Governance Models For AguaClara PDF
Governance Models For AguaClara PDF
Governance Models For AguaClara PDF
A Professional Report
of Cornell University
by
Karim Beers
May 2012
© 2012 Karim Beers
ABSTRACT
Over a billion people do not have access to safe, regular, and sufficient water. This takes a toll
on health, and the economy. Community-based management is the most widespread form of
water delivery and many scholars consider it the approach to be used to address the global
water shortfall. Yet the history of such an approach is full of failures. Scholars attribute such
failures to poor technological design, lack of access to sufficient funding for operations and
repairs, poor management, and lack of external support, among others. Poor governance in
general is pointed to as one of the most significant reasons for water system failure.
In this report I use the insights from the literature on community-based natural resource
governance models. The framework I develop rests on two principal concepts. First, is the
importance of six kinds of capital—natural, physical, financial, social, human, and political—
that are necessary for sustained success in water treatment and delivery. Second, is the
concept of nested governance, where the governance arrangement which exists at a local level
which may provide certain forms of capital lacking at lower levels. I apply this framework to
the case of AguaClara, a program with roots at Cornell University which has helped eight
Honduran communities build water treatment plants and set up functioning systems of
governance.
My analysis, based on program documents and interviews with key project personnel,
indicates AguaClara’s governance model is strong; its various layers of governance have the
capacity to steward, develop and marshal the requisite capital needed for sustainable water
for weakness in other areas such as financial and human capital. AguaClara’s social capital is
also substantial, especially in the areas of trust and community participation. Some weaker
areas include financial capital, especially that necessary for major capital investments in
construction or repair, and human capital, since a great part of its accumulated learning is
found in a few individuals. Political capital, in the form of regular and effective ongoing
support, is also of concern—one which AguaClara is actively addressing. The report concludes
Karim Beers was born in Tuskegee, Alabama, was raised in Ecuador, before settling with his
family in Ithaca, New York. He has since lived, studied and worked in a dozen countries in Latin
America, Africa, Europe and Asia. He is interested in building capacity for social change, and his
work in education and planning is informed by a Baha’i-inspired vision: that the purpose of
social and economic development is to cultivate the limitless potentialities latent in human
consciousness. He currently resides in Ithaca with his wife and children, where he cherishes
being immersed in extended family, a warm circle of friends, and a larger community actively
iii
I choose to dedicate what may well be my one ‘dedicatable’ project
to my wife, Alba, and to our two precious sons, Noé and Ali.
All three are a gift to me.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Nothing worthwhile is ever accomplished alone. Every new insight comes from standing on the
shoulders of others—the writers and thinkers gone before, one’s ancestors, those who tend
the fields, the founder of the university and its janitors, the bus driver who gets me to campus
every day. Among the many I’d like to recognize are: Mildred Warner, Monroe Weber-Shirk,
Marcela González-Rivas, Antonio Elvir, Michael Adelman, Matthew Fischer-Post, Daniel Smith,
Charles Brown, Sarah Long, Georgia Kayser, Stephen Gasteyer, and the Winter 2012 Honduras
SMART team. My whole family and especially my parents have been supremely supportive,
going far beyond the call of duty, and I’d also like to thank them all. And Manuel Melgarejo,
Tim Porch, Sebastian Ruth, Avi Smith, and Matt Yarrow—cherished friends. And to that
ineffable essence many call God, for giving us a world so full of beauty and wonder!
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Framework for Analysis Based on Six Intersecting Components of Capital ................. 34
Figure 2. AguaClara Plants in Honduras ...................................................................................... 46
Figure 3. AguaClara Governance Model...................................................................................... 56
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LIST OF TABLES
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Introduction
Local governance capacity is essential for sustaining community-based water systems. While
technological choice and financial capacity are also necessary for creating systems that provide
sufficient, safe and regular drinking water, the governance of a water project--the “capacity …
to coherently organise the sustainable development of water resources” (Peña and Solanes,
2003: 3)--is often neglected at great cost to the impact and sustainability of the project. To cite
one figure, between 30-40% of built water systems are dysfunctional at any given time
(Lockwood and Smits, 2011), suggesting that the maintenance of the systems is just as
AguaClara is a network of organizations based at Cornell University that aspires to develop and
implement innovative pro-poor water treatment technology. Working in Honduras over the
last six years with local NGOs and communities, AguaClara has built seven water treatment
plants, with a few more currently underway or in the pipeline. AguaClara strives for plants
which provide sufficient drinking water that meets national standards for quality at an
affordable rate. As the program seeks to ramp up diffusion of the technology, it is timely to
inquire into not only the infrastructure and financial capacity of the program, but also into the
With this report I intend to assess the strength of AguaClara's model of governance. More
specifically, I will look at whether AguaClara's governance successfully stewards, develops, and
marshals the necessary natural, physical, financial, social, human and political capital to
sustain and expand the benefits of its water projects. To do this I will compare AguaClara's
experience thus far to the challenges and issues of governance raised in (mostly) academic
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literature. I specifically focus on community-based management literature, as this is the
approach AguaClara has taken for service delivery. Community-based management is also the
most ubiquitous form of water delivery (Lockwood and Smits, 2011); hence the insights from
this field of study are applicable to most water systems around the world. According to one
group of water experts, “there is little doubt that community management will be the
predominant model for those striving to reach the goal of bringing sustainable water supply to
hundreds of millions of rural people in the next ten years” (Scaling Up Rural Water Supply
It may come as a surprise that community management is so widespread, especially with the
recent buzz on privatization. It is ubiquitous in part because most water systems are small, in
small towns and cities where there generally isn’t the profitability necessary to entice private
Before continuing with a literature review, methodology, analysis and suggestions, I will
provide some context in order to begin to grasp the potential contribution AguaClara could
make to an entrenched global problem. To do so, I will sketch a picture of the importance of
water provision, and how the world and Honduras in particular are doing in terms of ensuring
According to the World Health Organization (WHO)/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program (JMP)
for Water Supply and Sanitation, some 900 million people—roughly one out of eight human
beings—do not have access to what they call “improved water” (JMP, 2010). This is different
from ‘potable’ (safe to drink) water. An improved source includes household connections,
public standpipes, protected wells (JMP website, 1/23/12) but doesn’t imply necessarily that
the source is potable. For example, from my own experience around the world I know that tap
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water does not mean it is safe to drink. Thus the figure for those without sufficient, safe, and
regular drinking water is certainly much higher than a billion. Virtually all of these people are
poor, are in so called ‘developing’ countries, and most are living in rural or peri-urban areas. So
even though we are on track to meet the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goal
(MDG) to halve the number of people without access to improved water (UN, 2011: 53),
substantial: “[A]t any one time, close to half of the urban population in Africa, Asia and Latin
America is suffering from one or more of the main diseases associated with inadequate
provision of water and sanitation. These diseases account for a high proportion of infant and
child deaths” (Hardoy et al., 2001: 39). One of the diseases, diarrhea, “is the second leading
contributor to global burden of disease—ahead of heart disease and … [HIV/AIDS]. Two and a
half billion cases of diarrhea occur in children under five years of age every year, and an
estimated 1.5 million children die from it annually” (UN-GLAAS, 2010: ii). It is because of this
that some authors have concluded that the “greatest environmental threat” to poor people in
developing nations is their homes--as poor infrastructure and location make these places
Poor water service not only affects health. It takes an economic toll as well. Where there is no
public provision, poor households pay private companies higher rates than those with public
supply (Hardoy et al., 2001: 48). For example, in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, water
vendors have charged up to 34 times the public utilities’ rate (ibid.). Fetching water from rivers
or streams or public standpipes usually entails long waits in queues, and this task usually falls
to women and children (often girls), who have to get up early, miss school, etc.
3
Having access to good water, in contrast, could provide an economic boon to developing
countries. A report commissioned for the WHO estimated that improving water and sanitation
around the world would provide a $5-28 return on each dollar invested, depending on the
region, reflecting the benefits from reduced morbidity and loss of work time, and the time
Honduras presents its own particular problems. It is still recovering from the blow dealt to it in
1998 by Hurricane Mitch, which caused $2 billion in damage (CIA factbook, n.d.). Honduras is
the second poorest country in Latin America with about 65% of its population living in poverty
(ibid.). In terms of water provision, Honduras doesn’t appear to be doing that poorly. Eighty-six
percent of the population has access to “improved” water sources (JMP, 2010: 43), and one
recent study found that it was on track to reach the MDG targets for rural water supply
(Lockwood and Smits, 2011). This, however, does not take into account infrastructure failure
rates, and, as noted before, it doesn’t mean that most people are receiving water that is safe
for drinking. A 2004 Zamorano University study of 43 rural potable water systems in Honduras
found that in 88% of the systems the water wasn’t being treated and 70% had excessive
coliform counts (Zamorano, 2004). Eighty-three of the 86% of improved sources are listed as
‘piped on premises’ (JMP, 2010: 43), and it would not be too bold to assume that many of
It is in this challenging context, and with such high stakes, that AguaClara is situated.
up with a framework for analyzing the strength of AguaClara’s model. I describe this
framework more extensively in a section on research methods, and then hold up AguaClara’s
experience to the framework to gain insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the
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program’s governance model. After engaging in this analysis I offer some recommendations to
enhance the governance of the program and suggestions for future research.
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Literature Review
This section describes a sampling of the literature on governance issues for community
resource management, of which water services management is a subset. The literature, much
of which is based on case-study analyses, addresses in some way the following conundrum:
Necessarily, the theorists both try to explain the common pitfalls of local governance and why
community-managed systems frequently fail, and to offer insights into building capacity for
sustainable local natural resource management. These insights include broad principles for
effective governance, and strategies for strengthening local capacity. Here we find readings on
training programs and the skills they seek to build, and on the importance of collaboration and
partnerships. Within this latter discussion, there is a large volume of literature debating the
relative virtues of public vs. private management of utilities, which I’ll touch on only briefly.
Another set of readings emphasizes the significance of the political and economic environment
in which communities are embedded--external factors, if you will. Finally, I include some
authors’ perspectives on how to evaluate the success of a water project, especially as it relates
to pro-poor development.
While community provision of water is the most ubiquitous form of water delivery, it may fail
early on especially if issues of governance and appropriate technology are not adequately
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management will be found alongside the authors’ contributions below, I include here a
Lack of access to funds for capital infrastructure costs (Hardoy et al., 2001; Nickson
et al., 1997; Peña and Solanes, 2003);
Financial
Costs of service are unacceptable and/or unaffordable (Carter et al., 1999; Nickson
et al., 1997)
Poor management (Zamorano, 2004, Hardoy et al., 2001, Lockwood and Smits,
2011, SURWS, 2005);
Corruption (Budds and McGranahan, 2003);
Financial mismanagement (Fabricius and Collins, 2007);
Lack of maintenance and monitoring (Georgia Kayser, interview; Nickson et al.,
1997; Zamorano, 2004; Hardoy et al., 2001);
Lack of capacity to manage assets (Lockwood and Smits, 2011).
Lack of community ownership, motivation and participation (Carter et al., 1999):
Community is unconvinced of the new system’s desirability;
Social
Lack of ownership and low payment rates (Zamorano, 2004);
Low motivation because benefits are intangible or lack of incentives for workers,
administrators and volunteers (Fabricius and Collins, 2007);
Lack of involvement of women, the poorest, and marginalized (Spronk et al., 2012);
Wealthy and powerful influence provision away from needs of poorest (Cleaver and
Toner, 2006)
Poor planning: low tariffs and bad service (Peña and Solanes, 2003);
Unprepared for severe weather (Rizak and Hrudey, 2008);
Lack of preventative maintenance (SURWS, 2005)
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Broad Principles for Good Governance; Community Capitals
Governance can be the key factor in making a community water system sustainable. While
examples illustrate the importance of governance. For example, local corruption and
participation in governance, and increasing local accountability (Tayong and Poubom, 1999).
Ostrom is an early and prominent voice in the field who studied hundreds of traditional, local
resources, including irrigation systems and forests. She pointed out that it isn’t a specific set of
governance policies or structures that are crucial for successful long-term management of
common-pool resources (CPR); rather she argued it is the match of these diverse laws and
institutions “to the physical, biological, and cultural environments in which they are located
that will enable institutions (and the resources to which they relate) to survive into the
Ostrom identified eight broad ‘design principles’ that characterized the most robust of these
governance institutions:
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Ostrom (1994) considered these rules, structures, relationships, and mechanisms to be part of
a community’s social capital, which she defined as “the shared knowledge, understanding, and
patterns of interaction that a group of individuals brings to any productive activity” (Ostrom,
1994: 20). Social capital is created “when individuals learn to trust one another so that they
are able to make credible commitments and rely on generalized forms of reciprocity rather
than on narrow sequences of specific quid pro quo relationships” (ibid.). Well-meaning
governments and NGOs can damage this capital by bypassing longstanding traditions and
relationships that have helped a community manage its natural resources for centuries or even
Ostrom underscored the importance of social capital (and human) at a time when much
attention was being given to technical aspects of development. “[A] major lesson we need to
take forward into the next century is that it is a mistake to design irrigation and other
development projects on the presumption that physical capital is the most important input
factor in development” (Ostrom, 1994: 21). She sees human capital and social capital as
“necessary complementary inputs” in order for the physical capital--the built infrastructure--to
have a lasting impact (ibid.: 20). All three forms of capital require time and effort to build up;
however, social capital is quite different from its physical counterpart. First, it does not wear
out from use, and may even improve over use and time. Second, it may be used in distinct
contexts from where it was created. And third, “if unused, social capital deteriorates at a
Ostrom has also looked into the question of what leads people to cooperate as opposed to
free-loading which leads to sub-optimal outcomes (Ostrom, 2010). She constructs a model
using a combination of external structural variables and “inner core individual variables”
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(Ostrom, 2010: 163). The external variables that have been shown to encourage cooperation
are the number of participants involved (generally, the smaller the number, the higher the
chances of cooperation), the nature of the goods being shared (whether they are public goods,
or ‘subtractive’, that is, that their use by one affects the amount available to another), the
heterogeneity of participants (the more homogeneous the group, the more likely cooperative
strategies are chosen), and face-to-face cooperation. These are significant even when there is
a single interaction. When interactions are repeated, then information about past actions (an
individual’s reputation), the linkages among the individuals, and the opportunity to enter and
exit also influence the choice of cooperation. Ostrom suggests that “the links between the
trust that one participant … has in the others … involved in a collective-action situation, the
investment others make in trustworthy reputations, and the probability of all participants
using reciprocity norms” (Ostrom, 2010: 162) are also key to understanding successful (and
unsuccessful) collective action. These individual characteristics of trust and reciprocity, which
come from individual heuristics and values, can be positively reinforcing, leading to greater
levels of cooperation.
Other authors have followed Ostrom and looked at a community’s capacity to manage its
water resources in terms of its different types of capital, and have further elaborated on a
capital framework.
Cornelia Flora (2004) identified six forms of capital that communities need for sustainable
development: natural, cultural, human, social, political, and financial/built (Flora, 2004).
Natural capital is the community’s environment and natural resources. Cultural capital
includes “ways of knowing …, language, ways of acting and defining what is problematic”
(Flora, 2004: 8). It “determines how we see the world, what we take for granted …, what we
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value …, and what things we think possible to change” (ibid.). “Human capital is the native
intelligence, skills, abilities, education, and health of individuals within a community” (ibid.).
Flora says that these three forms of capital constitute the base of any community. Social
capital includes “mutual trust, reciprocity, collective identity, cooperation, and a sense of a
shared future” (ibid.). This includes “bonding” and “bridging” components. Bonding social
capital encompasses the trust, connections, and interaction among the community. While this
kind of capital can lead to cliques, “bridging” social capital helps overcome strong divisions and
enables work with outsiders. These forms of capital are likely formed over decades or
centuries from prior interactions. Political capital is “the ability of a community to influence
the distribution of resources and to determine which resources are made available” (ibid.: 10),
and includes political connections to access resources. Finally, financial/built capital includes
both sources of funding (debt, investment, savings, taxes, etc.) and the physical infrastructure
Flora links community participation with the development of all the capitals, and finds that the
expansion and repairs, monitoring and evaluation--”the higher the impact on a greater
number of capitals” (Flora, 2004: 10). Like Ostrom, she sees the benefits accruing from such
impact not only on the [water] system’s sustainability but on community sustainability as well”
(ibid.: 11). Although technicians or water operators may not be skilled in facilitating such
participation, “the extra collaborative effort necessary to involve those with skills in the
planning and implementation process has long-term positive pay-offs” (ibid.: 12). And the
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technician. “The supporting agency--whether for profit, not-for-profit, or governmental--must
support and encourage such action through its reward structure” (ibid.).
Gasteyer and Taylor (2009) slightly modify Flora’s framework, separating financial and built
capital into distinct categories, and dividing social capital into ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ social
1) human capital: improved knowledge of water system issues and needs at the
individual board member level; 2) political capital: improved connections to the local
community governance structure; 3) bonding social capital: increased interactions
between the water operator(s), the water board or committee, and the community
council and mayor; 4) [bridging] social capital: improved communication with
regulators, funders, and technical assistance providers; 5) cultural capital: the
development of the understanding at the community level that the water system is a
community asset that needs attention; 6) natural capital: better understanding of the
water source and what will be needed to protect it; 7) built capital: improved water
management, distribution and treatment infrastructure; 8) financial capital: a better
financial management plan (Gasteyer and Taylor, 2009: 5).
