Sociedad (B. Aires) vol.3 no.

se Buenos Aires 2007

The tragedy of development: disputes over natural resources in

Argentina

Norma Giarracca

Professor and researcher at the Gino Germani Institute [Instituto Gino Germani]. Coordinates the
Latin American Rural Studies and Social Movements Group [Grupo de Estudios Rurales y de
Movimientos Sociales en América Latina]. University of Buenos Aires

ABSTRACT

This article deals with the problem of development based on the production of natural resources
which in recent years has increased substantially in Latin America. This is a trend which includes de
case of Argentina where large petroleum, mining and agribusiness corporations have become some of
the main economic actors of the country. What are the consequences of this type of “development”
when the main objetives of these corporations is to exploit these natural resources which on the whole
were preserved in our countries of the “periphery” while they were depredated in the countries of the
“centre”? More then 80% of the natural resources available at present in the world for the future of
humanity are localized in territories pertaining to peasant and indigenous communities and, in large
measure, in Latin America. In this paper several case studies are considered: the expansion of mining,
forestry related to the paper pulp industry and agribusiness. The condiciones in which these activities
are expanded and the resistances and disputes developed by the populations that tend for the care of
nature and the environment are considered. Finally, some reflexiones in which a critique of the
concept of development based on techno-science and the activities of these large corporations as
some of their fundamental supports is presented.

Key words: Natural resoucers –Social Movements – critique of development -

Territories in dispute

The title of this article, borrows from Marshall Berman’s concept “the tragedy of development”1, a
critical stance in a blind drive towards the domination and appropriation of nature. Such a notion of
development is based on a project in which technical change is disconnected from the needs of the
majority of the population and devised for the only purpose of making a profit and achieving social
control. The idea of development whose different meanings were assigned to it by the hegemonic
capitalist countries, has gathered abundant criticism. In one of the most interesting books that criticize
this concept, Gustavo Esteva mentions that “the metaphor of development granted global hegemony
to a purely occidental genealogy of history, depriving peoples of different cultures the opportunity to
define the forms of their social life” (2001: 69). According to Esteva, critical theories from Europe
fell into the trap of depicting development in the original meanings of this concept. Thus development
was depicted as a historical process evolving under the same necessary conditions as natural laws.

1
Marshall Berman, “El Fausto de Goethe: la tragedia del desarrollo” (cited by Paula Sibilia, 2005).

1
Most Latin American thinkers did not question this notion in their critical work, being also traped and
dazzled by the myth of capitalist development.

For many social movements in the world, particularly in Latin America, the promise of development
has shown to have caused much damage to regions and populations whose living conditions have
worsened after the ‘modernization’ scheme was put into effect. On the other hand, that after breaking
with this myth, they could take the matter into their own hands, either by going back to agroecology
or installing it, and performing economic activities based on their own cultures, with innovative
initiatives often underlined by a high-tech complexity.

This articles deals with issues related to mining, forestry, pulp paper mills, as well as with
agribusiness in Argentina. It reflects on the formation of social actors that struggle with corporations
over natural resources bringing these issues to the public agenda. The last item includes some
considerations concerning economic models, technoscience, and the connections between both these
elements and the possibilities for expansion of democratization processes in society.

Novel conceptualizations that have abounded in recent years propose ‘knowledge starting from the
South’ (Santos, 2006), from border epistemologies (Gerfoguel, 2006), or from colonized people’s
awareness of knowledge and power (Lander, 2000, Quijano, 2000). They aim at addressing the
profound crisis affecting the epistemological paradigms of our times and to think these matters out
from the perspective of the experimental fields constructed by social movements (Santos, 2000). The
task of acquiring knowledge from such suggestive conceptualizations also involves a radical criticism
of the old modernization and developmentalist views (Sachs, 2001, Santos, 2000) This work explores
this new ‘development’ –based on the devastation of natural resources –and, the opposition of social
movements based on these new perspectives and throughts.

The disputes

In the late 20th Century, significant disputes have taken place in Argentina as well as in the rest of
Latin America involving natural resources. This has been a constant since the more advanced and
transnational capital has begun to consider natural goods as the basic of their valorization proceses. In
the past twenty years a new appropriation process of nature has become one of the main forms for the
valorization of capital. In this context “development” implies domination over natural resources, in
particular, over water, land, and biological diversity.

Territories are disputed in economic terms within a plan of world political domination. According to
Ana Esther Ceceña, the “national other” loses its voice to become embodied as part of one only
territory under dispute (Ceceña, 2004). In this paper we point out that in the cases of Argentina and
Uruguay, the National State makes its contribution to these processes by passing laws and setting
rules that facilitate new forms of investment, i.e. privatization laws, patent rights, permits for the use
of transgenic seeds, etcétera.

In other words, territories that used to be in the hands of private capital within the borders of a nation
–that is, factories, arable land, financial niches, etc. –have become part of a new worldwide territorial
configuration. Thus territoriality is a process, involving spaces that are currently being constructed
and disputed, and that is tearing up and reshaping geographies. It should be noted that the nation-state
has changed its status as a regulator mediating private capital, to become a facilitator for change, thus
generating, for example, new juridical norms and acquiescing to those created in transnational arenas
such as the CIADI2.

2
Centro Internacional de Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones. [International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes]

2
The Case of Argentina

Argentina is the Latin American country with a one of the highest territorial and natural resource
exposition to privatization and appropriation processes engineered by large transnational capital. She
is the fourth petroleum producer of Latin America. Nevertheless by privatizing her petroleum and
handing it over to foreign companies, Argentina has mortgaged all possibilities for pursuing an
autonomous policy. Another paradigmatic example can be found in the privatization of drinking
water (see Giarracca and Del Pozo, 2004). To this we may add legislation that favors the
establishment of mining, with large companies that besides ripping apart the territory and depriving
neighboring populations of water and other resources provides very slight incomes to the country as a
whole. This is an activity that ends up being subsidized by the State just because their exports go
through Patagonian ports. What is happening to arable land, shrub lands, and yungas is an additional
indicator of the fact that Argentina is highly exposed to the large economic players of the world.

