CRISANTA GALAY, ET AL., petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and

VIRGINIA WONG, represented by her Administrator, ATTY. REYNALDO
B. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 120132 | 1995-12-04
DECISION

FRANCISCO, J.:

In an effort to uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections of the communities
in urban areas, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7279 otherwise known as
the "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992", envisioned to be the antidote
to the pernicious problem of squatting in the metropolis. Nevertheless, the courts
continue to be swamped with cases arising from disputes in the proper
implementation of the aforementioned legislation, particularly on matters involving
the eviction, demolition and resettlement of squatters. The present suit is among
such cases.

The instant petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals dated September 20,1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33761
entitled "Crisanta Galay, et al. vs. Judge Mariano I. Bacalla and Virginia Wong,
represented by her Administrator, Atty. Reynaldo B. Hernandez". Petitioners claim
that the assailed decision was based on an unauthorized compromise agreement to
which they never consented nor had any knowledge thereof.

Material hereto are the following antecedents:

Private respondent Virginia Wong, as represented by her Administrator and

Attorney-in fact, Reynaldo B. Hernandez filed an ejectment suit (Civil Case No.
38-5830) against herein petitioners, who were alleged to have been illegally
occupying private respondents' 405 square meter lot located in Quezon City which
is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51589 of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City.

Although petitioners do not claim ownership over the subject premises, they
however disputed private respondents' claim of ownership and alleged that they
have been in possession of the property in question since 1972 by virtue of the
tolerance and permission of the alleged real owner, Dr. Alejo Lopez.

On August 3, 1992, judgment was rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of

Quezon City, Branch 38, ordering the ejectment of the petitioners from the
disputed premises. 1

Upon appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, the decision
of the Metropolitan Trial Court was affirmed in toto. 2

Still not satisfied, petitioners proceeded to the Court of Appeals and filed a petition
for review, but the petition was dismissed outright for failure to state the material
dates to show that the petition was filed on time and for not being accompanied by
certified true copies of the disputed decision. 3

No further appeal was interposed by petitioner, hence, the judgment became final.
This prompted private respondent to file a Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution which was granted by the Metropolitan Trial Court in its order dated
March 25, 1994, 4 taking into account that the judgment has already become final
and executory.

In an attempt to prevent the execution of the judgment and their consequent

eviction, petitioners filed a complaint for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 216, 5 alleging that herein private respondent must first comply with the
mandatory requirements of Section 28 (c) of R.A. 7279 regarding eviction and
demolition by court order.

In its order dated April 5, 1994, 6 the lower court denied the prayer for the
issuance of a restraining order as the act sought to be enjoined was pursuant to a
lawful order of the court.

Thereafter, petitioners again sought recourse from the Court of Appeals via
Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order, claiming that the latter order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion for
being arbitrary, unjust and oppressive and reiterating that they cannot be evicted
unless there is compliance with Section 28 (c) of R.A. 7279. 7

On April 28,1994, respondent Court of Appeals gave due course the petition and
granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction enjoining the ejection of
petitioners until further orders from the court. 8

On July 18,1994, counsel for private respondent filed a Motion To Lift And/Or
Dissolve Preliminary Injunction, contending among others that the Urban Poor
Affairs Office [People's Bureau] has already been notified, as mandated by RA
7279, and that more than 45 days had already lapsed since the notice was made in
April, 1994. Thus, private respondent has substantially complied with the
requirements of RA 7279 and therefore the enforcement of the final judgment and
ejectment of petitioners is in order. 9

Objecting to private respondent's motion, petitioners argued that RA 7279 requires

not only the 45-day notice, but also the relocation of petitioners and the grant of
financial assistance to them prior to their relocation. Furthermore, petitioners
maintain that there is no extreme urgency for petitioners' eviction 6n account of
private respondent's affluence. 10

The case was subsequently set for hearing and oral argument, after which,
respondent court rendered the assailed decision on September 20 1994 ordering as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, pursuant to RA 7279, the People's Bureau is hereby ordered to
relocate the herein petitioners from subject lot of private respondent not later than
October 30,1994. Should the relocation of petitioners be not finished on or before
October 30,1994, the People's Bureau shall pay petitioners a daily allowance of
P145.00 for every day of delay of relocation but in no case shall such allowance
last for more than sixty (60) days.

