s ofhis rule he succeeded in redefining the
boundaries of the rragrnented kingdom hc had
inherited, and spreading his intrrrastsfarthrr afield
towards Pangaeus, Thrace ancl Chalcidicc.
Although reluctant at first to interlire in the
warfare the successf~rlusc of a tactic arainst thc afhirs o f other Greek states, Philip was forced in
renowncd Spartan hoplitex. 354 R.C. to take action against Phocian inaetf'erence
In a valley near Leuctra in Bwutia, a Spartan in Thmsaly, which lay immerliatrly to thc south of
force thought to num her approximately I 0,000, of his own lands. Dcfcating the Phocian army near
whom 1,aoo wcrc cavalry, met Epaminondas Phcrac in 351 R.c., he movt*d on against Phocis
whose army was of a simiIar siw and constitution. itself, but a m v i n ~at Thermopylae he found the
'The Spartans took up their traditional formation, Phocian army supported by 5,000 Athenian hop-
with thc best tronps on the right wing, and thc rest litcs and decided that i t would hc prudent to
of their infantry spreacl o m , twelve deep, in a withdraw. Philip was anxious to avoid conflict with
relatively straight line. Eparninandas posted his Athens, thc forcmost naval power in Greece, but
Theban infantrv, fifty deep, on the left of his force Maceclonian policy was by now amusing concern in
oppmi~cthe track Spartan troops, and had the the Grcck statcs. Athens however, keenly aware of
remainder of his men set obliquely back towards his her current weaknesses, was happy 20 accept peace
right wing. The cavalry of both sides, stationed proposals concluded in 346 B.C. which receivd
ahead ol' the infantry, cngagcd first, and the Philip into thc Dclphic Arnphictyony; this was a
Spartans were decisively dcrcatcd; whilst still in federation or Grwk statcs, and i t is at about this
disarray, thr Spartans werc hit by the massed time that Philip dcvdoprd iclras not only of
strength of the hopli tes on rbe Theban left and were extcnrling Maccrlanian hrgcmonv nvcr thr whnleof
unahlr to resist. The Spartans lost over I ,000 men, Greece hut of uniting the Greek states and carryinq
qoo of whom werc Spartiates, a trrrible blow to a the war against thcl Pcnians. Despite setbacks at
state whose rorces had never heforc: hren drfeated Pcrinthus and Byzantiurn in an attempt to take
in pitched, battle. Et was now t h c turn of Thches to contml of the traclr routes of the HclIcspont, Philip
dominate, just as Sparla and Athcns had once moved muth once morr and in 339 LC., bvpassed
done, but this served only to unitc thc city states of Thermopylae anrl occupied Elathia. Athcns and
Thehrs f i ) r n ~ dan alliance against him and. raising whn were never rvcltlrtl into n sinql~,wtll t ) c v ~ n -
a forre of owcr 40,cx)n mrn, they nwt Philip at izcd fightinc bodv. 'E'hc 1mt trt>r~ps, C;~-t=c-k
Chaemnea in 3138R.C. Philip, with 3n,m infantry mcrct.nnrirs nncl Persian c;iviilsy, oficn round
and 3,000 cavalry, cntrustcrF to t l w cavalry on his themst-lvr..uundcr the higher camrnancI of'rclativciy
lrft wing, who werr lcrl hv his son Alexander, thc incnmprtmt satraps who l a c k 4 tllc ability to make
task of hreaking the Thc'uan phalanx. 'I'his t h y the hrqt use of them.
