Ajp-01 Allied Joint Doctrine
Ajp-01 Allied Joint Doctrine
AJP-01
FERBUARY 2017
Published by the
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)
© NATO/OTAN
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)
28 February 2017
Edvardas MAZEIKIS
Major General, LTUAF
Director, NATO Standardization Office
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
AJP-01
I Edition E Version 1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II Edition E Version 1
AJP-01
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1 – Alliance doctrine
Section 1 – The foundations of Alliance doctrine 1-1
The purpose of doctrine 1-1
Relationship between policy and doctrine 1-1
Interoperability 1-2
Doctrine documents 1-2
Alliance Strategic Framework and instruments of 1-3
national power
NATO and international law 1-6
Section 2 – Levels of operations 1-8
Distinguishing the levels of joint operations 1-11
Section 3 – Characteristics, principles and considerations of 1-12
Allied joint and multinational operations
Characteristics 1-12
Principles 1-13
Operational considerations 1-14
Section 4 – The nature of conflict 1-15
Enduring nature of conflict 1-15
The components of fighting power 1-16
IV Edition E Version 1
AJP-01
Lexicon
Part I – Acronyms and abbreviations LEX-1
Part II – Terms and definitions LEX-3
V Edition E Version 1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
VI Edition E Version 1
AJP-01
Related documents
The North Atlantic Treaty
The NATO Handbook
PO(2010)0169 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, dated 19 November 2010
C-M(2001)63 NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS): Policy Guidelines
PO(2000)30-Rev 2 Role of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO
NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM) 2016
PO-0141-2009 NATO Policy on Strategic Communication
PO(2012)0020 Chairman’s Progress Report on Implementing NATO/EAPC
Policy on UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions, dated 20
May 2012
PO(2015)0580 Political Guidance, dated 16 October 2015
SG(2006) 0244 Rev 1 Force Declarations and Designations, dated 08 May 2006
MCM-077-00 Military Committee Guidance on the Relationship between
NATO Policy and Military Doctrine
MCM 0041-2010 MC position on the use of effects in operations, dated
20 July 2010
MC 0053/5 Terms of Reference for the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe, drafted
MC 0058/5 Terms of Reference for the Supreme Allied Commander
Transformation, drafted
MC 0319/3 NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics
MC 0326/3 NATO Principles and Policies of Operational Medical Support
MC 0457/2 NATO Military Policy on Public Affairs
MC 0603/1 NATO Comprehensive CBRN Defence Concept
MC 0628/x NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications
MC 133/4 NATO’s Operations Planning, dated 7 January 2011
MC 324/3 The NATO Military Command Structure
MC 327/2 NATO Military Policy for non-Article 5 Crisis Response
Operations
MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement
MC 400/3 MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of Alliance
Strategy
MC 411/2 NATO Military Policy on CMI and CIMIC
MC 437/2 Military Committee Special Operations Policy
MC 469/1 NATO Military Principles and Policies for Environmental
Protection (EP)
MC 0472/1 Military Committee Concept for Counter-Terrorism
MC 560/1 Policy for Military Engineering
MC 586/1 MC Policy for Allied Forces and their use for Operations
Commercial publications:
Foch, Field Marshal Ferdinand The Principles of War (Henry Hot and Company, 1920)
Smith, Gen Sir Rupert The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern
World (Penguin, London)
Clausewitz, Carl von On War (Princeton University Press 1976)
Hughes, G My Enemy’s Enemy – Proxy Warfare in International
Politics (Sussex Academic Press, 2012)
Preface
Scope
1. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(E), Allied Joint Doctrine is the capstone NATO
doctrine for Allied joint operations. It explains the strategic context for such
operations and focuses on the underlying philosophy and fundamentals of joint
operations.
Purpose
2. Although each operation is unique, their planning and conduct can be approached in
the same manner. AJP-01(E) provides commanders and their staff with a common
framework for understanding the approach to all Alliance operations. It also provides
them with the principles and general guidance to plan and conduct campaigns and
operations.
Application
3. AJP-01(E) is intended primarily as guidance for NATO commanders and staffs.
However, the doctrine is instructive to, and provides a useful framework for,
operations conducted by a coalition of NATO members, partners and non-NATO
nations. It also provides a reference for NATO civilian and non-NATO civilian actors.
IX Edition E Version 1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
X Edition E Version 1
AJP-01
1.1. Doctrine is defined as: fundamental principles by which military forces guide their
actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in
application.1 The principal purpose of doctrine is to provide Alliance forces
conducting operations with a framework of guidance to achieve a common
objective. Operations are underpinned by principles describing how they should be
planned, prepared, commanded, conducted, sustained, terminated and assessed.
The principles of doctrine are defined by traditional, enduring capabilities proven by
best practices while incorporating contemporary insights on how these principles
are applied. Although doctrine has enduring principles, it is constantly reviewed for
relevance and is therefore evolutionary in nature. Doctrine describes how Alliance
forces operate but it is not about why they operate, which is the realm of policy.
1.2. Policy and doctrine are closely related, but they fill fundamentally separate
requirements. Policy develops in response to changing circumstances in the
political-military strategic environment, agreed political guidance, practical lessons
learned or new technology. Policy is essentially prescriptive. It can direct, assign
tasks, prescribe desired capabilities and provide guidance for preparing North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces to perform their assigned roles.
Implicitly, policy can create new roles and a requirement for new capabilities.
Doctrine primarily evolves in response to changes in policy, capabilities or force
employment considerations. Therefore, policy normally leads and directs doctrine.2
On occasion, capabilities might exist within NATO that are not covered by a policy.
These extant capabilities require policy to be created first, before they can be
written into doctrine. In addition, newly developed capabilities need fielding prior to
doctrine development.
mutually supportive.
Interoperability
1.4. The effectiveness of Allied forces in peace, crisis or in conflict depends on the ability
of the forces provided to operate together coherently, effectively and efficiently.
Allied joint operations should be prepared for, planned and conducted in a manner
that makes the best use of the relative strengths and capabilities of the forces that
members offer for an operation. Interoperability of formations and units of a joint
and multinational force has three dimensions: technical (for example, hardware,
systems); procedural (for example, doctrines, procedures); and human (for
example, language, terminology and training). Forces commit to information
sharing through the lessons learned process, in particular lessons about
interoperability shortfalls. Standardization agreements (STANAGs) are vital to
long-term effectiveness and the success of NATO operations. At the operational
level, emphasis should be placed on integrating the contributing nations' forces and
the synergy that can be attained; the success of the process will determine the
ability of a joint force to achieve its commander's objectives.
1.6. In contemporary operations, it is possible that NATO forces may operate alongside
non-NATO nations' military forces, even within the NATO Command Structure
(NCS). Non-NATO states can add political authority and legitimacy to an operation
as well as providing additional force elements. The benefit of participating with
non-NATO forces will often outweigh any issues with interoperability.
Doctrine documents
1.7. NATO develops doctrine documents for different audiences, with different
requirements and purposes. The purpose of these documents varies from outlining
overarching principles to describing procedures and tactical or technical
standardization issues. The former's target audience is normally the NCS and the
joint and component-level elements of the NATO force structure. These are known
as capstone or keystone publications.3,4
1.8. Alliance Strategic Framework. International politics links national power to the
international political system to support national and collective interest, usually in
conjunction with allies and partners. The objectives being pursued, combined with
the manner of their pursuit, constitute a nation's grand strategy. As the Alliance
operates by consensus, Alliance strategy is bound by the extent of the collective will
of Alliance members. Understanding how to apply the instruments of power is
essential to this strategy, using the diplomatic, information, military and economic
model.5 Once a collective decision has been made in the North Atlantic Council
(NAC), contributing nations employ their diplomatic, military and economic
instruments of power, supported by the Alliance's collective information resources.
1.9. The instruments of national power. The instruments of national power are as
follows.
3 The capstone doctrine is Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01. Keystone doctrines are: AJP-2, Allied Joint
Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security; AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of
Operations; AJP-4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics; AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of
Operations; and AJP-6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems.
4 Military Committee (MC) 324/3, The NATO Military Command Structure.
5 The Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive refers to instruments of
power as military, political, economic and civil.
c. The military instrument. Military power can be used in conjunction with the
other instruments in a wide variety of circumstances. Military force is therefore
an instrument of policy. Operations are characterized by the activities
undertaken and by the context within which they take place; for example, the
military contribution to deterrence, conflict prevention, disaster relief,
stabilization and reconstruction, and combat. Integrating the military
instrument early into a collective strategy is critical and is enabled at a high
level by continuous effective civil-military interaction (CMI). The Alliance will
use military force, which is a component part of the military instrument, only as
a last resort.
