Burden of Proof and Presumptions (Rule 131)

G.R. No. 184565, November 20, 2013

MANOLITO DE LEON AND LOURDES E. DE LEON, Petitioners, v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

“[I]n the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or
the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict
must be returned in favor of plaintiff.”1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the November 16,
2007 Decision3 and the September 19, 2008 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
91217.

Factual Antecedents

On June 13, 1995, petitioner-spouses Manolito and Lourdes de Leon executed a Promissory Note5
binding themselves to pay Nissan Gallery Ortigas the amount of P458,784.00 in 36 monthly installments
of P12,744.00, with a late payment charge of five percent (5%) per month.6 To secure the obligation
under the Promissory Note, petitioner-spouses constituted a Chattel Mortgage7 over a 1995 Nissan
Sentra 1300 4-Door LEC with Motor No. GA-13-549457B and Serial No. BBAB-13B69336.8

On the same day, Nissan Gallery Ortigas, with notice to petitioner-spouses, executed a Deed of
Assignment9 of its rights and interests under the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of
Citytrust Banking Corporation (Citytrust).10

On October 4, 1996, Citytrust was merged with and absorbed by respondent Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI).11
Petitioner-spouses, however, failed to pay their monthly amortizations from August 10, 1997 to June 10,
1998.12 Thus, respondent BPI, thru counsel, sent them a demand letter13 dated October 16, 1998.

On November 19, 1998, respondent BPI filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila a
Complaint14 for Replevin and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 161617 and raffled to Branch 6,
against petitioner-spouses.15 The summons, however, remained unserved, prompting the MeTC to
dismiss the case without prejudice.16 Respondent BPI moved for reconsideration on the ground that it
was still verifying the exact address of petitioner-spouses.17 On March 21, 2002, the MeTC set aside the
dismissal of the case.18 On April 24, 2002, summons was served on petitioner-spouses.19

Petitioner-spouses, in their Answer,20 averred that the case should be dismissed for failure of
respondent BPI to prosecute the case pursuant to Section 321 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court;22 that
their obligation was extinguished because the mortgaged vehicle was stolen while the insurance policy
was still in force;23 that they informed Citytrust of the theft of the mortgaged vehicle through its
employee, Meldy Endaya (Endaya);24 and that respondent BPI should have collected the insurance
proceeds and applied the same to the remaining obligation.25

On November 11, 2003, respondent BPI presented its evidence ex parte.26 It offered as evidence the
testimony of its Account Consultant, Lilie Coria Ultu (Ultu), who testified on the veracity of the
Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage, the Deed of Assignment, the demand letter dated October 16,
1998, and the Statement of Account27 of petitioner-spouses.28

For their part, petitioner-spouses offered as evidence the Alarm Sheet issued by the Philippine National
Police on December 3, 1997, the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Reynaldo Llanos (Llanos), the
Subpoena for Llanos, the letter of Citytrust dated July 30, 1996, the letters of respondent BPI dated
January 6, 1998 and June 25, 1998, and the testimonies of Ultu and petitioner
Manolito.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

On November 17, 2004, the MeTC rendered a Decision30 in favor of respondent BPI and declared
petitioner-spouses liable to pay their remaining obligation for failure to notify Citytrust or respondent
BPI of the alleged theft of the mortgaged vehicle and to submit proof thereof.31 The MeTC considered
the testimony of petitioner Manolito dubious and self-serving.32 Pertinent portions of the Decision
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[Petitioner Manolito] declared on the witness stand that he sent to [Citytrust], through “fax,” the papers
necessary to formalize his report on the loss of [the] subject motor vehicle, which included the Alarm
Sheet (Exhibit “1”) and the Sinumpaang Salaysay of one Reynaldo Llanos y Largo (TSN dated August 3,
2004, pp. 17-19).

However, [his claim that] such documents were indeed received by [Citytrust] only remains self-serving
and gratuitous. No facsimile report has been presented that such documents were indeed transmitted to
Citytrust. No formal letter was made to formalize the report on the loss. For an individual such as
[petitioner Manolito], who rather appeared sharp and intelligent enough to know better, an apparent
laxity has been displayed on his part. Heedless of the consequences, [petitioner Manolito] simply
satisfied himself with making a telephone call, if indeed one was made, to [a rank and file employee] of
Citytrust or [respondent BPI] x x x and did not exercise x x x due diligence to verify any feedback or
action on the part of the banking institution.

Worse, [petitioners] x x x failed to prove that they indeed submitted proof of the loss or theft of the
motor vehicle. [Petitioner-spouses] merely [presented] an Alarm Sheet and the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
one Reynaldo Llanos y Largo. But a formal police report on the matter is evidently missing. It behooved
[petitioner-spouses] to establish the alleged theft of the motor vehicle by submitting a police action on
the matter, but this, they did not do.

Haplessly, therefore, the required notice and proof of such loss have not been satisfied.33

Thus, the MeTC disposed of the case in this wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondent BPI] and against [petitioner-spouses]
Lourdes E. De Leon and Jose Manolito De Leon, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(i) Ordering [petitioner-spouses] to jointly and severally pay the sum of P130,018.08 plus 5% interest per
month as late payment charges from date of default on August 10, 1997, until fully paid;

(ii) Ordering [petitioner-spouses] to jointly and severally pay attorney’s fees fixed in the reasonable sum
of P10,000.00; and

(iii) Ordering [petitioner-spouses] to jointly and severally pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.34
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

On appeal,35 the RTC, Branch 34, reversed the MeTC Decision. Unlike the

MeTC, the RTC gave credence to the testimony of petitioner Manolito that he informed Citytrust of the
theft of the mortgaged vehicle by sending through fax all the necessary documents.36 According to the
RTC, since there was sufficient notice of the theft, respondent BPI should have collected the proceeds of
the insurance policy and applied the same to the remaining obligation of petitioner-spouses.37 The fallo
of the RTC Order38 dated July 18, 2005 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premised from the above considerations and findings, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and set aside.

The Complaint and the counterclaim are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.39

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, respondent BPI elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court.

On November 16, 2007, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Order and reinstated the MeTC Decision,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch 34), dated July 18, 2005, in Civil Case No. 05-111630, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch 6) is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.40
Petitioner-spouses moved for reconsideration, which the CA partly granted in its September 19, 2008
Resolution,41 the dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, our decision of 16 November 2007 is deemed
amended only to the extent herein discussed and the dispositive portion of said decision should now
read as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

“WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The Order issued by the Regional Trial Court
of

Manila (Branch 34), dated July 18, 2005, in Civil Case No. 05-111630, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch 6) is REINSTATED with the [lone] modification
that the therein ordered payment of 5% interest per month as late payment charges, is reduced to 1%
interest per month from date of default on August 10, 1997 until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.”

IT IS SO ORDERED.42

Issue

Hence, this recourse by petitioner-spouses arguing that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

THE REVERSAL BY THE [CA] OF THE DECISION OF THE [RTC] OF MANILA (BRANCH 34) THAT THE
PETITIONERS HAVE SATISFIED THE REQUIRED NOTICE OF LOSS TO [CITYTRUST] IS CONTRARY TO LAW
AND THE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.43

Ultimately, the issue boils down to the credibility of petitioner Manolito’s testimony.

Petitioner-spouses’ Arguments
Petitioner-spouses contend that the CA erred in not giving weight and credence to the testimony of
petitioner Manolito.44 They claim that his credibility was never an issue before the MeTC45 and that his
testimony, that he sent notice and proof of loss to Citytrust through fax, need not be supported by the
facsimile report since it was not controverted by respondent BPI.46 Hence, they insist that his testimony
together with the documents presented is sufficient to prove that Citytrust received notice and proof of
loss of the mortgaged vehicle.47 Having done their part, they should be absolved from paying their
remaining obligation.48 Respondent BPI, on the other hand, should bear the loss for failing to collect the
proceeds of the insurance.49

Respondent BPI’s Arguments

Respondent BPI counter-argues that the burden of proving the existence of an alleged fact rests on the
party asserting it.50 In this case, the burden of proving that the mortgaged vehicle was stolen and that
Citytrust received notice and proof of loss of the mortgaged vehicle rests on petitioner-spouses.51
Unfortunately, they failed to present clear and convincing evidence to prove these allegations.52 In any
case, even if they were able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that notice and proof of loss of
the mortgaged vehicle was indeed faxed to Citytrust, this would not absolve them from liability because
the original documents were not delivered to Citytrust or respondent BPI.53 Without the original
documents, Citytrust or respondent BPI would not be able to file an insurance
claim.54chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Our Ruling

The Petition is bereft of merit.

The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.

Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court defines “burden of proof” as “the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law.” In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence.55 Once the plaintiff has established his case, the burden of
evidence shifts to the defendant, who, in turn, has the burden to establish his defense.56

In this case, respondent BPI, as plaintiff, had to prove that petitioner-spouses failed to pay their
obligations under the Promissory Note. Petitioner-spouses, on the other hand, had to prove their
defense that the obligation was extinguished by the loss of the mortgaged vehicle, which was insured.
However, as aptly pointed out by the MeTC, the mere loss of the mortgaged vehicle does not
automatically relieve petitioner-spouses of their obligation57 as paragraph 7 of the Promissory Note
with Chattel Mortgage provides that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

7. The said MORTGAGOR covenants and agrees to procure and maintain through the MORTGAGEE, a
comprehensive insurance from a duly accredited and responsible insurance company approved by the
MORTGAGEE, over the personalty hereinabove mortgaged to be insured against loss or damage by
accident, theft, and fire for a period of one (1) year from date hereof and every year thereafter until the
mortgage DEBTS are fully paid with an insurance company or companies acceptable to the MORTGAGEE
in an amount not less than the outstanding balance of the mortgage DEBTS; that he/it will make all loss,
if any, under such policy or policies payable to the MORTGAGEE forthwith. x x x

xxx

MORTGAGOR shall immediately notify MORTGAGEE in case of los[s], damage or accident suffered by
herein personalty mortgaged and submit proof of such los[s], damages or accident. Said los[s], damage
or accident for any reason including fortuitous event shall not suspend, abate, or extinguish [petitioner
spouses’] obligation under the promissory note or sums due under this contract x x x

In case of loss or damage, the MORTGAGOR hereby irrevocabl[y] appoints the MORTGAGEE as his/its
attorney-in-fact with full power and authority to file, follow-up, prosecute, compromise or settle
insurance claims; to sign, execute and deliver the corresponding papers, receipts and documents to the
insurance company as may be necessary to prove the claim and to collect from the latter the insurance
proceeds to the extent of its interest. Said proceeds shall be applied by the MORTGAGEE as payment of
MORTGAGOR’s outstanding obligation under the Promissory Note and such other sums and charges as
may be due hereunder or in other instruments of indebtedness due and owing by the MORTGAGOR to
the MORTGAGEE and the excess, if any, shall thereafter be remitted to the MORTGAGOR. MORTGAGEE
however shall be liable in the event there is a deficiency.

x x x58

Based on the foregoing, the mortgagor must notify and submit proof of loss to the mortgagee.
Otherwise, the mortgagee would not be able to claim the proceeds of the insurance and apply the same
to the remaining obligation.
This brings us to the question of whether petitioner-spouses sent notice and proof of loss to Citytrust or
respondent BPI.

Testimonial evidence must also be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience.

Testimonial evidence, to be believed, must come not only from the mouth of a credible witness, but
must also “be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience.”59 A credible witness must,
therefore, be able to narrate a convincing and logical story.

In this case, petitioner Manolito’s testimony that he sent notice and proof of loss of the mortgaged
vehicle to Citytrust through fax lacks credibility especially since he failed to present the facsimile report
evidencing the transmittal.60 His failure to keep the facsimile report or to ask for a written
acknowledgement from Citytrust of its receipt of the transmittal gives us reason to doubt the
truthfulness of his testimony. His testimony on the alleged theft is likewise suspect. To begin with, no
police report was presented.61 Also, the insurance policy was renewed even after the mortgaged vehicle
was allegedly stolen.62 And despite repeated demands from respondent BPI, petitioner-spouses made
no effort to communicate with the bank in order to clarify the matter. The absence of any overt act on
the part of petitioner-spouses to protect their interest from the time the mortgaged vehicle was stolen
up to the time they received the summons defies reason and logic. Their inaction is obviously contrary to
human experience. In addition, we cannot help but notice that although the mortgaged vehicle was
stolen in November 1997, petitioner-spouses defaulted on their monthly amortizations as early as
August 10, 1997. All these taken together cast doubt on the truth and credibility of his testimony.

Thus, we are in full accord with the findings of the MeTC and the CA that petitioner Manolito’s testimony
lacks credence as it is dubious and self-serving.63 Failing to prove their defense, petitioner-spouses are
liable to pay their remaining obligation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed November 16, 2007 Decision and the
September 19, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91217 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015

NILO MACAYAN, JR. Y MALANA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari praying that the assailed Decision1 dated June 31, 2006
of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside and that a new one be rendered acquitting petitioner
Nilo Macayan, Jr.

The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification (by increasing the duration of
the penalty) the Decision2 dated November 15, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, which
found Nilo Macayan, Jr. (Macayan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery.

In the Information dated February 20, 2001, Macayan was charged with robbery as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of February 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with
intent to gain and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob / divest one ANNIE UY JAO of the amount of P4,000.00 in cash in the manner as follows:
on the date and in the place afore-mentioned, said accused threatened complainant that he would
destroy her and her entire family and that he will have her and members of her family kidnapped unless
she gives to him the amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency and thereafter negotiated with said
Annie Uy Jao at McDonald's located at Quezon Avenue, this City, thus creating fear in the mind of said
complainant who was compelled to give as in fact she gave and delivered to the accused the amount of
P4,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Annie Uy Jao in the amount
aforementioned.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-98670 and raffled to Branch 101 of the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City.4
During trial, the prosecution presented as it witnesses: Annie Uy Jao, the private complainant; Rodrigo
Mapoy, team leader of the NBI operatives who conducted the supposed entrapment operation that led
to Macayan's arrest; and Resurreccion R. Bajado, a forensic chemist. Macayan was the sole witness for
the defense.5

Annie Uy Jao (Jao) is the owner of Lanero Garments Ext (Lanero). In 1995, she hired Macayan as a
sample cutter and to undertake materials purchasing for her garments business.6

In her testimony, Jao acknowledged that in 2000, when her business was doing poorly, she allowed her
employees to accept engagements elsewhere to augment their income, provided they prioritize their
work at Lanero. It came to her attention that Macayan and his wife (also an employee at Lanero)
accepted work for a rival company. Thus, Jao confronted Macayan to impress upon him the need to
prioritize work at Lanero. Macayan still took his work at Lanero for granted, so Jao confronted him again.
In this confrontation, Macayan allegedly responded, "Kung gusto mo, bayaran mo na long ako at aalis
ako." Macayan then stopped reporting for work.7

Following this, Jao was surprised to find out that Macayan had filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal
against her (docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-09-05057-00). Several conferences were set for this
illegal dismissal case. Immediately after the postponement of the conference on February 12, 2001,
Macayan allegedly threatened Jao that her family would be harmed and/or kidnapped if she did not give
him P200,000.00. Marjorie Angel (Angel), Jao's secretary, was supposedly present when she was
threatened. The following day, Macayan allegedly called Jao to reiterate his threat and to specify the
time and place — February 16, 2001, sometime between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. at McDonald's Banawe
Branch — in which the P200,000.00 should be handed to him. Jao claimed that she was sure it was
Macayan speaking to her, as the person on the phone addressed her as "Madam," which was how he
customarily called her.8

Fearing for her family's safety, Jao sought assistance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). She
asked that an entrapment operation be set up. The NBI operatives asked her to prepare bills totalling
P4,000.00 to be marked and used in the operation.9

On February 16, 2001, Jao, Angel, and the NBI operatives arrived at McDonald's Banawe. They stayed
there for about 30 minutes before Macayan called Angel and told her that they were to meet at
McDonald's Quezon Avenue instead. They arrived there at about 7:30 p.m. Macayan called Angel again
and told her that he was moving the venue to McDonald's EDS A. They then proceeded to McDonald's
EDS A and waited for Macayan, while the NBI operatives waited outside. Macayan arrived and
proceeded to where Jao and Angel were seated. Jao handed him an envelope containing the marked
bills. Macayan pulled the bills halfway out of the envelope, and the NBI operatives accosted him.10
Prosecution witness Rodrigo Mapoy, team leader of the NBI operatives who arrested Macayan, testified
to the circumstances before and the conduct of the entrapment operation. The testimony of forensic
chemist Resurreccion R. Bajado regarding the marked bills handed to Macayan was subject of a joint
stipulation by the prosecution and the defense.11

Macayan, testifying for himself, emphasized that he enjoyed a relatively trouble-free employment with
Lanero. However, sometime in 1999, after his wife gave birth to their first child, he discovered that Jao
had not been remitting required premiums to the Social Security System.12

On August 18, 2000, as his child was confined in a hospital, Macayan inquired with Jao regarding his
Medicare benefits. This displeased Jao. The following day, she prevented him from performing his tasks
at work. Construing this as harassment, he stopped reporting for work.13

Thereafter, Macayan filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Jao. In the course of the proceedings
for this illegal dismissal case, no less than 11 conferences/hearings were set. As evidenced by these
conferences' minutes or constancias, at no instance did Jao ever attend, as it was either her legal counsel
or Angel who did so. Macayan recalled that in one of these conferences, he expressed to Angel his
willingness to settle the case for P40,000.00.14

On February 16, 2001, at about 9:00 a.m., Angel called Macayan. She told him that Jao was ready to
settle the illegal dismissal case. She added that Jao wanted to pay him already, as Jao was leaving for
Hong Kong. Angel set a rendezvous later in the day at McDonald's Banawe. At about 11:00 a.m., Angel
called him again, resetting the rendezvous to McDonald's EDSA. She even reasoned that this venue was
more convenient for her since she was going home to Zambales.15

Macayan arrived at the agreed venue at about 9:00 p.m. He saw Angel standing outside McDonald's. He
approached Angel, who then accompanied him inside and led him to a four-seat corner table. He was
surprised to see Jao present. Jao then brought out of her bag a piece of paper indicating that Macayan
received the settlement amount for the illegal dismissal case. Macayan signed this as he was of the
understanding that this was necessary to the settlement. Jao then pulled out a white envelope, handed
it to Macayan, and told him to count its contents. While counting the contents, a flash bulb went on
somewhere to his right. Then, a man who claimed to be an NBI operative struck a blow on the right side
of Macayan's face and told him, "Tatanga-tanga ka. Pupunta ka rito ng walang kasama, ikaw ngayon ang
me [sic] kaso."16
Handcuffed, he was taken aboard a minivan and physically abused. He was taken to several police
stations in the hope that an inquest fiscal was available. It was only at 10:00 a.m. of the following day
that an inquest fiscal, Prosecutor Hilda Ibuyan, became available.17

The Information charging him with robbery dated February 20, 2001 was then prepared, and the
criminal case (docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-98670) was filed and raffled to Branch 101 of the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City.

In the meantime, on October 31, 2001, the illegal dismissal case was decided in Macayan's favor by
Labor Arbiter Daisy G. Cauton-Barcelona. A total of P186,632.00 was awarded to him.18 On appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission would find that Macayan was entitled to unpaid benefits though
he was legally dismissed. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission was subsequently
affirmed by the Court of Appeals with modification as to the applicable rate of interest.19

After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City rendered the Decision20 convicting Macayan of robbery.
The trial court found the prosecution's version of events "from the time of the telephone overtures of
the Accused which is consistent with the elements of intimidation and/or extortion, up to complainant
Annie Uy Jao's reporting the matter to the NBI, to the time of the NBI entrapment" as "ring[ing] a loud
bell of truth and consistency, not to say credibility."21 It accorded the presumption of regularity to the
entrapment operation and held that the forensic findings connecting the marked money to Macayan
militated against his defense.22

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court, therefore, finds the Accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
the crime of robbery and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty (there being no
mitigating/aggravating circumstance) of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAYofARRESTO MAYOR as
minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (I) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as
maximum.

Lastly the P4,000.00 marked money exhibit, which has been claimed to be owned by the private
complainant, is ORDERED RELEASED to her after the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.23 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Macayan then appealed to the Court of Appeals. He filed his Appellant's Brief24 on August 25, 2004.

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines at the appellate stage, did
not file an appellee's brief. Instead, it filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee's Brief25
recommending that Macayan be acquitted. It asserted that his guilt was not established beyond
reasonable doubt.

Noting that Jao was never present in any of the conferences for the illegal dismissal case and that the
sole witness who could confirm if she was indeed threatened or intimidated on or immediately after
such an occasion (i.e., Angel) was never presented, the Office of the Solicitor General asserted that the
fourth requisite of the offense of robbery (i.e., violence against or intimidation of a person) could not
have been made by Macayan on the occasion of a conference for the illegal dismissal case. It added that
the other occasion when Macayan was supposed to have threatened Jao was equally dubious since Jao's
sole reason for claiming that it was Macayan speaking to her (i.e., her having been addressed as
"Madam") was insufficient to ascertain that person's identity.26

On July 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division rendered the assailed Decision27 affirming
Macayan's conviction and increasing the duration of the penalty imposed. It reasoned that Jao's sole,
uncorroborated testimony was nevertheless positive and credible. As regards Jao's having been
threatened after the postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference in the illegal dismissal case, the
Court of Appeals reasoned that constancias are "not the best evidence of attendance"28 and that, in any
case, Jao was threatened after and not during the conference.

The dispositive portion of this Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101,
in Criminal Case No. Q-01-98670 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-
appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one (1) year, seven (7) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, one (1) month and eleven (11)
days of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.

SO ORDERED.29 (Emphasis in the original)

On December 18, 2006, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division rendered the Resolution30 denying
Macayan's Motion for Reconsideration.31
Hence, this Petition was filed.32

Asked by this court to file a Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General instead filed a Manifestation
and Motion33 to adopt as its Comment the same Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee's Brief
that it filed with the Court of Appeals. Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General reiterated its position that
Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt has not been established and that he must be acquitted.

On September 11, 2007, Macayan filed the Manifestation in Lieu of Reply34 in view of the Office of the
Solicitor General's earlier Manifestation and Motion.

For resolution is the sole issue of whether Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt has been
established.

We reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals and acquit petitioner Nilo Macayan, Jr. of the charge of
robbery.

Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the requisite quantum of evidence in
criminal cases:

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such
a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the
strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause35 of the Constitution, but
similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved."36
"Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the
prosecution."37 Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that
an accused must be acquitted. As explained in Basilio v. People of the Philippines:38
We ruled in People v. Ganguso:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his
guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is
demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of
error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is
responsible for the offense charged.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the
weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.39 (Citations omitted)

II

The determination of the guilt of an accused hinges on how a court appreciates evidentiary matters in
relation to the requisites of an offense. Determination of guilt is, thus, a fundamentally factual issue.

This court, however, is not a trier of facts. Consistent with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, "[a]s a rule, only
questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45."40 More specifically, "in a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded
great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence
on record."41

Nevertheless, there are exceptions allowing this court to overturn the factual findings with which it is
confronted. Speaking specifically of criminal cases, this court stated in People of the Philippines v.
Esteban42 that "in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and
relevant matters . . . this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the [lower courts]."43
Below are the recognized exceptions to the general rule binding this court to the factual findings of lower
courts:

(1)

When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures;

(2)
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3)

Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4)

When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5)

When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6)

When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7)

When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8)

When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9)

When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and

(10)

When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.44 (Emphasis supplied)

Here, Macayan asserts that the lower courts committed a serious misapprehension of facts, thereby
wrongly concluding that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. He argues that the evidence adduced by
the prosecution falls seriously short of the quantum of evidence required to convict him. He specifically
draws attention to the following:

First, Jao's claim that, immediately after the postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference in the
illegal dismissal case and in the presence of Angel, Macayan threatened to harm and/or kidnap the
members of her family, despite the records in the same case showing that Jao never attended any of the
11 conferences that were set or conducted;
Second, the prosecution's unjustified failure to present Angel as a witness and its sole reliance on Jao's
testimony, considering that it was Angel who can confirm if, indeed, Macayan threatened Jao's family
immediately after the postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference;

Third, Jao's reliance on nothing more than how she was addressed as "Madam" by the person speaking
to her on the phone as basis for concluding that it must have been Macayan who was supposedly calling
and threatening her and her family;

Fourth, the inconsistency and absurdity of Jao's conduct in considering Macayan's threats of such serious
nature that she needed to report it to the National Bureau of Investigation for the prospective conduct
of an entrapment operation, and yet not telling her husband about the threats simply because he would
easily get annoyed; and

Lastly, the inconsistent claims of Jao and prosecution witness Rodrigo Mapoy, the NBI operations team
leader, as to who Macayan called on the evening of February 16, 2001 to reset the rendezvous to
McDonald's EDS A. Jao claimed that Macayan called Angel, while Rodrigo Mapoy claimed that Macayan
called Jao herself.

Macayan's position is buttressed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the public institution otherwise
charged with the task of pursuing the prosecution's case on appeal. As the Office of the Solicitor General
stated:

In the instant case, however, clues of untruthfulness in the testimony of Annie Uy Jao are abundant while
incentives for fabrication of a story [are] not wanting. The only way to eliminate any doubt in Annie Uy
Jao's assertions would have been to find independent confirmation from the other sources, as by way of
unambiguous testimony of a competent and credible witness. Sadly, no such confirmation could be had
as the prosecution's evidence on the most crucial elements of the crime was limited to that testified on
by Annie Uy Jao.

It is respectfully submitted that had the trial court seen and understood these realities laid on clearly in
the records of this case, it would have concluded reasonable doubt as to acquit appellant.45
(Underscoring in the original)

The position taken by the Office of the Solicitor General has resulted in the peculiar situation where it is
not the prosecution but, effectively, the trial court and the Court of Appeals arguing for Macayan's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
With the backdrop of these assertions, we deem it proper to reevaluate the factual findings and the
conclusions reached by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

III

Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code provides for who are guilty of robbery:

ARTICLE 293. Who are Guilty of Robbery. — Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal
property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force
upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery.

Accordingly, the following elements must be established to sustain a conviction for robbery:

1) there is a taking of personal property [i.e., unlawful taking]; 2) the personal property belongs to
another; 3) the taking is with animus lucrandi [i.e., intent to gain]; and 4) the taking is with violence
against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things.46

As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the "bone of contention"47 centers on the
elements of unlawful taking and of violence against or intimidation of persons. This is precisely
Macayan's contention: that he neither intimidated nor threatened Jao, and that he could not have
unlawfully taken money from her on account of any act of intimidation and/or threats made by him.

IV

Consistent with the rule on burden of proof, the requisite quantum of evidence in criminal cases, and in
light of the points highlighted by both Macayan and the Office of the Solicitor General, we find that the
prosecution failed to establish Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, a reversal of the rulings
of the trial court and Court of Appeals is in order. Macayan must be acquitted.

As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the resolution of this case hinges on
whether Jao was indeed threatened and/or intimidated by Macayan into giving him money, that is,
whether he extorted money from Jao. Per Jao's own testimony, there were two (2) instances in which
she was threatened and/or intimidated: first, immediately after the postponement of the February 12,
2001 conference in the illegal dismissal case; and second, when Macayan called her on February 13,
2001 and set a rendezvous for handing over the extorted money.

Contrary to the conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we find Jao's testimony regarding
these occasions (and ultimately, the presence of the requisite of violence against or intimidation of a
person) dubious and unreliable.

Macayan and the Office of the Solicitor General are one in pointing out that the records of NLRC-NCR
Case No. 00-09-05057-00 are bereft of any indication that Jao was present in any of the 11 conferences
held or set (only to be postponed even if both parties were represented). The defense introduced as its
Exhibits "2" to "12" the minutes and/or constancias of these conferences. Exhibit "2" was the
minutes/constancia of the February 12, 2001 conference. During his testimony, Macayan specifically
referred to this document as proof that he never saw, met, or spoke to Jao on the occasion of or
immediately after the conference set on that date:

Q:

Mr. Witness, you were present when complaining witness Annie Uy Jao told this Honorable Court that
sometime on February 12, 2001, during the hearing of the labor case in the NLRC, at Banawe, Quezon
City, you threatened her that you will kidnap her and her family if she will not give P200,000.00. What
can you say about this?

A:

That is not true, Sir.

Q:

Why did you say there is no truth in it?

A:

Because we did not meet on February 12.

Q:

Do you mean to tell this Honorable Court that Annie Uy Jao was not present during the hearing of that
case?

A:

She was not there.

Q:

Has she an [sic] representative?

A:

Yes, Sir.

Q:

Who is that?

A:

Marjorie Angel, the secretary.

Q:

Do you have any proof that she was not present?

A:

Yes, Sir.

Q:

I am showing to you constancia, date of hearing 2/12/03. Will '" you please examine this document.
Does it have anything to do with what you said?

A:

This is the Minutes of Hearing on February 12, 2001.

Atty. Oliva:

We would like to request that this constancia be marked as Exhibit "2."

Court:

Mark it. On its face, this is a form by the NLRC containing the caption, the name of the parties and the
case number, date of hearing and the time.

Atty. Oliva:

Mr. Witness, there are signature [sic] below this constancia, complaining witness, there is a signature
above the complainant.

A:

This is my signature and this is the signature of Marjorie Angel.

Q:

How do you know that this is her signature[?] A: Because I was with her for five (5) months.48
Jao's absence in the intended conference (though subsequently postponed despite both parties to the
illegal dismissal case being represented) places serious doubt on the occurrence of the supposed first
instance of intimidation on February 12, 2001.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that a constancia "would not be the best evidence of attendance in any
of the National Labor Relations Commission hearings."49 It added that, in any case, the act of
intimidation happened after, and not during, the conference. This is a strained £ consideration of the
facts of this case.

First, consistent with the presumption "[t]hat official duty has been regularly performed"50 and "[t]hat a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns,"51 both the personnel of the Labor Arbiter's office who
prepared the minutes of the February 12, 2001 conference and the persons who signed it must be
considered as having taken the necessary care to make it a faithful and accurate record of what
transpired and of who were present in the conference. Thus, the minutes' indication that only Angel was
present should be taken as accurate and reliable absent any proof to the contrary. If the principal, Jao,
were present, there would not have been a need for Angel, her representative, to sign in such capacity.

Second, much is made of how the threats were delivered after and not during the conference. To recall
the prosecution's allegation, the intimidation took place immediately after the conference, outside the
Labor Arbiter's office, along the corridor of the National Labor Relations Commission Building.52 As
there was neither an appreciable duration of time between the conference and the subsequent
threatening exchange nor a significant distance between where the conference was held and where the
subsequent threatening exchange took place, it may be deduced that whatever exchange, if any, that
transpired must have been between those who were present at the conference. Conversely, those who
were absent from the conference must have been equally unavailable to engage in an exchange with
Macayan.

Apart from these, that the rest of the minutes of the illegal dismissal case shows that Jao never attended
any conference gives rise to the question of why she chose to be personally present in, of all
conferences, the postponed February 12 conference. If, indeed, she was present in this despite her
absence in all others, some particular significance must have characterized this conference, something
that Jao has not accounted for. In any case, if there was any particular significance to this February 12
conference, then, all the more, her presence or attendance should have been indicated in the records.

Of course, many explanations — well within the realm of possibility — could be offered for why Jao's
attendance was not indicated in the minutes. For instance, Jao could have simply chosen to wait outside
the Labor Arbiter's office, or she could have declined from having her attendance specified in the
minutes. What is crucial, however, this being a criminal case, is for the prosecution to establish the guilt
of an accused on the strength of its own evidence. Its case must rise on its own merits. The prosecution
carries the burden of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt; it cannot merely rest on the relative
likelihood of its claims. Any lacunae in its case gives rise to doubt as regards the "fact[s] necessary to
constitute the crime with which [an accused] is charged."53

Here, there is serious doubt on whether Jao was actually threatened or intimidated at the time she
specified. Thus, there is serious doubt on the existence of the fourth requisite for robbery — violence
against or intimidation of a person — in relation to the alleged February 12, 2001 incident.

The prosecution could have addressed the deficiency in Jao's allegation that she was threatened on
February 12, 2001 by presenting as witness the other person who was supposedly present in the
incident: Angel, Jao's secretary. However, she was never presented as a witness.

The Court of Appeals noted that corroborative testimony is dispensable; "the lack of it does not
necessarily condemn a lone witness' recital of the crime for as long as that single witness' testimony is
credible."54

People of the Philippines v. Cleopas,55 which the Court of Appeals cited, states that the testimony of a
lone witness "may suffice for conviction if found trustworthy and reliable."56

Precisely, conviction resting on a singular testimony is warranted if this is, in the words of Cleopas,
"trustworthy and reliable,"57 or, in the words of the Court of Appeals, "credible."58 This could not be
said of Jao's testimony. As previously discussed, her very presence in the February 12, 2001 conference
that she claimed to have been immediately followed by Macayan's threats, is in serious doubt. Nothing
casts greater doubt on the reliability of Jao's claim than her having not been at the time and place of the
supposed intimidation.

With the first alleged instance of intimidation being discredited, the prosecution is left to rely on the
second supposed instance of intimidation: the phone call made by Macayan to Jao on February 13, 2001,
during which he not only reiterated his threats but also set a rendezvous for the handover of the
extorted money. Even this, however, is doubtful.

The prosecution itself acknowledged that there is no basis for ascertaining the identity of Macayan as
the caller other than the caller's use of "Madam" in addressing Jao. The following excerpt is taken from
Jao's direct examination:
Atty. Garena:

Madam Witness, you said you received another call after February 12, 2001. Is that from the accused or
from another person?

A:.

From the accused.

Q:

What was the call about?

A:

He repeated the threat again that I have to give him P200,000.00 or else, he will harm y [sic] family; and
he set a place to give the money.

....

Court:

The first word uttered by him. You narrated, more or less. Did he introduce himself?

A:

He never stated his name because he knew I know his name.

Court:

That is your presumption, but what was the first word uttered by him and what was your reply, line by
line[?]

A:

He always calls me madam.

Court:

You answer the question of the Court now. How did the conversation go?

A:

He said, Madam, Kung hindi mo ibibigay sa akin ang P200,000.00, ipapakidnap ko ang pamilya mo.
(Madam, if you don't give me that P200,000.00,1 am going to ask somebody to kidnap you and your
family.)

Court:

That was the first line. Was that the end of the first line of the accused?

A:
Those were the only words that he told me. I cannot say anything. I just put down the phone.

Court:

After he said those lines, you put down the telephone?

A:

After he said the date and time.

Court:

The Court is asking you to narrate line by line. What he said. What you said.

A:

If you will not give me P200,000.00, I will ask somebody to kidnap you, your child and your husband.

Court:

That was the first line, Did you reply to him?

