Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Due Process
Due Process
1
US vs. Ling Su Fan (G.R. L-3926, 10 February 1908).
2
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 840.
3
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines (G.R. 111953, 12 December 1997).
1
There are three inherent powers of government by which the state may interfere with property and other
rights, namely – (1) police power; (2) power of eminent domain; and (3) power to tax. These powers are said to
exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
Police Power is defined as “the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property.” Police power is the most essential of government powers, at times, the most insistent,
and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government. This power embraces the whole system of
public regulation. The field and scope of police power have become almost boundless, just as the fields of
public interest and public welfare have become almost embracing and have transcended human foresight. It is
so far-reaching in scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its sweep. Being coextensive with
self-preservation and survival itself, it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes. Police
power being the most active power of government and the due process clause being the broadest limitation on
governmental power, the conflict4 between this power of government and due process clause of the
Constitution is otherwise inevitable.
An ordinance of Quezon City requiring memorial park operators to set aside at least six percent (6%) of their
cemetery for charity burial of deceased persons is not a valid exercise of police power. Police power is usually
exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the
general welfare. It does not involve the taking of property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting
peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance the confiscation of an illegally possessed
article, such as opium and firearms. The ordinance is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. 5
It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law and even without compensation.
Republic Act No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code) abolished agricultural share tenancy in favor of
leasehold tenancy. The abolition does not entail a deprivation of property without due process of law because
the legislation is justified by the right of the state to exercise its police power for the public welfare. It is argued
that the exercise of police power is unreasonable because share tenancy does not involve health, morals and
public safety. However, police power is broad enough to be exercised on the basis of the economic need for the
public welfare. The public welfare should6 prevail through the state’s exercise of its police power when it
clashes with the individual right to property.
Examples of valid exercises of police power are as follows: the government’s power to control deployment of
female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (showing proof of academic and skills training7
and passage in test) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment;
ordinance making it unlawful for any proprietor, 8
lessee, or operator of an amusement place to admit two or
more persons with 9
only one admission ticket; an executive order prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except
under conditions;
10
an ordinance requiring guests of motels to fill up registration forms in the lobby open to
public view; and a law requiring as condition for renewal of electrical franchises that the franchise 11holders
shall not realize a net profit of more than 12% of their investments plus two-months operating expenses.
Eminent Domain – the power to expropriate private property – is inherent in every state and the provisions in
the Constitution pertaining to such power only serve to limit its exercise to protect the individual against those
whose property the power is sought to be enforced. The basis of the exercise of the power of eminent domain
is necessity. Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only
when expressly authorized by the legislature. Section 19 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) authorizes
local government units to exercise the power of eminent domain “for public use or purpose, or welfare for the
benefits of the poor and landless…” The exercise of the power may also be delegated to other government
corporations.
In the exercise of its sovereign right, the state is not subject to any limitation other than those imposed by the
Constitution which are: first, the taking must be for a public use; second, just compensation must be paid; and
third, due process must be observed. The first two limitations are found in Section 9 while the last limitation is
found in Section 1, all of Article III of the Constitution. These limitations are intertwined. Actually, the first two
elements are requirements of substantive due process; the last element is a requirement of procedural due
process. The substantive requirement of reasonableness is not met when private land is appropriated in an
irrational or piecemeal fashion or in the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a
few tenants or squatters. With respect to expropriation for purpose of urban land reform and housing, R.A.
7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act) establishes the following priorities in the acquisition of land: (a)
lands owned by government; (b) alienable lands of the public domain; (c) unregistered or abandoned and idle
lands; (d) lands within declared development sites; (e) Bagong Lipunan improvement sites; and (f) private
lands. Private lands rank last in order of priority for socialized housing. The order of priority is mandatory
because it is the safeguard of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what may be 12
a tyrannical
violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use.
4
City government of Quezon City vs. Ericta (122 SCRA 759).
5
Genuino vs. the Court of Agrarian Relations, et.al. (G.R. L-25035, 26 February 1968).
6
Ibid.
7
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (260 SCRA 319).
8
Samson and Gavilan vs. City Mayor of Bacolod City (60 SCRA 267).
9
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et.al. (148 SCRA 659).
10
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila (21 SCRA 440).
11
Alalayan, et al. vs. National Power Corporation, et al. (G.R. No. L-24396, 29 July 1968).
12
Lagcao, et.al. vs. Labra 9G.R.155746, 13 October 2004).
