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Case Digest: Reyes vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter
and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the
COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31,
2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the
petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the
petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent
alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a
manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended
last exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling
the petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines
because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No.
9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May
14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections
and on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring

the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of
member of the House of Representative.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for
office
Discussion:
1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House of
Representative.
2. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for
public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the
Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her
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American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the
case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with the requirements.
Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of
allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court approved
the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere
effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he
must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive
acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his
domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced
her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in
the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of
Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-
year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains
to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the
fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
Held:
The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC.

VELASCO V. BELMONTEG.R. No. 211140 January 12, 2016

FACTS:

Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,as
amended, by Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R.Belmo
nte, Jr. (Speaker Belmonte, Jr.), Speaker, House of Representatives, Hon.Marilyn B.
BaruaYap (Sec. Gen. BaruaYap ), Secretary General, House ofR epresentatives, an
d Hon. Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes), Representative, LoneDistrict of the Provinc
e of Marinduque .Velasco contended that he must be proclaimed because of the COMLEC reso
lution thatReyes COC is null and void and thus he must be proclaimed to be the w
inner of thecongressional district of Marinduque.O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , R e ye s c o n t e n d e d
t h a t a p e t i t i o n f o r q u o w a r r a n t o m us t b e f i l e d before HRET to settle the dispu
te who among them should be the representative ofCongressional district of Marinduq
ue and determine the qualification of Reyes.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petition for Mandamus is correctly filed by Velasco?

RULING:
Yes, petition for Manadamus is correctly filed by Velasco.The difference between a ministerial
and discretionary act has long been established. Apurely ministerial act or duty is one which a
n officer or tribunal performs in a given stateo f f a c t s , i n a p r e s c r i b e d m a n n e r , i n o b e
d i e n c e t o t h e m a n d a t e o f a l e ga l a u t h o r i t y, without regard to or the exercise of his o
wn judgment upon the propriety or improprietyof the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon
a public officer and gives him the right todecide how or when the duty shall be perfor
med, such dut y is discretionary and notministerial. The duty is ministerial only \when t
he discharge of the same requires neitherthe exercise of official discretion or judgment.

As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Y ap have
no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register
the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively.
It is beyond cavil that there is in existence final and executory resolutions of this Court in
G.R. No. 207264 affirming the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA
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No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a final
and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void
the proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the
position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.

FELICIANO P. LEGASPI, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALFREDOGERMAR,

AND ROGELIO P. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.G.R. No. 216572, September 01, 2015

FACTS'

Feliciano Legaspi sought for the disqualification of Alfredo Germar, Rogelio Santos
Jr.a n d R o b e r t o E s q u i v e l o n t h e g r o u n d o f r a m p a n t v o t e b u y i n g d u r i n g
t h e d a y s l e a d i n g t o t h e elections. Germar emerged as the highest vote getter in
the mayoralty race. Santos, for his part,also appeared to have secured enough
votes to be the second councilor of the municipalit!.Esquivel, though, failed in his
bid to become vice-mayor of Norzagaray,

The COMELEC Special First Division has disqualified Germar and Sa

n t o s . M o t i o n s f o r Reconsideration were filed which resulted in a split vote. A
rehearing has conducted insofar as the electoral aspect of the case but the
C O M E L E C en banc again failed to come up with a majority consensus. $he
C O M E L E C en banc dismissed the disqualification case based on Section 6, Rule-
of the C O M E L E C Rules of 1rocedures, which states that “When
the Commission
En banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be
had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action
or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission.

Unconvinced, the petitioner filed the present petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely erred in dismissing the disqualification case filed
against the respondents.

RULING:

The COMELEC did not err when it dismissed the electoral aspect of the case
when it was unable to reach a majority standing vote.

Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution obliges the COMELEC like the other
constitutionalcommissions, to decide all cases or matters before it by a :
majority vote of all its members.

Whensuch majority vote cannot be mustered by the COMELECen

banc,S e c t i o n 6 , R u l e - 1 8 o f t h e COMELEC Rules provides the mechanism to
avert a non-decision.

