Mission Essential
Mission Essential
Defendant.
Qui Tam Relator Paul Funk (“Relator” or “Mr. Funk”) brings this Second Amended
Complaint in the name of the United States Government for false claims that were submitted or
Personnel, LLC (“Defendant” or “MEP”), and to recover damages and other relief based on
forth below, Defendant MEP has engaged in a fraudulent scheme, prepared and submitted false
records, and made numerous false claims to the United States in connection with its receipt of
hundreds of millions of dollars from the United States for providing purportedly qualified
linguists to aid the United States in ongoing military operations and war efforts. Moreover,
when Relator repeatedly acted to determine the scope of this fraudulent and unlawful conduct,
repeatedly informed MEP management of this fraudulent and unlawful conduct, repeatedly acted
to make MEP cease this unlawful conduct, and otherwise engaged in protected activity under the
False Claims Act, MEP responded by reducing Relator’s job responsibilities, impeding his
ability to investigate this misconduct, and ultimately forcing him from his job at MEP. Relator
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has brought this action, both on behalf of the United States and as a result of discrimination and
retaliation he was subjected to by MEP, and respectfully seeks an award of all damages,
penalties, attorneys fees and expenses, and other relief available under the False Claims Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This is an action to recover damages and civil penalties on behalf of the United
States of America (“United States”) arising from false statements and claims made and presented
by Defendant Mission Essential Personnel, LLC (“Defendant” or “MEP”) and its agents,
employees, and/or co-conspirators in violation of the Federal Civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729 et seq., as amended (“the Act”). The violations consist of presenting false claims and
making or using false records or statements to cause false claims to be paid, in connection with
MEP’s claims for payment for the provision of linguists (and reimbursement and payment for
related work and expenses as set forth below) to the United States, and its discrimination and
2. The False Claims Act provides that any person who knowingly submits or causes
to be submitted a false or fraudulent claim to the United States for payment or approval is liable
for a civil penalty of not less than $5,500 and not more than $11,000 for each such claim
submitted or paid, plus three times the amount of the damages sustained by the United States. 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a). Liability attaches both when a defendant knowingly seeks payment that is
unwarranted from the United States and when false records or statements are knowingly created
or caused to be used to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money to the
United States. Id. The Act allows any person having information regarding a false or fraudulent
claim against the United States to bring an action for himself (the “Relator”) and for the United
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3. The False Claims Act further provides that any employee discriminated against
“shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee . . . whole.” Id. § 3730(h)(1).
Such relief shall include reinstatement with the same seniority status such employee would have
had but for the discrimination, two times the amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and
compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including
litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Id. § 3730(h)(2). Special damages therefore
4. Based on those provisions, Relator, Paul Funk, seeks to recover damages and civil
penalties arising from Defendant MEP’s presentation of false records, claims, and statements
to the United States and its agents in connection with the Defendant’s claims for payment for
services required to be performed under a contract with the United States military, as well as
appropriate damages and other relief based on its discriminatory and retaliatory conduct.
Defendant’s actions were designed to maximize profits illegally at the government’s expense.
The nature of this fraudulent and unlawful scheme is set forth below.
5. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to both
29 U.S.C. § 1331 and 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a), the latter of which specifically confers jurisdiction on
6. The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to 31 U.S.C.
§ 3732(a), which authorizes nationwide service of process and because the Defendant can be
found, transacts business, and/or presented the actionable false claims to the United States in the
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§ 3732(a) because the Defendant can be found, transacts business, and/or presented actionable
III. PARTIES
limited liability company headquartered at 4343 Easton Commons, Suite, 100, Columbus, Ohio
IV. FACTS
in Columbus, Ohio. MEP was formed in 2004 as Aegis Mission Essential Personnel, LLC.
According to the company, “[b]y any standard – facilities, revenues, or staff size – MEP’s
growth since its 2004 founding has been remarkable. The company has expanded from a small
business with a handful of employees to an industry leader with prime contracts and delivery
orders around the world.” In 2008, the company dropped “Aegis” from its name and became
providing linguists for military operations pursuant to contracts with the United States.
According to Marc Peltier (MEP’s Chief Operating Officer), the company won a $700 million
contract with the United States in 2007 to provide linguists to support United States military
operations in Afghanistan.
12. MEP has continued to provide linguists for United States military operations,
including operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, since that time. In August 2010, the
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Company reported that it was one of six companies nationwide awarded an omnibus support
services contract through the Army Intelligence and Security Command. According to
Columbus Business First, “[t]he five-year contract has a ceiling of $492.4 million and is labeled
13. MEP’s website includes a Department of Defense press release announcing that
agreements with the United States. According to this announcement, “Mission Essential
cost-plus-award fee contract. This contract action seeks the continuation of linguist/translation
services which provide our forces with the ability to communicate effectively with the local
populace, gather information for force protection, and interact with foreign military units in
Afghanistan.”
14. MEP represents that its “Mission is to Deliver Certainty to its Customers.” MEP
claims that it has “[a]n unrivaled array of advanced language resources” and is “a trusted source
15. MEP’s “remarkable” growth has been fueled by its receipt of contracts with the
16. In securing hundreds of millions of dollars in payments from the United States,
MEP is well aware that the provision of capable and effective linguists is critically important to
the effectiveness of military operations and the safety of military personnel. Testifying before
Congress, MEP’s chief executive officer stated that “[u]nlike the relatively straightforward
conflicts of the 20th Century, the global war on terror is a conflict where communication is a
more important force multiplier than weaponry. Army Major Cory Schulz, who served in the
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Paktika province of Afghanistan, has stated that ‘your interpreter is way more important than
your weapon.’ As noted in The New York Times, Major Schultz went on to explain that with an
interpreter, you can command hundreds of Afghan soldiers; with a gun, you can only defend
yourself. The United States needs reliable communication to share our message of goodwill with
those we can help while deciphering the hidden messages of those who seek to do us harm.”
17. David Chu, former DOD undersecretary for personnel and readiness, told the
Washington Post that “[p]erhaps most significant, language competence is now embraced by
many senior leaders as a military skill equal in importance to the skills traditionally
emphasized.” Nancy Weaver, director of the Defense Language Office, added that “[l]anguage
skills are considered by our senior commanders in the region to be as important as other basic
combat skills.”
18. MEP represents that it “supports state and federal agencies, NGOs, international
organizations, and global customers with linguists and interpreters, analysts, training, and
program management in intelligence, defense, peace support, emerging markets and law
enforcement operations.”