The authors suggest the framework can be used to assess the strength and resilience of a
of different forms of capital: “Don’t think that just because you have a good technology it will
be sustainable. Think about the extent to which that capacity is needed locally and inter-
locally--regionally. What kinds of political and social capital are going to be needed beyond
human capital, and of course the technology itself.” In particular, he laid emphasis on political
capital for water system sustainability: An effective local governance system is not enough. “I
really think that the ability of either networked communities or institutions that serve those
communities to advocate politically for resources is critical for ongoing sustainability of a rural
water system.” He noted that this ability to leverage external resources has been “critical” for
rural water systems in the US. Why? Because there isn’t enough internal capital to finance
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significant repairs and replacements--even if the communities are setting the rates
appropriately.
Gasteyer suggested that all such capitals need not be present at the local level. He suggested
using the concept of ‘nested governance’, looking at the network of institutions at community,
intercommunity, regional and national levels, and how they can support and complement each
other’s work. He suggested that the ability to pull in resources may be found at higher,
Hardoy et al. (2001) similarly acknowledge the importance of political capital: “[T]he capacity
negotiate effectively with local, city and (often) national government will continue to have the
greatest influence on the quality of their living environment” (Hardoy et al., 2001: 10). They
cite the challenges of provision stemming from a lack of investment capacity for installing or
expanding basic infrastructure and inadequacy of basic capital equipment, but even when
capital investment is there, the community’s capacity to manage and maintain the
Fabricius and Collins (2007) also use the lens of community capitals to examine failures of
what they call “community-based natural resource management” (CBNRM). Drawing on work
by Carney (1998) and others, they cite five categories of capital in people’s livelihoods: natural
capital, i.e. “ecosystem goods and services”; social capital, “social and kinship networks and
reciprocity, and social institutions”; human capital, “skills, knowledge and labor”; physical
capital, “infrastructure and services”; and financial capital, “money or other financial assets”
(Fabricius & Collins, 2007: 84). This is known as the ‘sustainable livelihoods framework’. The
authors suggest that while local communities may count with plentiful natural and social
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capital, the short supply of human, physical and financial capital make CBNRM initiatives
extremely vulnerable.
This framework uses a broader definition of social capital than Flora’s, one which resembles
The authors cite seven ‘classic surprises’, any of which can be enough of a shock to disrupt or
destroy a CBNRM initiative: conflict, including competition that arises at the time of success,
tension between traditional authorities and elected leaders, and between entrepreneurs and
collective action; financial mismanagement, from both corruption and poor accounting skills;
change at higher levels, including civil conflict; changes in markets; and top-down
disempowering local community governance efforts (Fabricius & Collins, 2007: 85-6).
They also point to a set of ‘obstinate implementation challenges’ that result from weak
governance and further threaten CBNRM initiatives, especially at the early and most delicate
stages of implementation. These include, a slow pace of development, from poor estimates of
time and lack of planning; weak participation by local, national and provincial governments;
According to the authors, the five types of capital act as buffers that can absorb shocks and
surprises and buttress CBNRM initiatives. They suggest focused efforts on strengthening the
“harder” types of capital--human, financial, and physical--which as noted earlier, they consider
to be in short supply, without neglecting the social and natural capital already present, and
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which are less mutable over time. The process of building up the various forms of capital, they
suggest, takes about a decade or more. “In the short term”, they argue, “while the financial,
physical and human capital base is being developed, strong and resilient governance systems
are essential to buffer CBNRM against change and unexpected events” (Fabricius & Collins,
2007: 93).
The authors use a broad definition of governance in CBNRM, which includes both the formal
decision-making structures and more informal social networks and the relationships of trust
that sustain them. Governance is about rules and compliance, and about resolving conflict.
Governance institutions also systematize experience, learning from it. According to this
definition, governance would encompass aspects of social and political capital, and would be
responsible for caring for, building and marshaling all the other forms of capital.
The authors emphasize aspects of governance that need be strengthened in the early stages of
projects to overcome the challenges to CBNRM noted earlier and be resilient when
unexpected changes occur. These are: ‘knowledge networks’ made up of diverse and
and which are recognized as legitimate by the community and government officials; conflict-
resolution practices; formal commitments to responsibilities for main actors, and incentives to
help these individuals meet these commitments; and “professional facilitation to promote
communication between participants in the knowledge network document the lessons learnt
on an on-going basis, keep champions motivated and on board, manage conflicts before they
have escalated, and remind key individuals of their commitments and responsibilities”
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Finally, the authors specifically suggest that governance structures engage in a “trialogue”, a
form of “cooperative governance” where scientists, government and local communities “share
information and develop innovative solutions” (ibid.). In this framework each of the three
actors plays a key role. Local communities are abreast of conditions in the grassroots and can
respond to changing circumstances by creating appropriate rules for natural resource use on a
local level. The role of scientists is to collect and share information that might not be apparent
between communities and policy makers. Also, scientists have access to advanced technology
such as GIS and computer models which can help with such tasks as planning and monitoring.
Government’s role is to ensure long-term stewardship of the natural resources. While this
three-player model may be considered distinct from one of ‘nested governance’, since there is
Other literature also underscores the capacity to engage in learning as important to long-term
project success (e.g. Uphoff 1998). In the context of scaling-up--expanding the scale of
successful projects—another scholar comments that this “… inevitably requires project staff
and management to learn and adapt their approaches and activities to local needs and
There have been a number of recent publications from the non-profit sector, generally written
by academics, that distill this sector’s experience in promoting water access in developing
countries. Scaling Up Rural Water Supply (SURWS, 2005) is a publication by experts from the
non-profit sector which attempts to compile lessons for sustainable rural water supply. The
document “Provides policy makers with a set of principles that set out the basis for assessing,
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understanding and creating the necessary enabling environment to take community
The authors believe “there is little doubt that community management will be the
predominant model for those striving to reach the goal of bringing sustainable water supply to
hundreds of millions of rural people in the next ten years” (ibid.). They recognize, however,
that “the majority of communities are not able to manage their water supply systems without
simply not realistic to expect rural communities to be completely self-sufficient throughout the
whole cycle of water service management: deciding on service levels and design, operating,
maintaining, extending, upgrading, adapting and replacing the system” (ibid.: 10).
They identify three sets of challenges for CBM water systems: First, there are limitations within
the community. These include tension within community groups, mismanagement, and lack of
capacity to maintain the water technology. Second, there are constraints that are internal to
the sector but external to the community, such as poor design and poor implementation, or
communities who are attempting to deal with major repairs, conflicts and other problems with
extension and upgrading” (ibid.: 10). Finally, there are constraints that are external to the
water sector, such as poor economic conditions which can frustrate community efforts.
In the face of such obstacles, according to the authors, “most communities require some form
of institutional support to sustain service provision” (ibid.), and add a word of caution: “Those
seeking to take community management models to scale must ensure that institutional
support mechanisms are also established and maintained over the long-term” (ibid.).
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In order to expand the benefits of well-functioning water systems, the authors believe
They find (a whopping) 26 principles to be relevant and necessary for the scaling up process
which they categorize under Universal, Enabling Environment, Institutional, Social Equity,
Monitoring and Evaluation, and Technical. ‘Universal principles’ frame a water system that
managed at a local level. One of these principles introduces the concept of the ‘water service
delivery model’, which sees “planning, implementation, operation and maintenance, and
The second set of principles relate to an ‘enabling environment’. These call for
leadership and support, and sector policy and legislation that defines, establishes and supports
the vision, goals, norms and models for water provision in the country. Next are ‘institutional
principles’ that outline the need for strong and competent institutions at all levels, with clearly
defined functions, roles and responsibilities, all of which receive institutional support, and are
regulated according in line with the public interest. ‘Financial principles’ call for
comprehensive financial planning which take into account all costs--planning, capital,
recurrent and support--, balancing service levels with financial resources available. Sources of
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revenues must be identified, along with cost-sharing mechanisms, and if subsidies are
‘Social equity principles’ highlight the need for universal participation, with special attention
given to including the poorest and women and (other) marginalized groups in decision-making.
This may require processes of empowerment and capacity building. Two ‘environmental
principles’ listed require using integrated water services management--giving thought to the
higher-level bodies in charge of water allocation. ‘Monitoring and learning principles’ entail
controlling quality through continuous monitoring, evaluating the impact of the project
through a comprehensive evaluation, and a learning environment where lessons are shared in
order to improve future work. Finally, there is one ‘technology principle’, espousing the need
for a range of technologies that are suited for varied physical and socio-economic conditions.
This will help diverse demand for varying levels of water service.
“Sustainable Services at Scale” (shortened as “Triple-S”), Lockwood and Smits extract lessons
on sustainable water delivery--many of which mirror those described above. They document a
plants and distribution systems to a more holistic and long-term approaches focused on the
whole life-cycle of the water system--what they and the ‘Scaling Up’ report call a “Service
Delivery Approach” (Lockwood & Smits, 2011: 19) . This combines infrastructure with long-
term post-construction support. While they understand that countries with low coverage tend
to choose the former strategy, they suggest the Service Delivery Approach is more sustainable.
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A “Service Delivery Model” then is one that uses this approach, and can be implemented by
Perhaps having learned that 26 principles was unwieldy (Lockwood was among the few dozen
experts in the SUWRS Task Force mentioned earlier), they condense their insights into nine
20
They also provide a framework for evaluating service, consisting of five levels from “no
service” to “high service: people access a minimum of 60 liters per capita per day of high
The authors give shape to the idea of nested governance, by separating out three levels of
functions. The national level is responsible for policy and normative functions, that is, creating
the “overall enabling environment where sector policy, norms and regulatory frameworks are
set, service levels defined, and macro-level financial planning and development partner
coordination takes place” (ibid.: 20). They note that it “can also be the level at which learning,
piloting and innovation is funded and promoted” and where capacity-building is coordinated
(ibid.) The intermediate level refers to local government that is in between national and the
service provider, a level which could be municipal, district or some other government,
depending on the country. This is where “service authority functions … such as planning,
coordination, regulation and oversight, and technical assistance, take place” (ibid.: 21). Finally
there is the local level, the level at which the service provider functions, whose role is the day-
to-day functioning of the water system. The authors argue that it is “the interplay between
these three levels” that makes for a quality and sustainable water system (ibid.): “[c]ommunity
management must be properly embedded in, and supported by, policy, legal and regulatory
frameworks and support services, both at national and local levels” (Lockwood & Smits, 2011: 2).
There seems to be a growing literature recognizing the importance of factors that are external
to the community, for effective community resource management. Flora (2004), for example,
underscored the importance of a nation’s economic and political climate, including the
21
whether or not communities have regular and sufficient access to safe water. Budds and
McGranahan (2003) note one particular legal problem is the lack of land tenure for the poor
(often in slums). In such cases, public and private companies are often legally prohibited from
serving them. The importance of national legislation frameworks for water provision is
highlighted in the discussion on the conception of water as a good or a right. Allen et al. (2006)
question the conception of water as a good to be distributed by market forces. They suggest
that by looking at water as a right--not just a good--governments can and have figured out
policies to make service provision happen. Legal and policy frameworks thus impact the
success of water distribution efforts, by aligning government funding with laws and policy
priorities.
Capacity Building
Given the broad appreciation for local governance capacity presented above--including the
importance of management and technical capacity--, it should come as no surprise that the
literature places significant emphasis on building local capacity. As Fabricius and Collins (2007)
put it:
Gasteyer and Taylor (2009) consider local management capacity to be at the center of a
community’s ability to take care of its water systems. Small communities are in particular need
of this capacity. Eighty-three percent of “community water systems in the United States serve
fewer than 3,300 customers” (Gasteyer & Taylor, 2009: 10), and these systems have “a
22
municipal and board members to implement the kinds of policies and procedures to correct
these issues over time” (ibid.: 10-11). Another problem that besets small systems is the lack of
effectively.
The authors note that in the U.S. significant effort has gone in to building this capacity through
small community water board and management training, which they abbreviate as BMT. While
assessing the effectiveness of BMT in five states, they noted that “[t]here is remarkable
similarity in the basic curricula taught around community water system board and
management training. All attempt to address aspects of technical, managerial and financial
issues” (Gasteyer & Taylor, 2009: 51-2). One example of a typical training program (from
Safe Drinking Water Act regulations; Reducing unaccounted for water loss.
While such training is ubiquitous it is more difficult to ascertain how effective the training is.
The authors above were unable to determine the impact of the trainings on the water system,
23
concluding that “more research is needed to really understand the impacts of BMT” (Gasteyer
More literature that provides detailed guidance for sound board management can be found in
manual called the “Good Governance Guide” (Governance Matters website, accessed 1/24/12)
to help grant makers and board members assess the strength, and build the capacity of
community governance boards. The guide lists nine principles of good governance, each one
accompanied by relevant indicators, questions to gauge progress towards these goals, and
examples of board practices that meet the criteria in the indicators. The nine principles are:
Evaluation.
Building local capacity is one way to deal with weak community capacity and capitals. Another
way is by accessing them through other individuals and organizations. Such support can come
from within the organization itself but from a higher level than the local--say from the national
office of an NGO. It can also be external, from donor agencies, universities, and different levels
of government. When there are different levels of decision-making and management working
on the same project or process, each receiving support and orientation from the level above,
Gasteyer conveyed the importance of looking at community assets within a nested governance
framework (interview 10/17/11). He mentioned that all the forms of capital need not be
24
present on a community level for the system to be successful in the long-run. If the community
Uphoff et al. (1998) too insist on the importance for local communities to be connected to a
larger scheme: "Small organizations by themselves may be beautiful, but their impact will be
Others have suggested partnerships as a way to supplement lack of local capacity in water
systems. Carter et al. (1999), for example, argue for the role of partnerships for effective
community water and sanitation provision, noting that neither governments nor NGOs have
First the authors state the following reasons for why improvements in water provision and
sanitation are not sustained: Communities or households may never have been convinced of
the desirability of new facilities; the financial costs which communities are expected to raise as
impracticable; communities may never have felt ownership of the new infrastructure, and
under-resourced governments have been unable to carry our repairs and maintenance;
benefits which have been promised at the outset of projects (e.g. dramatically improved
health) have failed to materialize; community education (e.g. hygiene education) and the
attitudinal and behavioral change expected to be achieved by it, take a long time to produce
results, and yet it often ceases prematurely; even where full community participation or
management has been planned from the start, community-level committees and caretakers
25
have lost interest or trained individuals have moved away. This can be a particular risk if
To overcome these shortcomings the authors suggest the need to strengthen four interrelated
needed to maintain use of a new facility. This may be challenging especially if the safer water
Carter et al. then highlight the importance of proper maintenance for sustainability.
Parts and tools, as well as appropriate transportation, also need to be available. Whether right
or wrong, the recurrent costs of water and sanitation service are placed on the community as a
practical measure, since dependence on outside funding is fickle. “The level of payment,
including any subsidies, the basis of payment (by volume, or flat rate per household), and the
the community” (Carter et al., 1999: 295). Empirical evidence suggests community enthusiasm
necessary for sustaining local committees and water boards can wane within two or three
years of construction. Thus it is essential for communities to receive outside support from
government or NGOs. “This is a long-term function, with a need to continue until there is such
a ‘critical mass’ of good practice within a district, that there is no going back” (ibid.).
Aside from motivation, maintenance, cost recovery and continuing external support, the
authors note that there must be significant community participation in the whole enterprise to
26
make it sustainable. According to the authors, “this is a pragmatic recognition of governments’
inability to deliver services” (Carter et al., 1999: 295). Effective community participation,
Education in health and hygiene, training in maintenance and the handling of cash, and
involvement of women in community institutions and decision-making, are key
activities which are needed to create local capacity to manage (ibid.).
Since the success of a project depends so heavily on the sustained participation of the
community, one major challenge facing water projects is the total reliance on the “strength of
community spirit” (295), since modernizing forces assail this spirit--including increased
significant threat to a sustainable water project, especially when the public sector is the
places, they need help. Many governments have devolved responsibility to communities,
mostly due to lack of resources, but communities have been largely unable to sustain
improvements in water and sanitation. “[W]ithout support, few community-based water and
sanitation systems will achieve anything approaching permanence” (Carter et al., 1999: 295).
The authors then argue for “[n]ew models of community participation, and specifically
institutional, legal, and contractual links between communities, governments and NGOs, need
to be developed” (ibid.).
Communities may also need external support to ensure equity in service delivery, as local
elites may influence policy to preclude offering service to the poor (Cleaver and Toner, 2006).
