G.R. No. 183053. October 10, 2012.

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, petitioner, vs. ISABEL

COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, respondent.

Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Administrators; The

paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator
over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s
interest in the estate.―The paramount consideration in the
appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is
the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate. This is the
same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that
those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical
administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have
the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the
estate correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of
preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a
decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the
estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
Same; Same; Same; In a number of cases, the Supreme Court
has sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator
for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein.―In a
number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more
than one administrator for the benefit of the estate and those
interested therein. We recognized that the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a decedent or the determination of a
person’s suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to
a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the
power of appointment. Under certain circumstances and for
various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American
jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-
administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2)
where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions
be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased;
(3) where

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* SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION.

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440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing
one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the
representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the
estate; and when a person entitled to the administration of an
estate desires to have another competent person associated with
him in the office.
Civil Law; Succession; Curtain Bar Rule; Article 992 of the
Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the
issue of who is better qualified to administer the estate of the
decedent.―Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we
exercise judicial restraint: we uphold that the question of who are
the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of
the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving
the issue of who is better qualified to administer the estate of the
decedent.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the

Supreme Court.
   The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
  Honorato Y. Aquino for petitioner.
  Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-
stretched imbroglio over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute
as in Inter Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace the
decision.
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of
our Deci-

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1 The Papal Bull mentioned in our Decision of 16 June 2010 (Suntay III
v. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, 16 June 2010, 621 SCRA 142, 144).

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Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
sion2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing the
issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner
Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner
Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case
No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to
declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according
to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other
persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further
directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3

We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy

between the parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died
intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived by her
spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five
grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including
herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate
grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by
Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay
(Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita,
were both reared from infancy by the spouses Federico and
Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her
siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother
Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s
parents, Emilio I and Isabel Co-

_______________
2  Penned by Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (now
retired) with Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson),
Diosdado M. Peralta, Roberto A. Abad and Jose Portugal Perez of the
Second Division, concurring. Rollo, pp. 231-246.
3 Id., at pp. 244-245.

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442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

juangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal

grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases,
including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco
against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal
separation against his wife, charging her among others
with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and void
and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel
Cojuangco on the finding that:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was

confined in the Veterans memorial Hospital. Although at the time
of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was
already out of the hospital[,] he continued to be under observation
and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the
plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had
made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed
under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the
subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of
adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties
was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness
had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes after (sic) existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless
such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage
defendant knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there
is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The
charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the
neuro-

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Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more

in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).4

Intent on maintaining a relationship with their

grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a complaint for
visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II,
and Isabel in the same special lower court. The Juvenile
Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC)
granted their prayer for one hour a month of visitation
rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty minutes,
and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel’s
testimony in court that her grandparents’ visits caused her
and her siblings stress and anxiety.5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after
Cristina’s death, Federico adopted his illegitimate
grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s
estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.
Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the
surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed
administrator of the decedent’s estate; (2) as part owner of
the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he
must be accorded preference in the administration thereof;
(3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the
enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it
did not mention the other children of his son, Emilio III
and Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico
had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is
better situated to protect the integrity of the decedent’s
estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as

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4 Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 360 Phil. 932, 936-937; 300 SCRA 760,
763-764 (1998).
5 Rollo, pp. 43-44.

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444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7)

Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties are in the
hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for
letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no
right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being
an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of
Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void.
However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically
declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a
voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on
paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate
children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate
of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio
III to administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the
event letters of administration issues to Federico.
Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-
Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio
III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and
manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the
trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as
administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is

DENIED and the Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is
hereby appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of
his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00,
conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and
complete inventory;

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Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all

debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and
at any other time when required by the court; and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of
Administration be issued in his favor.6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside

the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of
Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed
respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed

decision dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the
said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently
revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon
her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos.7

As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we

reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. We
decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of
Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico’s
estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III
and Isabel, we considered that:
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent,
Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both
acknowledged him as their grandchild;

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6 Id., at p. 60.
7 Id., at p. 31.

