T. Bhattacharyya, The Interpretation of Statutes (1985) .: 2. Id., Preface
T. Bhattacharyya, The Interpretation of Statutes (1985) .: 2. Id., Preface
careful thought and analysis, many would not agree with him. Some
prominent jurists have convincingly advocated that not only to the consti-
tution which is sui generis but also to different types of statutes, different
techniques of interpretation and construction must be applied.3 Strictly
speaking, a constitution is not a legislation, even though it is expressed in
the form of a legislation. It is the source of all legislation and provides
the framework for, and determines the competence of, the legislatures to
make laws for unforeseen and indeterminate future during which social,
economic and political policies will change many shades. These changes
cannot be ignored by judges even when they are asked to be guided by
"neutral principales".4 Of course, the Constitution itself says that unless
the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act shall apply to its
interpretation as it does to the interpretation of an Act,5 and the Supreme
Court has also occasionally reminded it directly or indirectly.6 But ever
since Chief Justice Marshall spoke in the beginning ofthe last century that
"we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding",7 the
courts in other jurisdictions as well as our own have repeatedly cautioned
that "a Constitution must not be construed in any narrow and pedantic
sense."8 and its provisions must be given a widest possible construction
because "a Constitution of government is a living and organic thing."9
Certainly a constitution cannot be interpreted and construed like a penal
or tax statute.10
This general consideration apart, even in matters of details there are
principles of interpretation and construction which have application only
to a constitution and not to an ordinary statute, such as the doctrines of
immunity of instrumentalities, implied powers and implied prohibitions
in the U.S. Constitution, or principles applicable to interpretation of
legislative lists in our Constitution are peculiar principles applicaale to a
federal or quasi-federal constitution. Moreover, the interpretation of
fundamental rights or directive principles of state policy will require a
3. SeeW. Friedmann, "Statute Law and Its Interpretation in the Modern State",
26Can.B.Rev. 1277(1948); Law in a Changing Society 44 (Indian reprint, 1970). See
also G. W. Paton, A Text-Book of Jurisprudence 219 (3rd ed. 1964).
4. Cf. Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 73
Harv.L.RevA (1959).
5. Art. 367.
6. See, e.g., A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27 at 42; Keshavan
Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 128 at 129; In re, Sea Customs Act
(1878), S. 20(2), A.LR. 1963 S.C. i760 at 1780.
7. McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 L. Ed. 579 at 602 (1819). (Emphasis added).
8. James v. Commonwealth of Australia, [1936] A.C. 578 at 614.
9. In re The Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of1938, [1939] F.C.R. 18 at
37. See, for reliance on these observations by the Supreme Court, Gopalan, supra note
5 at 91 and Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon, (1971) 2 S.C C. 779 at 794, 812-13.
10. **A constitution and a criminal code may both be statutes, but it is dangerous
not to take account of the difference between them.'* Pa*on, supra note 3.
1986] BOOK REVIEWS 139
constant touch with the existing facts and changing social policies.11
These are some of the considerations which require at least empha-
sis if not discussion in detail. An author may rightly choose to confine his
work to the interpretation of statutes and exclude the constitutional inter-
pretation from its purview. But to say that there are no separate principles
of constitutional interpretation is likely to create a wrong impression,
particularly on the young minds which are just being initiated into the
study of law and constitution.
To conclude, a personal remark maybe made though it is no reflection
on the book under review. Presentation of the existing law and practice
is in itself a great service to community. But a little critical appraisal with
a view to giving direction for the future is also necessary. How far have
the existing principles of statutory interpretation and construction met our
social needs effectively and what more do they require to achieve greater
effectiveness? Perhaps a reflection on the working of legal systems
different from ours could give some food for thought to our drafters as
well as judges.
M.P. Singh*
11. Consider in the light of the discussion in Law in a Changing Society, supra note
3 at 46, the corresponding developments in the interpretation of our Constitution parti
cularly since 1975. See also Upendra Baxi, "Pre-Marxist Socialism and the Supreme
Court of India", (1983) 4 S.C.C. (Journal) 3.
♦Professor of Law, University of Delhi, Delhi.
BOOKS RECEIVED FOR REVIEW
P.NARAYANAN, Patent Law (2nd ed. 1985). Eastern Law House Pvt.
Ltd. Pp. Ixvii-f 1377. Price Rs. 375.
RENE DAVID AND JOHN B.C. BRIERLEY, Major Legal Systems
in the World Today (3rd ed. 1985). Stevens & Sons Ltd. Distributors: N.M.
Tripathi Pvt. Ltd. Pp. xvi-f 624. Price £18. 75.
SHEELENDRA KUMAR, Law and Administration of Justice in
Arunachal Pradesh (1982). S. Kumar & Associates, 32, Sarojini Devi Lane,
Lucknow-226 001. Pp. 229. Price. Rs. 120.
WILLIAM TWINING, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore
(1985). George Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 91 Clapham High Street, London
SW4 7TA, U.K. Pp. x + 265. Price £ 8. 95.