Quo Warranto Case

QUO WARRANTO CASE OSG LIP BATCH XI (ARETE) Page 1 of 27
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE

C. CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc]
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of
when the subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to
render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to
the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless
committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if
the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if
otherwise.
FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of
the Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from
October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the
Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy
Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was
no record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of
profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement
of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a
manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced
from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no
record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one
SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position
of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit
documents, among which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for
those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the
private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with
incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or
considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she
resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated
as coming from the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs
from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that
“considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15
years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and
that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There
was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the
JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno
was appointed Chief Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against
Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The
House of Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable
cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not
made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as
pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN,
but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her
husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter,
in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against
Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66,
the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of
the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a
Motion for Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-
De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified against her on the impeachment
hearing before the House of Representatives.
Contentions:
Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being
sought is to question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment
complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v.
Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the phrase “may be
removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that
Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than impeachment.
OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period
under Section 11, Rule 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during
the impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible
right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi
(“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the
government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who
partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year
period is applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG
will have no other means by which to know the disqualification.
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC
which created a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to
investigate complaints involving graft and corruption and ethical violations against
members of the SC and contending that this is not a political question because such
issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.
OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed
to show that she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable
qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the
Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC
requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The
failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified
Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good
faith cannot be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed by the
concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is completely
immaterial.
Sereno (respondent):
Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through
impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz
v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon.
Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T.
Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution
was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by
impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of
removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield them from harassment
suits that will prevent them from performing their functions which are vital to the
continued operations of government. Sereno further argues that the word “may” on
Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the impeachment
trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong,
the SC has no jurisdiction.
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the
present case because the President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed
by means other than impeachment on the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole judge” of all contests
relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President. There is no
such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases
cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.
Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the
RTC, such would result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have
effectively exercised disciplinary power and administrative supervision over an
official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11,
Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary and
administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo
warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through
impeachment would be rendered inutile.
Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66
provides that a petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the
“cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the disqualification.
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her
SALNs because as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment
to office was regular. OSG failed to overcome the presumption created by the
certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all administrative
responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only be
decided by the JBC and the President.
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing
cannot give rise to the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs
were filed should give an inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.
Intervenors’ arguments:
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that
she possessed the integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of
determining whether or not she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover,
submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what is only required is
the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications”
such as citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such
as competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective
considerations.
ISSUES:
Preliminary issues:
1 Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention
2 Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno
against five Justices
Main Issues:
3 Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant
petition for quo warranto.
4 Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding
notwithstanding the fact that an impeachment complaint has already been
filed with the House of Representatives.
5 Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a
quo warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an
impeachable officer is impeachment.
6 Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the
principle of separation of powers
7 Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
8 Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the
sole and exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination.
partakes of the character of a political question outside the Court’s
supervisory and review powers;
9 Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for
the position of Chief Justice.
10 If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her
SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its
implementing rules and regulations
11 If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are
not filed properly and promptly.
12 Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required
by the JBC
13 If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to

submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as
Chief Justice;
14 In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief
Justice, whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment
by the President cured such ineligibility.
15 Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.
[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]
HELD:
Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third
party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected by those
proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but rests on the
sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal
interest and the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should result.
The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect
and uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and
Trillanes’ intervention that their would-be participation in the impeachment trial as
Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the
impeachment court will be taken away is not sufficient. The interest contemplated
by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo warranto is brought in the
name of the Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private individual or
group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of
governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel among rival claimants.
Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to inhibit in the case.
It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of
doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his
integrity. However, the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a
judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to
decide cases without fear of repression. Bias must be proven with clear and
convincing evidence. Those justices who were present at the impeachment
proceedings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given
that the Members are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge.
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition,
especially when the charge is without basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of
bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on speculations, or on
distortions of the language, context and meaning of the answers the Justices may
have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings before the House.
Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President
Duterte in entertaining the quo warranto petition must be struck for being
unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and discordance between the Court and
the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one, except to the
sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus
inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met consistent
litigation success before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be
received in the present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court
adjudicates without fear or favor. The best person to determine the propriety of
sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be disqualified.
[yourlawyersays]
Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable
officials and SC has jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary
writs, including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to
issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor,
and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the action is
directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of
transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is
empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in
reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial
duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will
eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to
settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings
are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s
constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This
constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference
to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as
an impeachment court through the Senate.
To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination
of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based
on predetermined rules while impeachment is a political process to vindicate the
violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled
by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a
public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto
proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries
with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General
or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible latitude within his legal
authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest
and the government policy on the matter at hand.
Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment
proceeding is not forum shopping and is allowed.
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these
remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules
pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is
the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by