Verify, the COMELECen banc is first required to rehear the case or matter that it cannot
decide
or r e s o l v e b y t h e n e c e s s a r y m a j o o r i t y . W h e n a m a j o r i t y s t i l l c a n n o t b e
h a d a f t e r t h e r e h e a r i n g , however, there results a failure to decide on the part
of the COMELECen banc . The provision then specifies the effectsof the COMELECen
banc's, failure to decide.
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1. I f t h e a c t i o n o r p r o c e e d i n g i s originally commenced in the COMELECsuch

action or proceedings shall be dismissed.
2. In appealed cases, the judgment order appealed from shall stand affirmed; or
3. In incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

The high court ruled that the failure of COMELEC en banc to reach majority votes on
the petition properly results in its dismissal as it further clarified the motion for
reconsideration as a “mere continuation of an existing process” and does not change
the case filed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the COMELEC dismissing the
disqualification casefiled against a mayor, a vice mayoral aspirant and a councilor in
"Norzagaray,Bulacan. The highcourt through Associate Justice Jose Perez dismissed
the petition for certiorari filed b! defeatedmayoral candidate Feliciano Legaspi
against Alfredo German, Rogelio Santos Jr. and RobertoEsquivel.

Kabataan Party-list vs. COMELEC Case DIgest (G.R. No. 189868, December
15, 2009)
FACTS:

In the instant case, the petitioners, Kabataan Party-List, seeks to extend the voters
registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections from October 31, 2009, as
fixed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8514, to January 9, 2010 which is the day before the
120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.

The petitioners anchor its ground on the provision of Section 8 of R.A. 8189 which reads:
"The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the
office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however,
be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a special election."

On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that the Constitution and the Omnibus Election
Code confer upon it the power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free,
orderly and honest elections; that Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436
authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election acts which include voters registration; and
that the October 31, 2009 deadline was impelled by operational and pragmatic
considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to fix the voter's registration beyond the
prohibitive period set forth by R.A. 8189.

RULING:

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.

It held that the right of every Filipino to choose its leaders and participate to the fullest
extent in every national or local election is so zealously guarded by Article V of the 1987
Constitution.

The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register
daily during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular
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election and 90 days before a special election. The Court is bound to respect the
determination of Congress that the 120 day or 90 day period, as the case may be, was
enough to make the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections and
COMELEC's rule making power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing
law.

R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter's
registration under R.A. 8189. R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 both grant COMELEC the power
to fix other period for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonable held
within the period provided by law. However, this grant of power, is for the purpose of
enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage -- the common underlying policy
under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436.

In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold that continuing voter's
registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189.

With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, The court explained
that if the petitioners had only filed their petition, and sought extension, before the 120
day prohibitive period, the prayer would have been granted pursuant to the mandate of
R.A. 8189.

As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution fixing voters
registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections on October 31, 2009 was
declared null and void.

RA 10742, Sec. 4

SEC. 4. Katipunan ng Kabataan. – There shall be in every barangay a Katipunan ng

Kabataan to be composed of all citizens of the Philippines residing in the barangay for
at least six (6) months, who are at least fifteen (15) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age, and who are duly registered in the list of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
and/or the records of the Sanggunia ng Kabataan secretary.

Velasco vs COMELEC sec 138 /38 / 143 OEC

This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside and annul the resolutions denying the COC
Velasco had filed for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Sasmuan, Pampanga.
The distinctions between inclusion/exclusion proceedings and COC denial/cancellation
proceedings, refute and belie Velasco's position that the COMELEC improperly ruled on
his right to vote when it cancelled his COC.

ISSUE: Is decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding operate as a bar to any future

action challenging one’s right to be registered as a voter?

HELD: Inclusion/exclusion proceedings, while judicial in character, are summary

proceedings. A decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding does not operate as a bar
to any future action in any other election that a party may take concerning his right to be
registered as a voter. A ruling on the right to vote by the trial court for a specific election
is binding on the COMELEC. By clear implication, the COMELEC itself does not rule on
the right to vote by recognizing in a Sec. 78 COC denial/cancellation proceeding the
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final and executory ruling by a court, as mandated by law, in an inclusion/exclusion

proceeding.

Inclusion and Eclusion Proceedings involve the simple issue of determining wheter a
person mas be included in the list of votes based on the qualifications required by law
and the evidence presented to support the possession of such qualifications.