A:

No, sir. 1 did not ask. The next line, he said he was going to wait for me at McDo Banawe at around 6:00
[to] 7:00 in the evening.

Court:

Did he state the date?

A:

February 16.

Court:

You are impressing to this Court that the accused had said two lines already without you uttering any
word. How did the accused knew [sic] that it is Annie Uy Jao on the other line?

A:

Because the first word [sic] that I said, Hello, then he replied, Madam.

Court:

You uttered the hello, that is why the accused recognized you on the line.

A:

Yes, your Honor. Because he knew that only two persons are answering [sic] the phone, my secretary and
me.59 (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution should have offered more convincing proof of the identity of the supposed caller. Even if
it were true that Macayan customarily addressed Jao as "Madam," merely being called this way by a
caller does not ascertain that he is the alleged caller. The prosecution never made an effort to establish
how addressing Jao as "Madam" is a unique trait of Macayan's and Jao's relationship. Other persons may
be equally accustomed to calling her as such; for instance, "Madam" may be Jao's preferred manner of
being addressed by her subordinates or employees. Likewise, it was established that Macayan and Jao
have known each other since 1995. Their relation was more than that of employer and employee, as Jao
was Macayan's godmother in his wedding.60

Certainly, Jao could have offered other, more reliable means of ascertaining that it was, indeed, Macayan
with whom she was conversing. The second alleged instance of intimidation is likewise cast in serious
doubt. Left with no other act of intimidation to rely on, the prosecution fails in establishing the fourth
requisite of the crime of robbery.

Apart from these, another point underscores the unreliability of Jao's allegations. As pointed out by
Macayan and acknowledged by the prosecution, Jao never saw it proper to warn her family, more
specifically, her husband, of the threat of being kidnapped. Nevertheless, she supposedly perceived
Macayan's alleged threat as being of such a serious nature that she must not only report the matter to
the National Bureau of Investigation, but also entreat its officers to conduct an entrapment operation.

Jurisprudence has established the standard for appreciating the credibility of a witness' claim:

[F]or evidence to be believed, however, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve
under the circumstances. The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such
is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind. Whatever is repugnant
to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance.61

Jao's inconsistent conduct, coupled with flimsy justifications for acting as she did, betrays the absurdity
and unreliability of her claims and ultimately, of her as a witness:

Court:

You did not inform anybody about that call?

A:

Only my secretary. She was beside me.

Court:

What about your husband? At that time, where was he?

A:

He was outside.

Court:

Does he have a cellular phone at that time?

A:

Only a pager.

Court:

Did it not occur to you to inform your husband about the call?

A:

No, your Honor.

Court:

How about the words uttered to you in the Labor hearing, did you inform you [sic] husband?

A:

No, your Honor.

Court:

What was the reason?

A:

I was afraid because he might accused (sic) me of what happened?

Court:

This is a very private question. That date of hearing in the NLRC, you slept together [with] your husband?

A:

Yes, your Honor.

Court:

That night, you did not inform him?

A:

He knows about the labor case.

Court:
You did not inform him about the extortion threat of the Accused?

A:

No, sir.62

On cross examination, Jao explained:

Q:

During the direct examination, the Honorable Court asked you whether you told this matter to your
husband and you said you did not?

A:

I am not [the] type of person who don't usually tell [sic] everything to my husband specially [sic]
regarding things like this because he is medyo makulit and I don't want him asking same questions again
and again (sic).

Q:

Instead of telling your husband, you went to the NBI to report the matter?

A:

Yes, sir.63 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court of Appeals stated that "the subsequent and contemporaneous actions of the private
complainant from the time the threat was made bolsters the veracity of her story."64 This cannot be
farther from the truth. On the contrary, inconsistencies and absurdities in Jao's actions cast serious
doubt on the veracity of her claims.

Finally, the trial court made much of how Macayan is supposedly estopped by the joint stipulation that
the prosecution and the defense made as regards the "existence, authenticity, due execution and
contents of [the] NBI Physics Report on the powder dusting/ positive results."65

The defense's accession to these is inconsequential. These only prove that Macayan handled the bills
used in the alleged entrapment operation, a fact that he does not dispute. It remains, however, that they
do not establish any certainty as to the circumstances surrounding his handling of the bills, among these:
whether there was, indeed, unlawful taking by Macayan, and whether Jao did hand him the bills because
he extorted them from her.
V

In sum, the prosecution failed to establish the elements of unlawful taking and of violence against or
intimidation of a person. Reasonable doubt persists. As is settled in jurisprudence, where the basis of
conviction is flawed, this court must acquit an accused:

In criminal cases, the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused. Ei
incumbit probatio non qui negat. He who asserts — not he who denies — must prove. The burden must
be discharged by the prosecution on the strength of its own evidence, not on the weakness of that for
the defense. Hence, circumstantial evidence that has not been adequately established, much less
corroborated, cannot be the basis of conviction. Suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of
evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, "the sea of suspicion has no shore, and the
court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass."

It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the
court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to their
guilt. Where there is no moral certainty as to their guilt, they must be acquitted even though their
innocence may be questionable. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can
be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.66 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

With the prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of establishing Macayan's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, this court is constrained, as is its bounden duty when reasonable doubt persists, to
acquit him.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 28380 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Nilo Macayan, Jr. y Malana is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If detained, he is ordered immediately
RELEASED, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. Any amount paid by way of a bailbond is
ordered RETURNED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,* Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

- versus -

SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., AGRICULTURAL CONSULTANCY

SERVICES, INC., ARCHIPELAGO REALTY CORP., BALETE RANCH, INC., BLACK STALLION RANCH, INC.,
CHRISTENSEN PLANTATION COMPANY, DISCOVERY REALTY CORP., DREAM PASTURES, INC., ECHO RANCH,
INC., FAR EAST RANCH, INC., FILSOV SHIPPING COMPANY, INC., FIRST UNITED TRANSPORT, INC.,
HABAGAT REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., KALAWAKAN RESORTS, INC., KAUNLARAN AGRICULTURAL CORP.,
LABAYUG AIR TERMINALS, INC., LANDAIR INTERNATIONAL MARKETING CORP., LHL CATTLE CORP.,
LUCENA OIL FACTORY, INC., MEADOW LARK PLANTATIONS, INC., METROPLEX COMMODITIES, INC., MISTY
MOUNTAIN AGRICULTURAL CORP., NORTHEAST CONTRACT TRADERS, INC., NORTHERN CARRIERS CORP.,
OCEANSIDE MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., ORO VERDE SERVICES, INC., PASTORAL FARMS, INC., PCY OIL
MANUFACTURING CORP., PHILIPPINE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., PRIMAVERA FARMS, INC., PUNONG-BAYAN
HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORP., PURA ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., RADIO AUDIENCE DEVELOPERS
INTEGRATED ORGANIZATION, INC., RADYO PILIPINO CORP., RANCHO GRANDE, INC., REDDEE
DEVELOPERS, INC., SAN ESTEBAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., SILVER LEAF PLANTATIONS, INC., SOUTHERN
SERVICE TRADERS, INC., SOUTHERN STAR CATTLE CORP., SPADE ONE RESORTS CORP., UNEXPLORED LAND
DEVELOPERS, INC., VERDANT PLANTATIONS, INC., VESTA AGRICULTURAL CORP. AND WINGS RESORTS
CORP.,

Respondents.
x--------------------------x

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

- versus -

SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., MEADOW LARK PLANTATIONS, INC.,
SILVER LEAF PLANTATIONS, INC., PRIMAVERA FARMS, INC., PASTORAL FARMS, INC., BLACK STALLION
RANCH, INC., MISTY MOUNTAINS AGRICULTURAL CORP., ARCHIPELAGO REALTY CORP., AGRICULTURAL
CONSULTANCY SERVICES, INC., SOUTHERN STAR CATTLE CORP., LHL CATTLE CORP., RANCHO GRANDE,
INC., DREAM PASTURES, INC., FAR EAST RANCH, INC., ECHO RANCH, INC., LAND AIR INTERNATIONAL
MARKETING CORP., REDDEE DEVELOPERS, INC., PCY OIL MANUFACTURING CORP., LUCENA OIL FACTORY,
INC., METROPLEX COMMODITIES, INC., VESTA AGRICULTURAL CORP., VERDANT PLANTATIONS, INC.,
KAUNLARAN AGRICULTURAL CORP., ECJ & SONS AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC., RADYO PILIPINO
CORP., DISCOVERY REALTY CORP., FIRST UNITED TRANSPORT, INC., RADIO AUDIENCE DEVELOPERS
INTEGRATED ORGANIZATION, INC., ARCHIPELAGO FINANCE AND LEASING CORP., SAN ESTEBAN
DEVELOPMENT CORP., CHRISTENSEN PLANTATION COMPANY, NORTHERN CARRIERS CORP., VENTURE
SECURITIES, INC., BALETE RANCH, INC., ORO VERDE SERVICES, INC., and KALAWAKAN RESORTS, INC.,

Respondents.
x--------------------------x

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

- versus -

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, EDGARDO J. ANGARA,*

JOSE C. CONCEPCION, AVELINO V. CRUZ, EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, TEODORO D. REGALA, DANILO URSUA, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, AGRICULTURAL CONSULTANCY
SERVICES, INC., ANGLO VENTURES, INC., ARCHIPELAGO REALTY CORP., AP HOLDINGS, INC., ARC
INVESTMENT, INC., ASC INVESTMENT, INC., AUTONOMOUS DEVELOPMENT CORP., BALETE RANCH, INC.,
BLACK STALLION RANCH, INC., CAGAYAN DE ORO OIL COMPANY, INC., CHRISTENSEN PLANTATION
COMPANY, COCOA INVESTORS, INC., DAVAO AGRICULTURAL AVIATION, INC., DISCOVERY REALTY CORP.,
DREAM PASTURES, INC., ECHO RANCH, INC., ECJ & SONS AGRI. ENT., INC., FAR EAST RANCH, INC., FILSOV
SHIPPING COMPANY, INC., FIRST MERIDIAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., FIRST UNITED TRANSPORT, INC.,
GRANEXPORT MANUFACTURING CORP., HABAGAT REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., HYCO AGRICULTURAL,
INC., ILIGAN COCONUT INDUSTRIES, INC., KALAWAKAN RESORTS, INC., KAUNLARAN AGRICULTURAL
CORP., LABAYOG AIR TERMINALS, INC., LANDAIR INTERNATIONAL MARKETING CORP., LEGASPI OIL
COMPANY, LHL CATTLE CORP., LUCENA OIL FACTORY, INC., MEADOW LARK PLANTATIONS, INC.,
METROPLEX COMMODITIES, INC., MISTY MOUNTAIN AGRICULTURAL CORP., NORTHEAST CONTRACT
TRADERS, INC., NORTHERN CARRIERS CORP., OCEANSIDE MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., ORO VERDE
SERVICES, INC., PASTORAL FARMS, INC., PCY OIL MANUFACTURING CORP., PHILIPPINE RADIO CORP., INC.,
PHILIPPINE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., PRIMAVERA FARMS, INC., PUNONG-BAYAN HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
CORP., PURA ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., RADIO AUDIENCE DEVELOPERS INTEGRATED ORGANIZATION,
INC., RADYO PILIPINO CORP., RANCHO GRANDE, INC., RANDY ALLIED VENTURES, INC., REDDEE
DEVELOPERS, INC., ROCKSTEEL RESOURCES, INC., ROXAS SHARES, INC., SAN ESTEBAN DEVELOPMENT
CORP., SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION OFFICERS, INC., SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORP., SOUTHERN
LUZON OIL MILLS, INC., SILVER LEAF PLANTATIONS, INC., SORIANO SHARES, INC., SOUTHERN SERVICE
TRADERS, INC., SOUTHERN STAR CATTLE CORP., SPADE 1 RESORTS CORP., TAGUM AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT CORP., TEDEUM RESOURCES, INC., THILAGRO EDIBLE OIL MILLS, INC., TODA HOLDINGS,
INC., UNEXPLORED LAND DEVELOPERS, INC., VALHALLA PROPERTIES, INC., VENTURES SECURITIES, INC.,
VERDANT PLANTATIONS, INC., VESTA AGRICULTURAL CORP. and WINGS RESORTS CORP.,

Respondents.

x------------------------x

JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, VIRGILIO M. DAVID, ROMEO C.

ROYANDAYAN for himself and for SURIGAO DEL SUR FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
(SUFAC), MORO FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR (MOFAZS) and COCONUT FARMERS
OF SOUTHERN LEYTE COOPERATIVE (COFA-SL); PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT
(PRRM), represented by CONRADO S. NAVARRO; COCONUT INDUSTRY REFORM MOVEMENT, INC. (COIR)
represented by JOSE MARIE T. FAUSTINO; VICENTE FABE for himself and for PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG
MGA SAMAHAN NG MAGSASAKA (PAKISAMA); NONITO CLEMENTE for himself and for the
NAGKAKAISANG UGNAYAN NG MGA MALILIIT NA MAGSASAKA AT MANGGAGAWA SA NIYUGAN
(NIUGAN); DIONELO M. SUANTE, SR. for himself and for KALIPUNAN NG MALILIIT NA MAGNINIYOG NG
PILIPINAS (KAMMPIL), INC.,

Petitioners-Intervenors.

G.R. No. 166859

G.R. No. 169203
G.R. No. 180702
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,
PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA, and

SERENO, JJ.:

Promulgated:

April 12, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For over two decades, the issue of whether the sequestered sizable block of shares representing 20% of
the outstanding capital stock of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) at the time of acquisition belonged to
their registered owners or to the coconut farmers has remained unresolved. Through this decision, the
Court aims to finally resolve the issue and terminate the uncertainty that has plagued that sizable block
of shares since then.

These consolidated cases were initiated on various dates by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) via
petitions for certiorari in G.R. Nos. 166859[1] and 169023,[2] and via petition for review on certiorari in
180702,[3] the first two petitions being brought to assail the following resolutions issued in Civil Case No.
0033-F by the Sandiganbayan, and the third being brought to appeal the adverse decision promulgated
on November 28, 2007 in Civil Case No. 0033-F by the Sandiganbayan.

Specifically, the petitions and their particular reliefs are as follows:

(a) G.R. No. 166859 (petition for certiorari), to assail the resolution promulgated on December 10,
2004[4] denying the Republics Motion For Partial Summary Judgment;

(b) G.R. No. 169023 (petition for certiorari), to nullify and set aside, firstly, the resolution promulgated
on October 8, 2003,[5] and, secondly, the resolution promulgated on June 24, 2005[6] modifying the
resolution of October 8, 2003; and

(c) G.R. No. 180702 (petition for review on certiorari), to appeal the decision promulgated on
November 28, 2007.[7]

ANTECEDENTS

On July 31, 1987, the Republic commenced Civil Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan by complaint,
impleading as defendants respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco) and 59 individual
defendants. On October 2, 1987, the Republic amended the complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 to include
two additional individual defendants. On December 8, 1987, the Republic further amended the
complaint through its Amended Complaint [Expanded per Court-Approved Plaintiffs
Manifestation/Motion Dated Dec. 8, 1987] albeit dated October 2, 1987.
More than three years later, on August 23, 1991, the Republic once more amended the complaint
apparently to avert the nullification of the writs of sequestration issued against properties of Cojuangco.
The amended complaint dated August 19, 1991, designated as Third Amended Complaint [Expanded Per
Court-Approved Plaintiffs Manifestation/Motion Dated Dec. 8, 1987],[8] impleaded in addition to
Cojuangco, President Marcos, and First Lady Imelda R. Marcos nine other individuals, namely: Edgardo J.
Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Avelino V. Cruz, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini, Juan Ponce Enrile,
Teodoro D. Regala, and Rogelio Vinluan, collectively, the ACCRA lawyers, and Danilo Ursua, and 71
corporations.

On March 24, 1999, the Sandiganbayan allowed the subdivision of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0033
into eight complaints, each pertaining to distinct transactions and properties and impleading as
defendants only the parties alleged to have participated in the relevant transactions or to have owned
the specific properties involved. The subdivision resulted into the following subdivided complaints, to
wit:

Subdivided Complaint Subject Matter

1.

Civil Case No. 0033-A

Anomalous Purchase and Use of First United Bank (now United Coconut Planters Bank)

2.

Civil Case No. 0033-B

Creation of Companies Out of Coco Levy Funds

3.

Civil Case No. 0033-C

Creation and Operation of Bugsuk Project and Award of P998 Million Damages to Agricultural Investors,
Inc.

4.

Civil Case No. 0033-D

Disadvantageous Purchases and Settlement of the Accounts of Oil Mills Out of Coco Levy Funds

5.
Civil Case No. 0033-E

Unlawful Disbursement and Dissipation of Coco Levy Funds

6.

Civil Case No. 0033-F

Acquisition of SMC shares of stock

7.

Civil Case No. 0033-G

Acquisition of Pepsi-Cola

8.

Civil Case No. 0033-H

Behest Loans and Contracts

In Civil Case No. 0033-F, the individual defendants were Cojuangco, President Marcos and First Lady
Imelda R. Marcos, the ACCRA lawyers, and Ursua. Impleaded as corporate defendants were Southern
Luzon Oil Mills, Cagayan de Oro Oil Company, Incorporated, Iligan Coconut Industries, Incorporated, San
Pablo Manufacturing Corporation, Granexport Manufacturing Corporation, Legaspi Oil Company,
Incorporated, collectively referred to herein as the CIIF Oil Mills, and their 14 holding companies,
namely: Soriano Shares, Incorporated, Roxas Shares, Incorporated, Arc Investments, Incorporated, Toda
Holdings, Incorporated, ASC Investments, Incorporated, Randy Allied Ventures, Incorporated, AP
Holdings, Incorporated, San Miguel Corporation Officers, Incorporated, Te Deum Resources,
Incorporated, Anglo Ventures, Incorporated, Rock Steel Resources, Incorporated, Valhalla Properties,
Incorporated, and First Meridian Development, Incorporated.

Allegedly, Cojuangco purchased a block of 33,000,000 shares of SMC stock through the 14 holding
companies owned by the CIIF Oil Mills. For this reason, the block of 33,133,266 shares of SMC stock shall
be referred to as the CIIF block of shares.

Also impleaded as defendants in Civil Case No. 0033-F were several corporations[9] alleged to have been
under Cojuangcos control and used by him to acquire the block of shares of SMC stock totaling
16,276,879 at the time of acquisition (representing approximately 20% percent of the capital stock of
SMC). These corporations are referred to as Cojuangco corporations or companies, to distinguish them
from the CIIF Oil Mills. Reference hereafter to Cojuangco and the Cojuangco corporations or companies
shall be as Cojuangco, et al., unless the context requires individualization.

The material averments of the Republics Third Amended Complaint (Subdivided)[10] in Civil Case No.
0033-F included the following:
12. Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., served as a public officer during the Marcos administration.
During the period of his incumbency as a public officer, he acquired assets, funds, and other property
grossly and manifestly disproportionate to his salaries, lawful income and income from legitimately
acquired property.

13. Having fully established himself as the undisputed coconut king with unlimited powers to deal with
the coconut levy funds, the stage was now set for Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. to launch his
predatory forays into almost all aspects of Philippine economic activity namely: softdrinks, agribusiness,
oil mills, shipping, cement manufacturing, textile, as more fully described below.

14. Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. taking undue advantage of his association, influence and
connection, acting in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and
the individual defendants, embarked upon devices, schemes and stratagems, including the use of
defendant corporations as fronts, to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the
Filipino people, such as when he misused coconut levy funds to buy out majority of the outstanding
shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation in order to control the largest agri-business, foods and
beverage company in the Philippines, more particularly described as follows:

(a) Having control over the coconut levy, Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco invested the funds in diverse
activities, such as the various businesses SMC was engaged in (e.g. large beer, food, packaging, and
livestock);

(b) He entered SMC in early 1983 when he bought most of the 20 million shares Enrique Zobel owned in
the Company. The shares, worth $49 million, represented 20% of SMC;
(c) Later that year, Cojuangco also acquired the Soriano stocks through a series of complicated and secret
agreements, a key feature of which was a voting trust agreement that stipulated that Andres, Jr. or his
heir would proxy over the vote of the shares owned by Soriano and Cojuangco. This agreement, which
accounted for 30% of the outstanding shares of SMC and which lasted for five (5) years, enabled the
Sorianos to retain management control of SMC for the same period;

(d) Furthermore, in exchange for an SMC investment of $45 million in non-voting preferred shares in
UCPB, Soriano served as the vice-chairman of the supposed bank of the coconut farmers, UCPB, and in
return, Cojuangco, for investing funds from the coconut levy, was named vice-chairman of SMC;

(e) Consequently, Cojuangco enjoyed the privilege of appointing his nominees to the SMC Board, to
which he appointed key members of the ACCRA Law Firm (herein Defendants) instead of coconut
farmers whose money really funded the sale;

(f) The scheme of Cojuangco to use the lawyers of the said Firm was revealed in a document which he
signed on 19 February 1983 entitled Principles and Framework of Mutual Cooperation and Assistance
which governed the rules for the conduct of management of SMC and the disposition of the shares
which he bought.

(g) All together, Cojuangco purchased 33 million shares of the SMC through the following 14 holding
companies:
a) Soriano Shares, Inc. 1,249,163

b) ASC Investors, Inc. 1,562,449

c) Roxas Shares, Inc. 2,190,860

d) ARC Investors, Inc. 4,431,798

e) Toda Holdings, Inc. 3,424,618

f) AP Holdings, Inc. 1,580,997

g) Fernandez Holdings, Inc. 838,837

h) SMC Officers Corps., Inc. 2,385,987

i) Te Deum Resources, Inc. 2,674,899

j) Anglo Ventures Corp. 1,000.000

k) Randy Allied Ventures, Inc. 1,000,000

l) Rock Steel Resources, Inc. 2,432,625

m) Valhalla Properties Ltd., Inc. 1,361,033

n) First Meridian Development, Inc. 1,000,000

___________

33,133,266

3.1. The same fourteen companies were in turn owned by the following six (6) so-called CIIF Companies
which were:

a) San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. 19%

b) Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. 11%

c) Granexport Manufacturing Corporation 19%

d) Legaspi Oil Company, Inc. 18%

e) Cagayan de Oro Oil Company, Inc. 18%

f) Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc. 15%

_____

100%
(h) Defendant Corporations are but shell corporations owned by interlocking shareholders who have
previously admitted that they are just nominee stockholders who do not have any proprietary interest
over the shares in their names. The respective affidavits of the following, namely: Jose C. Concepcion,
Florentino M. Herrera III, Teresita J. Herbosa, Teodoro D. Regala, Victoria C. de los Reyes, Manuel R.
Roxas, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escuete and Franklin M. Drilon, who were all, at the time they
became such stockholders, lawyers of the Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices,
the previous counsel who incorporated said corporations, prove that they were merely nominee
stockholders thereof.

(i) Mr. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., acquired a total of 16,276,879 shares of San Miguel Corporation from
the Ayala group: of said shares, a total of 8,138,440 (broken into 7,128,227 Class A and 1,010,213 Class B
shares) were placed in the names of Meadowlark Plantations, Inc. (2,034,610) and Primavera Farms, Inc.
(4,069,220). The Articles of Incorporation of these three companies show that Atty. Jose C. Concepcion
of ACCRA owns 99.6% of the entire outstanding stock. The same shareholder executed three (3) separate
Declaration of Trust and Assignment of Subscription: in favor of a BLANK assignee pertaining to his
shareholdings in Primavera Farms, Inc., Silver Leaf Plantations, Inc. and Meadowlark Plantations, Inc.

(k) The other respondent Corporations are owned by interlocking shareholders who are likewise lawyers
in the ACCRA Law Offices and had admitted their status as nominee stockholders only.

(k-1) The corporations: Agricultural Consultancy Services, Inc., Archipelago Realty Corporation, Balete
Ranch, Inc., Black Stallion Ranch, Inc., Discovery Realty Corporation, First United Transport, Inc.,
Kaunlaran Agricultural Corporation, LandAir International Marketing Corporation, Misty Mountains
Agricultural Corporation, Pastoral Farms, Inc., Oro Verde Services, Inc. Radyo Filipino Corporation,
Reddee Developers, Inc., Verdant Plantations, Inc. and Vesta Agricultural Corporation, were incorporated
by lawyers of ACCRA Law Offices.
(k-2) With respect to PCY Oil Manufacturing Corporation and Metroplex Commodities, Inc., they are
controlled respectively by HYCO, Inc. and Ventures Securities, Inc., both of which were incorporated
likewise by lawyers of ACCRA Law Offices.

(k-3) The stockholders who appear as incorporators in most of the other Respondents corporations are
also lawyers of the ACCRA Law Offices, who as early as 1987 had admitted under oath that they were
acting only as nominee stockholders.

(l) These companies, which ACCRA Law Offices organized for Defendant Cojuangco to be able to control
more than 60% of SMC shares, were funded by institutions which depended upon the coconut levy such
as the UCPB, UNICOM, United Coconut Planters Assurance Corp. (COCOLIFE), among others. Cojuangco
and his ACCRA lawyers used the funds from 6 large coconut oil mills and 10 copra trading companies to
borrow money from the UCPB and purchase these holding companies and the SMC stocks. Cojuangco
used $150 million from the coconut levy, broken down as follows:

Amount Source Purpose

(in million)

$22.26 Oil Mills equity in holding

companies
$65.6 Oil Mills loan to holding

companies

$61.2 UCPB loan to holding

companies [164]

The entire amount, therefore, came from the coconut levy, some passing through the Unicom Oil mills,
others directly from the UCPB.

(m) With his entry into the said Company, it began to get favors from the Marcos government,
significantly the lowering of the excise taxes (sales and specific taxes) on beer, one of the main products
of SMC.

(n) Defendant Cojuangco controlled SMC from 1983 until his co-defendant Marcos was deposed in 1986.
(o) Along with Cojuangco, Defendant Enrile and ACCRA also had interests in SMC, broken down as
follows:

% of SMC Owner

Cojuangco

31.3% coconut levy money

18% companies linked to Cojuangco

5.2% government

5.2% SMC employee retirement fund

Enrile & ACCRA

1.8% Enrile

1.8% Jaka Investment Corporation

1.8% ACCRA Investment Corporation

15. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino
Cruz, Rogelio Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala
and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed, conspired and confederated with each other
in setting up, through the use of coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK. CIC, and more than
twenty other coconut levy-funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation
shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through
insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the
total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation
number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000
shareholders. On the other hand, the corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.

16. The acts of Defendants, singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, constitute
gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust and fiduciary obligations,
brazen abuse of right and power, unjust enrichment, violation of the constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.[11]
On June 17, 1999, Ursua and Enrile each filed his separate Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims.

Before filing their answer, the ACCRA lawyers sought their exclusion as defendants in Civil Case No. 0033,
averring that even as they admitted having assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies
included in Civil Case No. 0033, they had acted as mere nominees-stockholders of corporations involved
in the sequestration proceedings pursuant to office practice. After the Sandiganbayan denied their
motion, they elevated their cause to this Court, which ultimately ruled in their favor in the related cases
of Regala, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[12] and Hayudini v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[13] as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division)
promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V.
Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini as parties-
defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.

SO ORDERED.

Conformably with the ruling, the Sandiganbayan excluded the ACCRA lawyers from the case on May 24,
2000.[14]
On June 23, 1999, Cojuangco filed his Answer to the Third Amended Complaint,[15] averring the
following affirmative defenses, to wit:

7.00. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) is without authority to act in the name
and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

7.01. As constituted in E.O. No. 1, the PCGG was composed of Minister Jovito R. Salonga, as Chairman,
Mr. Ramon Diaz, Mr. Pedro L. Yap, Mr. Raul Daza and Ms. Mary Concepcion Bautista, as Commissioners.
When the complaint in the instant case was filed, Minister Salonga, Mr. Pedro L. Yap and Mr. Raul Daza
had already left the PCGG. By then the PCGG had become functus officio.

7.02. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the complaint or over the transaction alleged in the
complaint.

7.03. The complaint does not allege any cause of action.

7.04. The complaint is not brought in the name of the real parties in interest, assuming any cause of
action exists.
7.05. Indispensable and necessary parties have not been impleaded.

7.06. There is improper joinder of causes of action (Sec. 6, Rule 2, Rules of Civil Procedure). The causes
of action alleged, if any, do not arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the
parties, nor are they simply for money, or are of the same nature and character.

7.07. There is improper joinder of parties defendants (Sec. 11, Rule 3, Rules of Civil Procedure).The
causes of action alleged as to defendants, if any, do not involve a single transaction or a related series of
transactions. Defendant is thus compelled to litigate in a suit regarding matters as to which he has no
involvement. The questions of fact and law involved are not common to all defendants.

7.08. In so far as the complaint seeks the forfeiture of assets allegedly acquired by defendant manifestly
out of proportion to their salaries, to their other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired
property, under R.A. 1379, the previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigation in criminal cases
required to be conducted under Sec. 2 of that law before any suit for forfeiture may be instituted, was
not conducted; as a consequence, the Court may not acquire and exercise jurisdiction over such a suit.

7.09. The complaint in the instant suit was filed July 31, 1987, or within one year before the local
election held on January 18, 1988. If this suit involves an action under R.A. 1379, its institution was also
in direct violation of Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379.

7.10. E.O. No. 1, E.O. No. 2, E.O. No. 14 and 14-A, are unconstitutional. They violate due process, equal
protection, ex post facto and bill of attainder provisions of the Constitution.
7.11. Acts imputed to defendant which he had committed were done pursuant to law and in good faith.

The Cojuangco corporations Answer[16] had the same tenor as the Answer of Cojuangco.

In his own Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims,[17] Ursua averred affirmative and special defenses.

In his own Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims,[18] Enrile specifically denied the material averments
of the Third Amended Complaint and asserted affirmative defenses.

The CIIF Oil Mills Answer[19] also contained affirmative defenses.

On December 20, 1999, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 0033-F on March 8,
2000, giving the parties sufficient time to file their Pre-Trial Briefs prior to that date. Subsequently, the
parties filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, as follows: Cojuangco and the Cojuangco corporations,
jointly on February 14, 2000; Enrile, on March 1, 2000; the CIIF Oil Mills, on March 3, 2000; and Ursua,
on March 6, 2000. However, the Republic sought several extensions to file its own Pre-Trial Brief, and
eventually did so on May 9, 2000.
In the meanwhile, some non-parties sought to intervene. On November 22, 1999, GABAY Foundation,
Inc. (GABAY) filed its complaint-in-intervention. On February 24, 2000, the Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc., Maria Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Domingo Espina, Jose Gomez, Celestino
Sabate, Manuel del Rosario, Jose Martinez, Jr., and Eladio Chato (collectively referred to as COCOFED,
considering that the co-intervenors were its officers) also sought to intervene, citing the October 2, 1989
ruling in G.R. No. 75713 entitled COCOFED v. PCGG whereby the Court recognized COCOFED as the
private national association of coconut producers certified in 1971 by the PHILCOA as having the largest
membership among such producers and as such entrusted it with the task of maintaining continuing
liaison with the different sectors of the industry, the government and its mass base. Pending resolution
of its motion for intervention, COCOFED filed a Pre-Trial Brief on March 2, 2000.

On May 24, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied GABAYs intervention without prejudice because it found
that the allowance of GABAY to enter under the special character in which it presents itself would be to
open the doors to other groups of coconut farmers whether of the same kind or of any other kind which
could be considered a sub-class or a sub-classification of the coconut planters or the coconut industry of
this country.[20]

COCOFEDs intervention as defendant was allowed on May 24, 2000, however, because the position
taken by the COCOFED is relevant to the proceedings herein, if only to state that there is a special
function which the COCOFED and the coconut planters have in the matter of the coconut levy funds and
the utilization of those funds, part of which is in dispute in the instant matter.[21]

The pre-trial was actually held on May 24, 2000,[22] during which the Sandiganbayan sought clarification
from the parties, particularly the Republic, on their respective positions, but at the end it found the
clarifications inadequately enlightening. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan, not disposed to reset,
terminated the pre-trial:
xxx primarily because the Court is given a very clear impression that the plaintiff does not know what
documents will be or whether they are even available to prove the causes of action in the complaint. The
Court has pursued and has exerted every form of inquiry to see if there is a way by which the plaintiff
could explain in any significant particularity the acts and the evidence which will support its claim of
wrong-doing by the defendants. The plaintiff has failed to do so.[23]

The following material portions of the pre-trial order[24] are quoted to provide a proper perspective of
what transpired during the pre-trial, to wit:

Upon oral inquiry from the Court, the issues which were being raised by plaintiff appear to have been
made on a very generic character. Considering that any claim for violation or breach of trust or deception
cannot be made on generic statements but rather by specific acts which would demonstrate fraud or
breach of trust or deception, together with the evidence in support thereof, the same was not
acceptable to the Court.

The plaintiff through its designated counsel for this morning, Atty. Dennis Taningco, has represented to
this Court that the annexes to its pre-trial brief, more particularly the findings of the COA in its various
examinations, copies of which COA reports are attached to the pre-trial brief, would demonstrate the
wrong, the act or omission attributed to the defendants or to several of them and the basis, therefore,
for the relief that plaintiff seeks in its complaint. It would appear, however, that the plaintiff through its
counsel at this time is not prepared to go into the specifics of the identification of these wrongs or
omissions attributed to plaintiff.
The Court has reminded the plaintiff that a COA report proves itself only in proceedings where the issue
arises from a review of the accountability of particular officers and, therefore, to show the existence of
shortages or deficiencies in an examination conducted for that purpose, provided that such a report is
accompanied by its own working papers and other supporting documents.

In civil cases such as this, a COA report would not have the same independent probative value since it is
not a review of the accountability of public officers for public property in their custody as accountable
officers. It has been the stated view of this Court that a COA report, to be of significant evidence, may
itself stand only on the basis of the supporting documents that upon which it is based and upon an
analysis made by those who are competent to do so. The Court, therefore, sought a more specific
statement from plaintiff as to what these documents were and which of them would prove a particular
act or omission or a series of acts or omissions purportedly committed by any, by several or by all of the
defendants in any particular stage of the chain of alleged wrong-doing in this case.

The plaintiff was not in a position to do so.

The Court has remonstrated with the plaintiff, insofar as its inadequacy is concerned, primarily because
this case was set for pre-trial as far back as December and has been reset from its original setting, with
the undertaking by the plaintiff to prepare itself for these proceedings. It appears to this Court at this
time that the failure of the plaintiff to have available responses and specific data and documents at this
stage is not because the matter has been the product of oversight or notes and papers left elsewhere;
rather, the agitation of this Court arises from the fact that at this very stage, the plaintiff through its
counsel does not know what these documents are, where these documents will be and is still
anticipating a submission or a delivery thereof by COA at an undetermined time. The justification made
by counsel for this stance is that this is only pre-trial and this information and the documents are not
needed yet.
The Court is not prepared to postpone the pre-trial anew primarily because the Court is given a very
clear impression that the plaintiff does not know what documents will be or whether they are even
available to prove the causes of action in the complaint. The Court has pursued and has exerted every
form of inquiry to see if there is a way by which the plaintiff could explain in any significant particularity
the acts and the evidence which will support its claim of wrong-doing by the defendants. The plaintiff
has failed to do so.