duly did, whilst Philip's rie;ht wing madr a ractical Alrxander's force of approximat~l y 3o,noo
retreat lo draw thr Athenians on and hrcak the incintry and 5,000 cavalry had a core or r 2,noo
Greek linr. Thc plan was succcs~ft~l, and tlsc Maccdonian root ancl I ,800 first-ratr hlacrclonian
Athenians, trappcd bclwprn Philip and cavalry, I ~ u tinclrirfcd, along with :i,ooo merccn -
Alexander's victorious cavalry, wrrc severcly irrica, j,oao i n k t r y ant1 Goo hnrsr from t llr Grrck
defeated. Apprcciatinq the scnsrlrsmcs5 of anni- stales. Qnrstions of stratc-gy lay cntirrly w i ~ l l~ h c
hilating rhosc soldiers he Ilopcd mon lo command M ;tccclonian high rnm nlsnrl , and a sys1c.m was
himsell; Philip allowrul t l ~ ealljm rt, r ~ x p c . rlrvisc.rl wherclp+ rcinforcrmrnts were 1)rotlght
Tltis victory rffcctiv~ly estahlishvrl Philip's prrinrEically rrom Grrr*rt. lo kccp the arm?. up to
It-adenhip of rhr Hellenes, ant1 having sccurcvl st rmgt h. Thc Itlact.tlonisns' chier wc-i~knrss\ r u s
hrinrh, hr summoned to thp city rlr.lcptcs from their f1t.t-I, which mmpriscd only rfio trin.rnt.s, Thc
thc Greek states and pmpmed ctlr Ibm;ltion of a i~dvancrhrrr ~rnclcrI'armvnitr harl Iwrn s~~llil.inq
drfcnsivea!~~-nsivo lca~utrunder Macrdonian mil- sr\,rrely at the. h a n d ~ ~ 1 ' M e m n o n 0 ~ R h ~ ~ l ~~1 .h1 t~ ~
itary command. 'l'bc C;rucks wrrc hrccd to accrpz. satraps ol'thc nci,qhbourina rrgiot~a.on Ilc;~rinqor
Philip's aim was to Icad an c x p ~ l i t i o ninto Asia hlexandcr's arrival, joincd 14cmnon in t hc 'I'roarl.
a ~ a i n s trhc Pvrsians whose perpetual intrrfrrrnce
in Grrrk alhirs wprcsrnltrcl a ~hrrar t o hllarrcl-
onian hrgrmony. In 376 n.c. he scht11 ~ o , m mrn
under ParmcaL)l o rsti~hlishn fmtholcl llryor~rlthr
Hellespont in nithynia and t h ~ 'I'roarl wliilat hc
himsell' assernblrcl t hc main invxqiotl I'orrr. Philip
was, IIOWPVCT, dcrrtincd ncvcr to rralixc his am-
hition personally, for in thc atltumn ol' 336 n x . . at
ltis daughtcr"~wpdctinq in Prlla, he was assassi-
nated, and i t was lrrt ro h i s son,Alexander, tn rnakr
sure t h a ~~ h kdcration
c did not drgcnoralc rmcc
more into a rltrstrr or bickering rivals.
I'hilip's death was followcd Isy revolt amonq thc
ritv-stares, ancl only after Alcxandcr had swifily
supprcsrd rrflrllion in Thchw and destroyed thc
rity did the Grrekx rvalizc. that thr rlrw rufrr conld
rctain as strnng a holcl as his fathrr had over
insurgent rncml~rr-starcsof the contcrlcracy. Thrrr
had l ~ e e nimplications of Prrsian I,~-iberyin thr
rcvolt, ancl i t was olwioris to Alexander t h a ~his
Fat hrr's plan must hr implcmcntcd if Grerk unity
was to IK maintainrd. Lcavinq a small force of
9,- men and a fi-w horse to ktrp ortlrr in Grrcce,
hlcxandcr leli Pella Ibr Scstos, and in spring 334
sac.brought his army into 'I'roas,
+P h m helmets, hw,W p a r r ~ quiver,
, tunic,
' h e Pclsian forccs untlcr thc recently enthront.4 rxe mdjavclfn. Mnny arthcrrc were aftrn worn and
c a m r d by Ptmian troops.
Darius I11 wcrc cornpowd, as usual, ol' a vast
conglomeration of trmps of ditT~rrntnat innalitics
U 11dc1-thc cotntrlar~do f Aristz~.satrap o f Hr~llrs-
~mntinc Fhryin, t h ~ ydiscusserl thcir stratc-gy:
Mrrnnon's nt,und arlvicr was t o rrtrc.:it. dcstroyinq
the land as 11ley went, arid t l ~ r . t i to v a r y thr war
into Grevct-, leaving 1hr. i)c.lr.agut.~*rd Alrxandrr in
a hostile wasteland ; l ~ i tlijs
t plan was r ~ j r t t r dhy
111~ satraps. who fitv~~urrcl an irnmcdiatr conflict.
app;~rcnrly placing thcir uonfidcnce in thc advan-
t i i p thcy h;ld avcr Alcxandcr in their choicr nf'
rcl-rain. F'osi tioncd on the eastern !lank of thc rivcr
Granivus (which was in thc area ol' the Darclati-
c.lIt.s), thrv cnt~ldforw .'\lr?cancler to alcernpt a
prrcario~~s crossing whic tl wou ltl 111-rak h i s liw-
marion and hindrr thr rlf'rctivr use nf rava1t-y.