IEP vs. COC Cancellation

AS to the purpose, the former refers to the application to be a registerd voter while the
later refers to the application to be a candidate.

AS to remedies available, in EIP, the recourse fom MTC is to go to RTC whose decision
is final and executor, applelable only via rule 65. On the other hand COC cancellation is
a matter cognizable by and under the discretion of COMELEC.

Velasco could not have registered as a regular voter because he did not posses the
residency requirement of 1 year.

Omnibus Election Code (OEC), Secs. 70-71

Sec. 70.Guest candidacy. - A political party may nominate and/or

support candidates not belonging to it. ( linked only through a
coalition)

Sec. 72.Effects of disqualification cases and priority. - The

Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final
decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be

disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall
not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.

Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC,

FACTS:
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the
Constitutionand Republic Act (RA) No. 7941mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These
are:

First t h e t w e n t y p e r c e n t ( 2 0 % ) a l l o c a t i o n
t h e c o m b i n e d n u m b e r o f all partylistc o n g r e s s m e n s h a l l n o t e x c e e d
t w e n t y p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l m e m b e r s h i p o f t h e H o u s e o f Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
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Second,the two percent (2%) threshold

- only those parties garnering a minimum of twopercent of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in theHouse of Representatives;

Third,
the three-seat limit
- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes itactually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is,one “qualifying ” andTwoadditional
seats
.
Fourth,
proportional representation
- t h e a d d i t i o n a l s e a t s w h i c h a q u a l i f i e d p a r t y i s entitled to shall be computed “in
proportion to their total number of votes.

FACTS:
There are 4 parameters to determine the winners in a party-list election under RA 7941:
1. 20% allocation
2. 2% threshold
3. 3-seat limit
4. Proportional representation

The Congress enacted RA 7941 on Mar. 3, 1995 which states that the State shall “promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives. The State shall also develop the simplest
scheme possible to guarantee a full, free and open party system by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature.”

ISSUES:

1. Is the 20% allocation mandatory? Should the 20% allocation for party-list be filled up
completely all the time?
2. Are the 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit constitutional?
3. How should the additional seats be determined?

HELD/RULING:

(1) NO. Sec. 5(2) Art. 6 merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. The
Congress has prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this
percentage requirement, and the mechanics by which it is to be filled up.

(2) YES. The 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit are consistent with the very essence of
“representation.” The 3-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations
into the legislative. Thus, no single group would dominate.

(3) To determine the additional seats, 3 steps will be followed:

a. rank the highest to lowest. The highest is called the “first” party.

b. determine the seats the “first” party will have. For the “first” party, it will have a 6%
benchmark. Every succeeding additional 2% of votes from the first 2% requirement will
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constitute 1 additional seat. If the “first” party gets 2 additional seats, then the next in
rank will get less.

c. to solve for the additional seats of other qualified parties, the formula provided below
will be used:

additional seats no. of votes no. of

for the = of the party x additional
concerned no. of votes of seats of the
party the “first” party “first” party

BANAT vs. COMELEC,

Nature: Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which
garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one
seat;

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in
May 2007.

In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which
garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one
seat;

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%,
then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more
than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a

party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used.
BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its
provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least
2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is

mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be
impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also
proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this
digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of
the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major
political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
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ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD:

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members
of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and
50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed
Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can
create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in
the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-
20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of
Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning,
the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number
of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be
filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to

allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat
and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold
creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The
Supreme Court explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes
cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the
votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability
of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get
two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives.”
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IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then
it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less
than 2% to also get a seat.

But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two

percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.

ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the

ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum
seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats
are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off
of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first
round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-
percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-
percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17
party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists
hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second,
in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast,
and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the
remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall
still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is
7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number
of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a
two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a
total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get
3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and
there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-
lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are
occupied.
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V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties
(the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc)from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either
from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of
the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to
participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which
represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate
opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats
the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who
ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the
marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly
or indirectly.

AtongPaglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayanivs COMELEC and BANAT
vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections
in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified
as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
AtongPaglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-
list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or
lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized
and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-
defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
12

“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political
constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice,
from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional
prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the
party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see
parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized
and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the
party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and
multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should
defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for
the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery –
unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts
but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list
system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the
system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in
the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
“marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political
constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.