Defendants Cojuangco have come back and reiterated their previous inquiry as to the statement of the
cause of action and the description thereof. While the Court acknowledges that logically, that statement
along that line would be primary, the Court also recognizes that sometimes the phrasing of the issue may
be determined or may arise after a statement of the evidence is determined by this Court because the
Court can put itself in a position of more clearly and perhaps more accurately stating what the issues are.
The Pre-Trial Order, after all, is not so much a reflection of merely separate submissions by all of the
parties involved, witnesses by the Court, as to what the subject matter of litigation will be, including the
determination of what matters of fact remain unresolved. At this time, the plaintiff has not taken the
position on any factual statement or any piece of evidence which can be subject of admission or denial,
nor any specifics of any act which could be disputed by the defendants; what plaintiff through counsel
has stated are general conclusions, general statements of abuse and misuse and opportunism.

After an extended break requested by some of the parties, the sessions were resumed and nothing anew
arose from the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought fifteen (15) days to file a reply to the comments and
observations made by defendant Cojuangco to the pre-trial brief of the plaintiff. This Court denied this
Request since the submissions in preparation for pre-trial are not litigious or contentious matters. They
are mere assertions or positions which may or may not be meritorious depending upon the view of the
Court of the entire case and if useful at the pre-trial. At this stage, the plaintiff then reiterated its earlier
request to consider the pre-trial terminated. The Court sought the positions of the other parties,
whether or not they too were prepared to submit their respective positions on the basis of what was
before the Court at pre-trial. All of the parties, in the end, have come to an agreement that they were
submitting their own respective positions for purpose of pre-trial on the basis of the submissions made
of record.

With all of the above, the pre-trial is now deemed terminated.

This Order has been overly extended simply because there has been a need to put on record all of the
events that have taken place leading to the conclusions which were drawn herein.

The parties have indicated a desire to make their submissions outside of trial as a consequence of this
terminated pre-trial, with the plea that the transcript of the proceedings this morning be made available
to them, so that they may have the basis for whatever assertions they will have to make either before
this Court or elsewhere. The Court deems the same reasonable and the Court now gives the parties
fifteen (15) days after notice to them that the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings herein
are complete and ready for them to be retrieved. Settings for trial or for any other proceeding hereafter
will be fixed by this Court either upon request of the parties or when the Court itself shall have
determined that nothing else has to be done.

The Court has sought confirmation from the parties present as to the accuracy of the recapitulation
herein of the proceedings this morning and the Court has gotten assent from all of the parties.

xxx

SO ORDERED.[25]
In the meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan, in order to conform with the ruling in Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Cojuangco, et al.,[26] resolved COCOFEDs Omnibus Motion (with prayer for
preliminary injunction) relative to who should vote the UCPB shares under sequestration, holding as
follows: [27]

In the light of all of the above, the Court submits itself to jurisprudence and with the statements of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 115352 entitled Enrique Cojuangco, Jr., et al. vs. Jaime Calpo, et al. dated
January 27, 1997, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court promulgated on January 27, 1999 in the
case of PCGG vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 13319 which included the Sandiganbayan as one
of the respondents. In these two cases, the Supreme Court ruled that the voting of sequestered shares
of stock is governed by two considerations, namely:

1. whether there is prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are ill-gotten and thus belong to
the State; and

2. whether there is an imminent danger of dissipation thus necessitating their continued sequestration
and voting by the PCGG while the main issue pends with the Sandiganbayan.

xxx xxx xxx.

In view hereof, the movants COCOFED, et al and Ballares, et al. as well as Eduardo Cojuangco, et al. who
were acknowledged to be registered stockholders of the UCPB are authorized, as are all other registered
stockholders of the United Coconut Planters Bank, until further orders from this Court, to exercise their
rights to vote their shares of stock and themselves to be voted upon in the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB) at the scheduled Stockholders Meeting on March 6, 2001 or on any subsequent continuation or
resetting thereof, and to perform such acts as will normally follow in the exercise of these rights as
registered stockholders.

xxx xxx xxx.

Consequently, on March 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
PCGG from voting the sequestered shares of stock of the UCPB.

On July 25, 2002, before Civil Case No. 0033-F could be set for trial, the Republic filed a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and/or for Partial Summary Judgment (Re: Defendants CIIF Companies, 14
Holding Companies and COCOFED, et al.).[28]

Cojuangco, Enrile, and COCOFED separately opposed the motion. Ursua adopted COCOFEDs opposition.

Thereafter, the Republic likewise filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Re: Shares in San Miguel
Corporation Registered in the Respective Names of Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and the
Defendant Cojuangco Companies].[29]

Cojuangco, et al. opposed the motion,[30] after which the Republic submitted its reply.[31]
On February 23, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued an order,[32] in which it enumerated the admitted facts
or facts that appeared to be without substantial controversy in relation to the Republics Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and/or for Partial Summary Judgment [Re: Defendants CIIF Companies, 14
Holding Companies and COCOFED, et al.].

Commenting on the order of February 23, 2004, Cojuangco, et al. specified the items they considered as
inaccurate, but particularly interposed no objection to item no. 17 (to the extent that item no. 17 stated
that Cojuangco had disclaimed any interest in the CIIF block SMC shares of stock registered in the names
of the 14 corporations listed in item no. 1 of the order).[33]

The Republic also filed its Comment,[34] but COCOFED denied the admitted facts summarized in the
order of February 23, 2004.[35]

Earlier, on October 8, 2003,[36] the Sandiganbayan resolved the various pending motions and pleadings
relative to the writs of sequestration issued against the defendants, disposing:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Writs of Sequestration Nos. (a) 86-0042 issued on April 8, 1986, (b) 86-
0062 issued on April 21, 1986, (c) 86-0069 issued on April 22, 1986, (d) 86-0085 issued on May 9, 1986,
(e) 86-0095 issued on May 16, 1986, (f) 86-0096 dated May 16, 1986, (g) 86-0097 issued on May 16,
1986, (h) 86-0098 issued on May 16, 1986 and (i) 87-0218 issued on May 27, 1987 are hereby declared
automatically lifted for being null and void.
Despite the lifting of the writs of sequestration, since the Republic continues to hold a claim on the
shares which is yet to be resolved, it is hereby ordered that the following shall be annotated in the
relevant corporate books of San Miguel Corporation:

(1) any sale, pledge, mortgage or other disposition of any of the shares of the Defendants Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al. shall be subject to the outcome of this case;

(2) the Republic through the PCGG shall be given twenty (20) days written notice by Defendants Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al. prior to any sale, pledge, mortgage or other disposition of the shares;

(3) in the event of sale, mortgage or other disposition of the shares, by the Defendants Cojuangco, et al.,
the consideration therefore, whether in cash or in kind, shall be placed in escrow with Land Bank of the
Philippines, subject to disposition only upon further orders of this Court; and

(4) any cash dividends that are declared on the shares shall be placed in escrow with the Land Bank of
the Philippines, subject to disposition only upon further orders of this Court. If in case stock dividends
are declared, the conditions on the sale, pledge, mortgage and other disposition of any of the shares as
above-mentioned in conditions 1, 2 and 3, shall likewise apply.

In so far as the matters raised by Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, et al. in their Omnibus Motion dated
September 23, 1996 and Reply to PCGGs Comment/Opposition with Motion to Order PCGG to Complete
Inventory, to Nullify Writs of Sequestration and to Enjoin PCGG from Voting Sequestered Shares of Stock
dated January 3, 1997, considering the above conclusion, this Court rules that it is no longer necessary to
delve into the matters raised in the said Motions.

SO ORDERED.[37]

Cojuangco, et al. moved for the modification of the resolution,[38] praying for the deletion of the
conditions for allegedly restricting their rights. The Republic also sought reconsideration of the
resolution.[39]

Eventually, on June 24, 2005, the Sandiganbayan denied both motions, but reduced the restrictions
thuswise:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Resolution dated September 17, 2003 Promulgated on
October 8, 2003) dated October 24, 2003 of Plaintiff Republic is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. As to
the Motion for Modification (Re: Resolution Promulgated on October 8, 2003) dated October 22, 2003,
the same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. However, the restrictions imposed by this Court in its
Resolution dated September 17, 2003 and promulgated on October 8, 2003 shall now read as follows:

Despite the lifting of the writs of sequestration, since the Republic continues to hold a claim on the
shares which is yet to be resolved, it is hereby ordered that the following shall be annotated in the
relevant corporate books of San Miguel Corporation:
a) any sale, pledge, mortgage or other disposition of any of the shares of the Defendants Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al. shall be subject to the outcome of this case.

b) the Republic through the PCGG shall be given twenty (20) days written notice by Defendants Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al. prior to any sale, pledge, mortgage or other disposition of the shares.

SO ORDERED.[40]

Pending resolution of the motions relative to the lifting of the writs of sequestration, SMC filed a Motion
for Intervention with attached Complaint-in-Intervention,[41] alleging, among other things, that it had an
interest in the matter in dispute between the Republic and defendants CIIF Companies for being the
owner by purchase of a portion (i.e., 25,450,000 SMC shares covered by Stock Certificate Nos. A0004129
and B0015556 of the so-called CIIF block of SMC shares of stock sought to be recovered as alleged ill-
gotten wealth).

Although Cojuangco, et al. interposed no objection to SMCs intervention, the Republic opposed,[42]
averring that the intervention would be improper and was a mere attempt to litigate anew issues already
raised and passed upon by the Supreme Court. COCOFED similarly opposed SMCs intervention,[43] and
Ursua adopted its opposition.
On May 6, 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied SMCs motion to intervene.[44] SMC sought reconsideration,
[45] and its motion to that effect was opposed by COCOFED and the Republic.

On May 7, 2004, the Sandiganbyan granted the Republics Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or
Partial Summary Judgment (Re: Defendants CIIF Companies, 14 Holding Companies and COCOFED, et al.)
and rendered a Partial Summary Judgment,[46] the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hold that:

The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Re: Defendants CIIF Companies, 14 Holding Companies and
Cocofed, et al.) filed by Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, THE CIIF COMPANIES, NAMELY:

1. Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills (SOLCOM);

2. Cagayan de Oro Oil Co., Inc. (CAGOIL);

3. Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc. (ILICOCO);

4. San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. (SPMC);

5. Granexport Manufacturing Corp. (GRANEX); and

6. Legaspi Oil Co., Inc. (LEGOIL),

AS WELL AS THE 14 HOLDING COMPANIES, NAMELY:

1. Soriano Shares, Inc.;

2. ACS Investors, Inc.;

3. Roxas Shares, Inc.;

4. Arc Investors, Inc.;

5. Toda Holdings, Inc.;

6. AP. Holdings, Inc.;

7. Fernandez Holdings, Inc.;

8. SMC Officers Corps. Inc.;

9. Te Deum Resources, Inc.;

10. Anglo Ventures, Inc.;

11. Randy Allied Ventures, Inc.;

12. Rock Steel Resources, Inc.;

13. Valhalla Properties Ltd., Inc.; and

14. First Meridian Development, Inc.

AND THE CIIF BLOCK OF SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (SMC) SHARES OF STOCK TOTALING 33,133,266
SHARES AS OF 1983 TOGETHER WITH ALL DIVIDENDS DECLARED, PAID AND ISSUED THEREON AS WELL
AS ANY INCREMENTS THERETO ARISING FROM, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, EXERCISE OF PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS
ARE DECLARED OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN-TRUST FOR ALL THE COCONUT FARMERS AND
ORDERED RECONVEYED TO THE GOVERNMENT.

Let the trial of this Civil Case proceed with respect to the issues which have not been disposed of in this
partial Summary Judgment, including the determination of whether the CIIF Block of SMC Shares
adjudged to be owned by the Government represents 27% of the issued and outstanding capital stock of
SMC according to plaintiff or 31.3% of said capital stock according to COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.

SO ORDERED.[47]
In the same resolution of May 7, 2004, the Sandiganbayan considered the Motions to Dismiss filed by
Cojuangco, et al. on August 2, 2000 and by Enrile on September 4, 2000 as overtaken by the Republics
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Partial Summary Judgment.[48]

On May 25, 2004, Cojuangco, et al. filed their Motion for Reconsideration.[49]

COCOFED filed its so-called Class Action Omnibus Motion: (a) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction and Alternatively, (b) Motion for Reconsideration dated May 26, 2004.[50]

The Republic submitted its Consolidated Comment.[51]

Relative to the resolution of May 7, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution of December 10, 2004,
[52] denying the Republics Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Re: Shares in San Miguel Corporation
Registered in the Respective Names of Defendants Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and the defendant
Cojuangco Companies) upon the following reasons:

In the instant case, a circumspect review of the records show that while there are facts which appear to
be undisputed, there are also genuine factual issues raised by the defendants which need to be threshed
out in a full-blown trial. Foremost among these issues are the following:
1) What are the various sources of funds, which the defendant Cojuangco and his companies claim
they utilized to acquire the disputed SMC shares?

2) Whether or not such funds acquired from alleged various sources can be considered coconut levy
funds;

3) Whether or not defendant Cojuangco had indeed served in the governing bodies of PC, UCPB
and/or CIIF Oil Mills at the time the funds used to purchase the SMC shares were obtained such that he
owed a fiduciary duty to render an account to these entities as well as to the coconut farmers;

4) Whether or not defendant Cojuangco took advantage of his position and/or close ties with then
President Marcos to obtain favorable concessions or exemptions from the usual financial requirements
from the lending banks and/or coco-levy funded companies, in order to raise the funds to acquire the
disputed SMC shares; and if so, what are these favorable concessions or exemptions?

Answers to these issues are not evident from the submissions of the plaintiff and must therefore be
proven through the presentation of relevant and competent evidence during trial. A perusal of the
subject Motion shows that the plaintiff hastily derived conclusions from the defendants statements in
their previous pleadings although such conclusions were not supported by categorical facts but only
mere inferences. In the Reply dated October 2, 2003, the plaintiff construed the supposed meaning of
the phrase various sources (referring to the source of defendant Cojuangcos funds which were used to
acquire the subject SMC shares), which plaintiff said was quite obvious from the defendants admission in
his Pre-Trial Brief, which we quote:
According to Cojuangcos own Pre-Trial Brief, these so-called various sources, i.e., the sources from which
he obtained the funds he claimed to have used in buying the 20% SMC shares are not in fact various as
he claims them to be. He says he obtained loans from UCPB and advances from the CIIF Oil Mills. He
even goes as far as to admit that his only evidence in this case would have been records of UCPB and a
representative of the CIIF Oil Mills obviously the records of UCPB relate to the loans that Cojuangco
claims to have obtained from UCPB of which he was President and CEO while the representative of the
CIIF Oil Mills will obviously testify on the advances Cojuangco obtained from CIIF Oil Mills of which he
was also the President and CEO.

From the foregoing premises, plaintiff went on to conclude that:

These admissions of defendant Cojuangco are outright admissions that he (1) took money from the bank
entrusted by law with the administration of coconut levy funds and (2) took more money from the very
corporations/oil mills in which part of those coconut levy funds (the CIIF) was placed treating the funds
of UCPB and the CIIF as his own personal capital to buy his SMC shares.

We cannot agree with the plaintiffs contention that the defendants statements in his Pre-Trial Brief
regarding the presentation of a possible CIIF witness as well as UCPB records, can already be considered
as admissions of the defendants exclusive use and misuse of coconut levy funds to acquire the subject
SMC shares and defendant Cojuangcos alleged taking advantage of his positions to acquire the subject
SMC shares. Moreover, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court should take that view of
the evidence most favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving such party the benefit of all
inferences. Inasmuch as this issue cannot be resolved merely from an interpretation of the defendants
statements in his brief, the UCPB records must be produced and the CIIF witness must be heard to
ensure that the conclusions that will be derived have factual basis and are thus, valid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the forgoing, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated July 11, 2003 is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, on December 28, 2004, the Sandiganbayan resolved the other pending motions,[53] viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, 2004 filed by
defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al. and the Class Action Omnibus Motion: (a) Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Alternatively, (b) Motion for Reconsideration dated May 26,
2004 filed by COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[54]

COCOFED moved to set the case for trial,[55] but the Republic opposed the motion.[56] On their part,
Cojuangco, et al. also moved to set the trial,[57] with the Republic similarly opposing the motion.[58]

On March 23, 2006, the Sandiganbayan granted the motions to set for trial and set the trial on August 8,
10, and 11, 2006.[59]
In the meanwhile, on August 9, 2005, the Republic filed a Motion for Execution of Partial Summary
Judgment (re: CIIF block of SMC Shares of Stock),[60] contending that an execution pending appeal was
justified because any appeal by the defendants of the Partial Summary Judgment would be merely
dilatory.

Cojuangco, et al. opposed the motion.[61]

The Sandiganbayan denied the Republics Motion for Execution of Partial Summary Judgment (re: CIIF
block of SMC Shares of Stock),[62] to wit:

WHEREFORE, the MOTION FOR EXECUTION OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: CIIF BLOCK OF SMC
SHARES OF STOCK) dated August 8, 2005 of the plaintiff is hereby denied for lack of merit. However, this
Court orders the severance of this particular claim of Plaintiff. The Partial Summary Judgment dated May
7, 2004 is now considered a separate final and appealable judgment with respect to the said CIIF Block of
SMC shares of stock.

The Partial Summary Judgment rendered on May 7, 2004 is modified by deleting the last paragraph of
the dispositive portion which will now read, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hold that:

The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Re: Defendants CIIF Companies, 14 Holding Companies and
Cocofed, et al.) filed by Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, THE CIIF COMPANIES, NAMELY:

1. Southern Coconut Oil Mills (SOLCOM);

2. Cagayan de Oro Oil Co., Inc. (CAGOIL);

3. Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc. (ILICOCO);

4. San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. (SPMC);

5. Granexport Manufacturing Corp.

(GRANEX); and

6. Legaspi Oil Co., Inc. (LEGOIL),

AS WELL AS THE 14 HOLDING COMPANIES, NAMELY:

1. Soriano Shares, Inc.;

2. ACS Investors, Inc.;

3. Roxas Shares, Inc.;

4. Arc Investors, Inc.;

5. Toda Holdings, Inc.;

6. AP Holdings, Inc.;

7. Fernandez Holdings, Inc.;

8. SMC Officers Corps, Inc.;

9. Te Deum Resources, Inc.;

10. Anglo Ventures, Inc.;

11. Randy Allied Ventures, Inc.;

12. Rock Steel Resources, Inc.;

13. Valhalla Properties Ltd., Inc.; and

14. First Meridian Development, Inc.

AND THE CIIF BLOCK OF SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (SMC) SHARES OF STOCK TOTALING 33,133,266
SHARES AS OF 1983 TOGETHER WITH ALL DIVIDENDS DECLARED, PAID AND ISSUED THEREON AS WELL
AS ANY INCREMENTS THERETO ARISING FROM, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, EXERCISE OF PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS
ARE DECLARED OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN TRUST FOR ALL THE COCONUT FARMERS AND
ORDERED RECONVEYED TO THE GOVERNMENT.

The aforementioned Partial Summary Judgment is now deemed a separate appealable judgment which
finally disposes of the ownership of the CIIF Block of SMC Shares, without prejudice to the continuation
of proceedings with respect to the remaining claims particularly those pertaining to the Cojuangco, et al.
block of SMC shares.

SO ORDERED.[63]

During the pendency of the Republics motion for execution, Cojuangco, et al. filed a Motion for Authority
to Sell San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares, praying for leave to allow the sale of SMC shares to
proceed, exempted from the conditions set forth in the resolutions promulgated on October 3, 2003 and
June 24, 2005.[64] The Republic opposed, contending that the requested leave to sell would be
tantamount to removing jurisdiction over the res or the subject of litigation.[65]

However, the Sandiganbayan eventually granted the Motion for Authority to Sell San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) shares.[66]
Thereafter, Cojuangco, et al. manifested to the Sandiganbayan that the shares would be sold to the San
Miguel Corporation Retirement Plan.[67] Ruling on the manifestations of Cojuangco, et al., the
Sandiganbayan issued its resolution of July 30, 2007 allowing the sale of the shares, to wit:

This notwithstanding however, while the Court exempts the sale from the express condition that it shall
be subject to the outcome of the case, defendants Cojuangco, et al. may well be reminded that despite
the deletion of the said condition, they cannot transfer to any buyer any interest higher than what they
have. No one can transfer a right to another greater than what he himself has. Hence, in the event that
the Republic prevails in the instant case, defendants Cojuangco, et al. hold themselves liable to their
transferees-buyers, especially if they are buyers in good faith and for value. In such eventuality,
defendants Cojuangco, et al. cannot be shielded by the cloak of principle of caveat emptor because case
law has it that this rule only requires the purchaser to exercise such care and attention as is usually
exercised by ordinarily prudent men in like business affairs, and only applies to defects which are open
and patent to the service of one exercising such care.

Moreover, said defendants Eduardo M. Cojuangco, et al. are hereby ordered to render their report on
the sale within ten (10) days from completion of the payment by the San Miguel Corporation Retirement
Plan.

SO ORDERED.[68]

Cojuangco, et al. later rendered a complete accounting of the proceeds from the sale of the Cojuangco
block of shares of SMC stock, informing that a total amount of P 4,786,107,428.34 had been paid to the
UCPB as loan repayment.[69]
It appears that the trial concerning the disputed block of shares was not scheduled because the
consideration and resolution of the aforecited motions for summary judgment occupied much of the
ensuing proceedings.

At the hearing of August 8, 2006, the Republic manifested[70] that it did not intend to present any
testimonial evidence and asked for the marking of certain exhibits that it would have the Sandiganbayan
take judicial notice of. The Republic was then allowed to mark certain documents as its Exhibits A to I,
inclusive, following which it sought and was granted time within which to formally offer the exhibits.

On August 31, 2006, the Republic filed its Manifestation of Purposes (Re: Matters Requested or Judicial
Notice on the 20% Shares in San Miguel Corporation Registered in the Respective Names of defendant
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and the defendant Cojuangco Companies).[71]

On September 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued the following resolution,[72] to wit:

Acting on the Manifestation of Purposes (Re: Matters Requested or Judicial Notice on the 20% Shares in
San Miguel Corporation Registered in the Respective names of Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and
the Defendant Cojuangco Companies) dated 28 August 2006 filed by the plaintiff, which has been
considered its formal offer of evidence, and the Comment of Defendants Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et
al. on Plaintiffs Manifestation of Purposes Dated August 30, 2006 dated September 15, 2006, the court
resolves to ADMIT all the exhibits offered, i.e.:

Exhibit A the Answer of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. to the Third Amended Complaint
(Subdivided) dated June 23, 1999, as well as the sub-markings (Exhibit A-1 to A-4;
Exhibit B the Pre-Trial Brief dated January 11, 2000 of defendant CIIF Oil Mills and fourteen (14) CIIF
Holding Companies, as well as the sub-markings Exhibits B-1 and B-2

Exhibit C the Pre-Trial Brief dated January 11, 2000 of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. as well as the
sub-markings Exhibits C-1, C-1-a and C-1-b;

Exhibit D the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [Re: Shares in San Miguel Corporation Registered
in the Respective Names of Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and the Defendant Cojuangco
Companies] dated July 11, 2003, as well as the sub-markings Exhibits D-1 to D-4

the said exhibits being part of the record of the case, as well as

Exhibit E Presidential Decree No. 961 dated July 11, 1976;

Exhibit F Presidential Decree No. 755 dated July 29, 1975;

Exhibit G Presidential Decree No. 1468 dated June 11, 1978;

Exhibit H Decision of the Supreme Court in Republic vs. COCOFED, et al., G.R. Nos. 147062-64, December
14, 2001, 372 SCRA 462

the aforementioned exhibits being matters of public record.

The admission of these exhibits is being made over the objection of the defendants Cojuangco, et al. as
to the relevance thereof and as to the purposes for which they were offered in evidence, which matters
shall be taken into consideration by the Court in deciding the case on the merits.

The trial hereon shall proceed on November 21, 2006, at 8:30 in the morning as previously scheduled.
[73]

During the hearing on November 24, 2006, Cojuangco, et al. filed their Submission and Offer of Evidence
of Defendants,[74] formally offering in evidence certain documents to substantiate their counterclaims,
and informing that they found no need to present countervailing evidence because the Republics
evidence did not prove the allegations of the Complaint. On December 5, 2006, after the Republic
submitted its Comment,[75] the Sandiganbayan admitted the exhibits offered by Cojuangco, et al., and
granted the parties a non-extendible period within which to file their respective memoranda and reply-
memoranda.

Thereafter, on February 23, 2007, the Sandiganbayan considered the case submitted for decision.[76]

ISSUES

The various issues submitted for consideration by the Court are summarized hereunder.
G.R. No. 166859

The Republic came to the Court via petition for certiorari[77] to assail the denial of its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment through the resolution promulgated on December 10, 2004, insisting that the
Sandiganbayan thereby committed grave abuse of discretion: (a) in holding that the various sources of
funds used in acquiring the SMC shares of stock remained disputed; (b) in holding that it was disputed
whether or not Cojuangco had served in the governing bodies of PCA, UCPB, and/or the CIIF Oil Mills;
and (c) in not finding that Cojuangco had taken advantage of his position and had violated his fiduciary
obligations in acquiring the SMC shares of stock in issue.

The Court will consider and resolve the issues thereby raised alongside the issues presented in G.R. No.
180702.

G.R. No. 169203

In the resolution promulgated on October 8, 2003, the Sandiganbayan declared as automatically lifted
for being null and void nine writs of sequestration (WOS) issued against properties of Cojuangco and
Cojuangco companies, considering that: (a) eight of them (i.e., WOS No. 86-0062 dated April 21, 1986;
WOS No. 86-0069 dated April 22, 1986; WOS No. 86-0085 dated May 9, 1986; WOS No. 86-0095 dated
May 16, 1986; WOS No. 86-0096 dated May 16, 1986; WOS No. 86-0097 dated May 16, 1986; WOS No.
86-0098 dated May 16, 1986; and WOS No. 87-0218 dated May 27, 1987) had been issued by only one
PCGG Commissioner, contrary to the requirement of Section 3 of the Rules of the PCGG for at least two
Commissioners to issue the WOS; and (b) the ninth (i.e., WOS No. 86-0042 dated April 8, 1986), although
issued prior to the promulgation of the Rules of the PCGG requiring at least two Commissioners to issue
the WOS, was void for being issued without prior determination by the PCGG of a prima facie basis for
sequestration.

Nonetheless, despite its lifting of the nine WOS, the Sandiganbayan prescribed four conditions to be still
annotated in the relevant corporate books of San Miguel Corporation considering that the Republic
continues to hold a claim on the shares which is yet to be resolved.[78]

In its resolution promulgated on June 24, 2005, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republics Motion for
Reconsideration filed vis-a-vis the resolution promulgated on October 8, 2003, but reduced the
conditions earlier imposed to only two.[79]

On September 1, 2005, the Republic filed a petition for certiorari[80] to annul the resolutions
promulgated on October 8, 2003 and on June 24, 2005 on the ground that the Sandiganbayan had
thereby committed grave abuse of discretion:

I.

XXX IN LIFTING WRIT OF SEQUESTRATION NOS. 86-0042 AND 87-0218 DESPITE EXISTENCE OF THE BASIC
REQUISITES FOR THE VALIDITY OF SEQUESTRATION.

II.
XXX WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS ALTERNATIVE PRAYER IN ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER OF SEQUESTRATION AGAINST ALL THE SUBJECT SHARES OF STOCK IN
ACCORDNCE WITH THE RULING IN REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 258 SCRA 685 (1996).

III.

XXX IN SUBSEQUENTLY DELETING THE LAST TWO (2) CONDITIONS WHICH IT EARLIER IMPOSED ON THE
SUBJECT SHARES OF STOCK.[81]

G.R. No. 180702

On November 28, 2007, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision,[82] decreeing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court is constrained to DISMISS, as it hereby DISMISSES,
the Third Amended Complaint in subdivided Civil Case No. 0033-F for failure of plaintiff to prove by
preponderance of evidence its causes of action against defendants with respect to the twenty percent
(20%) outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation registered in defendants names,
denominated herein as the Cojuangco, et al. block of SMC shares. For lack of satisfactory warrant, the
counterclaims in defendants Answers are likewise ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, the Republic appeals, positing:

I.

COCONUT LEVY FUNDS ARE PUBLIC FUNDS. THE SMC SHARES, WHICH WERE ACQUIRED BY
RESPONDENTS COJUANGCO, JR. AND THE COJUANGCO COMPANIES WITH THE USE OF COCONUT LEVY
FUNDS IN VIOLATION OF RESPONDENT COJUANGCO, JR.S FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION ARE, NECESSARILY,
PUBLIC IN CHARACTER AND SHOULD BE RECONVEYED TO THE GOVERNMENT.

II.

PETITIONER HAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED ITS ENTITLEMENT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO THE RELIEFS
PRAYED FOR.[83]

and urging the following issues to be resolved, to wit:

I.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED

CIVIL CASE NO. 0033-F; AND

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT SHARES IN SMC, WHICH WERE ACQUIRED BY, AND ARE IN THE
RESPECTIVE NAMES OF RESPONDENTS COJUANGCO, JR. AND THE COJUANGCO COMPANIES, SHOULD BE
RECONVEYED TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR HAVING BEEN ACQUIRED USING COCONUT
LEVY FUNDS.[84]

On their part, the petitioners-in-intervention[85] submit the following issues, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED THE CASE A QUO IN VIOLATION OF
LAW AND APPLICABLE RULINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN RULING THAT, WHILE ADMITTEDLY THE
SUBJECT SMC SHARES WERE PURCHASED FROM LOAN PROCEEDS FROM UCPB AND ADVANCES FROM
THE CIIF OIL MILLS, SAID SUBJECT SMC SHARES ARE NOT PUBLIC PROPERTY
II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED THE CASE A QUO IN VIOLATION OF
LAW AND APPLICABLE RULINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN FAILING TO RULE THAT, EVEN ASSUMING
FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT LOAN PROCEEDS FROM UCPB ARE NOT PUBLIC FINDS, STILL, SINCE
RESPONDENT COJUANGCO, IN THE PURCHASE OF THE SUBJECT SMC SHARES FROM SUCH LOAN
PROCEEDS, VIOLATED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND TOOK A COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY THAT
RIGHTFULLY BELONGED TO UCPB (A PUBLIC CORPORATION), THE SUBJECT SMC SHARES SHOULD REVERT
BACK TO THE GOVERNMENT.

RULING

We deny all the petitions of the Republic.

Lifting of nine WOS for violation of PCGG Rules

did not constitute grave abuse of discretion

Through its resolution promulgated on June 24, 2005, assailed on certiorari in G.R. No. 169203, the
Sandiganbayan lifted the nine WOS for the following reasons, to wit:

Having studied the antecedent facts, this Court shall now resolve the pending incidents especially
defendants Motion to Affirm that the Writs or Orders of Sequestration Issued on Defendants Properties
Were Unauthorized, Invalid and Never Became Effective dated March 5, 1999.

Section 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations promulgated on April 11, 1986, provides:

Sec. 3. Who may issue. A writ of sequestration or a freeze or hold order may be issued by the
Commission upon the authority of at least two Commissioners, based on the affirmation or complaint of
an interested party or motu propio (sic) the issuance thereof is warranted.

In this present case, of all the questioned writs of sequestration issued after the effectivity of the PCGG
Rules and Regulations or after April 11, 1986, only writ no. 87-0218 issued on May 27, 1987 complied
with the requirement that it be issued by at least two Commissioners, the same having been issued by
Commissioners Ramon E. Rodrigo and Quintin S. Doromal. However, even if Writ of Sequestration No.
87-0218 complied with the requirement that the same be issued by at least two Commissioners, the
records fail to show that it was issued with factual basis or with factual foundation as can be seen from
the Certification of the Commission Secretary of the PCGG of the excerpt of the minutes of the meeting
of the PCGG held on May 26, 1987, stating therein that:
The Commission approved the recommendation of Dir. Cruz to sequester all the shares of stock, assets,
records, and documents of Balete Ranch, Inc. and the appointment of the Fiscal Committee with ECI
Challenge, Inc./Pepsi-Cola for Balete Ranch, Inc. and the Aquacor Marketing Corp. vice Atty. S. Occena.
The objective is to consolidate the Fiscal Committee activities covering three associated entities of Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco.Upon recommendation of Comm. Rodrigo, the reconstitution of the Board of
Directors of the three companies was deferred for further study.

Nothing in the above-quoted certificate shows that there was a prior determination of a factual basis or
factual foundation. It is the absence of a prima facie basis for the issuance of a writ of sequestration and
not the lack of authority of two (2) Commissioners which renders the said writ void ab initio. Thus, being
the case, Writ of Sequestration No. 87-0218 must be automatically lifted.

As declared by the Honorable Supreme Court in two cases it has decided,

The absence of a prior determination by the PCGG of a prima facie basis for the sequestration order is,
unavoidably, a fatal defect which rendered the sequestration of respondent corporation and its
properties void ab initio. And

The corporation or entity against which such writ is directed will not be able to visually determine its
validity, unless the required signatures of at least two commissioners authorizing its issuance appear on
the very document itself. The issuance of sequestration orders requires the existence of a prima facie
case. The two commissioner rule is obviously intended to assure a collegial determination of such fact. In
this light, a writ bearing only one signature is an obvious transgression of the PCGG Rules.
Consequently, the writs of sequestration nos. 86-0062, 86-0069, 86-0085, 86-0095, 86-0096, 86-0097
and 86-0098 must be lifted for not having complied with the pertinent provisions of the PCGG Rules and
Regulations, all of which were issued by only one Commissioner and after April 11, 1986 when the PCGG
Rules and Regulations took effect, an utter disregard of the PCGGs Rules and Regulations. The Honorable
Supreme Court has stated that:

Obviously, Section 3 of the PCGG Rules was intended to protect the public from improvident, reckless
and needless sequestrations of private property. And since these Rules were issued by Respondent
Commission, it should be the first entity to observe them.