?\lthouqb thr Pvrsinn infantry was nr) rnatcbh for
that ol'thr Macvtfonians, Aristrs war; rrlyingon hi9
supcrior 11t1rnl)rrs or ~ ; - I v ; I ~ I ovvr
-v I 5,000- to
countcs any Mart.tFonian attack.
O n reaching IIIC /,a~tLc-groundAlcxandcr's staff
saw clcarly thr dangers o f a dirccc advance across
the river, and so, ovcrnight, they rno\~cddown-
sttram. forcling; the river at dawn. Ry the time the
Persian ravalrv, summonrd by scouts, had arrived
at hlrxander's crznsing point, tlzr Maccrlaniarl
phalanx llaci Sr)r-mt.d u p and hlc*xandcrk cavalry
charged, forcing a I'crsian rrtrcat.
'131eg~.oundon the castrrn s i c k of rhr Granicus
/
!
2% (imk -(.
dabort sword.
hehim& o f t h e b r r i c sty1c,shittd
A 2 Pmsinn Imrnortol s p ~ n m a n
12rotn information shown in colourrtil glazed -hick
rrliers in the ruins or PcncpoIis the Immortal
A I Pminn stundard-h ~ m ~ r spearman is depicted hcrr in the dress ol*thr kinx's
This s(anda1-d-hearer, taken rrom a paintitl~:or] a bodycuard; thry wcrr thc clite corps of the kinq's
Grcck vase, wcars [he traditional woli'-skin tic-ad- bodyguard and army, and they wcrv callcd
d r m 0ovr.r thr head and shoulrlrrs as a clistinction or *TmmartaIs' hcc.a~isc thcir numhrrx were never
rank. Thc colnurfi~I, pat t~rncd,tir nic and trousers allowed to fall helow ro,ono, with the possjhlc
madr thc standarcl-bearcr easy to recognize in addition of somc infantry and cavalry. 'l'hey ware
battle. The 'uniTom* followed thc Mrdian style the Pessian style 0~1ong-skirtcd,loose-fitting tunic
with close-fitting tunic and narrow slcrvcs, tight at with thc wide flowing slccvcs. The skirt was hitchcd
thc wrist; under the plain short skirt, thc close- up in front with a f r i n g ~ waist l sash. I t is possihlc
fitting truscm also fitt~l-tightly at the ankk. No that a claw-fit tin^ under-tunic was worn with
shield was carried as both hands were required to narrow slrcves fitting rightly at the wrist (these can
raise the standard, hut slung from the leu shoulder be seen crmcr~ngfrom the wide slcrve). The tunic,
lg. G m k a
-r, showing pn early shield from *be
inside, helm&, g m v c q swoxd, bow, quiver m d
herald stpffs.
E2 Gr~tkard~rn
Thc Greeks werr: not renowned Tot thrir prowcss as
archers, compared with thr Persians, although
same sourccs stair that thr Athenians did maintain
a rqirncnt ofarchers during thc Pcmian wars. This
rcconstruction is from a statue datcd r . 480 R.C. and
shows an archcr in action. Hc wosc a Iion-skin
head-covering-. anrl a lrathcr c o m ~ l c twith shnuldrr
picc~sovcr the t radi t ianal chilnn tunic. From I hc
waist hung the leather p t e r t ~ t e , ~Over
. his shoulder
hung the quiver which was usually very ornarcly
decorated. He squatted so as to be in the best firing
position. They were used in the phalanx among the
hoplites and, in the p ~ i i o i ,as tight infantry.