27
Evaluation
Carter et al. (1999) also place special attention on criteria for evaluating community water
projects. They provide a framework for evaluating community water supply and sanitation
programs in developing countries, using the two frames of “impact” and “sustainability”. They
believe the framework can be used in the design, monitoring and evaluation of water and
sanitation projects in developing countries, with the aim of improving the limited impacts of
these projects. The table below shows the criteria by which a water supply project should be
deemed of impact and sustainable (criteria on sanitation has been omitted since it is not
directly relevant to this study). The costs have been updated to reflect inflation.
whether local stakeholders continue with a project, how much effort and how many resources
28
they dedicate to it, and how long the project continues to function after the instigating agency
Younger (2007) uses public participation as a criterion for evaluating pro-poor infrastructure
technology. He states that such technology should have three characteristics: they can be used
by small communities and enterprises as well as larger ones; they require only modest capital
investments and are not dependent on costly external inputs, and they are relatively simple to
use (Younger, 2007: 828). Furthermore, the best examples of pro-poor water engineering
develop with little external finance and build on self-help principles (e.g. communities
contribute labor and land). Having studied a partnership of a Bolivian NGO with local
communities on water provision and found that after eight years 95% of water wells were still
working, he concludes: “Although it is deeply rooted in the local cultural value system, the
Younger contends that the highly technocratic nature of water projects by imposing
technology and processes in a top-down manner actually damages local community: “the
uncritical export of northern attitudes and hardware to the South does violence to both the
It isn’t easy though to get everyone to the table. Wealthy and powerful community members
may be able to control projects on local scale (Cleaver and Toner, 2006). The poor and
marginalized groups need special attention, as do women (Hardoy et al., 2001). Cleaver and
Toner suggest that facilitating equality of access at the local level requires concerted action
from both ‘above’ and ‘below’. These actions include ensuring an adequate legal/policy
29
framework guaranteeing access to water and a real commitment on the part of the
outside support is unsustainable. Lockwood and Smit (2011) sum it up thus: “Most community-
based management and local private operators cannot manage on their own; there is a need
for structured systems of support that are properly funded to back-up and monitor these
One longstanding model of ongoing support that has received some attention in the literature
is referred to as the Circuit-Rider model, and is concerned primarily with technical support.
Here is a description from Georgia Kayser, postdoctoral scholar at the University of North
The Circuit Rider model, founded by the National Rural Water Association in the United
States in the 1970’s, is designed to provide on-going technical assistance so that the
Village Water Committees (VWCs), and their water system operators have the capacity
to prepare for and overcome technical, financial and operational obstacles. The Circuit
Rider model is operating in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and the United States.
The Circuit Rider model, in all four countries, offers access to a trained technician. These
technicians are engineers, have years of experience as a water systems operator, or are
trained by other Circuit Riders, water engineers, and water operators prior to gaining
Circuit Rider status. Circuit riders, once trained, make monthly visits to a specific set of
rural communities to address operation and maintenance problems, and train VWCs
and their operators in water quality and disinfection, water source protection, and
accounting and budgeting. Circuit Riders also hold workshops every few months for
operators and VWCs. These workshops address common operation problems in rural
water systems and in managing rural water systems. These workshops include: pump
maintenance, water treatment, treatment technology options, microbiological water
quality testing, and residual chlorine testing, calculating household water fees, and relay
any new standards or laws. In El Salvador, the Circuit Riders also stress the importance
of meters, installed in households to reduce water waste. To receive assistance from the
Circuit Riders in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, VWCs solicit support, or Circuit
Riders who work in one community will offer their assistance to adjacent communities.
Funding for the Programs outside of the USA, comes from the International Rural Water
Association, an arm of the Rural Water Association (Kayser, personal correspondence,
10/31/11).
30
The Circuit-Rider model is part of the ‘post-construction’ support. One recent study of the
model in El Salvador linked the model with improved water quality and better payment rates
(Kayser, 2011). One problem Kayser pointed out with this model is that funding for the support
is unstable, often coming from external NGOs, posing a challenge to its sustainability
Partnerships are another way support can be found. Many voices on the importance of
partnerships are found within the debate on public versus private provision of water and other
services, a debate that is separate from community-based management. While Ostrom and
those in CBRNM were writing about governance systems that are neither public nor private,
others take sides on whether these should be under public control or run like a business.
Those who favor private control refer to public mismanagement, bloated and inefficient
bureaucracies, and claim that the introduction of market competition will lead to water
delivery that is more efficient and less expensive (Nickson 1997, e.g.). Those who argue for
public control show that market forces don’t operate well with water (tends to a monopoly),
and cite examples of the same problems that plagued the public sector, like corruption, in
private hands. While in the 90s there was much support, especially from the World Bank and
its ilk, for the privatization of public water management, more recently there has been
substantive opposition from academic, activist and public sectors (see, for example, TNI 2010).
Twenty years later, most water systems are still under public control, although the debate is
not over. One meta-study (Bel and Warner, 2008), however, found no link between cost
However, insofar as provision to the poor is concerned, the public-private debate may miss the
point entirely, as neither sector has done a good job in facilitating regular and affordable
31
access to safe water to those with few financial resources at their disposal and both private
and public have done well when attending to wealthier populations (Budds and McGranahan,
2003). Hardoy et al. (2001) agree. Since no one is providing services, they suggest “[t]here is
organizations and local NGOs. ... What is needed is a series of pragmatic alternatives with a
Community-based organizations (CBOs) can often show how cheap and feasible alternative
solutions are without government funding, after which governments or NGOs can step in to
ramp up efforts and channel funds through local organizations. Hardoy et al. (2001) cite the
example of Orangi Pilot Project, an NGO working in a slum in Karachi, Pakistan helping groups
of 10-15 houses to organize to raise funds for a sewer system, which the community then
builds and manages at one-sixth the cost of the official system. However, the authors find that
the scope and effectiveness of CBO efforts increase substantially if these are aided by
government. Similarly, they argue that donor organizations can get a bigger bang for their
buck if financing is channeled through grassroots organizations that can set priorities and
Discussion
The above readings on community capitals, capacity building, nested governance and external
support have helped me develop a lens through which to view and analyze AguaClara’s
experience. Following Gasteyer and Taylor (2009) I employ the frame of community capitals as
a way to organize the various themes in the literature. My framework is slightly different from
those presented in the literature. Ostrom (1994), for example, shows a sagacious appreciation
for the nuances of social capital, but does not seem to give value to enabling policies and
32
regulatory environments, and external support—i.e. what I’m calling political capital. The
sustainable livelihoods framework which Fabricius and Collins (2007) use for their analysis
contains the same weakness. The authors’ claim that social capital is usually robust in local
communities also suggests that they are using a less comprehensive definition of this capital.
My framework resembles those used by Flora (2004) and Gasteyer and Taylor (2009), both of
which contain references to political capital. I include what they call cultural capital into my
category of social capital, which I consider to include traditions, shared understanding, and
patterns of interaction. Gasteyer and Taylor formalized Flora’s (2004) division of social capital
into bonding and bridging types. In my framework, the relationships with outsiders (regulators,
funders) and the capacity to build these, fall into three (or four) separate categories. On the
one hand, connections to funders and sources of funding can be seen as financial capital; if
financing comes through government, then it may be considered part of political capital. The
relationships that a community has with outsiders may also be considered part of its social
capital. One could further complicate things by noting that the capacity to build outside
connections may be found only in a few individuals within the community; then it would make
The capitals I ended up with are six—natural, physical (or built), financial, social, human and
political. These categories, as can be gleaned from the discussion above, contain significant
overlap and have divisions that are at times arbitrary. The following diagram shows this
interconnected nature for the capitals I have chosen for my analysis, an analysis that primarily
focuses on social, human and political capital. Note that there is not necessarily more
33
Natural capital: continuous surface
water; land for plant construction
34
Methodology
The aim of this report is to assess the strengths and weaknesses of AguaClara’s governance
development of water resources” (Peña and Solanes, 2003: 3), and by sustainable I mean such
that it can be maintained over time. In order to do this assessment, I conducted mostly
qualitative research in the form of a multiple case study analysis, looking at AguaClara’s
experience with six plants in the light of insights on community-based water governance found
framework that outlined the major topics to consider and questions to answer. And I compiled
information on AguaClara using primary documents and several key informant interviews.
system governance in particular. I conducted most of this research using electronic Cornell
library and Internet searches, including Google Scholar and the Google search engine. My
literature review was further enhanced by two key interviews with scholars in the field of
water system management, Stephen Gasteyer, Assistant Professor from Michigan State
University, and Georgia Kayser, a Postdoctoral Research Associate at the Department of Public
Policy and The Water Institute at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Professor
Gasteyer has experience working with small community-based water systems in the U.S., and
Dr. Kayser is an expert on the Circuit-Rider model of post-construction technical support for
water systems. Both provided me with valuable insights, and suggested relevant literature to
35
As noted in the previous section, based on the insights from these interviews and from the
literature, I created a framework for analysis around the concept of a series of capitals that a
community may or may not possess. Using this framework I first identified the issues raised in
the literature that most directly related to each one of the six capitals, and came up with sets
of broad and more specific questions whose answers would address each of the identified
issues. This is the framework with which I approached AguaClara's experience, which can be
Natural Community needs to have a reliable and Does the community -Where is the source located
nearby river source above it have access to a river in relation to the homes?
The community needs to have control over that can meet its -What pollutant problems
the source needs for water does it have?
Needs to have land for building the plant supply? -Does the community
control it?
Physical A community needs a functioning water Is the plant and -Is the plant and distribution
treatment plant, and distribution system. distribution system system built, run and
These need to be suited to local conditions: suited to local maintained with locally-
built with locally available materials; run condition? available materials and
and repairable with locally available talent?
materials and talent
Financial System should aim for total cost recovery Do system have, or --Can handle future capital
for O&M (Carter et al., 1999) have access to, funds costs, e.g. repairs?
Need access to financing for engineering to cover engineering -How is payment rate? What
studies and capital costs, including costs, capital is WTP?
construction and major repairs and/or expenses, and O & M? -Capacity to fund expansion
expansion of service? Subsidize poor?
Social 1. Community ownership and trust: Do communities feel -Is there space for
Communities need to feel like the water like the systems participation?
system belongs to them. This is related to belong to them? -Who is participating
the concept of empowerment. Is there trust in the (women? poor?)?
-Space for broad community participation community? -Structural variables that
in decision-making (Ostrom, 1994; Bakker, affect collective action
2008, Flora, 2004), especially for women. present?
-Members are motivated to participate in -Are there indicators of
system that belongs to them (Gasteyer, trust?
2011; Flora, 2004; Carter et al., 1999; -Is the trust born from the
Younger, 2007) project or did it exist
-There is trust between users, board and beforehand?
operators (Ostrom, 2004), and an ethic of -Does the AguaClara project
reciprocity contribute to or detract
-Structural variables (Ostrom 2010) that from this social asset?
affect collective action: small communities, -What elements of the
homogeneity, face-to-face communication, project motivate community
and repetition members to participate?
36
Social 2. Good management: The water system Is the system managed -Have constitutions?
(structures, policies, procedures) needs to well? -Written contracts?
be transparent, efficient and fair: -Monitoring system?
-Needs rules and boundaries to determine -Conflict-resolution and
who can participate and how (Ostrom, graduated sanctions?
1994; Carter et al., 1999) -Incentives for fulfilling
-Meet regularly, keep minutes (Carter et obligations?
al.,1999) -Maintenance and asset
-Monitoring of participation (Ostrom, 2004; management plans?
Fabricius and Collins, 2007) -Water boards meet
-A system of graduated sanctions for regularly? Have minutes and
misappropriation (Ostrom, 2004) funds in order?
-System of conflict-resolution (Ostrom,
2004; Fabricius and Collins, 2007)
-Constitution for board, and rules for
membership and procedures, including
ridding of misbehaving members (Fabricius
and Collins, 2007)
-Formal contracts and commitments for
employees, and incentives, especially for
volunteers (Flora, 2004; Fabricius and
Collins, 2007)
-Professional facilitation to promote
communication between varied
participants (Fabricius and Collins, 2007;
Flora, 2004)
-Maintenance and asset management plans
(Carter et al., 1999; Lockwood and Smits,
2011), including plans for sudden events
(Rizak and Hrudey, 2008)
-Financial planning for all life-cycle costs
(Lockwood and Smits, 2011)
Social 3. Learning or ‘adaptive management’: Is AguaClara able to -Spaces for reflection and
Water systems need to continually learn learn from its evaluation on different
and incorporate new insights into experience? levels?
operations (Lockwood and Smits, 2011; -Capacity to systematize
Fabricius and Collins, 2007) learning
-There is regular space and time for -How learning shared?
evaluation -Ongoing training and
-Reflections and learning are systematized capacity building?
and shared -Is there an iterative process
-Ongoing training and capacity building to allow for positive
(Carter et al., 1999) feedback of trust?
-Iterative process that allows for positive -Experts to facilitate
feedback of trust and reciprocity (Ostrom, exchange of information
2011) between groups?
-Knowledge networks to draw on broad
expertise to share learning (Fabricius and
Collins, 2007)
Human 1. Communities need individuals with Do Board members How is motivation among
management skills/capacities: have management board members and
-Facilitation of Dialogue and conducting skills? workers kept up?
meetings Are there venues for
-Maintain motivation--both for paid and resolving conflicts?
especially unpaid staff (board members) Are customers happy with
-Manage conflict and Customer service their service?
-Planning both contingency (e.g. drought, How is the board chosen?
emergency water supply) and expansion or Does it rotate members?
strategic planning Do retiring members train
the next set?
Is there a tradition of board
members serving the
37
community or using this
position to extract personal
gain? What is the culture
around board behavior in
general?
The first category of capital I’m considering is natural, which refers to the natural resources
available in the community. The most relevant concerns here relate to the presence of
perennial surface water, a water source for which the plants are designed, and sufficient land
38
on which to build the plant. These are mostly givens, as AguaClara only enters in communities
with such resources, but I include the relevant questions here for completeness and as a
The second category of capital is physical, which refers to the built aspects of the water
system. For my research this capital is the treatment plant and the distribution system. My
questions have to do with the presence of such infrastructure, and, perhaps more importantly,
with its suitability to the context. That is, I look at the extent to which the design of the plants
and piped system fits in with the other capitals—e.g. the physical environment, or the level of
AguaClara’s strengths in the treatment plant design, while including the distribution system in
the questions provides a reminder that the plant is dependent on the presence of other
functioning infrastructure.
Third is financial capital, which recognizes the reality of the importance of funding to get
something built, and then to maintain it over time. My questions probed for financial capital
either present in the community or AguaClara institutions or access to it for three areas: initial
engineering studies, the building of the plant itself, operation and maintenance (O&M),
Fourth is social capital, a category so complex I decided to separate it into three: community
ownership and trust, good management, and learning. The first of these includes the issues on
which Ostrom’s work (1994, 2010) focuses. I wanted to know if and how AguaClara was
working in places that had the factors that contributed to successful community management,
and in what way did AguaClara’s technology and governance structure contribute to the trust
and empowerment that are so crucial to such a management model. Some of the questions
39
got at the frequency and nature of spaces for community participation, as one main element
Good management was the second category I used within social capital. Here I looked at more
participation in the form of written constitutions and policies; sanctions for misappropriation;
incentives for fulfilling responsibilities, plans for maintenance and management; and
administrative competence as shown by the regular use of minutes and well-kept financial
records.
The third category dealt with the specific ability of AguaClara to learn from its experience and
adapt to changing circumstances. I looked for evidence of this in the presence of specific
spaces for reflection and learning, in the ongoing training offered, in the iterative process that
allows feedback, in the presence of people who act as facilitators to share learning among the
Human capital is the fifth category of capital, which I divided into management skills, technical,
and financial. This category had plenty of overlap with others—the presence of management
skills was also probed for when asking about management capacity under social capital; the
financial skills of keeping books and soliciting funds can also be induced from management
capacity, and from the presence of financial capital. Technical skills, however, refer to those
needed to build, maintain and operate the treatment plants, and is inferred from the amount
of time the plants are properly running, and AguaClara’s ability to deal with breakdowns.
The final category of capital is political capital, which I divided into two sections: the presence
of ongoing external support, and an enabling policy, legal, and regulatory environment. For the
40
former I looked at the connections AguaClara communities have with external agencies—
NGOs, universities, different levels of government, and the private sector—and the examples
of received technical and financial support, as well as support for other governance issues. I
also looked at the support the different AguaClara actors (communities, NGO, Cornell
researchers) had, in the context of a nested governance model. For the latter I asked questions
mostly about the presence of legal and regulatory frameworks on a national level, regulatory
bodies, and fertile national and regional networks for the exchange of information and
support.
With these questions in mind I set out to gather information on AguaClara. I used several
training materials--which I gathered from people involved with AguaClara projects and from
AguaClara’s website. I also conducted a series of key informant interviews. The most important
of these was with Antonio Elvir, who has had the most direct and complete contact with the
communities where AguaClara plants have been built over the last six years. I interviewed him
twice during his weeklong visit to Cornell at the end of October 2011. I also conducted
interviews with Chuck Brown, a former AguaClara intern who helped train AguaClara staff in
grant writing, and Daniel Smith, an AguaClara engineer who has worked in Honduras for the
I also benefited from information from Michael Adelman and Matthew Fisher-Post, two
members of the AguaClara research team with whom I frequently met to share updates on our
respective research and pass along useful documents. I also spoke to Monroe Weber-Shirk,
41
director of the AguaClara program at Cornell, informally on a number of occasions and
Having the stories of six plants enabled me to compare their experiences in the light of the
literature, and try to draw out relevant insights. This is referred to as a multiple case study
As I began to write up my research, and answer some of my questions, I would often realize
that I needed additional clarification from the academic literature, and I would set off on a
fresh search. More frequently, I would realize that I could not yet answer my questions with
the information I had, or another new question would emerge. I compiled these questions in a
document and sent them to relevant people as follow-ups to my interviews. For this follow-up
research, I also benefited from a group of Cornell students who visited Honduras in January
2012, among them Michael Adelman, as part of a Student Multidisciplinary Applied Research
Team (SMART) program out of Cornell’s International Institute for Food, Agriculture and
Development.
