Digested Go y Tambunting Vs CA

GO y TAMBUNTING vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
FACTS:
On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro
Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos
Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted
from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. The police arrived shortly
thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one
round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land
Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go. Having
established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a
manhunt for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to
verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by
two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting,
who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the
gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an
information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot
wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for

frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder before the Regional Trial Court.
No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified
that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not
execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the
Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary
investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that
no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed.
Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an

Order, embodying the following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was
recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself;
(2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct
preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion
for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as
a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition

and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus.
The Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision dismissing the two (2)
petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in
respect of petitioner Go
RULING:
In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an
offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in
time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a
"continuing crime."
The warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the
terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
"arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at
the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six
(6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting
had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none
of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the
police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down
the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in
petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal
knowledge."
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner
within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
FACTS:
Petitioner, in a case of road rage, shot the victim and fled the scene. After
establishing that that petitioner was probably the assailant, the police launched
a manhunt. Six days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself before the
police to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police. He was
immediately detained.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner’s warrantless arrest was valid.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan.
The arresting officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section
5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the “arrest”
effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected
“when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the meaning of
Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal
knowledge” of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot
Maguan.
Petitioner is ORDERED released upon posting of a cash bail bond without

prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Provincial
Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation.

Digested Go y Tambunting Vs CA

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GO y TAMBUNTING vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for

On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an

On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition

On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.

On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus.

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

Petitioner is ORDERED released upon posting of a cash bail bond without

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