Different segments of the population are denouncing and taking action so as to put an end to such an
outrageous situation. The inhabitants of small cities or towns from the interior, as well as peasants,
and indigenous communities are organizing themselves, gathering information, and getting in touch
with similar organizations in other countries in an attempt to stop these new investors. It is a long,
unequal battle, for they have to confront large capital in the global economic world: the huge
Canadian and Australian mining companies, the French transnational corporations that, with a few
exceptions, have taken over management of water around the world, the large soy investors
accompanied by Monsanto and Sygenta, and the powerful pulp mills, such as the Spanish Ence and
Finnish Botnia .

1) Rejection of mining

The macro-institutional context

With a territory of 2,700,000 km2 Argentina is considerably rich in mineral resources, 75 per cent of
which remain unexploited. This attracts investors as can indeed be read from advertisements in
official Internet sites. The main mining areas are located in the Andes, along a mountain range of
more than 4,500 km. A paper issued by the Ministry of the Economy and published in the Internet
recommends investments in mining, arguing that, according to a 1999 CEPAL survey based on
information provided by the Colorado Mining School (EEUU), out of 24 countries studied, Argentina
provides the second highest domestic rate of return for a model gold project, and the third for a model
copper project. The Ministry of the Economy supplemented this data by volunteering information on
the convenience of Argentina´s low cost labor, public services, and utilities.

During the neo-liberal Menem administration, the Law of Investments in Mining No.24.196/93,
attracted about significant investments 3 as the number of mining companies increased4. According to

3
The inflow of foreign investment went mainly to the exploration and exploitation of metal minerals. Among
the outstanding undertakings mention can be made of Bajo La Alumbrera and Salar del Hombre Muerto
(Catamarca), Mina Aguilar (Jujuy), Cerro Vanguardia (Santa Cruz) and Veladero (San Juan, (Barrick Gold
Corp., Homestake), all of them now functioning. Among the ambitious projects that have not entered the
exploitation stage we may mention Agua Rica (Catamarca), Cordón de Esquel (Chubut), Pascua-Lama and
Pachón (San Juan), Pirquitas (Jujuy) and Potasio Río Colorado (Mendoza). There are many other mining
undertakings, some already being exploited and others at the exploration or prospecting stage (see Ministry of
the Economy).
4
The main mining companies operating in Argentina are: Bajo La Alumbrera (Xstrata, Wheaton River
Minerals Ltd., Northern Orion Resources Inc.), Salar del Hombre Muerto (FMC Lithium Corp.), Mina Aguilar
(Compañía Minera Aguilar S.A.), Cerro Vanguardia (Anglogold), Agua Rica (Northern Orion Resources Inc.),
Farallón Negro (YMAD), Pirquitas (Silver Standard), Pascua-Lama (Barrick Gold Corp.), Pachón (Noranda),
Manantial Espejo (Silver Standard, Pan American Silver Corp.), Andacollo (Andacollo Gold), Veta Martha

3
a report of CEPAL in the early 90s there were seven mining companies in the country, whereas at
present the number has soared to fifty-five foreign companies and a few local ones. This could be
expected since the above mentioned law provides an unprecedented beneficial legal framework never
subscribed before by a sovereign State. Under its provisions, foreign companies are fully entitled to
obtain domestic credit, to transfer abroad realized profits, and repatriate their investments, besides
mining all minerals, including nuclear matter, without any restrictions whatsoever. In addition, these
companies are entitled to the following incentives, as established by the mining investment regime:
- Double deduction of exploitation expenses. In order to establish their due income tax payments,
companies may deduct the total amount invested when determining the feasibility of the project.
- Reimbursement of VAT on exploration activities. Law 25.429 included reimbursement of VAT
fiscal credit stemming from investments in exploration twelve months after the expenses were
incurred.
- Exemption from tariffs/customs duties. Registered mining companies are exempted from paying
import duties on capital goods, special equipment, or components of such goods. Mining servicing
companies enjoy equal benefits.
- Tax exemptions and deductions. Profit derived from mines and mining rights devoted to construct
company capital do not pay income tax.
- Exemption from Minimum Expected Profit (Assets). Capitalization of mining reserves valuation:
following approval, they can be capitalized to a maximum of 50 per cent.
- VAT advanced reimbursement and financing. In the case of new projects or of a substantial increase
in production capacity, the companies will obtain VAT reimbursement or financing for the following
transactions: permanent import or purchase of new capital goods and investment in infrastructure
applied to production.
- Tax exemption on mining property. No mining property, products, premises, machinery, workshops,
or vehicles will be taxed.
- Provincial and municipal taxes. In the Federal Mining Agreement (Law 24.228), the provinces
agreed to lift all municipal taxes, rates, and documentary stamp taxes that might encumber mining
activities in the provinces.
- Royalties. Of the twenty-three provinces of Argentina, only seven collect royalties. Some provinces
have adopted new royalty schemes, in which the amounts paid decrease as the value added of the
mineral inside the province increases.

In other words, the legal framework for mining is so permissive and favors foreign investment in such
a way that one cannot but understand the enormous influx of foreign capital that has flooded the
country over the last few years. As we mention above, the State not only does not regulate but
facilitates depleting mineral resources in Argentina.

“No to the mines”: the protesters

The main players here are the ‘self-convened residents’(vecinos autoconvocados), people
whose home towns and environment are being affected by the exploitation of the mines. They dwell
in ‘medium-sized’ cities (about 50,000 inhabitants each), and have different migratory and ethnic
origins –you will find people from European, aboriginal, ‘criollo’ descent, and others. These cities are
inhabited by professionals with a level of education that enables them to gather and classify
information on mining as well as aboriginal communities who try to articulate their own knowledge
and meanings of the problem with that of the (“asambleìstas”) activist protesters.