2
A limited meaning of “public use” is “use by the public.” The more generally accepted view sees “public use”
as public advantage, convenience, or benefit, and anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the
industrial energies, and promote the productive power of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a
section of the state, or which leads to the growth of towns and creation of new resources for the employment of
capital and labor, which contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community.” In this
jurisdiction, “public use” is defined as “whatever is beneficially employed for the community.” “Just
compensation” has been defined as “the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator,” and that the gauge for computation is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. For the payment
to be “just,” it must be real, substantial, full and ample. Not only must the payment be fair and correctly
determined, 13
but also that the payment should be made within a “reasonable time” from the taking of the
property.
The power of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belonging as a matter of right to
every independent government, without being expressly conferred by the people. It is the power that is purely
legislative and which the central legislative body cannot delegate either to the executive or judicial department
of the governments without infringing upon the theory of separation of powers. However, an exception is the
case of local governments to whom may be delegated matters of local concern. By necessary implication, the
legislative power to create political corporations for purposes 14
of local self-government carries with it the power
to confer on such local government units the power to tax.
The power to tax is sometimes called the power to destroy. Hence, it should be exercised with caution to
minimize injury to the proprietary rights of the taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally and uniformly,
lest the tax collector kills the “hen that lays the golden egg.” And, in order to maintain the general 15
public’s trust
and confidence in the government, this power must be used justly and not treacherously. So as not to run
afoul with the due process clause, (1) the tax must be for a public purpose, (2) the rule on uniformity of taxation
must be observed, (3) either person or property taxed must be within the jurisdiction of the government
levying the tax, and (4) notice and opportunity for hearing must be provided in the assessment and collection
of certain kinds of taxes. Due process does not require that the property subject to the tax or the amount of tax
to be raised should be determined by judicial inquiry, and a notice and hearing as to the amount of tax and the
manner in which it shall be apportioned are generally not necessary to due process of law. Also, due process is
not violated by double taxation. Double taxation, in general, is not forbidden by our fundamental law. Double
taxation becomes obnoxious only where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the same governmental
entity or by the same jurisdiction for the same 16
purpose, but not in the case where one tax is imposed by the
State and the other by the city or municipality.
C. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The standard definition of due process that focuses on its procedural aspect is as follows:
By ‘due process of law’ we mean ‘a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry,
and renders judgment only after trial …(4 Weaton, U.S. 518,581)’; or , as this Court has said, ‘due
process of law’ contemplates ‘notice 17
and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered,
affecting one’s person or property.
Notwithstanding the above definition of due process, distinction must be made between judicial process and
executive or administrative process. Due process requirements of notice and hearing in judicial proceedings
are outlined in the Rules of Court. But much of the process by means of which the government is carried on,
and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative. Of the many processes undertaken
by administrative bodies the requirements of procedural due process – which involve notice and hearing as
basic elements – are only applicable when these bodies are exercising their quasi-judicial functions.
Procedural due process does not apply when these bodies are performing executive or legislative functions,
such as when they use rules and regulations. Individuals affected by the rules and regulations 18
issued by these
administrative bodies are not entitled to notice and hearing before their issuance. Also, in certain
administrative proceedings, the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. For
instance, there is no due process violation when a foreigner is advised by the Bureau of Immigration to depart
5 days without granting him a hearing. Advice is only a preliminary step, 19
i.e., if the foreigner does not depart
within 5 days, then deportation proceedings against him will commence.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may either be a legislative or an adjudicative
function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a
requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules
and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where rules and rates imposed apply 20
exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.
13
Ibid.
14
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Municipality of Tanauan (69 SCRA 460).
15
Roxas vs. Court of Tax Appeal (23 SCRA 276).
16
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, et al. (G.R. No. L-31156, 27
February 1976).
17
Albert vs. University Publishing Co., Inc. (G.R. L-191118, 30 January 1965).
18
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines (G.R. 111953, 12 December 1997).
19
De Bisschop vs. Galang (G.R.L-18365, 31 May 1963).
20
Phil. Consumers Foundation, Inc. v, the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports (G.R. 78385, 31 August 1987).
3
Due Process in Civil Proceedings
Procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial. It contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment affecting one’s
person or property. Its requisites are the following: (1) there must be a court of tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of
the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the 21
defendant must be given an
opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Upon the filing of a civil complaint, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the
named defendant with the direction that the defendant answer within the time fixed by the rules. When the
civil action is in personam, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the authority of the
court. Without
22
such personal service, any judgment on a non-appearing defendant would be violative of due
process. If a defendant debtor’s address is unknown, the remedy of the plaintiff creditor is to locate
properties, real or personal, of the defendant debtor and cause him to be attached under Rule 57, Section 1 (f), in
which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding 23
in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by
publication may then accordingly be deemed valid and effective.