19. MEP represents that it has more than 6,000 employees and has “major offices” in
Chantilly, Virginia; Lorton, Virginia; Augusta, Georgia; Columbus, Georgia; Fayetteville, North
United States Government for the “Management and Support of Translation and Interpretation
21. The Executive Summary explains that the contract is designed to “rapidly and
securely recruit and deploy skilled contract linguists with various foreign language capabilities
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explains that “[l]inguist services are required to permit our forces to communicate effectively
with the local populace, gather information for force protection, and interact with foreign
military units.” Id. The contract is an “indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity” contract; it does
not specify a firm quantity of linguists to be provided, but allows the U.S. military to issue MEP
task orders “require[ing] linguist services based on man-hours, man-days, man-months, man-
Contract linguist services allow our forces to communicate with the local
populace, gather information for Force Protection, and interact with other foreign
military units. This requirement includes performance-based services for the
rapid recruitment and deployment of foreign language interpretation and
translation type services in support of the U.S. Army, acting as the Executive
Agent for DoD for translator and interpreter services. The interpreters and
translators will be required to accompany military units during military missions.
Services required within the scope of this contract includes skilled interpreters
and translators in support of OEF-A related intelligence operations. . . . This effort
requires skilled contract linguists with various foreign language capabilities to
support current intelligence efforts.
23. MEP is required to engage in pre-screening to ensure that linguists have the skills
required to perform these duties. The contract imposes the following requirements:
The contractor pre-screening process initiates the screening process for all
candidate linguists. Linguists must possess certain skills, and meet specific
security and medical requirements. The contractor shall pre-screen each
applicant to ensure that each individual meets these requirements.
24. Under the contract, MEP is required, as part of its “pre-screening” process, to
recruit and ensure that linguists have the skills required by the contract for Category I,
Category II, and Category III linguists. Category I (“CAT I”) linguists are linguists, generally
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locally hired or hired from a region outside the Area of Operations, who do not require a security
clearance. The contract requires that “CAT I linguists shall have native proficiency in the SCRL
25. Category II (“CAT II”) linguists are United States citizens; the contract requires
that “CAT II linguists shall have native proficiency in the SCRL (ILR level 4 to 5) and a working
26. Category III (“CAT III”) linguists, generally U.S. citizens who possess a “Top
Secret” security clearance, must have an ILR level 3 in the SCRL language and be fluent in
English. Id. The contract states that “[n]ative proficiency in the SCRL language is preferred for
Category III linguist, but is not required. CAT III linguists shall meet at a minimum the criteria
27. The contract requires MEP to screen applicants to ensure compliance with the
linguist applicants to ensure that they possess the necessary interpreting and translation skills,
including the following: interpretation into and from English and the SCRL language(s);
written translation of general and technical material into and from English and the SCRL
language(s); interpreting aptitude; transcription of aural SCRL language material into written
form; and advising supported commanders and organizations on the cultural and ethnic
28. The ILR levels required by the contract were established by the Interagency
Government agencies adhere to the ILR Definitions as the standard measurement of language
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proficiency. To meet a specified ILR level, an individual must satisfy the requisite ILR level for
four different language skills: speaking, reading, listening and writing. The scale used to
describe each skill has six “base levels,” ranging from 0 (“no proficiency”) to 5 (“functionally
29. To achieve an ILR level of 2+, an individual must have the following skills in the
referenced language:
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Writing (Limited Working Proficiency, Plus): Shows ability to write with some
precision and in some detail about most common topics. Can write about
concrete topics relating to particular interests and special fields of competence.
Often shows surprising fluency and ease of expression but under time constraints
and pressure language may be inaccurate and/or incomprehensible. Generally
strong in either grammar or vocabulary but not in both. Weaknesses or
unevenness in one of the foregoing or in spelling result in occasional
miscommunication. Areas of weakness range from simple constructions such as
plurals, articles, prepositions and negatives to more complex structures such as
tense usage, passive constructions, word order and relative clauses. Normally
controls general vocabulary with some misuse of everyday vocabulary evident.
Shows a limited ability to use circumlocutions. Uses dictionary to advantage to
supply unknown words. Can take fairly accurate notes on material presented
orally and handle with fair accuracy most social correspondence. Writing is
understandable to native speakers not used to dealing with foreigners’ attempts to
write the language, though style is still obviously foreign.
30. To achieve an ILR level of 3, an individual must have the following skills:
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service reports, oral reports, some oral technical reports and public addresses on
non-technical subjects; can understand without difficulty all forms of standard
speech concerning a special professional field. Does not understand native
speakers it they speak very quickly or use some slang or dialect. Can often detect
emotional overtones. Can understand implications.
31. To achieve an ILR level of 4, an individual must have the following skills:
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32. To achieve an ILR level of 5, an individual must have the following skills:
33. In addition to requiring that linguists in the specified categories have the specified
skills and meet specified ILR proficiency levels, the contract also requires MEP to “implement a
complete quality control program that identifies potential and actual problem areas in providing
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requirements of the contract . . . and the results of corrective actions taken throughout the life of
34. Under the contract, MEP “shall only be reimbursed for those candidates that
successfully complete the screening process or for failed candidate where the contractor has
properly completed and documented the required contractor pre-screening of candidates.” Id.
§ 2.1.2.5. Moreover, as explained below, the longer that MEP keeps a candidate in the pipeline –
whether by sending them to MEP’s Pre-Deployment Processing Center (“PDPC”) even if they
have failed their oral proficiency tests, by engaging them in “translation” work at the PDPC even
if they have failed to demonstrate written translation skills, by moving them on to the CONUS
Replacement Center (“CRC”) at Fort Benning for military training, or through their deployment
to Afghanistan or other locations – the larger the claim MEP can submit to the United States, and
the greater its financial reward under its cost-plus agreement with the United States.
35. As a company that has been involved with the recruitment, training, and supply of
linguists since 2004, MEP is well aware of what these contractual requirements mean. In
testimony before Congress on July 26, 2010, MEP’s CEO, Chris Taylor, testified that “[w]hether
a linguist is a local national or a cleared U.S. citizen, MEP makes sure that he or she is properly
vetted and appropriately trained. Regarding vetting, each U.S. hire linguist is required to
support of the U.S. military. Once completed and determined to meet standards, U.S. candidates
are administered an Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) to evaluate their ability to converse in
deployment processing site and re-screened for oral proficiency, as well as screened in reading
and writing proficiencies in English and the target language(s). In addition candidates receive
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medical and dental screenings. Once completed, U.S. candidates go through force protection and
counterintelligence screenings. If successful, U.S. candidates deploy to Fort Benning where the
military re-screens them for dental and medical acceptability. Prior to deployment, linguists
receive training classes on topics ranging from working with the military to how to be an
36. Similarly, with respect to CAT I linguists (hired outside the United States), Taylor
told Congress that “Local National Linguists go through similar evaluations to include medical,
oral proficiency, reading, and writing evaluations both in English and the required target
language. Following such screening, Local National Linguists receive counterintelligence and
biometric screening.”