(Coeur Dálene), Potasio Río Colorado (Río Tinto), Borax Argentina (Borax Argentina), Arizaro/Lindero
(Mansfield Minera S.A., Río Tinto) [Source: Mining Secretariat]. A public officer working in the present
administration confided to me the existence of about 500 mining projects under way and 250 at an advanced
exploration stages.

4
 While first foreign investment and exploitation of the new era was carried out in Catamarca
under the name of Bajo La Alumbrera, the first forceful collective protest took place in Esquel,
Chubut, toward the end of 2002. It took place in the nation wide scenario that was a sequel to the
protests of December 19 and 20, 2001 (see Giarracca and Teubal, 2004)5. The form of organization
chosen in Esquel was the assembly following the model of the struggles fought in the capital.

Thus, the initial drive that would later give rise to the rejection of other megaprojects in various
Andean regions began in the city of Esquel in the south. During the ‘protest cycle’ between 2003 and
2007, Catamarca joined the dispute and the countrywide movement through an organization of her
own. A resident of Andalgalá (Catamarca), who is thinking of selling his house due to the pollution in
the area, declared to a provincial newspaper: “Ten years ago, I welcomed La Alumbrera as a sign of
advancement. All of us were happy with this company. But it proved to be my worst mistake. The
whole thing was a lie. Far from providing job opportunities, they brought along more poverty and
polluted everything. They are literally killing us”. (Andalgalá, Catamarca, 12/21/05).

In this small town located in Northwestern Argentina, the confrontation involves two parties; on the
one hand the gold mining companies Swiss Xstrata, Canadian Goldcorp and Northern Orion, and, on
the other, an assembly composed of pensioners, teachers, professionals, and housewives who spend
their leisure time learning formulas or surveying the Internet for experiences similar to theirs, in a
relentless effort to reject this mining undertaking..

In 2006, Andalgalá staged a number of protests and complaints, besides having organized a
referendum when word got round that a new investment project was in the making. That same year,
breakage of a pipeline contaminated the waters of the nearby river.

Still, Esquel was the starting point for civil society’s setting limits on extractive activities. In 2003,
the city’s self-convened assembly succeeded in thwarting Meridian Gold Inc.’s project, an open-sky,
cyanide-based operation. Open-pit/open-sky mining was banned in Vallenar (Chile), Tambogrande
(Peru), Cantón Cotacachi (Ecuador), San Luis de Potosí (Mexico), Montana (EEUU), San Marcos
(Guatemala), and Valle de Siria (Honduras) among other places. As a consequence in 2002 in the
province of Río Negro a network of assemblies that were emulated all over the country was started,
thus giving rise to a nation wide network of assemblies that established a link with similar movements
in other countries.

Due to the good work of the assemblies gathered in the localities of Epuyén, Lago Puelo, Bariloche,
Jacobacci, El Maitén, Maquinchao, the governor of the Southern province of Río Negro prohibited
gold mining based on cyanide or mercury, and the ‘self-convened residents’ demanded that a law be
passed without delay in order to check this or any other mining methods using water mixed with toxic
chemicals and to permanently revoke authorization for further prospecting. Both measures sought to
put an end to the environmental hazards caused by ongoing and future exploration.

2) The dispute over the land

Scenarios

In Argentina, agriculture comprises 63 per cent of total mainland territory. It includes a region known
for the fertility of its productive plains, the Pampa, and other regions with great soil diversity,
productive possibilities, and biodiversity.

5
Norma Giarracca y Miguel Teubal. “‘Que se vayan todos’: Neoliberal collapse and social protest in
Argentina”, en J. Demmers, A. E. Fernández Gilberto, y B. Hogenboom (editores). Good Governance in the
Era of Global Neoliberalism. Conflict and Depolitisation in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa.
Londres y Nueva York, Routledge, 2004.

5
Argentina’s agrarian social structure is quite heterogeneous. In the 20th Century, the large agricultural
and cattle-raising “estancias” coexisted with small and medium-sized farms. Unlike other Latin
American countries, Argentina’s small and medium-sized farms including those run by peasants
amounted to 78 per cent of all farm units. This was possible thanks to a number of institutional
agreements that kept negotiations going between the economic actors and the State, the latter being
represented by institutions created after the 1930 crisis, such as the National Grains Board [Junta
Nacional de Granos], National Meat Board [Junta Nacional de Carnes], National Sugar Board
[Dirección Nacional del Azúcar], and the Yerba Maté Board, among others. In 1991, the decree of
economic deregulation of Menem – Cavallo destroyed this coexistence (see Teubal and Rodríguez,
2002). The Neo-liberal policy of the then President and his Minister of the Economy paved the way
for large - scale production, a demand of large economic actors who considered this necessary to
increase profits and agrarian rents from the vast expanses of our exceptionally fertile lands.

The dispute over the land began in the mid-90s due to a significant change in the agrarian model. It
coincided with the expansion of soy, but it also had to do with a change in the logic of production,
i.e., it affected the role of the land, of the productive sector, of the financial sector, etc. The new
‘agribusiness’ model failed to take into account the coexistence of large farms with peasant and
aboriginal communities. Land as a whole was absorbed into the capitalist valorization process and
ended up as a mere commodity. Land was cleared without qualms, and yungas and other territories
which ensured an ecological balance were eliminated to give way to new investments. According to
data provided by Greenpeace –Argentina, deforestation increased exponentially reaching at present
about 250,000 hectares per year. This economic behavior is not exclusive of new investors, since the
old sugar mills and other long-established agro-industries adopted the same logic. Thus, the dispute
over the land is held throughout the country.