6 Some Alliance members’ constabularies include gendarmerie-type forces that are part of the military
instrument. See AJP-3.22, Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing for details.
existing NATO and national capabilities, relevant planning staff and expertise is
required at the appropriate levels in NATO's structures.7
7 Political guidance on ways to improve NATO’s involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction, 2011,
paragraph 17.
8 NATOTerm – NATO Agreed.
1.12. The essence of Alliance strategy. The key to successfully conducting the
Alliance's external relations is by using the most appropriate mix of instruments of
national power and complementary capabilities. While each instrument is limited in
terms of its discrete influence and impact, careful use of each of the instruments in
a coordinated Alliance strategy will maximize their effectiveness. Diplomatic means
are usually more successful when they are backed up with an implicit or declared
will to use other means in support. Any threat, no matter how it is communicated,
must be credible. To be an effective instrument of Alliance strategy, the military
instrument must be developed and maintained in a manner consistent with the
demands that are likely to be placed upon it. This requires Alliance military forces
to have both the capability and capacity to act. The military instrument will not
operate in isolation, but as part of a collective strategy in which the diplomatic and
economic instruments of the member nations will be as important as the Alliance
military forces and the military strategy supporting them. Through a comprehensive
approach, this collective strategy is expanded to harmonize Alliance actions with the
efforts of international organizations and NGOs.
1.13. The North Atlantic Treaty is based on the purposes and principles of the United
Nations (UN) Charter and it commits member nations to 'unite their efforts for
collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security'. Public
international law regarding armed conflict9 refers to two different types of conflict:
international armed conflicts; and armed conflicts of a non-international character.
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, with the exception of Common Article 3, and
the 1977 Additional Protocol I combined with the Hague Conventions, concern the
regulation of international armed conflicts. Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol II, combined with the principles of
customary international law, concern the regulation of armed conflicts of a non-
international character. NATO is not a signatory to these conventions; ratification
and application of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols is a
matter for NATO members.10
9Often referred to as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC); in the USA it is known as the Law of War.
10Not all nations have ratified the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols and are therefore not
obliged to adhere to them except as stated in national policy.
1.15. International human rights. NATO forces and NATO-led forces always operate in
accordance with international law conforming to international human rights as part
of norms designed to protect and promote the human rights of all persons,
particularly in times of armed conflict where there is increased risk of torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.12 International human rights are
reflected in a number of human rights treaties such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
as well as in customary law.
1.16. Gender perspective. Gender perspectives need to be considered during all stages
of a NATO operation; men and women must participate equally to achieve a
comprehensive and enduring resolution.13 NATO is committed to fully implementing
the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on Women, Peace and
Security across all three of its core tasks. Gender inequalities are often
exacerbated during periods of crisis and conflict and, if not addressed, may
continue after the end of conflict.
1.17. Use of force in international law. There are three basic criteria in international
law, under which NATO can act as an international political and military cooperation
organization. These are: in collective defence against an attack on one of the
member countries, as defined by the North Atlantic Treaty Article 5; as a crisis
management tool, based on a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) provided
mandate adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (also referred to as the
Charter); or based on an intervention by invitation of the legitimate government of
the host-nation state. The inherent right to political independence, and respect of
other states' territorial integrity, are two of the fundamental principles governing
friendly relations between states in the international system. Consequently, in
Articles 2(4) and 2(7), the UN Charter says: 'nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters, which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state…and that all members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
11 An armed conflict not of an international character is described as ‘protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state’, as stated in
the Duško Tadić case of 1997 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
12 Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever nationality, place of residence, sex,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language or any other status. These rights are interrelated,
interdependent and indivisible.
13 See AJP-3.4.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction and
PO(2013)0491, Final NAC Approval of MC Advice on the Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR
1325 for the Conduct of NATO-led Operations and Missions, dated 18 October 2013.
1.18. When NATO acts collectively, in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty, it draws the legal framework for these actions from Article 51 of the UN
Charter. Furthermore, Article 24 of the UN Charter lays down the responsibility of
the UNSC to maintain international peace and security. In order to comply with this
responsibility, the UNSC enjoys wide powers under Chapter VII of the Charter in
that it may make recommendations, or binding decisions, when acting on situations
endangering international peace and security.
1.19. Chapter VII of the Charter is an evolving process, in which the UNSC under
Article 39 determines whether a situation constitutes a threat to the peace, and it
may adopt binding resolutions under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, to initiate
measures involving sanctions or use of armed force. UNSC may authorize
international organizations, such as NATO, regional arrangements or agencies, or
members of the UN, to use armed force to enforce measures taken in resolutions
adopted under Article 42 of the Charter. When NATO, as an international
organization, acts as a crisis management tool, NATO finds the additional legal
framework for these actions in a specific UNSC resolution adopted under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter; or based on an intervention by invitation or consent of the
legitimate government of the receiving state.
14Strategic level is defined as: the level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or
multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed.)
1.21. There is a difference of focus between command at different levels. The military
strategic commander determines theatre or campaign objectives and allocates
resources, as well as setting relevant freedoms and constraints. The operational
commander determines subordinate operational objectives and directs the
activities of assigned forces, in accordance with the plan, to achieve specific
objectives. In practice, even this apparently clear distinction does not preclude an
operational-level commander from receiving specific direction on what to do, as well
as how to do it. This might be when there is a clear political imperative to intervene
at a certain time, in a certain place or in a certain way.
1.22. The military-strategic level. At the military-strategic level, armed forces are
deployed and employed within an overarching political framework as part of a
collective strategy to achieve the strategic objectives of the Alliance. The Military
Committee (MC) considers the realistic contribution that military force can make to
achieve those objectives and provides potential military response options (MROs) to
the appropriate political committee or group for consideration. In forming these
MROs, the MC consults the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to:
identify the broad mission statement, strategic and military goals, and define
the objectives that would constitute success;
recognize any political, financial or legal constraints on the use of force, which
will probably vary between different Alliance partners;
define the force capabilities and the need for a strategic reserve;
1.23. Should the NAC decide on a requirement for military intervention, it issues political
guidance which authorizes the start of detailed planning. SACEUR develops the
strategic-level operation plan (OPLAN) and any necessary support plans, outlining
the mission financial arrangements plus command and control (C2) responsibilities.
When endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC, the operational-level
commander receives the OPLAN to finalize the operational-level OPLAN prior to
SACEUR approval.15 Thereafter, SACEUR monitors the operational-level planning
and execution of the operation.
1.24. The operational level. The operational level is: the level at which campaigns and
major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to achieve strategic
objectives within theatres or areas of operations.16 The operational level links
strategic objectives to tactical military activity. At the operational level and within a
designated joint operations area (JOA), armed forces are deployed and employed in
accordance with a strategy to achieve military-strategic objectives. Normally this
requires sustained operations with often simultaneous and sequential actions by
committed forces. It is at the operational level that tactical success in engagements
and operations are combined to create desired effects to achieve strategic
objectives and attain the NATO end state. This is achieved through understanding
the strategic context and the outcomes sought and by applying forces effectively
(where necessary, in coordination with other actors). To that end, the commander
refines the OPLAN approved by the establishing authority, issues operation orders
and directs operations. The commander will carry out the following.
a. Analyze the mission and objectives and decide in what sequence these
objectives should be achieved, while remaining sensitive to political
considerations.
15 Operation plan is defined as: a plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out
simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive
employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders.
The designation ‘plan’ is usually used instead of ‘order’ in preparing for operations well in advance. An
operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation
order. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed.)
16 NATOTerm – NATO Agreed.
1.25. The tactical level. The tactical level is defined as: the level at which activities,
battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military
objectives assigned to tactical formations and units.17 At the tactical level, forces
are employed to conduct military tasks to achieve military objectives. Successfully
achieving these objectives will contribute to success at the operational and strategic
levels.
1.26. The distinction between the military-strategic, operational and tactical levels of joint
operations is not always clearly defined. This is because even if a force is only of
small tactical value, its employment may have a political context in relation to the
providing nation. Conversely, the pursuit of strategic objectives will not always
require deploying large and heavily equipped forces. Furthermore, the commander
of the joint force may not have C2 of all military assets engaged within the JOA.
Some assets, such as forces held in reserve for strategic engagement and special
operations forces, may be controlled at the military-strategic level.