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446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in

the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their
conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of
their marriage;
3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are
still commingled with those of her husband, Federico,
because her share in the conjugal partnership remains
undetermined and unliquidated; and
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico,
entitled to share in the distribution of the latter’s estate as
a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in
representation of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the
Court of Appeals’ Decision in favor of her sole
administratorship based on her status as a legitimate
grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to
administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of preference for
the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored
and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed.
Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated
adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does
not deserve to become a co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an
illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not an heir of the
decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a “next
of kin” of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to
justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio
III’s actuations since his appointment as administrator by
the RTC on 9 November 2001 emphatically demonstrate
the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no
basis for joint administration as there are no “opposing
parties or factions to be represented.”
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Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of

who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to
act as administrator of the decedent’s estate. We did not
choose. Considering merely his demonstrable interest in
the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should likewise
administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother,
Cristina, as a co-administrator. In the context of this case,
we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider our
decision of 16 June 2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of
the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78
of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration

granted.―If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or
a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or
to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing
to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an

order of preference, in the appointment of an
administrator. This order of preference, which categorically
seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
creditors in the appoint-
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448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
ment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence.8
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an
administrator over the estate of a decedent is the
prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.9 This is
the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale
behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a
wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate,
or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest
and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of
preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a
decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in
the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other
candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the
surviving spouse in the administration of a decedent’s
estate presupposes the surviving spouse’s interest in the
conjugal partnership or community property forming part
of the decedent’s estate.11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if
not more, interest in administering the entire estate of a
decedent, aside from her

_______________
8  Uy v. Court of Appeals, 519 Phil. 673; 484 SCRA 699 (2006); Angeles
v. Angeles-Maglaya, 506 Phil. 347; 469 SCRA 363 (2005); Valarao v.
Pascual, 441 Phil. 226; 392 SCRA 695 (2002); Silverio, Sr. v. Court of
Appeals, 364 Phil. 188; 304 SCRA 541 (1999).
9  Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-59935, 30 September 1982,
117 SCRA 608, 612; Corona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-59821, 30
August 1982, 116 SCRA 316, 320; Matias v. Gonzales, 101 Phil. 852, 858
(1957).
10  Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 74769, 28 September 1990, 190
SCRA 112, 117-118.
11 See Articles 91 and 106 of the Family Code.
12 See Article 887, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.

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Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

share in the conjugal partnership or absolute community

property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of
preference in the appointment of administrator of a
decedent’s estate, that the appointment of co-
administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We
again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
which specifically states that letters of administration may
be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin.
In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule
82 of the Rules of Court which say that “x x x [w]hen an
executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the
remaining executor or administrator may administer the
trust alone, x x x.”
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the
appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit
of the estate and those interested therein.13 We recognized
that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
decedent or the determination of a person’s suitability for
the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent,
in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of
appointment.14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons
well-settled in Philippine and American jurisprudence, we
have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to
have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all
times to have different interests represented;15 (2) where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions
be represented in the management of the estate of the
deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause,
an intricate and perplexing

_______________
13 Matias v. Gonzales; Corona v. Court of Appeals; Vda. de Dayrit v.
Ramolete, supra note 9.
14  Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at p. 680; p. 705; Angeles v.
Angeles-Maglaya, supra note 8 at p. 365; p. 379; Valarao v. Pascual, supra
note 8 at p. 234; p. 701; Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at
pp. 210-211; p. 563.
15 Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, supra note 10 at pp. 118-119.

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450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

one to settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied

and the representatives to work in harmony for the best
interests of the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another
competent person associated with him in the office.18
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on
the appointment of special co-administrators during the
pendency of the appeal for the probate of the decedent’s
will. Pending the probate thereof, we recognized Matias’
special interest in the decedent’s estate as universal heir
and executrix designated in the instrument who should not
be excluded in the administration thereof. Thus, we held
that justice and equity demands that the two (2) factions
among the non-compulsory heirs of the decedent, consisting
of an instituted heir (Matias) and intestate heirs
(respondents thereat), should be represented in the
management of the decedent’s estate.19
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete,
where we held that “inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-
half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a
compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand
in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of
the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests.”20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling
in Ventura v. Ventura21 where we allowed the appointment
of the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the
decedent as co-administrators. However, we drew a
distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the
nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:

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16  Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at p. 681; p. 707; Gabriel v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, 7 August 1992, 212 SCRA 413, 423
citing Copeland v. Shapley, 100 NE. 1080.
17 Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, id.
18 In re Fichter’s Estate, 279 N.Y.S. 597.
19 Supra note 9.
20 Supra note 9 at p. 612.
21 243 Phil. 952; 160 SCRA 810 (1988).