"Petitioners are hereby ordered to vacate the premises in question not later than
October 30,1994, on which date the private respondent shall have the right to take
over possession thereof and, if necessary, to ask for a writ of execution for the
implementation of this disposition. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED." 11

On October 25, 1994, a new counsel entered his appearance for petitioners and
filed a motion to set aside the aforequoted decision. 12 As initially mentioned,
petitioners assert that the assailed decision was rendered based on a compromise
agreement to which they never gave their consent nor authorized their former
counsel to enter into, and for which reason said former counsel has withdrawn his
appearance as counsel of record.

Petitioners contend that the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals was indeed
based on a compromise agreement which is evident from the following portions of
the decision:

xxx xxx xxx

"When the case was called for hearing on September 14,1994, as scheduled, both
parties were represented. Atty. Rogelio Directo stood up for the People's Bureau
(Urban Poor Affairs Office). And the parties, including the said representative of
the People's Bureau, agreed that petitioners herein are all qualified to avail of the
protection and benefits under RA 7279 and through counsel, manifested their
willingness and readiness to be relocated in accordance with said law. It was
likewise agreed by all concerned that should petitioners be not relocated within the
period of 45 days, from September 15 to October 30,1994, the People's Bureau
shall pay them an allowance of P145.00, equivalent to the minimum wage, per day
of delay of relocation, until their actual transfer to the relocation site to be
designated for them. It is understood, however, that the daily allowance for
petitioners shall be for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, starting October 31,
1994. In other words, should the delay of relocation of petitioners be for more than
sixty (60) days, they shall only be entitled to the daily allowance of P145.00 per
day of delay of relocation for not more than sixty (60) days.

"It was likewise agreed that on October 31, 1994, whether petitioners shall have
been relocated or not, the private respondent shall then be entitled to the execution
and implementation of this judgment, and to cause the ejectment of petitioners
from subject property litigated upon. (Emphasis supplied)." 13

In its Resolution dated May 4,1995, respondent Court of Appeals denied

petitioners' Motion to Set Aside Decision 14 and reiterated that the assailed
decision dated September 20,1994 was a decision based on the merits and not upon
a compromise agreement.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners adamantly argue that the decision of respondent court dated September
20, 1994 was based on an unauthorized compromise agreement, sans their
knowledge, consent and authority. Additionally, petitioners interpose the following
issues: 1) whether there can be eviction and demolition without actual relocation;
2) can the petitioners be considered as homeless and underprivileged?; and 3)
whose duty is it to relocate them?

A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that is expressly acknowledged as a

juridical agreement by the Civil Code. It is defined in Article 2208 of the Code as
"a contract whereby the parties by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced". 15 Thus, a judgment upon a
compromise is a judgment embodying a compromise agreement entered into by the
parties in which they make reciprocal concessions in order to terminate a litigation
already instituted. 16

In the present suit, the assailed decision, far from being a judgment based on a
compromise agreement, is undoubtedly a decision rendered entirely on the merits.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the dispositive portion of the decision is very
explicit in exclusively adverting to RA 7279 as the basis for the judgment.
Nowhere did it appear nor can it be inferred therefrom that respondent court's
disposition took into account any agreement or concessions made by the parties
that is indicative of a judgment on a compromise. A scrutiny of the assailed
portions of the decision allegedly embodying the compromise agreement revealed
that the same are nothing but admissions made by the parties intended to clarify the
applicable provisions of RA 7279. In fact the said admissions are expressly laid out
in Section 28(c) (8) of RA 7279 and thus could not have been the subject of any
compromise agreement as the same are already provided in the law.