Since governance is a concept that is defined very differently throughout the literature a
few words on how I use it are in order. I have used the capitals framework as a proxy for
assessing governance capacity. The relationship between governance and the various
governance capacity in terms of its human and social capital assets, I will also consider the
organization’s ability to access, protect, marshal, and develop the natural, physical and
42
Also, I have used the concept of nested governance for my analysis. That is, for the overall
AguaClara model to be governance to be strong, it need not have all the types of capital at
each level of governance--in each water board, at the local NGO, at Cornell. Each capacity and
type of capital is important, but may be sufficient if found at a certain level. Indeed, requiring
all forms of capital at all levels may be too much to ask, especially at lower levels where some
forms are in short supply (e.g. financial). That would be imposing what is sometimes referred
to as a governance burden.
My research contains a number of limitations. First of all, it relies heavily on interviews. While I
have tried to triangulate in order to verify information, much of the details of the stories of
each of the community come from the perspective of a single person. Having limited access to
the Village Water Boards, their documentation, or records from the operation of the plants,
have had plants for less than three years, which makes it hard to judge what will happen over
a longer period. Some scholars note that many of the problems that assail community-based
managed systems only emerge two or three years after the system is built (Carter et al. 1999);
a study in a few more years may provide much greater insight into my research question. A
related issue is that I’m using a relatively small sample size. Six plants provide some diversity of
experience, but a larger sample would provide for richer comparisons and contrasts.
Notwithstanding these limitations, since this is a project report intended to inform the practice
of the AguaClara program, I think there is value in having identified salient issues that merit
the program’s attention. As their experience matures, AguaClara staff may be able to bring
into better focus the root challenges, and identify solutions to improve their interventions.
43
Analysis
In this section I apply the analysis framework developed through my background research to
the AguaClara model. By going through the major questions relevant to each category of
capital, I hope to gauge the strength of the AguaClara governance model. Before proceeding
with this analysis, however, I will provide a little background of the AguaClara story, and of the
AguaClara Background
The AguaClara program began in 2005 as a collaboration between Cornell University and Agua
Para el Pueblo (APP), a Honduran NGO focused on providing piped water to poor communities
across the country. AguaClara was started by Monroe Weber-Shirk, senior lecturer at Cornell’s
School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, who is the director of the program. Since its
founding, seven AguaClara plants have been built in small rural communities around
Honduras.
The story of AguaClara is shaped by the story of Monroe. Monroe was raised on a small farm in
issues of peace and social justice (Weber-Shirk, CEE website). Monroe volunteered in the early
1980s in Salvadoran refugee camps in western Honduras sponsored by the Mennonite Central
Committee, where he worked as a technical assistant. It was there where he saw first-hand the
impact of poor water and sanitation on people who had the ‘misfortune’ of being born poor.
After taking a degree in Physics at a small Mennonite college in Indiana, he finished his M.S. in
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then spent another year working with the Mennonite Central Committee in Honduras, before
returning to Cornell to continue his research on slow sand filtration for his Ph.D. Receiving his
doctorate in 1992, Monroe has continued his research in technologies for water treatment.
Monroe lost contact with colleagues in Honduras until 2004 when he reconnected with Jacobo
Nuñez, the director of APP. The idea for AguaClara came to Monroe during one of his visits
there, when Nuñez asked Monroe, “What can we do to treat the dirty water that we are
providing to rural communities?” AguaClara was thus born out of a concern for other people,
who happen to have been born with fewer financial resources. Monroe’s continued
commitment to social justice can be seen in the amount of pro-bono work he has put in, the
hours worked, the time spent in Honduras, and the sincerity and quality of his relationships
Eight plants have been built in the last six years in seven communities (one has two parallel
plants). Four communities are located in the Francisco Morazán department, where
Tegucigalpa is, and two in contiguous departments, La Paz and El Paraíso (see map and table
below for summary). A ninth plant is under construction in the department of Santa Barbara.
While all have followed a similar sequence of steps of design, build, operate, train and
transfer, new practices have evolved over the years, which illustrate well issues of governance,
45
Santa Barbara Dept.
The first small-scale gravity powered flocculation/sedimentation plant was built starting in the
fall of 2004 for a town built on a former United Fruit Company banana plantation and known
as “La 34” (interview Antonio, 10/24/11). It is located in the municipality of Cedros, in the
Francisco Morazán department. This was not technically an AguaClara plant, as the program
had not yet started. I include it here because it was the prototype for the AguaClara
technology, designed by a team led by Monroe at Cornell, and it illustrates well what happens
when capitals aside from the physical are neglected. It was a proof of concept that gravity
powered water treatment could work for small communities. The plant was funded by IRWA
(under the direction of Fred Stottlemyer, a friend and mentor of Monroe’s) and did not involve
much community involvement in the construction. APP was not involved at this stage, and
there was no pre construction community agreement on raising the tariff as is currently done.
According to Antonio, while the plant works well, it is not used much, being run only when
46
someone from AguaClara pays the community a visit. This said, the community has elected to
develop a new higher quality water source and no longer uses the water treatment plant.
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The first plant under the auspices of AguaClara was built in 2006 in the municipality of
Ojojona. This is a small town of 2,100 in the department of Francisco Morazán, some 22
miles from the capital city of Tegucigalpa. While maintaining its connections to its
agricultural roots, a significant percentage of people, many of whom are indigenous, make
handcrafts which are sold in markets in the capital (Ojojona, 2007). The plant took over a
year to build, and was financed primarily by third-party funding. The community did
provide wood, stone and about one-fifth of the unskilled labor. AguaClara was building the
very first small scale plant with vertical flow flocculation and vertical flow sedimentation
tanks and did not want to place the cost of the experiment on communities (A. Elvir,
personal interview, 10/24/11). The plant’s capital cost was approximately $68,000, and it
could treat 6.3 liters of water per second. Funding was from IRWA and the Sanjuan
Foundation. The plant lacks a roof, making it an unpleasant place to work when it is
raining. Ojojona has two different water supply sources and the plant only treats one of
the sources. This has been one of the complicating factors and has made setting
The next plant was built in Támara in 2008, a town of about 3,000, located 15 miles to the
before construction began. According to Antonio, it was the Village Water Board (VWB)
itself which approached APP to request a plant be built. The educational, promotional
work was carried out primarily by Antonio Elvir, an APP technician with a background in
community-wide water user meetings. APP also approached local health centers to learn
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more about water-borne diseases in the town, and shared this information at the
meetings. Water samples of untreated and treated water were displayed to show the
difference between them, and the results of laboratory tests with information on fecal
coliform counts and other contaminants were shared. After these meetings the water
users were asked whether they wanted such a plant and if they were willing to pay an
increased tariff (about double the previous one), which APP had calculated beforehand. A
majority (at least “fifty percent plus one” according to Antonio) agreed. They also agreed
to contributing 30-40% of the construction cost by providing materials (such as sand and
bricks) and unskilled volunteer labor. Every water user had to volunteer for one or two
days in order to receive treated water later. This was all formally detailed in a contract
Once the contract with the water users and the VWB was signed, construction and training
began in parallel. Construction took some five months, and was supervised by an APP-
designated engineer, who hired master builders (the community provided a steady stream
of unskilled labor throughout the five months of construction). The Támara plant cost
around $62,000 (not including in-kind and labor contributions), was financed by Rotary
The Marcala plant was completed in 2008 in the department of La Paz, and is the largest
one thus far, with a capacity of 30 liters per second. The six to nine thousand people it
servers are indigenous, and many cultivate coffee (A. Elvir, personal communication,
5/2/12). Similar to “La 34”, this plant was built under the supervision of IRWA, who also
provided over half of the $64,000 needed for construction (Smith, personal
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communication, 3/22/12). The rest was provided by the municipality. IRWA also provided
training for the operators, though APP assisted in the training. Agua y Desarrollo
The next plant built is referred to as “Cuatro Comunidades”, as it serves four small, rural
villages in the Francisco Morazán department. APP had been working there previously to
improve their water distribution system and had a relationship with the people and water
boards in the villages. The plant is small with a capacity of 6.3 liters per second and serves
around 1500 people and was completed in spring of 2009. The VWB is comprised of
representatives of each of the four communities. It cost around $49,000, most of which
was given by CESAL and Alianza por el Agua, two Spanish development NGOs, along with
The following four plants have mostly followed the format described above, and the
procedure has been further systematized by APP, who by this time had become the only
implementation partner on the ground in Honduras. The next plant built was in Agalteca, a
small municipality about 37 miles to the north of the country’s capital. This plant was
financed by friends of AguaClara, an Italian mining company (Five Star Mining), and the
municipality, and others. The capital cost was around $58,000, and the capacity is 6 liters
per second, and serves 380 households. It was completed in June of 2010.
The next two plants were completed in 2011. One was an expansion to the plant at
Marcala. This was a second plant that provided an extra 22 liters per second of treated
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water. This enabled Marcala to abandon their second water source that had served a
significant fraction of the town. The decision to expand the capacity of the first water
source was based on the concept that it would be more economical to have plant
operators running parallel treatment trains at a single site rather than requiring a whole
new set of plant operators to run a second facility at a different location. It was financed
The Alauca plant was built as part of a CARE international project, who had been working
in the municipality, with financing from the Swiss government (through its development
agency, COSUDE). The plant has a design flow of 12 liters per second and is intended to
A ninth plant, in the municipality of Atima in the Santa Barbara department, is currently
under construction, and slated to be completed in 2012. Many of the 3,300 people it will
serve are connected to coffee cultivation. Estimated costs are $76,530. This is being
funded by Rotary International, and for the first time includes in its budget the time APP
staff are dedicating to it. There is also a cross-subsidized tariff scheme proposed for the
town, which has not yet been approved by the Assembly of Water Users.
In general, the process from design to transfer takes about a year: one month for
community research and education, five months for construction and training, and
AguaClara has seven more sites pending for plants, including San Nicolas in Santa Barbara,
San Vicente in Santa Barbara, La Libertad, Santa Rita in Copan (AguaClara Website,
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“Project Sites”, n.d.), with another half a dozen identified as potential sites, with requisite
water source, turbidity problems, population size and capacity to pay an adequate tariff to
Organizational Scheme
While the general division of labor is that Cornell handles the development of the technology
and APP the implementation, and the Village Water Boards (VWBs) the day to day operations,
this arrangement has evolved over the years and has grown in complexity.
AguaClara's governance model--which encompasses how decisions and policy are made, and
how they are implemented--may be looked at on three levels, international, national, and
local. The international level is comprised of what is called the AguaClara Research, Invent,
Design, and Empower (RIDE) Group, at Cornell University, and of Donor Organizations. The
RIDE Group, which is made up of undergraduate and graduate students, and led by Dr. Weber-
Shirk, with the support of other professors, is dedicated to advancing the design of the
treatment plants and developing the sustainable processes that they employ. They do
Small teams of students work all semester on the project, and one question may require
various semesters to address. Students can and do take the class several semesters in a row.
Some students become experts, and guide the work of other teams, and organize the class
itself. Groups of 15-20 students have been visiting Honduras every year since 2004. In the last
few years about 50 students have been enrolled in the course at any given time.
Although the RIDE Group operates within the university framework, some additional funding is
required here. The RIDE Group typically has two to three paid research assistants, who are
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MS/PhD students in the School of Civil and Environmental Engineering advised by Monroe and
Dr. Len Lion. These students are sometimes supported by departmental teaching
assistantships, but the AguaClara RIDE Group must sometimes pay them with funds from
supporting foundations or research grants. In addition to the graduate students, the major
expenses for the RIDE Group come from purchasing equipment and supplies such as pumps,
Once a new treatment process or a technical improvement has been developed in the lab, it is
taken to the field. Students again participate in this. Technical innovations are often field-
tested at AguaClara plants during the annual student trip, and students from the RIDE Group
may spend additional time in the field as new technologies are brought to scale. The
AguaClara engineers in Honduras play an important role in the sharing of information among
the RIDE Group, the APP staff, and the plant operators. Technical insights from the lab work
are added to plant operating procedures and training materials in the field. Similarly, feedback
from the APP civil engineer and social technician and from the plant operators helps inform
The innovations are all considered ‘open-source engineering’, and are shared freely. The RIDE
Group disseminates its technical insights and treatment process on its own website and
through academic conferences and publications. This way, the knowledge is available to the
public and not ‘hidden’ through patents or copyrights. The students in the course have also
put together an automated design tool (AguaClara, “Automated Design Tool”, n.d.), to help
communities come up with technical drawings for a treatment plant according to their
specifications and needs. AguaClara offers this design service for free, and it greatly simplifies
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The other component of the international level of governance is the donor organizations--
though these can be considered in some sense as external agencies to AguaClara. These have
contributed the funds needed for the capital costs of constructing the plants. CARE
International, International Rural Water Association (IRWA), Rotary International and the
Cooperazione Rurale in Africa e America Latina (ACRA)--an Italian NGO--, Spanish cooperation,
and Swiss cooperation (COSUDE), are among the donors. In the early years Monroe helped
raise this funding for capital costs. It is now the focus of AguaClara Engineers working for APP
along with the APP grant writer. There is some evidence of small towns beginning to take a
more active role in obtaining funding. Aside from providing financing, some of these
international organizations have also provided technical assistance and training (IRWA, e.g.),
or helped connect AguaClara to communities and done some of the preliminary legwork.
The second level of governance is found on a national level, and is currently represented by
Agua Para el Pueblo (APP), a Honduran NGO founded in 1984 with decades of experience in
the water treatment sector. APP is considered “the implementation partner” and is in charge
of the relationship with the local communities where the plants are built, overseeing
construction of the plant, training the water boards and operators, and doing follow-up
support. APP is a small NGO of 11 staff, five of whom work exclusively on AguaClara projects,
including Cornell engineering graduates. APP has a long track record of working with
communities on water projects, and has contacts with national water service organizations,
and national level water networks, such as the Red de Agua y Saneamiento de Honduras (RAS-
HON), a network comprised of public sector officials, NGOs, and international donors, which
receives the support of CARE, IRC, and the European Union, among others (RAS-HON website,
undated). APP is dependent on external funding, and has in the past received support from
USAID, and European development agencies. Antonio mentioned that in the last few years it
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has struggled to find donors for its projects, and is just struggling to survive (personal
communication, 2/7/12).
For the last few years, there have been a few Cornell engineering students who after
graduating have gone to work for APP full-time. They have acted as links between the RIDE
Group and APP, the implementation partner, and helped in a number of roles, including grant-
The local governance functions primarily reside in the Juntas Administradoras de Agua, usually
translated as “Village Water Boards” (Kayser, 2011) and abbreviated VWBs. They coordinate
various parts of the construction, oversee operations and maintenance of the plant after
construction, hire and pay operators, set and collect tariffs, and resolve conflicts and problems
at the local level. These are nationally-mandated bodies, and according to national legislation,
are elected every two years by all water users of that community (interview Antonio,
10/24/11). Generally, the VWB have a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, ‘fiscal’,
and two other voting members all of whom work on a voluntary basis (APP, “Estructura JAA y
sus Estatutos”, n.d.). They are supposed to serve a maximum of two two-year terms, although
this isn’t always practiced or enforced. The deputy mayor is also a member, with voice but not
voting powers. In one of the AguaClara plants local operations are under municipal control,
The local level has several layers itself. The general assembly, made up of all water users elects
the VWB (which in Figure 3 is erroneously is referred to as the Municipal Water Board) and
makes big decisions about whether to build or not, to raise tariffs, etc. The VWB is the non-
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profit that owns and manages the water and sanitation systems. Under the VWB may be a few
Antonio mentioned that these committees do function, especially during the construction
phase; after construction is over they cease meeting (Antonio Elvir, personal communication,
1/4/12).
APP has been working on creating a fourth level of governance, that of the inter-community
level (A. Elvir, personal interview, 10/24/11). In 2010 several meetings of representatives of
VWBs were organized to share learning and problems and discuss the creation of an
Association of Water Boards that use the AguaClara technology. APP hopes that this level may
be where long-term technical support may be financed. APP could still provide a technician to
visit plants regularly, but the Association would pay for that support. APP could then focus
more attention on new construction, and other short-term training and technical support
needs.
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Although external to AguaClara governance, so to speak, there are also associations of water
boards on national and regional levels. The national association of local boards is the AHJASA
Water Board Administrators. AHJASA represents 500 boards and provides technical and
administrative assistance and a space for sharing experiences and information (AHJASA site,
undated). There are also Asociaciones de Juntas de Agua Municipales (AJAMs) which are
regional or municipal association of boards representing rural communities. There are some 50
relevance, though similarly external to AguaClara governance, are the national regulatory and
(SANAA), which is charged with offering technical support, the Consejo Nacional de Agua
Potable y Saneamiento (CONASA), responsible for goal and policy setting, and the Ente
Regulador de los Servicios de Agua Potable y Saneamiento (ERSAPS), which regulates and
supervises water and sanitation services. These are explained in greater detail in a section
below.