37. MEP’s CEO also told Congress that “[f]or training, MEP completes an oral
proficiency interview with each potential hire and then completes a more rigorous written test for
each linguist before he or she is offered employment. The standards for these language tests are
set by the U.S. Government and are based on the Department of Defense’s Inter-Agency
38. Relator Paul Funk has been involved in military support operations for almost
thirty years. For more than twenty-seven years he worked for Northrop Grumman, one of the
leading defense contractors in the United States, and various predecessor entities (which merged
into, or were acquired by, Northrop Grumman). In that capacity, he provided support for the
provision of more than 650 linguists in connection with the Desert Storm operation. He also
provided support for efforts to provide linguists in the second Iraq operation and in Afghanistan.
Mr. Funk has provided support services and worked with the United States military in numerous
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39. Mr. Funk was hired by MEP in October 2007. In October and November he
worked with MEP officials to help MEP set up its PDPC, which was eventually located in
Linthicum, Maryland. In November 2007, Mr. Funk moved to Afghanistan, where he was to
serve as MEP’s Regional Manager in Afghanistan (Kandahar). In late November, Mr. Funk
returned to the United States because of a death in his family. In December 2007, Mr. Funk was
asked to become the Director of the PDPC. He remained in that position until December 2008.
40. As Director of the PDPC, Mr. Funk’s responsibilities included supervising the
translators and interpreters for the United States military. As a result of his job responsibilities,
Mr. Funk has direct and independent knowledge of MEP’s fraudulent and unlawful conduct.
41. The paragraphs that follow describe MEP’s fraudulent, unlawful, and retaliatory
and discriminatory conduct. Because most of the records pertaining to the time period in which
Mr. Funk was employed by MEP are in the possession, custody, or control of MEP – not Mr.
Funk – the dates provided below are based on the best information currently available to Mr.
Funk. More precise information should become available from MEP during the discovery
process in this litigation. The descriptions below are not intended to enumerate every interaction
or communication between Mr. Funk and MEP, but describe, in considerable detail, the
fraudulent activities engaged in by MEP and the actions taken by Mr. Funk.
42. In late November 2007, Mr. Funk learned that MEP was not screening CAT I
linguists in Afghanistan to ascertain their ILR level, as required by MEP’s contract with the
United States. Mr. Funk learned this when he interviewed an MEP official who had
responsibility for much of MEP’s CAT I testing in the northern region of Afghanistan. Mr. Funk
learned from this MEP official that instead of testing for ILR proficiency level, the MEP official
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was simply meeting with candidates for approximately five minutes and either passing or failing
them. The MEP official had no knowledge of the ILR proficiency standards, was not evaluating
candidates on that basis, and was not using a written test that evaluated a candidate’s ILR
proficiency level.
43. In late November, Mr. Funk reported to Beth Theiss, who had HR responsibilities
for MEP, that the company was not testing candidates for CAT I linguist positions in
Afghanistan to determine whether they met ILR proficiency standards as required by its contract
with the United States. Ms. Theiss responded that this was outside the scope of her
responsibilities.
44. After returning to the United States and assuming a position as Director of the
PDPC, Mr. Funk told MEP’s Marc Peltier that MEP had a major problem because it was hiring
linguists in Afghanistan to support the United States’ military even though they were not being
tested for ILR proficiency as required by MEP’s contract with the United States. Peltier told
Funk that this would be taken care of. In the next month, Mr. Funk also discussed MEP’s failure
to conduct the required testing of CAT I linguists in Afghanistan with Frank Marois, the Program
45. In 2008, Marc Peltier was MEP’s Senior Vice President for Operations and
Administration. (He subsequently became, and remains, MEP’s Chief Operating Officer.) As
Senior Vice President for Operations and Administrations, Peltier is very familiar with MEP’s
practices of submitting claims and invoices to the United States seeking reimbursement (on a
cost-plus basis) for the services and employees described below. Peltier is also familiar with
government contracting practices and the claims submitted to the Government in connection with
such work, because – prior to securing a senior position at MEP – he had similar responsibilities
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for years providing linguists to Afghanistan for another defense contractor. David Slovina,
46. As Director of the PDPC, Mr. Funk also learned in early 2008 that MEP was
failing to screen candidates properly for Cat II and Cat III linguist positions in the United States.
Candidates in the United States were located by MEP’s Recruiting Department and then given
oral proficiency tests to determine if they met the ILR standards for oral skills (i.e., speaking and
listening in the Specified Contract Required Languages (“SCRL”) and English). This test was
conducted and scored by a subcontractor – Language Learning Enterprises, Inc. (“LLE”), and
later Ceiba Enterprises, Inc., dba Gracor Language Services, Inc. (“Gracor”) – and the results
were provided to MEP’s central office in Columbus, Ohio. LLE and Gracor would conduct the
testing by telephone with the candidate. If a candidate passed the oral proficiency test, they were
to be sent by MEP to the PDPC in Linthicum, Maryland, where they would be given a written
proficiency test. While at the PDPC, candidates would also undergo medical and dental
screening, certain forms of training, security screening by the 902nd Military Intelligence Group
47. If the individual received the required skill rating on the written as well as oral
exams, the individual was then sent to the CONUS Replacement Center (“CRC”) in Fort
Benning, Georgia. There, the individual would undergo the basic military training required for
all contractors prior to deployment to Afghanistan or other locations. This included verifying
security, medical, and dental screenings, but not verification of language capabilities.
48. For each stage in this process, MEP submits a claim and receives payment from
the United States. The longer an individual stays in this pipeline, the more money MEP will
make. Thus, if an individual is moved on to the PDPC for a two week period (as was commonly
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the case in early 2008), MEP will invoice the United States for that time (and receive payment on
a cost-plus basis). If MEP continues to process the individual and send them to the CRC
(typically for a multi-week period), it will invoice for additional amounts to cover this period.
And if the individual is then deployed to Afghanistan or another location, MEP will invoice the
United States (and receive payments on a cost-plus basis) for the duration of their deployment.
Afghanistan or another location, MEP maximizes the amount of its own claims to, and
reimbursement from, the United States. MEP submits written claims and invoices to the United
States on a regular basis seeking reimbursement for the costs of employing and training each of
these individuals.
49. As Director of the PDPC in early 2008, Mr. Funk began receiving reports about
individuals who did not have the skills required by the contract – indeed, some of them could
barely speak English. Mr. Funk also learned that LLE and MEP were conducting oral
proficiency tests without confirming that the individual taking the test was the same person that
was applying for a job as a linguist. Based on his experience over many years, Mr. Funk was
aware that over-the-phone testing, without clear confirmation of the candidate’s identity and
other quality controls, would facilitate and predictably result in fraud because competent
50. This potential for fraud is particularly high because of the very substantial salaries
paid by MEP to linguists. A CAT II or CAT III linguist hired in the United States received a
salary of up to approximately $1,000 per month or more while at the PDPC and CRC, and
approximately $190,000 to $235,000 a year while deployed. MEP pays these salaries, but then
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makes a claim to the United States and is reimbursed for this expense and a substantial additional
51. In early 2008, Mr. Funk told David Slovina, the Director of Recruiting for MEP,
that linguists who had already gone through the screening conducted by LLE and MEP in
Columbus were being sent to the PDPC even though they did not have the language skills
required by the contract. Mr. Funk said that individuals were cheating on the oral proficiency
tests. When Mr. Slovina asked Mr. Funk how he knew people were cheating, Mr. Funk said he
had spoken directly to individuals who had been sent to the PDPC and learned that they could
not speak English. Mr. Funk also told him that based on his experience, and the results he was
seeing at PDPC, MEP’s use of this form of over-the-phone testing was facilitating cheating. Mr.