1.29. Legitimacy. The legitimacy of NATO will be a crucial factor for drawing support
within the international community, contributing nations and the involved parties –
including the civil community. The participation of partners and other non-NATO
countries in a NATO-led operation would broaden the basis of international support.
It is therefore necessary to execute crisis response operations in accordance with
all applicable international law, including the principles of the UN Charter.
Accusations against forces, which could compromise their legitimacy, are more
easily refuted if the force's intentions and activities are made clear and are
transparent to the international community and parties involved. A robust, clearly
articulated and appropriately disseminated legal basis for a crisis response
operation will bolster a force's legitimacy and give authority to its actions.
1.30. There are two aspects to legitimacy: the political legitimacy to initiate operations;
and the perceived legitimacy established in theatre to execute a mandate
successfully. The legitimacy for the operation is usually derived from the politically
brokered international agreement. The most widely respected legitimacy, albeit not
always easy to attain, is that conferred by a UNSC resolution; NATO should always
strive to have UN backing as it is the best way to obtain legitimacy. Alternatively,
regional agreement or consent from international organizations such as the African
Union or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can
provide for more timely, preventative or responsive action than might be possible
through a UNSC resolution. Depending on the kind of operation, an invitation from
the legitimate government of the country in which the operation will take place may
provide the desired legitimacy. However, regional authorizations are vulnerable to
perceptions of bias and may prove to be more sensitive to variations in international
will. The 'mandate' is crucial to establishing NATO legitimacy, shaping the NATO
response and determining the freedom of action allowed at the operational level to
achieve objectives.
1.31. While the mandate confers legitimacy, a successful outcome may rely on
agreements which establish compliance and consent for the duration of the
operation. The manner in which operations are conducted, specific activities
undertaken and expectations are managed will vary. When required, status of
forces agreements (SOFAs) and host-nation support arrangements between NATO
and host nations may contribute to perceived legitimacy. The commander must
always be aware that the perceived legitimacy of operations can be established and
reinforced by the military, but can also be deliberately undermined by antagonists.
Employed forces can lose legitimacy in various ways such as a belligerent faction
simply deciding to remove consent and compliance unilaterally. The NATO-led
force may also lose legitimacy if it does not meet local expectations. A loss of
perceived legitimacy should be planned for by the commander. If lost, legitimacy
must be re-established for the operation to progress.
1.33. Perseverance. Perseverance ensures the commitment necessary to attain the end
state. Perseverance also involves preparing for measured, protracted military
operations in pursuit of the end state. Some joint operations may take years to
reach termination. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it
difficult to achieve decisive resolution. Allied forces will often require patience,
resolve and persistence in pursuing objectives to achieve success.
Principles
1.34. The following are the principles of joint and multinational operations.18
Understanding and applying these principles enables commanders and staff to
approach problems coherently. For further detail on these principles, see AJP-3,
Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.
18Background information on principles can be found in The Principles of War, Foch, Field Marshal
Ferdinand, Henry Hot and Company, 1920.
Operational considerations
1.35. The principles outlined above are, in turn, supported by the following operational
considerations. They are always relevant; however, their relative importance will
depend on the campaign or operation theme. Further detail is contained in AJP-3,
Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.
1.36. The nature of conflict remains constant, but its character changes according to
circumstances. The ability to exploit new technologies or the interconnected nature
of the international environment will depend on the organization, but the challenges
facing Service personnel who deploy on operations remain unchanged.
a. Friction. Friction is the force that frustrates action; it makes the simple difficult
and the difficult seemingly impossible. Friction may be mental (indecision over
what to do next) or physical (the effects of intense fire). Friction may be
externally imposed (by the action of an adversary or the weather) and/or it
may be self-induced (by a poor plan or clashes of personality).
1.37. The ability of any actor to use, or threaten to use, force to achieve a desired
outcome is dependent on their will to act, their understanding and their capability to
act decisively. Together these determine an actor's effectiveness – their fighting
power – and represent respectively its three interrelated components; moral,
conceptual and physical. No component is more important than any other; for
instance, it does not matter how advanced the platforms, weapons and sensors if
the people operating them lack legitimacy, morality, motivation, doctrine and
1.38. The moral component. Ultimately, it is humans that generate fighting power. The
moral component of fighting power focuses on the force's legitimacy, ethical
foundations, enthusiasm and conviction to fight, thus promoting an offensive spirit,
initiative and a determination to accomplish the mission. Maximizing the moral
component requires motivation, leadership and management, and the conviction
that an operation is necessary to support the security or objectives of the force. The
moral component may be negatively impacted by the lack of political or public
support for the operation and, or, by poor leadership.
1.40. The physical component. The physical component of fighting power is the means
to fight. It has five elements: manpower; equipment; collective performance;
readiness; and sustainability. It is the combination of the ships, land vehicles,
aircraft, their associated weapons and sensors, and other equipment, together with
the people that operate them and the training they undergo, both as individuals and
as teams. It also covers effective deployment, sustainment and recovery of all five
elements.
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
2.1. NATO’s essential and enduring purpose, set out in the North Atlantic Treaty, 21 is to
safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military
means in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Charter. The North Atlantic
Treaty embodies the transatlantic link that binds Europe and North America in a
defence and security alliance. Based on common values of democracy, individual
liberty and the rule of law, NATO has provided for the collective defence of its
members since its foundation in 1949.
2.2. To achieve this, the Alliance collectively uses all instruments of national power of
the member states to meet the security challenges that face Alliance members. As
the strategic environment changes, so too does the way in which the Alliance
responds to security challenges. The Alliance continues to preserve stability
throughout the Euro-Atlantic area through traditional tasks such as territorial
defence and peace support. It is also evolving to meet the challenges of:
2.4. The fundamental guiding principle of the Alliance is that of mutual security and
cooperation; if any one member is threatened, all are affected. In signing the North
21 See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North Atlantic Treaty. Available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.
2.5. The Strategic Concept22 is the core document that establishes and reflects NATO’s
transatlantic consensus. It lays out the vision of an Alliance:
Implementing the Strategic Concept by the military is: directing the missions and
tasks of Alliance forces; establishing the principles for Alliance military structures;
and amplifying capability development, capability delivery and transformation.24
collective defence;
crisis management; and
cooperative security.
22 Active Engagement, Modern Defence – Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, dated 19 November 2010.
23 At the political level NATO identifies two criteria under which operations are executed. These are
collective defence (Article 5 operations of the North Atlantic Treaty – see Paragraph 0112 a.) and crisis
response (often referred to as non-Article 5 operations). Crisis response operations are focused on
contributing to effective crises management by the wider international community when there appears to be
no direct threat to NATO nations or territories.
24 MC 0400/3, MC Guidance on Military Implementation of NATO’s Strategic Concept, 12 August 2013.
Each requires the Alliance and its members to have capabilities of sufficient quality
and quantity to be able to conduct every type of operation the Alliance may commit
to in the context of a comprehensive political, military and civil approach.
a. Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against
attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.25 Alliance
military structures must therefore be able to:
b. Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and
military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and
after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political
and military tools to:
o help respond to and resolve crises that have the potential to affect
Alliance security;
o stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and
o help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes
to Euro-Atlantic security.
Operations conducted under these provisions are not confined to NATO
territory. They may be conducted globally, at all levels of intensity, and
separately from the provision of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
c. Cooperative security. NATO is affected by, and can affect, political and
security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to
enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and
other international organizations26 and by contributing actively to arms control,
25 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more
of them in Europe or North America, shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area’.
26 For example, the Berlin-Plus agreement which allows the European Union (EU) to call on NATO
resources. Other examples are the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP), the Mediterranean Dialogue
and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
2.7. NATO’s experiences in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere have shown that crises
do not lend themselves to simple definitions or analyses. Military means, although
essential, are insufficient to deal with such crises alone. These challenges demand
a comprehensive approach by the international community, including the
coordinated action of a range of military and non-military actors. The effective
implementation of a comprehensive approach requires all actors to contribute with a
shared purpose, based on a common sense of responsibility, openness and
determination. NATO’s engagement in a comprehensive approach to resolve crises
is facilitated through civil-military interaction (CMI) which applies to all military
bodies and at all levels.27
27 See MC 0411/2, NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation and Civil-Military Interaction, 12 May
2014. Civil-military interaction (CMI) is a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and
coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors,
both during NATO operations and in preparation for them. This mutually increases the effectiveness and
efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises.
b. Improve the Alliance’s practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN
and other relevant international organizations, governmental and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), contractors, commercial partners
and local actors when planning and conducting operations.
a. Proactive engagement between all actors, both before and during a crisis.