Anent the writ of sequestration no. 86-0042 which was issued on April 8, 1986 or prior to the
promulgation of the PCGG Rules and Regulations on April 11, 1986, the same cannot be declared void on
the ground that it was signed by only one Commissioner because at the time it was issued, the Rules and
Regulations of the PCGG were not yet in effect. However, it again appears that there was no prior
determination of the existence of a prima facie basis or factual foundation for the issuance of the said
writ. The PCGG, despite sufficient time afforded by this Court to show that a prima facie basis existed
prior to the issuance of Writ No. 86-0042, failed to do so. Nothing in the records submitted by the PCGG
in compliance of the Resolutions and Order of this Court would reveal that a meeting was held by the
Commission for the purpose of determining the existence of a prima facie evidence prior to its issuance.
In a case decided by the Honorable Supreme Court, wherein it involved a writ of sequestration issued by
the PCGG on March 19, 1986 against all assets, movable and immovable, of Provident International
Resources Corporation and Philippine Casino Operators Corporation, the Honorable Supreme Court
enunciated:

The questioned sequestration order was, however issued on March 19, 1986, prior to the promulgation
of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. As a consequence, we cannot reasonably expect the commission to
abide by said rules, which were nonexistent at the time the subject writ was issued by then
Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or
regulation (and even policies) shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated so. We find no
provision in said Rules which expressly gives them retroactive effect, or implies the abrogation of
previous writs issued not in accordance with the same Rules. Rather, what said Rules provide is that they
shall be effective immediately, which in legal parlance, is understood as upon promulgation. Only penal
laws are given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused.

We distinguish this case from Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, Romualdez and Dio Island Resort, G.R. No.
88126, July 12, 1996 where the sequestration order against Dio Island Resort, dated April 14, 1986, was
prepared, issued and signed not by two commissioners of the PCGG, but by the head of its task force in
Region VIII. In holding that said order was not valid since it was not issued in accordance with PCGG
Rules and Regulations, we explained:

(Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations), couched in clear and simple language, leaves no room for
interpretation. On the basis thereof, it is indubitable that under no circumstances can a sequestration or
freeze order be validly issued by one not a commissioner of the PCGG.

xxxxxxxxx

Even assuming arguendo that Atty. Ramirez had been given prior authority by the PCGG to place Dio
Island Resort under sequestration, nevertheless, the sequestration order he issued is still void since
PCGG may not delegate its authority to sequester to its representatives and subordinates, and any such
delegation is valid and ineffective.

We further said:
In the instant case, there was clearly no prior determination made by the PCGG of a prima facie basis for
the sequestration of Dio Island Resort, Inc. x x x

xxxxxxxxx

The absence of a prior determination by the PCGG of a prima facie basis for the sequestration order is,
unavoidably, a fatal defect which rendered the sequestration of respondent corporation and its
properties void ab initio. Being void ab initio, it is deemed nonexistent, as though it had never been
issued, and therefore is not subject to ratification by the PCGG.

What were obviously lacking in the above case were the basic requisites for the validity of a
sequestration order which we laid down in BASECO vs. PCGG, 150 SCRA 181, 216, May 27, 1987, thus:

Section (3) of the Commissions Rules and regulations provides that sequestration or freeze (and
takeover) orders issue upon the authority of at least two commissioners, based on the affirmation or
complaint of an interested party, or motu propio (sic) when the Commission has reasonable grounds to
believe that the issuance thereof is warranted.
In the case at bar, there is no question as to the presence of prima facie evidence justifying the issuance
of the sequestration order against respondent corporations. But the said order cannot be nullified for
lack of the other requisite (authority of at least two commissioners) since, as explained earlier, such
requisite was nonexistent at the time the order was issued.

As to the argument of the Plaintiff Republic that Defendants Cojuangco, et al. have not shown any
contrary prima facie proof that the properties subject matter of the writs of sequestration were
legitimate acquisitions, the same is misplaced. It is a basic legal doctrine, as well as many times
enunciated by the Honorable Supreme Court that when a prima facie proof is required in the issuance of
a writ, the party seeking such extraordinary writ must establish that it is entitled to it by complying
strictly with the requirements for its issuance and not the party against whom the writ is being sought
for to establish that the writ should not be issued against it.

According to the Republic, the Sandiganbayan thereby gravely abused its discretion in: (a) in lifting WOS
No. 86-0042 and No. 87-0218 despite the basic requisites for the validity of sequestration being existent;
(b) in denying the Republics alternative prayer for the issuance of an order of sequestration against all
the subject shares of stock in accordance with the ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 258 SCRA 685, as
stated in its Motion For Reconsideration; and (c) in deleting the last two conditions the Sandiganbayan
had earlier imposed on the subject shares of stock.

We sustain the lifting of the nine WOS for the reasons made extant in the assailed resolution of October
8, 2003, supra.

Section 3 of the Rules of the PCGG, promulgated on April 11, 1986, provides:
Section 3. Who may issue. A writ of sequestration or a freeze or hold order may be issued by the
Commission upon the authority of at least two Commissioners, based on the affirmation or complaint of
an interested party or motu proprio when the Commission has reasonable grounds to believe that the
issuance thereof is warranted.

Conformably with Section 3, supra, WOS No. 86-0062 dated April 21, 1986; WOS No. 86-0069 dated April
22, 1986; WOS No. 86-0085 dated May 9, 1986; WOS No. 86-0095 dated May 16, 1986; WOS No. 86-
0096 dated May 16, 1986; WOS No. 86-0097 dated May 16, 1986; and WOS No. 86-0098 dated May 16,
1986 were lawfully and correctly nullified considering that only one PCGG Commissioner had issued
them.

Similarly, WOS No. 86-0042 dated April 8, 1986 and WOS No. 87-0218 dated May 27, 1987 were lawfully
and correctly nullified ̶ notwithstanding that WOS No. 86-0042, albeit signed by only one Commissioner
(i.e., Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista), was not at the time of its issuance subject to the two-
Commissioners rule, and WOS No. 87-0218, albeit already issued under the signatures of two
Commissioners ̶ considering that both had been issued without a prior determination by the PCGG of a
prima facie basis for the sequestration.

Plainly enough, the irregularities infirming the issuance of the several WOS could not be ignored in favor
of the Republic and resolved against the persons whose properties were subject of the WOS. Where the
Rules of the PCGG instituted safeguards under Section 3, supra, by requiring the concurrent signatures of
two Commissioners to every WOS issued and the existence of a prima facie case of ill gotten wealth to
support the issuance, the non-compliance with either of the safeguards nullified the WOS thus issued. It
is already settled that sequestration, due to its tendency to impede or limit the exercise of proprietary
rights by private citizens, is construed strictly against the State, conformably with the legal maxim that
statutes in derogation of common rights are generally strictly construed and rigidly confined to the cases
clearly within their scope and purpose.[86]

Consequently, the nullification of the nine WOS, being in implementation of the safeguards the PCGG
itself had instituted, did not constitute any abuse of its discretion, least of all grave, on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.

Nor did the Sandiganbayan gravely abuse its discretion in reducing from four to only two the conditions
imposed for the lifting of the WOS. The Sandiganbayan thereby acted with the best of intentions, being
all too aware that the claim of the Republic to the sequestered assets and properties might be
prejudiced or harmed pendente lite unless the protective conditions were annotated in the corporate
books of SMC. Moreover, the issue became academic following the Sandiganbayans promulgation of its
decision dismissing the Republics Amended Complaint, which thereby removed the stated reason the
Republic continues to hold a claim on the shares which is yet to be resolved underlying the need for the
annotation of the conditions (whether four or two).

II

The Concept and Genesis of

Ill-Gotten Wealth in the Philippine Setting

A brief review of the Philippine law and jurisprudence pertinent to ill-gotten wealth should furnish an
illuminating backdrop for further discussion.
In the immediate aftermath of the peaceful 1986 EDSA Revolution, the administration of President
Corazon C. Aquino saw to it, among others, that rules defining the authority of the government and its
instrumentalities were promptly put in place. It is significant to point out, however, that the
administration likewise defined the limitations of the authority.

The first official issuance of President Aquino, which was made on February 28, 1986, or just two days
after the EDSA Revolution, was Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1, which created the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG). Ostensibly, E.O. No. 1 was the first issuance in light of the EDSA Revolution
having come about mainly to address the pillage of the nations wealth by President Marcos, his family,
and cronies.

E.O. No. 1 contained only two WHEREAS Clauses, to wit:

WHEREAS, vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth;[87]

Paragraph (4) of E.O. No. 2[88] further required that the wealth, to be ill-gotten, must be acquired by
them through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds belonging to the
Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial
institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the grave damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Although E.O. No. 1 and the other issuances dealing with ill-gotten wealth (i.e., E.O. No. 2, E.O. No. 14,
and E.O. No. 14-A) only identified the subject matter of ill-gotten wealth and the persons who could
amass ill-gotten wealth and did not include an explicit definition of ill-gotten wealth, we can still discern
the meaning and concept of ill-gotten wealth from the WHEREAS Clauses themselves of E.O. No. 1, in
that ill-gotten wealth consisted of the vast resources of the government amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates both here and abroad. It is
clear, therefore, that ill-gotten wealth would not include all the properties of President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, and close associates but only the part that originated from the vast
resources of the government.

In time and unavoidably, the Supreme Court elaborated on the meaning and concept of ill-gotten wealth.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[89] or
BASECO, for the sake of brevity, the Court held that:

xxx until it can be determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in
truth ill-gotten, i.e., acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of
funds belonging to the Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or
financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence, resulting in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave damage and
prejudice to the State. And this, too, is the sense in which the term is commonly understood in other
jurisdictions.[90]

The BASECO definition of ill-gotten wealth was reiterated in Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Lucio C. Tan,[91] where the Court said:

On this point, we find it relevant to define ill-gotten wealth. In Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc.,
this Court described ill-gotten wealth as follows:

Ill-gotten wealth is that acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of
funds belonging to the Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or
financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence, resulting in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave damage and
prejudice to the State. And this, too, is the sense in which the term is commonly understood in other
jurisdiction.

Concerning respondents shares of stock here, there is no evidence presented by petitioner that they
belong to the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks
or financial institutions. Nor is there evidence that respondents, taking undue advantage of their
connections or relationship with former President Marcos or his family, relatives and close associates,
were able to acquire those shares of stock.
Incidentally, in its 1998 ruling in Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[92] the Court
rendered an identical definition of ill-gotten wealth, viz:

xxx. We may also add that ill-gotten wealth, by its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the
aforementioned Executive Orders, ill-gotten wealth refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired,
directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates
through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having
taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influence or relationships, resulting
in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the
government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon
reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive
claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another declared overriding
consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national
economic recovery.

All these judicial pronouncements demand two concurring elements to be present before assets or
properties were considered as ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) they must have originated from the
government itself, and (b) they must have been taken by former President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, and close associates by illegal means.

But settling the sources and the kinds of assets and property covered by E.O. No. 1 and related issuances
did not complete the definition of ill-gotten wealth. The further requirement was that the assets and
property should have been amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and
close associates both here and abroad. In this regard, identifying former President Marcos, his
immediate family, and relatives was not difficult, but identifying other persons who might be the close
associates of former President Marcos presented an inherent difficulty, because it was not fair and just
to include within the term close associates everyone who had had any association with President
Marcos, his immediate family, and relatives.
Again, through several rulings, the Court became the arbiter to determine who were the close associates
within the coverage of E.O. No. 1.

In Republic v. Migrio,[93] the Court held that respondents Migrio, et al. were not necessarily among the
persons covered by the term close subordinate or close associate of former President Marcos by reason
alone of their having served as government officials or employees during the Marcos administration, viz:

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee
during the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. This is so because otherwise the respondents case will fall under existing
general laws and procedures on the matter. xxx

In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[94] the Court declared that the petitioner was not a close associate as the
term was used in E.O. No. 1 just because he had served as the President and General Manager of the
GSIS during the Marcos administration.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[95] the Court stated that respondent Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas having
been a Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the Marcos administration d[id] not
automatically make him a subordinate of former President Ferdinand Marcos as this term is used in
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos.
It is well to point out, consequently, that the distinction laid down by E.O. No. 1 and its related issuances,
and expounded by relevant judicial pronouncements unavoidably required competent evidentiary
substantiation made in appropriate judicial proceedings to determine: (a) whether the assets or
properties involved had come from the vast resources of government, and (b) whether the individuals
owning or holding such assets or properties were close associates of President Marcos. The requirement
of competent evidentiary substantiation made in appropriate judicial proceedings was imposed because
the factual premises for the reconveyance of the assets or properties in favor of the government due to
their being ill-gotten wealth could not be simply assumed. Indeed, in BASECO,[96] the Court made this
clear enough by emphatically observing:

6. Governments Right and Duty to Recover All Ill-gotten Wealth

There can be no debate about the validity and eminent propriety of the Governments plan to recover all
ill-gotten wealth.

Neither can there be any debate about the proposition that assuming the above described factual
premises of the Executive Orders and Proclamation No. 3 to be true, to be demonstrable by competent
evidence, the recovery from Marcos, his family and his minions of the assets and properties involved, is
not only a right but a duty on the part of Government.

But however plain and valid that right and duty may be, still a balance must be sought with the equally
compelling necessity that a proper respect be accorded and adequate protection assured, the
fundamental rights of private property and free enterprise which are deemed pillars of a free society
such as ours, and to which all members of that society may without exception lay claim.

xxx Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components
freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with
these freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds
and under proper control. xxx Evincing much concern for the protection of property, the Constitution
distinctly recognizes the preferred position which real estate has occupied in law for ages. Property is
bound up with every aspect of social life in a democracy as democracy is conceived in the Constitution.
The Constitution realizes the indispensable role which property, owned in reasonable quantities and
used legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort and the formation and growth of a solid
social middle class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the backbone of every progressive
and happy country.

a. Need of Evidentiary Substantiation in Proper Suit

Consequently, the factual premises of the Executive Orders cannot simply be assumed. They will have to
be duly established by adequate proof in each case, in a proper judicial proceeding, so that the recovery
of the ill-gotten wealth may be validly and properly adjudged and consummated; although there are
some who maintain that the fact that an immense fortune, and vast resources of the government have
been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close
associates both here and abroad, and they have resorted to all sorts of clever schemes and
manipulations to disguise and hide their illicit acquisitions is within the realm of judicial notice, being of
so extensive notoriety as to dispense with proof thereof. Be this as it may, the requirement of
evidentiary substantiation has been expressly acknowledged, and the procedure to be followed explicitly
laid down, in Executive Order No. 14. [97]
Accordingly, the Republic should furnish to the Sandiganbayan in proper judicial proceedings the
competent evidence proving who were the close associates of President Marcos who had amassed
assets and properties that would be rightly considered as ill-gotten wealth.

III.

Summary Judgment was not warranted;

The Republic should have adduced evidence

to substantiate its allegations against the Respondents

We affirm the decision of November 28, 2007, because the Republic did not discharge its burden as the
plaintiff to establish by preponderance of evidence that the respondents SMC shares were illegally
acquired with coconut-levy funds.

The decision of November 28, 2007 fully explained why the Sandiganbayan dismissed the Republics case
against Cojuangco, et al., viz:

Going over the evidence, especially the laws, i.e., P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 755, and P.D. No. 1468, over
which plaintiff prayed that Court to take judicial notice of, it is worth noting that these same laws were
cited by plaintiff when it filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment
regarding the CIIF block of SMC shares of stock. Thus, the Court has already passed upon the same laws
when it arrived at judgment determining ownership of the CIIF block of SMC shares of stock. Pertinently,
in the Partial Summary Judgment promulgated on May 7, 2004, the Court gave the following rulings
finding certain provisions of the above-cited laws to be constitutionally infirmed, thus:

In this case, Section 2(d) and Section 9 and 10, Article III, of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 mandated the UCPB
to utilize the CIIF, an accumulation of a portion of the CCSF and the CIDF, for investment in the form of
shares of stock in corporations organized for the purpose of engaging in the establishment and the
operation of industries and commercial activities and other allied business undertakings relating to
coconut and other palm oils industry in all aspects. The investments made by UCPB in CIIF companies are
required by the said Decrees to be equitably distributed for free by the said bank to the coconut farmers
(Sec. 10, P.D. No. 961 and Sec. 10, P.D. No. 1468). The public purpose sought to be served by the free
distribution of the shares of stock acquired with the use of public funds is not evident in the laws
mentioned. More specifically, it is not clear how private ownership of the shares of stock acquired with
public funds can serve a public purpose. The mode of distribution of the shares of stock also left much
room for the diversion of assets acquired through public funds into private uses or to serve directly
private interests, contrary to the Constitution. In the said distribution, defendants COCOFED, et al. and
Ballares, et al. admitted that UCPB followed the administrative issuances of PCA which we found to be
constitutionally objectionable in our Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-A, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:

xxx xx xxx.

The distribution for free of the shares of stock of the CIIF Companies is tainted with the above-
mentioned constitutional infirmities of the PCA administrative issuances. In view of the foregoing, we
cannot consider the provision of P.D. No. 961 and P.D. No. 1468 and the implementing regulations issued
by the PCA as valid legal basis to hold that assets acquired with public funds have legitimately become
private properties.
The CIIF Companies having been acquired with public funds, the 14 CIIF-owned Holding Companies and
all their assets, including the CIIF Block of SMC Shares, being public in character, belong to the
government. Even granting that the 14 Holding Companies acquired the SMC Shares through CIIF
advances and UCPB loans, said advances and loans are still the obligations of the said companies. The
incorporating equity or capital of the 14 Holding Companies, which were allegedly used also for the
acquisition of the subject SMC shares, being wholly owned by the CIIF Companies, likewise form part of
the coconut levy funds, and thus belong to the government in trust for the ultimate beneficiaries
thereof, which are all the coconut farmers.

xxx xxx xxx.

And, with the above-findings of the Court, the CIIF block of SMC shares were subsequently declared to
be of public character and should be reconveyed to the government in trust for coconut farmers. The
foregoing findings notwithstanding, a question now arises on whether the same laws can likewise serve
as ultimate basis for a finding that the Cojuangco, et al. block of SMC shares are also imbued with public
character and should rightfully be reconveyed to the government.

On this point, the Court disagrees with plaintiff that reliance on said laws would suffice to prove that
defendants Cojuangco, et al.s acquisition of SMC shares of stock was illegal as public funds were used.
For one, plaintiffs reliance thereon has always had reference only to the CIIF block of shares, and the
Court has already settled the same by going over the laws and quoting related findings in the Partial
Summary judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 0033-A. For another, the allegations of plaintiff pertaining
to the Cojuangco block representing twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding capital stock of SMC stress
defendant Cojuangcos acquisition by virtue of his positions as Chief Executive Officer of UCPB, a
member-director of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) Governing Board, and a director of the CIIF
Oil Mills. Thus, reference to the said laws would not settle whether there was abuse on the part of
defendants Cojuangco, et al. of their positions to acquire the SMC shares. [98]
Besides, in the Resolution of the Court on plaintiffs Motion for Parial Summary Judgment (Re: Shares in
San Miguel Corporation Registered in the Respective Names of Defendants Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
and the defendant Cojuangco Companies), the Court already rejected plaintiffs reference to said laws. In
fact, the Court declined to grant plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment because it simply
contended that defendant Cojuangcos statements in his pleadings, which plaintiff again offered in
evidence herein, regarding the presentation of a possible CIIF witness as well as UCPB records can
already be considered admissions of defendants exclusive use and misuse of coconut levy funds. In the
said resolution, the Court already reminded plaintiff that the issues cannot be resolved by plaintiffs
interpretation of defendant Cojuangcos statements in his brief. Thus, the substantial portion of the
Resolution of the Court denying plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is again quoted for
emphasis: [99]

We cannot agree with the plaintiffs contention that the defendants statements in his Pre-Trial Brief
regarding the presentation of a possible CIIF witness as well as UCPB records, can already be considered
as admissions of the defendants exclusive use and misuse of coconut levy funds to acquire the subject
SMC shares and defendant Cojuangcos alleged taking advantage of his positions to acquire the subject
SMC shares. Moreover, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court should take that view of
the evidence most favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving such party the benefit of all
favorable inferences. Inasmuch as this issue cannot be resolved merely from an interpretation of the
defendants statements in his brief, the UCPB records must be produced and the CIIF witness must be
heard to ensure that the conclusions that will be derived have factual basis and are thus, valid. [100]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated July 11, 2003 is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis supplied)

Even assuming that, as plaintiff prayed for, the Court takes judicial notice of the evidence it offered with
respect to the Cojuangco block of SMC shares of stock, as contained in plaintiffs manifestation of
purposes, still its evidence do not suffice to prove the material allegations in the complaint that
Cojuangco took advantage of his positions in UCPB and PCA in order to acquire the said shares. As
above-quoted, the Court, itself, has already ruled, and hereby stress that UCPB records must be
produced and the CIIF witness must be heard to ensure that the conclusions that will be derived have
factual basis and are thus, valid. Besides, the Court found that there are genuine factual issues raised by
defendants that need to be threshed out in a full-blown trial, and which plaintiff had the burden to
substantially prove. Thus, the Court outlined these genuine factual issues as follows:

1) What are the various sources of funds, which defendant Cojuangco and his companies claim they
utilized to acquire the disputed SMC shares?

2) Whether or not such funds acquired from alleged various sources can be considered coconut levy
funds;

3) Whether or not defendant Cojuangco had indeed served in the governing bodies of PCA, UCPB and/or
CIIF Oil Mills at the time the funds used to purchase the SMC shares were obtained such that he owed a
fiduciary duty to render an account to these entities as well as to the coconut farmers;
4) Whether or not defendant Cojuangco took advantage of his position and/or close ties with then
President Marcos to obtain favorable concessions or exemptions from the usual financial requirements
from the lending banks and/or coco-levy funded companies, in order to raise the funds to acquire the
disputed SMC shares; and if so, what are these favorable concessions or exemptions?[101]

Answers to these issues are not evident from the submissions of plaintiff and must therefore be proven
through the presentation of relevant and competent evidence during trial. A perusal of the subject
Motion shows that the plaintiff hastily derived conclusions from the defendants statements in their
previous pleadings although such conclusions were not supported by categorical facts but only mere
inferences. xxx xxx xxx. (Emphasis supplied) [102]

Despite the foregoing pronouncement of the Court, plaintiff did not present any other evidence during
the trial of this case but instead made its manifestation of purposes, that later served as its offer of
evidence in the instant case, that merely used the same evidence it had already relied upon when it
moved for partial summary judgment over the Cojuangco block of SMC shares. Altogether, the Court
finds the same insufficient to prove plaintiffs allegations in the complaint because more than judicial
notices, the factual issues require the presentation of admissible, competent and relevant evidence in
accordance with Sections 3 and 4, Rule 128 of the Rules on Evidence.

Moreover, the propriety of taking judicial notice of plaintiffs exhibits is aptly questioned by defendants
Cojuangco, et al. Certainly, the Court can take judicial notice of laws pertaining to the coconut levy funds
as well as decisions of the Supreme Court relative thereto, but taking judicial notice does not mean that
the Court would accord full probative value to these exhibits. Judicial notice is based upon convenience
and expediency for it would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and expensive both to parties and
the court to require proof, in the ordinary way, of facts which are already known to courts. However, a
court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. Certainly, there are genuine factual
matters in the instant case, as above-cited, which plaintiff ought to have proven with relevant and
competent evidence other than the exhibits it offered.
Referring to plaintiffs causes of action against defendants Cojuangco, et al., the Court finds its evidence
insufficient to prove that the source of funds used to purchase SMC shares indeed came from coconut
levy funds. In fact, there is no direct link that the loans obtained by defendant Cojuangco, Jr. were the
same money used to pay for the SMC shares. The scheme alleged to have been taken by defendant
Cojuangco, Jr. was not even established by any paper trail or testimonial evidence that would have
identified the same. On account of his positions in the UCPB, PCA and the CIIF Oil Mills, the Court cannot
conclude that he violated the fiduciary obligations of the positions he held in the absence of proof that
he was so actuated and that he abused his positions.[103]

It was plain, indeed, that Cojuangco, et al. had tendered genuine issues through their responsive
pleadings and did not admit that the acquisition of the Cojuangco block of SMC shares had been illegal,
or had been made with public funds. As a result, the Republic needed to establish its allegations with
preponderant competent evidence, because, as earlier stated, the fact that property was ill gotten could
not be presumed but must be substantiated with competent proof adduced in proper judicial
proceedings. That the Republic opted not to adduce competent evidence thereon despite stern
reminders and warnings from the Sandiganbayan to do so revealed that the Republic did not have the
competent evidence to prove its allegations against Cojuangco, et al.

Still, the Republic, relying on the 2001 holding in Republic v. COCOFED,[104] pleads in its petition for
review (G.R. No. 180702) that:

With all due respect, the Honorable Sandiganbayan failed to consider legal precepts and procedural
principles

vis--vis the records of the case showing that the funds or various loans or advances used in the
acquisition of the disputed SMC Shares ultimately came from the coconut levy funds.
As discussed hereunder, respondents own admissions in their Answers and Pre-Trial Briefs confirm that
the various sources of funds utilized in the acquisition of the disputed SMC shares came from borrowings
and advances from the UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills.[105]

Thereby, the Republic would have the Sandiganbayan pronounce the block of SMC shares of stock
acquired by Cojuangco, et al. as ill-gotten wealth even without the Republic first presenting
preponderant evidence establishing that such block had been acquired illegally and with the use of
coconut levy funds.

The Court cannot heed the Republics pleas for the following reasons:

To begin with, it is notable that the decision of November 28, 2007 did not rule on whether coconut levy
funds were public funds or not. The silence of the Sandiganbayan on the matter was probably due to its
not seeing the need for such ruling following its conclusion that the Republic had not preponderantly
established the source of the funds used to pay the purchase price of the concerned SMC shares, and
whether the shares had been acquired with the use of coconut levy funds.

Secondly, the ruling in Republic v. COCOFED[106] determined only whether certain stockholders of the
UCPB could vote in the stockholders meeting that had been called. The issue now before the Court could
not be controlled by the ruling in Republic v. COCOFED, however, for even as that ruling determined the
issue of voting, the Court was forthright enough about not thereby preempting the Sandiganbayans
decisions on the merits on ill-gotten wealth in the several cases then pending, including this one, viz:
In making this ruling, we are in no way preempting the proceedings the Sandiganbayan may conduct or
the final judgment it may promulgate in Civil Case No. 0033-A, 0033-B and 0033-F. Our determination
here is merely prima facie, and should not bar the anti-graft court from making a final ruling, after
proper trial and hearing, on the issues and prayers in the said civil cases, particularly in reference to the
ownership of the subject shares.

We also lay down the caveat that, in declaring the coco levy funds to be prima facie public in character,
we are not ruling in any final manner on their classification whether they are general or trust or special
funds since such classification is not at issue here. Suffice it to say that the public nature of the coco levy
funds is decreed by the Court only for the purpose of determining the right to vote the shares, pending
the final outcome of the said civil cases.

Neither are we resolving in the present case the question of whether the shares held by Respondent
Cojuangco are, as he claims, the result of private enterprise. This factual matter should also be taken up
in the final decision in the cited cases that are pending in the court a quo. Again, suffice it to say that the
only issue settled here is the right of PCGG to vote the sequestered shares, pending the final outcome of
said cases.

Thirdly, the Republics assertion that coconut levy funds had been used to source the payment for the
Cojuangco block of SMC shares was premised on its allegation that the UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills were
public corporations. But the premise was grossly erroneous and overly presumptuous, because:
(a) The fact of the UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills being public corporations or government-owned or
government-controlled corporations precisely remained controverted by Cojuangco, et al. in light of the
lack of any competent to that effect being in the records;

(b) Cojuangco explicitly averred in paragraph 2.01.(b) of his Answer that the UCPB was a private
corporation; and

(c) The Republic did not competently identify or establish which ones of the Cojuangco corporations had
supposedly received advances from the CIIF Oil Mills.

Fourthly, the Republic asserts that the contested block of shares had been paid for with borrowings from
the UCPB and advances from the CIIF Oil Mills, and that such borrowings and advances had been illegal
because the shares had not been purchased for the benefit of the Coconut Farmers. To buttress its
assertion, the Republic relied on the admissions supposedly made in paragraph 2.01 of Cojuangcos
Answer in relation to paragraph 4 of the Republics Amended Complaint.

The best way to know what paragraph 2.01 of Cojuangcos Answer admitted is to refer to both paragraph
4 of the Amended Complaint and paragraph 2.01 of his Answer, which are hereunder quoted:

Paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint

4. Defendant EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., was Governor of Tarlac, Congressman of then First District
of Tarlac and Ambassador-at-Large in the Marcos Administration. He was commissioned Lieutenant
Colonel in the Philippine Air Force, Reserve. Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., otherwise known as
the Coconut King was head of the coconut monopoly which was instituted by Defendant Ferdinand E.
Marcos, by virtue of the Presidential Decrees. Defendant Eduardo E. Cojuangco, Jr., who was also one of
the closest associates of the Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, held the positions of Director of the
Philippine Coconut Authority, the United Coconut Mills, Inc., President and Board Director of the United
Coconut Planters Bank, United Coconut Planters Life Assurance Corporation, and United Coconut
Chemicals, Inc. He was also the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer and the controlling
stockholder of the San Miguel Corporation. He may be served summons at 45 Balete Drive, Quezon City
or at 136 East 9th Street, Quezon City.

Paragraph 2.01 of Respondent Cojuangcos Answer

2.01. Herein defendant admits paragraph 4 only insofar as it alleges the following:

(a) That herein defendant has held the following positions in government: Governor of Tarlac,
Congressman of the then First District of Tarlac, Ambassador-at-Large, Lieutenant Colonel in the
Philippine Air Force and Director of the Philippines Coconut Authority;
(b) That he held the following positions in private corporations: Member of the Board of Directors of the
United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc.; President and member of the Board of Directors of the United Coconut
Planters Bank, United Coconut Planters Life Assurance Corporation, and United Coconut Chemicals, Inc.;
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of San Miguel Corporation; and

(c) That he may be served with summons at 136 East 9th Street, Quezon City.

Herein defendant specifically denies the rest of the allegations of paragraph 4, including any insinuation
that whatever association he may have had with the late Ferdinand Marcos or Imelda Marcos has been
in connection with any of the acts or transactions alleged in the complaint or for any unlawful purpose.

It is basic in remedial law that a defendant in a civil case must apprise the trial court and the adverse
party of the facts alleged by the complaint that he admits and of the facts alleged by the complaint that
he wishes to place into contention. The defendant does the former either by stating in his answer that
they are true or by failing to properly deny them. There are two ways of denying alleged facts: one is by
general denial, and the other, by specific denial.[107]

In this jurisdiction, only a specific denial shall be sufficient to place into contention an alleged fact.[108]
Under Section 10,[109] Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, a specific denial of an allegation of the complaint
may be made in any of three ways, namely: (a) a defendant specifies each material allegation of fact the
truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, sets forth the substance of the matters
upon which he relies to support his denial; (b) a defendant who desires to deny only a part of an
averment specifies so much of it as is true and material and denies only the remainder; and (c) a
defendant who is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a
material averment made in the complaint states so, which has the effect of a denial.

The express qualifications contained in paragraph 2.01 of Cojuangcos Answer constituted efficient
specific denials of the averments of paragraph 2 of the Republics Amended Complaint under the first
method mentioned in Section 10 of Rule 8, supra. Indeed, the aforequoted paragraphs of the Amended
Complaint and of Cojuangcos Answer indicate that Cojuangco thereby expressly qualified his admission
of having been the President and a Director of the UCPB with the averment that the UCPB was a private
corporation; that his Answers allegation of his being a member of the Board of Directors of the United
Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. did not admit that he was a member of the Board of Directors of the CIIF Oil Mills,
because the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. was not one of the CIIF Oil Mills; and that his Answer nowhere
contained any admission or statement that he had held the various positions in the government or in the
private corporations at the same time and in 1983, the time when the contested acquisition of the SMC
shares of stock took place.

What the Court stated in Bitong v. Court of Appeals (Fifth Division)[110] as to admissions is illuminating:

When taken in its totality, the Amended Answer to the Amended Petition, or even the Answer to the
Amended Petition alone, clearly raises an issue as to the legal personality of petitioner to file the
complaint. Every alleged admission is taken as an entirety of the fact which makes for the one side with
the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its effect on the other side. The reason for this is, where
part of a statement of a party is used against him as an admission, the court should weigh any other
portion connected with the statement, which tends to neutralize or explain the portion which is against
interest.

In other words, while the admission is admissible in evidence, its probative value is to be determined
from the whole statement and others intimately related or connected therewith as an integrated unit.
Although acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted, however, evidence
aliunde can be presented to show that the admission was made through palpable mistake. The rule is
always in favor of liberality in construction of pleadings so that the real matter in dispute may be
submitted to the judgment of the court.

And, lastly, the Republic cites the following portions of the joint Pre-Trial Brief of Cojuangco, et al.,[111]
to wit:

IV.

PROPOSED EVIDENCE

xxx

4.01. xxx Assuming, however, that plaintiff presents evidence to support its principal contentions,
defendants evidence in rebuttal would include testimonial and documentary evidence showing: a) the
ownership of the shares of stock prior to their acquisition by respondents (listed in Annexes A and B); b)
the consideration for the acquisition of the shares of stock by the persons or companies in whose names
the shares of stock are now registered; and c) the source of the funds used to pay the purchase price.

4.02. Herein respondents intend to present the following evidence:

xxx
b. Proposed Exhibits ____, ____, ____

Records of the United Coconut Planters Bank which would show borrowings of the companies listed in
Annexes A and B, or companies affiliated or associated with them, which were used to source payment
of the shares of stock of the San Miguel Corporation subject of this case.

4.03. Witnesses.

xxx

(b) A representative of the United Coconut Planters Bank who will testify in regard the loans which were
used to source the payment of the price of SMC shares of stock.

(c) A representative from the CIIF Oil Mills who will testify in regard the loans or credit advances which
were used to source the payment of the purchase price of the SMC shares of stock.

The Republic insists that the aforequoted portions of the joint Pre-Trial Brief were Cojuangco, et al.s
admission that:
(a) Cojuangco had received money from the UCPB, a bank entrusted by law with the administration of
the coconut levy funds; and

(b) Cojuangco had received more money from the CIIF Oil Mills in which part of the CIIF funds had been
placed, and thereby used the funds of the UCPB and the CIIF as capital to buy his SMC shares.[112]

We disagree with the Republics posture.

The statements found in the joint Pre-Trial Brief of Cojuangco, et al. were noticeably written beneath the
heading of Proposed Evidence. Such location indicated that the statements were only being proposed,
that is, they were not yet intended or offered as admission of any fact stated therein. In other words, the
matters stated or set forth therein might or might not be presented at all. Also, the text and tenor of the
statements expressly conditioned the proposal on the Republic ultimately presenting its evidence in the
action. After the Republic opted not to present its evidence, the condition did not transpire; hence, the
proposed admissions, assuming that they were that, did not materialize.