some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in
one court, then in another. The test for determining forum shopping is whether in
the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of
action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto
proceedings is the determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief
Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the
other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable
offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo
warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally
holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being
whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from
office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding
shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to
hold. Moreover, impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses
shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is
legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an
office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.
Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings
before the House is not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a
determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by
the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment,
there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the
House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a person may
be reasonably charged with a crime.
Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an
invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from
office.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo
warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The
provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be
construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an
opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the
express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit
prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate reasons to
account for this express provision.”
The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers
cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of
removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for
their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not
extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she
occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and
the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.
Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is,
only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not
equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be a complete
statement of the causes of removal from office. If other causes of removal are
available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the
view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial
review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining
to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in
an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation
where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when,
for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices
where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented
to be a member of the Bar.
Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo
warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a
person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a
disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that
impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again, the
difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action
for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense,
neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The
Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude
Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for
impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it
preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of
impeachment.
However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain
arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an unqualified public official should be
removed from the position immediately if indeed Constitutional and legal
requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal
controversy simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case
impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended
to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch
to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment
proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may
clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law.
For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or
at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold
office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a
quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof
are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of
integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the

subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal
action, if otherwise.
Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.
The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be
construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster
from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of
such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”.
Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private
individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case where no private
individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government
itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the
qualification of the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.
Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor,
when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding
section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It may be stated
that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo
warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or
prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the
reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead
as a defense to an action by the Government.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very
purpose of an action for quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a
continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the action. Needless to
say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public
office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic
cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon
discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not
been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s
appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately
rendered obscure.
Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC
includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its own rules.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power
of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the
subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court
as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore
not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to
recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither
absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy
decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s
supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC
in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion
to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is
not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the
same category as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving.
[yourlawyersays]
[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]
With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot
be waived or bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the
Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to
an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct,
and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by
the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the
litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a
member of the Supreme Court must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.
Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory
requirement.
Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee
shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law,
submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has
likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is
a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result
in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical
standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so
important for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply
with such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the public service but
also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-
compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a
fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold public office.
Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily
mandated to perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities.
According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion in one case, those who accept
a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are considered as accepting
its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject
themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and
undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to
demand the performance of those duties. More importantly, while every office in the
government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s
integrity. It is not merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the
mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering
that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is
the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character
or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated.
Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus
violated the Constitution, the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been
filed. Sereno could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the
unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to
withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The
Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case,
there was a letter of the head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the
missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA as the
repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in
the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the
Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of
filing thereof were neither established by direct proof constituting substantial
evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is
categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for
calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the
Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.
For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the
certification from UP HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon
Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo
warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by the State in that the burden
rests upon the respondent.
In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her