2.12. The role of the military force in achieving the desired outcome must be carefully
considered since achieving military objectives will not necessarily lead to a desired
political outcome. Understanding the role of military force is, therefore, essential for
those directing the strategy (see Chapter 3). If the successful use of force leads
directly to achieving the desired outcome, then it can be said to be decisive. But if
the military contribution simply enables, or supports, achieving the desired outcome
by others, then it is not decisive. In the latter case, it is essential to include those
elements that are linked to military success from the outset. Failure to do so will, at
best, lose the strategic initiative; at worst, it will result in strategic failure.
2.13. Challenges to Alliance security will come from a wide variety of threats, both military
and civil, and will be difficult to predict. Aggression against the Alliance, in particular
at the edge of its members’ territory, could affect the security of NATO members.
Challenges including ethnic, political and religious rivalries, territorial disputes,
conflict over resources, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human
rights (including conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence) and the
dissolution of states could lead to local and regional instability. The resulting
tensions could create a wide range of consequences resulting in NATO being
required to execute a wide variety of operations, potentially concurrently and at
different scales. Threats could also affect Alliance security by spilling over into
neighbouring countries, including those of NATO members, and could affect the
security of other states.
2.14. The risk of state and non-state actors attempting to achieve their goals through
destabilization exists.28 In the operating environment, this implies a blurring of the
boundaries between state and non-state actors (such as insurgents, terrorists and
criminals) and NATO may confront an adversary who uses both conventional and
unconventional warfare.29 Military confrontations are rarely symmetrical.
Adversaries normally differ in some regard, and sometimes significantly; this
asymmetry may reflect differences of intent, doctrine, composition of forces, culture,
technology and size. This materializes as an asymmetric threat. Any subsequent
military confrontation could be a compound of coincidental or uncoordinated actors,
or as a hybrid threat when used by an adversary in a simultaneous and coordinated
manner together with non-military measures. These adversaries will use hybrid
threats to exploit Alliance vulnerabilities wherever possible. Such adversaries may
not be bound by Alliance nations’ legal or ethical frameworks allowing them to
challenge NATO in ways that are difficult to anticipate.
2.15. The spread of nuclear capabilities outside the Alliance constitutes a potential threat
to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Additionally, proliferation of chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and devices in parallel with
innovative delivery means remains a matter of serious concern. Despite welcome
progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges
remain.
2.17. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies may generate a response under
Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.30 However, Alliance security interests
could be affected by other extant or emerging threats, and the various forums in the
Alliance give member states platforms to discuss mutual security issues and
coordinate responses under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Such threats
include political or economic pressure, acts of terrorism, sabotage, organized crime,
28 See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization
and Reconstruction for a discussion on the fundamental elements of a stable state and destabilizing factors.
29 Unconventional warfare is defined as: military activities conducted through or with underground, auxiliary
or guerrilla forces to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a
government or occupying power. (NATOTerm – NATO agreed.)
30 See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North Atlantic Treaty. Available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm for the full text of The North Atlantic Treaty.
It makes the possibility of discrete, localized conflict less likely and increases
the likelihood of complex interconnected threats involving a range of state and
non-state actors.
(2) Alliance members may become more open as societies. They remain
reliant on stable global security conditions, particularly with key trading
partners.
31 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines globalization as: the process by which businesses or other
organizations start operating on a global scale. (12th Edition, 2011.)
(4) Failed and fragile states may become a more persistent and pervasive
threat. For example, non-state actors32 may exploit the vacuum caused
by the deterioration in security, including with respect to the rule of law
and transparent governance. There is potential to undermine the
security of the Alliance in a world where concern for personal and
collective security is gaining prominence over the defence of territory
against conventional attack. A failed state that has little strategic
significance in the traditional sense of resources or location can increase
its strategic importance as a potential base for non-state actors. The
Alliance may therefore choose, or be called upon, to intervene more
frequently to stabilize dangerous situations in poorly or ungoverned
territory. Any attendant rise in support for extremist groups will continue
to involve the diplomatic, and potentially military, capabilities of Alliance
nations.
(5) The technical and economic strength of NATO members and other
developed states means that to compete effectively, adversaries are
likely to stimulate innovation to achieve political objectives, including
using unconventional warfare. Reaction to such threats must be
coordinated across all instruments of national power which necessitates
close liaison between multilateral networks and organizations.
(1) Competition for access to resources will continue, and global demand for
energy resources in particular will intensify. Although oil and gas
reserves are sufficient for the near future, their location and
transportation will present security challenges for developed and
developing nations alike. Starvation and water scarcity will remain a
significant problem for areas of the developing world.
32Including groups supporting transnational terrorism, human trafficking and organized crime.
33Some populations in developed countries will age and are likely to decline. Populations in developing
countries will increase rapidly and rapid urbanization may challenge stability. Age and gender imbalances
may exacerbate political and social tensions, especially among youth populations in developing countries.
(3) Poor resource distribution and lack of open and transparent governance
in areas affected by demographic and environmental change may
exacerbate tensions. This may increase migratory pressures and
internal instability. As a consequence, NATO may receive requests to
provide a military contribution in response to humanitarian crises.
Military trends
2.19. The future balance of military power. The future balance of military power will be
affected by several factors.
34NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) and Defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats,
01 September 2009.
c. Posture and alliances. NATO must have the full range of capabilities
necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety of Alliance
members. To that end, NATO will maintain an appropriate mix of forces.37
NATO’s goal is to enhance deterrence as a core element of its collective
defence and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance.
d. Terrorism. The Strategic Concept38 and the declarations of the Lisbon 2010
Summit,39 the Chicago 2012 Summit and Wales 2014 Summit make clear that
terrorism continues to pose a real and serious threat to the security and safety
of Alliance members. The multifaceted nature of terrorism is such that NATO
has engaged in a number of initiatives – diplomatic, military, conceptual,
technological and scientific – to address this issue. The Emerging Security
Challenges Division within NATO deals with a growing range of non-traditional
risks and challenges, including terrorism, in a cross-cutting manner.
35 The Emerging Security Challenges Under NATO’s New Strategic Concept – Brig Gen Panizzi,
International Military Staff (IMS) Public Affairs and Strategic Communications Advisor, 16 November 2011.
36 Such as civilian aircraft, ships or remotely piloted aerial systems.
37 PO(2015)0580, Political Guidance, 16 October 2015.
38 Active Engagement, Modern Defence, Strategic Concept Lisbon, 19 November 2010.
39 Lisbon Summit Declaration, paragraph 39, 20 November 2010.
40 See PO(2015)0580, Political Guidance, 16 October 2015.
a. Nations. The ability of a nation to engage in armed conflict will remain the
ultimate indication of state power. Any such armed conflict tends to be
characterised by major combat operations (a series of battles and
engagements), often requiring intense combat activity and high logistic
consumption. Particular emphasis is placed on maintaining freedom of action
and denying that freedom to an adversary. Major combat operations often
involve large-scale manoeuvre by complex joint forces organized and
commanded as functional components.
41 C-M 2011 0042, NATO Policy on Cyber Defence and Cyber Defence Action Plan, 7 June 2011.
42 There is no NATO definition for proxy or proxies. Dr G Hughes describes proxy as ‘a non-state
paramilitary group receiving direct assistance from an external power’. My Enemy’s Enemy – Proxy Warfare
in International Politics, G Hughes, Sussex Academic Press, 2012.
c. Non-state actors. There exists potential for conflict between nations and
armed non-state actors. The incentive for these non-state actors is to seek
strategic effect and their ability to act internationally is increasing. State
militaries and law enforcement agencies will be required to develop
counter-capabilities to allow them to have an increased role in engaging such
adversaries, both domestically, in their own overseas territories and abroad.
This may involve seeking to disrupt or destroy armed organizations (including
criminal), or to prevent (through support to diplomacy) or interrupt (by military
means) state support to them. Where possible, this will be supporting state
law enforcement agencies.
2.21. Asymmetric threats. Some of NATO’s adversaries will seek ways to negate
military advantage by undermining the Alliance’s cohesion, will, credibility and
influence by using unconventional warfare. The threat that such adversaries can
pose both to Alliance forces and civil societies is termed ‘asymmetric’ because it is
not possible for the Alliance to counter it in an equal way or by equal methods. This
asymmetric threat is mainly defined by the:
2.22. NATO forces operate throughout a spectrum of conflict, where distinguishing clearly
between peace and war is challenging. The evolution of conflict will continue to be
unpredictable; its prevalence, scale and intensity will change along the conflict
continuum from war, through inter- and intra-state conflict to, ultimately, peace. Its
character will evolve through human experiences, innovation and the dynamics of
conflict. NATO forces will confront a variety of situations and threats, both state and
non-state, potentially concurrently and in the same operating environment. The
relationship between cause and effect will remain difficult to predict. Therefore, the
way commanders frame problems is becoming more important.