In sum, a whole package of public policy was originated in the deregulation decree, but also included
a number of instruments used by the State in order to promote one particular mode of production
rather than other ones. In this context, peasants and aboriginal communities are dealt with in the same
way as the urban unemployed. They have been assigned to assistential programs while it is hoped that
they will definitely give up the land.

The subjects involved in the protests: peasants and aboriginal communities

During the first part of the process herein described, the large economic actors overlooked the
peasants, in the first place, because the latter did not occupy the best soils, which mattered the most
and, secondly, because they never thought they might stage an organized resistance. As a matter of
fact, in the 90s large economic actors had to face the stubbornness of sectors of the population that
had lived on the land for decades, producing food for both their self- subsistence and the market, and
therefore totally reluctant to leave or ‘give away’ their place. Most peasants do not have titles that
prove their ownership of the land, either because they are entitled to it after having inhabited it for
over twenty years or because they have inherited it.

When the ‘new’ agents, such as soy producers, decide to take over peasant land, they resort to a
variety of strategies, including eviction with violence. They are aided by provincial judicial systems
bound to the local ruling classes which are very much under the influence of these ‘new powers’. The
actors that play their part in this process are the evicting businessmen, the peasants or aboriginal
communities, and a judiciary implicitly or explicitly under suspicion, as was the case with Santiago
del Estero (see Barbetta, 2005).

Quite often, the sale of land appears to be voluntary. Nevertheless it is the consequence of cornering
practices which, unlike evictions, are not ostensibly violent, so the producers’ ‘disappearance’ is
viewed as a form of ‘silent exclusion’. The peasantry resisted these evictions induced by the ‘new
agriculture’ by organizing themselves, creating organizations that initially were very incipient but
which have become much stronger and which have been integrated into the National Peasant and

6
Aboriginal Movement [Movimiento Nacional Campesino e Indígena], which includes provincial and
regional movements that are rapidly being expanded.

In recent years, the kolla, mapuche, wichí, toba, and ava guaraní communities have actively resisted
eviction not giving up their struggle to legalize their ownership of the land. Despite their efforts, they
have often been violently evicted. Our country’s legal framework acknowledges the right of
aboriginal peoples to inhabit the lands of their ancestors and to live in accordance with their old
culture and customs; however, the enforcement of the law is never made. In other words, in spite of
the Aboriginal Law [Ley Indígena 23.302], and of the Article 75 Section 17 of the National
Constitution and in accordance with all international treaties and covenants with constitutional force,
such as Covenant 169 of ILO, aboriginal demands remain unanswered and the communities become
ever more uncertain about obtaining their due title to the land.

It is precisely because large companies are disputing the land and its riches that the rightful aboriginal
demands are not fulfilled. These are ongoing processes and it does not seem likely that they will stop,
due to a juridical legality which though to a large extent socially delegitimized, is extremely difficult
to overturn.

In brief, aboriginal communities need to fight for their rights which are supported by national and
international legislation to which the Argentinean State is committed. Yet it does not honor this
legislation, a fact which brings the State to the brink of an policy of ´ethnocide’. The human rights
policies that have given this administration a worldwide positive image is not extended with regards
to the social rights of the aboriginal communities’ or the peasants’ twenty-year ownership rights,
included in the 19th Century Civil Code. The final chapter (dedicated to aboriginal populations) in the
latest yearly report on human rights produced by the Center for Legal and Social Studies [Centro de
Estudios Legales y Sociales] is more than eloquent on this issue.

3) Caring for the Uruguay River: the protest against the paper mills

Investment scenarios in forestation and paper mills

In 2003, the Uruguayan administration of President Julio Batlle promoted the establishment of two
paper mills and a river port, on the Uruguay River following previous forestation developments in the
country. This was denounced by Uruguayan and Argentinean environmental organizations that
pointed out that the project was flawed by procedural errors from the start. For example, no
environmental studies had been made, and no consultations were held with Argentina, thus failing to
comply with pre-established treaties. When the Tabaré Vázquez administration decided to continue
this project in 2005, a binational organization composed of members from diverse sectors emerged
opposing an initiative that could cause an ecological disaster in the Uruguay River.

The companies involved are the Spanish Ence and Finnish Matse Botnia. According to the
Uruguayan scholar Raúl Zibechi the total production, of these two companies is to be greater then
that of eleven Argentine paper mills operating at present. While Uruguay fulfills it demand for paper
with the production of two small paper mills located in Juan Lacaze and Mercedes, the new ventures
will export totally its production contributing to meet the substantial needs of Northern countries.
Zibechi referred to an address by Alan Greenspan to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on June 7, 2006, in which he maintains that that ethanol was a byproduct of cellulose that might lead
the country off its oil dependence. In other words, the new role cellulose might have been a mighty
stimulus to encourage ‘paper pulp basins’ in the Southern Cone (Zibechi, 2006).

The Spanish company Ence, which eventually withdrew from Fray Bentos, had .set foot in Uruguay
in 1989. This company established logistic terminal involving the forestation of over 62,000
hectares. The firm has announced that it will invest 600 million dollars in a eucalyptus cellulose plant
near Fray Bentos, 60 km. from the Argentine city of Gualeguaychú. Uruguayan civilian governments,

7
were encouraged by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, to strengthen this
forestry model in their territory with a view to providing for the international paper industry. At the
time when the Forestry Promotion Law was passed, a most appealing international market could be
visualized.

About 34 per cent of Uruguayan soil is fit for forestry, whereas the remaining 66 per cent is
agricultural and cattle-raising land. A little over 10 per cent of forest land remains available for
production purposes. Moreover, in recent years a powerful concentration process took place with
small and medium forestry investors selling their lands to large foreign companies.