Further negating petitioners' contention are the following ratiocinations made by

respondent court in denying the Motion to Set Aside Decision, with which we are
in complete accord:

"After a careful study, We find movant's stance barren of merit. Our Decision
promulgated on September 20,1994 in this case was not rendered as a Judgment by
Compromise. It resolved the petition on the merits, after the lawyers of the parties
and the representative of the Urban Poor Affairs Office agreed on the applicability
of Rep. Act No. 7279 to petitioners's situation. As a result of such development of
the case, Our judgment granted petitioners more than what they have came here
for. All they prayed for was to hold in abeyance execution of subject final and
executory Decision of the Quezon Metropolitan Trial Court, ordering their
ejectment, until after the expiration of forty-five (45) days from date of notice of
their ejectment to the Urban Poor Affairs Office. But the judgment in question has
recognized not only petitioners's right not to be ejected sans the 45-day notice to
the Urban Poor Affairs Office, but also the right to a daily allowance of P145.00
for each day of delay or relocation, for a period of not more than sixty (60) days,
should there be a delay in their relocation, as mandated by law. 17

Finally, in a desperate move to prolong the execution of the decision ordering their
eviction, petitioners invoke the principle of social justice and plead that as
underprivileged and homeless citizen, their eviction and demolition of their homes
cannot be effected unless there is adequate relocation. Moreover, petitioners
maintain that private respondent is also duty bound to share in the task of
relocating them.

The contentions are without merit. It is beyond dispute that the ejectment suit
against petitioners has already been resolved with finality way back on February
16, 1994 when the petitioners' appeal was dismissed outright by the Court of
Appeals and they did not interpose any further appeal therefrom. The subsequent
proceedings merely sought to enforce the decision ordering their ejectment from
the disputed premises, which petitioners however, repeatedly tried to thwart by
invoking non-compliance with Section 28(c) of RA 7279. Thus, upon compliance
by private respondent with the requirements of the aforesaid law, particularly on
the notice to the People's Bureau (Urban Poor Affairs Office) and the expiration of
45 days from said notice, petitioners' right to remain in the subject lot ceased.
Resultingly, petitioners' eviction must now proceed in accordance with Section
28(c) (8), to wit:

". . . Provided, however, That in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to a

court order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be
undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National Housing
Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45)
days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the
said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be
possible within the said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the
prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to
the affected families by the local government unit concerned."

Anent petitioners' claim that private respondent must also share the responsibility
of relocating petitioners, the same is also without any basis. The aforecited
provision is very explicit that the task of relocating the homeless and the
underprivileged shall be the responsibility of the local government unit concerned
and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of the other government
agencies. Although private individuals are not prohibited from taking part in the
relocation, there is nothing in the law either that compels them to undertake such
task on a mandatory basis, otherwise, such obligation should have been included in
the provision, either expressly or impliedly. Thus, petitioners attempt to further
burden private respondent with their relocation is unwarranted.

Equally unpersuasive is petitioners' plea for social justice. In previous cases, this
Court has emphasized that "never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because
they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must
always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law." 18
In the same vein, it has been held that "the policy of social justice is not intended to
countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged.
At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense.
Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when
the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege." 19

Further militating against petitioners' appeal for compassion is the fact that only
recently, President Ramos himself, in the exercise of his veto power, vetoed a
congress and approved measure 20 intended to extend the moratorium on the
demolition of squatter colonies throughout the country. The President's action was
intended to curtail the negative influences to general growth and development in
urban areas brought about by the problem of squatting and to prevent the legitimate
landowners from being unduly deprived of the immediate use of their properties.

In closing, we find it fitting to advert to the following pronouncements made in the

case of Martires vs. Court of Appeals 21 :

"While we sympathize with the millions of our people who are unable to afford the
basic necessity of shelter, let alone the comforts of a decent home, this sympathy
cannot extend to squatting, which is a criminal offense. Social justice cannot
condone the violation of law nor does it consider that very wrong to be a
justification for priority in the enjoyment of a right. This is what the petitioner
wants us to grant him. But we cannot heed his unjust plea because the rule of law
rings louder in our ears."

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant petition is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.