Obviously, too, the statements found under the heading of Proposed Evidence in the joint Pre-Trial Brief
were incomplete and inadequate on the important details of the supposed transactions (i.e., alleged
borrowings and advances). As such, they could not constitute admissions that the funds had come from
borrowings by Cojuangco, et al. from the UCPB or had been credit advances from the CIIF Oil Companies.
Moreover, the purpose for presenting the records of the UCPB and the representatives of the UCPB and
of the still unidentified or unnamed CIIF Oil Mills as declared in the joint Pre-Trial Brief did not at all show
whether the UCPB and/or the unidentified or unnamed CIIF Oil Mills were the only sources of funding, or
that such institutions, assuming them to be the sources of the funding, had been the only sources of
funding. Such ambiguousness disqualified the statements from being relied upon as admissions. It is
fundamental that any statement, to be considered as an admission for purposes of judicial proceedings,
should be definite, certain and unequivocal;[113] otherwise, the disputed fact will not get settled.

Another reason for rejecting the Republics posture is that the Sandiganbayan, as the trial court, was in
no position to second-guess what the non-presented records of the UCPB would show as the borrowings
made by the corporations listed in Annexes A and B, or by the companies affiliated or associated with
them, that were used to source payment of the shares of stock of the San Miguel Corporation subject of
this case, or what the representative of the UCPB or the representative of the CIIF Oil Mills would testify
about loans or credit advances used to source the payment of the price of SMC shares of stock.

Lastly, the Rules of Court has no rule that treats the statements found under the heading Proposed
Evidence as admissions binding Cojuangco, et al. On the contrary, the Rules of Court has even
distinguished between admitted facts and facts proposed to be admitted during the stage of pre-trial.
Section 6 (b),[114] Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, requires a Pre-Trial Brief to include a summary of
admitted facts and a proposed stipulation of facts. Complying with the requirement, the joint Pre-Trial
Brief of Cojuangco, et al. included the summary of admitted facts in its paragraph 3.00 of its Item III,
separately and distinctly from the Proposed Evidence, to wit:

III.

SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

3.00. Based on the complaint and the answer, the acquisition of the San Miguel shares by, and their
registration in the names of, the companies listed in Annexes A and B may be deemed undisputed.
3.01. All other allegations in the complaint are disputed.[115]

The burden of proof, according to Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law. Here, the Republic, being the plaintiff, was the party that carried the burden of
proof. That burden required it to demonstrate through competent evidence that the respondents, as
defendants, had purchased the SMC shares of stock with the use of public funds; and that the affected
shares of stock constituted ill-gotten wealth. The Republic was well apprised of its burden of proof, first
through the joinder of issues made by the responsive pleadings of the defendants, including Cojuangco,
et al. The Republic was further reminded through the pre-trial order and the Resolution denying its
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra, of the duty to prove the factual allegations on ill-gotten wealth
against Cojuangco, et al., specifically the following disputed matters:

(a) When the loans or advances were incurred;

(b) The amount of the loans from the UCPB and of the credit advances from the CIIF Oil Mills, including
the specific CIIF Oil Mills involved;

(c) The identities of the borrowers, that is, all of the respondent corporations together, or separately;
and the amounts of the borrowings;
(d) The conditions attendant to the loans or advances, if any;

(e) The manner, form, and time of the payments made to Zobel or to the Ayala Group, whether by check,
letter of credit, or some other form; and

(f) Whether the loans were paid, and whether the advances were liquidated.

With the Republic nonetheless choosing not to adduce evidence proving the factual allegations,
particularly the aforementioned matters, and instead opting to pursue its claims by Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Sandiganbayan became completely deprived of the means to know the necessary but
crucial details of the transactions on the acquisition of the contested block of shares. The Republics
failure to adduce evidence shifted no burden to the respondents to establish anything, for it was basic
that the party who asserts, not the party who denies, must prove.[116] Indeed, in a civil action, the
plaintiff has the burden of pleading every essential fact and element of the cause of action and proving
them by preponderance of evidence. This means that if the defendant merely denies each of the
plaintiffs allegations and neither side produces evidence on any such element, the plaintiff must
necessarily fail in the action.[117] Thus, the Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed Civil Case No. 0033-F for
failure of the Republic to prove its case by preponderant evidence.

A summary judgment under Rule 35 of the Rules of Court is a procedural technique that is proper only
when there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.[118] It is a method intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases
where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
affidavits on record.[119] Upon a motion for summary judgment the courts sole function is to determine
whether there is an issue of fact to be tried, and all doubts as to the existence of an issue of fact must be
resolved against the moving party. In other words, a party who moves for summary judgment has the
burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, and any doubt as to the
existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant. Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court should take that view of the evidence most favorable to the party against whom it is
directed, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences.[120]

The term genuine issue has been defined as an issue of fact that calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue that is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, and patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. The court can determine this on the basis
of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits, and counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to
the court. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary
judgment cannot take the place of a trial.[121] Well-settled is the rule that a party who moves for
summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact.
[122] Upon that partys shoulders rests the burden to prove the cause of action, and to show that the
defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay. After the burden has been discharged, the
defendant has the burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend.[123] Any doubt as to the
propriety of a summary judgment shall be resolved against the moving party.

We need not stress that the trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may
do so only in cases where no genuine issue as to any material fact clearly exists between the parties. The
rule on summary judgment does not invest the trial courts with jurisdiction to try summarily the factual
issues upon affidavits, but authorizes summary judgment only when it appears clear that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact.[124]

IV.

Republics burden to establish by preponderance of evidence that respondents SMC shares had been
illegally acquired with coconut-levy funds was not discharged
Madame Justice Carpio Morales argues in her dissent that although the contested SMC shares could be
inescapably treated as fruits of funds that are prima facie public in character, Cojuangco, et al. abstained
from presenting countervailing evidence; and that with the Republic having shown that the SMC shares
came into fruition from coco levy funds that are prima facie public funds, Cojuangco, et al. had to go
forward with contradicting evidence, but did not.

The Court disagrees. We cannot reverse the decision of November 28, 2007 on the basis alone of judicial
pronouncements to the effect that the coconut levy funds were prima facie public funds,[125] but
without any competent evidence linking the acquisition of the block of SMC shares by Cojuangco, et al.
to the coconut levy funds.

V.

No violation of the DOSRI and

Single Borrowers Limit restrictions

The Republics lack of proof on the source of the funds by which Cojuangco, et al. had acquired their
block of SMC shares has made it shift its position, that it now suggests that Cojuangco had been enabled
to obtain the loans by the issuance of LOI 926 exempting the UCPB from the DOSRI and the Single
Borrowers Limit restrictions.

We reject the Republics suggestion.

Firstly, as earlier pointed out, the Republic adduced no evidence on the significant particulars of the
supposed loan, like the amount, the actual borrower, the approving official, etc. It did not also establish
whether or not the loans were DOSRI[126] or issued in violation of the Single Borrowers Limit. Secondly,
the Republic could not outrightly assume that President Marcos had issued LOI 926 for the purpose of
allowing the loans by the UCPB in favor of Cojuangco. There must be competent evidence to that effect.
And, finally, the loans, assuming that they were of a DOSRI nature or without the benefit of the required
approvals or in excess of the Single Borrowers Limit, would not be void for that reason. Instead, the bank
or the officers responsible for the approval and grant of the DOSRI loan would be subject only to
sanctions under the law.[127]

VI.

Cojuangco violated no fiduciary duties

The Republic invokes the following pertinent statutory provisions of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 1455. When any trustee, guardian or other person holding a fiduciary relationship uses trust
funds for the purchase of property and causes the conveyance to be made to him or to a third person, a
trust is established by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the funds belong.

Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it s by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
and the Corporation Code, as follows:

Section 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers.Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly
vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or
bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in
conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages
resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.

When a director, trustee or officer attempts to acquire or acquires, in violation of his duty, any interest
adverse to the corporation in respect of any matter which has been reposed in him in confidence, as to
which equity imposes a disability upon him to deal in his own behalf, he shall be liable as a trustee for
the corporation and must account for the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the
corporation.

Did Cojuangco breach his fiduciary duties as an officer and member of the Board of Directors of the
UCPB? Did his acquisition and holding of the contested SMC shares come under a constructive trust in
favor of the Republic?

The answers to these queries are in the negative.

The conditions for the application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of the Civil Code (like the trustee using trust
funds to purchase, or a person acquiring property through mistake or fraud), and Section 31 of the
Corporation Code (like a director or trustee willfully and knowingly voting for or assenting to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation, among others) require factual foundations to be first laid out in
appropriate judicial proceedings. Hence, concluding that Cojuangco breached fiduciary duties as an
officer and member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB without competent evidence thereon would
be unwarranted and unreasonable.

Thus, the Sandiganbayan could not fairly find that Cojuangco had committed breach of any fiduciary
duties as an officer and member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB. For one, the Amended Complaint
contained no clear factual allegation on which to predicate the application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of
the Civil Code, and Section 31 of the Corporation Code. Although the trust relationship supposedly arose
from Cojuangcos being an officer and member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB, the link between
this alleged fact and the borrowings or advances was not established. Nor was there evidence on the
loans or borrowings, their amounts, the approving authority, etc. As trial court, the Sandiganbayan could
not presume his breach of fiduciary duties without evidence showing so, for fraud or breach of trust is
never presumed, but must be alleged and proved.[128]

The thrust of the Republic that the funds were borrowed or lent might even preclude any consequent
trust implication. In a contract of loan, one of the parties (creditor) delivers money or other consumable
thing to another (debtor) on the condition that the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be
paid.[129] Owing to the consumable nature of the thing loaned, the resulting duty of the borrower in a
contract of loan is to pay, not to return, to the creditor or lender the very thing loaned. This explains why
the ownership of the thing loaned is transferred to the debtor upon perfection of the contract.[130]
Ownership of the thing loaned having transferred, the debtor enjoys all the rights conferred to an owner
of property, including the right to use and enjoy (jus utendi), to consume the thing by its use (jus
abutendi), and to dispose (jus disponendi), subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.[131]
Evidently, the resulting relationship between a creditor and debtor in a contract of loan cannot be
characterized as fiduciary.[132]

To say that a relationship is fiduciary when existing laws do not provide for such requires evidence that
confidence is reposed by one party in another who exercises dominion and influence. Absent any special
facts and circumstances proving a higher degree of responsibility, any dealings between a lender and
borrower are not fiduciary in nature.[133] This explains why, for example, a trust receipt transaction is
not classified as a simple loan and is characterized as fiduciary, because the Trust Receipts Law (P.D. No.
115) punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to the
prejudice of another regardless of whether the latter is the owner.[134]

Based on the foregoing, a debtor can appropriate the thing loaned without any responsibility or duty to
his creditor to return the very thing that was loaned or to report how the proceeds were used. Nor can
he be compelled to return the proceeds and fruits of the loan, for there is nothing under our laws that
compel a debtor in a contract of loan to do so. As owner, the debtor can dispose of the thing borrowed
and his act will not be considered misappropriation of the thing.[135] The only liability on his part is to
pay the loan together with the interest that is either stipulated or provided under existing laws.

WHEREFORE, the Court dismisses the petitions for certiorari in G.R. Nos. 166859 and 169023; denies the
petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 180702; and, accordingly, affirms the decision promulgated
by the Sandiganbayan on November 28, 2007 in Civil Case No. 0033-F.

The Court declares that the block of shares in San Miguel Corporation in the names of respondents
Cojuangco, et al. subject of Civil Case No. 0033-F is the exclusive property of Cojuangco, et al. as
registered owners.

Accordingly, the lifting and setting aside of the Writs of Sequestration affecting said block of shares
(namely: Writ of Sequestration No. 86-0062 dated April 21, 1986; Writ of Sequestration No. 86-0069
dated April 22, 1986; Writ of Sequestration No. 86-0085 dated May 9, 1986; Writ of Sequestration No.
86-0095 dated May 16, 1986; Writ of Sequestration No. 86-0096 dated May 16, 1986; Writ of
Sequestration No. 86-0097 dated May 16, 1986; Writ of Sequestration No. 86-0098 dated May 16, 1986;
Writ of Sequestration No. 86-0042 dated April 8, 1986; and Writ of Sequestration No. 87-0218 dated
May 27, 1987) are affirmed; and the annotation of the conditions prescribed in the Resolutions
promulgated on October 8, 2003 and June 24, 2005 is cancelled.

SO ORDERED.

B. Conclusive Presumptions

C. Disputable Presumptions

BERSAMIN, J.:

Is the presentation of a stock certificate a condition sine qua non for proving one’s shareholding in a
corporation? This is the decisive question to be resolved in this appeal.

The Case

In this appeal, the petitioners challenge the decision promulgated on June 6, 2012 in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
115203,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal of their complaint by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, in Bangued, Abra under the order dated June 28, 2010 for their failure to
comply with the order to present their stock certificates.[2]

Antecedents

Petitioners Grace Borgoña Insigne, Diosdado Borgoña, Osbourne Borgoña, Imelda Borgoña Rivera,
Aristotle Borgoña are siblings of the full blood. Respondent Francis Borgoña (Francis) is their older half-
blood brother. The petitioners are the children of the late Pedro Borgoña (Pedro) by his second wife,
Teresita Valeros, while Francis was Pedro’s son by his first wife, Humvelina Avila.[3] In his lifetime, Pedro
was the founder, president and majority stockholder of respondent Abra Valley Colleges, Inc. (Abra
Valley), a stock corporation. After Pedro’s death, Francis succeeded him as the president of Abra Valley.
[4]

On March 26, 2002, the petitioners, along with their brother Romulo Borgoña and Elmer Reyes, filed a
complaint (with application for preliminary injunction) and damages in the RTC against Abra Valley
(docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. 2070),[5] praying, among others, that the RTC direct Abra
Valley to allow them to inspect its corporate books and records, and the minutes of meetings, and to
provide them with its financial statements[6]

Due to Abra Valley’s failure to file its responsive pleading within the reglementary period provided in the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies,[7] the RTC rendered judgment on
May 7, 2002 in favor of the petitioners,[8] disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1). Ordering respondent Abra Valley College to allow petitioners to inspect its corporate books and
records and minutes of meetings at reasonable hours on business days, copies of excerpts from said
books, records and minutes shall be allowed reproduction by petitioners at their expense and after
written demand pursuant to Section 74 of the Corporation Code;

(2). Ordering respondent Abra Valley College to furnish petitioners its financial statement at their
expense within ten (10) days from receipt of a written request pursuant to Section 75 of the Corporation
Code;

(3). Ordering respondent Abra Valley College to pay petitioners the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney’s
fees.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The RTC denied Abra Valley’s motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2002;[10] hence, Abra Valley
appealed to the CA, which promulgated its decision on December 20, 2006,[11] ordering the RTC to
admit Abra Valley’s answer despite its belated filing on May 10, 2002; and remanding the case for further
proceedings.
Thereafter, the petitioners amended their complaint[12] to substitute Evelyn Borgoña, the wife of
Romulo Borgoña, as one of the plaintiffs due to Romulo’s intervening death;[13] to implead Francis as an
additional defendant, both in his personal capacity and as the president of Abra Valley; and to include
the immediate holding of the annual stockholders’ meeting as the second cause of action. The amended
complaint also alleged that they were bona fide stockholders of Abra Valley, attaching copies of stock
certificates indorsed in their favor on the dorsal portion by the original holders.[14]

On November 10, 2009, Abra Valley and Francis filed their respective answers.[15]

In its answer, Abra Valley raised the following special and affirmative defenses, to wit:

18. Inasmuch as the originals of the above enumerated certificates of stock are still in names of the
original owners, it is the conclusion that the transfers or transactions, if any, that may have transpired
between said owners and plaintiffs are not yet recorded and registered with the corporation issuing the
same;

19. If said transaction or transfer was already registered, the stock certificates in the name of the
assignor, transferor or indorses should have been cancelled and replaced with stock certificates in the
name of the assignee, transferee or indorsee;

20. The stocks certificate submitted by the plaintiffs are still not in their respective names, but still in the
name of the supposed assignors, transferors or indorsers.

xxxx

23. To avail of the rights of stockholders, the plaintiffs must present stock certificates already in their
names, and not in the names of other persons;[16]

On his part, Francis averred similar special and affirmative defenses, to wit:

10. From the Annexes of the amended complaint filed by plaintiffs, it appears that not one of them is a
stockholder of record of the Abra Valley Colleges, Inc.;
11. Be that as it is, plaintiffs are not vested with the rights to vote, to notice, to inspect, to call for an
annual meeting or demand the conduct of one, and such other rights and privileges inherent and
available only to stockholders of record;

12. From the copies of Stock Certificate attached to the AMENDED COMPLAINT, some of the plaintiffs are
mere assignees or indorsees, and that the other plaintiffs are not even assignees or indorsee;

13. And the right of an assignee or indorsee of a stock certificate is limited only to the issuance of stock
certificate in his or her name, after the requirements and conditions are complied with;[17]

The respondents then filed on March 2, 2010 a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Special and Affirmative
Defenses.[18] At the hearing set on March 8, 2010, the RTC ordered the petitioners to present the stock
certificates issued by Abra Valley under their names.

On April 7, 2010, the petitioners submitted their Compliance and Manifestation,[19] attaching the
following documents:

(1) Certification of defendant corporation dated April 3, 2001, issued by its Corporate Secretary, Jocelyn
Bernal, officially stating that “as per Records of the Stock and Transfer Book of the Abra Valley Colleges
the following persons has [sic] a share” in defendant corporation, namely: plaintiffs –

(a) Grace V. Borgoña [110 shares],

(b) Aristotle and Imelda V. Borgoña [30 shares],

(c) Diosdado V. Borgoña [15 shares], and

(d) Osbourne V. Borgoña [10 shares].

(Annex “A”);

(2) SEC certified true copy of “ISSUANCE OF PART OF AUTHORIZED AND UNISSUED CAPITAL STOCK” of
defendant corporation, declaring that in a Special Meeting of Trustees held on February 1, 1982, a
Resolution to make a private offering of its authorized and unissued capital stock to certain persons,
which included the following plaintiffs: Grace B. Insigne, Osbourne v. Borgoña, Diosdado V. Borgoña,
Imelda B. Rivera and Aristotle V. Borgoña, was duly adopted. (Annex “B”);
(3) Official Receipts (O.R.) of defendant corporation showing that on August 8, 1986, each of the
following plaintiffs paid for 36 shares of stock of defendant corporation, to wit:

1. Grace Insigne [O.R. # 62092],

2. Osbourne Borgoña [O.R. # 62094],

3. Diosdado Borgoña [O.R. # 62095],

4. Imelda B. Rivera [O.R. # 62096], and

5. Aristotle Borgoña [O.R. # 62097],

(Annexes “C” to “C-4”);

(4) SEC certified copy of “Letter” of defendant corporation’s President Pedro V. Borgoña, dated June 17,
1987, addressed to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), informing the SEC that defendant
corporation issued 324 shares of its authorized and unissued capital stocks to certain offerees, which
included the following plaintiffs: Grace B. Insigne, Osbourne v. Borgoña, Diosdado V. Borgoña, Imelda B.
Rivera and Aristotle V. Borgoña. (Annex “D”);

(5) SEC certified copy of “Secretary’s Certificate” of defendant corporation, dated June 17, 1987, issued
by the Corporate Secretary and attested by its President, stating that at a Special Meeting of the Board of
Trustees held on February 1, 1982, a Resolution was passed formally confirming and ratifying the
issuance of 324 shares from the authorized and unissued capital stock of the corporation to certain
persons, which included the following plaintiffs: Grace B. Insigne, Osbourne V. Borgoña, Diosdado V.
Borgoña, Imelda B. Rivera and Aristotle V. Borgoña, and who subscribed and fully paid their respective
number of shares. (Annex “E”);

(6) SEC certified copy of the “General Information Sheet” (GIS) of defendant corporation showing that in
1989, the following plaintiffs, namely: Grace B. Insigne, Diosdado V. Borgoña, Imelda B. Rivera and
Aristotle V. Borgoña, together with then President, Pedro V. Borgoña, were members of the Board of
defendant corporation. (Annex “F”); and

(7) SEC certified copy of the “MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF DIRECTORS AND STOCKHOLDERS
OF THE ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE ON JANUARY 29, 1989” showing that the following plaintiffs, namely:
Grace B. Insigne, Osbourne V. Borgoña, Diosdado V. Borgoña, Imelda B. Rivera and Aristotle V. Borgoña,
attended said Annual Meeting as stockholders, and the same minutes shows that some of the plaintiffs
were elected members of the 1989 Board of defendant corporation. (Annex “G”)[20]
The petitioners likewise filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of Documents,[21] asking that the RTC
direct the respondents to produce Abra Valley’s Stock and Transfer Book (STB); and that petitioners be
allowed to inspect the same.

On June 28, 2010, the RTC issued the assailed order dismissing Special Civil Action Case No. 2070
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, pertinently holding:

As can be gleaned, the documents presented are not Stock Certificates as boldly announced by the
plaintiff’s counsel, hence, plaintiffs failed to comply with the order of the Court dated March 8, 2010.
Hence, this case is dismissible under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — “If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the
date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the complaint may
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the Court's own motion without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counter-claim in the same or in a separate action. The dismissal
shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the Court.”

Going into the merits, the Court is of the considered opinion that the documents presented in the
compliance failed to defeat the challenge of the defendant. “A mere typewritten statement advising a
stockholder of the extent of his ownership in a corporation xxx cannot be considered a formal Certificate
of Stock”. (SEC opinion. 20 October 1970, cited in Bitong vs. CA)

Further, in a derivative suit, it is required that stockholder is an owner of a stock certificate at the time of
the suit. The documents presented are not updated.

WHEREFORE, premises considered this case is ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[22]

The petitioners appealed the dismissal.

On June 6, 2012, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,[23] the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Order dated 28 June 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 2070 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[24]

After the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on October 15, 2012,[25] the petitioners
have come to the Court for review.

Issue

To be resolved is whether the RTC properly dismissed Special Civil Action Case No. 2070 on the ground of
the petitioners’ failure to comply with the order issued by the RTC on March 8, 2010 to produce stock
certificates. In other words, the Court should determine whether or not the petitioners were bona fide
stockholders of Abra Valley.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, we stress that the Court’s determination is limited to resolving the issue concerning the
status or relation of the petitioners with Abra Valley. Whether or not the petitioners could exercise their
right to inspect Abra Valley’s corporate books, records and minutes of meetings, and be furnished with
financial statements, and whether or not they could demand the immediate holding of the annual
stockholders’ meeting are matters to be tried and resolved by the RTC.

1.

Petitioners were stockholders of Abra Valley

In their amended complaint, the petitioners alleged that they were bona fide stockholders of Abra Valley.
On the other hand, the respondents claimed as an affirmative defense that the petitioners were not Abra
Valley’s stockholders.

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, or evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto. Thus, the party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the
affirmative of an issue bears the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment.
From the plaintiff the burden to prove his positive assertions never parts. Yet, for the defendant, an
affirmative defense is one that is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action,
but rather one that, if established, will be a good defense – i.e., an “avoidance” of the claim.[26]

The petitioners’ causes of action against the respondents were premised on Sections 50, 74 and 75 of
the Corporation Code,[27] to wit:

Section 50. Regular and special meetings of stockholders or members. – Regular meetings of
stockholders or members shall be held annually on a date fixed in the by-laws, or if not so fixed, on any
date in April of every year as determined by the board of directors or trustees: Provided, That written
notice of regular meetings shall be sent to all stockholders or members of record at least two (2) weeks
prior to the meeting, unless a different period is required by the by-laws.

Section 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. – x x x

The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meetings shall be
open to inspection by any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable
hours on business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records or
minutes, at his expense.

xxxx

Section 75. Right to financial statements. – Within ten (10) days from receipt of a written request of any
stockholder or member, the corporation shall furnish to him its most recent financial statement, which
shall include a balance sheet as of the end of the last taxable year and a profit or loss statement for said
taxable year, showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the result of its operations.
(Emphasis ours)

xxxx

Conformably with these provisions, the petitioners had to establish that they were stockholders of Abra
Valley. Indeed, the CA concluded that it was the petitioners who had failed to discharge the burden of
proving their stock ownership because they did not produce their stock certificates.
We reverse the CA.

First of all, the present issue was the offshoot of the RTC’s resolution of the Motion for Preliminary
Hearing of Special and Affirmative Defenses, wherein the respondents alleged that the petitioners were
not stockholders of Abra Valley; and that they had no cause of action against the respondents. Being the
parties who filed the Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Special and Affirmative Defenses, the
respondents bore the burden of proof to establish that the petitioners were not stockholders of Abra
Valley. The respondents’ assertion therein, albeit negative, partook of a good defense that, if established,
would result to their “avoidance” of the claim. On that basis, the CA erroneously laid the burden of proof
on the petitioners.

Secondly, the petitioners, assuming that they bore the burden of proving their status as stockholders of
Abra Valley, nonetheless discharged their burden despite their non-production of the stock certificates.

A stock certificate is prima facie evidence that the holder is a shareholder of the corporation,[28] but the
possession of the certificate is not the sole determining factor of one’s stock ownership. A certificate of
stock is merely: –

x x x the paper representative or tangible evidence of the stock itself and of the various interests therein.
The certificate is not stock in the corporation but is merely evidence of the holder's interest and status in
the corporation, his ownership of the share represented thereby, but is not in law the equivalent of such
ownership. It expresses the contract between the corporation and the stockholder, but it is not essential
to the existence of a share in stock or the creation of the relation of shareholder to the corporation.[29]
(Emphasis supplied.)

To establish their stock ownership, the petitioners actually turned over to the trial court through their
Compliance and Manifestation submitted on April 7, 2010 the various documents showing their
ownership of Abra Valley’s shares,[30] specifically: the official receipts of their payments for their
subscriptions of the shares of Abra Valley; and the copies duly certified by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) stating that Abra Valley had issued shares in favor of the petitioners, such as the
issuance of part of authorized and unissued capital stock; the letter dated June 17, 1987; the secretary’s
certificate dated June 17, 1987; and the general information sheet.

And, thirdly, the petitioners adduced competent proof showing that the respondents had allowed the
petitioners to become members of the Board of Directors. According to the Minutes of the Annual
Meeting of Directors and Stockholders of the Abra Valley College of January 29, 1989, which was among
the documents submitted to the trial court on April 7, 2010 through the Compliance and Manifestation,
the petitioners attended the annual meeting of January 29, 1989 as stockholders of Abra Valley, and
participated in the election of the Board of Directors at which some of them were chosen as members.
Considering that Section 23 of the Corporation Code requires every director to be the holder of at least
one share of capital stock of the corporation of which he is a director, the respondents would not have
then allowed any of the petitioners to be elected to sit in the Board of Directors as members unless they
believed that the petitioners so elected were not disqualified for lack of stock ownership. Neither did the
respondents thereafter assail their acts as Board Directors. Conformably with the doctrine of estoppel,
the respondents could no longer deny the petitioners’ status as stockholders of Abra Valley. The
application of the doctrine of estoppel, which is based on public policy, fair dealing, good faith and
justice, is only appropriate because the purpose of the doctrine is to forbid one from speaking against his
own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of another to whom he directed such act,
representations, or commitments, and who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine springs from
equitable principles and the equities in the case, and is designed to aid the law in the administration of
justice where without its aid injustice might result. The Court has applied the doctrine wherever and
whenever special circumstances of the case so demanded.[31]

Under the circumstances, the dismissal of Special Civil Action Case No. 2070 on June 28, 2010 on the
basis that “the documents presented are not Stock Certificates as boldly announced by the plaintiff’s
counsel, hence, plaintiffs failed to comply with the order of the Court dated March 8, 2010” was
unwarranted and unreasonable. Although Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court[32] expressly
empowers the trial court to dismiss the complaint motu proprio or upon motion of the defendant if, for
no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to comply with any order of the court, the power to dismiss is not
to wielded indiscriminately, but only when the non-compliance constitutes a willful violation of an order
of consequence to the action. Dismissal of the action can be grossly oppressive if it is based on non-
compliance with the most trivial order of the court considering that the dismissal equates to “an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.”[33] A line of demarcation must
be drawn between an order whose non-compliance impacts on the case, and an order whose non-
compliance causes little effect on the case. For example, the non-compliance of an order to the plaintiff
to amend his complaint to implead an indispensable party as defendant should be sanctioned with
dismissal with prejudice unless the non-compliance was upon justifiable cause, like such party not within
the jurisdiction of the court.

As we have seen, however, the dismissal of Special Civil Action Case No. 2070 by virtue of Section 3, Rule
17 of the Rules of Court should be undone because the petitioners’ production of the stock certificates
was rendered superfluous by their submission of other competent means of establishing their
shareholdings in Abra Valley.

2.

Petitioners were entitled to demand

the production of the STB of Abra Valley

The respondents insist that the petitioners should establish that the indorsement of the stock certificates
by the original holders was registered in their favor in the STB of Abra Valley.[34]

We do not agree with this insistence.

A person becomes a stockholder of a corporation by acquiring a share through either purchase or

subscription. Here, the petitioners acquired their shares in Abra Valley: (1) by subscribing to 36 shares
each from Abra Valley’s authorized and unissued capital stock;[35] and (2) by purchasing the
shareholdings of existing stockholders, as borne out by the latter’s indorsement on the stock certificates.
[36]

In determining the validity of the transfer of shares through purchase, we resort to Section 63 of the
Corporation Code, which pertinently provides:

Section 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. – x x x Shares of stock so issued are personal
property and may be transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his
attorney-in-fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be
valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation
showing the names of the parties to the transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the
certificate or certificates and the number of shares transferred.

No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claim shall be transferable in the
books of the corporation.

In this regard, the Court has instructed in Ponce v. Alsons Cement Corporation[37] that:

x x x [A] transfer of shares of stock not recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation is non-
existent as far as the corporation is concerned. As between the corporation on the one hand, and its
shareholders and third persons on the other, the corporation looks only to its books for the purpose of
determining who its shareholders are. It is only when the transfer has been recorded in the stock and
transfer book that a corporation may rightfully regard the transferee as one of its stockholders. From this
time, the consequent obligation on the part of the corporation to recognize such rights as it is mandated
by law to recognize arises.
Nonetheless, in Lanuza v. Court of Appeals,[38] the Court has underscored that the STB is not the
exclusive evidence of the matters and things that ordinarily are or should be written therein, for parol
evidence may be admitted to supply omissions from the records, or to explain ambiguities, or to
contradict such records, to wit:

x x x [A] stock and transfer book is the book which records the names and addresses of all stockholders
arranged alphabetically, the installments paid and unpaid on all stock for which subscription has been
made, and the date of payment thereof; a statement of every alienation, sale or transfer of stock made,
the date thereof and by and to whom made; and such other entries as may be prescribed by law. A
stock and transfer book is necessary as a measure of precaution, expediency and convenience since it
provides the only certain and accurate method of establishing the various corporate acts and
transactions and of showing the ownership of stock and like matters. However, a stock and transfer
book, like other corporate books and records, is not in any sense a public record, and thus is not
exclusive evidence of the matters and things which ordinarily are or should be written therein. In fact, it
is generally held that the records and minutes of a corporation are not conclusive even against the
corporation but are prima facie evidence only, and may be impeached or even contradicted by other
competent evidence. Thus, parol evidence may be admitted to supply omissions in the records or
explain ambiguities, or to contradict such records. (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering that Abra Valley’s STB was not in the possession of the petitioners, or at their disposal, they
could not be reasonably expected or justly compelled to prove that their stock subscriptions and
purchases were recorded therein. This, more than any other, was precisely why they filed their Motion
for Production/Inspection of Documents[39] to compel the respondents to produce the STB, but the RTC
did not act on the motion.

Unfortunately, the CA concurred with the RTC’s inaction on the ground that “the Stock and Transfer Book
is one of the corporate books which may be examined only by a stockholder-of-record.”[40]

In our view, the CA thereby grossly erred. The rules of discovery, including Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules
of Court[41] governing the production or inspection of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things not privileged, which contain or constitute
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in the other party’s possession,
custody or control, are to be accorded broad and liberal interpretation.[42] In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
[43] the Court has dwelt on the breadth of discovery in the following tenor:

What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the
preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts;
those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location
of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, the “deposition-discovery rules are to be
accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve
to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all
the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may
compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery
procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to
the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise,”...

In light of the foregoing, the RTC should have favorably acted on the petitioners’ Motion for
Production/Inspection of Documents in order to enable the petitioners, consistent with the recognized
privileges and disabilities, to enable them to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
to be determined in Special Civil Action Case No. 2070, and thereby prevent the trial from being carried
on in the dark, at least from their side.[44] Doing so would not have caused any prejudice to the
respondents, for, after all, even had the petitioners not filed the Motion for Production/Inspection of
Documents, the respondents would themselves also be expected to produce the STB in court in order to
substantiate their affirmative defense that the petitioners were not stockholders-of-record of Abra
Valley. Verily, that there was no entry or record in the STB showing the petitioners to be stockholders of
Abra Valley was no valid justification for the respondents not to produce the same. Otherwise, the
disputable presumption under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that “evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced” could arise against them.

For sure, the transfer of shares in favor of the petitioners was made through the indorsement by the
original holders who were presumably the registered owners of the shares, coupled with the delivery of
the stock certificates. Such procedure conformed to Section 63 of the Corporation Code. Although Abra
Valley did not yet recognize such stock purchases until the surrender of the stock certificates to the
corporate secretary to enable the latter to exercise the ministerial duty of recording the transfers,[45]
there was no way of avoiding or evading the production of the STB in court on the part of the
respondents. The STB would definitely be relevant and necessary for the purpose of ascertaining
whether or not the petitioners’ subscriptions to the authorized and unissued capital stock of Abra Valley
had been duly registered.

Lastly, we take notice of the petitioners’ submission of the certification issued on April 3, 2001 by Abra
Valley’s corporate secretary stating that the petitioners were shareholders “as per Records of the Stock
and Transfer Book of the Abra Valley Colleges” belied the respondents’ claim that no entry or record had
been made in the STB.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on June 6, 2012 in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 115203; NULLIFIES and SETS ASIDE the order issued in Special Civil Action Case No. 2070 on June
28, 2010 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Bangued, Abra; DECLARES the petitioners as
stockholders of respondent Abra Valley Colleges, Inc.; ORDERS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in
Bangued, Abra TO REINSTATE Special Civil Action Case No. 2070, and TO RESUME its proceedings therein;
and DIRECTS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

TRAVEL ON V. CA

210 SCRA 351

FACTS:

Petitioner was a travel agency involved in ticket sales on a commission basis for and on behalf of
different airline companies. Miranda has a revolving credit line with the company. He procured
tickets on behalf of others and derived commissions from it.

Petitioner filed a collection suit against Miranda for the unpaid amount of six checks. Petitioner
alleged that Miranda procured tickets from them which he paid with cash and checks but the checks
were dishonored upon presentment to the bank. This was being refuted by Miranda by saying

that he actually paid for his obligations, even in the excess. He argued that the checks were for
accommodation purposes only. The company needed to show to its Board of Directors that its
accounts receivable was in good standing. The RTC and CA held Miranda not to be liable.