The Technology
AguaClara has developed technology for treating surface water with over 500 NTU
turbidity (NTU, a turbidity measure). These waters have high concentrations of organic
and inorganic solids, and are not suitable for human consumption. Furthermore, high
reacts quickly with the organics in highly turbid water and does not kill the pathogens that
make people sick (Díaz Ordóñez et al., 2009). For chlorination to be effective turbidity has to
be low. Most of Honduras’s water sources are surface water, e.g. rivers and streams, and
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have problems of turbidity that have been exacerbated by deforestation and increased
agricultural activity. Turbidity is at its worst during the rainy season (May to November in
the interior of the country, where the plants are located), when torrential downpours
wash tons of sediment into the river. Turbidity can reach thousands of NTU during high
runoff events. Untreated water, which is the norm in most rural villages, will look brown
The AguaClara plant is designed to reduce turbidity through a process of flocculation and
sedimentation. Flocculation is the clumping of particles together, which then weigh more
and settle to the bottom (sedimentation). To get particles to clump, operators add a
chemical (aluminum sulfate or polyaluminum chloride), and then make the water zigzag
through compartments to get the particles to bump into each other and grow in size. The
flocculated water then passes to a sedimentation tank where the flocs settle to the
bottom and the clear water rises to the top. Chlorine is added to the clean water to kill
component of filtration, using “stacked rapid sand filters” to further reduce turbidity to
Key innovations of the AguaClara technology include: it doesn’t require electricity, as the
water flows through gravity and all materials used for construction and treatment are locally
available. Plant design can also be done automatically with the AguaClara design tool, in
response to the required flow rate and the dimensions of the materials that will be used in
construction.
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Honduran Context
As mentioned in the introduction, a 2004 Zamorano study of 43 rural water systems found
that most were doing poorly--with 88% of them lacking chlorination and 70% with excessive
coliform counts (Zamorano, 2004). The same study found that while 70% of water systems
charge a tariff that is sufficient to cover O&M, 80% of these have trouble collecting payments.
In urban areas the situation doesn’t seem to be much better. Monroe suggested that none of
the more sophisticated, electricity dependent systems in Honduran cities are working well due
to reliance on technologies with high failure rates and design errors (personal conversation,
8/30/11). A Honduran government study, however, estimated that 75% of urban dwellers and
The legal framework for the water and sanitation sector in Honduras underwent significant
changes in 2003, when a new ‘water law’ was passed which called for decentralization in water
and sanitation services. This law is called the “Ley Marco del Sector Agua”. The Sistema
for all water and sanitation systems, but following the new law was to assume the role of
technical assistance provider. This devolved the responsibility of owning and operating water
and sanitation systems to the municipal or community level. While SANAA is still in the process
of devolving some systems, like Tegucigalpa, many municipalities and rural communities have
already assumed control of their systems. The law calls for non-profit Juntas Administrativas
authorities to administer the systems, and establishes the rules and procedures for their
creation and operation. As mentioned before, VWBs must be non-profit entities whose officers
work on a voluntary basis. They must be elected for terms of two years, and can’t serve more
than two terms. They also have to have a bank account, and certain control of the finances,
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including co-signing transactions and yearly audits. While the law stipulates public ownership
of the sector, there are a few exceptions. The large city of San Pedro Sula has a 30-year
contract with a private company, and a few municipalities have a mixed system.
The law also called for two new institutions: one with responsibility for setting policy and
developing sector plans, which is the Consejo Nacional de Agua Potable y Saneamiento
(CONASA website, undated), overseen by the Ministry of Health. Regulatory functions are the
responsibility of the other institution, the Ente Regulador de los Servicios de Agua Potable y
Saneamiento (ERSAPS). The ERSAPS site does list the functions of ERSAPS to regulate and
supervise water provision in Honduras, but nowhere is there a list of actual regulations
(ERSAPS site, undated). CONASA, however, does have on its site a list of policies, strategies and
key actors, though the list is brief (CONASA website, undated). While these institutions exist, a
2010 UN report notes that Honduras is one of the few countries without policies regarding
water (UN-GLAAS 2010). The same report, however, did list Honduras as having defined and
operationalized institutional roles for setting and implementing policy (39) and does have
annual reviews of goals and progress (42). It also has a program for investing in rural water
systems, but not one for urban water (41). Honduras also received a good score for budget
The national government has also sponsored the Plataforma del Agua de Honduras, which
brings together representatives from the above agencies with their counterparts from civil
society and the international development community (UNDP, n.d.) to collaborate on water
resource management issues. The Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social (FHIS) is another
government institution that channels funding from national funds and international donors to
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projects to meet the basic needs of the population, including water projects (FHIS website,
n.d.)
Having looked at AguaClara’s story and the Honduran institutional context I will now proceed
Analysis
The intent of this research is to assess the strength of AguaClara’s governance model, which is
one of the program’s essential components for effective, long-lasting work with a large impact.
framework. That is, I’m looking at the extent which AguaClara has access to, and can marshal,
sustain its high-quality water treatment plants. The framework for analysis is based on a close
Natural Capital
This refers primarily to the water source. In my analysis I treat this as a given. AguaClara only
goes in to communities that have adequate surface running water to feed the plant. However,
it may be helpful to mention here a potential concern. If the water source is not owned by the
VWB or community, this can seriously impede the community’s efforts to have regular, safe,
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and clean water. Also, the function of the Watershed committee is to protect this resource,
Physical Capital
This is perhaps AguaClara’s strongest capital, as it is the treatment plant which has received
sustained attention and research for over six years by hundreds of minds. The treatment plant
has demonstrated its capacity to provide consistent amounts of clean water at a relatively low
cost. There is strong evidence demonstrating that rural water users highly value this service,
showing this support by voluntarily paying up to twice the amount they formerly paid for the
same amount of water in their homes. They produce water that meets Honduran and WHO
standards, and it looks like the latest generation of plants will meet U.S. standards for turbidity
(NTU < 0.3). These plants provide quality water far above the UN’s definition of an ‘improved’
source; it is potable--something we (reader and writer) would be willing to drink or offer our
children. The plants offer almost continuous service, and provide an amount of water per
person per day that exceeds numerous standards: Lockwood and Smits (2011), for example,
recommend a standard of 60 liters/day/person, and the plants supply well over 100
technologies: they are made and operated with inputs that are available locally; they don’t rely
on electricity; they can be run by local people; and may cost less than any other technology
that provides a similar level of water quality and volume. While the technology comes from
the international level of governance, one might argue that it has been designed to be
accessible to all levels of the governance model. That AguaClara has made the design an open
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The success of AguaClara’s plant design may be judged using the same criteria that Ostrom
(1994) laid out for governance policy and structure, namely, that it must match the natural,
human, and cultural resources of the area in which it is built. Monroe made this point: “The
technology must be designed to match the institutional capacity. Thus the appropriateness of
assessed in context” (personal communication, 2/12/12).By being sensitive to the cultural and
natural environment, the AguaClara plants reduce the amount of other capital—e.g. financial,
human—necessary for proper plant functioning. That they don’t eliminate the need for other
But stepping back from the water treatment plant, there are two issues of concern. The first
has to do with non-plant related infrastructure, such as the distribution system. In the
communities where AguaClara has worked this infrastructure existed previously to AguaClara’s
interventions and may be of variable quality. Water pipes that are of poor quality, poorly
designed, and poorly maintained can lead to water leaks, which in turn leads to reduced water
pressure, and decreased water availability for some households. Faulty pipes can also lead to
the contamination of the water after it has been treated, especially when service has starts
and stops (Lee and Schwab 2005). This does not seem to have happened in AguaClara’s
experience, though it is good to be aware of the potential problem. AguaClara did face a
serious problem with leaky water pipes in Marcala, however (Smith, 2010). There, leaky pipes
raised demand for water above levels that the plant was able to treat effectively, leading to
suboptimal water.
Just as there can be problems after the water is treated, there can be problems before, too. In
Agalteca, the “obra de toma”--the pipe that brings in water from the river to the plant--is in
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poor condition. This has led to numerous breakdowns, with Antonio estimating that the plant
If AguaClara is to be guided by its vision to provide sufficient, clean, reliable water to poor
people, then it has to continue to look beyond the plant, and think about these broader issues.
Along the same lines, if the reason it values clean water is the impact on health and quality of
life, then it has to look at not only the water going in to homes, but also to that water’s egress.
If sewage water is untreated then further contamination problems are pushed downstream.
We must not underestimate the importance of physical (infrastructure) capital. But we must
not overestimate it either. Infrastructure has traditionally received the most attention in water
projects, still does. This may indicate an entrenched paradigm in the field and we must take
care not to fall in the rut. Antonio himself spoke of his previous work with USAID installing
water treatment plants that were fated to short lives due to their myopic focus on
infrastructure. Monroe has suggested that AguaClara’s technical strength may be able to
compensate for other areas where capital is weak. This is quite plausible. The question is to
what extent one capital can compensate another. As Ostrom says (1999), human and social
capital are necessary “complementary” inputs to physical infrastructure. Gasteyer was more
direct: “Don’t think that just because you have a good technology it will be sustainable”
(interview, 10/17/11).
Furthermore, infrastructure can be a means for destroying social capital. Fabricius and Collins
(2007) suggest that large infrastructure projects carried out in a top-down manner may end up
disempowering local governance efforts, reducing their possibilities for effective water system
management. Even though, as noted earlier, AguaClara’s technology has many elements that
are pro-poor, if the plants had been built by outside experts, they might have had this
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disempowering effect. By involving communities in decision-making, construction and
management, AguaClara may circumvent this issue, but it serves as an important reminder
Financial Capital
In order to assess AguaClara’s ability to access and leverage financial capital it will be useful to
look at the different areas of expenditure incurred over a plant’s lifetime. These fall into three
categories: engineering studies, construction (capital costs, which includes initial construction
and subsequent major repairs or expansions), and operation and maintenance (O&M). This is a
simplification. There are other activities such as training that are an integral part of the
Having an open-access design tool and a continuous group of engineering students working on
AguaClara projects reduces the engineering studies costs significantly. This is a significant
strength of the project, as this first step can often be a significant barrier for small
communities. There has recently (2012) been an instance of a community offering to pay APP
O&M costs also seem to be well accounted for in the model. Numerous scholars have written
about the imperative of total cost recovery for at least the O&M costs (see, e.g., Carter et al.
1999), which in AguaClara’s case, include salaries for the operators, purchase of chemicals, and
some administrative costs. AguaClara seems to have achieved this. There seem to be at least
three factors behind this success. First, the treatment technology produces abundant and
clean water at a relatively low cost. The average tariff is approximately $2.90 a month per
household. This figure is calculated by APP based on estimates of salaries for operators,
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chemicals, office supplies, etc. Based on figures provided by APP, average household size is 5-6
people, so this works out to be around $0.50 a month per person, or $6.00 a year per person.
Carter et al. (1999) suggested providing the service at £2/year, which in today’s terms is
around $4.50. While the AguaClara plants fall short of this, considering that the minimum
salary in Honduras is $250/month (A. Elvir, personal interview, 10/24/11), and that the going
rate for a farmhand is $5/day (ibid.), this rate does not seem inordinate. It represents between
There is sometimes a challenge of getting communities to accept even this tariff level,
however. Antonio has listed this as one of the most significant obstacles to overcome at the
Ojojona plant, for example. That users are remiss to a tariff increase is not surprising, since the
increase represents an almost doubling of the previous rate (on average, $1.64/month).
A second reason AguaClara has been able to cover O&M costs is that, as mentioned earlier,
people are both willing to pay and do pay the water tariffs. Antonio mentioned that the
demonstration of the treatment process, showing the water quality before and after, helped
convince people to support the construction of the plant and provided the primary motivation
to pay. Some wealthier members of the community who would otherwise be buying bottled
water may even end up saving money on water through the plant. (There may also be some
incentive for some to think about using the treatment plant to bottle potable water and sell it
to other communities.) Antonio estimates payment rates to be high, though he didn’t have
exact figures. He said that all plants are covering O&M, and some are saving for repairs or
other needs in the future. Tariffs cover O&M in Agalteca, but according to Antonio they have
been unmotivated to save because the plant is receiving subsidies from a Canadian mine that
operates there.
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Total cost recovery isn’t just achieved when everybody pays the required amount. The
administrators then have to properly manage the funds, paying employees on time, and
setting aside money for maintenance. This third factor hasn’t always been easy to achieve,
according to Antonio, but the VWBs seem to be doing it. However, this has to do more with
The third category of costs is capital costs. This component of financial capital may be one of
the biggest impediments towards the widespread diffusion of the AguaClara system. While
there have been hypotheses that water users themselves could support these costs if
amortized into their (higher) monthly water fees (Atkinson Center discussion, 10/7/2011),
these hypothesis are untested and unproven. So far AguaClara has depended on third party
funding, mostly from international NGOs such as CARE, Rotary and IRWA. Some individuals
There are at least two factors that mitigate the challenge of capital financing. First, capital
costs for AguaClara plants are lower than for other comparable technologies (Adelman, 2011).
Second, communities contribute significantly towards defraying the (lower) capital costs.
Antonio estimates that communities offer 30-40% of the total cost through in-kind
contributions of materials and labor. This is evidence of how social capital--trust, cooperation,
and capacity to organize--can be transmuted, so to speak, into financial capital. More on this
But the technology’s lower costs and the community’s ability to finance some of that do not
solve the problem. AguaClara struggles to find funding to further expand the service to other
villages and municipalities. And this capacity to find funding is found only among a few people
in the whole structure. One person who helped train AguaClara staff in fundraising skills said
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that there are currently only three AguaClara engineers working with APP right now with these
skills, two of whom are leaving shortly (interview with Chuck Brown, 11/6/11). The one who is
staying has just begun receiving some training on writing grants. While capacity to write grants
is also found at Cornell, Monroe and some other colleagues and university contacts are
Capital financing is also needed to support major repairs or expansions to water systems. The
plants are designed for 20 years (Antonio, interview, 10/24/11), and Gasteyer remarked that
the capacity to bring resources in for capital improvements or repairs was a crucial component
of ensuring system sustainability. Charles Brown, too, thought this was one of two key
challenges for AguaClara’s success, and commented that the plant at Ojojona already needed
an infusion of capital to bring it up to par, yet capital was not forthcoming. Monroe suggested
the difficulties in raising funds might be more connected to the plant’s lack of a roof, the fact
that only half of the community’s water is treated, and the intentions of the water board
(personal communication, 2/12/12). As a result of these factors, the community does not
value the plant sufficiently to raise the necessary funds for its upkeep. This argument shows,
There is a final category of costs that are external to the plant per se, which have to do with
questions of equity and access. This refers to money needed to connect those who are
currently not benefitting from the water system. This may require subsidizing the water tariff
for some; it may also require putting in pipes to connect them to the grid. Connecting the poor
and Monroe has expressed interest in exploring tariff schemes with cross-subsidies. This is one
area of focus needed for AguaClara’s program to have a greater impact, and reach the poorest.
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It will involve close consultations with VWBs and community members and leaders. According
to a recent communication with Antonio, Atima is considering this type of tariff (Antonio,
water meters (SANAA website, n.d.), and AguaClara may find their scheme useful.
While some authors have said that ultimately water systems need to be supported by different
Antonio stated that the government “neither helps nor interferes” (10/24/11), and he did not
expect to receive financial support anytime in the future. The government does seem to have
some funds for water projects, however, and an institution to channel these, the Fondo
Hondureño de Inversión Social (FHIS). A 2010 UN report states that Honduras is receiving
between 50-75% of financing needed to meet the MDG goals regarding water and sanitation
national budget (Antonio, personal communication, 4/9/12), which could be used to cover
water and sanitation expenses. Partial funding for the Alauca plant came from the
municipality.
The discussion above illustrates how, although the capitals are listed separately, they are quite
interconnected. In this case, accessing funds to finance capital costs depends on different
capitals—the community’s own local resources (financial capital), the ability of the
organization to fundraise and manage funds (social capital), the relationships to people and
institutions with capital (political capital), and the specific capacity of individuals within the
Social Capital
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This is the main focus on my analysis. As can be seen in the chart presented earlier I have
divided up this into four interrelated areas, to which I’ve assigned the headings of ‘Community
Community ownership and trust are the sine qua non of any community-based resource
management program. Carter et al. (1999) ascribe this as one of the chief reasons why water
systems are not sustained. It is axiomatic that if the community doesn’t take responsibility for
the system, this will fall into disrepair. Similarly, relationships based on trust significantly
These categories are not suited to a binary assessment--that is, it doesn’t make sense to talk
about either having full trust or none at all--but rather should be looked at falling somewhere
on a wide spectrum. That said, there are numerous indicators of community ownership and
First, high payment rates suggest that the communities feel ownership for the plants and
recognize the legitimacy of the VWBs as managers. As cited earlier, 80% of rural water systems
in a study carried out by Zamorano University had difficulties collecting payments (Zamorano,
2004), even though tariffs were generally about half of AguaClara’s. In contrast, Antonio
reports that AguaClara communities have high payment rates. For example, Antonio cited the
case of Agalteca where, during the five years prior to AguaClara’s intervention, only 5000
lempiras (about $250) were collected; whereas the VWB has collected over 120,000 lempiras
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An example of the importance of community ownership can be found in AguaClara’s origins.