According to the Forestry Bureau of the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries, the
Uruguayan government has subsidized the development of 625,000 hectares of forest land in 2002.
For a long time now the government has been subsidizing forestry, issuing a number of decrees and
resolutions to this end. A paper by the UITA (International Union of Food Workers) states:
“nowadays, a site declared as a priority forest land is entitled to be subsidized and to further benefits
granted by the State: 50 per cent of the estimated forestation cost, preferential credits (Libor rate of
interest plus 2 per cent) from the Banco República for an amount covering up to a hundred per cent of
forestation costs with a ten-year grace period for both capital and interest, exemption from national
and municipal taxes, including those not yet existing at the moment, and strong support for
infrastructure works (railroad networks, bridges, and ports [...] According to a study conducted by
economist Joaquín Etchevers, a member of GAP (Parliamentary Support Group for the Frente
Amplio, between 1988 and 2000), the State contributed with a direct subsidy of 69.4 million dollars
for forestry undertakings, in addition to a 55.8 million in tax exemption, 55 million in soft loans, and
234.1 million in works related to the sector. “A total of 414.3 million dollars that has been increasing
year by year until reaching a sum well beyond 500 million dollars” (Falco, 2006).

This activity does not create job opportunities, since the sector only employs 1.88 per cent of rural
workers. Forestry production has a very limited scope, hence the strategy of turning Uruguay into a
land of forests ‘with paper mills’. The integration of both activities appears to be feasible, above all
because the country lacks economic projects other than agribusiness, to which our neighbors can also
aspire.

The sector is entirely dominated by four transnational companies: the conflictive Botnia and Ence;
Finnish and Swedish funded Stora Enso, a newcomer to Uruguay, and the US Weyer Haeuser. The
Stora Enso project approved in 2005 includes forestation and the installation of a cellulose plant in
the heart of the country, on the banks of the Río Negro. Weyer Haeuser is negotiating the
construction of at least five wood processing plants in the Northern departments of Rivera,
Tacuarembó and Paysandú. The one in Tacuarembó is in its final stage, and the construction of a
related cellulose plant on the Río Negro has not been discarded.6

Contamination resulting from these undertakings is being constantly denounced all over the world.
The most significant literature on this matter has been produced by Uruguayan professionals and
environmentalists. It was precisely the Uruguayan Ricardo Carrere, Secretary to the World Rainforest
Movement and a frequent visitor to Buenos Aires, who declared to journalists that size is one of the
most dangerous features of these paper mills. “We are talking of huge mills meant to process a total
of a million and a half tons. The issue is that they all use chemicals”. Carrere emphatically denies the
existence of new, non-contaminating techniques: “Last year, Sweden carried out a survey in the
Baltic Sea. While in 1993 cellulose plants substituted chlorine dioxide for chlorine, the levels of
dioxins (known to be carcinogenic and depressors of the immune system) were expected to have
dropped. In fact, what they found was that they had risen.” (Página/12, 2/5/2006).

6
Argentina cannot be said to have lagged behind: it boasts of eleven highly contaminating plants. Things are
not too different in Brazil; we all know about the struggles of the “Sin Tierra” against the ‘green deserts’, i.e.,
forestation.

8
On the other hand, a recent report submitted by the Universidad de La República scientists after a
thorough study of the environment presented conclusive results. The effects of forestation on the
ecosystemic services offered by natural pasture lands are alarming, as are the effects of liquid
effluents pouring out of the cellulose plants. One of the conclusions set forth in the document is that,
in order to provide enough raw materials for the functioning of the two cellulose plants under
construction it is necessary to increase the area to be forested by 40 per cent relative to the existing
area, which is already in excess of 700,000 hectares.

Another alarming issue is the amount of water consumed by both plants for their normal operations.
The report suggests that “the functioning of the plants requires high water consumption both for the
generation of raw materials (extensive monocultures) and to turn them into finished products
(cellulose)”. On the whole, these plants are reckoned to consume 140,000 m3 of water per day.

The actors: environmental associations and the Gualeguaychú Assembly

If we were to set a starting point for the protest, we might say that it “dawned” on April 30, 2005
when it massively came out into the open. In fact, on that saturday, Argentineans and Uruguayans
staged “the largest environmental protest in history” (Página/12, 5/2/2005). The meeting place was
Gualeguaychú, but protesters came over from Paraná, Victoria, Colón, Concepción del Uruguay, and
Buenos Aires. About forty thousand people blocked the international bridge connecting Fray Bentos
with Gualeguaychú, a city in the province of Entre Ríos known for its Carnival celebrations. The
meeting point was the site destined for these celebrations the “corsódromo”, and from there the crowd
used assorted transportation to travel over forty kilometers and then walked four kilometers farther
until they reached the highest point on the bridge. There Argentineans and Uruguayans exchanged
national flags and brotherly embraces.

The conflict had been brewing for a long time, and the actors of the protest had been taking
systematic action since 2003 at the very least. It should be noted that the Northwestern province of
Entre Ríos enjoys a long tradition in environmentalist movements focused on the care of its rivers.

Several members of the Gualeguaychú assembly acknowledge, as their most important precedent, the
Red de Asociaciones Socioambientales de Uruguay y Argentina, [Uruguayan and Argentine Social
and Environmental Associations Network] known simply as “La Red‘ [the Network]’. Argentina is
represented by the Paraná Ecologists Forum (M’Biguá de Paraná), which serves as a connection
between Uruguay and Entre Ríos, while Uruguay’s main reference organization is Guayubira, led by
Ricardo Carrere. That same year, Spanish corporation Ence introduced itself to the public, and the
Uruguayan political party Frente Amplio predicted its electoral triumph. In a public hearing held in
Fray Bentos in 2003, Uruguayan organizations were in charge of revising a report on the paper mills
produced by the Uruguay’s National Office of Environmental Resources [Dirección Nacional del
Medio Ambiente (DINAMA)]. That is to say, during the early stages, environmental organizations of
both countries were jointly involved in these initiatives, and when Uruguayan organizations stepped
onto the arena, they maintained their autonomy with regards to the State.

