Lapid V CA
Lapid V CA
Lapid V CA
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
RESOLUTION
GONZAGA-REYES , J : p
Before us are the Motions for Reconsideration led by the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of the Interior and Local Government, represented by
the O ce of the Solicitor-General, and the O ce of the Ombudsman of our 5 April
2000 Resolution. 1 In this resolution, we ordered the immediate reinstatement of
petitioner Manuel Lapid to the position of Governor of Pampanga as the respondents
failed to establish the existence of a law mandating the immediate execution of a
decision of the O ce of the Ombudsman in an administrative case where the penalty
imposed is suspension for one year. dctai
The copy of the said decision was received by counsel for the petitioner on
November 25, 1999 and a motion for reconsideration was led on November 29, 1999.
The O ce of the Ombudsman, in an Order 6 dated 12 January 2000, denied the motion
for reconsideration.
Petitioner then led a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on January 18,
2000 praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
Ombudsman from enforcing the questioned decision. The temporary restraining order
was issued by the appellate court on January 19, 2000. 7
When the 60-day lifetime of the temporary restraining order lapsed on March 19,
2000 without the Court of Appeals resolving the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, a petition 8 for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was led
with this Court on March 20, 2000. The petition asked for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the respondents from enforcing the assailed decision of the
Ombudsman and prayed that "after due proceedings, judgment be rendered reversing
and setting aside the questioned decision (of the Ombudsman) dated November 22,
1999 and the order January 12, 2000." 9
On March 22, 2000 the Third Division of this Court issued a Resolution requiring
the respondents to comment on the petition. That same day, the Court of Appeals
issued a resolution 1 0 denying the petitioner's prayer for injunctive relief. The following
day, or on March 23, 2000, the DILG implemented the assailed decision of the
Ombudsman and the highest ranking Provincial Board Member of Pampanga, Edna
David, took her oath of office as O.I.C. — Governor of the Province of Pampanga.
On March 24, 2000 a Motion for Leave to File Supplement to the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus 1 1 and the Supplement to the Petition 1 2 itself
were led in view of the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioner's
prayer for preliminary injunction. In addition to the arguments raised in the main
petition, the petitioner likewise raised in issue the apparent pre-judgment of the case on
the merits by the Court of Appeals in its resolution denying the prayer for preliminary
injunction. In so doing, petitioner argued that the respondent court exceeded the
bounds of its jurisdiction. Proceeding from the premise that the decision of the
Ombudsman had not yet become nal, the petitioner argued that the writs of
prohibition and mandamus may be issued against the respondent DILG for prematurely
implementing the assailed decision. Finally, the petitioner prayed for the setting aside
of the resolution issued by the Court of Appeals dated March 22, 2000 and for the
issuance of a new one enjoining the respondents from enforcing the said decision or, if
it has already been implemented, to withdraw any action already taken until the issue of
whether or not the said decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory has been
settled.
The Solicitor-General and the O ce of the Ombudsman led their respective
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comments 1 3 to the petition praying for the dismissal thereof. Regarding the issue of
the immediate enforcement of the decision of the Ombudsman, the Solicitor-General
maintains that the said decision is governed by Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court and is therefore, immediately executory. For its part, the O ce of the
Ombudsman maintains that the Ombudsman Law and its implementing rules are silent
as to the execution of decisions rendered by the Ombudsman considering that the
portion of the said law cited by petitioner pertains to the nality of the decision but not
to its enforcement pending appeal. The O ce of the Ombudsman also stated that it
has uniformly adopted the provisions in the Local Government Code and Administrative
Code that decisions in administrative disciplinary cases are immediately executory.
The Solicitor-General led an additional comment 1 4 alleging that the petitioner
did not question the executory character of the decision of the Ombudsman and that he
is presenting this argument for the rst time before the Supreme Court. The appellate
court should be given an opportunity to review the case from this standpoint before
asking the Supreme Court to review the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. The
petitioner filed a consolidated Reply 1 5 to the Comments of the respondents.
After oral arguments before the Third Division of this Court on 5 April 2000, the
Resolution 1 6 subject of the instant Motions for Reconsideration was issued. The
Resolution provides as follows:
"From the pleadings led by the parties and after oral arguments held on
April 5, 2000, the petitioner represented by Atty. Augusto G. Panlilio, the
respondent Ombudsman represented by its Chief Legal Counsel, and the National
Bureau of Investigation and the Department of the Interior and Local Government
represented by the Solicitor General, and after due deliberation, the Court nds
that the respondents failed to establish the existence of a law mandating the
immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case
where the penalty imposed is suspension for one year. The immediate
implementation of the decision of the Ombudsman against petitioner is thus
premature.