HELD:

Reliance by the lower and appellate court on the company’s financial statements were wrong, to
see if Miranda was liable or not. This financial statements were actually not updated to show that there
was indebtedness on the part of Miranda. The best evidence that the courts should have looked
at were the checks itself. There is a prima facie presumption that a check was issued for valuable
consideration and the provision puts the burden upon the drawer to disprove this presumption.
Miranda was unable to relieve himself of this burden.

Only clear and convincing evidence and not mere self-serving evidence of drawer can rebut this
presumption. The company was entitled to the benefit conferred by the statutory provision.
Miranda failed to show that the checks weren’t issued for any valuable consideration. The checks were
clear by stating that the company was the payee and not a mere accommodated party. And
also, notice was given to the fact that the checks were issued after a written demand by the
company regarding Miranda’s unpaid liabilities.

Presentation of Evidence (Rule 132)

A. Examination of witness

People v. Alma Bisda, G.R. No. 140895, July 17, 2003;

[G.R. No. 140895. July 17, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALMA BISDA y GAUPO and GENEROSA JENNY ROSE BASILAN y
PAYAN, appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before this Court on automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina
City, Branch 272, convicting appellants Alma Bisda and Generosa Jenny Rose Basilan, of kidnapping for
ransom; sentencing each of them to the extreme penalty of death by lethal injection, and ordering them
to indemnify the parents of the victim Angela Michelle Soriano the amount of P100,000 as moral
damages, and to pay the costs of the suit.

The Case

In an Amended Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-2647-MK, the appellants were charged
with the felony of kidnapping for ransom committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd of September 1998, in the City of Marikina, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, did there and then willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly kidnap, detain and
deprive ANGELA MICHELLE SORIANO y SAN JUAN of her liberty for six (6) days for the purpose of
extorting ransom from her/or her family.

Contrary to law.[2]

When arraigned, the appellants, assisted by counsel, entered separate pleas of not guilty.[3]

The Evidence for the Prosecution[4]

William Soriano, a training consultant by profession, and his wife Marymae Soriano, had two children:
Kathleen Denise and Angela Michelle. They rented a house at No. 5 Col. Divino St., Concepcion,
Marikina. Their landlady who lived nearby had a telephone with number 942-49-18.[5] During the school
year 1997-1998, then five-year-old Angela was in Prep at the Mother of Divine Providence School in
Marikina Heights, Marikina City. The couple employed Lea and Wendy Salingatog as the yayas of their
children. Angela met appellant Jenny Rose Basilan when the latter visited her niece Wendy in the Soriano
residence. Jenny Rose was, thus, no stranger to Angela.

About 11:00 a.m. on September 3, 1998, Angelas classes had just ended and she was on her way to her
school bus which was parked outside the school campus near the exit gate. She was in her school
uniform and wore black shoes. Unknown to Angela, appellants Alma and Jenny Rose were outside of the
school gate waiting for her. When they saw Angela, Alma and Jenny Rose proceeded to the gate and
showed a visitors gate pass to the security guard. They approached the young girl, and told her that her
parents were waiting for her at the Jollibee Restaurant. Angela initially refused to go with the two
women, but because Alma held on to her hand so tightly and poked a knife at her, Angela had no choice
but to go with them. They rode a tricycle and went to the Jollibee Restaurant where Jenny Rose ordered
spaghetti for Angela. When Angela did not see her parents, she wondered why she went with Jenny Rose
and Alma in the first place. With Angela in tow, Alma and Jenny Rose boarded a white taxi and went to a
dirty house where they changed Angelas clothes. The girl was made to wear blouse and shorts, yellow t-
shirt and a pair of panties.[6] Alma and Jenny Rose took her earrings. They fed her with the spaghetti
they earlier bought at the restaurant. Alma then left, leaving Angela and Jenny Rose in the house.

Jenny Rose sent Angela to sleep, and after a while, Alma returned. When Angela woke up, Alma and
Jenny Rose served her merienda and allowed her to watch television. Henceforth, Angela was kept in the
house. At one time, Alma and Jenny Rose tied up Angelas hands and feet, and placed scotch tape on her
mouth. Angela was sometimes left alone in the house but the door was kept locked. To pass the time,
Angela watched television and made drawings. Jenny Rose and Alma did not fail to feed and bathe
Angela. Angela did not call her parents through the telephone number of their landlady.
In the meantime, when William arrived home shortly before noon on that day, Lea and Wendy told him
that Angela had not yet arrived home from school. He rushed to the school to fetch Angela, but was
informed by the school security guard that his daughter had already been picked up by two women, one
of whom was registered in the visitors slip as Aileen Corpuz. Because he did not know anyone by that
name, William immediately proceeded to the registrars office to verify the information, only to find out
that Aileen Corpuz had earlier inquired at the said office about the possibility of transferring Angela to
another school. The school staff panicked when William demanded to know how unknown persons were
able to get his daughter. He then started calling his friends and relatives to help him locate Angela. He
also sought the help of Rizza Hontiveros, a TV personality who promised to relay his plea to the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). The school staff also reported the incident to the
Marikina Police Force which dispatched a team of investigators to the Soriano residence.[7]

When apprised of the incident, the PAOCTF organized a team headed by then Chief Inspector Ricardo
Dandan with SPO4 Tito Tuanggang, SPO1 Charles Larroza and civilian agent George Torrente, as
members, to conduct surveillance operations and to recover the victim and arrest the culprits. The team
proceeded to the Soriano residence and to Angelas school to conduct an initial investigation.

At about 6:00 a.m. on September 4, 1998, Williams landlady went to his apartment to tell him that a lady
had called up earlier and left a message for him: Pakisabi na lang kay Mr. Soriano na kakausapin ko siya
bukas ng umaga. When the landlady asked who the caller was, the voice replied, Hindi na importante
iyon.[8] William thereafter convinced his landlady to have her telephone set transferred to his residence
to facilitate communication with his daughters abductors.[9]

Shortly before midnight that same day, George arrived at the Soriano residence and asked William if the
kidnapper had already made contact. William responded that a woman had earlier called, through his
landlady. George then instructed William to prolong the conversation should the kidnapper call again, to
enable the agents to establish the possible location of the caller.[10]

On September 5, 1998 at around 9:25 p.m., William received a call from an unidentified woman who told
him, Kung gusto mo pang makita yong anak mo, maghanda ka ng five million pesos. He replied, Saan
naman ako kukuha ng five million? Alam mo naman na nakatira lang ako sa apartment. The caller said,
Hindi ko masasagotyan. Tatanungin ko na lang sa aking mga boss. William informed George of his
conversation with the caller. George relayed the information by means of a hand-held radio to the other
PAOCTF operatives standing by.[11]

On September 7, 1998, at about 11:25 a.m., Marymae received a telephone call from a woman
demanding for ransom money. The caller called two more times, at 7:00 p.m. and at 9:26 p.m. Marymae
pleaded with the caller to reduce the ransom money to P25,000, or if that was not possible, to an
amount not exceeding P50,000. The caller said, Hindi ko masasagot iyan. Dadaihin na lang namin ang
bata sa boss namin. Marymae relayed the conversation to William, their other daughter Kathleen and to
George.[12]

At about noon that day, PAOCTF Chief of Operations Superintendent Michael Ray Aquino received a call
from an anonymous source informing him that a woman who had talked about a ransom and had acted
in a suspicious manner was spotted at the MSC Freight Service office located at No. 1303 Paz Street,
Paco, Manila. Acting on the information, Ricardo, Charles, Tito and other PAOCTF operatives swooped
down on the place and saw a woman, who turned out to be Alma Bisda, emerging from a small house at
No. 1258 Paz Street, some fifty meters or so away from the said office. She had just bought food from an
adjacent store at No. 1246 Paz Street, Paco, Manila. Surveillance operations were thereafter conducted.

At about 3:40 p.m. on September 8, 1998, George and Charles were at the Soriano residence. Ricardo
and Tito were in the periphery of Almas house, monitoring her whereabouts and movements. Alma
again left her house and after locking the door, went to the small store nearby. She lifted the telephone
and called someone. The telephone in the Soriano residence rang. When William lifted the receiver, he
heard a voice similar to that of the woman who had called him the first time. The caller was asking
where the money was. William told her that the P25,000 was ready, to which she replied, Hindi ko
masasagot iyan, dadalhin na lang namin ang bata sa aking boss. William told the caller that he was
willing to give P50,000 but pleaded that he be given ample time to produce the money. The woman
reiterated: Hindi ko masasagot iyan.[13]

Ricardo and Tito heard the sound of a car horn blowing while Alma was using the telephone. Tito called
up Charles and inquired whether he (Charles) heard the same sound while William was talking to the
caller. After William hung up the telephone, he told George that he could hear the horn off a car blowing
in the background. George then called up Ricardo by phone and relayed the information. When George
inquired if Ricardo heard the sound of the horn of a car while Alma was talking over the telephone,
Ricardo replied in the affirmative. The PAOCTF operatives concluded that Alma was the kidnapper.

After making the call, Alma hung up the telephone and returned to her house. The PAOCTF operatives
followed. When Alma unlocked the door to the house, the operatives accosted her. She tried to escape,
to no avail. Tito heard the cry of a child coming from inside the house, pleading for help: Tita ilabas mo
ako![14] He rushed to the house and saw the victim Angela. He then carried her outside to safety. The
agents searched the house for evidence and found a pair of black shoes, a pair of panties, a yellow shirt,
a set of blouse and shorts with red, yellow and white stripes. The evidence was placed in a plastic bag.
[15] The victim and the suspects were thereafter brought to the PAOCTF office for proper
documentation.
When informed that his daughter had already been rescued, William rushed to the PAOCTF
headquarters where he and Angela were reunited. Angela identified Alma as her kidnapper. When
William asked Alma why she kidnapped Angela and what she would do with the one-million-peso
ransom she was demanding, she replied: Kuya, wag kang maghusga, pareho lang tayong biktima. When
William asked Alma: Biktima, saan? Alma replied: Ang anak ko, kinidnap din nila.[16]

Chief Inspector Dandan turned over to Evidence Custodian P02 Joseph Bagsao, the pieces of evidence
contained in a blue Shoe Mart (SM), plastic bag which the operatives found in Almas house: a pair of
black shoes, a pair of panties, a yellow shirt, a set of white blouse and shorts with red, yellow and white
stripes, all of which were sized to fit a child of 4 to 7 years of age.[17]

On October 19, 1998, an Information for kidnapping for ransom was filed against Alma and Jane Doe.

On October 26, 1998, at around 11:00 a.m., Jenny Rose arrived at the PAOCTF Headquarters in Camp
Crame, and proceeded to P02 Joseph Bagsaos office where she announced that she was one of Almas
cohorts. P02 Bagsao took Jenny Roses fingerprints and entered the data in a fingerprint index card.[18]
Jenny Rose was thereafter placed in a police line-up. Angela, who arrived at the PAOCTF office with her
father, identified Jenny Rose as one of her kidnappers. Police Chief Inspector Atty. Aurelio C. Trampe, Jr.,
the Legal and Investigation Division Chief of the PAOCTF, later referred Jenny Rose to the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Marikina City, for preliminary investigation.[19]

The prosecutor later amended the Information by deleting the name Jane Doe and substituting the
name Jenny Rose Basilan y Payan as the second accused.

Almas Evidence

Alma denied having kidnapped Angela for ransom. She testified that she was married, and a resident of
Block 38, Lot 38, G. Maliputo Street, Phase II, Area 4, Kaunlaran Village, Navotas, Metro Manila. She was
a businesswoman who ran a local employment agency for household help. She was also engaged in the
business of buying and selling palay grains. Her local employment agency was located in Navotas. She
had another office at No. 1258 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, which served as a bodega for items she sent to
the province, as well as items she purchased. She had an adopted daughter named Mary Rose, who, in
September 1998, studied at Harris School in Antipolo. She had employed Wendy Salingatog for a time as
the yaya of her adopted daughter. Alma was then residing in V. Luna Street, Quezon City.
Alma employed Jenny Rose as secretary in her employment agency. In payment for services rendered,
Jenny Rose was sent to school at the Lyceum of the Philippines to study B.S. Business Administration. She
was also given an allowance.

In September 1998, Alma was looking for a school run by nuns that would be willing to accept her
adopted daughter in the middle of the school year. Jenny Rose suggested the Divine Providence School
in Marikina City. In the morning of September 3, 1998, Jenny Rose brought her to the said school. They
proceeded to the administration office where Alma inquired if the school would allow her adopted
daughter to enroll. When Jenny Rose and Alma were about to leave, a little girl, who turned out to be
Angela, approached them and asked what Jenny Rose was doing in her school. Jenny Rose introduced
Angela to Alma as her niece, and informed Alma that she would be bringing Angela with her to her
boarding house in Espaa Street.

At that point, Alma asked Jenny Rose and Angela if they wanted to eat. When they agreed, the three of
them proceeded to the Jollibee Restaurant near the Meralco office in Marikina City. After eating, Alma
bade them goodbye and was about to leave for her office when Jenny Rose asked if she and Angela could
come along with her to Cubao. She acceded to the request, and they rode a Tamaraw FX taxi. Because
Angela was getting sleepy, Alma offered to bring them to Jennys boarding house in Espaa, and dropped
them off there. Alma thereafter proceeded to her office at 1258 Paz St., Paco, Manila, where she had
been holding office since January 1997, and arrived thereat at about 2:00 p.m.

At or about 8:00 p.m. of the same day, Alma passed by Jenny Roses boarding house to give her
instructions on what to do the following day. She saw Angela crying profusely. She told Jenny Rose to
bring Angela home, but Jenny Rose told her that Angelas parents would be coming to fetch her. Thinking
that Angela was probably bored, Alma suggested that they stay in her office in Paco so that they could
watch television while waiting for Angelas parents. Jenny Rose agreed. They arrived at the said office at
around 8:40 p.m. Alma left at around 10:00 p.m. and went home to her rented house in Palmera Homes,
Antipolo, where she stayed until September 6, 1998.

On September 7, 1998, at around 12:00 noon, Alma arrived at her office in Paco, Manila, and found that
Jenny Rose and Angela were still there. Jenny Rose assured Alma that Angela would be fetched by her
parents. At around 4:00 p.m., Alma instructed Jenny Rose to go to the province to collect some debts,
Jenny Rose left for the province on the same day. Alma stayed in the office because she was having her
menstrual period at the time and was not feeling well. She took care of Angela while Jenny Rose was
away.

The next day, September 8, 1998, Alma was still in her office with Angela. At about 3:00 p.m., while she
was watching television with Angela, someone knocked at the door. When she opened it, two male
persons entered. One of them was Inspector Ricardo Dandan who showed her a photograph of Angela
and asked if she knew the child. Alma answered in the affirmative. Ricardo then asked her, Dont you
know that this is kidnapping? to which Alma replied, I do not know. She also told Dandan that she did
not know what was happening to her. Suddenly, Alma was handcuffed. Angela cried and asked Alma:
What are they doing to you, Tita? She was brought to Camp Crame where she was interrogated and
detained. Alma did not make any telephone calls that day. William, Marymae and Angela arrived at
Almas detention cell. When Angela saw her, the girl tried to run to Alma but William held on to his
daughter. William asked Alma why she took Angela, Alma replied that it was Jenny Rose who brought the
girl along with them. She told William that they were both victims.

Sometime on October 26, 1998, Jenny Rose visited Alma to ask for forgiveness and to assume full
responsibility for the incident. Jenny Rose also informed her that she wanted to ask forgiveness from the
Sorianos so that she could finish her schooling. It was only then that she realized what Jenny Rose had
done to her. Nevertheless, she still believed that Jenny Rose was a good person. She advised her to go
home and continue with her studies.

When Angelas sworn statement was shown to her, Alma noticed that Angela did not mention Jenny Rose
as one of the two persons who had kidnapped her. Alma executed a handwritten statement denying the
truth of the contents of Angelas affidavit.[20]

Jenny Roses Evidence

Jenny Rose did not testify in her defense. She presented Atty. Aurelio Trampe, Jr. as her witness who
testified[21] that he was the Legal and Investigation Division Chief of the PAOCTF. On October 26, 1998,
he interviewed Jenny Rose when the latter surrendered to the task force. Jenny Rose insisted that she
wanted to help Alma and get all the blame for the kidnapping. She wanted to admit her participation in
the crime, and volunteered the information that she and Alma kidnapped Angela. Atty. Trampe, Jr. wrote
a letter[22] to the Department of Justice requesting for her inclusion in the ongoing preliminary
investigation. He believed that it would be more appropriate for the prosecutor handling the case to
investigate and determine whether Jenny Rose was the Jane Doe referred to in the complaint. Atty.
Trampe, Jr. admitted, however, that aside from the voluntary surrender of Jenny Rose, he did not have
any other evidence to include her as one of the suspects in the case. Further, he did not provide a lawyer
for Jenny Rose because he did not intend to conduct an exhaustive interrogation, and he knew that even
if she admitted her participation, the statement would not be admitted as evidence.[23]

Jenny Rose adduced in evidence the letter of Atty. Trampe, Jr. to prove that she voluntarily surrendered
and that there was lack of evidence against her.

On September 16, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused ALMA BISDA y GAUPO and GENEROSA
BASILAN y PAYAN are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and is
sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of DOUBLE DEATH by lethal injection, the two accused having
conspired in the commission thereof. They are further ordered to pay solidarily the parents of the victim
the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages, and costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[24]

The assigned errors ascribed by the appellants to the trial court may be synthesized, thus: (a) the trial
court erred in convicting the appellants of kidnapping; (b) the trial court erred in sentencing the
appellants to double death.[25] The Court will delve into and resolve the issues simultaneously.

The prosecution adduced

proof beyond reasonable

doubt that the appellants

kidnapped the victim.

The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to muster proof, beyond reasonable doubt that, they
kidnapped and illegally detained Angela. Angela in fact voluntarily went with them, and she was free to
roam around the house, and to call her parents through the telephone of their landlady which Angela
knew by heart.

There is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants conspired to kidnap Angela. Appellant
Bisda avers that she is guilty only of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code
because (a) Angela stayed in her office for only three days; and (b) the circumstance of a female offender
and a female offended party is not one of those included in the definition of kidnapping or serious illegal
detention under Article 267 of the RPC.
The trial courts reliance on Angelas testimony is misplaced because the records do not show that Angela
had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong when she testified in open court. The appellants point
out that she was merely six years old at the time. Although Angela took an oath before she testified, the
trial judge failed to ask any questions to determine whether or not she could distinguish right from
wrong, and comprehend the obligation of telling the truth before the court. Hence, one of the standards
in determining the credibility of a child witness was not followed. There is, thus, a veritable doubt that
Angela told the truth when she testified.

Moreover, Angelas testimony is, besides being inconsistent on material points, contrary to ordinary
human experience. Angela did not shout or cry when she was forced to leave the school premises and
brought to the Jollibee Restaurant. Angela could have easily sought help from the security guard at the
exit gate of the school and from the customers in the restaurant, or even from the tricycle and taxi
drivers; but Angela did not. Angela even admitted that she voluntarily went with the appellants. She did
not cry while detained in the office of appellant Bisda, and even admitted that it was only that time
when she was rescued that she cried. The conduct of Angela, the appellants insist, is contrary to ordinary
human experience, knowledge and observation. By her own admission in her sworn statement[26] to
the PAOCTF agents, Angela was assisted by her parents while she was giving the said statement. This
raised doubts as to the veracity of her testimony.

The contentions of the appellants are bereft of merit.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 reads:

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death.

I. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if
threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture
or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As amended by RA No. 7659).[27]

For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention, the prosecution is burdened
to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely, (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the
act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the
following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it
is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, female, or a public officer.[28] If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor,
the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for
the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.[29] The word female in
paragraph 1(4) of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code refers to the gender of the victim and not of the
offender.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty under any of the
above-mentioned circumstances, coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the
same.[30] There must be a purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim
because taking coupled with intent completes the offense.[31] Kidnapping which involves the detention
of another is by its nature a continuing crime.[32]

The victims lack of consent is also a fundamental element of kidnapping. The involuntariness of the
seizure and detention is the very essence of the crime.[33] The general rule is that the prosecution is
burdened to prove lack of consent on the part of the victim. However, where the victim is a minor
especially if she is only five years old, lack of consent is presumed. She is incompetent to assent to
seizure and illegal detention.[34] In this case, Angela was merely five years old when she was kidnapped;
thus incapable of giving consent. The consent of such child could place the appellants in no better
position than if the act had been done against her will. The appellants cannot rely on Angelas initial
willingness to go along with them to the restaurant. As Judge Shepherd stated in State v. Chisenhall:[35]
It is clear that the consent of the child, obtained by means of persuasion, is no defense, since the result
of such persuasion is just as great an evil as if it had been accomplished by other means.

A kidnapper should not be rewarded with an acquittal simply because she is ingenious enough to
conceal her true motive from her victim until she is able to transport the latter to another place.

Although Angela was free to roam around in the dirty house, to draw and to watch television during the
entire period of her detention, and was regularly fed and bathed, the appellants are nevertheless guilty
of kidnapping and illegally detaining the five-year-old child. As Judge McGill of the United States Court of
Appeals said in United States v. McCabe[36],to accept a childs desire for food, comfort as the type of will
or consent contemplated in the context of kidnapping would render the concept meaningless.

In People v. Baldogo,[37] this Court held that illegal serious detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended, includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of her
liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It includes a situation where the victim cannot
go out of the place of confinement or detention or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move.[38] In
this case, the door to the office of appellant Bisda was locked while Angela was detained therein. Even if
she wanted to escape and go home, Angela, at her age, could not do so all by herself. During the period
of her confinement, Angela was under the control of the appellants. The helpless child was waiting and
hoping that she would be brought home, or that her parents would come and fetch her.

The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants conspired to kidnap and
illegally detain Angela. The appellants testimonies even buttressed the testimonies of both the victim
and the other witnesses for the prosecution.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it.[39] In People v. Pagalasan,[40] this Court held that conspiracy
need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and
design.[41] Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues
until the object of it has been accomplished unless abandoned or broken up.[42] To hold an accused
guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[43] There must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[44]
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the
execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not
intended as part of the original design.[45] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the
accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident
to and growing out of the purpose intended.[46] Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly
produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result.
[47] Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically
and substantively from that which they intended to commit.[48] As Judge Learned Hand put it in United
States v. Andolscheck,[49] when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he
takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes
as he understands them.

The appellants enveigled Angela into going with them by telling her that her parents were waiting for her
at the Jollibee Restaurant. Appellant Bisda poked a knife at Angela and held her hands so tightly that the
helpless child had no recourse but to come along. The appellants transported Angela on board a taxi and
brought her to Cubao, and then to appellant Bisdas office at No. 1258 Paz St., Paco, Manila. The
appellants tied her hands, covered her mouth with scotch tape, and detained her from September 3,
1998 until September 8, 1998, when she was providentially rescued by the operatives of the PAOCTF.

The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellants before, during and after the kidnapping
and the illegal detention of Angela constitute indubitable proof that the appellants conspired with each
other to attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap Angela and detain her illegally. The appellants are
thus principals by direct participation in the kidnapping of Angela and illegally detaining her.

Appellant Basilan cannot escape conviction for the crime charged on her barefaced claim that she merely
accompanied appellant Bisda to the latters office with the victim in tow. The records show that the
appellant presented as her sole witness Atty. Aurelio Trampe, Jr., then PAOCTF Legal and Investigation
Division Chief, who testified that when she surrendered to him, the appellant admitted that she and
appellant Bisda had kidnapped Angela:

ATTY. SALAMERA:

This court would like to be cleared (sic). Did she admit to you the condition of the alleged kidnapping on
September 3, 1998?

WITNESS:
She volunteered that statement that she was together with Ms. Alma Besda (sic) kidnap (sic) Angela
Michelle Soriano.[50]

The appellants contention that the prosecution failed to establish that Angela understood the nature of
an oath and the need for her to tell the truth must fail.

Section 1, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of evidence provides that the examination of witnesses shall be
under oath or affirmation:[51]

SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated
to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given
orally. (1a).[52]

An oath is defined as an outward pledge, given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is
made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God.[53] The object of the rule is to affect the
conscience of the witness and thus compel him to speak the truth, and also to lay him open to
punishment for perjury in case he willfully falsifies.[54] A witness must be sensible to the obligation of an
oath before he can be permitted to testify.[55] It is not, however, essential that he knows how he will be
punished if he testify falsely.[56] Under modem statutes, a person is not disqualified as a witness simply
because he is unable to tell the nature of the oath administered to a witness.[57] In order that one may
be competent as a witness, it is not necessary that he has a definite knowledge of the difference
between his duty to tell the truth after being sworn and before, or that he be able to state it, but it is
necessary that he be conscious that there is a difference.[58] It cannot be argued that simply because a
child witness is not examined on the nature of the oath and the need for her to tell the whole truth, the
competency of the witness and the truth of her testimony are impaired. If a party against whom a
witness is presented believes that the witness is incompetent or is not aware of his obligation and
responsibility to tell the truth and the consequence of him testifying falsely, such party may pray for
leave to conduct a voire dire examination on such witness to test his competency.[59] The court may
motu proprio conduct the voir dire examination. In United States v. Buncad,[60] this Court held that
when a child of tender age is presented as a witness, it is the duty of the judge to examine the child to
determine his competency. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[61] this Court held that:

[W]hen a witness is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party to object to his
examination on the ground of incompetency to testify. If a party knows before trial that a witness is
incompetent, objection must be made before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be
made before he has given any testimony; if the incompetency appears on the trial, it must be interposed
as soon as it becomes apparent.[62]

The competency of a person to take the prescribed oath is a question for the trial court to decide.[63]

If a party admits proof to be taken in a case without an oath, after the testimony has been acted upon by
the court, and made the basis of a judgment, such party can no longer object to the admissibility of the
said testimony.[64] He is estopped from raising the issue in the appellate court. This was the ruling of
this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[65] thus:

Simply put, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time such evidence is
offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility becomes apparent, otherwise the
objection will be considered waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as
competent and admissible evidence. The failure of petitioner to interpose a timely objection to the
presentation of Divinaflors testimony results in the waiver of any objection to the admissibility thereof
and he is therefore barred from raising said issue on appeal.

In this case, Angela was six years old when she testified.[66] She took an oath to tell the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth before she testified on direct examination. There was nary a whimper of
protest or objection on the part of the appellants to Angelas competence as a witness and the
prosecutions failure to propound questions to determine whether Angela understood her obligation and
responsibility of telling the truth respecting the matter of her testimony before the court. The appellants
did not even bother requesting the trial court for leave to conduct a voir dire examination of Angela.
After the prosecution terminated its direct examination, the appellants thereafter cross-examined
Angela extensively and intensively on the matter of her testimony on direct examination. It was only in
this Court that the appellants raised the matter for the first time, that there was failure on the part of the
prosecution to examine Angela on the nature of her oath, and to ascertain whether she had the capacity
to distinguish right from wrong. It is too late in the day for the appellants to raise the issue.

The determination of the competence and capability of a child as a witness rests primarily with the trial
judge.[67] The trial court correctly found Angela a competent witness and her testimony entitled to full
probative weight. Any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if she can perceive and
perceiving, can make known to others, and that she is capable of relating truthfully facts for which she is
examined.[68] In People v. Mendiola,[69] this Court found the six-year-old victim competent and her
testimony credible. Also in Dulla v. Court of Appeals,[70] this Court gave credence to the testimony of a
three-year-old victim. It has been the consistent ruling of the Court that the findings of facts of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof,
as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded by the appellate courts high respect if
not conclusive effect absent clear and convincing evidence that the trial court ignored, misconstrued, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which if considered warrants a reversal or modification of
the outcome of the case.[71] In this case, the Court finds no basis to deviate from the findings and
conclusions of the trial court on the competency of Angela, and the probative weight of her testimony.

Appellants must come to grips with case law that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and
credit. The testimony of children of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of
older persons.[72] In People vs. Alba,[73] this Court ruled that children of sound mind are likely to be
more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older persons, and their testimonies
are likely more correct in detail than that of older persons. Angela was barely six years old when she
testified. Considering her tender years, innocent and guileless, it is incredible that Angela would testify
falsely that the appellants took her from the school through threats and detained her in the dirty house
for five days. In People v. Dela Cruz,[74] this Court also ruled that ample margin of error and
understanding should be accorded to young witnesses who, much more than adults, would be gripped
with tension due to the novelty and the experience in testifying before the trial court.

The credibility of Angela and the verisimilitude of her testimony is not impaired by her failure to shout
for help when the appellants took her, or to make any attempt to call her parents or to escape from her
captors and to use the telephone to call her parents. At five years old, she could not be expected to act
and react to her kidnapping and detention like an adult should. She did not shout and seek help from the
school security guards because the appellants told Angela that her parents were waiting for her.
Appellant Basilan was the niece of Angelas yaya. She then believed that nothing was amiss. It was only
when she failed to see her parents that Angela blamed herself for going with the appellants in the first
place.

Atty. Laracas:

Now, they told you that your parents were at Jollibee. When you did not see your parents, what did you
do?

Witness:

I told myself, why did I go with them.

Atty. Laracas:
So you just told that to yourself?

Witness:

Yes, maam.

Atty. Laracas:

So initially, Angela, you are not blaming yourself when you went with Jenny Rose?

Witness:

Yes, maam.[75]

The evidence on record shows that appellant Bisda poked a knife at Angela and her hands were held
tightly by the appellants as they proceeded to the restaurant from the school. Although the Soriano
spouses were by Angelas side when the latter gave her sworn statement[76] in the PAOCTF office, there
is no showing on record that the spouses ever influenced their daughter to prevaricate. Significantly, the
appellants counsel did not even cross-examine Angela on her sworn statement.

In this case, appellant Bisda asserts that Angelas testimony contains four inconsistencies on material
points; hence, is incredible. First, Angela testified on cross-examination that the appellants approached
her but she did not talk to them.[77] In contrast, Angela testified on cross-examination that she saw
appellant Basilan, and talked to her.[78] Second, Angela testified on direct examination that she first
came to know the identities of the kidnappers when she was brought to the dirty house.[79] Angela
contradicted herself when she testified on cross-examination that when she was brought to the said
house, she already knew appellant Basilan.[80] Third, Angela testified on direct examination that she
went with the appellants to the Jollibee Restaurant when they held her hands firmly.[81] On cross-
examination, Angela testified that the appellants threatened her when they kidnapped her by pointing a
knife at her which made her cry.[82] Angela further contradicted herself when she testified on direct
examination that the appellants pointed a knife at her one night.[83] Fourth, Angela said that when she
was in the office of appellant Bisda in Paco, Manila, her feet were tied and her mouth was covered with
scotch tape.[84] However, on cross-examination, Angela revealed that she was free to roam around and
even watched television and made drawings.[85]
Anent the first and second set of inconsistencies adverted to by the appellants, the same pertain only to
minor and peripheral matters and not to the principal occurrence or the elements of the crime charged,
and the positive identification of the appellants. Hence, the credibility of Angela, and that of her
testimony were not impaired by the said inconsistencies.[86] The inscrutable fact is that the appellants
took the victim from the school and detained her at the office of appellant Bisda at No. 1258 Paz St.,
Paco, Manila, until she was rescued. Whether or not Angela talked with the appellants as she was being
brought to the restaurant or that she came to know of the identities of the kidnappers before or when
she was brought to the dirty house, are inconsequential. The overwhelming evidence on record is that
no other than the appellants kidnapped her from her school and illegally detained her from September 3
to 8, 1998. Indeed, when asked to point and identify her kidnappers, Angela did so spontaneously and
positively.[87]

Pros. Junio:

If you see... this Alma Besda (sic), if you will be able to see her again, if you see her again, will you be
able to recognize her?

Witness:

Yes, maam.

Pros. Junio:

Will you point to her.

(The witness is pointing to a lady, seated at the second from the left at the corner at the last seat.)

Court:

Identify yourself.

(The person pointed to, stood up and identified herself as Alma Besda [sic]).
Pros. Junio:

What about Jenny Rose, will you be able to recognize her?

Witness:

Yes, maam.

Pros. Junio:

You point to her Angel.

(The witness is pointing to the first lady seated on the left side)

Court:

Stand up and identify yourself.

The lady stood up and identified herself as Jenny Rose Basilan.[88]

Appellant Basilan did not controvert the evidence of the prosecution that she was the niece of the yaya
of the victim, and that the said appellant, at one time, went to the Soriano residence where Angela saw
and met her. The victim was, thus, acquainted with appellant Basilan even before the kidnapping.

Angela testified on direct examination, thus:

Atty. Junio:

So when Alma and Jenny Rose told you that Mommy and Daddy were at Jollibee, what did you do?
Witness:

I did not want to go with them but they held me firm.

Pros. Junio:

What part of the body did they hold firmly?

Witness:

My hands.

Pros. Junio:

After Alma and Jenny Rose held your hand firmly, what did, where did you go?

Witness:

To Jollibee.[89]

Angela was not asked by the public prosecutor whether or not the appellants threatened her with any
weapon before proceeding to the Jollibee Restaurant. The additional fact was revealed by Angela,
ironically, on cross-examination:

Atty. Salamera:

Now, were you threatened on September 3 at around eleven in the morning when both accused
allegedly abducted you?
Witness:

Yes, sir.

Atty. Salamera:

There are two accused, who threatened you?

Witness:

They pointed knife against me.

Atty. Salamera:

Who pointed the knife upon your person?

Witness:

Alma, sir.

Atty. Salamera:

Did you cry?

Witness:

Yes, sir.

Atty. Salamera:
Did you also cry inside the Jollibee?

Witness:

No, sir.

Atty. Salamera:

Was Alma still holding a knife at the Jollibee?

Witness:

No, sir.[90]

The prosecutor tried on re-direct to take advantage of Angelas revelation but the appellants counsel,
realizing that he had just committed a faux pas, objected to the questions of the public prosecutor. It
turned out that the latter was himself confused because instead of adverting to a knife, as testified to by
Angela, he blurted that appellant Bisda used a gun in intimidating the victim. Even Angela must have
been bewildered by the repartees of the prosecution and the appellants counsel such that, instead of
answering one time, to the questions of the prosecutor, she said one night.

Redirect:

Pros. Junio:

Angel, how many times did Alma and Jenny Rose point a knife at you?

Atty. Salamera:
Objection. Improper at this point in time. First it was not covered.

Pros. Junio:

How many times did Alma point a gun?

Atty. Salamera:

Knife, your Honor.

Pros. Junio:

It was covered on cross.

Court:

Objection denied. Overruled. Witness may answer.

Witness:

One night.[91]

There was, thus, no inconsistency in Angelas testimony on this point.

Angelas hands were tied, and her mouth was covered with scotch tape the day after she was brought to
the dirty house. Angela testified on direct examination, thus:

Pros. Junio:
Okay, where did you go?