In the meantime, environmental organizations based in Gualeguaychú, Argentina, launched an

information and diffusion campaign which engaged various sectors, such as local political groups,
regional economic groups, and ecological movements. These groups had different interests in the
matter: tourism, the possibility of including the environmental issue in the year’s electoral campaigns,
contamination, etc. The meetings to inform the public, were mostly held in primary and secondary
schools, and were attended by about four hundred people. But on October 3, 2003, about 1,500
people, following the call of Uruguayan and Argentinean associations, blocked the bridge connecting
Gualeguaychú and Fray Bentos, with the subsequent creation of a non-governmental organization that
went under the name of Vecinos autoconvocados [Self-convened neighbors].

9
In 2004, the Vecinos Autoconvocados contacted organizations based in other countries, chiefly in
Chile and Spain, which were facing similar situations concerning paper mills and the resulting
environmental damage.

In both countries, public opinion became more familiar with the events that took place as from April
2005 onwards up to the present. After the important march of April 30, there were new roadblocks
and diplomatic negotiations began. The World Bank was requested to take action. It did so by
appointing an ombudsman to arrange meetings with the conflicting parties. However, after several
months the negotiator established the conditions for a credit approval on the part of the World Bank’s
International Finance Corporation. In other words, three developments in just a couple of months: the
issue became installed in the public arena, pressure was exerted on the government to start diplomatic
action, and it became evident, thanks to the reports submitted about environmental conditions, that
such undertakings should definitely not enjoy funding.

At this stage, the Assembly gathered initiatives and managed to be received by the President of
Argentina. In the mean time Uruguayan organizations slipped into the background. One possible
explanation for their retreat may lie in the fact that the Frente Amplio, which they undividedly
supported, won the elections. To most Uruguayans, this was a long-awaited triumph, and the
prevailing thought was that the new government deserved a period without opposition.

In October 2005, the presidential website of the República Oriental del Uruguay showed that 58 per
cent of Uruguayans opposed the installation of the paper mills in question because of environmental
hazards. This spirit of civil awareness and of respect for the environment had not yet been affected by
propaganda based on a strengthening of national identity which raises its head from time to time,
reviving the idea of a small country bullied by a powerful neighbor. There were also practical reasons
in this scenario: trade unions, whose general meetings had voted against the paper mills, suddenly
decided to reverse their previous decision –even though this entailed a violation of internal
regulations –because a considerable number of members of the two main unions, including many of
their leaders (metallurgist and construction workers) were in fact employed by the paper mills
(Zibechi, 2006).

It could be said that at the beginning of the summer of 2005-2006 the Gualeguaychú Assembly had
the opportunity to change the logic of its mode of protest. While so far they had relied on the logic of
numbers, by gathering thousands of people in demonstrations and roadblocks, the coming of the
summer provided the chance of causing ‘material damage’. Circulation between Argentina and
Uruguay increases exponentially during the summer months, since many middle and upper class
Argentineans choose vacationing in the Uruguayan sea resorts. Although there are no official
calculations of the income supplied by Argentine tourists, it is common knowledge that it provides a
substantial income to the economy of the neighboring country. The strategy of impeding access by
land had strong repercussions in Uruguay, which suffered its economic consequences , though the
Uruguayan Government also took advantage of the damage caused by these measures to strengthen
its propaganda against the Entre Ríos protests. At different times, other Entre Ríos cities joined in the
protest, which derived in further bridge blockades. Thus, by the summer of 2006, a most interesting
situation had developed due to the accumulated effects of the population’s perseverance, the support
it gathered, and the installment of the environmental issue in Argentine society.

Diplomatic efforts increased until there arose the possibility of filing a complaint at The Hague
International Court, which first ruled against Argentina and then returned a second verdict that
favored the Assembly. Still, the issue is here to stay, and the chances of its being reversed are slim. It
would also seem as if, very slowly indeed, the Uruguayan population is its silence, something that can
be inferred from demonstrations carried out in downtown Montevideo against the pulp-forestation
model chosen by the government to boost the national economy.

The Assembly’s activity did not slacken its pace: the claims and protests continued throughout the
year. There were celebrations when Ence decided to abandon Fray Bentos, and in December 2006 a

10
large demonstration was held at Plaza de Mayo, with the support of many other organizations
engaged in the environmental struggle.

In the summer of 2007, the Gualeguaychú protesters sought consensus from the rest of the population
so as to further legitimize their endeavors. To this purpose, they resorted to new strategies and joined
activities staged by other environmental assemblies and social organizations.

Divided opinions were expressed in Colón, Entre Ríos: a group of merchants whose business
was negatively affected by the blockade of General Artigas international bridge attempted to lift the
blockage by force.

Also in the summer of 2007, Buenos Aires assembly members and leftist militants staged an
original supportive protest across from the Finnish Embassy. On the ground, they installed two
canvas swimming pools, one filled with clean water and the other with dirty water, as an allusion to
the expected contamination of the Uruguay River. The protesters intended to involve the Finnish state
in the issue. When Botnia began operations in November of that year, the protesters boiled large
amounts of cauliflowers in front of the Uruguayan Embassy, so that those inside the building and
nearby neighbors could sample what contamination is about: the unbearable stink given off by the
plant. As to The Hague’s final ruling, there is nothing left to do but to wait.

Final reflections: the tragedy of development

The Union of Citizen Assemblies (UAC, Unión de Asambleas Ciudadanas) was created in 2006. Its
demands include the right to the land ownership for peasants and aboriginal communities,
cancellation of mining activities and of contaminating industries (paper mills), and rejection of
agribusiness. We might wonder what aboriginal rights, the Gualeguaychú, Esquel, and Andalgalá
Assemblies, and peasant organizations have in common? In Laclau’s words (1996), what is the
“empty significant” that can articulate these specific demands? In my view, the answer lies in how we
are to confront material and cultural life; that is, what we used to call “the development model”. The
above mentioned associations reject a manner of organization that involves life, the economy, and a
particular relation with natural goods. Many of them propose, through their own actions, a different
kind of economic activity (see Giarracca and Wahren, 2005; Esteva, G. 2001). Their shared identity is
constructed on the basis of a rejection of a ‘model’ that excludes then as citizens capable of choosing
a “life policy” (Giddens, 1994).