In a case of theft of large cattle, the barangay captain was one of the witnesses for the prosecution. The judge
found the accused not guilty of the crime charged but found the barangay captain to have violated the
accused’s constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. He then imposed a fine against the
barangay captain. The court ruled that the imposition of fine was in violation of due process because the
barangay captain, who was the witness, had absolutely no idea that he himself was on trial for the commission
of some offense. He consequently had no opportunity whatsoever to present 24
any evidence in his behalf to
exculpate him from the offense which was known to nobody except the judge.
Due Process in Administrative Proceedings
Administrative tribunals are not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure. They may act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms, and may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. This does not mean that
they may entirely ignore or disregard fundamental and essential requirements of due process. In the landmark
case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, the Supreme Court enumerated the following cardinal requirements of
administrative due process:
1. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
3. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does not imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.
4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence
must be substantial. “Substantial evidence” is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify
orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative
tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to
know and meet the case against them.
6. The tribunal or its judges must act on its own or his independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
7. The tribunal should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions 25
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
A party who was not heard at the stage of mediation and fact-finding cannot claim of procedural due process
when his Memorandum
26
of Appeal was given due course. He was effectively given the opportunity to be27 heard
on appeal. A party is accorded due process when he is heard on his motion for reconsideration. Due
21
Macabingkil vs. Yatco (21 SCRA 152).
22
Citizens’ Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Melencio-Herrera (38 SCRA 369).
23
Ibid. Section 1 (f) Rule 57, provides the relief of preliminary attachment of the properties of a party in an action
against said party “who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by
publication.” Section 14, provides for the remedy of summons by publication where the defendant is unknown or
“wherever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.”
24
Pagasian vs. Azura ( A.M. No.. RTJ-89-425, 17 April 1990).
25
Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations (69 PHIL. 635, 1940).
26
Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC (G.R. 127529, 10 December 1998).
4
process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One
may be heard not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and
practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. A formal or trial type hearing is not all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain28
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of
notice or hearing.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel is a
right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It may not be invoked by a respondent in
an administrative investigation. A party is an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and so duty
rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. 29
The right to counsel is not
indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings
The due process requirements in criminal proceedings are incorporated as constitutional guarantees. These
are found in Section 14, “Article III, of the Constitution that states:
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature of the cause of accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.
In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is immutable. Otherwise, there will be a
grave denial of due process. The fundamental principle of due process is that a person must be heard before he
is condemned. To be heard entails active involvement of a lawyer in his behalf. Ordinarily, the negligence of
counsel deprives his client of due process of law. Such is the case when counsel did not file a demurer to 30
evidence presented by the prosecution nor appeared for the presentation of evidence in behalf of the accused.
A judgment that is tainted with lack of due process is void. It amounts to excess or lack of jurisdiction. If the
judgment is that of conviction, it may be collaterally attacked by a petition for habeas corpus. Habeas Corpus is
a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose
liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused’s constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect
results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore 31
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of
the accused whose fundamental right was violated. If the judgment is that of acquittal, the State may appeal
therefrom. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack32
of jurisdiction. Being void, said decision does not constitute a proper
basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
Due Process in Termination Cases
A person’s livelihood is “property” within the context of the due process clause. Consequently, no one may be
deprived of his work or employment without due process of law. The Labor code distinguishes regular and
casual employment. A casual employee has no security of tenure while a regular employee enjoys security 33
of
tenure – i.e., he cannot be dismissed from service “except for just cause or when authorized by law.” The
“just causes” are enumerated in Article 288 of the Labor Code, while the “authorized causes” are in Articles 289
to 290 of the Labor Code. An additional requirement in the implementing Rules 34
is that termination of
employment by an employer shall be “subject to the requirements of due process.” The following standards
of due process are provided:
i. A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination,
and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.
ii. A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with assistance of counsel if
he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut
the evidence presented against him.
iii. A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due
consideration 35
of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.
27
Paat v. Court of Appeals (266 SCRA 167).
28
Sunrise Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC (G.R. 146703, 18 November 2004).
29
Lumiqued v. Exevea (282 SCRA 125).
30
Callangan v. People (G.R. 153414, 27 June 2006).