from filing her SALN because it is not tantamount to separation from government
service. The fact that Sereno did not receive any pay for the periods she was on
leave does not make her a government worker “serving in an honorary capacity” to
be exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]
Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno.
During the period when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/
s of the Office of the President or the Ombudsman had not yet established
compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials and employees of
State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to
issue compliance order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P.
HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing
compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that time.
Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance
is limited only to clearing Sereno of her academic and administrative
responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from administrative
charges as of the date of her resignation.
Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete
requirements and in the shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her
compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion in the shortlist of candidates
for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her with the requisite
proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the
JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible because it does
not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by
the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to
the position do not estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her
qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the
party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake
Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs,
again in violation of the Constitutional and statutory requirements .
Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to
dishonesty if the same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to
make false statements. The suspicious circumstances include: 1996 SALN being
accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only
notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she
received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended
to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious
increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her first five months as
Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in
complying with the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying
her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose the
supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to
have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.
Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify
for nomination pursuant to the JBC rules.
The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who
are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have
been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. From the minutes of
the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was singled out from the rest of
the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of
service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement,
but still required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only
Sereno who was not able to substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and
instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing justifications why she should
no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and
then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her government service is not
continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus
infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative
responsibilities and charges.
These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno
submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there
was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover, Sereno curiously failed
to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the course of her employment
in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the
JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme
Court. [yourlawyersays]
Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of
the SALNs but there was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave
offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction. A
person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful
compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act
that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the integrity
and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these reasons, the
JBC should no longer have considered Sereno for interview.
Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in
UP, her false representations that she was in private practice after resigning from
UP when in fact she was counsel for the government, her false claims that the
clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with SALNs requirement, her
commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for
the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least
P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public bidding,
misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La
Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary
to the Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the DOJ
request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored
rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship benefits
which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of
deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude
then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document
involving national security against the latter among others, all belie the fact that
Sereno has integrity.
Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for
several years means that her integrity was not established at the time of her
application
The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is
eyeing the position of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting,
Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the requirement of SALN in order for the
next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through. Further, the failure to
submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the
opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or
dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank
deposits would be practically useless for the years that she failed to submit her
SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches the entries indicated
in the SALN.
Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity
cannot be cured by her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.
Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the
time of appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire
tenure as a continuing requirement. The voidance of the JBC nomination as a
necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first
place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for
said position follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do
so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice
of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo
warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further judgment
determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of
all the parties to the action as justice requires.
Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although
the JBC is an office constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the
selection and nomination process is evident from the composition of the JBC itself.
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. While the Court surrenders discretionary appointing
power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-
negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal
requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is susceptible
to attack.
Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo
warranto
The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is
that his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on
him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno
is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable
right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an
impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is
justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is
proper to oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief
Justice. [yourlawyersays]
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of
UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE.
Accordingly, Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the
Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the application and nomination
process.
This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the
Court.
Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why
she should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for
casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme Court.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE

C. CALIDA v. HON. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
1. Main Decision - G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
1.1.Dissenting Opinion
1.1.1. Justice Carpio 1
Central to Justice Carpio’s assailment of the main opinion was his

argument that Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution expressly
provides the mode of removal from office of "the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court (SC), the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman." Removal from office
of these public officers shall only be by impeachment, and not through
any other mode.
The House impeaches, and the Senate convicts. Impeachment is the

only method allowed under the Constitution to remove a member of the
SC. To allow any other method, and to permit a quo warranto petition in
removing an incumbent member of the SC is to re-write the
Constitution.
Furthermore, citing Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Justice Carpio argues

that the Constitutional provision mandating removal only by
impeachment is "the Constitution's strongest guarantee of security of
tenure. The guarantee effectively blocks the use of other legal ways of
ousting an officer."
One of the grounds for impeachment is the catch-all phrase "betrayal of

public trust". It covers every conceivable misconduct by an impeachable
officer, whether committed while in government service before the
appointment, at the time of application for the office, or after
appointment to office. Any misrepresentation on material matters at the
time of application for office is an integrity issue subsumed under this
phrase.
The repeated failure to file Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net

worth (SALNs) constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust. Only Congress, through the impeachment
process, can remove an impeachable officer on these grounds.
1 Submitted by Group 9
1.1.2.Justice Leonen 2
Justice Leonen opines that the quo warranto petition was not the proper
remedy to oust an impeachable officer. He also argued that the petition
undermined judicial independence.
The Constitution should be read as a singular, whole unit. A verba legis