Slovina indicated that he would take steps to get positive identification from individuals when
52. Both Mr. Slovina and his superior, Marc Peltier, were aware that if individuals
who did not meet the competency qualifications required by the United States were sent to the
PDPC, sent to the CRC, or deployed to the United States, this would result in the submission of
claims to – and receipt of payments from – the United States for linguists who were not, in fact,
CAT II and CAT III linguists despite being presented as such in claims to the United States.
Additionally, Mr. Peltier had been involved in the recruitment and hiring of linguists pursuant to
contracts with the United States for years, both before his employment by MEP (when he worked
at Titan/L3 and had similar job responsibilities relating to government contracts for linguists)
53. Indeed, the compensation and job performance systems set up by MEP, and
implemented by Mr. Peltier and Mr. Slovina, were plainly based on recognition of this. The
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MEP recruiters managed by Mr. Slovina, as Director of Recruiting, and Mr. Peltier, as his
supervisor, were compensated in part based on the stage in the deployment process that an
individual recruit had reached – the farther recruits advanced in the pipeline, the more MEP
would pay an individual recruiter. Similarly, if a recruiter failed to advance a sufficient number
of individuals through the various stages in the pipeline (PDPC, CRC, and deployment), he or
she risked job loss, and recruiters were in fact terminated on this basis. This system was based
on the recognition by both Mr. Peltier and Mr. Slovina, by at least 2008, that MEP could submit
larger claims to the United States if individuals remained in the process longer, resulting in
greater reimbursement (and cost-plus payments) from the United States to MEP.
54. In early 2008, after being informed by Mr. Funk that unqualified individuals were
being sent to the PDPC, Mr. Peltier told Mr. Funk that when he discovered individuals at the
PDPC who did not have the required language skills, he should just pass them through the PDPC
and they would see what happened down the line. In other words, even if individuals were
incompetent and did not qualify as CAT II or CAT III linguists – as required by the contract and
as represented by MEP in claims and invoices submitted to the United States – MEP would keep
them in the pipeline and continue to make salary and other payments to these individuals which
would then be reimbursed, with a cost-plus payment, by the United States. Peltier said that
MEP’s goal was to get the maximum number of linguists through the PDPC.
55. In or about February 2008, Mr. Funk was informed by Daniel Simms, an MEP
employee under Mr. Funk’s supervision, that individuals at the PDPC who submitted blank
written examinations to determine ILR proficiency had received passing grades from LLE and
MEP. These written tests were administered by employees under Mr. Funk’s supervision at the
PDPC in Linthicum, and each individual’s test answers were scanned and sent to LLE for
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grading. In the course of this, Mr. Simms discovered that blank exams sent to LLE had received
ILR proficiency scores that purportedly met the standards in the contract with the United States.
56. Mr. Funk told his superior, Frank Marois, the Program Manager at the PDPC, that
individuals submitting blank written examinations were being given passing grades on these
written tests by LLE and MEP. Mr. Marois instructed Mr. Funk to contact LLE about this. In or
about February 2008, Mr. Funk contacted Bill Hingle at LLE, who told Mr. Funk that he would
57. Mr. Funk subsequently received further information from Mr. Simms that this
practice was continuing. Mr. Simms found other examples of blank written test answers that
were provided to LLE in or about February 2008, but these individuals then received grades by
LLE and MEP that purportedly met the ILR proficiency standards. These falsified grades were
58. Because of his position as a Director – and his supervisory and other
responsibilities relating to testing – Mr. Funk was able to ascertain the test scores of individuals
that were sent by MEP to the PDPC. Mr. Funk learned that individuals who did not have the
proficiency levels required by the contract were nevertheless being funneled to the PDPC by
MEP. Mr. Funk communicated to David Slovina, the Director of Recruiting, that MEP was
sending individuals to the PDPC even though they had failed to achieve the required ILR
standards on their oral proficiency tests. Mr. Funk reiterated to Mr. Slovina the ILR standards
required by the contract. Mr. Slovina indicated that he would address this but, in fact, this
practice continued.
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59. In or about this time, Mr. Funk also informed Mr. Marois that individuals were
being sent to PDPC who could not read or write English, could not read or write Pashtu or Dari
60. On or about March 14, 2008, Mr. Funk prepared and submitted a Weekly Activity
Report (“WAR”) to MEP. Mr. Funk believes this document was provided to numerous
management officials at MEP, including Mr. Slovina and other Directors at MEP. In this report,
Mr. Funk reported that “Written Testing appears to be compromised” and that “Recruiting might
consider similar issues for the OPI.” Although Mr. Funk did not have responsibility for the oral
testing being conducted by MEP, he had also raised these issues directly with Slovina and other
61. In the spring of 2008, Paul Clemens replaced Mr. Marois as Program Manager at
PDPC. Mr. Funk informed Mr. Clemens of the conduct described above. Mr. Clemens told Mr.
Funk that he “better get something in writing” indicating that these practices had been approved
by the United States if he wanted to “stay out of jail.” On numerous occasions during the course
of the events described herein, Mr. Funk contacted David Slovina and asked if there was
anything in writing permitting PDPC to submit linguists who did not meet the contract
requirements described above. While Mr. Slovina would try to assure Mr. Funk that this would
be or was being taken care of, neither Mr. Slovina nor anyone else at MEP provided any
documentation that these practices were acceptable. (Mr. Funk only recalls receiving a limited
waiver pertaining to 2007 that did not support the practices described above.)
62. On June 9, 2008, Mr. Funk communicated to Marc Peltier, Paul Clemens, and
David Slovina that the Statement of Work (“SOW”) “at the PDPC shows a 4 to 5 ILR as a
contract requirement.” By this time, MEP had submitted and was continuing to submit claims to
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the United States for numerous individuals who MEP was describing as CAT I, CAT II and
CAT III linguists even though they failed to meet the proficiency levels required for these
positions.
63. During this time period, MEP also changed the company that it used to conduct
and grade language tests from LLE to Gracor. Mr. Funk was asked to review the testing contract
and warned MEP that it did not provide adequate safeguards. These warnings were disregarded.