WHEREFORE, the respondents are ordered to reinstate effective
immediately the petitioner to the position of Governor of the Province of
Pampanga. This case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for resolution
of the appeal in CA-GR. SP No. 564744 on the merits. Said court is hereby directed
to resolve the same with utmost deliberate dispatch. cdphil
From this 5 April 2000 Resolution, the O ces of the Solicitor-General and the
Ombudsman filed the instant motions for reconsideration.
The sole issue addressed by our 5 April 2000 Resolution is whether or not the
decision of the O ce of the Ombudsman nding herein petitioner administratively
liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one (1) year suspension
without pay is immediately executory pending appeal.
Petitioner was administratively charged for misconduct under the provisions of
R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Section 27 of the said Act provides as follows:
"Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — All provisionary
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the
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O ce of the Ombudsman must be led within ve (5) days after receipt of
written notice and shall be entertained only on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
Similarly, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, Section 47, par. (4) of the Administrative
Code of 1987 provides:
"(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in
case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in
the event he wins an appeal."
Where the legislature has seen t to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial
agency is immediately nal and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so
provides.
Section 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the
appeal will not stay the award, judgment, nal order or resolution unless the law directs
otherwise.
Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly
the provisions of the Ombudsman Act should apply in his case. Section 68 of the Local
Government Code only applies to administrative decisions rendered by the Office of the
President or the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local government o cials.
Similarly, the provision in the Administrative Code of 1987 mandating execution
pending review applies speci cally to administrative decisions of the Civil Service
Commission involving members of the Civil Service.
There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution pending
review should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there
is nothing in the Ombudsman Act which provides for such suppletory application.
Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include
therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time
of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however
later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. 2 8
And while in one respect, the Ombudsman Law, the Administrative Code of 1987
and the Local Government Code are in pari materia insofar as the three laws relate or
deal with public o cers, the similarity ends there. It is a principle in statutory
construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that
which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other. 2 9 In the
instant case, the acts attributed to petitioner could have been the subject of
administrative disciplinary proceedings before the O ce of the President under the
Local Government Code or before the O ce of the Ombudsman under the
Ombudsman Act. Considering however, that petitioner was charged under the
Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should govern his case.
Respondents, through the O ce of the Solicitor General, argue that the ruling
against execution pending review of the Ombudsman's decision grants a one-sided
protection to the offender found guilty of misconduct in o ce and nothing at all to the
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government as the aggrieved party. The offender, according to respondents, can just let
the case drag on until the expiration of his o ce or his reelection as by then, the case
against him shall become academic and his offense, obliterated. As such, respondents
conclude, the government is left without further remedy and is left helpless in its own
fight against graft and corruption.
We nd this argument much too speculative to warrant serious consideration. If
it perceived that the ght against graft and corruption is hampered by the inadequacy
of the provisions of the Ombudsman Act, the remedy lies not with this Court but by
legislative amendment. prcd
As regards the contention of the O ce of the Ombudsman that under Sec. 13(8),
Article XI of the 1997 Constitution, the O ce of the Ombudsman is empowered to "
(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law," su ce it to note that the Ombudsman
rules of procedure, Administrative Order No. 07, mandate that decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month salary or ne equivalent to one month salary
are still appealable and hence, not nal and executory. Under these rules, which were
admittedly promulgated by virtue of the rule-making power of the O ce of the
Ombudsman, the decision imposing a penalty of one year suspension without pay on
petitioner Lapid is not immediately executory.
WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration led by the O ce of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. LibLex
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 354-355.
2. Rollo, pp. 11-12.
3. Rollo, p. 12.
4. Rollo, pp. 53-73.
5. Rollo, p. 71.
6. Rollo, pp. 75-82.
7. Rollo, p. 18.
8. Rollo, pp. 5-35.
9. Rollo, p. 32.
10. Rollo, pp. 121-131.
11. Rollo, pp. 117-120.
12. Rollo, pp. 94-116.
13. Rollo, pp. 138-184 and pp. 265-287, respectively.
14. Rollo, pp. 288-314.