Witness:

To the dirty house.

Pros. Junio:

Who was with you or who were with you at that time?

Witness:

Alma Besda (sic) and Jenny Rose, maam.

Pros. Junio:

Where is this dirty house located?

Witness:

I do not know, maam.

Pros. Junio:

Upon arriving at that dirty house, what did you do?

Witness:

They changed my clothes once.

Pros. Junio:

Do you remember the color of the dress?

Witness:

No, maam.

Pros. Junio:

After they changed your dress or your clothes, what happened next? What did they do to you?

Witness:

They fed me, maam.

Pros. Junio:

After they fed you, what did you do?

Witness:

They send (sic) me to sleep.

Pros. Junio:

When you woke up, what did they do to you?

Witness:

They fed me (pinamiryenda) (sic)

Pros. Junio:

After you ate your miryenda (sic) what else did they do to you?

Witness:

They allowed me to watch tv, maam.

Pros. Junio:

What about your hands, your mouth, what did they do?

Witness:

They tied my hands.

Pros. Junio;

And your mouth?

Witness:

It was sealed with scotch tape.

Pros. Junio;
And your feet?

Witness:

They were also tied, maam.

Pros. Junio:

Who tied your hands?

Witness:

The two of them, maam.

Pros. Junio:

Will you mention their names again?

Witness:

Alma Besda (sic) and Jenny Rose.[92]

On cross-examination, Angela testified that on the day she was rescued, she could watch the television,
make drawings and roam around the room:

Atty. Larracas:
You did . . . At that time you were allegedly rescued, Jenny Rose was not at the place where you were
rescued?

Witness:

She was not there, maam.

Atty. Larracas:

All along you were watching tv (sic) at the place where you were taken?

Witness:

Only once, maam.

Atty. Larracas:

And when you were not watching tv (sic), what were you doing Angela in that dirty house?

Witness:

I was drawing, maam.

Atty. Larracas:

So you watched tv once and the rest of the time you were drawing?

Witness:
Yes, maam.

Atty. Larracas:

Of course, you cannot draw if your hands were tied, Angela?

Witness:

Yes, mam.

Atty. Larracas:

So your hands were not tied?

Witness:

No, maam.

Atty. Larracas:

You can move along freely at that time?

Witness:

Yes, maam.

Atty. Larracas:

You can walk?

Witness:

Yes, maam.

Atty. Larracas:

You can drink?

Witness:

Yes, maam.

Atty. Larracas:

Of course, you cannot walk if your feet were tied and cannot drink if your mouth was sealed?

Witness:

Yes, maam.

Atty. Larracas:

When the police arrived, what were you doing?

Witness:

I cried, maam.[93]
It is not quite clear whether the counsel for the appellants were asking about Angelas activities during
her detention, or during her rescue. Taking into account Angelas answers, it is evident that her hands
were tied and her mouth covered with scotch tape the day after she was kidnapped, but that she was
free to roam around the room, practice on her drawings and watch television during the rest of the
period of her detention.

PROPER PENALTIES

The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to prove that in kidnapping and illegally detaining the
victim, they intended to demand ransom from her parents. William Soriano, the victims father, failed to
prove that the appellants or any of them called through the telephone demanding ransom. The
collective testimonies of police operatives Tito Tuanggang, Ricardo Dandan and George Torrente were
hearsay evidence; hence, barren of probative weight. The trial court likewise failed to take into account
the voluntary surrender of appellant Basilan.

The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, posits the view that the prosecution mustered the
requisite quantum of evidence to prove that the appellants and no other demanded ransom from the
parents of the victim.

The appellants contention does not hold water. Admittedly, the prosecution failed to adduce direct
evidence that the appellants demanded ransom for the release of the victim. However, the prosecution
adduced circumstantial evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants, or at least one
of them, demanded ransom from the Soriano spouses for the release of their daughter.

To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
for ransom, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused
to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the
accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for the release of the victim. The purpose of the
offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may be proved by his words and overt
acts before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim.[94] Neither actual demand for
nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed.[95] Ransom as employed in
the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value,
price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment
that releases from captivity.[96] It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to
the kidnapper as a condition for the release of the victim.[97]

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the qualifying circumstance if (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are proven; (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The circumstances proved
should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused to the exclusion of others as the one who demanded ransom. The circumstances proved must
be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and that at the
same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.[98] The prosecution must rely on
the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of that of the appellants.[99]

In this case, the chain of circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution proves that no one other
than the appellants or one of them called up the spouses Soriano through the telephone and demanded
ransom of P5,000,000:

1. Appellant Basilan is the niece of Wendy Salingatog, who was for a time the housemaid of appellant
Bisda;

2. The appellants kidnapped Angela shortly before noon on September 3, 1998, and detained her at No.
1258 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, where appellant Bisda held office;

3. The following morning, William was informed by his landlady that a woman had earlier called up over
the telephone requesting her to inform William that she (the caller), would call again the next day,
September 5, 1998;

4. On September 5, 1998, William received a telephone call from a woman demanding a ransom of
P5,000,000 for Angelas freedom. When William complained that he did not have the amount, she told
William that she cannot be responsible for it and that she would inquire from her bosses. Williams
testimony reads:

Pros. Junio:

And what did she tell you?

Witness:

She told me KUNG GUSTO MO PANG MAKITA IYONG ANAK MO, MAGHANDA KA NG FIVE MILLION
PESOS.
Pros. Junio:

What did you told (sic) her if any?

Witness:

SAAN AKO KUKUHA NG FIVE MILLION PESOS? ALAM MO NAMAN NA NAKATIRA LANG AKO SA
APARTMENT.

Pros. Junio:

What did she say?

Witness:

She answered, HINDI KO MASASAGOT YAN.

Pros. Junio:

Did she tell you why she could not respond to you?

Witness:

She continued to say TATANUNGIN KO NA LANG SA AKING MGA BOSS.[100]

5. In the morning of September 7, 1998, Inspector Ricardo Dandan and SPO4 Tito Tuanggang, acting on
an anonymous tip, rushed to the vicinity of No. 1303 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, the office of the MSC
Freight Service, to conduct surveillance operations. Later in the afternoon, they saw appellant Bisda
emerging from a small house about fifty meters from the office of the MSC Freight Service;
6. At about 3:40 p.m. on September 8, 1998, appellant Bisda emerged from the house at No. 1258 Paz
Street, and went to the small store near the house. Chief Inspector Dandan and Tito Tuanggang were
about two meters from the store and saw appellant Bisda enter the same, lift the telephone and talk to
someone over the telephone;

7. At about the same time, William received a telephone call from a woman demanding where the
money was and when William replied that he was ready with P25,000, the woman replied: Hindi ko
masasagot iyan, dadalhin na lang namin ang bata sa aking boss. When William intimated that he could
raise P50,000 but pleaded for more time to produce the amount, the woman retorted: Hindi ko
masasagot iyan. Williams testimony reads:

Pros. Junio:

On September 8, 1998, at about 3:40 in the afternoon, what happened if any?

Witness:

At around 3:40 in the afternoon of September 8, a lady caller called again. I answered the telephone.

Pros. Junio:

Who was this lady caller?

Witness:

I would say, my perception is it was the same lady caller who called the first time I answered the
telephone.

Pros. Junio:

And what did she tell you?

Witness:

And she told me where is the money.

Pros. Junio:

And what did you tell her?

Witness:

And I also told her if its okey with you, my twenty-five is ready.

Pros. Junio:

Then what did she say?

Witness:

She said HINDI KO MASASAGOT IYAN, DADALIN NA LANG NAMIN ANG BATA SA AKING BOSS.

Pros. Junio:

What happened next after that?

Witness:

I would like to plead that I will make it fifty thousand, just give me ample time.
Pros. Junio:

How did she react to your suggestion?

Witness:

HINDI KO MASASAGOT IYAN. Then she hanged (sic) the phone.[101]

8. After making the telephone call, appellant Bisda left the store and returned to the house at No. 1258
Paz Street, Paco, Manila;

9. The operatives from the PAOCTF followed appellant Bisda and confronted her before she could enter
the house. The operatives then barged into the premises of No. 1258 Paz Street where they saw Angela
in the room;

10. When William arrived at the PAOCTF office, with Angela that day, he inquired from appellant Bisda
why she kidnapped Angela and what she would do with the P5,000,000 ransom she was demanding, and
the appellant replied: Kuya, wag (sic) kang nang maghusga, pareho lang tayong biktima. When William
asked Alma: Biktima, saan? The appellant replied: Ang anak ko, kinidnap din nila.

In light of the foregoing facts, there can be no other conclusion than that appellant Bisda demanded a
ransom of P5,000,000 from William Soriano; hence, she is GUILTY of kidnapping for ransom. Being a
conspirator, appellant Basilan is also guilty of the said crime. The penalty for kidnapping for ransom is
death, a single and indivisible penalty. The aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle under
Article 14, paragraph 20 of the Revised Penal Code was attendant in the commission of the crime.[102]
However, said circumstance, as well as the voluntary surrender of appellant Basilan, are inconsequential
in the penalties to be imposed on the said appellants, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code.[103]

CIVIL LIABILITIES OF THE APPELLANTS

The trial court awarded P100,000 moral damages to the spouses William and Marymae Soriano, the
parents of the victim. The trial court did not award any moral and exemplary damages to the victim. The
decision of the trial court has to be modified. Under Article 2219, paragraph 7, of the New Civil Code,
moral damages may be awarded to a victim of illegal arrest and detention. In this case, the appellants
poked a knife on the victim as they took her from the school. The appellants also tied her hands, and
placed scotch tape on her mouth. The hapless victim was so shocked when operatives of the PAOCTF
barged into the office of appellant Bisda, and took custody of the victim that she cried profusely. The
victim suffered trauma, mental, physical and psychological ordeal. There is, thus, sufficient basis for an
award of moral damages in the amount of P300,000.[104] Since there were demands for ransom, not to
mention the use by the appellants of a vehicle to transport the victim from the school to the Jollibee
Restaurant and to the office of appellant Bisda, the victim is entitled to exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.[105] Although the victim claims that the appellants took her earrings, the
prosecution failed to prove the value of the same.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272,
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellants, Alma Bisda and Generosa Jenny Rose Basilan, are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom under paragraph 4 and the last
paragraph of Article 267, of the Revised Penal Code, and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by
lethal injection. The appellants are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the victim Angela
Michelle Soriano the amount of P300,000 by way of moral damages and P 100,000 by way of exemplary
damages. Costs against the appellants.

Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that Rep. Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

In accordance with Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659 amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal Code, let
the records of this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this Decision, to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of the pardoning power. Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

1. Examination to be done in open court

2. Proceedings to be recorded

3. Rights and obligations of a witness

4. Order in the examination of an individual witness

5. Direct examination  Judicial Affidavit Rule  Efficient Use of Paper Rule

6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent

People v. Fabre, G.R. No. 146697, July 23, 2002;

[G.R. No. 146697. July 23, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE, accused-appellant.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court, Br. VI, of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, of
raping his own daughter Marilou Fabre, and he was sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death.

Fabre was indicted in an Information that read:[1]

That on or about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of April 26, 1995 in the house of the accused located at
Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused by force, threats and intimidation, with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with his own daughter MARILOU FABRE,
a girl thirteen (13) years of age, of good reputation, against her will and consent to the damage and
prejudice of the said victim consisting of moral, actual and compensatory damages.

Accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of
Marilou, that of Adela Fabre, her mother and the wife of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon,
the doctor who examined Marilou, along with the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the
sworn statement of Adela, and the criminal complaint signed by both Marilou and Adela. The defense,
during its turn in the presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the accused himself. It
also called Adela Fabre back to the witness stand.

The trial court gave credence to the evidence given by the prosecution, particularly to the narration of
the young complainant, expressing a quote from an observation once made by this Tribunal in one of its
decision that even when consumed with revenge, it (would) take a certain amount of psychological
depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which (could) put her own father for the rest of his
remaining life in jail and drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame.[2] Convinced that
the accused committed the crime of rape on his own daughter, the trial judge disposed of the case
thusly:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE alias Nardo, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of RAPE as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 Section 11 thereof and hereby imposes upon the
accused Leonardo Fabre y Vicente alias Nardo the penalty of DEATH; to pay the victim Marilou Fabre civil
indemnity in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS and the costs.[3]

In this automatic review, the convicted accused assigned the following alleged errors committed by the
court a quo.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF
ALIBI AND DENIAL.

II

ASSUMING IN ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
IMPOSING THE DEATH SENTENCE UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE ACTUAL AGE OF MARILOU FABRE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION
OF THE ALLEGED RAPE.[4]

The defense argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength
for the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal
evidence. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is
called.[5] The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a
witness made on direct examination.[6] The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any
further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or
thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly,
the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely
because he is not cross-examined by the other party.
The alibi of appellant itself would not appear to be deserving of serious consideration. His account that
at the time of the alleged rape he was working at a coconut plantation, just about one kilometer away
from the place of the crime, hardly would amount to much. Nor would the testimony of Adela Fabre, his
wife, merit any better regard. At first, she testified that on the day of the rape incident, she had left their
house at four oclock in the afternoon. Later, however, she changed her story by saying that she had left
the house in the morning and returned only at ten oclock that same morning, staying home the whole
day thereafter. In any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough for an accused to
prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he would have to demonstrate
likewise that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.[7] Clearly, in the instant case, it was not at all impossible nor even
improbable for appellant to have been at the crime scene.

Upon the other hand, the evidently candid and straightforward testimony of Marilou should be more
than enough to rebut the claim of innocence made by appellant.[8]

On 26 April 1995, around four oclock in the afternoon, Marilou Fabre was alone in their house in
Barangay Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Adela Fabre, her mother, had gone to Purok 4 to buy fish while
her siblings were out strolling. After cleaning their yard, Marilou went to the adjacent palm plantation,
about fourteen to fifteen meters away from their house, to gather palm oil. Marilou had been gathering
palm oil for about a minute when her father, appellant Leonardo Fabre, arrived. He suddenly gripped
Marilous hands and forcibly dragged her towards the house. He closed the door and removed his
daughters underwear. He took off his pants and asked Marilou to hold his sex organ. In tears, Marilou
obeyed her father. He then began touching the girls breasts and vagina. He forced her to lie down,
mounted her and sought to insert his penis into her organ. Marilou cried in pain. When after some time
he still could not insert his penis into Marilous vagina, he applied coconut oil to lubricate his and his
daughters sexual organs. He was finally able to penetrate her. Once inside her, appellant made push and
pull movements until he was through with her. Appellant threatened to kill her if she would tell anybody
about the sexual encounter. The young girls mother, Adela Fabre, arrived home about five oclock that
afternoon but, remembering her fathers threats, she kept mum about her ordeal.

The credibility of Marilou would not be all that difficult to discern from her narration that, as so
described by the prosecution, was full of graphic details which a young provincial girl could not possibly
have concocted and which could only have come from someone who must have personally experienced
a brutal rape assault. She testified:

PROS. ENRIQUEZ:

Q Now, Miss Marilou, can you recall where were you on April 26, 1995 at about 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you that time?

A In our house, sir.

Q What were you doing in your house?

A I was cleaning our yard, sir.

Q How far is your yard where you were doing some works from your house?

A (Witness pointing a distance of around 2 to 3 meters.)

Q Now, while you were doing your work in your yard, can you recall if there was an incident that
occurred?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that incident that occurred?

A While I was gathering a palm oil my father arrived and suddenly dragged me to our house, sir.

COURT:

Q Where is your house located?

A At Purok 4, Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, Your Honor.

PROS. ENRIQUEZ:

Q What did you do when your father dragged you to your house?

A Because I was dragged by my father to our house I just went with him, sir.

Q While you were in your house after having been dragged by your father, what happened if any?

A He closed our house and he removed my panty, sir.

Q And after removing your panty, what did your father do next?

A He removed his pants and he let me hold his penis, sir.

Q And what did you do next after holding his penis?

A I was crying, sir.

Q While you were crying what did your father do?

A He was touching my breast and my vagina, sir.

Q After that what did he do next?

A He let me lie down, sir.

Q And while lying down, what did your father do?

A He mounted me and he inserted his penis, to my vagina, sir.

Q And what did you feel while your father was inserting his penis to your vagina?

A Very painful, sir.

Q And what did you do while your father was inserting his penis to your vagina?

A I was crying, sir.

Q And while you were crying what did your father do if any?

A He told me not to tell anybody because if I will do it he will kill me, sir.

Q Now, did your father find it easy to insert his penis to your vagina?

A It [took] a long time, sir.

Q And did he use anything to facilitate the insertion of his penis to your vagina?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that?

A He used coconut oil in his penis and also in my vagina so that his penis can easily insert my vagina, sir.

Q Now, while his penis was in your vagina, can you tell this Honorable Court if he did anything also on
top of you and while his penis was inside your vagina?
A None, sir.

Q Did he make any movement?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that movement?

A He made a push and pull movement on my body, sir.

Q Now, while your father was doing it to you where was your mother that time?

A She was in Purok 4, Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, sir.

Q And did you report this incident to your mother?

A Not yet sir because he told me not to tell anybody.

Q So when did you had a chance to tell your mother about this incident?

A On May 1, 1995, sir.

Q And what did your mother do after you reported to her this incident?

A She reported [the matter] to the Kagawad, sir.[9]

It has been stressed quite often enough that the testimony of a rape victim, who is young and still
immature, deserves faith and credence[10] for it simply would be unnatural for a young and innocent girl
to invent a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter subject herself
and her family to the trauma of a public trial unless she indeed has spoken the truth.[11] Most
especially, a daughter would not accuse her own father of such a serious offense or allow herself to be
perverted if she were not truly motivated by a desire to seek a just retribution for a violation brazenly
committed against her.[12]

Confirming Marilous story was the medical report and testimony of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the government
physician stationed at the Bunawan District Hospital in Agusan del Sur, who examined Marilou. Dr.
Jalalon made these findings; viz:

Abrasion at (L) labia minora at 3:00 oclock position.

Vaginal smear (-) negative for spermatozoa.[13]

The doctor concluded that it was possible that genital penetration on the victim did occur and that a
penis could have caused the abrasion on the victims labia minora.

There is merit, however, in the plea of the defense, seconded by the prosecution, that the penalty of
death imposed by the trial court should be reduced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, provides:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law-spouse of the parent of the victim.

While the father-daughter relationship between appellant and private complainant has been sufficiently
established, the fact of minority of the victim, although specifically averred in the information, has not
been equally shown in evidence. These qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority are twin
requirements that should be both alleged in the information and established beyond reasonable doubt
during trial in order to sustain an imposition of the death penalty.[14] Neither an obvious minority of the
victim nor the failure of the defense to contest her real age always excuse the prosecution from the
desired proof required by law.[15] Judicial notice of the issue of age without the requisite hearing
conducted under Section 3, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court, would not be considered sufficient
compliance with the law. The birth certificate of the victim or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary
evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records and documents of similar nature, or credible
testimonial evidence, that can help establish the age of the victim should be presented.[16] While the
declaration of a victim as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible
under the rule on pedigree, the question on the relative weight that may be accorded to it is a totally
different matter.[17]

In the case at bar, the complainant claimed that she was 13 years old at the time of the incident.[18] Her
mother stated, however, that she was 14.[19] The birth certificate of the victim, at least already in her
teens, was not presented to ascertain her true age on the bare allegation that the document was lost
when their house burned down.[20] No other document that could somehow help establish the real age
of the victim was submitted.

The Court, in sum, upholds the decision of the trial court convicting Leonardo Fabre of the crime of rape
but must reduce, on account of insufficiency of proof on the qualifying circumstance of minority of the
victim, the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the civil liability, the Court sustains
the award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity but, in keeping with prevailing jurisprudence, must additionally
order the payment of P50,000.00 moral damages[21] and P20,000.00 exemplary damages.[22]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding LEONARDO FABRE guilty of rape is AFFIRMED but
the sentence of death therein imposed should be, as it is hereby so, reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
award of P50,000.00 civil liability in favor of victim, Marilou Fabre, is sustained; however, appellant is
further ordered to pay to the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 moral damages and P20,000.00
exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Acting C.J.), Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., on leave.

7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent

8. Re-cross-examination
9. Recalling witness

People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 125016, May 28, 1999;

[G.R. No. 125016. May 28, 1999]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOMER VELASCO Y PANGILINAN, accused-
appellant.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

Accused-appellant Nomer Velasco y Pangilinan together with Reynaldo Endrina y Roa and Ernesto
Figueroa y Santos were charged with the crime of Murder in an Information filed on March 2, 1994 (and
docketed as Crim. Case No. I.S. Nos. 94B-05391-93) before Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region at Manila. The Information reads as follows:

That on or about February 20, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation and with the use of their superior
strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one DANILO VALENCIA y
MANZANO by then and there stabbing him twice with a bladed weapon at the back and left side of his
body thereby inflicting upon the latter serious mortal stab wounds, which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death thereafter.

Contrary to law.[1]

Upon arraignment on March 16, 1994, all three accused duly assisted by their counsel de parte pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged in the Information.[2]

The testimony of prosecution witness SPO2 Jose Bagkus was dispensed with as the prosecution and
defense agreed to stipulate on the following facts which said witness will be testifying on, to wit:
(1) That SPO2 Jose Bagkus is an investigator assigned to the Crimes against Persons Division, WPDC since
1991;

(2) That on February 21, 1994, he prepared an Advance Information Report regarding the reported
stabbing of a victim who he later identified as one Danilo Valencia and who was allegedly stabbed on
Capulong Extension, Tondo, Manila, on February 20, 1994 between 3:00 to 3:15 a.m.;

(3) That in the course of his investigation, he also prepared an Additional Information Report dated
February 22, 1994; and

(4) That if SP02 Jose Bagkus will take the witness stand, he will testify and affirm the correctness of the
contents of the Advance Information as well as the Additional Information Report.[3]

There being no other facts proposed for further stipulation between the parties, trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.

Pieced together from the testimony of Leonardo Lucaban, the lone eyewitness to the incident, is the
following set of facts:

It appears that at around 3:30 oclock in the morning of February 20, 1994, Leonardo Lucaban, as he was
walking along Capulong Highway, Tondo, Manila, saw a man whom he recognized as Danilo Valencia.[4]
He saw Valencia grab a man.[5] This person was about 54 in height and of medium build[6] and was able
to free himself from Valencias hold.[7]

Danilo Valencia thereafter proceeded on his way. Two people approached him.[8] One of the two was
short but with a big build while the other was tall but of a medium build.[9] The smaller of the two asked
Valencia why he did not shoot the person he (Valencia) had earlier grabbed.[10] Valencia replied, among
other things, that he did not have a gun.[11] He continued to walk away.

The lone eyewitness, Leonardo Lucaban afterwards saw the person who moments ago had been
questioning Valencia follow the latter and stab him at the back.[12] Lucaban was about six (6)
armslength away from the victim.[13] The companion of the assailant confronted Lucaban as he shouted
ilag (duck).[14] Lucaban immediately ran towards a guardhouse.[15] It was there where he heard two
gunshots.[16] He saw the assailant and his companion running towards Happy Land, Tondo, Manila[17]
while the person whom Valencia grabbed was running towards Herbosa St., Tondo, Manila.[18]
The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, to wit: Carmencita Valencia, Dr. Florante Baltazar, SPO2
Alejandro Yanquiling, Jr., and Leonardo Lucaban.

Carmencita Valencia, the wife of the victim, testified that: Leonardo Lucaban went to her house to
inform her that he witnessed the incident; that he told her he will give a statement to the police;[19]
that Lucaban did so on February 22, 1994;[20] that her statement was taken down in writing by the
police;[21] that the reason why her husband was stabbed was because he gave sanctuary and helped a
certain Jude who had snitched on the akyat barko gang;[22] that attempts on the lives of this Jude and
his wife were made;[23] that Nomer Velasco and Reynaldo Endrina were some of the people who were
trying to kill Jude and his wife;[24] that she knows that it was the accused who stabbed her husband
because they have a grudge against him;[25] that she did not actually see that it was the accused who
stabbed her husband;[26] that she was sleeping when she heard her husband calling out to her;[27] that
he asked to be taken to the hospital because he had a wound;[28] that her husband was already dead
when he reached the hospital.[29]

Dr. Florante Baltazar, Medico Legal Officer, conducted the autopsy examination on the cadaver of Danilo
Valencia.[30] He confirmed the injuries sustained by the decedent,[31] the relative positions of the
wounds,[32] the kind of instrument which could have caused the stab wounds,[33] and the cause of
death of the victim.[34]

Leonardo Lucaban when he first testified on November 22, 1994 averred that he cannot remember his
(referring to the person who stabbed Danilo Valencia) face because it was dark[35] contrary to the
positive identification he made of the three accused which were given in his Supplemental Statement
dated February 24, 1994.[36] He likewise testified that because of financial difficulties he could not
appear in court[37] and was only able to go when he was apprehended by the police a day before the
hearing.[38] At first he said that he was not threatened by anybody[39] but later admitted that he was
being threatened by the family of the accused but he was not bothered because he had not pointed to
anyone yet.[40]

The fourth prosecution witness is SPO2 Alejandro Yanquiling, Jr. He was the follow-up investigator in the
stabbing incident of Danilo Valencia. In the course of his investigation he took down the Supplemental
Statement of Leonardo Lucaban;[41] that in a line-up of six persons three (3) persons were identified by
Leonardo Lucaban as the assailants of the victim;[42] that the said persons were Nomer Velasco,
Endrina, and Figueroa;[43] that Lucaban identified these persons in the line-up by touching their right
shoulders;[44] that Lucaban was able to identify the accused without any wavering.[45]
Leonardo Lucaban was thereafter recalled to the witness stand. He testified that he pointed to only one
suspect in the line-up not three as testified to by SP02 Alejandro Yanquiling, Jr.;[46] that the suspect he
pointed to as the assailant of the victim Danilo Valencia is identified as Nomer Velasco;[47] that he saw
the accused Nomer Velasco stab the victim by the light coming from a passing jeepney and after that he
screamed ilag (duck) and he ran away;[48] that he could not see very well the other persons because of
the darkness;[49] that the reason why he denied having pointed to the suspects in the last hearing was
because of a threat he received and that a day before he was apprehended a person named Peter almost
stabbed him because he was nagpapakabayani (pretending to be a hero);[50] that he personally knows
Nomer Velasco because he recruited him before to be one of his workers[51] in the cutting of logs.[52]

The defense denied the accusation and raised the defense of alibi. Aside from accused-appellant Nomer
Velasco three (3) other witnesses were presented. The witnesses and their testimonies consisted of the
following:

(1) Reynaldo Endrina was one of the accused. He testified that he and the other two accused were
neighbors at Happy Land;[53] that they have known each other for, more or less, two years;[54] that he
knows the Spouses Danilo Valencia and Carmencita Valencia;[55] that Danilo Valencia is his compadre
because the former is the godfather of his son;[56] that he was at home sleeping at 3:30 oclock in the
morning of February 20, 1994;[57] that he did not go out of his house on or before 3:30 a.m. of February
20, 1994.[58]

(2) Ernesto Figueroa, the third accused in the case, testified, among other things, that he does not know
the Spouses Danilo and Carmencita Valencia;[59] that he was also at home sleeping on that morning of
February 20, 1994.[60]

(3) Nomer Velasco, the accused-appellant, likewise denied knowing the Spouses Danilo and Carmencita
Valencia[61] and Leonardo Lucaban.[62] He testified that he was also at home sleeping at 3:30 a.m. of
February 20, 1994;[63] that he did not go out of his house prior to or at 3:30 oclock in the morning;[64]
that he and his co-accused were not friends but only acquaintances;[65] that he had last seen his co-
accused in 1993;[66] that he came to know that Danilo Valencia was killed only after he and the other
two accused were apprehended;[67] that it was a police officer who told them to admit that they killed
Danilo Valencia.[68]

(4) Rosemarie Velasco, the wife of Nomer Velasco, corroborated her husbands testimony that he was
sleeping at their house[69] on the morning of February 20, 1994. She testified, among others, that she
had asked Leonardo Lucaban why he should point to her husband as the assailant in the killing of Danilo
Valencia and he told her that he was being threatened by the police;[70] that the scene of the crime
(Capulong Highway) and the residence of the accused at Happy Land are twenty (20) meters apart from
each other.[71]
After the presentation of evidence, the trial court in its decision promulgated on February 19, 1996
found the accused-appellant to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt and ordered the acquittal of
Reynaldo Endrina and Ernesto Figueroa. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING accused Reynaldo Endrina
y Roa, and accused Ernesto Figueroa y Santos for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain their conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Their immediate release from detention is hereby ordered, unless their
continuous confinement is necessitated by other lawful orders.

Accused Nomer Velasco y Pangilinan is hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessory
penalties provided by law. He is also condemned to pay the heirs of victim Danilo Valencia the amount of
P50,000.00 as actual damages and the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs. His immediate
transfer to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa is hereby ordered.

SO ORDERED.[72]

Accused Nomer Velasco comes to this Court on appeal praying that the decision of the trial court be
reversed and set aside and that a new one be entered acquitting him of the charge.

The accused-appellant assigns the following errors in his brief:

I. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT ACCUSED NOMER VELASCO WAS NOT
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE LONE EYEWITNESS, LEONARDO LUCABAN.

II. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RELYING UPON THE TESTIMONY OF LEONARDO LUCABAN,
CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME IS REPLETE WITH INCONSISTENCIES.

III. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO FAVORABLY CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF HEREIN
PETITIONER.

IV. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The contentions are without merit.

In assailing the questioned decision the accused-appellant attacks the credibility of the lone eyewitness
by pointing out that when Leonardo Lucaban first testified on November 22, 1994 he failed to name the
appellant as the assailant even though the latter was in the courtroom at that time.[73] But when he was
recalled to the witness stand three (3) days thereafter or on November 25, 1994, he was able to do so.
[74]

This change of heart by the said witness is attributed by the appellant Nomer Velasco to the former
being thoroughly prepared by the police authorities when he was taken into custody for five (5) days.[75]

Accused-appellant likewise imputes that the physical, emotional and psychological stress consequent to
an apprehension of a prolonged and indefinite detention[76] provoked the witness to testify in the
manner desired by the police or the prosecution if only to win back his life and freedom.[77]

The counsel for accused-appellant is trying to mislead us into thinking that the police authorities had a
hand in the change of the eyewitness earlier testimony just because he was placed under detention. Or
that the arrest was made as a result of a whim.

We find that the deduction arrived at by the appellant is totally baseless. The police apprehended the
eyewitness in compliance with two lawful orders of the trial court. And for the accused-appellant to
impute otherwise is uncalled for, as is the implication that while under their custody the witness was
coached into pointing an accusing finger at Nomer Velasco.

Quoted below in full are the orders of the court a quo dated October 12, 1994 and November 22, 1994
explicitly stating why there was a need for the apprehension of the said witness, to wit:

ORDER

Considering the importance of the prosecutions intended witness Leonardo Lucaban, an eyewitness to
the incident who refused to obey the subpoena of this Court despite receipt thereof.
Order is hereby given to the WPDC thru any police officer to arrest the person of said Leonardo Lucaban
of 410 Radial 10 cor. Capulong St., Tondo, Manila, so that this court can secure his appearance on the
next scheduled hearing, which is reset to November 22, 1994, at 8:30 oclock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.

Given in open court this 12th day of October 1994, at Manila, Philippines.[78]

ORDER

For disregarding the subpoena sent to him for several times despite receipt thereof, and if not for the
warrant issued against him, his attendance for todays hearing cannot be secured.

WHEREFORE, witness Leonardo Lucaban is declared guilty of indirect contempt of court and shall be held
in custody of SP01 Pedro Justiniano and PO2 Ismael Velasco, for the continuation of his testimony which
is set on Friday, November 25, 1994, at 8:30 a.m.

SO ORDERED.

Given in open court this 22nd day of November 1994, at Manila, Philippines.[79]

It is not totally unheard of for a person who has witnessed a crime and recognized its perpetrators to
deny knowledge of the identity of these malefactors for fear of reprisals against his life or that of his
family.

We have held in a number of cases that it is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some
reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case, as in fact the natural reticence of most people to get
involved is of judicial notice.[80]

Considering that it was the trial court which gave the order to place Lucaban in the custody of the police
for the continuation of the his testimony mayhap the accused-appellant also infers that the trial court
likewise wanted Lucaban to point to the accused-appellant as the assailant?
Accused-appellant casts aspersion on (1) the ability of the witness to recognize him but failing to
recognize his co-accused, namely Endrina and Figueroa, when all three of them were at the scene of the
crime, (2) the failure of the witness to shout for help from vehicles passing by, (3) the action of the
witness in going to a remote tricycle spot to summon a rescue.

The accused-appellant considers these instances to be lapses and deficiencies that do not lend credence
to the prosecutions lone eyewitness.

In the case of People vs. Dones[81] it has been held that there is no standard form of human behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.

A person when faced with an out of the ordinary situation is not expected to act in a manner similar to
another. The conduct therefore of Lucaban should not be deemed suspect if the only person he
recognized at the scene of the crime was Nomer Velasco or if he fails to enlist the help of the drivers or
passengers of passing vehicles or for going to a remote tricycle spot instead of, for example, knocking on
the doors of the houses in the neighborhood.

We do not deem the deficiencies made by Lucaban in his testimonies so material as to put the
trustworthiness of said witness open to serious doubt. Minor inconsistencies do not impair the essential
integrity of the prosecutions evidence as a whole.[82] Moreover discrepancies between sworn
statements or affidavits and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the
witnesses.[83]

The rule is well-settled that the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses presented before it for it had occasion to observe the witnesses deportment on the stand and
the manner in which they gave their testimonies. In fact, it has become a consistent and immutable rule,
since more often than not, the appeals relate to the credibility of witnesses, that we are bound by the
prevailing doctrine, founded on a host of jurisprudential rulings, to the effect that the matter is best
determined at the trial court level where testimonies are first hand given, received, assessed and
evaluated.[84] Thus in the absence of a showing that serious and substantial errors were committed by
the lower court in the appraisal of the evidence before it, factual findings, particularly, the trial judges
assessment of the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses are accorded great weight and
respect[85] and treats it with finality.

We have perused the records of this case and we find, as the lower court did, that the testimony of the
lone eyewitness Leonardo Lucaban is clear, straightforward and worthy of belief.
It is well-settled rule that the defense of alibi, admittedly, the weakest defense, cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses.[86]

Leonardo Lucaban testified that he personally knows Nomer Velasco.

Q Prior to that incident, you know personally this Nomer Velasco?

A Yes, sir.

COURT

Why do you know him?

A Because once I have recruited him as one of my workers.

COURT

What is your work?

A Cutting of log, Your Honor.

Q You are really sure that it was this Nomer Velasco whom you saw stab the victim?