These archen were mercenaries and, apart from m.Greek noldiet.9 returnlnp; from battle. cmfY;n~:
from the
mmrnrmnratiun mnrl~lrof Salnmim. (Pirnww M u s e u m )
rhc Scythian archers, were the only troops to be
hired by the Athenians as regular light infantry. atrnour was made from leather with metal rein-
They were employed in the same capacity as rorcemenw. Under the leather arrnour the arms
slinqers and othrr l i ~ h ttmclps, c-ithcr a%p.G/ni or and lrp wrrt: cnvcrcd with a highly-coloured thick,
positioned among the hoplite heavy infantry. Their woven material. which was close-fitting and wa%
di~ltinctivc:characteristic was thc rcd chiton tunic. tight at thr wrisrs and ankles. 'I'he: head wascovrrrd
They worc no body arrnour and rhcir only hv a metal helmet which came in various forms; thc
protection was the small round bronze shicld one hcrr has movable chrrk-pircrs, which arc
(Jeltn), As wrll as IHIW i ~ n dquivrr of arrows i t i~ shown turned up. Weapns consisted or spear,
possihlc that r hey i ~ carried
l ~ javelins. sword or axe (bipennes). A specia! feature was the
crescent-sl~apedshirld which cna bled thc soldirt t o
F I PJ~?yginnh~ary-in
fnn@ mPrcPnary g c t v r r y rlosc to thr cavalryman.
Thew tough mercenaries came from the north of
Asia Minnr and scrvrd h t h Grcrk and Persian FP I'ursintr s / ~ c ~ r n n n
maskrs. Their tunics wcrc colourful and thcir body This i s in a11 probability a Pcrsian spearman, hut as
53. Crown Prince Xcnes, detail From the Treasury Frieze at 34. A Creek hoplite without 8 #Meld, dttpfl from a *lief.
Pcrsepolis. ( N a d m l M u ~ r u r n Achcns)
, ( N a t i o p a l Muacum, Athens)
all troop or the Persian army wore the Median- aficn concealing thr lowcr jaw. The, high crown
style dathes on campaign it may be a littlr di ficuit was usuaIly a sign of'rank. Equipment was the
to distinguish thc regular troops from the d i t c standard shicld, quiver and h w and thc long spcar.
'Immorralq'. T h e ca1ourfi1l tunic came to mid-
thiqh or slightly lower; trousers were worn unclcr F3 PPI.rinn oJictr
the tunic and fitted very closely to thc leg and Persian officers ware a quilted type amormr over (he
ankle. Various snurms stale that armour was worn rlathing, as the Persians and ,Metlrs wcre used as
Irut, as thcre is no evidence of this, i t must IH: lightly-armed mounted archers. OfTicerx wore the
assumed rhar it was worn tlndct the runic, a Mcdian-type campaign dress with the knee-length
common p r a c t i c ~in warmer climates. Thr head tunic, and trousers. 'l'hr quiltcd armnur camc to
was covcrrd by a lnosc cloth which framed the face, waist and a sash encircled the waist. A short broad-
38
sword, similar to the Creek one w m used, mainly the pcrsonal taste or the individual the basic
lror thrusting, this was supported in a scallbard equipmmt prevailed, the metal or lrathrr Irasrrl
which hung froni a leathcr sling from ttlc left torselel over the clrr'ton, shown here, with thr
shoulcler. A turban covered the head and a cloak, addition o f a cloak. T h c large round shicld jaspir)
which was v c y usrful an c a m p a i p , was olien had a blazon painted on, with a small canopy
worn. attached to guard thc Icgs from sword or spear
thrusts. Bronze grcavcs werc worn. On the h a d
G I Gwrk cnvalrynim was the Ionic helrnrt which had a fixed nose-piece
With all the trappings or thc hoplite, the heavy and two hinged check-picces: the fixed crest was a
cavalryman was ablr to fulfil the roles of in- tnlourcrl horsvtail.
fan tryman and horseman. Often these elite caval-
rymcn cum hoplitcs woulrl ride to the site of thc H I . Hz, H-7 Cret-k I I Y ~ O U T Pinfi~n!~_l
~
battic then dismount and fight on Smt. The 'I'hese qoldiers camr rrom t h e Grcek city states 01'
rtluipmrnt and arms wrrr thr samc as those oi"a Athens, Sparta, Tl~ehcsor Corinr h. A1though 111err
11oplitc with the exception of thc shicld; a caval- was deep enmity between them they sallied
ryman never carried onc. Thc typc of ht=[m~t worn to2e:erhprwhrn th(-Prrsians invadrd. At t h e battle ol'
IJV this cavalryman was known as 'Attic', alier the Marathon in 490 B.c.,with thc phalanx ol' thr
Coddcss Athene. As a11 thc q u i p m m r was pur- A1lleniar1 l~c~pliws, they dcfcawd thc. Prrsian
chased hy thc solcli~rs~hernsrlvcs,therc was very arc11rr-s who w t w ac-claimed as the Iwst in tIlr.
little uniformity. world. At thr l~attlrof Thcrnmopylar 300 Spartan
(HP)hoplites hrlcl nul for thrrr days against a fierce
C2 ir-/t~s.~a/innra7vlyntan t ou times greatpr in numhcr, until all werc k i 3 l d .