2.23. Adversaries of all types adapt quickly to opposing military strength and operating
methods. Adversaries in regions with multiple persistent problems, using
de-centralized command styles and an ability to exploit opportunities in heavily
populated areas, are unlikely to present themselves in sterile battle space for
precision attack. Conflict is less likely to end in clear ‘victory’ and it will be resilience
and institutional agility that will define the Alliance’s chances of success as much as
technological mastery. History has shown that asymmetry is not new, but some of
its modern manifestations are. Traditionally the Alliance has referred to a set of
operational engagements, ranging from stable peace to general war. This implied
that there are discrete types of conflict, with traditional ‘war’ against near-peers as
the professional benchmark. This view overlooked the inevitable concurrency and
unique challenges posed by conflicts that have different characteristics. These
characteristics overlap and merge and can be visualized as a spectrum. Conflict
can now be seen as a blurring of the distinctions between adversaries and the way
they use force to achieve political goals, generating a spectrum of conflict in which
the level of violence increases from stable peace to high intensity conflict. Future
conflict is likely to blend the lethality traditionally associated with state-on-state
conflict and the protracted nature of unconventional warfare.
2.24. International relations are characterized by complex interactions ranging from stable
peace to high-intensity conflict. Within the spectrum of conflict, different types of
operations develop, sometimes concurrently, depending on the context. These
operations do not necessarily follow a linear progression. Figure 2.1 depicts the
spectrum of conflict in relation to the level of violence. On the far left, stable peace
is characterized by the absence of conflict, on the far right, there is high-intensity
conflict. Within the spectrum, levels of violence are not clearly distinguished but
both blend into one another and vary in space and time. Actors will perceive the
level of violence differently depending on their perspective.
2.25. NATO must be able to conduct the full range of its missions, from low- to
high-intensity combat, including missions designed to deter conflict. At the extreme,
NATO forces may be required to engage in warfighting against
well-resourced opponents, with technologically advanced weapons systems and
equipment. NATO forces should therefore be prepared, equipped and trained for
the most complex and demanding of high-intensity warfighting operations.
Interoperability is the key consideration for an effective Alliance warfighting force.
43 Operations can be described based on the size (or scale) of the NATO force involved (major and smaller
operations, see CM(2011)0022, Political Guidance, 14 March 2011) and in terms of the foreseen intensity
and frequency of the combat incidents (high/low intensity operations, see MC 400/3, MC Guidance for
Strategic Concept implementation, 5 July 2013).
44 Irregular activity is defined as: the use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals,
frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and
authority. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed.)
45 Smith, General Sir Rupert, The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World, Penguin, London.
46 Women, children, refugees, internally displaced persons, and other groups in vulnerable situations are
likely to be disproportionately affected.
fusing lethal and non-lethal capabilities to create both physical and psychological
effects. For NATO forces to do this effectively, they need to understand the
situation (its human context, the dynamics at play and the other agencies that could
help to reach the desired outcome. NATO seeks to accomplish this through
permanent and intensive CMI with civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)47 as the main
facilitator. Commanders at all levels must be proactive in interacting with the civil
environment to improve understanding and responses to crises.
2.27. Information and intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination and sharing will be
critical to anticipate and, potentially, prevent or contain conflicts. Intelligence
processes include engaging with agencies not traditionally associated with
operations, such as law-enforcement agencies, and non-traditional sources such as
non-governmental actors. Understanding the operating environment and a
proactive approach in the earliest stages of an emerging crisis is required. Many
threats will be unconventional, and counter-intelligence activity and products play an
important role in providing the necessary knowledge. The overall assessment will
increase situational awareness and aid intelligence sharing and collaboration in
rapidly evolving situations. An adaptable decision-making cycle may be necessary
to shorten the time between the appearance of a risk, threat or opportunity and
subsequent execution of an operation. When non-NATO military or security forces,
international organizations and NGOs are to be part of an operation, any
intelligence sharing arrangements must be agreed in advance.
2.28. The Alliance must be capable of operating under political, media and public scrutiny
while maintaining the requirements for operations security. Increased public
awareness brought about by greater access to information, coupled with the
necessity to maintain domestic public support may lead to further constraints being
placed upon the military, while simultaneously increasing the requirement to
demonstrate rapid success. The public’s response to casualties, whether civilian,
Alliance or the adversary’s, may also generate its own pressures. These factors
and their associated legal codification will influence the military’s application of force
to satisfy accountability and proportionality requirements.
2.29. The Alliance structures itself for the most likely operations with the agility to adapt to
the most demanding. The Alliance’s military posture will continue to evolve to meet
new threats and challenges. The posture provides the Alliance with a broad set of
capabilities that enable it to project stability, reassure nations and partners, and
deter adversaries and aggressors across the spectrum of conflict.
47 Civil-military cooperation is defined as: CIMIC, a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to
supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in
a broad spectrum of CMI with diverse non-military actors. (MC 411/2 – not NATO Agreed).
NATO forces will usually be only one of the contributors. While different actors’
respective goals may be broadly aligned, each will have different perspectives,
priorities, motivations, mandates, timeframes, cultures and processes. These
actors may include, in addition to multinational military forces, the indigenous
population with their formal and informal authorities, media, diplomats, international
organizations such as the UN, NGOs, private military and security companies,
multinational companies and opportunists.
2.31. NATO must seek to influence these complex situations by applying the instruments
of national power and complementary capabilities. Individually, each instrument is
limited in terms of its influence. The likelihood of a favourable and enduring
outcome is therefore enhanced through the careful use of all instruments in concert,
using a comprehensive approach. What constitutes an appropriate combination of
the instruments of power will depend upon the context.
2.32. Conflict will, however, remain inherently adversarial, dynamic and fundamentally
human. The party that decides and acts first gains the initiative. This places a high
premium on decision-making at the operational level. It also means that plans may
become overtaken by events. This demands that commanders produce, as the
norm, clear intent and clear, concise orders which minimize the restrictions placed
on the force to enhance mission command and freedom of action.
Understanding
2.33. Crisis, conflict and war are inherently dynamic and frequently unbounded; they are
subject to continual change, external intervention and other influences. Indeed,
military activity alters the dynamics of a situation, precipitating intended and
unintended consequences. Boundaries between the outcomes sought over time
(and hence the role of NATO forces) may be blurred; they may change suddenly
and very obviously, or more gradually, even imperceptibly.
2.35. Commanders should ensure that they establish and maintain an accurate
understanding of the ‘kind of war on which [NATO is] embarking’.48 As every
mission and context will differ (and be subject to dynamic tensions), prescribing a
definitive understanding ‘checklist’ is not possible. However, commanders will want
to understand:
Since each conflict is likely to involve a different, and shifting, balance between
offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities, understanding needs to be
constantly refreshed. NATO’s actions will have intended and unintended effects
(the latter may not always be positive) and these must be re-analysed and
understood. Investment in developing understanding may involve forgoing speed of
action in the initial stages, but such a sacrifice will underpin later progress.
2.36. It is important that commanders resist the temptation to consider the operating
environment as fixed and requiring only one solution, even though it may seem so.
Rather, they should continually review the balance between types of military
activities over the course of a crisis, in terms of principal purpose(s) and the
associated weight of military effort committed.
Operations themes
48 ‘The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have
to make is to establish....the kind of war on which they are embarking.’ Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, edited
and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, page 7, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
2.37. The character of the operation theme may demand different intellectual approaches
and require different force packages. Experience demonstrates that a wide range
of military activities is required simultaneously, rather than a single focus or
sequential progression. Conducting successful operations is therefore likely to
depend on understanding such simultaneity, how it evolves through the
campaign/operation and how it affects planning and executing operations and
activities. However, operations management consists of coordinating essentially
the same set of fundamental military activities:
offensive;
defensive;
stability; and
enabling.
2.38. To inform the planning and conduct of operations, it is desirable to define the
operations theme. The theme affords an understanding of the general conditions of
the operating environment and the main activities it will be necessary to conduct. It
helps commanders and planners balance the military activities that comprise any
operation, including organizing their forces and allocating resources. The next
paragraphs describe operations themes. Although here they appear in succession,
it should not be interpreted as suggesting that they are sequential in practice.