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In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased

Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are:
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura.
The “next of kin” has been defined as those persons who
are entitled under the statute of distribution to the
decedent’s property [citations omitted]. It is generally said
that “the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is
more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of
administrator. ‘Among members of a class the strongest
ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of
interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be
preferred.’” [citations omitted]
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme
Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate
children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura,
they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of
Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence,
under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78,
the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana
Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to
represent both interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)

In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that

the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the legitimate
child’s appointment as special administrator, and
eventually as regular administrator, of the decedent’s
estate as against the surviving spouse who the lower court
found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as good
law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment as
administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind
or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.

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22 Id., at pp. 962-963; p. 820.
23 Supra note 8.
24 44 Phil. 711 (1923).

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452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a

running theme of heirs squabbling over the estate of a
decedent. We found no reason to set aside the probate
court’s refusal to appoint as special co-administrator Diaz,
even if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the
decedent and represented one of the factions of heirs,
because the evidence weighed by the probate court pointed
to Diaz’s being remiss in his previous duty as co-
administrator of the estate in the early part of his
administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases of
Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, thus:

Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v.

Gonzales, Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v.
Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their
claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right
demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-
administrators who would represent the respective
interests of squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute
precedents for the authority of the probate court to
designate not just one but also two or more special co-
administrators for a single estate. Now whether the
probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs
are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to
its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit
hinge upon factual circumstances other than the incompatible
interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant
case. In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a special
co-administrator because of the applicant’s status as the universal
heir and executrix designated in the will, which we considered to
be a “special interest” deserving protection during the pendency of
the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower court in Matias
had already deemed it best to appoint more than one special
administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the
lower court in ignoring the applicant’s distinctive status in the
selection of another special administrator.

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25 Supra note 8.

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In Corona we gave “highest consideration” to the “executrix’s

choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to
serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix
in her will,” for this Court to compel her appointment as special
co-administrator. It is also manifest from the decision in Corona
that the presence of conflicting interests among the heirs therein
was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special
administrator as this fact was taken into account only to
disregard or, in the words of Corona, to “overshadow” the
objections to the appointment on grounds of “impracticality and
lack of kinship.”
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the
wife of the decedent as special co-administrator because it was
“our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns
one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a
compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the
administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would
be unfair to her proprietary interests.” The special status of a
surviving spouse in the special administration of an estate was
also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we held that
the widow would have more interest than any other next of kin in
the proper administration of the entire estate since she possesses
not only the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive
property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal
partnership for which the good or bad administration of the estate
may affect not just the fruits but more critically the naked
ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals we
recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as
regular administrator of the deceased spouse’s estate when we
counseled the probate court that “there must be a very strong case
to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration.”
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in
Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the
independent proprietary interests and moral
circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily
related to the demand for representation being repeatedly
urged by respondents.26 (Emphasis supplied)

_______________
26 Id., at pp. 233-235.

454

454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally

declared the mandatory character of the rule on the order
of preference for the issuance of letters of administration:

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the

order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and
the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in
appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of
discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient
reason therefor.27

Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we

expounded on the legal contemplation of a “next of kin,”
thus:

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of

administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse
is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law
speaks of “next of kin,” the reference is to those who are entitled,
under the statute of distribution, to the decedent’s property; one
whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the
estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore,
the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a
next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce
has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate
action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this
consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked
into and pass[ed] upon the claimed relationship of respondent to
the late Francisco Angeles.29

Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into

consideration the size of, and benefits to, the estate should
respondent therein be appointed as co-administrator. We
emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any
cause, an intricate

_______________
27 Supra note 16 at p. 420.
28 Supra note 8.
29 Id., at p. 365.
30 Supra note 8.

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VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 455

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-

administrators may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on
Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed
over the order of preference set forth in the Rules. We gave
weight to Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in Cristina’s
estate and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts
and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We
are led to a review of such position by the foregoing survey
of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of
interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle
an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither
does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests
necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set
forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the
principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.31 Given
Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the
decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest
“next of kin,” the appointment of Emilio III as co-
administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable
right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of
the Court32 and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and
circumstances of this case even as we reiterate Isabel’s and
her sibling’s apparent greater interest in the estate of
Cristina.
 These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of
the order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of

_______________
31 Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, supra note 10 at p. 117.
32 Fernandez v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-18799, 26 March 1965, 13 SCRA
416, 419-420.
33 Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at p. 211; pp. 562-563.