Before the program was officially started, the “La 34” plant was built on a piece of land owned
by the Standard Fruit Company using technology Monroe and his students developed. As
recounted earlier, this was a test of the technology and they did not require community
inputs. APP was not involved at the time, and there had not been much community
involvement in the decision making, or the kind of community education that Antonio has
done with later communities. According to Antonio, the lack of community involvement and
education--that is, the community did not receive visits explaining the importance of treated
water and the impact on people’s lives--has led to the plant being underutilized. Antonio
suspects that it is only made to function when he comes around to visit, and that typically the
community’s water quality has not improved. This also underscores the importance of
Marcala, too, may illustrate a similar lack of ownership. There, the plant is run by the
municipal government. It had a history of problems of delivering and receiving the chemicals
for treating the water (Smith, 2010). At times the chemicals would be delivered late; at times
they would be left far from the plant, at the bottom of a steep hill. This may be an indication
that people involved did not care enough for the plant to ensure proper delivery. That the
problem was solved only when IRWA, an international NGO stepped in, also suggests that the
Community participation is both an indicator of ownership and trust and is conducive to the
sense of ownership. The main space for broad community participation is in the “Asamblea
General”, the assembly of water users which elects board members and makes major policy
decisions. This assembly is engaged early on in the project, and community members have to
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vote on whether they want AguaClara or not. Antonio estimated that community participation
is greatest in the smaller communities (size is one of the ‘structural variables’ conducive to
successful community endeavors [Ostrom 2010]), and estimated that 70-90% of water users
attended these meetings. The assemblies, however, after the initial period of education and
Since the assemblies are comprised of paying water customers, those who aren’t connected to
the water system don’t have a voice there. This is an obstacle towards addressing the concerns
Women are generally the ones whose lives are most affected by the quality of the water
system, since they are the ones who are generally in charge of water collection and
purification, and cooking and cleaning, which require water. Giving women a voice in
assemblies is crucial therefore to ensure the system is designed in a way that meets the
consumers’ needs. Like in most countries in the world, women in Honduras are not afforded
equal standing; however, these patterns of oppression appear to be shifting, albeit slowly. One
it would show that a stakeholder that is both key and traditionally discriminated against--
mentioned earlier, women comprised 15% of the membership of VWBs. In AguaClara, women
constitute 23% of VWB membership in the five communities with water boards. The sixth
system, Marcala, is run by the municipality (though the director of water services there is a
woman). The slightly higher average number suggests a small improvement in female
representation in the AguaClara systems. But there is still considerable distance to go.
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AguaClara is aware of this challenge, and includes gender balance as a goal that VWBs should
Flora (2004) points out that the more elements of participation employed—e.g. reflecting on
the community’s own resources and context, building a shared vision, consulting on problems
that arise, and listening to diverse ideas—the greater the strength of diverse capitals. It is
significant, therefore, that in the AguaClara model community participation is not limited to
the plants. Antonio said that the contract communities sign requires each household to send
workers for one or two days to the site, volunteers which Antonio and the VWBs help
coordinate. This helps bring down capital costs (strengthening ‘financial capital’, in a way).
However, participation is not without its own challenges. Those who do not work on
construction are later denied access to the water, for example, unless they pay a steep fee
Community members also participate in different committees under the VWB (APP, “JAA y sus
Estatutos”, n.d.). These include construction and repairs committee, in charge of organizing
the volunteer labor for construction, and then making repairs; the ‘Saneamiento Basico’
fomenting the use of latrines; and the Watershed committee, responsible for protecting the
watershed by delimiting it, getting recognition of it as a protected area, and keeping it clean
(ibid.). These generally are most active at the beginning of the project.
The AguaClara projects include several of the ‘structural variables’ that influence collective
action (Ostrom 2010): communities are small, they are dealing with common-pool resources,
which are subtractive (i.e. get used up), and there is face-to-face communication between
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members of the community, both through formal meetings and through everyday contact. The
variables that are associated with an iterative process are also present, such as information
about people’s past actions, and the opportunity for individuals to enter or exit at will. While
I’m not sure whether information about people’s payments is publicly available or not,
community members were able to see who contributed to the construction and who did not.
In one community, this knowledge has been used against those who didn’t participate, and are
not being allowed to join unless they pay a sizable fee (interview Charles Brown, 11/6/11).
Ostrom has indicated that individual-level variables of reputation, trust and reciprocity can be
positively reinforcing. One area in which we might be witnessing this positive feedback is in
the Cornell team’s participation with APP and the communities. Antonio expressed total
appreciation for and trust in the Cornell staff. He also mentioned that the presence of Cornell
students working hard on the plants during construction helped inspire community residents
to participate as well. Other community members have echoed the appreciation for the
Cornell team, calling them part of the “family” (Gonzalez, 2012). That Monroe and the Cornell
program have not received money from the Tech Award --all $50,000 went to APP (personal
trustworthiness. Monroe’s personal values of respect and love for the people in these small
communities can be seen in the immense dedication he has given to the project, and in his
respect for local decision-making. This was apparent in a personal communication in which he
expressed his yearning for universal water coverage in the towns that AguaClara serves, but
This iterative and self-reinforcing process may also be seen in the increased community
confidence and trust in the VWBs and the plant. Antonio mentioned that while initially only a
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very slight majority of water users may have voted to approve the AguaClara plant, after a few
months of receiving clear, regular water, those who were initially opposed became some of its
Good management
The second category of social capital I’m considering is good management, which is seen in the
extent to which the water system’s structures, policies and practices are efficient, transparent
and fair. This includes having appropriate rules for participation, spaces for it, sanctions for
misappropriation, formal contracts and commitments for various parties, oversight and
The VWB are supposed to have regulations and statutes, be formally incorporated, and have
up-to-date lists of members and of their pay schedules (APP, “JAA y sus Estatutos”, n.d.), and
according to Antonio, all AguaClara plants have these. All VWBs must have a bank account, and
at least two members must sign all checks. Antonio spends time helping the treasurer keep his
or her books in order. Antonio also mentioned that communities are sanctioning members
that fall behind on payments, first with a notice and then by cutting off service. He attributes
higher rates of payment in the communities with AguaClara technologies to these punitive
measures. VWBs have also handled other forms of free loading. In Ojojona, the VWB decided
to place water meters on several households found to be using and wasting excessive water,
which was leaving less for other households, and placing an excessive demand on the
treatment plant. Antonio expressed interest in metering all households, as he felt this was an
effective way of getting people to appreciate and pay for what they use.
In towns with AguaClara plants, most VWBs meet monthly (A. Elvir, personal interview,
10/24/11) and keep minutes of decisions. This is part of the criteria AguaClara uses when
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determining where to build a plant, and part of the work Antonio does to help strengthen the
boards. Plant operators also keep records. AguaClara has placed a lot of emphasis on water
quality, and operators keep track of this by taking regular measurements of turbidity, and
writing down the inputs they’ve used and the activities carried out during their shift (A. Elvir,
personal interview, 10/24/11). These books are in order, as AguaClara directly monitors this.
Fabricius and Collins (2007) point out the importance of having formal contracts for employees
as well as mechanisms for getting rid of those who are dishonest. According to Antonio
(personal communication, 1/4/12), only the operators in Ojojona and Marcala have contracts;
the others do not. No contracts may make it easier for VWBs to fire operators, but it takes
away both an incentive for operators, and leaves them without clear guidance as to what their
rights and responsibilities are. VWBs do use their authority to cut the service of those who
don’t pay, as well as to fire operators who are not doing their job well. This occurred in
Támara, where, according to Antonio, the operator had left the plant under someone else’s
care for two or three days. The VWB “punished” him with no pay for a week, and the operator
Getting rid of underperforming board members may be more difficult, however, since they are
elected by the body of water users, and traditional distributions of power may play a big role
in election outcomes. In Ojojona, in spite of national regulations that stipulate that members
can serve a maximum of two consecutive two-year terms, the VWB members haven’t changed
since the plant was built in 2006. Antonio suggested that water users allowed this because
there they participate little in decision-making. According to him, this apathy was
characteristic of larger towns, since Ojojona is like a “mini-city”. He was concerned about the
board members in Ojojona in part because money has gone missing and people haven’t been
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held responsible. A 2008 student paper on AguaClara projects provides more insight into these
problems in Ojojona (Kite, 2008). The paper states that the VWB had not raised the tariffs even
after a year in operation, and consequently, the plant didn’t have enough money to buy the
chemicals needed to treat the water. It quoted an intern working in Honduras explaining,
"several members of the Junta have political aspirations, and this likely makes them reluctant
to raise the tariff," especially since elections were coming up (ibid., no page numbers).
But Ojojona was the community that had received the least attention in terms of community
education and capacity building, and so it is less surprising that they faced such problems. In
another community (Agalteca) that had received Antonio’s training, for example, a Board
member who had embezzled funds was evicted from the board.
Furthermore, some of Ojojona’s problems were overcome. According to Antonio, the greatest
challenge that AguaClara faced at Ojojona was changing the water tariff. APP had calculated
that in order to pay for the minimum operation and maintenance costs--including paying the
salaries of the technicians and the chemicals needed for treatment--the tariff would have to
Antonio stated that he had to visit the community several times to convince them that the
increase was necessary. “After a lot of social and educational work we were able to get people
to pay the 53 lempiras regularly. This is what has enabled the plant to continue operating”.
This story also touches on the question of incentives, highlighted in the literature as important
for sustainable community management. In Ojojona, the board members might have been
staying on in order to make a little money off the operations. Antonio suggested that there is
little motivation for the VWB members to do a good job, since the national framework states
that they must be volunteers. He believes that board members should be able to get paid.
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Similarly, the main incentive for operators to do their work well, according to Antonio, is their
salary. While they receive a minimum wage (about $250 a month), this is often seen as a good
deal in rural areas where stable work is scarce. Before, the operators in charge of the water
system were paid a pittance, which led to their and the system’s underperformance. While
Antonio fixated on wages as incentives, there appear to be other non-monetary incentives for
VWB members and other volunteers that may be contributing to better management. For
example, an incentive for those who volunteer during construction is the possibility of
receiving clean water. Following construction, there are incentives that have to do with
community recognition, and the opportunity to offer a service to one’s community and
participate in its betterment. Antonio suggested that this desire to see one’s community
improve was behind the strength of the VWB in Támara. Perhaps this incentive is stronger
than a pecuniary one. Monetary incentives can sometimes backfire. In Ojojona at least some
of the unskilled labor was not volunteer but paid, and Antonio believed that this led to an
Ojojona’s travails also highlight the importance of monitoring and oversight in a successful
governance model. APP provides much of this for the technical aspects of the plant’s
functioning, with Antonio accompanying the operator for much of the first three months of
operation. VWBs are also checked on to see that they are meeting, and have their books in
order. VWBs are required by law to have yearly audits of their accounts, which provides
another level of monitoring. However, this is an internal audit, done by the ‘fiscal’ member of
the Board. Another level of oversight comes from the Ministry of Health, which periodically
tests water quality and lets APP, and presumably the VWB, know when it is deficient
(interview Antonio, 10/24/11). Donors also monitor APP, especially keeping tabs on spending.
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Accessible mechanisms of conflict-resolution are another element towards successful
community-based resource management (Ostrom, 1990). There are several mechanisms for
resolving conflict within AguaClara’s nested governance model. First, there are the general
assemblies and VWBs. In both of these venues problems can be hashed out by members of the
community. Grievances can also be aired to the local authorities. And APP, too, may help solve
Good management is also key to maintaining high motivation and trust. As Ostrom points out,
while these and other elements of social capital can be self-reinforcing, they also can
deteriorate rapidly. In Agalteca, one of the Board members siphoned money from the water
system. Although he was run out of town, this incident was a blow to the community. It took
time to rebuild trust in the system, and get users to continue paying their water tariffs (A. Elvir,
important for learning, maintaining motivation and disarming potential conflicts (Fabricius and
Collins, 2007, 93-4). In AguaClara there are spaces in which such dialogue takes place. The
research group at Cornell benefits from Monroe’s facilitation of this dialogue, for example. He
is in conversation with both APP and the students. APP is in communication with communities
and passes this on to Monroe. Monroe is then able to come up with research and design
challenges for teams of students at Cornell. The annual January trip which he facilitates is
another space where dialogue between community members, students and APP professionals
takes place. While on a community level there are spaces such as the general assembly and
the water board meetings for dialogue between users, administrators, operators and others,
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A number of authors have pointed out the importance of making plans to ensure the long-
term viability of the water system, including planning for maintenance and asset management,
planning for sudden events, and financial planning for all life-cycle costs. One achievement of
AguaClara’s is helping VWBs put money away for maintenance costs, and most or all of them
have some money in bank accounts (A. Elvir, personal interview, 10/24/11). However, the
amount that they have saved is not sufficient to handle significant repairs. As pointed out
earlier, Ojojona needs a roof among other things, but the VWB doesn’t have the money to
embark on such a project. More advanced planning for sudden events, like heavy rains and
floods, does not exist, nor does asset management planning. As noted earlier, as plants age
and require replacement, it is unknown what will happen. Antonio said that they are designed
for 20 years, though they could last much longer. But at some time they will need a serious
uplift. Maybe the municipalities will find access to financing. The current model merely
suggests that the plants will have been completely turned over to the VWBs which will be fully
One very strong indicator of good management is seen when clean and sufficient water is
reaching households each day. And for the most part, in this respect VWBs appear to be
running operations efficiently. Plants are operating almost all the time and producing potable
water. In one study in Cuatro Comunidades, the plant produced water with NTU < 5 80% of
the time (Smith, 2010). Plant operators improve their technique over time, and the number
now is much higher. There have been some problems in regularly producing potable water. As
mentioned before, in Marcala, which is run by the municipality, the delivery of chemicals to
the plant was irregular for some time, leaving the operators unable to treat the water (ibid.).
Sometimes the chemicals were delivered, but not to the plant, which was up a steep hill. This
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aspect of the problem was only solved when IRWA bought the operators a horse for hauling
(ibid., 60).
Learning
This sub-category of social capital addresses the capacity of AguaClara to adapt to learn from
experience and adapt to changing conditions, which a number of authors suggest is crucial for
Learning at AguaClara is most apparent in questions of plant design. The research team at
Cornell, based on reports from the field, have improved almost every aspect of the plant
design, helping reduce cost, improve durability of the plant, comfort for operators, and
effectiveness of treatment. For example, current plants are intending to get the NTU below 1
by using stacked rapid sand filtration along with flocculation. While Georgia Kayser expressed
doubt as to whether communities appreciate the extra clarity as much as the engineers
(Kayser interview, 11/2/11), that the community of Támara paid significant capital upfront and
raised tariffs in order to get the improved water suggests they do.
Learning has also taken place in regards to interactions with the community. Antonio has
developed a set of training materials based on his own experience. However, this seems to be
mostly Antonio’s own reflections. When asked about the trainings, he said, “Since my area is
social education, I have had certain liberty to do what I’ve seen fit” (A. Elvir, personal
interview, 10/24/11). He did add that AguaClara engineers were supportive of his work.
AguaClara now has a good sense of which communities to work in. When approached by a
local community that would like to have an AguaClara treatment plant, APP first makes sure
the community meets a series of technical and social conditions (AguaClara website,
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“Community Prerequisites”, accessed 12/23/11). The technical conditions include a population
between one and fifty thousand and a water system that uses surface water with high
turbidity. Social conditions include having a well-functioning water board (e.g. that meets
regularly, has a bank account, has its books in order), the community agrees to a new tariff
that will cover O&M costs, and to providing labor and materials for construction, and that the
To gauge the existence of such prerequisites, and to contribute to them, APP spends at least a
month meeting with the VWB, water users, municipal authorities, and other local authorities,
such as workers in local health clinics, SANAA workers, etc. First, local leaders are contacted,
and once they are on board, a meeting of the general assembly—the body comprised of all
water users, each one with a vote—is convoked. Antonio Elvir estimates that between 80-90%
of water users attend the initial meeting and vote on accepting it.
Another plus in the area of learning for AguaClara, is that it brings together some of three
and local communities. Cornell provides the scientists, and the VWBs represent local
communities to some extent. APP, an organization of civil society, provides another valuable
perspective. As to government, in its experience in Honduras, AguaClara does not have much
interaction with the public sector, with some exceptions. For instance, the plant in Marcala is
run by the municipality, not a VWB. Antonio, however, was not very pleased with the way the
municipality was running things (the tariff he claims is not enough to cover O&M, and is
supplemented with subsidies). His displeasure also suggests that there isn’t a shared vision
between APP and the municipal government, and may indicate a lack of dialogue. AguaClara
also has some contact with health department officials, which APP approaches at the
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beginning of a project. Monroe has mentioned that AguaClara also enjoys a healthy
relationship with SANAA since 2007 (personal communication, 2/20/12). But lack of a
conversation with other government officials responsible for regulating and monitoring water
There are a few promising arenas for collaborative learning. One opportunity is found on the
international development sectors concerned with water and sanitation. This organization has
published a number of interesting studies and articles on the state and challenges of water
decentralization and issues related to national governance. There is a similar space sponsored
Another promising space for learning is the inter-municipal association of plants that APP is
working on forming. The idea is that here Board members from different villages with
AguaClara projects can share experiences and learn from one another. Two meetings have
been held so far in which this dialogue has taken place. However, the association is not yet
self-sustaining. It depends on APP, and I think Antonio in particular, to organize and convene
the meetings.