Onc of the most p o p l a r fi~urpsznkrn from Grerk T h e hoplitr's main squipmcnt rrrnained the cuirass
vast: painting is the unualal figure o1'1hi.ThessaIiatl or corseler which covcrrd thr rrppr pa~tof thc
horseman. Thme cavalrymen carnr from thc plains M y , made of metal or some flrxi1,lc maai.rial onftr
of Thmsaly in the north o f Greecr, and wcre which metal strips werr altachrd. The shield had a
rnercenarics. This tyllical Thesalian wrars the rnctal arm-loop inside, at thr ucntrc, thmuqh
chiton tumcd dawn to he waisl and, over his which the left arm was pushcd up to thc rlhow, ancl
shouldrrs, a s t i f f brightly-coloured cloak. His a m r h l handle near the rim. Hrlrnrts wcrc ust~alty
clistincrivr Thcssalian hat was aften called a sun- onc of three types : Doric, cornplctrly closecl with
hat Sccause of its w r y wide brim and small crown. slats For thc ryes, Corinthian, madr in cjnc pirce
As all h o w m c n of that period did, h e rndc without with Iixccl nose alicl cherk-pirctms, r,r lonir, witl-t
saddle or stirrups, only a small rphippion or movahlc cheek pieces. These helrncts nearly always
saddlecloth was sometimes placed on thr home's had crmts, though later ones were worn without
hack. 'l'he h o w was tbr usual small Mditrrranran crcxts. Metal greaves, sandals and hoots were worn.
type, extensively lrsed by thc cavalry at this time. Thc lung spcars wrrc not thrown, hut were uscd as
Spears nr javelins were carricd. thrusting weapons, either from almve to the neck,
or from 1x10~ to the point under the cuira~q.'I'hc
Rofilif~
G3 Amnured i v f i n ! ~ short .word or dagger was used as a ttlsus~ingrat h ~ r
TIIOU~IF
the appearance of the hoplites varied with than a cutting wcapon.
:I Iln arthrr.cni~rhanruln xrc. rl'llr~ v:ur Crrrqur. .?yr I1.r:. *-a blilriarlrr. lc
cornrnnndani Grrcquc r m p n n u h l c dc la vicroirc tlt Muwll~on.c3 'Ti.tr d'un
wcrrirr C r m q u c pnrraeil un caquc l h t r . 14 RrlirTrl';'ll~x;lnrl45 ~ r r p h a r m
d l . l w ~ r > ~ nla a ~h~r t r c n r r r Ira p r r r i r n M a r h l a u ~ i c ~c~i t I ' m r s . 15 Bar-rrlirf r l u
yrntr qiirlr. nio#ilran\ I- : b ~ ~ r m q t*~all;iquenq
i I- Arahr%~ I ~ I I T +-3 <c l ~ ~ ~ i t i c ; i u .
r 6 l&i.r:til t l ' u ~ l rIriu-dr 'Gi~.tnt~,m;trhi~', lllrmtnrbl u l l r It~rrn;mltr~rb r l r Irt>uj-lirr
l ~ i v 17<;lherric*~I ;1rt,i#11r
t ~ ~ ~ pt.rrr1111r. ; ~ wit- ; ~ q u[Iur1<111r
r rt l n h ~ ~ r l iri~nr!.