The company MEP engaged to perform this critical function, Gracor, operates out of the home of
its founders and owners, Thomas and Rosario Hubbard. At or about the same time, the
Hubbard’s son began working for MEP, first as an intern in the Recruiting Department from June
to September 2008 to “[a]ssist” the Department “in recruiting” linguists for Afghanistan, and
since that time as a full-time MEP employee. After MEP began using the Hubbards’ home-
based company to test and grade recruits, the number of recruits being funneled in “waves” to
64. Because Mr. Funk was not employed by LLE or Gracor, discovery in this action
will be appropriate to determine the full extent of their complicity and/or facilitation of MEP’s
fraudulent statements, false records, and false claims. As described here, Mr. Funk became
aware of passing grades being assigned to blank tests, advance test information (cheat sheets)
being provided to recruits being moved through the pipeline, and test scores being changed and
improved after the fact. These fraudulent actions were taken during the time periods that LLE
and then Gracor had responsibilities for grading exams and transmitting those grades to MEP.
65. In or about July of 2008, Mr. Slovina instructed Mr. Funk to allow three
individuals who had failed their written tests at the PDPC to retake the examinations. The
explanation provided was that one of the three had not had a dictionary at the time of the
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examination. When re-tested, each of the three individuals passed the written examination. Mr.
Funk’s Deputy Director, Idin Pirasteh, discovered – and reported to Mr. Funk – a “cheat sheet”
that had been used by one or all of these individuals for the re-examination. This cheat sheet
contained written answers to the test questions. Because the testing materials were not available
to individuals outside Gracor or MEP – and varied for different test sessions – these answers
were very likely provided to these individuals by officials or employees at MEP (or Gracor). At
the time this cheat sheet was discovered by Mr. Pirasteh, Mr. Funk was in the midst of
investigating the matter. The three individuals were questioned by Mr. Funk and others at the
PDPC, and they admitted that they had used the cheat sheet and cheated on the written exam.
They refused to identify who supplied them with the cheat sheet.
66. Shortly after Mr. Funk investigated and detected this attempt to cheat – and
learned that they had in all likelihood been assisted in these efforts by one or more MEP
employees who were aware of the test that would be used and the correct answers – MEP
responded by taking steps to restrict Mr. Funk’s job responsibilities including, in particular, the
responsibilities of Mr. Funk and his staff relating to testing linguists. Mr. Funk was informed by
his superior, Paul Clemens, that Mr. Funk’s oversight of the written test process was being
removed and was being reassigned to David Slovina, the Director of Recruiting.
67. No rationale for this change was given to Mr. Funk. This change meant that
officials in the Recruiting Department – who had made clear that their mission was to maximize
the number of linguists moving through the system, notwithstanding their failure to meet ILR
proficiency requirements, and were being compensated and rewarded based on those numbers –
would now have complete responsibility for “screening” the language skills of their recruits.
Recruiting was given sole responsibility for this notwithstanding the fraudulent practices that had
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already attended oral proficiency testing and the Recruiting Department’s overriding financial
68. This abrupt change not only limited Mr. Funk’s job responsibilities, but also
impeded the ability of Mr. Funk to investigate MEP’s continuing fraud. Because the
responsibilities of Mr. Funk and his staff relating to the testing of candidates were being
curtailed, MEP’s screening process would become less transparent to Mr. Funk. While his
responsibilities relating to testing had previously permitted Mr. Funk to investigate or learn about
the fraudulent practices described above, MEP’s actions significantly limited this and ensured
that its testing and screening practices would now be under the exclusive control of David
Slovina and MEP’s Recruiting Department. This discriminatory and retaliatory action was taken
in direct response to Mr. Funk’s ongoing efforts to investigate, report, and remedy MEP’s
fraudulent activities, including it provision of unqualified linguists to the United States and
related submission of claims to and receipt of payments from the United States for unqualified
linguists who were being falsely depicted as CAT I, CAT II, or CAT III linguists.
69. Moreover, in addition to Mr. Funk’s own responsibilities regarding testing, the
related responsibilities of his staff had significantly facilitated Mr. Funk’s ability to discover the
fraudulent activities described herein. By eliminating Mr. Funk’s job responsibilities relating to
testing, MEP also curtailed the ability of other MEP employees under his supervision to detect
MEP’s fraudulent activities and report them to Mr. Funk. Instead, MEP acted to vest these
and demonstrated willingness to move individuals through the MEP pipeline even if they failed
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70. Despite MEP’s efforts to restrict his responsibilities and prevent further
investigation or actions regarding the ongoing fraud, Mr. Funk continued to take steps to
ascertain the legality of MEP’s practices. In or about August 2008, Mr. Funk spoke with David
Slovina and again requested written documentation justifying the number of incompetent
linguists that were being hired by MEP and presented to the United States as qualified linguists.
Mr. Slovina claimed that he and Marc Peltier had received verbal approval and he would send
Mr. Funk anything in writing if he received it. Mr. Funk requested that Mr. Slovina send him an
e-mail confirming that MEP had received approval, but Mr. Slovina was unwilling to do so.
71. MEP did in fact hire numerous linguists during this period to support United
States troops in Afghanistan or elsewhere that MEP knew had failed oral proficiency
examinations, failed written proficiency examinations, or failed both. MEP submitted claims to
the United States related to these individuals, falsely claimed that they were CAT I, CAT II, or
CAT III linguists (even though MEP knew that they were not CAT I, CAT II, or CAT III
linguists as expressly defined by MEP’s contractual obligations with the United States), and
72. Although Mr. Funk does not have records that identify linguists who failed tests
during the later months of his employment at MEP – and, as set forth above, MEP took actions to
limit his responsibilities relating to testing and receipt of information that would reveal test
results – MEP’s fraudulent practices were continuing when he was forced to leave MEP in
December 2008. Examples of linguists who received ILR ratings below the level specified in the
contract, but nevertheless had completed the PDPC process or were further in the MEP pipeline
x Nasrullah Azad received failing scores in or about January 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
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x Wali Khan received failing scores in or about January 2008 but completed the
PDPC and, on information and belief, was sent to the CRC.
x Roya Qarizadah received failing scores in or about January 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Mohammad Haris received failing scores in or about January 2008 but completed
the PDPC and, on information and belief, was sent to the CRC.
x Mohammad Rasuli received failing scores in or about January 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Masood Mahfooz received failing scores in or about February 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Ahmadshan Helman received failing scores in or about February 2008 and was
then deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Torpaakai Harari received failing scores in or about February 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Ahmad Helmandi received failing scores in or about February 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Ali Moshini received failing scores in or about February 2010 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Manucher Wahab received failing scores in or about March 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Safoora Nejrabi received failing scores in or about March 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Tandar Dawaarzai received failing scores in or about March 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Ahmadwali Lodin received failing scores in or about March 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Sharif Haronee received failing scores in or about March 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Ahmadullah Ashrafi received failing scores in or about March 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Salahuddin Ahmadzai received failing scores in or about March 2008 and was
then deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Zabairullah Noori received failing scores in or about April 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Ali Musa received failing scores in or about April 2008 and was then deployed by
MEP to military theatre operations.
x Rhamatullah Hassan received failing scores in or about April 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Khoja Hassan received failing scores in or about April 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Azizullah Hassan received failing scores in or about April 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x David Asadi received failing scores in or about April 2008 and was then deployed
by MEP to military theatre operations.