There are also further opportunities for collaboration and learning regionally with the AJAMs--
the municipal associations of boards that represent rural communities--, and nationally with
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Human Capital
No water system is foolproof, and AguaClara’s technology is especially sensitive to the ability
of its operators. In contrast to many modern systems, which use electro-mechanical control
systems and effectively prevent the operator from being able to control the plant while
can observe the processes and adjust them at the same time. In this sense, the plants are
designed to reduce to a certain extent the need for high levels of human capital, though not
reduce it entirely. The plants are designed to be comfortable and easy, but not to reduce the
measuring turbidity, selecting the appropriate dose of chemicals, observing the water all
require a trained operator working at the plant. The operator also records observations, keeps
track of chemical inventory, and does regular cleaning and maintenance of the plant. Other
skills that are necessary for proper system functioning include accounting skills for the
treasurer of the VWB, facilitation skills for the chairperson, secretarial skills for the secretary.
capable and committed operators. According to the report, “the presence of the operator [at
the plant] was the most important factor for producing good quality water” (Smith, 2010, 3,
my translation). The author had found that when operators were not around, the plants didn’t
work well. The reasons for leaving were varied, sometimes they just were being pushed
beyond human limits, assigned to work over 80 hours a week, sometimes negligence or
personal emergencies (Smith, 2010). But presence wasn’t everything. The same report
mentions that some water quality problems resulted from operators’ incomplete
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understanding of how to work the plant (ibid.: 51), an explanation which was repeated in an
The skills needed for successful running of the AguaClara plants can be organized into three
sets--those related to management, those that are technical and have to do with operation
The training Antonio carries out contemplates all three sets of skills. The first module he
and includes short courses on organizational roles and functions of the general assembly,
VWB, and committees, leadership and community participation, teamwork, a SWOT analysis
and basic accounting for treasurers. The second module is on Water Quality and covers the
relationship of water to health, ways of measuring water quality, and the Honduran legal
framework for water quality. This is especially geared towards health workers, the mayor and
other municipal administrators, and the plant operators. The next module is on Water
Treatment, and includes information on both AguaClara technology and other types of
treatment systems. It is primarily for VWB members and plant operators. The fourth module is
on Basic Math Skills and is intended especially to help the operators learn to measure well and
carry out the necessary arithmetic for adding chemical doses. The last model is on Operating
and Maintaining the plant, and includes information on calculating appropriate tariff levels.
Each module takes 2-3 full days of training (interview Antonio, 10/24/11). The classes are later
complemented by on-the-job training, especially for operators. Currently, all trainings are
carried out by Antonio Elvir, using slides, handouts, and group exercises.
Training in technical skills is particularly strong. Aside from the modules mentioned above,
Antonio budgets three days a week for three months to accompany the operators day and
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night with the tasks of the plant, including proper dosing, cleaning, and bookkeeping (APP,
“Cronograma Social Alauca”, n.d.). After three months are up, engineers still visit each plant
every few weeks to check on the equipment and test the water. Antonio visits regularly and
transcribes the notes and measurements of the operators to electronic format for APP’s
analysis.
Training for the other skill sets, however, is less developed. For one, the related training
materials appear fairly rudimentary. For example, the presentation on leadership includes
slides that list qualities of good and bad leaders, and behaviors to avoid (Liderazgo course,
undated presentation). This information may be correct, but merely the reading of a list of 13
good characteristics and 13 bad probably won’t translate into people internalizing these. It is
hard, however, to for me from 1000s of miles away to determine exactly what transpires
during the trainings from a reading of the presentations and training schedule. Also, although
Antonio mentioned that he did do on-site training for Board members to help them with their
tasks as well, no special time is allotted to do so in his six-month plan for Alauca.
Related to, and more important than, the training is whether the human resources with the
above skills actually exist. Some proxy measurements for management, technical and financial
skills on a water board could include the number of meetings in a year and presence and
quality of minutes, the quality of the water from the plant and presence and quality of notes
from operators, and collection rates and rate of savings of VWB. According to Antonio, the
VWBs are all meeting at least once a month, all of them have up-to-date water user lists, and
all of the Boards have savings (personal communication, 1/4/12). All operators monitor the
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There is still progress to be made, of course. In Támara, for example, despite the months of
training, the operator still made mistakes when applying chemicals, mistakes which affected
the water’s quality (Smith 2010, 173). The operator continued receiving training and visits
once a week, and did improve his skills, but kept on making mistakes when applying the
Other specific skills that the literature has listed of importance include budgeting, contingency
and expansion planning, understanding audits, conflict management, and facilitation. While
the VWBs may not have the human resources with these capacities, AguaClara as a whole
might, at APP and in the Cornell team. But these may be in short supply as well. As noted
earlier, the ability to raise funds for capital expenses is mostly limited to Monroe and a few
Cornell engineers working for APP. While AguaClara recently has been partnering with staff
from other departments and staff at Cornell (including from City and Regional Planning and
the Atkinson Center for Sustainability), this is one bottleneck preventing expansion.
The physical working environment can also enhance or hinder the operator’s experience. In
Ojojona, the lack of a roof, bed, and electricity discouraged the operators from caring for the
Political Capital
In this section I consider two general aspects of political capital. First, the existence and quality
of the relationships AguaClara communities and organizations have to power structures, which
otherwise—that the communities require for sustaining the projects. Second, I look at the
country’s policy, legal, and regulatory frameworks, as the literatures refers to these as the
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Ongoing Support
The need for ongoing, and often external, support was perhaps the idea that received the
Lockwood and Smits, 2011), and in the conversations I had with experts in the area (Gasteyer,
personal interview, 10/17/11; Kayser, personal interview, 11/2/11). There is virtual consensus
that small community organizations cannot maintain services over a long term without
significant external support. This support comes in many forms, technical, financial, social—for
instance, helping repair a clogged filter, accessing financing for a plant expansion, or mitigating
It should be said, though, that AguaClara’s nested governance structure provides significant
support for the system overall. VWBs receive broad support from APP, which in turn receives
While many authors have underlined the importance of governmental support for the long-
term sustainability of the water system, in Honduras, substantive state support does not seem
forthcoming. While there is a national legislative and regulatory framework, the relevant
institutions do not seem to have the resources to help much. Antonio characterized
AguaClara’s relationship with the national government and SANAA, the organization in charge
of offering technical support to communities, as one in which they neither help nor interfere.
SANAA does have a list of water system categories with a list of recommended interventions
(SANAA, 2009, quoted in Lockwood and Smits, 2011). Also the legislation does recognize the
legitimacy of the VWBs and their legal ownership of the system, a recognition that, according
to the literature, goes a long way (Fabricius and Collins, 2007; Ostrom, 1990; Lockwood and
Smits, 2011).
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While the link to government may be weak--or the state institutions may be weak in
stakeholders whose importance is underscored in the literature. The AguaClara model involves
partners (Fabricius and Collins, 2007; Carter et al., 1999; Hardoy et al., 2001). It also engages
international donors, and some opportunities for connection to public institutions. For
example, the VWBs are structured such that the mayor delegates one non-voting member to
the Board. According to national water policy, these local water management structures are
Currently, the bulk of the direct support communities receive comes from APP. APP trains
board members, operators, helps secure funding for the construction, oversees construction,
and then accompanies operators and the VWB during the first six months to a year after
construction. Once the plant is operating, Antonio, for example, spends three days a week for
three months with the operators at the plant, ensuring they understand how to correctly dose
the chemicals, take readings, record observations, etc. He especially makes sure to be there
during heavy rains in the rainy season, when turbidity is highest and the plant requires the
most attention.
But this support lasts some three months. Afterwards, although APP staff do visit occasionally
to check on the plants, communities basically fend for themselves. The administration of the
plants and other ‘social’ components receive little attention after the initial round of training.
Antonio mentioned that after that initial period of training “the social problems are outside
our reach”, and that his energies were focused on the new plants, because “that is where our
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salaries come from and there isn’t enough funding to attend to the old plants” (interview,
10/24/11). He lamented this situation, as he is aware of several problems currently facing the
Another limitation to APP’s support is related to physical proximity. All but one of the nine
plants are clustered in the same department as Tegucigalpa, the capital, where APP is also
mentioned that he was able to visit Ojojona in particular as much as he did because it was so
close to APP’s headquarters. As other plants get built further away from the capital, APP’s
Antonio mentioned an idea to address the lack of continued support--an association of plants
that could pay for a staff person to offer post-construction technical and organizational
support to the villages and towns with an AguaClara plant. This person, who is referred to in
the literature as a ‘circuit-rider’, could also offer community education, VWB and operator
training and refreshers. While two meetings of members from all the VWBs have been held
organized by APP, the association does not yet have a life of its own.
IRWA, which has over 20 years of experience using circuit riders to support rural water
providers, including AguaClara projects, could provide circuit-rider training and supervision,
and might be able to help find resources to pay or partially subsidize the expense.
which is crucial to long-term quality service (Carter et al., 1999), as well as with ongoing
training of the VWBs and operators. The circuit-rider would most likely be able to offer little
assistance, however, in another critical phase of the system’s life-cycle: when the
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infrastructure needs major repairs or expansion. While the plants are designed to last 20
years, communities may face situations earlier that require significant capital to repair or
expand the capacity of their plant. As mentioned earlier, Ojojona already needs money for a
roof and to repair some parts of the plant. Agalteca also needs financing to fix its water source
pipe. Currently AguaClara doesn’t have the capacity to offer this kind of support, and the
communities are either not connected to other institutions with resources or their connections
don’t have resources (like municipal and national governments) to finance this work.
Carter et al. state there is empirical evidence that shows community motivation to participate
and support the local project may wane two to three years after construction (1999, 195), and
that outside intervention is necessary to maintain high levels of commitment and motivation.
AguaClara currently does offer continued technical support to communities, both through
APP’s support, and through periodic visits by members of the Cornell team, including groups of
some 20 students who visit for two weeks in January. Monroe visits twice a year. According to
Antonio, these visits motivate local water users, and reinforce the importance of the plant in
their minds.
But can there be too much external assistance? Chuck Brown suggests that the regular visits of
the Cornell engineers working for APP is excessive “handholding”, which isn’t allowing the
External Environment
As noted before, this category receives a lot of attention in the most recent publications on
sustainable water supply and refers to the presence policy, legal and regulatory framework of
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management, and national institutions that offer support to decentralized water services. This
is a component of capital over which AguaClara obviously has little control; nevertheless it is
one that is important to look out for, especially as AguaClara considers expanding to other
countries. Here I will comment briefly on the environment in Honduras, in order to identify
relevant opportunities and constraints there within which AguaClara has to operate.
Honduras has national water policy, and related institutions. This might reflect the country’s
giving value to providing clean water throughout the country. SANAA, which used to be in
charge of all water provision and is in the process of devolving this responsibility to
municipalities and water boards, uses “Water ... A Human Right” as its tagline on its website
(SANAA site, n.d., the ellipsis is theirs). According to Antonio (personal communication,
4/9/12), the national constitution was recently reformed and refers to water as a human right.
The first ‘basic policy’ CONASA’s is to “support the decentralization process with citizen
translation). And ERSAPS, the regulatory body, exists with a mission to “ensure the law is
obeyed in order to...guarantee all Hondurans have access to services of potable water and
sanitation of high quality and efficiency” (although no regulations per se were found on its
website [12/13/2011], my translation). These statements suggest that the country intends to
APP is a member of RAS-HON, the Honduran Network of Water and Sanitation, which brings
together members from government, international donors, national NGOs, UN agencies and
others to share information and resources on water and sanitation. It has produced several
analyses of the challenges of water provision in the country, and is a good forum for
networking and sharing ideas. This may be the key platform where national policy and
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regulations can be impacted, and resources leveraged. There is also the nationally-sponsored
Plataforma del Agua de Honduras, and the associations of VWBs on national and regional
levels. These may potentially contribute to an environment that is conducive for water
projects, with accessible materials, shared knowledge, technical and financial support, and
legal resources.
Analysis Summary
AguaClara’s governance model is strong; its various layers of governance appear to have the
capacity to steward, develop and marshal the requisite capital needed for sustainable water
delivery. AguaClara’s physical capital appears particularly robust, which suggests it may be able
to compensate for weakness in other areas such as financial and human capital. AguaClara’s
social capital is also substantial, especially in the areas of trust and community participation.
Some weaker areas include financial capital, especially that necessary for major capital
investments in construction or repair, and human capital, since a great part of its accumulated
learning is found in a few individuals. Political capital, in the form of regular and effective
my analysis of all the capitals and the idea of external support is found in the following table.
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Table 5. Summary of Analysis
Does the community This is a criteria used for selecting communities, and is a given in this study.
have access to a river There is some concern over control of the source at times.
Natural that can meet its
needs for water
supply?
Is the plant and Built with locally available materials and local talent.
distribution system Run and maintained by locals, with materials they have access to.
Physical
suited to local
condition?
Do system have, or Engineering studies are free. Communities are paying O&M. They contribute
have access to, funds 30-40% in-kind for construction.
to cover engineering Haven’t incurred other capital costs yet.
Financial costs, capital APP and AguaClara has limited capacity to raise funds for capital costs.
expenses, and O & May be difficult to access funds for future capital expenses for existing plants,
M? and for large-scale expansion of technology.
The very poor are currently excluded from water provision.
Is the system -Have constitutions, though unsure how much use them
managed well? -Some communities use contracts with operators; most do not
-Have graduated sanctions and ways of getting rid of water users and
operators who don’t behave, but difficult to do the same with VWB members
-Some incentives exist: salaries for operators; some remuneration for
treasurer; non-monetary incentives like community recognition, opportunity
to serve, etc.
-Degree of facilitation of communication between various levels of
governance, and with community
-Minor maintenance schedules and some money saved in banks; however,
major repairs, and advanced planning--asset management, sudden events,
life-cycle costs--do not exist
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Do Boards members -Training in management skills quite rudimentary
have management -Boards do meet at least monthly, and keep minutes of their meetings
skills? -Conflicts can be resolved in Board meetings, or in Assemblies
-Board is elected every 2 years, for a max. of two terms, though this isn’t
Human
respected everywhere.
-Some Board members are in it for personal gain; others seem sincerely
interested in serving community
-High payment rates suggest users happy with service
Are operators able to -Strong training, accompanied by three months of accompaniment on site,
run and maintain the and regular follow ups.
infrastructure? -Plants mostly functional
-Strong accompaniment by AguaClara engineers to some plants, who provide
continued training and help fix things
Do AguaClara -Enjoy varying levels of municipal support, in one case plant is run by
communities receive municipality
sufficient ongoing -Have low level support from SANAA, and health authorities
external support? -Regional and national support mostly absent
Political
-Connected to several national water networks, where share information,
network
-Strongest support is from APP and Cornell
-Have connections to international NGOs, which support specific projects
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Conclusion and Recommendations
The purpose of this report is to gauge AguaClara’s sustainability and possible growth through
the lens of its governance model. Specifically the report asked whether this model successfully
stewards, develops, and marshals the necessary natural, physical, financial, social, human, and
political capital to sustain and expand the benefits of its water projects. In the previous section
I analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of each form of capital in light of the literature on
water governance; in this section I will synthesize the insights from this analysis to provide an
answer to the questions of expansion and sustainability--including sustaining the current level
AguaClara communities and institutions count on substantial amounts of each of the six
capitals under consideration and appear ready to both sustain their operation for years to
come and support a moderate level of expansion. However, deficiencies in certain capitals may
affect how long the projects will be sustained, the rate and success of expansion, and the
While natural capital in the form of sufficient surface water and land to build on is always
present in the communities, there is at least one issue that AguaClara needs to address. This is
control over the water source. For AguaClara communities to sustain their operations, they
will need to control the source. AguaClara should add this to its list of prerequisites for
working with communities. This may be a non-issue if VWBs or municipalities already always
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Physical capital appears to be another strong suit. The plants are made locally, with locally-
available materials and labor, and are run by local workers. And they work, providing the users
with abundant clear, safe water most of the time. This represents a substantial impact.
Naturally, for the plants to sustain this accomplishment, the plants have to last. While they are
designed to last 20 years, and since they have been made well they may last much longer than
this, none have been around this long to test this design. Embarking on serious repairs may be
a question that communities have to tackle in a shorter time frame, a task whose difficulties I
mentioned in a previous section, and will come back to later. Perhaps more likely, they may
The distribution system is also part of the communities’ physical capital and should be
included in AguaClara’s calculations and planning. While all the communities where AguaClara
is working have piped distribution systems to homes, the condition of these pipes is uncertain.
Leaking pipes can lead to insufficient supply. I will comment on the need for a more holistic
Financial capital is present at a community level, in the ability of water users to regularly pay
the water tariff, and at higher levels of AguaClara governance, in the ability of APP and Cornell
staff to solicit and receive grants to cover research and capital costs for the plants. The
concern here, of which AguaClara is well aware, is twofold: being able to access increasing
amounts of funding for new construction, and doing so to pay for significant repairs or
expansion of existing plants. It is AguaClara’s intention to completely turn over the plants to
local control (in order, in part, to dedicate its efforts towards working with new communities
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and plants). If this occurs, these local communities currently do not have the capacity to access
large amounts of capital for repairs/expansions that entail a significant outlay of funds.