rr ~8
n;\ I (~;tsrli~i*
In*-m. + ~ I III.<:., ll; C :AUIIIY 'l'tlr~i.ir11a i r 1 ~ E > I I I ~ > ?~n-rlt*
rt.~:. C :.nsqk~~
lL,,.l,. dl, .3+,,>? <i~Il.. n.c, (1) 8 C::L<~I,P 1 ;,,vr ,,v *,,Kh ,$t"> n.<: tg ll"iil,l t l ' l , , , ,-.nr
<l;tt;~rrtrl~t~i.r~~rr,r-rl~.montr;h~~t III~I'\ ;lril.~l,il!.ll~;rlr.*CI ~ l ' l 1 ~ 1 6 Ih: .I 1~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ Y U ~ Y ~ I
14ri+nlrrib( Ir IIWIII~I ,lrll 11111. ~ > t ~ i ~ l ihl.tc~111~1i111~n
i~txr r r p ~IYlrtr i 111. FI>IKIPT I,~III
c%
'S.kriw',
nt Uravurr N u n phalanx datant d u tfinr Jklr. p.A r r h r r p n a n t u n b n CI rn F i n Ikrqrnwhulzc spam! r i n r Wnffr; n a r h dnrr firiwhihrn V m , 4yi
l'hrv.~lr.n, u;uc r,~y, n.r:.T*a x r t h r n i t ~ i r n uuliria
t par Alcxx~lrlrrrn q : ~R.<:.
, sg v.Chr r%M ~ l ~ i a t ! r rq,r i w l l i r h r lhfrhlrllalwr w.ihrrnd (lr111 'ivg 'K h l a r ~ h o n .
FCmclirm I'lrrv~irm.ranlutllr r r hipnlrra. y <:.L~II<Y P h v p ~ ~arc. ~ r Irtpnnv.
. l ~ i v ~ l ~Krin,gvrh~l>I
vr I~III -FZew~$;m'1 lrml,n..14 U v h r l \,~btb.\tcx:\rulvm
1.3 t
t i , t t i t j : i v l i r ~ r ti^ L r n r v ~ i i r ~I . I biirkoph.1~ rilit,nl Kimirlld ~ w i w h r nn ~ i ~ ~ w l o r ~ lint1 i w h p-miu-l\rr~
~n Kriqrm
t t o l ~ l mP r r r . *5 C;uvrricr (:n.r-rlur pnt:u11 un r;tulur l)r,~iqui., ,kcrt UII dsm!rlla-ntl. t 5 lb.m-~u-!ir~ di*t~r7. Jiif>rb~u~icie.rt, Aswrirr ~ r r i l r:1mIx1 t~ ;ill(
tn~uc,t~rr r t IIIW vp+r rorlrrr. & 1L~acItr.t 'l'l~cb~rts iat-et- arr et rarq!ium. q vi11v11 K.*tnrl II~~II~PI?: arb. r 6 D ~ I . ~ I dI r r 'C:~~.~t~roin.wcl~i.a'-Frirqe%' rut
i r ur I I u a I u I r r i i ~ id i jirqrl~llial~l~vr It ~ q ~ I ~ t ~ * - S u ~ t ~ i l r i - F n ti tf ~tr;ar t~i r~cmt i i ~ - h Krlrqc1
rr nlrl ~II~M
C h r r r i r r (;rrcq~trdrsini,d'tln v;lrc Sicilirll. n g A r m ~ r r r h 4 . r ~ q upc L:t\Pr4,rnn14. I1dn1 ti11d r u ~ r t a l ~ , r 5r ~~ I i i t l i .m8 ,,.I! l'rwwrhrr t l?ltu. i!w%*,(,:l~r. I s 1 '~III
I;m-rlur rlui JOLJP (It. 1.1 tumprtlr. 31 klrEatn I'cru., rit..mir~h clur n ~ ~ r i r , % alc ;,.
Hrtn~. i z t ~ r t i ~ ~ ~ u r'.(:hr.
b r r i ~,rrICmliiwhcr 1Irlm; .(, jahrl~utmla+rbv.I Ilr. .rl;
I'cra11r~lk.31 Slldiuts I;CCC(]LIPI rrvrt~.unl rlr lr birrilillr. cI.tworr d r SilJdmuir r n . l ~ r ~ IN^ jrn r.t:hr. sg 1k-tail r-irwr V i ~ wi l l 1 5 rlrm 5. j.r ttrlr~~trrlr
I . r ~ , ~ - l r i ~ l1rl111.
r I t t ~ ~ t ~ r ~ n t rS i i i . i fI I I I dc I e r r :r..( :hr.I tnil v r t v l l i ~ . t l r n r nIV;~lla-rr1111rl. I l l ~ k l l . i r l a l m i + < ~ t ~ ( ~1:inSlir.h
k ~ * . ~ ;trlrtlrrri
q l r I'r~wplis, 1 {cq~litrGrct.rlr~r. ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ , t i ~: v111rtr l r ~I~> ~I ~ :r <I r r~
~~ ~ ! ~nmt
I'LI.II,WIIX >dIr In ~ ~ ~\~C n~I rn I '~S :*t t~
i ~I~ t - l
I
~min
IUI~K
Hz. H3 Ilnpli~a
I\
Irulcr p u t 113:vw.