456

456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of

one over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing
animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III,
on the other, traced back from the time their paternal
grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as
adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III
to Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of
Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as co-
administrators may result in prejudice to the decedent’s
estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the
management of Cristina’s estate, has not looked after the
estate’s welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice
thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that
Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the estate makes him
a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals
that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable
administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out
that after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the
subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare
of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage
and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the following:
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate
court for a complete inventory, omitted in the partial
inventories34 he filed therewith properties of the estate35
including several parcels of land, cash, bank deposits,
jewelry, shares of

_______________
34  Annexes “3,” “5,” and “6,” of respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Rollo, pp. 318-331.
35 Annex “4,” of respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration. Id., at p. 326.

457
 VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 457
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

stock, motor vehicles, and other personal properties,

contrary to Section 1,36 paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions
against Federico’s settlement of the decedent’s estate which
adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly
belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially), and
which contained a declaration that the decedent did not
leave any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled
to succeed to her estate.37
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012
requiring Emilio III to respond to the following imputations
of Isabel that:
1. [Emilio III] did not file an inventory of the assets until November
14, 2002;
2. [T]he inventory [Emilio III] submitted did not include several
properties of the decedent;
3. [T]hat properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to
different individuals or persons; several properties to Federico
Suntay himself; and
4. [W]hile some properties have found their way to [Emilio III], by
reason of falsified documents;38

_______________
36  Section 1. Bond to be given issuance of letters. Amount.
Conditions.―Before an executor or administrator enters upon the
execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of administration issue,
he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as
follows:
(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true
and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of
the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the
possession of any other person for him;
37  Annexes “1,” and “2,” of respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Rollo, pp. 318-321.
38 Id., at p. 407.

458

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was

lackadaisical in assuming and performing the functions of
administrator of Cristina’s estate:
 1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio
III as administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings before the
RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption of
that office, arguing that “[t]he decision of the [RTC] dated 9
November 2001 is not among the judgments authorized by
the Rules of Court which may be immediately implemented
or executed”;
2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was
due to Isabel’s vociferous objections to Emilio III’s attempts
to act as administrator while the RTC decision was under
appeal to the Court of Appeals;
3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory,
inherent in the nature thereof, and one of the first steps in
the lengthy process of settlement of a decedent’s estate,
such that it cannot constitute a complete and total listing of
the decedent’s properties; and
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up
charges where Isabel, as private complainant, has been
unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a possible motu proprio
dismissal of the cases.
While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s
explanation for the blamed delay in the filing of an
inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, partial
as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement of a
decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on
Isabel’s accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted
properties in the inventory, which properties of Cristina he
knew existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable
about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his
unsuitability as administrator rooted in his failure to
“make and return x x x a true and complete inventory”
which
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VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 459

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

became proven fact when he actually filed partial

inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on
two occasions of Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other
compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the
list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts
a bond and executes an oath to faithfully discharge the
duties of settling the decedent’s estate with the end in view
of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The
foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission and
inaction become even more significant and speak volume of
his unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his
interest adverse to those immediately interested in the
estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the
pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is the inescapable
fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep
aversion for each other. To our mind, it becomes highly
impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-
administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The
allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of Federico and the
other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and
her siblings were estranged from their grandparents
further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility
towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental
to the decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator
(Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel,
immediately interested in the said estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of
administration is simply a preliminary order to facilitate
the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we here point out that
Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his interests
in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of
Appeals,39 we mapped out as among the allowable
participation of “any interested persons”

_______________
39 G.R. No. 164108, 8 May 2009, 587 SCRA 464.

460

460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

or “any persons interested in the estate” in either testate or

intestate proceedings:

xxxx
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested
in the estate of the deceased “to complain to the court of the
concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the
decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;”
5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and
place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s
account “to persons interested”;
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give
notice “to the persons interested” before it may hear and grant a
petition

_______________
 40  Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or
fraudulently conveyed.―If an executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor, or
other individual interested in the estate of the deceased, complains to the court
having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is suspected of having concealed,
embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods, or chattels of the deceased,
or that such person has in his possession or has knowledge of any deed,
conveyance, bond, contract, or other writing which contains evidence of or tends to
disclose the right, title, interest, or claim of the deceased to real or personal estate,
or the last will and testament of the deceased, the court may cite such suspected
person to appear before it and may examine him on oath on the matter of such
complaint; and if the person so cited refuses to appear, or to answer on such
examination or such interrogatories as are put to him, the court may punish him
for contempt, and may commit him to prison until he submits to the order of the
court. The interrogatories put to any such person, and his answers thereto, shall
be in writing and shall be filed in the clerk’s office.
41  Section 10. Account to be settled on notice.―Before the account of an
executor or administrator is allowed, notice shall be given to persons interested of
the time and place of examining and allowing the same; and such notice may be
given personally to such persons interested or by advertisement in a newspaper or
newspapers, or both, as the court directs.
42  Section 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or
otherwise encumber estate. x x x.