or plain reading of Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution provides a
myopic and unhistorical view. Granting the quo warranto would result in
the following dire consequences:
First, the Solicitor General shall be granted the competence to reconsider
the determination of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and the President
as to the qualifications of any appointed judge or justice.
Second, this Decision would empower appellate court judges to exercise

discipline and control over lower courts through acting on Petitions for
Quo Warranto against other lower court judges. This will take away the
SC’s sole constitutional domain to discipline lower court judges.
Third, there will be no security of tenure for SC justices who will

consistently dissent against the majority.
Justice Leonen also argued that assuming quo warranto is a proper

remedy, the same had already prescribed.
He further argued that the JBC itself recognized that the SALN is a mere
tool in determining if an applicant possesses integrity and is not an
actual measure of integrity. Failure to disclose assets or the
misdeclaration of assets only translates to dishonesty if the accumulated
wealth of the public servant is grossly disproportionate to their source(s)
of income, and which cannot be properly explained or accounted for.
1.1.3.Justice Caguioa 3
Impeachment is the only mode of removal for impeachable officers. The

case for the filing of quo warranto against the President and the Vice
President is a specific and narrow exception, explicitly sanctioned by
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution.
Furthermore, non-submission/ incomplete submission of SALN to the JBC

is not a valid ground to question respondent’s eligibility—the SALN not
being a constitutional requirement for the Chief Justice position. Article
VIII, Section 7 of the Constitution enumerates qualifications for
members of the judiciary. Such qualifications are absolutely exclusive.
Also, the one-year prescriptive period for filing of quo warranto lapsed
one year after the appointment/ assumption of office by the respondent
as Chief Justice in 2012.
Any defect in the exercise of discretion by the JBC should have been
assailed via certiorari, prior to the respondent's appointment. There
must be an allegation that the JBC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Without it, the Court cannot
review JBC’s exercise of its discretion.
The non-filing of SALN may lead to the removal from office of an

impeachable officer through procedure in Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713;
but not through a quo warranto petition.
Finally, the Solicitor General failed to prove non-filing of SALN. In

Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr., failure to file SALN was not be
readily concluded simply because said documents are missing in the files
of its required custodian.
This case marks the time when the Court commits seppuku - without
honor.
1.2.Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
1.2.1. Justice Velasco4
Quo warranto is available to unseat even an impeachable officer. Nothing

in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution precludes a resort to quo
warranto because impeachment and quo warranto are anchored on
different grounds.
Impeachment presupposes that the officer subject of the proceeding

legally assumed office or had all the qualifications to assume office.
Quo warranto is available against a person who had no legal right to hold
the office from the outset because he or she does not have the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution or the laws. In such case,
no impeachment proceeding is required as he or she is deemed never to
have assumed and occupied the office in the first place.
However, quo warranto cannot unseat Sereno because nullity of the

JBC Nomination is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a petition for
quo warranto. As a constitutional body vested with the discretion in
screening and selecting applicants to the Judiciary, the JBC is more than
entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance of its duty.
The JBC should have been afforded the opportunity to review and defend
its findings that the nominee possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications prescribed by the Constitution and laws, and
subsequently its own decision to nominate the official based on these
findings. The present petition for quo warranto is premature. A petition
for certiorari against the JBC should first be filed.
1.2.2.Justice Del Castillo 5
The Constitution allows the removal from office of an impeachable

official by modes other than impeachment.
The use of the word “may” was not meant to indicate exclusivity in the
mode of removal of the enumerated public officers. Had the framers
intend such, they would have adopted a similar categorical, unequivocal
language as they did in the other sentences of the law. The deliberate
omission is a strong indication that the framers recognized other modes
by which impeachable public officers may be removed from office such
as: 1) election contests; 2) removal of an appointee by the Commission
on Appointments.
However, SC has no jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition against an

impeachable official. The Constitution adopted mechanisms to safeguard
the independence of the branches of government. The intent is to
enable the officials of these bodies to carry out their constitutional
mandates free from political influence and pressure.
Another problem is the concurrent jurisdiction of the SC, CA, and the
RTC over quo warranto proceedings. Granting RTC judges and CA
justices the power to order the removal of an SC member would result in
the perversion of the doctrine of hierarchy of Courts and would render
ineffective the Court’s constitutional power to discipline judges of lower
courts.
Court is likewise precluded from assuming jurisdiction based on the

doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Respondent’s ineligibility is already
before the Congress as one of the charges in the Articles of
Impeachment. The Court must exercise judicial restraint and accord
respect to the processes that the Constitution has lodged with a co-equal
department.
The proper remedy is Impeachment.
1.3.Separate Concurring Opinion
1.3.1. Justice Peralta6
An impeachable public officer may be removed through a petition for

quo warranto if the invalidity of his or her appointment stems from the
qualifications required by the Constitution.
The language of Sec. 2, Art XI of the 1987 Constitution is clear - “May

be removed from office.” There is nothing in the provision that states
that said public officers may be removed from office only through
impeachment. This constitutional provision, being clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.
Courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even

of impeachable officers; otherwise, there would be an absurd situation
where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned
even when he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality
or, in an office where Bar membership is a qualification, he or she
fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.
As held in Frivaldo v. COMELEC, qualifications for public office are

continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure.
It is the respondent, not the petitioner, who bears the burden to prove
that she possessed the constitutional qualification of proven integrity
when she applied for the position of Associate Justice of Supreme
Court in 2010, despite her failure to comply with the statutory and
constitutional requisite of SALNs.
The one-year prescriptive period should also be reckoned from
discovery of the concealed cause for ouster from public office.
1.4.Separate Opinion
1.4.1. Justice Perlas-Bernabe 7
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is the central authority, which
determines the existence of the subjective qualification of “integrity” of
candidates for appointment to the Judiciary.
In order to fulfill its constitutional mandate, “the JBC had to establish a

set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets
the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities
expected of him and his office.” Thus, the JBC has to concretize these
qualifications into operable standards, through demandable submissions
and institutional checks; otherwise, their determination would be highly-
subjective and more so, inexecutable because of their obscurity.
It is within the JBC’s sphere of authority to determine if non-compliance

with the legal requirements on the filing of SALNs - assuming that
Respondent had indeed failed to file her SALNs as prescribed by law - is
per se determinative of one’s lack of "proven integrity.”
The OSG failed to consider that the qualification being assailed, i.e.
proven integrity, is a subjective qualification that has been previously
determined based on certain criteria set by the JBC. As may be gathered
throughout this discourse - it could not have been intended that the
subjective qualifications of any judge or justice be directly assailed
before a court of law; otherwise, that court would be basically
supplanting the Council's determination thereof, and in so doing,
effectively assume the latter's role incongruous to and disruptive of the
current structure of the Constitution.
1.4.2.Justice Jardeleza8 -
Resolution on the Motion to Inhibit
Sereno, through an ad cautelam motion for inhibition, sought the recusal

of Justice Jardeleza. There were three charges, namely: (1) Justice
Jardeleza stated that respondent committed treason; (2) He alleged that
respondent orchestrated his exclusion from the Associate Justice
nomination process. He described Sereno’s actions as “inhumane” and
“not those of a normal person”; and (3) That his negative
characterization of Sereno persists to this day.
The ad cautelam motion was denied. When the prayer for inhibition is
triggered by grounds not objectively verifiable, such as bias or prejudice,
the Court generally leaves the inhibition discretionary, and submits it to
the sole discernment of the judge sought to be inhibited.
Justice Jardeleza gave full weight to a judge's duty to sit and decide a
case. The grave importance of this case, its far-reaching doctrinal value
and its permanent implications to the Court as an institution and an
equal branch of Government call for no less than a decision made by a
full court.
The conducts and utterances complained of were not undeserved, and

were not done to merely vex respondent’s reputation; but rather
founded on fact and done in “righteous indignation”, due to respondent's
assaults on Justice Jardeleza’s integrity.
Most importantly, Justice Jardeleza’s actions and words are wholly

extraneous and immaterial to the facts and issues specifically relating to
Sereno’s alleged deficient SALN submissions. That he cannot be impartial
and decide this case based on facts and evidence on record cannot be
presumed simply on account of his “unpleasant history” with Sereno.
1.4.3. Justice Martires9
The appointment of respondent Sereno is void ab initio, since she failed