Some communities may be able to pay for these repairs themselves through debt financing,
and AguaClara is currently exploring a model for this. This model may also be used for
construction of new plants. However, in either case, the local communities would need help
employing the model, and accessing the loan. Municipalities are supposed to have significant
amounts of money to support water and sanitation work in their respective towns and villages;
if the VWBs could access these funds--which are indeed intended to support their work--this
Social capital I looked at in terms of community ownership and trust, good management, and a
capacity for adaptation or learning. AguaClara has demonstrated its capacity to learn and
adapt over the last six years or so. The improvements to the treatment system is one example
of this capacity. In terms of governance, perhaps foremost among the lessons gained is how to
create the conditions for community to take ownership of their water system, which has
assured the system is cared for, paid for, and protected from malfeasance. This is now
accomplished through a series of visits that involve community education, mobilization and
training. Since Antonio from APP is the person who has been most directly involved in these
activities and in charge of them, he seems to be the person who has internalized many of
these lessons. While some of what has been learned has been incorporated into training
modules (whose curricula is compiled in a series of slide presentations), my guess is that much
has not. How community leaders and members are approached, in what order, what is said or
shown to them, when meetings are planned, how people are invited, how they should be
organized and conducted, for example, are among the lessons that may primarily be found in
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Antonio’s mind. Antonio is someone who not only knows a lot about community mobilization
and education and the AguaClara technology, but also is someone who seems to be seen by
community members as someone who is credible and trustworthy (perhaps akin to what
community that will then take charge of its water system, versus another approach that may
AguaClara ends up partnering with other ‘implementation partners’, NGOs like APP or even
private companies, it may not be easy to find people who can work on the ground like
Antonio. He may embody a significant amount of social capital, and may be crucial for
unlocking this capital in the communities. Finding and/or training people like Antonio may
It is not only Antonio who contributes significantly to the project’s social capital. Other
AguaClara staff also bring in valuable contributions to this spirit of trust and ownership. The
spirit of service that characterizes Monroe’s involvement, as well as that of many of the
members who may feel validated by their visits, and inspired to be part of an international
network of sorts.
AguaClara’s present work with small communities further lends itself to building trust, as these
small communities tend to possess the structural variables Ostrom (2010) identifies as
essential for collective action. If it were to work with larger towns or cities, some of these
factors would be no longer be present, and AguaClara would have to establish trust in the
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model through other means, or use other governance systems that don’t rely as heavily on
collective action. This should be kept in mind as AguaClara seeks to multiply its plants.
In the previous section I have outlined some of the strengths and weaknesses of the
management practices--especially of the local water boards. While the VWBs appear capable
of running the water system, since this management ability is so crucial, it could benefit from
additional attention. The training in management practices offered to the communities is very
rudimentary, and VWBs could profit from continued support as challenges emerge over time.
Perhaps the intermunicipal association of plants could be a forum where such support and
shared learning could be addressed. An experienced circuit-rider may also be able to provide
such support. Whatever advances Boards make in their management will surely spill over to
other collective endeavors the community undertakes, and make it worth the investment.
The importance of human capital has already been underscored above in the comments made
on the key role Antonio—a single individual—plays in the success of AguaClara’s projects. That
operator error is the primary cause of plant malfunctioning also highlights its importance.
Furthermore, human capital is lacking both at Cornell (Monroe can only do so much) and in
Honduras at APP: Monroe and the AguaClara engineers can only handle a certain number of
plants at a time and currently their hands are full. Since human capital is so important, training
and retaining talent will be crucial for both sustainable community water system functioning
and AguaClara’s expansion to other areas. Antonio and other AguaClara staff are already
aware of the importance of paying operators an attractive wage, so I will not go into that here.
Training is one of the factors that is related to proper plant functioning in the six communities
where AguaClara has worked. Where the period of training and community education did not
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take place (Ojojona and La 34), the communities struggled with mismanagement and a lack of
ownership. Antonio has done his best, with some help, to put together a series of training
modules on governance, water quality, plant operations, and basic math skills. However, this
curriculum could be significantly improved with a relatively small effort. (Operator training is
currently robust, and may not need such revision.) Perhaps Antonio could be helped to think
through what the community, the VWB members, the operators need to know and be able to
do, then come up with the relevant concepts to understand and skills to master, and then craft
materials with pertinent readings and exercises. Especially if Antonio can draw on real
examples of problems and exercises that have come up in the field, these materials can be
much more effective than they currently are. Continued training could also be offered through
circuit-riders, who could be expected to contribute real-life problems and cases to the evolving
educational materials. The curricular design might benefit from consultations with other
people and institutions, including other organizations in the RAS-HON network. University
scholars in fields of community development and adult education may also be helpful for
I looked at political capital in terms of ongoing external support, and an enabling political
environment. As noted before, external support in the form of financial, technical and other
forms of assistance is critical to sustaining functioning water systems. The lack of a plan for
ongoing support for AguaClara communities perhaps constitutes the greatest threat to the
There are three possible sources for this support--municipal and national government, circuit-
riders, and the association of communities with AguaClara plants. Some authors claim that
ultimately it is the public sector that has to step up to the plate in order to ensure sustainable
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provision, and this possibility should receive topmost attention. If municipalities are indeed
receiving 6% of the national budget, then municipal governments would be in the perfect
place to offer such support. APP and VWBs in each locality would do well, then, to build strong
relationships with their respective municipal governments in order to help channel the funds
appropriately. Circuit-riders and an association of plants may well not have as much capacity
to access significant amounts of funds, though they may well be best suited to offering long-
term technical and educational support. The associations of water boards, AHJASA and AJAMs,
and the FHIS may also provide potential outlets through which to influence government in
order to receive support. Different kinds of external support may come from different sources,
Why doesn’t AguaClara work with IRWA as they have over two decades of experience with
circuit-riders in Latin America? One study showed that the cost of the circuit rider model was
under $1 a year per household (Kayser, 2011). If incorporated into tariffs, this would amount
to less than a 10 cent increase per month, or 3% increase from present average rates.
However, Daniel Smith suggested that IRWA was no longer in Honduras and that the circuit-
riders from ADEC which they helped set up don’t have a good reputation (group conversation
2/6/12). Another option is to support APP in developing the capacity and the financing model
managed water systems. As noted in earlier sections, it has regulatory, policy-making, and
of course. However, the country seems to be taking water seriously, and at least in some ways
supports AguaClara’s work (e.g. water system management has been decentralized, and
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funding is made available for water and sanitation to municipalities). This is important to keep
in mind as AguaClara thinks of building new plants and venturing into new (national)
territories. Whether other countries have as good a political environment, better, or worse,
In a group conversation on 2/6/12, Jeff Will, a Fulbright Scholar in Honduras, mentioned that
SANAA has expressed its desire to use AguaClara technology for all their new plants. If this is
so, it seems like opportunity not to be missed, as having SANAA behind the new plants would
appropriate legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks, and a supportive government--is the
grease to the machine. Things can work without it, but with great difficulty. AguaClara needs
relationships with relevant national authorities, participating and promoting dialogues in the
sector, and advocating for such policies and support on a national level. AguaClara is already
doing this. Both through APP and with Cornell’s staff it has been building relationships with
SANAA, the health department, and participating in national dialogue and organizations such
as RAS-HON.
The concern I’ve heard most from people associated with AguaClara at Cornell is the rapid
multiplication of AguaClara plants around the world. Monroe has talked about “scaling up”,
about the technology “go[ing] viral” (Weber-Shirk, AguaClara ScaleUp, 10/15/2011). There was
a sponsored discussion of the topic at Cornell’s Atkinson Center for a Sustainable Future in
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October, 2011, and a number of consultants have gone to Honduras with the question of how
to expand.
First of all, “scaling up” might not be the most appropriate term. It often means taking a
technology and growing it to reach a scale where it is more efficient--i.e. reducing the cost of
production per unit. If I understand correctly, this is not what AguaClara is doing, although cost
(SURWS [2005], however, does use the term scaling up in terms of multiplying successful
AguaClara plants are considered ripe for expansion because the world needs this innovation,
and the major bottleneck is financing--for building the plants, and to pay for technical support
for the new implementation partners. The discussion at the Atkinson Center focused entirely
on financing alternatives for new plants, with a focus on debt financing and for-profit schemes.
In a document on Scaling Up written by Monroe, he underscored the need for financing to pay
for “adequate technical support for new implementation partners”, and that this was “the
critical missing component at Cornell” for AguaClara “to go viral” (Weber-Shirk, 10/15/2011).
While finding sustainable sources of financing for plants and technical support are a real
challenge, there is a real danger that AguaClara may overemphasize the importance of the
physical infrastructure and technical support at the expense of social factors, which, as amply
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Antonio spoke of this danger. Although his words may not be applicable to AguaClara
engineers, who I think are becoming increasingly aware of the social dimensions of water
In Honduras engineers could care less about the educational component [of water
systems]. The engineer will tell you, “Give me cement and steel and I’ll build you
something”. But they never participate in community meetings because they think it’s
a waste of time, that the people there are ignorant and won’t pay attention to them,
and that people just don’t care. … I, on the other hand, as an agent of social
development, believe in people. I believe that we have to teach them, and believe they
can learn. This is what has helped us a lot in AguaClara--make sure the people become
educated, help them learn by example, with patience, with spirit, with enthusiasm. This
is what makes us different; this is what ensures the plants are maintained” (interview,
10/24 /11).
AguaClara engineers are becoming aware of this. Daniel Smith, an AguaClara engineer working
for APP in Honduras, said “right now our tech capacity is exceeding our institutional capacity”,
and spoke about governance as “pivotal”, adding: “Governance is what stays after the six-
months [of construction and training] is over. And it needs to be a goal of the project to
facilitate that part …” (interview, 11/10/11). In a more recent group conversation, other
engineers expressed similar hesitation. Michael Adelman highlighted the human capital limits:
in Honduras APP and the Cornell engineers can’t support any additional plants; and in Ithaca
the research team is also already stretched to be able to support more plants and do
administrative work. Jeff Long added that the technology itself was “not ready to package,
Governance and social capital in general take a long time to build. They deal with intangibles
such as trust, honesty, and community participation, and require changes in culture (ours and
others). In this context it may be encouraging to remember that the benefits of social capital
extend beyond ensuring the success of water systems (which are important in their own right).
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Building up relationships based on mutual understanding and reciprocity will enable materially
poor communities to extend their problem-solving capacities beyond water, and tackle other
pressing issues the community is facing and may face in the future. Since such work requires
resources--especially staff time--, it will be important for AguaClara to help donors appreciate
the “long-term positive pay-offs” of such efforts, as Flora said (2004, 12).
The insights into the vital role of governance may have implications for AguaClara’s “open
source” philosophy. In particular, I can imagine that the open-source design tool may work
against AguaClara’s goals of expansion and provision of quality water to the poor. The open-
source design tool may give the appearance that the plants are a kind of stand-alone, do-it-
yourself technology; however, we know that technology is only half of what makes the
AguaClara plants function. If you get the plants built and installed correctly, which probably
isn’t easy in itself, you still have to worry about the processes encompassed in governance--
building trust, managing money, dealing with conflicts, maintaining the plant, and so on. This
knowledge is difficult to explain in a manual (which doesn’t exist anyway). As noted before,
much of what has been learned about this is incorporated into the way AguaClara’s staff
function. If other communities, NGOs, or even SANAA, use the design tool to directly build a
plant, the water system may not be successful if the governance issues aren’t addressed. The
community and institution may end up becoming disheartened with the technology as well,
thwarting future possibilities of collaboration, and sullying AguaClara’s record in the eyes of
potential donors.
One of AguaClara’s burning questions in regards to expansion is who to partner with, and is
considering different implementation partners and models, NGOs, public, and private. As
noted in the literature review, there is a raging and large debate regarding the relative benefits
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of public vs. private provision of water. Without opening this Pandora’s box, there are a few
considerations AguaClara should have in mind if considering a partner from the private sector.
Foremost among these is that a for-profit approach may compromise the spirit of trust and
collaboration that has been central to the success of the AguaClara plants in Honduras. People
contributed time, labor, and money not only because they were receiving a good product, but
because they have a sense of ownership of the plant. Private companies may also find it more
difficult to reconcile their aims of profit with the needs for community education and
participation, as these can be costly, without any direct or immediate monetary returns. That
said, there may be some private firms whose values may make them potential partners for
AguaClara.
Some authors are convinced that community-based management may be the best strategy for
water provision in rural communities (SURWS, 2005) in the face of current political and
financial constraints. If communities don’t do it themselves, so goes the argument, no one else
will--the public sector is either incompetent or too corrupt, and the private sector can’t make a
profit there. While this may be accurate, AguaClara may find over time that different
communities are served best by different ownership and governance models. Ostrom (2004)
placed great emphasis not on a particular institution to manage common pool resources such
as water, but rather on the match of these institutions to each community’s particular
physical, natural and social circumstances. Marcala, for example, does not use community-
based management; the municipality runs it, and runs it successfully (though Antonio has
some qualms about it). This is AguaClara’s largest plant, and may indicate that larger
communities may allow for and/or afford other kinds of governance structures that don’t rely
as heavily on some aspects of social capital, like community participation. They even may be
107
It may make sense then to talk not of a single governance model, but of governance models
that suit the different realities of diverse communities. While much has been learned
model for such communities--other models may emerge over time. AguaClara’s governance
model may be partnering with an organization that is well acquainted with the community,
and which can set up a local governance structure that fits well in the context. Understanding
what types of governance models work well in what contexts would be a useful future study.
Now a few words on impact. In keeping with the spirit of service in which AguaClara was
founded and currently operates, AguaClara’s desire to expand is not for expansion’s sake, but
to have a large impact on the lives of people in communities that adopt the technology.
Carter et al. (1999) suggested that water and sanitation projects be evaluated through the two
lenses of impact and sustainability. These two are obviously interconnected, since to ensure
impact over time one must sustain the intervention. The AguaClara plants appear to meet or
exceed almost all the criteria spelled out in Carter et al.’s framework which appears in Table 6
below.
AguaClara plants serve hundreds of liters a day of clean water per capita in each of the six
communities. This is much more than the benchmarks of 60 liters/day/capita on demand that
Lockwood and Smits qualify as high service level (23). The water is clean, with NTU below 5 for
most of the time and no coliforms. With stacked rapid sand filtration, e.g. as in Támara, it is
likely under this benchmark virtually all the time. Monroe suggested using turbidity and
residual chlorine levels as proxies for water quality (personal communication, 2/12/12).
108
Table 6. AguaClara Impact and Sustainability
b. Reduce the time Water is piped to b. Committees should Water boards meet
spent in water- homes. Negligible be meeting regularly, regularly, keep minutes,
carrying to a maximum time spent keeping minutes, and and seem to meet
of one person-hour collecting. functioning in a manner community standards
per day which is acceptable to
the community
c. Bring about Piped to homes. c. Revenue collection Water rates are set by the
significant should be taking place general assembly, and are
improvements in in the manner agreed at collected according to
water-carrying the construction phase, agreed upon methods.
technology or in some other
effective way
e. Achieve equity in all While water rates e. The use of water Water supply is
aspects of service are low, some supply … should be continuous.
provision households are not continuing at high levels
connected to clean
water.
f. Supply these Per capita one time f. Physical infrastructure Six plants fully functional.
services [water and capital cost between should be fully
sanitation] at a per $12-35 functional
capita one time capital
cost of no more than
$42
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Obviously, these issues beg the question of AguaClara’s intent. If good treatment plants are its
mission, then it could rest on its laurels; but if it is concerned with bringing clean water to
poor, often marginalized peoples, then it will have to broaden the scope of its analysis and
activities. For example, if it is not only concerned with water, but more broadly about health
and quality of life, then it may also have to think about sanitation and community education in
its planning and operations. Otherwise people may have clean water but not have clean hands
The “Service Delivery Approach” (SDA [Lockwood and Smits, 2011]) is one approach to water
services that goes beyond the implementation of a (good) water treatment and distribution
system and encompasses long-term post-construction support. AguaClara should adopt this
approach, so that explicit and systematic work building local capacity for financial and asset
planning, and long-term assistance is included from the outset in project proposals and
executions.
Evaluation
AguaClara may want to adopt a framework for evaluation based on some of the considerations
specified earlier. In addition to data on the cost of water and its quality at the point of use,
AguaClara may consider its question of equity. In particular, it may want to evaluate the
percentage of people in a community that have access to, and are receiving the service. In this
respect, as AguaClara, in consultation with the VWBs, looks for ways to provide universal
access to water, it might be useful to remember that this need not mean that everyone needs
to receive piped water in their own home (though this is arguably the best scenario). If cost is
an issue, other distribution technologies such as public standpipes can be used to provide
access to populations that can’t pay. As Satterthwaite and McGranahan (2007) point out, what
110
is needed is “… the best possible mix between good-quality convenient provision, what
Other indicators that AguaClara might consider using to evaluate its impact and sustainability
are related to proper management and participation. Two relevant proxies may be payment
and savings rates for proper management, and the proportion of women in the Water Boards
and as operators as a proxy for participation. Below is a possible framework for evaluation.
Table 7. Recommended Guidelines for Evaluation Based on Recent Literature and Author’s Analysis
Quantity a. Achieve a daily consumption of at Payment rate a. Most or all of the tariffs
a
least 60 liters/per capita/day are collected
I think AguaClara can take rightful pleasure in what it has accomplished in terms of
technological innovation and learning about community-based governance systems. Its future
111
is bright. But it still has a long way to go. Which is good news for the program: there are lots of
I will give the final to word to Antonio Elvir, who sums up much of this report with an apt
analogy:
We should not neglect to follow up with the social education part. It would be a mistake
to think only in the technical aspects--in improving the flocculators, the sedimentation
tanks, the dosification of chemicals. If we neglect the educational and social component,
1
we are planting for a meagre harvest (personal interview, 10/24/11).
1
The original is more poetic: “… estamos sembrando para poco tiempo.”
112
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