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x Khadim Yousafi received failing scores in or about April 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Parwin Moore received failing scores in or about April 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Ahmad Amiri received failing scores in or about April 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Mark Zaman received failing scores in or about April 2008 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Fnu Azizullah received failing scores in or about April 2008 but was sent by MEP
to the PDPC for at least three weeks and completed the PDPC.
x Najiya Muhammad received failing scores in or about April 2008 but was sent by
MEP to PDPC for three weeks and completed the PDPC.
x Amini Durrani received failing scores in or about April 2008, but was moved by
MEP through its pipeline to the CRC.
x Noor Roadwwall received failing scores in or about May 2009 and was then
deployed by MEP to military theatre operations.
x Qadir Khattak received failing scores but was sent by MEP to the CRC in or
about May 2009.
x Abdullah Hotaki received failing scores but was sent by MEP to the CRC in or
about May 2009.
x Ghulam Lomany receiving failing scores but was sent by MEP to the PDPC and
completed the PDPC in or about May 2009.
x Shakeeba Ahmadi received failing scores but was sent by MEP to the CRC in or
about May 2009.
x Sameer Sajid received failing scores but was sent to the CRC in or about May
2009.
x Nizam Haidary received failing scores but was sent to the CRC in or about May
2009.
x Tamim Saifi received failing scores but was sent to the CRC in or about May
2009.
73. In or about September 2008, Mr. Funk was informed by John Bateman, an
employee working under him at the PDPC, that other expenses billed by MEP to the United
States involved “fraud, waste and abuse.” This fraud occurred in connection with claims
submitted to the United States for translation work MEP asked its linguists to do at the PDPC on
74. Notwithstanding the fact that many of these individuals had failed the writing and
reading proficiency tests, MEP instructed them to bill time at the PDPC under the DOMEX
project translating documents. Individuals working on DOMEX were scheduled to work only
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two hours a day, but MEP submitted invoices and claims to the United States for eight hours of
work each day. In fact, MEP had neither sufficient work, nor adequate facilities, to support eight
hours of work for individuals working on DOMEX. Moreover, MEP employees were aware that
individuals working on DOMEX were only being scheduled to work two hours each day.
75. MEP management told Mr. Funk’s Deputy at the PDPC, Idin Pirasteh, that if an
individual working on DOMEX only entered two hours of work in time records, the records
should be changed to reflect eight hours of work. The purpose of preparing MEP time records,
including false entries by the employees involved into MEP’s Unanet time recordation system,
that deliberately overstated the amount of work actually performed was to support the
submission of claims and invoices to the United States seeking payment for these inflated work
hours. MEP’s invoices to the United States, as described below, included false and overstated
claims for reimbursement for this work and resulted in substantial overpayments to MEP.
76. Mr. Funk complained to MEP management about this fraudulent overbilling. He
told his superior, Paul Clemens, that Mr. Bateman – who was the operations coordinator for this
project – had explained to him that these billing practices constituted fraud, waste, and abuse.
He also informed David Slovina, Director of Recruiting, about this fraudulent overbilling. Mr.
Funk believed that bills for DOMEX services that had not been performed were being submitted
to the United States. Mr. Clemens, Mr. Slovina, and others at MEP were also aware that it was
MEP’s standard practice to submit claims to the United States seeking reimbursement for
expenses of this kind – indeed, this was central to MEP’s business and profitability model – and
thus knew that the reported conduct involved the submission of false statements and false claims
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77. MEP’s fraudulent overbilling for these services to the United States began in or
about August 2008 and continued into 2009. MEP’s regular practice was to bill the United
States for eight hours a day for individuals working on DOMEX, even though they routinely
worked only two hours. Mr. Funk does not have DOMEX records, but does have per diem
records that identify the linguists at PDPC during the relevant time period, including individuals
who were at the PDPC more than one week. MEP generally did not assign linguists to DOMEX
until they completed their first week at the PDPC, and therefore those linguists with per diem
records reflecting multiple weeks at the PDPC likely participated in DOMEX and engaged in the
fraudulent practices described above. MEP submitted false and overstated invoices and claims to
the United States pertaining to the work allegedly being performed for these individuals. The
x In or about August 2008 through at least November 2008, Yamah Tom Kwaga;
x In or about August 2008 through at least November 2008, Nasir Farooqi;
x In or about August 2008 through at least November 2008, Mohammad Ferozi;
x In or about August 2008 through at least November 2008, Rabia Hashemi;
x In or about August 2008 through at least November 2008, Naseer Khan;
x In or about August 2008 through at least November 2008, Yamah Mojadedi;
x In or about August 2008 through at least November 2008, Mustafa Nasafi;
x In or about August 2008 through at least November 2008, Wahab Raofi;
x In or about August 2008 through at least November 2008, Farzana Razimowar;
x In or about September 2008 through at least November 2008, Reda Al Ahmadi;
x In or about September 2008 through at least November 2008, Isac Alemi;
x In or about September 2008 through at least November 2008, Star Qurashi;
x In or about September 2008 through at least November 2008, Ahmad Safa;
x In or about September 2008 through at least November 2008, Bashir Wali;
x In or about September 2008 through at least November 2008, Urooj Abbas;
x In or about September 2008 through at least November 2008, Mohammad
Ariasaif;
x In or about September 2008 through at least November 2008, Adela Ashpari;
x In or about September 2008 through at least November 2008, Noria Azizi;
x In or about September 2008 through at least November 2008, Qudratullah
Wardak;
x In or about September 2008 through at least November 2008, Abas Ali;
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78. Mr. Funk also learned that the fraudulent overbilling in connection with DOMEX
was, essentially, a continuation or extension of similar overbilling that MEP was engaged in at
Fort Benning, Georgia. From approximately March 2008 through the summer of 2008, MEP
(“DOCEX”). Although MEP did not have the resources at Fort Benning that would be necessary
to support large numbers of linguists spending full days doing translation work, it is Mr. Funk’s
understanding that the overbilling that occurred at the PDPC in connection with the DOMEX
project was a continuation of similar fraudulent billing practices that had commenced earlier at
79. In the fall of 2008, David Slovina met with Mr. Funk and made thinly veiled
warnings regarding Mr. Funk’s continuing actions relating to MEP’s fraudulent conduct. He
communicated to Mr. Funk that the company “doesn’t get you,” that Mr. Funk needed to “get in
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lock step with recruiting,” and that the company needed to hit its numbers. Mr. Funk indicated
that he would not send people who were incompetent and did not have the proficiency levels
required by the contract into the field. He reiterated that Mr. Slovina knew that testing was being
compromised and that stand-ins were being used to take tests. Mr. Slovina’s actions and
statements implied that if Mr. Funk did not get in line, his job at MEP would be at risk.