to comply with the essential requirement of SALN submission imposed
by the JBC. This showed her lack of integrity, an indispensable
qualification for the Office of the Chief Justice.
The discretion of the JBC to nominate Judiciary members is not

unbridled. In the exercise of its recommending function, the JBC must
ascertain that its nominees have satisfied all the membership
qualifications. Evidence shows that the JBC did not categorically rule that
respondent Sereno substantially complied with the requirements.
She is a mere “de facto” Chief Justice who can be removed from office
through an action for quo warranto. The constitutional provision on
impeachment only applies to a “de jure” and not to de facto officers.
Respondent also cited cases where the SC dismissed disbarment

complaints, holding that a public officer who under the Constitution is
required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for his
office and who may be removed from office only by impeachment,
cannot be charged with disbarment during incumbency. Thus, the
officer’s qualification to continue holding office was not the issue.
The present case is glaringly different. Respondent’s appointment as the

Chief Justice is void ab initio; and that she is merely sitting as a de facto
officer in the office of the Chief Justice and who should not be allowed to
continue holding on to the said office. This ground for her removal is
within the province of quo warranto proceedings and not of
impeachment.
2. Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration
2.1.Concurring Opinion
2.1.1. Justice De Castro 10
On May 11, 2018 the Court granted the Quo Warranto petition against
respondent Sereno and held that respondent was ineligible for the Chief
Justice for failure to submit her SALN within the 10-year period to the
JBC. In the present MR, respondent reiterated that she was denied due
process since certain justices refused to inhibit themselves from deciding
the case.
Justice De Castro stated that she should not recuse herself. Her
objective and factual testimony before the House Committee on Justice
hearing on the determination of probable cause of the impeachment
complaint against respondent was only on matters related to said
complaint, which did not include the failure to submit her SALN. Thus, it
could not have been the basis to conclude that the Justice is impartial to
warrant inhibition.
The discussions of false entries aside from respondent’s Personal Data

Sheet (PDS) were warranted. The past action of a person is a valuable
yardstick of her character. It was explicitly laid down in the Court’s
Resolution on respondent’s Ad Cautelam Motion to Set for Oral Argument
that respondent is given the opportunity to answer specific questions,
under oath, “needed for the judicial resolution of the instant case.”
Justice De Castro had legitimate grounds to question respondent with
regard to her entry in her PDS that she served as Deputy Commissioner
of the CHR. The Justice merely inquired if respondent filed her SALN
during her stint with the CHR.
The SALN issue lies at the heart of the qualification of integrity required
for appointment as Chief Justice. As such, the quo warranto proceeding
was proper.
2.2.Separate Concurring
2.2.1. Justice Peralta11
Contrary to Sereno’s argument that “actual bias or prejudice against a

party” is a compulsory ground for inhibition, the said ground is merely
voluntary and discretionary.12
The participation of Justice Peralta in the Congressional Hearings does

not show bias prejudice. His statements were hypothetical.
Besides, he cannot be a material witness because he lacks personal
knowledge as to whether respondent complied with the SALN
requirement for 2000, 2001, 2003 to 2006; even while he was Acting
Ex-Officio JBC Chairperson in 2012.
Sereno has the burden of proof that she filed all her SALNs according to
law. Based on American Jurisprudence, the burden falls on the public
officer to prove her integrity when her public office is tested.
Respondent deliberately concealed from the JBC the material fact that
she failed to file her SALNs for the said years and thus put her integrity
to doubt. Sereno’s appointment as Associate Justice [n. b.: not just as
Chief Justice] is void ab initio because she lacks the qualification of
proven integrity as required by the Constitution for members of the
Supreme Court.
12 Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Rule 8 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.
The Constitutional provision simply means that only the enumerated

high government officials may be removed via impeachment, but it does
not follow that they could not be proceeded against in any other manner,
if warranted. Otherwise, the constitutional precept that public office is a
public trust would be undermined simply because political or other
improper consideration may prevent an impeachment proceeding being
initiated.
2.3.Separate Opinion
2.3.1. Justice Jardeleza 13
In denying the Ad Cautelam motion filed by respondent Sereno, Justice