2.41. Peace support. The peace support theme describes an operating environment
following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment
where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is
low. Where peace support is the predominant theme, NATO commanders may
expect to develop almost exclusively stability activities, even if ready for offensive
and defensive activities. The purpose is to sustain a situation that has already met
the criteria established by international mandate; the use of force by peacekeepers
is normally limited to self-defence. Typical peacekeeping activities include
interposition and protection, interim management of selected civilian administration
functions and humanitarian assistance.
Types of operations
2.43. NATO operations are categorized with reference to essential characteristics that
differentiate them from one another. Within the spectrum of conflict, all types of
operations may be developed according to Alliance purposes. The same type of
operation may take place at different points of the spectrum and be related to
different themes depending on the level of violence faced in the operating
environment. For further detail see Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3, Allied Joint
Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.
2.44. Combat. Combat operations may be required to directly defend NATO against an
aggressor. Combat operations tend to be characterized by a series of battles and
major engagements, and therefore involve intense activity and high logistic
consumption. The tempo of activities is usually high, with a need to prioritize
resources, generate additional fighting power and involve large-scale manoeuvre by
complex and multi-faceted joint forces. Forces are generally organized and
commanded as functional components.
50 See AJP-3.4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency for more information.
51 NATOTerm – NATO Agreed.
52 See MC 0472/1, Military Committee Concept for Counter-Terrorism.
53 See AJP-3.4.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support for further information.
54 See AJP-3.4.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance for further
information.
55 While not policy or doctrine, the following guidelines cover the use of military and civil defence resources
deployed under UN control specifically to support humanitarian activities: Guidelines on the Use of Foreign
Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – Oslo Guidelines, and Guidelines on the Use of Military
and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.
56 For more on disaster relief, see MC 343, NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief
Operations.
57 See AJP-3.8, Allied Joint Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence
58 See AJP-3.4.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction.
59 See AJP-3.4.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations for further information.
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
3.2. The Military Committee, as the interface between the civil and military levels of
NATO, provides military advice upwards and converts policy and political guidance
into military direction downwards. It is at this level that strategic-political objectives
are converted into supporting strategic-military objectives, with a desired end state.
A commander may well require political advice, which could be provided either by a
nominated adviser in the theatre of operations or by strategic guidance provided
through the chain of command.
3.3. The relevance of the levels of operations. Defined levels of operations provide a
framework for planning and executing operations, in particular as a tool for
coordinating and orientating political and military activity. The key difference
between military commanders at the strategic and operational levels is that the
military-strategic commander, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), is
concerned with translating guidance from political direction to establish
strategic-military objectives and, finally, generate, deploy and sustain a military
force. The operational-level commander is responsible for achieving the assigned
objectives through military activity, in the context of contributing to a comprehensive
approach, in the designated joint operations area (JOA).
Military strategy
3.4. Military strategy is defined as: that component of national or multinational strategy,
presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to
achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.60 Military strategy is,
therefore, an integral aspect of strategic-level planning. Military strategists face the
same enduring challenges: how to develop, deploy, sustain and redeploy military
forces to achieve policy objectives. Documents setting out a military strategy must
contain an explanation of how the military strategy is to be integrated with other
3.5. The relationship between political and military objectives. Political objectives
will shape the military contribution to conflict resolution and may specify military
priorities. Political objectives are not necessarily military specific. As such, the
strategic commander will determine the military strategic objectives using guidance
contained in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) initiating directive. NAC initiating
directives contain the NATO end state, political objectives and the other guidance
on specific military actions.
3.6. The role of military force. The role of military force in achieving strategic
objectives and attaining the end state demands careful consideration and clear
understanding by both the strategic- and operational-level commanders. The
military will often create and maintain the conditions needed by other agencies to
attain the NATO end state. It is extremely unlikely that military activity alone will
achieve this. As part of the contribution to a comprehensive approach, it is vital to
include those measures, be they diplomatic, informational or economic, which will
reinforce military success and thereby maintain the strategic initiative.
3.8. Ends. The core issue for commanders and staff is identifying the essential
conditions that must be met to resolve the crisis or conflict on acceptable terms.
However, at the strategic level, identifying a clear and enduring objective is not
always possible. It may be challenging to reach agreement quickly on the desired
end state in an Alliance founded on the principle of consensus. When strategic
objectives are not clearly defined, initial planning must be conducted against broad
guidance and informed assumptions. It is important to remember that the desired
end state may not coincide with transitioning and terminating operations. A further
possible complication is that nations supporting the Alliance may join the operation
after the conflict has started (perhaps once certain conditions have been met) or
leave a conflict before the coalition objectives have been achieved.
3.9. Ways. Given the objective and the resources, a plan is developed to make best
use of the available means. The plan should include guidance on applying force to
3.10. Means. Preparing the statement of requirements62 and executing the force
generation process provides the means at a commander's disposal, although
additional forces may be requested by a commander if they feel they are necessary.
These means should be employed in ways that are coherent with the objectives.
62 See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations and AJP-4, Allied
Joint Doctrine for Logistics for more detail.
63 C-M(2001)63, NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS): Policy Guidelines.
(EU) Common Security and Defence Policy operations through activation of the
Berlin Plus agreement.64
3.13. Even before conflict arises, demonstrable military capability and measured power
projection will contribute to deterrence to dissuade would-be aggressors from acting
against the interests of any Alliance member. Faced with either an imminent crisis
or a more gradual deterioration in relations within or between states, NATO forces
may be required to prevent further deterioration in security. Focused military
intervention may supplement or replace deterrence with more assertive coercion
and conflict prevention activities. During periods of cooperation and confrontation,
the focus is likely to be on deterrence and coercion; once conflict develops
however, emphasis shifts to compliance by applying force.
3.14. In broad terms, striking an opponent to remove their means and motivation to
undermine security must be combined with subsequent, or possibly concurrent,
stabilizing of the overall crisis situation. To be successful, some level of assurance
of future security must accompany any threat removal.
3.15. Immediate post-conflict military activity seeks to re-establish and maintain security
to enable stabilization. Stabilization is not an exclusively military endeavour; it
requires a comprehensive response, with the military most likely to be in a
supporting role. NATO military forces are likely to focus on reducing the causes
of conflict and instability, and enabling the other instruments of power to restore
host-nation governance, capacity and authority, thereby ensuring that conditions do
not again provoke conflict. Achieving these interrelated objectives of security and
stability will require applying military effort to a variety of potentially concurrent
activities.
64 The Berlin Plus agreement allows the European Union (EU) to make use of NATO assets and capabilities
for EU-led crisis management operations. This agreement, amongst other things, includes: assured access
to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led operations; procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of
NATO assets and capabilities; terms of reference for using NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (DSACEUR) for commanding EU-led operations; and consultation arrangements for capability
requirements.
65 Political and Partnerships Committee, Operations Policy Committee, Military Committee, and Civil
Emergency Planning Committee.
e. NATO security alert states. NATO security alert states are those
counterterrorism and counter-sabotage measures that may be adopted by
NATO commands and member states to counter specific security threats.
3.17. The NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP) is primarily designed to allow
NATO staffs and committees to coordinate their work. It enables them to submit
advice to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in a coherent way to facilitate strategic
decision-making.66 The NCMP provides a procedural structure that allows
SACEUR to undertake prudent preparatory planning activities against a developing
or actual crisis and, subsequently, to provide strategic assessments, advice and to
undertake operations planning.
3.18. The NCMP consists of the following phases that generally conform with the cycle of
a crisis.
66The military supports this process through the operations planning process. See MC 133/4, NATO’s
Operations Planning, 7 January 2011.
d. Phase 4. Planning.67
3.19. The political decision for NATO to act is addressed through the NAC. The output of
the NAC is broad agreement between all member nations, and often with
international organizations such as the United Nations, as to what can realistically
be achieved, by whom and in what timeframe. The NAC's aspirations are then
translated into a firm intent or NATO end state. The product of this process is a
NAC initiating directive.
3.20. NATO's strategic objectives are achieved through NATO's political and military
structures. Military-strategic objectives are developed or extracted from the
strategic objectives; these military-strategic objectives are then owned by SACEUR.
3.21. National and NATO military authorities must ensure that an operational-level
commander receives the resources and command authority required to achieve
operational objectives. They should also ensure that commanders are allowed
sufficient flexibility and freedom of action for planning to meet changing
circumstances within the JOA.