In a declaration against large scale mining, the inhabitants of Catamarca state the following: “We
believe that under no circumstances should ‘progress’ amount to the destruction of our habitat or of
our holy places, the plundering of our natural resources or of our reserves of drinkable water, the
contamination of our natural environment or a systematic and increased aggression to our fragile
ecosystem” (August 2006, website www.noalamina.con)

These new social movements –or, at least, the new meanings acquired by actions taken by these
populations –have to do with a new stage of capitalism, in which once again, natural resources are
fundamental and are perceived to be in danger. The notion of ‘territory’ and the idea that processes of
‘territorialization’ defining the identities of the inhabitants of the land circulate both inside the
movements and among the scholars that walk the same path.

It has often been maintained that, within the framework of modern ideas, Marxism installed a relation
with nature in accordance with the basic postulates of the scientific revolution. However, it should be
remembered that, regarding this and other issues, Marx’s thoughts alternated between the values of
his times and other much more advanced conceptions. His followers, whose ideas were clearly less
complex than those of the master, imposed the notion that the development of productive forces in a
socially ‘undetermined’ way, are blind to their consequences in the social and natural world. In the
20th Century, critical theory could have made a difference, by constructing a different relation with

11
nature and with the political and cultural aspects of economic activity, but a certain determinism
spoilt that opportunity.

For most of the 20th Century, a development model based on industrial production has prevailed.
While this model showed a marked tendency for the internationalization of capital, it nevertheless
respected certain limits established by the national states that played a significant regulatory and
juridical role. We might venture to say that these industrialist models were underlined by a scientific
development which, in agreement with Paula Sibilia, I would call ‘Promethean’, as it aimed towards
bending nature through technology, placing its faith in the liberating role of knowledge insofar as it
aspired to improve mankind’s living conditions (Sibilia, 2005: 45). Both capitalism and communism
(particularly in the Soviet Union) promised, in their own particular terms, the same kind of
‘progress’: peace, food, health, and education for everyone, as the core sense of the pair comprising
economic and scientific development. It is to be noted that in this context, national states valued
petroleum, gas, mines, land, and water as geopolitical strategic resources, and either kept them as
state property or exercised a close control over them. For example, when it came to the question of
land, it was rare not to find restrictions on its sale to foreign populations. In the mid-70s the model
underwent “a great transformation” (see Teubal and Rodríguez, 2002)

There is a vast literature on the special features acquired by the capitalist economy in this new stage
of globalization, its connection with hegemonic power, political and military modes of generating
hegemony, etc. (see Ana Esther Ceceña, 2004). Agrarian studies have also contributed to characterize
the concentrating, extractive nature of this model, emphasizing the shift from agrofood and
agroindustrial agriculture to agribusiness (see Giarracca and Teubal, 2006; Mançano Fernández,
2006). It remains to be added that the new model that operates at the international level aided by new
legal, financial, and economic institutions have ultimately broken with what used to be the promises
of modernization. The Third World is being devastated by starvation, poverty, and old and new
diseases as the polarization of wealth reaches unprecedented levels. The whole process takes place
amid endless wars with their concomitant high costs for the civilian population.

Some authors believe that the so-called ‘technoscience’ is in some way involved with these new
developments. They speak of a ‘technoscientific’ conception that is becoming hegemonic throughout
the world and which, unlike the ‘Promethean’ scientific myth of yore, now exhibits human aspirations
that stand quite apart from the promises made by modernity. Paula Sibilia maintains that
contemporary science conceals a technological program: the strengthening of a ‘Faustian’ tradition7.
According to this author “in the Faustian perspective [...], scientific procedures do not aim to reach
the truth or to know the intimate nature of things; instead, they propose a limited comprehension of
the phenomena in order to predict and control: both these purposes are strictly technical. One can
associate Faustian criteria to contemporary technocscience. We might go as far as to suggest the
existence of some sort of affinity between the Faustian technique, with its drive to the unlimited
appropriation of human and non-human nature, and capitalism, with its drive to the unlimited
accumulation of capital. At present this project based on an endless technological race and its
inextricable relations with globalized markets seems to be reaching its summit” (2005: 50).

Many authors agree that the new models do not intend to improve the living conditions of a majority
of men and women, not even with a view to reaching some consensus that might enable governments
to continue ruling. The search for consensus, which could have given rise to hegemonies and
inclusive projects, was replaced by a feeling of resignation: “either this or something worse”, “there is
no alternative” (Sibilia, 2005; Santos, 2000).

However, not everyone is reconciled to these ideas. Whole populations are struggling against them,
while conceiving other ways of living in the very process of their struggles. Likewise –and this
should be emphasized –scientists from all over the world oppose Faustian ways of generating

7
Sibilia remarks that ‘Promethean’ and ‘Faustian’ traditions have always coexisted, by way of tension and
debate, inside the scientific system, with one or the other dominating the scenario at different times.

12
knowledge and, starting from scientific knowledge, seek other social and economic forms that will
give due consideration to the problems posed by starvation, education, health, culture, and
democratization.8

Bibliography

BARBETTA, Pablo (2005): “El Movimiento Campesino de Santiago del Estero: luchas y sentidos en
torno a la problemática de la tierra”, in GIARRACCA, Norma and TEUBAL, Miguel (Coordinators.)
(2005): El campo argentino en la encrucijada. Estrategias y resistencias sociales, ecos en la ciudad,
Buenos Aires, Alianza Editorial.