Lokin vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010

FACTS: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a duly registered party-list
organization, manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized national
and local elections. They submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would
be chosen should CIBAC obtain the number of qualifying votes. However, prior to the elections,
the list of nominees was amended: the nominations of the petitioner Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and
Emil Galang were withdrawn; Armi Jane Borje was substituted; and Emmanuel Joel Villanueva
and Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were retained.
13

Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and that Lokin, as second
nominee on the original list, to a proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-
Gonzales.

The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the amendment of the list of nominees and
the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It approved the amendment of
the list of nominees with the new order as follows:

1. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva

2. Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales

3. Armi Jane Borje

The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.

Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the
official second nominee of CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another petition for certiorari assailing
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 by
allowing CIBAC to change its nominees.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
2. Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
3. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-
List System Act; and
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the
amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close
of polls
.
RULING:

The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case. Lokin’s case is not an election protest nor
an action for quo warranto.

Election protest is a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the
grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who obtained the higher number of
votes entitling them to hold the office.

On the other hand, a special civil action for quo warranto questions the ineligibility of the
winning candidate. This is a special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the
review of the resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution.

Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping because the filing of the action for certiorari and the
action for mandamus are based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were
different. Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively to obtain a favorable judgment.

The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid. The COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 7804 as an implementing rules and regulations in accordance with the provisions
of the Omnibus Election Code and the Party-List System Act.
14

As an administrative agency, it cannot amend an act of Congress nor issue IRRs that may
enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces. Section 8 of R.A.
No. 7941 provides that:

Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than
forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-
list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in
writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or
a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election.

No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shal be allowed after the same shall
have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in
writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee
shall be placed last in the list.

Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the
party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

The above provision is clear and unambiguous and expresses a single and definite meaning,
there is no room for interpretation or construction but only for application. Section 8
clearly prohibits the change of nominees and alteration of the order in the list of nominees’
names after submission of the list to the COMELEC. It enumerates only three instances in which
an organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been
submitted to the COMELEC : (1) when the nominee dies; (2) when the nominee withdraws in
writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee becomes incapacitated. When the statute
enumerates the exception to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but
reasonably construed.

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941
when it provided four instances by adding “nomination is withdrawn by the party” as
statutory ground for substituting a nominee. COMELEC had no authority to expand, extend,
or add anything to law it seeks to implement. An IRR should remain consistent with the law it
intends to carry out not override, supplant or modify it. An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is
itself law but in case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the law prevails.

The petitions for certiorari and mandamus were granted. Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was
declared invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to
withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the COMELEC.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain
biblical and Koran passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways
are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In
fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article
201.
15

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition
on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.

AngLadlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the

exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also
claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional
rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal
protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the
Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based
on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.

Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in AngBagongBayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or
related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As
we explicitly ruled in AngBagongBayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the

COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of
AngLadlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
16

condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-
list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal

and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of AngLadlad’s registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

Bantay vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007

FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus
to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in
the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were
accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act
(BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an
Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has
yet to be resolved.

Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director
of the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc
Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names
confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request.
Comelec’s reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public
is deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue
of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec
to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality
oriented according to Chairman Abalos.

In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec
17

resolutions accrediting private respondents BiyahengPinoy et al., to participate in the

forthcoming party-list elections without simultaneously determining whether or not
their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941,
or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector each seeks to.

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan
Foundation and BantayKatarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April
3, 2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the
names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named
therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that
the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the
elections.

ISSUE:

1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent
party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their
respective nominees do not appear to be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of
the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to
documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the
public the names of said nominees.

HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation
of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec
to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or
organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions
are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose
and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,

1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR
for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The
exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is
outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In
certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the
case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of
certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and
does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. (note that
nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list
nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. )

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.
18

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.

COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-
list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-
list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card
for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A.
No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums
other than the "Certified List" of the names.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect
their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a
party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that
would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees
of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a
public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be
precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and
its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The people’s right to
know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation
as may be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless,
the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands
of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their
respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.