3.22. National and NATO military authorities have a collective responsibility for planning
and executing NATO's operations. Their responsibilities include interpreting
political objectives to facilitate the development of military-strategic objectives, and
to sustain operations. National and NATO military authorities should also prepare
contingency plans to cover possible changes in the political and military-strategic
situation.
4.2. In the force generation process, the capabilities needed for the operation are
selected based on national capabilities and other specific agreements to provide
forces. The contributions of the components and other force elements, and the
force generation process are described in detail in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3,
Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.
Joint functions
4.5. The joint functions are a framework that provides the commander and staff a means
to visualise the activities of the force and to ensure all aspects of the operation are
addressed. They are a point of reference, as well as a description of the
capabilities of the force. The commander needs to consider the joint functions, both
when determining the capabilities required for a joint force and when conducting the
operation. The joint functions are:
manoeuvre;
fires;
command and control;
intelligence;68
information activities;69
sustainment;70
force protection;71 and
civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).72
4.6. NATO always prepares to operate with traditional partners, but it is also required to
operate with other, less familiar, forces, actors and agencies in a coalition. In a
multinational and multi-agency environment, mutual confidence is essential; this
confidence stems from the following.
a. Rapport. Military personnel at all levels, but especially senior officers, should
strive to achieve a sympathetic rapport with their counterparts. The personal
relationships amongst military leaders and personnel will influence every
aspect of cooperation.
68 See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and
Security for detail.
69 See AJP-3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations for detail.
70 See AJP-4 series for logistics and medical support detail.
71 See AJP-3.14, Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection for detail.
72 See AJP-3.4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation for detail. This AJP will be re-titled
AJP-3.19 after its next review.
b. Respect and trust. Mutual trust in the professional ability, and respect for the
culture, history, religion, gender, customs and values of participants will serve
to strengthen relationships. Respect and trust cannot be assumed or quickly
implemented – they must be developed over time.
4.8. Media. A proactive approach to the media is an important consideration during all
stages of an operation. Joint forces deal with the media at all levels, and require
support from a NATO information strategy or strategic communications
framework.73 Commanders should consider establishing a media information
centre to facilitate media interaction and monitor informal media activities. The
information strategy and associated media access must not compromise operations
security requirements.
4.9. Rules of engagement. The rules of engagement (ROE)74 are authorized by the
North Atlantic Council (NAC) on approval of the operation plan. Subsequent
changes to the ROE profile will need to be proposed to Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR) via the joint force commander for NAC approval. ROE define
the degree and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as
provocative, may be applied and are designed to ensure that applying such force is
73 See PO-0141-2009, NATO Policy on Strategic Communication, MC 0628/x, NATO Military Policy on
Strategic Communications and MC 457/2, NATO military Policy for Public Affairs.
74 See MC 362/1, NATO Rules of Engagement for detail.
4.10. Maximizing the force's capability. The commander will consider the integration,
synchronization and coordination76 of effort of the force. This aims to exploit fully
the complementary nature of the force components and the potential synergy of the
force, both internally and with other actors and agencies, in executing joint
operations.
takes a long-term view about the underlying causes and symptoms of conflict;
focuses on the outcomes as well as the conditions required to realize them;
plans and executes operations in concert with the other instruments of power,
where practicable;
embraces collaborative engagement with those agencies sharing the same
purpose to resolve the situation;
considers the entire situation, recognizes that it may change, and that it can be
non-linear and unpredictable;
conducts continuous analysis and assessment to deepen understanding of
changing environments and modifies planning and execution accordingly; and
selects and executes the best approach to ensure success (this can be direct
or indirect – the indirect approach is often described as the manoeuvrist
approach – depending on the prevailing circumstances).
75 All actions are conducted according to the principles of military necessity, humanity, distinction and
proportionality. See AJP-3.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting for more detail.
76 See AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations for details on synchronization and
coordination processes.
Operational art
4.12. Operational art77 is employing forces, in concert with other agencies, to achieve
strategic and operational objectives through the design, organization, integration
and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. This includes
transitioning and terminating NATO’s crisis management role. Operational art
embraces a commander's ability to take a complex and often unstructured problem
and provide sufficient clarity and logic (some of which is intuitive) to enable detailed
planning and practical orders. A commander's approach is as much art as science.
They gain an understanding of the context through analysis of the situation,
including both the overt symptoms and underlying causes of conflict. Thereafter,
awareness of a situation, and a feel for how it is being changed by military activity
and other influences, is cultivated and maintained by continual assessment.
Operational art is therefore realized through combining a commander's skill and the
staff-assisted processes of operations design and operations management.
4.13. Operational art is not a purely mechanistic process. There is a significant human
dimension focused on the commander and the reach that they are able to extend
through their leadership across the theatre of operations, including beyond the joint
force. Operations design and management draws extensively from the
commander's intent to guide and focus staff effort. A commander has to balance
the time it may take to develop understanding of the breadth and depth of the
problem with the requirement to produce clear direction and plans in time for
effective execution.
4.14. Operations design. Operations design frames the environment and the problem,
and then develops an operational approach that gives a comprehensive logic to the
campaign or operation, while synchronizing the joint functions with the objectives. It
also refines a commander's ideas – the commander's vision of how the operation
will unfold – to provide detailed plans. Operations design continues throughout an
operation, adapting to changing circumstances, understanding and guidance. While
the planned and intended relationship between actions, effects and decisive
conditions is an important one, it is not fixed. Continuous review and refinement are
critical aspects of operations design.
77 See AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations for more detail.
Operations framework
4.16. The operations framework comprises the following joint core activities: shape;
engage; exploit; protect; and sustain. They help the commander to visualize how
activities relate to one another within the operation. Military activities should not be
viewed as sequential or separate, distinct phases; the key is to maintain a clear
focus on success, balancing the need to be bold and decisive within the prevailing
circumstances. Based on a sound understanding of the operation, these core
activities also enable a commander to describe how subordinates' missions relate to
each other in purpose, time and space.
4.18. Engage. The decisive element of an operation will usually involve some form of
offensive action against the fighting power of adversaries. It will be difficult to
determine how to attack the fighting power of non-traditional military forces, such as
dispersed insurgent groups; nevertheless, there will normally be some form of
coordinating organization, however loose knit and dispersed.79 The main
contributors to this joint core activity are manoeuvre, fires and information activities.
4.19. Exploit. A commander should exploit opportunities to seize and retain the
initiative, or regain it once lost, to accomplish the mission. Making the most of such
opportunities, whether created through successful engagement or arising through
chance, relies upon a commander's ability to generate the means to exploit them.
More broadly, it involves: identifying or creating opportunities; having or obtaining
78 See PO-0141-2009, NATO Policy on Strategic Communication and MC 0628/x, NATO Military Policy on
Strategic Communications.
79 In a situation where there is no clear adversary, this might be the object of the mission, namely, the thing
which provides the greatest resistance to the mission and in this sense is ‘affect’ rather than ‘attack’.
the means and will to exploit those opportunities; and achieving a higher tempo
relative to the adversary.
4.20. Protect. At the same time as attacking the adversary, the Alliance force must
protect itself. Those elements of an adversary which a commander seeks to
engage – will, understanding and capability - are also those elements of the joint
force which require protecting. One of the key protection challenges is defensive
cyberspace operations; this is an area of increasing vulnerability, directly
proportional to NATO's levels of dependence on such systems.
Planning
4.22. Planning is a continuous iterative process that responds to the evolving operating
environment and the wider military-strategic context. Its purpose is to develop an
operation plan (OPLAN). Planning, like all of NATO's activities, is command
focused and should be collaborative, with contributions from military and non-
military actors and agencies.80
4.23. The sequence of activities for the planning of operations is shown below. This
sequence applies to all types and to all levels of operations.
80 See AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations for further detail.
5.2. Military command at all levels is the art of decision-making, motivating and directing
to accomplish given missions. It requires a vision of the desired outcome(s),
understanding concepts, mission priorities and allocating resources, an ability to
assess people and risks, and involves a continual process of re-evaluating the
situation. A commander determines a course of action and leads the command.
Thus, leadership and decision-making are their primary responsibilities. Command
also involves accountability and control. However, control is not an equal partner
with command but merely an aspect of it. The commander and staff share
execution of control between them.
5.4. A commander's relationship with their staff. The force of the commander's
personality, leadership, command style and general behaviour will have a direct
bearing on the morale, sense of direction and performance of their staff. Thus,
commanders will need to take the measures outlined below.
a. Set standards and be clear as to what they expect from their staff. The
reciprocal duty of all staff, at any level, is to state the truth.