80. In or about October 2008, Mr. Funk contacted MEP’s contracting office. Mr.
Funk requested information regarding MEP’s ability to purchase certain equipment through the
General Services Administration under its contract with the United States. During the course of
this contact, he also inquired about whether MEP had received any documentation from the
United States that would permit it to depart from the standards and requirements in its contract
with the United States, and was told that the office would check and get back to him. Shortly
thereafter, Mr. Funk was contacted by Paul Clemens, the PDPC Program Manager, and
reprimanded for this inquiry. Mr. Funk was told he was not permitted to contact or speak with
81. In the fall of 2008, Mr. Funk learned that individuals were being sent to the PDPC
even though they had failed to receive grades on English oral proficiency tests that met the
ILR 2+ standard required by MEP’s contract with the United States. For a brief period, the oral
test scores were sent to the PDPC with other information about individuals being sent to the
PDPC. Mr. Funk was informed by an MEP employee, Anthonya Morales Torres, that
individuals were being sent even though their ILR levels from the oral proficiency tests were
below that required by the contract. Mr. Funk and Ms. Torres reported to David Slovina and
Ashley Laurrey that these candidates could not be accepted. After complaining of this, Ms.
Torres learned (and informed Mr. Funk) that the scores for these individuals were then changed
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in MEP’s records to indicate, falsely, that they had received passing scores on their oral
proficiency examinations.
82. In or about December 2008, Mr. Funk confronted Mr. Slovina about MEP’s
continuing actions to move individuals through the pipeline that did not meet the contract
with another individual who had progressed to the PDPC notwithstanding an insufficient score
on the oral proficiency testing, Mr. Funk sarcastically told Mr. Slovina that he should just
retroactively change the grade in MEP’s system as MEP had done previously.
83. Shortly after this, Mr. Funk learned about a financial issue involving the PDPC.
The issue involved no wrongdoing of any kind by Mr. Funk. Mr. Funk notified MEP
headquarters in Columbus of the matter. He was then contacted by company owner Greg Miller,
one of MEP’s owners. Mr. Miller said that Marc Peltier was extremely angry with Mr. Funk and
was insisting that he be fired. Mr. Peltier had also falsely accused Mr. Funk of taking money.
This accusation was baseless and was simply a pretext to force Mr. Funk out of his job because
of his continuing investigation of MEP’s fraudulent activities, his complaints about these
fraudulent activities to MEP management, and the risk to MEP of potential liability under the
False Claims Act. The actions and persistent conduct that Mr. Funk described were unlawful
and resulted in the submission of numerous false claims to the United States throughout this time
period. Mr. Funk’s continuing investigation and complaints about these activities, and his
unwillingness to ignore this unlawful conduct and get in “lock step” with recruiting, presented a
clear danger to the company that it could be subject to liability under the False Claims Act.
Indeed, the facts complained of by Mr. Funk not only could reasonably lead to a viable False
Claims Act case, but demonstrated clear and continuing violations of the False Claims Act.
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84. By leveling accusations of financial misconduct against Mr. Funk, MEP was able
to both threaten him and gain a pretextual basis for challenging his credibility if he later brought
85. The actions by MEP – including MEP’s actions to restrict his job responsibilities;
MEP’s efforts to limit his ability to investigate and/or discover these fraudulent activities; MEP’s
admonition to Mr. Funk that he had to get in “lock step” with recruiting (notwithstanding the
fraudulent activities described herein); its warning to Mr. Funk that Mr. Peltier insisted that he be
fired; and numerous other actions described above – created a threatening and hostile work
environment that made it impossible for Mr. Funk to continue at MEP and constructively
discharged him from his position. Mr. Funk’s employment at MEP ended in December 2008.
86. It is revealing that even today, the company uses these false accusations of
financial impropriety by Mr. Funk as a pretext to discredit Mr. Funk’s claims under the False
Claims Act. On September 8, 2010, in response to an ABC News story relating to Mr. Funk’s
claims, MEP issued a press release in which it stated that “Mr. Funk has no credibility.” It then
says that Mr. Funk “resigned due to financial improprieties in his office,” clearly trying to
convey that Mr. Funk was involved in “financial improprieties.” In another recent press release,
MEP asserted that Mr. Funk “resigned in 2008 over misuse of company funds.” Marc Peltier has
also publicly asserted that Mr. Funk “offered to resign and resigned over financial
improprieties.” All of these statements are not only untrue, they are intended to convey that Mr.
Funk’s allegation of violations of the False Claim Act should be disregarded because he is
wrongdoing. These statements are false and MEP knows they are false. Indeed, MEP’s public
efforts to discredit his claims under the False Claims Act on this basis are directly contradicted
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by its own internal documentation. In these communications, one of the owners of MEP and a
member of its Board of Directors, Greg Miller, acknowledged internally in January 2009 that
Mr. Funk did “nothing inappropriate.” Nevertheless, MEP has used – and continues to use –
allegations of Mr. Funk’s involvement in “financial improprieties” to impugn his character and
87. In engaging in the fraudulent activities described above, MEP has submitted
numerous false claims to the United States, has done so using false statements and records, and
has received substantial reimbursement from the United States. For example, during the period
December 2007 through 2008 and continuing thereafter, MEP sent invoices to the United States
on approximately a monthly basis seeking reimbursement for salaries and other costs related to
each person at the PDPC, the CRC, and in the theatre of operations. These invoices were sent to
the United States by administrative personnel at MEP. MEP officers and management –
including, for example, Marc Peltier and David Slovina – were aware that the company regularly
invoiced the United States and submitted claims related to the linguists and expenses described
above. In fact, as explained above, the job performance and compensation of employees in the
Recruiting Department was based in significant part on their “success” in moving individuals
through the pipeline described above – to the PDPC, the CRC, and into the theatres of military
operations – precisely because they knew that progressing individuals through each stage meant
that larger claims and invoices would be submitted to the United States for payment.
88. Invoices submitted to the United States beginning in or about December 2007 and
continuing through thereafter identified many of the individuals for whom reimbursement was
being sought as CAT I, CAT II, or CAT III linguists. Many of these representations, including
representations relating to individuals described above, were false. As explained above, MEP’s
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internal documents demonstrate that MEP knew that many of these individuals were not, in fact,
CAT I, CAT II, or CAT III linguists. Nevertheless, MEP presented them as such in claims to the
MEP to the United States on approximately a monthly basis in connection with task orders
90. These false claims and false records were sent by MEP’s administrative/clerical
personnel from MEP’s facilities in Reston, Virginia to the Defense Finance and Accounting
Service (“DFAS”) payment office in Dayton, Ohio via the wide area work flow system accessed
by MEP.