461

VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 461

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the

estate; and
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows “any person interested in
the estate” to petition for an order for the distribution of the
residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are
either satisfied or provided for.44

In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise

avail of the remedy found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:

_______________
(a) x x x
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such
petition, and cause notice stating the nature of the petition, the reason for
the same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given personally or by
mail to the persons interested, and may cause such further notice to be
given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper.
43  Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made.―When
the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance
to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which
each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to he
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributes, or
any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for
the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
44 Hilado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 37 at pp. 472-473.

462

462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or

administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or
removal.―If an executor or administrator neglects to render his
account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an
order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by
these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise
incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may
remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When
an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust
alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him.
If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration
may be granted to any suitable person.

Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise

judicial restraint: we uphold that the question of who are
the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article
992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable
in resolving the issue of who is better qualified to
administer the estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint

impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship
and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the
estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on
who will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has
yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue
remains good law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is
premature, although the evidence sufficiently shows who
are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly
been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet
 reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must
come after the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from
the foregoing admonition:

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VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 463

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is

made.―x x x. If there is a controversy before the court as to
who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of
said obligations within such time as the court directs.45

Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the

Supplemental Comment46 of Emilio III questioning the
Special Second Division which issued the 18 April 2012
Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that “the operation of
the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional
and void” as the Second Division in Manila had already
promulgated its Decision on 16 June 2010 on the petition
filed by him:

7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in

Baguio, acting separately from the Second Division of the
Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be two Second
Divisions of the Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme
Court in Manila, and another Special Second Division acting
independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in
Manila.47

For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second

Division in Baguio is not a different division created by the
Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on
this case on 16 June 2010, penned by Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different composition, with
the advent of Justice Nachura’s retirement on 13 June
2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court provides:

_______________
45 Rollo, pp. 243-244.
46 Id., at pp. 442-445.
 47 Id., at p. 443.

464

464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or

clarification of decisions or signed resolutions and all other
motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special
Division.―Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a
decision or of a signed resolution and all other motions and
incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by the
ponente and the other Members of the Division who participated
in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution.
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the
Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from
acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or
she shall be replaced through raffle by a new ponente who
shall be chosen among the new Members of the Division
who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution and who concurred therein. If only one Member
of the Court who participated and concurred in the
rendition of the decision or signed resolution remains, he
or she shall be designated as the new ponente.
If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered
the decision or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a
Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or
herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or
clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a
replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other
Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for the
retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a new Justice, he or she
shall replace the designated Justice as replacement Member of
the Special Division.
Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled
by raffle from among the other Members of the Court to constitute
a Special Division of five (5) Members.
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that
rendered the Decision or signed Resolution are no longer
Members of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member of
the Court and the motion shall be acted upon by him or her with
the participation of the other Members of the Division to which he
or she belongs.
If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the
denial of the motion for reconsideration or clarification, the case
shall be acted upon by the ponente on record with the
participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or
she belongs at the

465
 VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 465
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

time said pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the

Court. (Emphasis supplied)

As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is

simply a change in venue for the Supreme Court’s summer
session held last April.48
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053
dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to beset by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to
settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Sereno (C.J.),** Peralta and

Abad, JJ., concur.

Motion for Reconsideration partially granted, judgment

modified.

Notes.―It has long been settled that the selection or

removal of special administrators is not governed by the
rules regarding the selection or removal of regular
administrators—the probate court may appoint or remove
special administrators based on grounds other than those
enumerated in the Rules at its discretion. (Ocampo vs.
Ocampo, 623 SCRA 559 [2010])

_______________
48 See Resolution dated 9 February 2012, A.M. No. 12-2-7-SC Re: 2012
Summer Session in Baguio City.
**  Per raffle dated 4 July 2011.

466

466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

The property rights and obligations to the extent of the

value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to
another through the decedent’s death. (Republic vs.
Marcos-Manotoc, 665 SCRA 367 [2012])

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