5.5. The personal dimension. Command is personal; there is no single formula or right
combination of qualities. Important though a commander's personal qualities may
be, judgement is paramount. It is important, therefore, that strategic-level
commanders have a choice of whom they select to command operations to fit the
circumstances. To be effective, an operational-level commander should have the
confidence of superiors, subordinates and allies. In other circumstances, trust and
the ability to build or contribute to a disparate coalition may be more valuable.
Ideally, a combination of trust and confidence is required. These considerations
may also affect the tasks an operational-level commander gives their subordinates,
which are especially sensitive in a multinational context.
5.6. The terms command and control are not synonymous, although they share a close
relationship and they are commonly used together.
81 See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations for detail
regarding decision-making and military risk.
the armed forces to direct, coordinate, and control military forces.82 It is how a
commander impresses their will and intentions on subordinates to achieve
particular objectives. It encompasses the authority and responsibility for
deploying and assigning forces to fulfil their missions. Direction is defining the
objectives to achieve, the actions to take and the resources and procedures to
employ to achieve those objectives. Coordination is harmonizing and guiding
assigned forces to achieve the objectives.
5.7. To exercise command and control (C2) authority in joint operations, the commander
and staff should use standardized procedures84 and communication and information
systems (CIS) that are interoperable with the Alliance's core network. Together,
these procedures and CIS form a system that the commander, the staff and
subordinates use to plan, direct, coordinate, control and support operations.
c. Loyalty and trust. Loyalty and trust will take time and effort to develop and
maintain. It requires a broad, coherent and consistent approach to planning
and execution performed by a well-organized, well-trained and efficient
headquarters.
5.10. Methods of control of forces. Commanders are able to command and control
resources more effectively with assistance from joint staffs. Specialist or
liaison/staff officers, as well as the commanders of subordinate, supporting or
higher elements may provide military advice. A senior national representative
(SNR) or national contingent commander may also provide political-military advice
in accordance with their force contribution or contingent capabilities. There are
three methods employed in NATO operations.
a. Component method. For most Allied joint operations, the joint commander
exercises authority over the force through groupings of force elements called
component commands. These component commands are collections of
forces drawn together into functional elements from one or more services such
as maritime, air, or special operations. This structure reduces a joint
commander's span of command and has particular utility on major combat
operations.
These methods are not exclusive and adopting combinations of methods may be
necessary to address the operational situation effectively.
5.11. Communication and information systems. Whatever the situation, CIS support
the C2 structure to the maximum possible extent. The need to sustain operations in
degraded and denied C2 environments further reinforces the requirement for a
mission command philosophy. Even with modern CIS, there will be occasions
where face-to-face discussions are required and preferred. In principle, modern
CIS assets enable a reach-back capability, enhancing information exchange and
supporting decision-making. The CIS architecture should also be resilient enough
to function in the face of adversary attack or material failure.
5.12. Allied command authority. Each operation has a unique C2 construct, designed
during planning to match the specific requirements of the campaign or operation.
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) will recommend a C2 structure for
Military Committee endorsement and North Atlantic Council (NAC) approval.
SACEUR is ultimately responsible for:
c. Formulate and deliver their intent as to what they want to achieve and why.
The commander usually expresses this in terms of effects to create and
objectives to achieve.
d. Assign tasks and give approval. Within the limits of their C2 authority,
commanders assign tasks to subordinate commands to accomplish their
objectives and approve their concept of operations.
e. Establish liaison throughout the JOA. This will include with the commands and
authorities operating in support of operations, as well as between the
components of the force.
86 See MC 0319/3 (Final), NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics, dated 11 August 2014, for detail.
87 National approaches to the nomination and role of the National Contingent Commander differ. Some
nations appoint a SNR in the joint force headquarters and a separate national contingent commander
outside the force C2 structure, others ‘dual-hat’ one individual with both appointments.
88 See AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations for detail.
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
Lexicon
Part 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations
AAP Allied administrative publication
AJP Allied joint publication
ATP Allied tactical publication
EU European Union
MC Military Committee
MCM Military Committee Memorandum
MRO military response options
UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
campaign
A set of operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
civil-military interaction
CMI is a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all
NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors,
both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, which mutually increases the
effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises.
(MC 411/2 – not NATO Agreed)
civil-military cooperation
CIMIC, a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the
achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively
in a broad spectrum of CMI with diverse non-military actors. (MC 411/2 – not NATO
Agreed)
combat power
The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can
apply against the opponent at a given time. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
command
1. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination,
and control of military forces.
2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the
purpose of bringing about a particular action.
3. A unit, group of units, organization or area under the authority of a single individual.
4. To dominate an area or situation.
5. To exercise command. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
component command
1. In the NATO military command structure, a third-level command organization with
specific air, maritime or land capabilities that is responsible for operational planning and
conduct of subordinate operations as directed by the NATO commander.
2. A functional component command or environmental component command responsible
for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land, air, special or other operation as part of a
joint force. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
component commander
1. A single-service or functional component commander at the third level of the NATO
military command structure.
2. A designated commander responsible for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land,
air, special or other operation as part of a joint force. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
concept of operations
A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to
accomplish his given mission. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
conduct of operations
The art of directing, coordinating, controlling and adjusting the actions of forces to achieve
specific objectives. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
conflict prevention
A peace support effort to identify and monitor the potential causes of conflict and take
timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation or resumption of hostilities.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
control
That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate
organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, that encompasses
the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
counterterrorism
All preventive, defensive and offensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of
forces, individuals and property to terrorist acts and to recover after such acts.
(MC 0472/1 – not NATO Agreed)
course of action
In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment
of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
doctrine
Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of
objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
end state89
The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which
indicates that the objective has been achieved. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
environmental protection
The prevention or mitigation of adverse environmental impacts. (NATOTerm – NATO
Agreed)
force protection
All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment
and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the
operational effectiveness of the force. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
host nation
A nation which, by agreement: a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations
operating on/from or transiting through its territory; b. allows materiel and/or NATO
organizations to be located on its territory; and/or c. provides support for these purposes.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
host-nation support
Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO
and/or other forces and NATO organizations that are located on, operating on/from, or in
transit through the host nation's territory. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
intelligence
The product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information regarding
the environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, in order to identify threats
and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
interoperability
The ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical,
operational and strategic objectives. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
joint
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at
least two services participate. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
89MCM-0041-2010, Annex B defines end state as: the NAC approved set of required conditions within the
engagement space that defines an acceptable concluding situation to be attained at the end of a strategic
engagement.
logistics
The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its
most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:
a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance,
evacuation, and disposal of materiel;
b. transport of personnel;
c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities;
d. acquisition or furnishing of services; and
e. medical and health service support. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
manoeuvre
1. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy.
2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation
of war.
3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements.
4. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or
fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to
accomplish the mission. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
military strategy
That component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which
military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of
a group of nations. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
mission90
A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
multinational
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of
more than one nation participate. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
multinational operation
An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations acting together.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
operation
A sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose.
Notes: 1. NATO operations are military
2. NATO operations contribute to a wider approach including non-military actions
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
operational art
The employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the
design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations
and battles. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
operational command
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate
commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational
and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. Note: It does not include
responsibility for administration. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
operational control
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander
may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or
location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It
does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units
concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
operational level
The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained
to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
operation order
A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the
purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (NATOTerm – NATO
Agreed)
operation plan
A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in
succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive
employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting
plans and orders. The designation ‘plan’ is usually used instead of ‘order’ in preparing for
operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time,
or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
peace support
Efforts conducted impartially to restore or maintain peace.
Note: Peace support efforts can include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace
enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
risk management
The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors,
and making informed decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
rules of engagement
Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and
limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other
forces encountered. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
special operations
Military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, selected, trained and
equipped forces using unconventional techniques and modes of employment.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
strategic level
The level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational
security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
supported commander
A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher
NATO military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more
supporting commanders. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
tactical level
The level at which activities, battles and engagements are planned and executed to
accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units.
(NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
terrorism
The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in
an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or
ideological objectives. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)
theatre of operations
A designated area, which may include one or more joint operations areas.
Note: A theatre of operations may include land, air, space and sea outside a joint
operations area. (This term is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO
Agreed status)
unity of effort
In military operations, coordination and cooperation among all actors in order to achieve a
common objective. (NATOTerm – NATO Agreed)