91. The false claims and false records submitted to DFAS included claims for
reimbursement for individuals who were being falsely represented as CAT I, CAT II, and
CAT III linguists in the United States and Afghanistan and for alleged expenses that were being
92. Throughout the period described above, Mr. Funk’s investigation and complaints
about MEP’s fraudulent conduct made clear to MEP management officials that false and
fraudulent records were being prepared in connection with employees and work for which MEP
would be seeking reimbursement from the United States. This conduct included, for example,
preparing records showing that individuals had passed their proficiency tests, when in fact they
had submitted blank tests or otherwise failed; changing failing test scores to create records
showing that tests had been passed; and preparing false time records.
93. The fraudulent conduct described by Mr. Funk also made clear to MEP
management, including Mr. Slovina, Mr. Peltier, Mr. Clemens, and others, that MEP was
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submitting false claims and invoices to the United States for payment. All of the fraudulent
activities described by Mr. Funk were conducted in connection with MEP’s performance of a
contract with the United States, for which it would regularly submit claims for payment to the
United States. It was common knowledge to management at MEP – including Mr. Peltier, Mr.
Clemens, and Mr. Slovina – that the company regularly submitted claims to the United States
seeking payment and reimbursement for work that allegedly was being performed by MEP
employees and the movement of individuals that qualified as CAT I, CAT II, and CAT III
linguists through the MEP pipeline. Indeed, the submission of these claims to the United States
was the core part of MEP’s business model, and accounted for virtually all of the company’s
94. The information and complaints of Mr. Funk also made clear to management that
these claims to the United States were false. They were based in significant part on claims for
services that were not being performed and fraudulent practices relating to the competence and
qualifications of linguists for whom MEP was routinely seeking payment from the United States.
For example, Mr. Clemens’ knowledge that the activities being reported by Mr. Funk involved
fraud and potentially criminal activity in the provision of services and claims to the United States
is evidenced by his statement to Mr. Funk that he had better secure documentation that such
95. By December 2008, MEP had been engaged in these fraudulent practices for a
lengthy period of time, and they were continuing when Mr. Funk was constructively discharged
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96. The discriminatory and retaliatory conduct described above have caused
substantial financial damages to Mr. Funk including loss of his employment, reputational
COUNT ONE
False Claims Act – Presentation of False Claims
[31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) as amended in 2009]
97. Relator incorporates by reference the allegations made in the prior Paragraphs of
98. Through the acts described above, Defendant MEP and its agents and employees
knowingly presented and caused to be presented to an officer or employee of the United States
Government a false and/or fraudulent claim for payment or approval in violation of 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1), and engaged in a fraudulent course of conduct for the purpose of securing payment
99. The conduct described herein has resulted in substantial payments by the United
States, and has caused significant damage to the United States treasury, based on payments of
COUNT TWO
False Claims Act – Making or Using False
Record or Statement to Cause Claim to Be Paid
[31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2),31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) as amended in 2009]
100. Relator incorporates by reference the allegations made in the prior Paragraphs of
101. Through the acts described above and otherwise, MEP and its agents and
employees knowingly made, used, and/or caused to be made or used false records and statements
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in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) in order to get such false and fraudulent claims paid and
102. The conduct described herein has resulted in substantial payments by the United
States, and damages to the United States treasury, based on statements and claims that were false
and fraudulent.
COUNT THREE
False Claims Act Retaliation Violation
[31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)]
103. Relator incorporates by reference the allegations made in the prior Paragraphs of
104. Defendant MEP has a duty under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), to
refrain from taking discriminatory or retaliatory actions against employees who take lawful
actions in furtherance of a False Claims Act action, including investigation for, testimony for, or
105. As set forth above, Mr. Funk engaged in numerous activities that are protected
under the False Claims Act. This includes his investigation of MEP’s fraudulent activities;
bringing this fraudulent and illegal activity to the attention of MEP management; refusing to
participate in, assist, or ignore a scheme to defraud the government; and numerous actions to
by Mr. Funk were knowing, fraudulent, and involved the submission of false records and claims
to the United States, Mr. Funk’s activities created a distinct risk that MEP would be subject to
litigation under the False Claims Act, and that such litigation was a reasonable possibility.
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107. Moreover, the conduct being investigated by Mr. Funk, and his disclosure to and
confrontations with management about this fraudulent conduct, reasonably could have led to a
viable action under the False Claims Act. The conduct engaged in by MEP does, in fact, violate
the False Claims Act and Mr. Funk’s persistent efforts to ascertain, investigate, and complain
about these fraudulent activities certainly could lead to a viable action under the FCA.
108. Mr. Funk’s protected activities were known to numerous management officials at
109. Defendant MEP discriminated and retaliated against Mr. Funk because of his
lawful actions taken in furtherance of a False Claims Act action. This discrimination and
retaliation included curtailment of Mr. Funk’s job responsibilities, efforts to limit his ability to
investigate the fraud, implied threats because of his protected activities (and failure to act in
“lock step” with those engaged in this fraud), harassment, false charges of financial wrongdoing,
110. Defendant MEP’s actions damaged and continue to damage Relator in violation
of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). This includes financial damages by virtue of his loss of employment and
other financial damages caused by MEP’s conduct. In connection with this claim, Relator seeks
all damages and other appropriate relief authorized by the False Claims Act, as well as litigation
111. Defendant MEP’s misconduct and illegal treatment of Relator has the effect of
stifling reports of military contractor fraud. This treatment effectively warned MEP’s other
employees that they should not engage in honest and open reporting of Defendant’s conduct.
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and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in the vindication of his reputation and the pursuit of his
retaliation claims.
WHEREFORE, Relator Paul Funk requests that judgment be entered against Defendant
1. The Court enter judgment against Defendant in an amount equal to three times the
amount of damages the United States has sustained as a result of Defendant’s actions, as well as
a civil penalty against Defendant of not less than $5,500 and not more than $11,000, for each
3. Relator be awarded all costs and expenses of this action, including attorneys’ fees,
4. Relator be awarded all damages and other relief allowable under law because of
5. That the Court award any other legal or equitable relief, including injunctive or
declaratory relief if authorized by law, necessary to fully address and remedy the unlawful
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Scott Newar
700 Louisiana, 25th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
Tel: 713-220-9155
Fax: 713-223-9319
[email protected]
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of October, 2010, I will electronically file the
foregoing Relator’s Second Amended Complaint with the Clerk of the Court using the
CM/ECF system, which will then send a notification of such filing to the following:
I also hereby certify that I will cause to be mailed a copy of the same document to the
/ s / David A. Young
David A. Young
COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
Suite 500 West
Washington, DC 20005
Tel: (202) 408-4600
Fax: (202) 408-4699
[email protected]