Jardeleza is convinced that impeachment is not an exclusive mode of
removal with respect to justices of the Supreme Court, by virtue of their
constitutional qualifications.
The textual recognition of the essentially judicial nature of questions of

qualifications, coupled with the accumulated effect of all of the changes
to the Constitution, have been to create a distinctive Philippine
constitutional law on impeachment and removal, with regard to judges.
As shown by history, judicial discipline and accountability have always

held the line to safeguard both institutional and individual judicial
independence, and to impute that the freedom of dissent will be negated
by the option of judicial removal is a precarious fallacy of unwarranted
assumptions.
In converse truth, the very existence of the elbow room for dissent owes
itself in large measure to judicial accountability, inasmuch as dissents
continuously ensure that no one sitting magistrate may stifle the voice of
another who is moved to “show why the judgment of his fellows are
worthy of contradiction.”
He, thus, affirmed his non-recusal and concurrence to the analysis of the
ponencia and Justice De Castro on why Sereno’s integrity was not
proven on account of her repeated failures to file her SALNs.

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QUO WARRANTO CASE OSG LIP BATCH XI (ARETE) Page 1 of 27

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

13 If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to

substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by

incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE

1. Main Decision - G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

1.1.1. Justice Carpio 1

Central to Justice Carpio’s assailment of the main opinion was his

The House impeaches, and the Senate convicts. Impeachment is the

Furthermore, citing Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Justice Carpio argues

One of the grounds for impeachment is the catch-all phrase "betrayal of

The repeated failure to file Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net

The Constitution should be read as a singular, whole unit. A verba legis

Second, this Decision would empower appellate court judges to exercise

Third, there will be no security of tenure for SC justices who will

Justice Leonen also argued that assuming quo warranto is a proper

Impeachment is the only mode of removal for impeachable officers. The

Furthermore, non-submission/ incomplete submission of SALN to the JBC

The non-filing of SALN may lead to the removal from office of an

Finally, the Solicitor General failed to prove non-filing of SALN. In

1.2.Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

1.2.1. Justice Velasco4

Quo warranto is available to unseat even an impeachable officer. Nothing

Impeachment presupposes that the officer subject of the proceeding

However, quo warranto cannot unseat Sereno because nullity of the

1.2.2.Justice Del Castillo 5

The Constitution allows the removal from office of an impeachable

However, SC has no jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition against an

Court is likewise precluded from assuming jurisdiction based on the

The proper remedy is Impeachment.

1.3.Separate Concurring Opinion

1.3.1. Justice Peralta6

An impeachable public officer may be removed through a petition for

The language of Sec. 2, Art XI of the 1987 Constitution is clear - “May

Courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even

As held in Frivaldo v. COMELEC, qualifications for public office are

1.4.1. Justice Perlas-Bernabe 7

In order to fulfill its constitutional mandate, “the JBC had to establish a

It is within the JBC’s sphere of authority to determine if non-compliance

Sereno, through an ad cautelam motion for inhibition, sought the recusal

The conducts and utterances complained of were not undeserved, and

Most importantly, Justice Jardeleza’s actions and words are wholly

1.4.3. Justice Martires9

The appointment of respondent Sereno is void ab initio, since she failed

The discretion of the JBC to nominate Judiciary members is not

Respondent also cited cases where the SC dismissed disbarment

The present case is glaringly different. Respondent’s appointment as the

2. Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration

2.1.1. Justice De Castro 10

The discussions of false entries aside from respondent’s Personal Data

2.2.1. Justice Peralta11

Contrary to Sereno’s argument that “actual bias or prejudice against a

The participation of Justice Peralta in the Congressional Hearings does

The Constitutional provision simply means that only the enumerated

2.3.1. Justice Jardeleza 13

In denying the Ad Cautelam motion filed by respondent Sereno, Justice

The textual recognition of the essentially judicial nature of questions of

As shown by history, judicial discipline and accountability have always

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