I
I iL i nI ~
! 1
tla citis G r r q u n d'hthrnm. T h t k rr Vnrinrhc pofiant
r l c v a y l ~ m I: h r i q u r . tbmr I;I rkuluctkr rrmurrait I- s m i c a avm.
CLltinth~xn,r n y u r ~ i rat
, r I
t e~ ~ ~ ~ i r n ~ p , ii1
i t a
c "11 mmt-r.1~
x I
r lcko u p l~luki)!( 1 1 1 ~ IanrCm,
;wF,- un n r r Fui F I
I .
~ r idrs
~ ~ r ~ ~ ~ l ~ r~licttr,lptn.ll,
erlrll
f'kxiqcrhr s l d n r r vnn der wh*;.crm I n h n l r r i r . Sir d i r n l m m w h l untn
primhiwhrn *llcll w k h c n l'mhnen. th-r l-lalhm~ndnrhild m n e l i r h l t
drt, Srrlrlut whr tlah an tIr11 K.rvallrnr~ hrrnnnrrko~~~mcrr.
I..*nnrneraRrr i n r n r t l i ~ r h c r ' l ' m r h tS. i t wawn r u l ~ w r vrm r
Fa I'vnisrhr
dvn F . l i l r ~ nIJIFII.
-
~ ttic
u l c h vhlrht.Tr;lrhr irrl I:rl<lrcru~crrx u untrnrhritlrlr. Fg lJt.lurs~llr~ Ohiyivr n l ~
w : t l l l r r ~ r n il l a r n L 3 1 u 1 ~ r1i n r m Ilrnhanp,,{lar\ 1111 FrIdu- .LtLwrm ~ l i r ~ ~ w:I~. hilr
tSbtr~&rift GI ( ; r i ~ h i r h r r Iinvnllcrint. E. war u h l i r h im Karnpfe ithtmitrrn urn! clrn
K a m p RI F~1s-fortft1nr1irti.Lr w u n l r a l ~Wrqdifr (nhrrnhnr Sdiilrli ;rurfinirslrt.
,rli;.I Rrlirr dcr
svldm,
Jr.;crm-I.cihRarrlc
doriwhm I,elm, , DA,.l
ktail
At,lrniwhrr
mil KrirKrr ,jnd
Gg '111mIi<rhrr Kavallrris~.D i r w K r i a - ~ r aramlnr?li
r .~unN ~ ~ r r i ~ r i r r h r n l
1111dw:jrcll r.rn1iutl1r.h S1ltllrcr.63 Hupllrv. Kel)rtvrrrtr Infxnrcnr ruiz ~orrlwcllrm
rinpr. Scllslr
klaili, ,
a.lr ,41,1k,l. 5, +,.,hrh,lndrrl,
, t,v,, , ,
Rrjrrhlsrhr I lr,pli,r Finrn
, !lr'lm : d i r twwcqliu.trn I%arkrl~rturkr l w a < i r r r n ! ~V
'i'ihrlla~~'', als tkinwllurr Kwrri St-hwrrrhia~l~=n
. o m Srhllrlr hmy! r l n r n
*anti I . a n a ~ - i ~ ~ t ~ cr ld~~r r h
~ 1 1 I r 1 rI 6 I i t t k i t I
I1 I I nS l l t l hrrll"irl'
I I I I .7 I I I ;I I n t ~ r ~ ~ ~5 i i l H l rHuplircndcr g r i t c h i i l t c n Sl;ult-Ymten Athcn.Spann,Thchnndrr Korlnth.