CAPRA Fritjof (1992) El punto crucial Buenos Aires, Editorial Estaciones

CECEÑA, Ana E. (2004): Hegemonías y emancipaciones en el siglo XXI, Buenos Aires, CLACSO.

CELS (Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales) Annual Report on Human Rights, 2006, in
www.cels.org.ar

CEPAL (1999): Panorama minero de América Latina a fines de los noventa, Serie Recursos
Naturales e Infraestructura No.1, Santiago de Chile.

ESTEVA, Gustavo (2000) “Desarrollo” en Sachs, W. Diccionario del desarrollo. Una guía del
conocimiento como poder, Mexico, Galileo Editorial

FALCO, Walter (2006): “Uruguay, país forestal: modelo en rojo”, in Publicación Rel-UITA / Brecha,
available at http://www.rel-uita.org/agricultura/uruguay/forestacion/.

GERFOGUEL, Ramón (2006) “La descolonización de la economía política y los estudios

poscoloniales. Transmodernidad, pensamiento fronterizo y colonialidad global” en Tábula Rasa No.
4, January-June, Colombia

GIARRACCA, Norma et al. (2001): La protesta social en Argentina: transformaciones económicas y

crisis social en el interior del país, Buenos Aires, Alianza Editorial.

GIARRACCA, N. and DEL POZO, N. (2005) “To make Waves: water and privatization in Tucumán,
Argentina” in Bennet et al Opposing Currents. The Politics of water and gender in Latin American,
EEUU, Pittsburgh Press.

GIARRACCA, Norma and WAHREN, Juan (2005): “Territorios en disputa: iniciativas productivas y
acción política en Mosconi, Argentina”, in Seaone, J. (compilator), Reforma agraria y lucha por la
tierra en América Latina. Territorio y movimientos sociales, Year VI, No. 16, Buenos Aires,
CLACSO-OSAL.

GIARRACCA, Norma and TEUBAL, Miguel (2004): “`Que se vayan todos´: Neo-liberal collapse
and social protest in Argentina”, in Demmers, J., Fernández Gilberto, A.E., and Hogenboom, B.
(Eds.): Good governance in the era of global Neo-liberalism. Conflict and depolitisation in Latin
America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa, London and New York York, Routledge.

8
During the public discussion of this work there was an interesting debate between social scientists and a
representative of the exact sciences. I do not intend to pass judgement on ‘science as a whole’, since I myself
am a scientist. My aim is to create a space for critical reflection so that science can achieve autonomy from the
large economic corporations. Many research groups all over the world are working to bring science back into
the realm of an emancipating thought, reinventing it, which makes the new different from the past. The liberty,
autonomy, and self-reflection of scientific communities are the main ways to reach this goal.

13
GIARRACCA, Norma and TEUBAL, Miguel (2006): “Del desarrollo agroindustrial a la expansión
del `agronegocio´: el caso argentino”, in Mançano Fernández, B. (Coord.) Campesinado y
Agronegocios en América Latina, Buenos Aires, CLACSO-ASDI (forthcoming).

GIARRACCA, Norma and PETZ Inés (2007) “La Asamblea de Gualeguaychú: su lógica de nuevo
movimiento social y el sentido binacional “artiguista” de sus acciones” in Realidad Económica No
226, Buenos Aires.

GIDDENS, Anthony (1994): Consecuencias de la modernidad, Madrid, Alianza Editorial.

QUIJANO, Aníbal (2000) “Colonialidad del poder eurocentrismo y América Latina” in La

colonialidad del saber: eurocentrismo y ciencias sociales, Buenos Aires, CLACSO.

LACLAU, Ernesto (1996): Emancipación y diferencia, Buenos Aires, Ariel.

LANDER, Edgardo (2000) La colonialidad del saber: eurocentrismo y ciências sociales, Buenos
Aires, CLACSO.

MANÇANO FERNANDEZ, Bernardo (2006): “Um nome para `modernizar´o sistema de latifundio”,
en Fórum, Suplemento do Journalunesp, Año XX, Nº 211, São Paulo, Universidade Estadual Paulista.

SACHS Wolfgang (2001) Diccionario del desarrollo. Una guía del conocimiento como poder,
Mexico, Galileo Editorial.

SANTOS DE SOUSA, Boaventura (2000) A crítica da razao indolente: contra o desperdício da

experiêmcia. Para un novo senso comun. A ciência, o dereito e a política na transiçao paradigmática,
Sao Paulo, Cortez.

SANTOS DE SOUSA, Boaventura (2006) Conocer desde el Sur. Para una cultura política
emancipadora, Peru, Universidad Nacional de San Marcos Ed.

SIBILIA, Paula (2005): El hombre postorgánico: cuerpo, subjetividad y tecnologías digitales,

Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica.

TEUBAL, Miguel and RODRÍGUEZ, Javier (2002): Agro y alimentos en la globalización. Una
perspectiva crítica, Buenos Aires, La Colmena.

TEUBAL, Miguel (2004): “Rise and collapse of Neo-liberalism in Argentina: the role of economic
groups”, in Journal of Developing Societies, vol. 20, No. 3-4, London, Thousand Oaks and New
Delhi, SAGE Publications.

ULLOA, Fernando (1995): Novela clínica psicoanalítica. Historial de una práctica, Buenos Aires,
Paidós.

SHIVA, Vandana (2003): Cosecha robada: el secuestro del suministro mundial de alimentos, Buenos
Aires, Paidós.

ZIBECHI, Raúl (2006): “Los movimientos según Zibechi: empezar de nuevo”, interview by La Vaca,
available at http://www.lavaca.org/seccion/actualidad/1/1398.shtml.

Translated by Marta Inés Merajver

Translation from Sociedad (Buenos Aires), Buenos Aires, nº 26, 2007.

14