Mayor Vs Tiu
Mayor Vs Tiu
FACTS:
Rosario Casilan passed away and left a holographic will, wherein she named her sister,
Remedios Tiu, and her niece, Manuela Mayor, as executors. Immediately thereafter, Remedios
and Manuela filed a petition for the probate of Rosario's will. The probate court found the
petition as sufficient in form and substance and set the case for hearing. Consequently, Damiana
Charito Marty, claiming to be the adopted daughter of Rosario, filed an opposition. She prayed
for the probate court to: 1) order an immediate inventory of all the properties subject of the
proceedings; 2) direct the tenants of the Primrose Development Corporation, namely, Mercury
Drug and Chowking, located at Primrose Hotel, to deposit their rentals with the court.
Remedios and Manuela countered that the probate court had no jurisdiction over
properties owned by third persons, particularly by Primrose, the latter having a separate and
distinct personality from the decedent's estate. The probate court applied the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction and issued an order directing DEPOSIT OR CONSIGNMENT of
all the rental payments or such other passive incomes from the properties and assets registered
in the name of Primrose, including all income derived from the Primrose Hotel and the lease
contracts with Mercury Drug and Chowking Restaurant. The probate court likewise ordered the
inventory of the assets of Primrose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of piercing the veil is applicable under the circumstances.
RULING:
No. Under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, the Court looks at the corporation
as a mere collection of individuals or an aggregation of persons undertaking business as a group,
disregarding the separate juridical personality of the corporation unifying the group. Another
formulation of this doctrine is that when two business enterprises are owned, conducted and
controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of
third parties, disregard the legal fiction that two corporations are distinct entities and treat them
as identical or as one and the same.
Here, the probate court ordered the lessees of the corporation to remit rentals to the
estate's administrator without taking note of the fact that the decedent was not the absolute
owner of Primrose but only an owner of shares thereof. Mere ownership by a single stockholder
or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation is not of itself
a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities. No compelling
evidence was ever presented to substantiate the position of Marty that Rosario and Primrose
were one and the same, justifying the inclusion of the latter's properties in the inventory of the
decedent's properties.