v.C:hr. 8 Kzirurr von :\tIirn 1rr111 Sp;lrr:tw;ihrmd r l r i ~
~wlrptlnnmjrrhcttk r i c K r t ~ Slc rr.,qrir d r r i Hr8mtrprn: dunscl~r-rrrllcinpxhlnmn m i l A n ~ r r m - h l i i ~ r n
I ~ I II I ~ 1 i 1 I 1I 5. , r l u ~ ~ i hr t 9 h i i ' i ~ r i ~ ~ ~ l ~3 ~ 1 1x~r111G111
hr S ~ k kU I I ~ n l n t l x i r n r n NXVLI-UMIt ( . ~ ~ k r l l < ~ l
k tt i l n r l 1I : \ X ~ I I ~ .I i I r lh rilrllr r k ~ ~ i l ~ 1B~(.~TMIIIc~~*.
fif lrt 1u~1;~ l r l i ~ l -- hmil 1 ~ 1 1 Dir l a n ~ ct,a[lrrn w u n h
:~~tt~~l~a~~.~~rrn;iI~t~, IIIT~EI g r u ~ l r l r nvrndrt~,111 Sti~Imw;~Crt Slcnl~~rr.
Contmucd from buck rovcr 59 !,;L<;- a r r r ~ ~ ~ IrFn!' - .na
230 I.Y,A..r, Ik'Y: 'i.'"
160 11 rl:' - ~ , . r r J l ~ ~ f . j r , t f- vI : 95 I t ..l,,:#..t :n..,r. 1K.r.
44 \I.rl; :.o,tr.h!.r A -..I I !
43 ~II!;.'+ , r ~ - b # i --,.I:: A THE WORLD WARS
90 ~ I , I , < , : ~ P I ~ ~ :,,.-.I
106 '.!If:'- r ,.,r7>.-I
- / * !,
r-. . ..I:
80 Il,..-
81 l l , . . ! ~r.
... ;.. ...
11, :-,.,..1,
-t
*
, u'r4 A
.l.l-l@
C.4MP.IIIGN
C ~ n c i s c authoritative
, accounts of decisive encounters in military history. F ~ c h
9Gpagc hook contains
mare than 90 illustrations includingmaps, nrders o f battle and colour platen, plus a series o f
thrcdimcnsional hsttlc maps that mark the critical staws of thc campaign.
154 A d h ~ . ,R ;~ryn-57.w.roiW,i-,
NAPOLEONIC PERIOD
3B Thc L a w i s k r t u ~ t s 257 I.J..l* r r~,r,',. .tnr>,u~~y 11~1:nly
252 Arm ct of :I.,. Y L I ~T Lcrlcvcn 101 Thclopq~~radorm 7 9 h . : l * > ~ , r ';*r y. p - al r , :..>mpa'Rn
125 A ~ Tr . n'~ I< ,ir->. 7 9 - 1 lh; 263 Muaht I r d a I :W- 761 87 h,,lu>rmur', :-!:-.? ;
150 T h r A?,Po!C tlarlrm.11:r~ 234 GLC:AVU~ A d d ~ I > u \ lr! I n f ~ n - ~ y 6 1 h J q > - c . :vlr,:\.,~r.rrA C a r a ~ i b r n
89 R y ~ a n . . r e A r n ~ eRRh
: 1 1 18 262 C~zauus/~drdd;ll'l~1i7~.CAVII~ 55 h.q'',,I?-.I~~I..; R larCtr<
84 Lwr. V k v ~ R Nur.nar I4 knp, shC~vrlW?. h r v ~ s 6B h,q,'$I.,?.- rl~arsmrs
331 f rrirl. Ycd~rvaArmrcr I W -1330 IIP kkw Modpl A. rr y 1645 6C
76 E*.~p'r H~.;=..trs
7s A , r c r a ' P + ~ C - L I ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ 2D3 Cosqs XIV ;Army
171 LiI,~llad~i R :b*5irrrnc, 267 'Itw Hr ( $hArrny 1660 17W 83 N . ~ l ~ ' c , Z ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r d I : a v a l r y
I 4 I N,lp-rL u r ,ilartr)r
152 K~lybtrolChr17 97 M.ir b w o ~ g b5 A m y
I 4 6 N,;p$L.rpht '*i.!rtry
200 I 1 :II!& S n orrqurrta 1050- 1493 B6 b n u r a A m ~ m15jC 1615 153 N.rp~rC~1.1rdlnl~n:~(1>
I 0 5 -he Tr,nvvr 184 f ' d * A r n r r I W llh%[I;
222 - l i d . ficr b! T,jncr .rnc 188 Po rh hmmcr I s 9 1596 r?; Jhr contkued an IruMe b m k c m r
T~tle