31
Santiago v. Alikpala (25 SCRA 356).
32
People v. Tac-an and |Austria (G.R. 148000, 27 February 2003).
33
Article 282, Labor Code.
34
Sec. 2, Rule 1, Book VI, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
35
Sec.2 (d), Ibid.
5
The above “in-plant” due process is not the due process covered by the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Constitutional due process – i.e., the due process clause in Section 1, Article III of the Constitution – protects
the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative
proceedings. On the other hand, statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules
protects employees from being unjustly terminated by private employers without just cause after notice and
hearing. Due process in the Labor Code, like constitutional due process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the
just authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of
dismissal. Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code. But while government
actions that violate constitutional due process are null and void, the employer actions that violate statutory due
process are not necessarily illegal. Where there is just cause for the dismissal of an employee, but the
employer failed to comply with the statutory due process in the Labor Code, the dismissal is still valid but the
36
employer will be liable for nominal damages for the violation of statutory due process.
However, pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Before harbor pilots can earn a
license to practice their profession, they have to pass five examinations, each followed by actual training and
practice. A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do
an act which, without such license, would be illegal. Their license is granted in form of an appointment which
allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at age 70. This is a vested right. An Administrative Order of
the Philippine Port Authority providing that existing licenses shall only be valid for 1 year subject to renewal is
40
unreasonable, thus violative of due process.
36
Agabon vs. NLRC (G.R.158693, 17 November 2004). The nominal damages imposed in the case was P30,000.00.
before 1989, the jurisprudence was dismissal of an employee is illegal if there is just cause for dismissal but there
was no compliance with statutory due process of law. This jurisprudence entitled the employee to reinstatement
with running backwages computed from the date of dismissal to the date of actual reinstatement. The 1989 case of
Wenphil reversed the jurisprudence by ruling that the dismissal is valid but the employee is entitled to indemnity on
account of lack of due process. The Supreme Court latter found the indemnity that ranged from P1,000 to P10,000
to be niggardly. Hence, in 2000 case of Serrano, the Court ruled that non-compliance with the statutory due process
in the Labor Code makes the dismissal ineffectual up to the finality of judgment. Hence, the dismissed employee is
entitled to running backwages up to the finality of judgment.
37
Brown Madonna Press Inc., et al. vs. Casas (G.R. No. 200898, 15 June 2015).
38
Chavez vs. Romulo, et.al. (G.R.157036, 9 June 2004).
39
Republic of the Philippines vs. Rosemoor Mining & Devt. Corp., et.al. (G.R. 149927, 30 March 2004).
40
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phil. (G.R. 111953, 12 December 1997).
6
41
even without preliminary determination yet of his culpability. Stricter qualifications for public office may also
be required by law without running afoul with the due process clause. Or the office may be abolished by the
42
Legislature during the term of an incumbent of said office. However, when the dispute concern’s one’s
constitutional right to security of tenure, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense;
43
hence the right to due process could be rightfully be invoked.
Due process cannot be invoked when no vested right has been acquired. The period during which petitioners
occupied the lots, no matter how long, did not vest them with any right to claim ownership since it is a
fundamental principle of law that acts of possessory character executed by virtue of license or tolerance of the
44
owner, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of acquisitive prescription.
E. VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to
the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle." The vagueness
doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process uncertainty
cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases
where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate warning to those subject to its
prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the
vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a
necessary interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are
"void-for-vagueness." But where the law is clear but there is only lack of enforcement parameters to guide
local authorities, then the law is not void for vagueness. There must be a showing that the perceived danger of
unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to
second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of
law contravenes due process because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the
law permits and/or forbids. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards
45
result in erratic and arbitrary
application based on individual impressions and personal predilections.
41
Sto.Domingo vs. De Los Angeles (96 SCRA 139).
42
Urgelio, et.al. vs. Osmena, et.al. (G.R.L-14908, 31 October 1963).
43
Lumigued vs. Exevea (282 SCRA 125).
44
Espinocilla, et.al. vs. BagongTanyag Homeowners’ Asso., Inc., et.al. (G.R.151019, 9 August 2007).
45
Samahan Ng Mga Progresibong Kabataan, et al. vs. Quezon City, et al. (G.R. No. 225442, 8 August 2017). The subject
in this case are curfew ordinances in implementation of President Duterte’s campaign to strictly implement curfew
ordinances on minors through police operations.
46
Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan and People (G.R. No. 152259, 29 July 2004).