A It seems he was really the one. I saw his face.[87]

Accused-appellant contends that he was sleeping at his house at the time of the incident. His wife
corroborates this. However, in this instance, we have to take the word of his wife with a grain of salt for
witnesses who are either wives or mothers of the accused, in almost all instances, would freely perjure
themselves for the sake of their loved ones.[88]
In the light of the positive identification made by an eyewitness who admittedly has no grudge against
the accused-appellant the defense of alibi put up by the latter does not hold water.

It is the burden of the accused not only to prove that he was not at the scene of the crime when it
happened but also that it was impossible for him to be there at the time of the commission of the
offense.[89]

This test the accused-appellant failed. Rosemarie Velasco, the wife of the accused, testified that the
distance of their house from the scene of the crime is a mere twenty meters. The distance between
these two locations is not so great that it would have been impossible for the accused-appellant to be
present at the scene of the crime.

Accused-appellant avers that the recall of the witness had no basis and was made with grave abuse of
discretion.

We disagree. In the case of Arce, et al. vs. Arce, et al.,[90] it was held that if, after hearing all the
evidence adduced by the parties, the trial Judge is not satisfied, he may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, on his own motion and in furtherance of justice, call additional witnesses or recall some of
the same witnesses, for the purpose of questioning them himself, in order to satisfy his mind with
reference to particular facts or issues involved in the case.

Treachery or alevosia qualified the killing of Danilo Valencia to murder committed by the accused. There
is alevosia when a person is unexpectedly attacked from behind, depriving him of any opportunity to
defend himself.[91]

The following circumstances show that the accused-appellant indeed committed the killing by
treacherous means: He engaged the victim into a conversation, brief though it may be. From that
conversation he gleaned that the victim was not carrying a weapon. Assured that the victim was
unarmed the accused-appellant then followed the victim and stabbed him at the back.

The assailant was known to the victim for he used to be under the latters employ.[92] Unsuspecting of
the assailants evil plans the latter continued to walk away. The attack was so sudden that it gave the
victim no chance to defend himself or to retaliate. Moreover the safety of the assailant from defensive or
retaliatory attacks coming from the victim was ensured because the latter was unarmed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Quisumbing, JJ., concu

10. Leading and misleading questions

People v. Perez, G.R. No. 142556, February 5, 2003 (per curiam)

[G.R. No. 142556. February 5, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez (appellant for
brevity), guilty of raping Mayia P. Ponseca (Mayia for brevity) and imposing on appellant the death
penalty.

On January 22, 1997, the Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor[2] of Zambales filed an Information[3]
charging appellant with the crime of rape penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, committed as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of January, 1997 at 12:00 noon at Sitio Baco, Brgy. Macarang, in the
Municipality of Palauig, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with lewd design and by means of coercion, inducement and other
consideration, did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
one Mayia P. Ponseca, a minor of 6 years old, without her consent and against her will, to the damage
and prejudice of the latter.
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de officio Atty. Genaro N. Montefalcon, pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.[4] Subsequently, the trial court allowed the withdrawal of Atty.
Montefalcon as counsel for health reasons. The trial court appointed Atty. Roberto Blanco as appellants
counsel de oficio.[5]

At the pre-trial, the prosecution and defense stipulated on the following facts:

1. The identity of the accused;

2. The accused was at the time of the incident in the vicinity thereof;

3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca, was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by her birth
certificate;

4. That after the incident, the child was subjected to a medico-legal examination to which a medico-legal
certificate was issued by Dr. Editha Divino.

The prosecution marked in evidence the birth certificate of the victim Mayia O. Ponseca as Exhibit A, and
the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Editha Divino as Exhibit B.[6]

Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: the victim, Mayia Ponseca;
the victims mother, Hermie Ponseca; the victims father, Osias Ponseca; Virginia Espejo Giron; and Dr.
Editha dela Cruz Divino. On the other hand, the defense presented appellant and his employer,
Bartolome Tolentino.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG for brevity) summarized the prosecutions version of the incident
in the appellees brief, to wit:

On January 17, 1997, about noontime, in Sitio Baco, Barangay Macarang, Palauig, Zambales, six-year old
Mayia Ponseca was walking along Sulok on her way to her house in Sitio Camiling when appellant Jesus
Sebunga Perez approached her (pp. 7-8, TSN, December 15, 1998). Appellant introduced himself as
Johnny and immediately afterwards, strangled her neck and boxed her abdomen (p. 10, TSN, December
15, 1998). Still in shock, Mayia fell down (id.). At that point, a dog arrived and barked at them.
Appellant then proceeded to lower his black denim pants while simultaneously removing Mayias panty.
He then inserted his penis inside Mayias vagina (p. 11, id.). Mayia felt excruciating pain in her private
parts (sic) but was not able to repel her aggressor whose strength and weight totally engulfed her. Her
only recourse was to cry while her young body was being ravished (p. 13, id.).

After satisfying his beastly desires, appellant raised his pants and ran away (p. 14, id.). Notwithstanding
that her vagina was bleeding profusely and her dress now covered with her own blood, Mayia managed
to stand up and seek help. She ran to the house of Virginia Giron, which was only fifty (50) meters away
from the scene of the crime. In fact, Giron was outside when she heard her dog barking (apparently, it
was the same dog barking at appellant while he was consummating his lust on Mayia, pp. 2-3, TSN,
January 12, 1999; p. 11, TSN, December 15, 1998). Looking at the direction of the noise, she saw a
confused Mayia approaching her with blood dripping from her private parts and thighs. When Giron
asked Mayia what happened, the latter shouted ni-rape ako, ni-rape ako (p. 4, TSN, January 4, 1999).
Giron then summoned her husband and other companions to look for Mayias attacker but was unable to
find him. Giron then proceeded to Hermie Ponseca and Osias Ponseca, Mayias parents, to inform them
of what happened (p. 5, TSN, January 5, 1999; p. 2, TSN, January 19, 1999).

When her parents asked Mayia if she knew her assailant, the latter answered the name Johnny. (id.) The
couple brought their daughter to the President Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital for medical
examination (p. 2, TSN, February 24, 1999). She was examined by Dra. Editha Dela Cruz Divino, who
issued a medico-legal certificate dated January 23, 1997 stating the following:

a. Bleeding of genitalia coming from median laceration at the vaginal floor around four (4) centimeters in
size. Possible cause, a fall and then hitting a sharp object and also an alleged sexual assault (p. 4, TSN,
February 24, 1999).

b. Genitalia had hymenal lacerations at 3, 6, 9 and 12 oclock positions.

(pp. 4-6 id.)

Because of the extent of the damage on her genitals, Mayia undertook an IV sedation operation to repair
her lacerations (p. 6, id.) During her confinement at the hospital, the Ponseca couple reported the
incident to the Palauig PNP Police Station and recounted their daughters narration including the name of
the culprit as Johnny who, according to their neighbors, was a worker at the fishpond of Bartolome
Tolentino (pp. 11-12, TSN, January 5, 1999). Police operatives then proceeded to the said fishpond and
arrested appellant. After her discharge from the hospital, Mayia learned that appellant was already
apprehended (pp. 3-8, TSN, January 5, 1999). In the police station, she was able to positively identify the
appellant as the person who sexually assaulted her (p. 18, TSN, December 15, 1998).[7]

Appellant denied raping Mayia. Appellant testified that on the date of the alleged rape incident, he was
working at a fishpond at Macarang, Zambales. He heard of the rape of a young girl from his manager,
Bartolome Tolentino (Tolentino for brevity).[8] Appellant further testified that on January 25, 1997,
policemen went to the fishpond where he worked. The policemen arrested appellant and brought him to
the police station at Palauig. Later, the policemen took him to the municipal jail of Palauig.

On cross-examination, appellant testified that his nickname is not Johnny but Jessie.[9] He testified that
on January 17, 1997, at around 12 oclock noon, he left the fishpond and walked home to Barangay Alwa
which was about thirty meters from the fishpond.[10]

The defense formally offered the testimony of witness Tolentino to prove that appellant was employed
as caretaker of Tolentinos fishpond for almost two years before the alleged rape incident. Appellant was
purportedly of good moral character while employed as a fishpond caretaker. The prosecution admitted
the offer of testimony. Hence, the trial court dispensed with the testimony of Tolentino in open court.
[11]

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment[12] on October 26, 1999, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, accused Jesus Perez y Sabung (SIC) is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutore Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was only 6 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III, Republic Act 7610, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH. Jesus Perez is directed to pay to the private complainant the amount of
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as and by way of civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) as and by way of moral damages.

Hence, this automatic review.

In his brief, appellant raises the following lone assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular. Appellant points
out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt when the
prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant stresses that when Mayia identified him
in open court, she referred to him as a man named Johnny and did not give any description or any
identifying mark. Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in the cell when Mayia identified him after
the police arrested him. Appellant bewails that the identification was not done with the usual police line-
up.

Appellants contention is untenable.

As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the witness
is a child of tender years[13] as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or
suggestion.[14] Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips.[15] In the
case at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently
young and unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain.[16] As explained in People v.
Rodito Dagamos:[17]

The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the
questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the
truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the
child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time.
Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will further the interests
of justice.

The Court has repeatedly stated that it is highly inconceivable for a child of tender age, inexperienced in
the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private
part, subject herself to public trial, and tarnish her familys honor and reputation, unless she was
motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.[18]

Mayia recounted her harrowing experience, thus:

Q What time was this when Johnny introduced himself to you?

A I do not recall, mam.

Q Was it in the morning, noontime or in the afternoon or in the evening?

A Noontime, mam.

Q So, when Johnny said, Ako si Johnny, what did you do?

A None, mam.

Q After that when Johnny said, Ako si Johnny, what happened?

A He strangled (sinakal) me.

Q Were there persons around in the place when Johnny strangled you?

A None, mam.

Q So, what did he do then after he strangled you?

A He boxed me on my stomach, mam.

Q When he boxed you on your stomach, what happened to you?

A I was shocked, mam.

Q Did you fall down?

A Before that, I was already lying down, so when he boxed me, I was shocked.

Q You said that you were already lying down. Who made you lie down?

A The person, mam.

Q Why were you shocked, Mayia?

A Because he strangled me and boxed me.

Q After he boxed you on your abdomen, what happened? What else did he do to you?

A There was a dog that arrived in the place and it barked at us. Then Johnny moved in a hurry by
penetrating my private part and after he dressing (SIC) me, he ran away.

Q You said that Johnny penetrated your private part. With what instrument did he use in penetrating
your private part?

A His penis, mam.

Q What was he wearing at that time?

A A black denim, mam.

Q When he used his penis in entering your private part, did he remove his pants?

A No, mam.

Q What did he do with his pants?

A He brought out his penis, mam.

Q You mean to say Mayia, he lowered his pants?

A Yes, mam.

Q What about you, were you wearing any panty?

A Yes, mam.

Q What was your clothes at that time?

A A dress, mam.

Q When his penis entered your vagina Mayia, did he remove your panty?

A Yes, mam.[19]

The identity of appellant as the rapist has been established by the clear, convincing and straightforward
testimony of Mayia. During the trial, she testified as follows:

Q Mayia, there is a man sitting wearing orange t-shirt, do you know this man?

A Yes, mam.

Q Do you know his name?

A Yes, mam.
Q What is his name?

A Johnny, mam.

Q Why do you know him?

A Because he introduced himself to me.

Q Where did he introduced himself to you?

A At Sulok, mam.

Q Sulok is a place?

A Yes, mam.

Q Do you have any companion when this man introduced himself to you?

A None, mam.

Q How did he introduce himself to you?

A The man introduced himself to me by saying, Kilala mo ba ako? Hindi po. Ako si Johnny.[20]

The trial court further asked Mayia:

Q You were talking of a certain Johnny. s this Johnny in court now?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you point to him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Point to him.

A (Witness pointing to the person sitting at the accused bench and when asked of his name answered
Jesus Perez)

Q Is this Johnny whom you point to the person whom you saw in that Sulok?

A Yes, sir. [21]

Mayias simple, positive and straightforward recounting on the witness stand of her harrowing
experience lends credence to her accusation. Her tender age belies any allegation that her accusation
was a mere invention impelled by some ill-motive. As the Court has stressed in numerous cases, when a
woman or a child victim says that she has been raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show that
rape was indeed committed.[22]

Mayia had a clear sight of appellants face since the rape occurred at noontime.[23] Her proximity to
appellant during the sexual assault leaves no doubt as to the correctness of her identification for a man
and woman cannot be physically closer to each other than during the sexual act.[24] Thus, even if Mayia
did not give the identifying marks of appellant, her positive identification of appellant sufficed to
establish clearly the identity of her sexual assailant.

Appellants claim that the police improperly suggested to Mayia to identify appellant is without basis.
True, Mayia did not identify appellant in a police line-up when Mayia identified appellant in his cell.
However, appellant, in his testimony admitted that he had two other companions in his cell.[25]
Moreover, the Court has held that there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification. Even without a police line-up, there could still be a proper identification as long as the
police did not suggest such identification to the witnesses.[26] The records are bereft of any indication
that the police suggested to Mayia to identify appellant as the rapist.
Mayias identification in open court of appellant as her rapist dispels any doubt as to the proper
identification of appellant. Mayia positively identified and pointed to appellant as her rapist. We are
satisfied that her testimony, by itself, is sufficient identification of her rapist. As held in People v.
Marquez:[27]

xxx. Indeed, the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit, as the
willingness of complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a
public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint. Stated differently, it is most improbable
for a five-year old girl of tender years, so innocent and so guileless as the herein offended party, to
brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not true.

In his Reply Brief, appellant contends that even assuming that the guilt of appellant has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty. Appellant maintains that
the death penalty cannot be imposed on him for failure of the prosecution to prove Mayias age by
independent evidence. Appellant points out that while Mayias birth certificate was duly marked during
the pre-trial, it was not presented and identified during the trial. Appellant asserts that Mayias minority
must not only be specifically alleged in the Information but must also be established beyond reasonable
doubt during the trial.

Appellants argument deserves scant consideration.

At the pre-trial, the parties mutually worked out a satisfactory disposition of the criminal case. Appellant,
assisted by counsel, signed a Pre-Trial Agreement[28] which, as incorporated in the Pre-Trial Order,
stated that:

x x x.

3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by her birth
certificate;

x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence Mayias birth certificate as Exhibit A.[29] The
prosecution submitted its Offer of Evidence[30] which included Exhibit A, a certified true copy of Mayias
birth certificate. The trial court admitted Exhibit A[31] without any objection from the defense.

The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c)
marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes lawful defenses; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.
[32] Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind the parties. Section 4, Rule 118 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[33] provides:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions
taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the
court to prevent manifest injustice. (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on December 15, 1998,
which was about twenty-three (23) months after the rape incident occurred on January 17, 1997, Mayia
testified on cross-examination that she was 8 years old last May 23.[34] Thus, by deduction, since Mayia
was born on May 23, 1990 as shown in her birth certificate, she was about six (6) years and seven (7)
months old on January 17, 1997, the day the crime took place. We rule that the prosecution has
indisputably proven that Mayia was below seven years old at the time appellant raped her.

Finally, the trial court was correct in imposing the death penalty on appellant. Under Article 335[35] of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,[36] the death penalty shall
be imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years old. Mayia was six (6)
years and seven (7) months old when appellant raped her.

If rape is qualified by any of the circumstances[37] warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the
civil indemnity for actual or compensatory damages is mandatory.[38] Following prevailing
jurisprudence, the civil indemnity is fixed at P75,000.00. In addition, moral damages of P50,000.00
should also be awarded to the rape victim without need for pleading or proving it.[39]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch
69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of qualified rape, sentencing him to suffer the death penalty,[40] and ordering him to pay the
victim Mayia P. Ponseca the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages,
is AFFIRMED in toto.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of the Republic Act
No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President of the Philippines for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness

12. Party may not impeach his own witness

Design Sources International v. Eristingcol, 19 February 2014

G.R. No. 193966, February 19, 2014

DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL INC. AND KENNETH SY, Petitioners, v. LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL,
Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Design Sources International, Inc. and Kenneth Sy
(petitioners) under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Petition assails the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision2 dated 1 June 2010 and Resolution3 dated 30 September 2010 in CA G.R. SP No. 98763.
The assailed Decision and Resolution sustained the Orders dated 8 February 2006, 1 June 2006 and 26
February 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Civil Case No. 00–850.
Considering that there are no factual issues in this case, we adopt the findings of fact of the CA, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Design Sources International, Inc. (“Petitioner Corporation”) is a distributor of Pergo flooring. Sometime
in 1998, the Private Respondent bought the said brand of flooring of the “Cherry Blocked” type from the
Petitioner Corporation. The flooring was installed in her house.

On February 24, 2000, the Private Respondent discovered that the Pergo flooring installed had unsightly
bulges at the joints and seams. The Private Respondent informed the Petitioners of these defects and
the former insisted on the repair or replacement of the flooring at the expense of the latter.

After several inspections of the alleged defective flooring, meetings between the parties and exchanges
of correspondence, the Petitioner Corporation was given until May 31, 2000 to replace the installed
flooring. Nevertheless, on the deadline, the Petitioner Corporation did not comply with the demand of
the Private Respondent. A complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case No.00–850, was thus filed by
the Private Respondent before the RTC on July 13, 2000.

On February 8, 2006, Kenneth Sy, one of the Petitioners’ witnesses, testified in open court. Immediately
after his testimony, the following occurred as evidenced by the transcript of stenographic notes
(“TSN”):chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

COURT :

(To Atty. Posadas) Who will be your next witness?

ATTY. POSADAS :

Your honor, my next witness will be Stephen Sy, also of Design Source.

ATTY FORTUN :

Your honor, may I know if Mr. Stephen Sy around [sic] the courtroom?

ATTY. POSADAS :

(Pointing to the said witness) He is here.

ATTY. FORTUN :
So the witness is actually inside the Courtroom.

ATTY. POSADAS :

But, your honor, please, I was asking about it, nahiya lang ako kay Atty. Fortun.

ATTY. FORTUN :

But I was [sic] asked of the exclusion of the witness.

COURT :

(To Atty. Posadas) You shall [sic] have to tell the Court of your ready witness.

ATTY. FORTUN :

He already heard the whole testimony of his colleague.

ATTY. POSADAS :

I’m sorry, your honor.

COURT :

All right. When were [sic] you present him, today or next time.

ATTY. POSADAS :

Next time, your honor.

COURT :

All right. Next time, Atty. Posadas, if you have other witnesses present in Court inform us.

ATTY. FORTUN :

No, your honor, in fact I will object to the presentation of Mr. Stephen Sy, because his [sic] here all the
time when the witness was in [sic] cross–examined.
ATTY. POSADAS :

Your honor, I will just preserve [sic] my right to present another witness on the technical aspect of this
case.

COURT :

Okay. All right. Order. After the completion of the testimony of defendant’s second witness in the person
of Mr. Kenneth Sy, [A]tty. Benjamin Posadas, counsel for the defendants, moved for continuance
considering that he is not feeling well and that he needs time to secure another witness to testify on the
technical aspect, because of the objection on the part of plaintiff’s counsel Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun on
his plan of presenting of Mr. Stephen Sy as their next witness due to his failure to inform the Court and
the said counsel of the presence of the said intended witness while Mr. Kenneth Sy was testifying. There
being no objection thereto on the part of Atty. Fortun, reset the continuation of the presentation of
defendant’s evidence to April 5, 2006 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.

xxx

SO ORDERED.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On 22 March 2006, petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Order, but their motion was denied by
the RTC on 1 June 2006 on the ground that “the Court deems it no longer necessary to allow Stephen Sy
from testifying [sic] when a different witness could testify on matters similar to the intended testimony
of the former.”5 The Order also stated that “to allow Stephen Sy from testifying [sic] would work to the
disadvantage of the plaintiff as he already heard the testimony of witness Kenneth Sy.”6

Petitioners filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration (with Leave of Court) dated 19 June 2006, which
was likewise denied by the RTC in the assailed Order dated 26 February 2007.7cralawred

Petitioners sought recourse before the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. They raised the sole issue of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to allow architect Stephen Sy (Stephen) to testify as to material matters.8cralawlawlibrary

At the outset, the CA found no sufficient basis that herein respondent previously asked for the exclusion
of other witnesses. It was the duty of respondent’s counsel to ask for the exclusion of other witnesses,
without which, there was nothing to prevent Stephen from hearing the testimony of petitioners’ other
witnesses. Nevertheless, following the doctrine laid down in People v. Sandal (Sandal),9 the appellate
court ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders
considering that petitioners failed to show that Stephen’s testimony would bolster their position.
Moreover, from the Manifestation of petitioners’ counsel, it appears that petitioners had another
witness who could give a testimony similar to Stephen’s.

Petitioners elevated the case before us assailing the Decision of the CA. In the meantime, trial proceeded
in the lower court. On 11 February 2014, they filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order either to allow the presentation of Stephen as a
witness or to suspend the trial proceedings pending the ruling in the instant Petition.

Assignment of Errors

Petitioners raise the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:

Finding that the preclusion of Stephen Sy from testifying as a witness in the trial of the case did not
amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Pozon.

Applying the case of People vs. Sandal in justifying the order of exclusion issued by Judge Pozon,
precluding Stephen Sy from testifying as witness.

Concluding that the petitioners had another witness that could have given a similar testimony as that of
Stephen Sy.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court’s Ruling

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit.

The principal issue is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders
disallowing petitioners from presenting Stephen as their witness.

The controversy arose from the objection of respondent’s counsel to the presentation of Stephen as
petitioners’ witness considering that Stephen was already inside the courtroom during the presentation
of witness Kenneth Sy (Kenneth). However, as aptly found by the CA, respondent failed to substantiate
her claim that there was a prior request for the exclusion of other witnesses during the presentation of
Kenneth. Respondent did not even allege in her Comment11 that there was any such request.

Section 15, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from
the court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other
witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing
with one another until all shall have been examined.

Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time another witness is testifying, or ordering that
these witnesses be kept separate from one another, is primarily to prevent them from conversing with
one another. The purpose is to ensure that the witnesses testify to the truth by preventing them from
being influenced by the testimonies of the others. In other words, this measure is meant to prevent
connivance or collusion among witnesses. The efficacy of excluding or separating witnesses has long
been recognized as a means of discouraging fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. However, without any
motion from the opposing party or order from the court, there is nothing in the rules that prohibits a
witness from hearing the testimonies of other witnesses.

There is nothing in the records of this case that would show that there was an order of exclusion from
the RTC, or that there was any motion from respondent’s counsel to exclude other witnesses from the
courtroom prior to or even during the presentation of the testimony of Kenneth. We are one with the CA
in finding that under such circumstances, there was nothing to prevent Stephen from hearing the
testimony of Kenneth. Therefore, the RTC should have allowed Stephen to testify for petitioners.

The RTC and the CA, however, moved on to determine the materiality of the testimony of Stephen,
which became their basis for not allowing the latter to testify. Applying Sandal, the CA ruled that the
absence of a showing of how his testimony would bolster the position of petitioners saved the judgment
of the RTC in issuing the order of exclusion.

We agree with petitioners that the application of Sandal is misplaced. Contrary to the present case, in
Sandal there was a court order for exclusion which was disregarded by the witness. The defiance of the
order led to the exercise by the court of its discretion to admit or reject the testimony of the witness
who had defied its order. Again, in this case, there was no order or motion for exclusion that was defied
by petitioners and their witnesses. Thus, the determination of the materiality of Stephen’s testimony in
relation to the strengthening of petitioners’ defense was uncalled for.

Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the parties, a court cannot simply
allow or disallow the presentation of a witness solely on the ground that the latter heard the testimony
of another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent’s counsel to protect the interest of his client
during the presentation of other witnesses. If respondent actually believed that the testimony of
Kenneth would greatly affect that of Stephen’s, then respondent’s counsel was clearly remiss in his duty
to protect the interest of his client when he did not raise the issue of the exclusion of the witness in a
timely manner.
Respondent is bound by the acts of her counsel, including mistakes in the realm of procedural
techniques.12 The exception to the said rule does not apply herein, considering that there is no showing
that she was thereby deprived of due process. At any rate, respondent is not without recourse even if
the court allows the presentation of the testimony of Stephen, considering the availability of remedies
during or after the presentation of witnesses, including but not limited to the impeachment of
testimonies.

Therefore, this Court finds that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not allowing Stephen to
testify notwithstanding the absence of any order for exclusion of other witnesses during the
presentation of Kenneth’s testimony.

In view thereof, the RTC is hereby ordered to allow the presentation of Stephen Sy as witness for
petitioners. Accordingly, petitioners’ Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
or Temporary Restraining Order is now rendered moot.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo–De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements

People v. Jaime Castillano, Sr., G.R. No. 139412, April 2, 2003;

[G.R. No. 139412. April 2, 2003]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. alias Talino, RONALD CASTILLANO
alias Nono and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun, accused,

RONALD CASTILLANO alias Nono and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun, appellants.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31, in
Criminal Case No. P-2542, convicting appellants Ronald Castillano alias Nono and Jaime Castillano, Jr. of
murder, meting on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering them to pay, jointly and
severally, damages to the heirs of the victim Diosdado Volante.

The Evidence or the Prosecution

Diosdado Volante, who eked out a living as a farmer, his wife Luz,[2] and their four children lived in their
farmland located in the outskirt of Sitio Danawan, Barangay Sagrada, Bula, Camarines Sur.

About 200 meters away from Diosdados farmland was the farmhouse of Jaime Castillano, Sr.[3] He
tasked his son, Jaime Castillano, Jr., to take care of the farmhouse and allowed him to reside there.[4]
Jaime, Sr., his wife Concepcion, their son Ronald (Nono) Castillano and other children lived at their family
residence in Sagrada, Bula, Camarines Sur, approximately three kilometers away from their farmhouse in
Sitio Danawan.[5]

Sometime in the early part of June 1996,[6] Jaime, Sr. fired his gun indiscriminately. Afraid that a stray
bullet might hit any member of his family, Diosdado accosted Jaime, Sr. and asked him to desist from
firing his gun indiscriminately. Jaime, Sr. resented the intrusion. He remonstrated that neighbors did not
even complain about him firing his gun. A heated altercation ensued. Jaime, Sr. then fired his gun
towards the house of Diosdado. The incident germinated deep animosity between the two and their
respective families.[7] Jaime, Sr. always carried a bolo whenever he passed by the house of Diosdado.

On July 8, 1996, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., Levy Avila, a teacher, was in his house doing some
repairs. He noticed Jaime, Jr. and Ronald talking by the roadside near the gate of his (Levys) house. Levy
overheard the two planning to go to Diosdados house. Jaime, Jr. and Ronald even told Levy: Ayaw namin
kasing inaasar. Suspecting that the two were intending to harm Diosdado, Levy urged them to amicably
settle their differences with Diosdado.

At around 8:00 p.m., Luz and Diosdado were about to retire for the night. Their children were already
fast asleep. Diosdado was tired after a days work of spraying chemicals at the rice field. He reclined on a
bamboo bench near the main door of their house. A kerosene lamp lighted the house. Suddenly, Luz
heard voices near their house. She saw Jaime, Sr. holding a flashlight and his two sons, Jaime Jr. and
Ronald, on their way to the house. Luz immediately alerted her husband and told him that the
Castillanos were in their yard. However, Diosdado was nonchalant and simply told Luz not to mind them.
All of a sudden, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun at Diosdados house. Terrified, Luz hastily carried her baby
daughter Mary Jane, sought cover and hid near the rear door. She was about five meters away from her
husband when the Castillanos barged inside their house and ganged up on Diosdado. Jaime, Jr. and
Ronald, armed with bladed weapons, took turns in stabbing Diosdado. Ronald stabbed Diosdado on the
right side of his breast, right thigh and on the back. He also struck him with a one-meter long pipe. Not
satisfied, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun hitting the right thigh of Diosdado. Luz was so shocked by the sudden
turn of events. To silence her one year old baby, she breastfed her. As soon as she could, Luz fled to the
rice paddies where she hid for a time. The Castillanos fled on board a jeep parked in the NIA road about
200 meters from the house of Diosdado. When Luz returned to their house, she saw her husband
sprawled on the ground in a pool of his own blood. Diosdado, at the point of death, asked her for help.
Not knowing what to do, Luz lost no time and ran to the house of their neighbor Celedonio Espiritu for
help. Celedonio rushed to the Bula Police Station and reported the incident.

A team composed of SPO4 Jaime Javier, SPO3 Jaime Bellano and SPO3 Nilo Fornillos,[8] the duty
investigator,[9] went to the crime scene[10] to conduct an on-the-spot investigation. Photographs were
taken of the cadaver.[11] SPO3 Fornillo drew rough sketch[12] of the scene. The policemen saw a bolo at
the place where Diosdado was sprawled near the door of their house. A scabbard of a bolo was found a
meter away from the house of Diosdado.[13] The policemen also found a bullet hole on the wall of the
house.[14] Thereafter, the cadaver was placed on a hamak [hammock] brought to the police station. The
police investigators turned over the scabbard and bolo to the desk officer of the police station.[15]

From the police station, SPO4 Javier, SPO3 Bellano and Sgt. Rogelio Palacio boarded their mobile police
car and set out a manhunt for the malefactors. They proceeded towards the boundary in Sto. Domingo
where they put up a checkpoint. The police officers inspected every vehicle that passed by. At around
12:45 a.m., SPO4 Javier halted a passenger jeepney. On board were Jaime, Sr. and his two sons, Jaime Jr.
and Ronald, each of whom carried a bag containing their clothes. The policemen brought the Castillanos
to the police station.[16] The bags of Jaime, Jr. and Ronald were turned over to the police investigators.
The three were placed under arrest for the killing of Diosdado. The policemen submitted their
investigation report.[17]

In the meantime, at 7:00 a.m., Dr. Evangeline Consolacion, the Municipal Health Officer of Bula,
conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Diosdado. Her autopsy report revealed the following findings:

External Findings

1. Incise Wound 3 cm Superior pinna R ear

2. Incise woud (sic) 10 cm. from nasal bridge extending to mandible R

3. Stab wound 2 cm.x 5 cm. Epigastrium R

4. Stab wound 2 cm.x 4 cm. Epigastrium L

5. Stab wound 2.5 cm. Middle third Arm R

6. Stab wound 2cm x 5 cm. posterior Back.

7. Amputating middle third finger L

8. Hacked wound posterior ankle L

9. Gunshot wound POE 2 x 2cm. with contusion collar medial aspect middle third R thigh

No point of exit noted

Internal Findings:

Fracture femur with Foreign body bullet lodge in middle third femur with hematoma about about 100 cc
R thigh

Cause of Death; Hypovolemia secondary to Multiple Stab Wound[18]

The doctor recovered a slug from the right thigh of Diosdado. She later signed the victims post-mortem
certificate of death.[19] Senior Inspector Edgardo B. Sambo, Chief of Police of Bula Police Station, filed
with the Municipal Trial Court of Bula, Camarines Sur, a criminal complaint[20] for murder against the
Castillano brothers.[21] Judge Francisco O. Tolentino conducted the preliminary examination and
thereafter issued an order of arrest against the Castillanos.[22] No bail was recommended for their
provisional release. On July 9, 1996, Luz gave a sworn statement to the police investigators.[23]

On July 10, 1996, the accused were transferred to the Tinangis Penal Farm. Senior Inspector Sambo
requested the PNP-CLRU5 Provincial Unit to conduct a paraffin test on the Castillanos.[24]

On July 12, 1997, Major Lorlie Arroyo, the Head Forensic Chemist of PNP-Region 5, conducted the
paraffin test on the Castillanos. Ronald was found positive for gunpowder residue.[25] Jaime, Sr. and
Jaime, Jr. were found negative for gunpowder residue.

The MTC issued a subpoena requiring the accused to submit their counter-affidavits from notice thereof.
However, the accused failed to submit any counter-affidavit.[26]

On August 2, 1996, an Information for murder was filed against Jaime, Sr., Ronald and Jaime Jr. with the
Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 8th day of July 1996 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening at Barangay Sagrada,
Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with
intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation armed with a handgun, bladed weapon and piece
of wood did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot and stab one
DIOSDADO VOLANTE y LOZANO inflicting upon the latter several mortal wounds on the different parts of
his body which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Diosdado Volante the amount of which to be proven in Court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[27]

Upon their arraignment[28] on August 29, 1996, accused Jaime Sr., Jaime, Jr and Ronald, duly assisted by
counsel de parte, Atty. Avelino Sales Jr., pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.

Luz testified that when Diosdado was still alive, he had an annual income of over P65,000. She spent
P18,000 for the funeral services,[29] P300 for religious services,[30] P9,111 for food and other
expenses[31] during her husbands wake and funeral. She suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish
for his sudden death.
The Defenses and Evidence of the Accused

Ronald admitted when he testified that he killed Diosdado but insisted that he did so in self-defense and
in defense of his brother Jaime, Jr. He asserted that his father Jaime, Sr. and brother Jaime, Jr. had
nothing to do with Diosdados death. Ronald alleged that on September 8, 1996, at about 7:30 p.m., he
was driving a passenger jeepney on his way to the poblacion of Bula. Jaime, Jr. flagged down the
jeepney. He boarded the jeepney and told Ronald that he was instructed by their mother to go to the
house of Jose del Socorro to ask the latter to accompany them to their farmhouse in order to fetch Gilda
Albes. Ronald was armed with a .38 paltik gun, while Jaime, Jr. was armed with a bolo sheathed in a
scabbard. They fetched Jose and then Ronald parked the jeepney at the NIA road. Jaime, Jr., who was
holding a flashlight, walked along the footpath on top of a pilapil (a narrow earthen barrier between two
rice fields). Ronald and Jose walked behind Jaime, Jr. As they passed by the house of Diosdado, a man
suddenly shouted: you shit, I have await (sic) for you for a while, why just now. Surprised, Jaime, Jr.
forthwith focused his flashlight towards the man who shouted. He was aghast when he saw Diosdado
armed with a bolo running towards them and about to attack them with his bolo. Ronald shoved Jaime,
Jr. who fell on the muddy rice paddies below the pilapil. Ronald forthwith shot Diosdado. Diosdado took
a step but fell on a kneeling position. Diosdado brandished his bolo. Ronald shot Diosdado once more
but his gun misfired. To defend himself, Ronald took Jaime, Jr.s bolo and hacked Diosdado to death.[32]
Ronald then fled from the scene and ran to the jeepney at the NIA road. Jaime, Jr. and Jose boarded the
jeep and left the scene. Ronald threw the bolo along the way. He threw his gun into a rice farm in
Danawan.

Jaime, Jr. corroborated the testimony of his brother. He, however, testified that he did not see his
brother hack and kill Diosdado. He claimed that when Ronald got hold of his bolo, he ran away and
proceeded to their jeepney which was then parked at the roadside. Minutes later, Ronald followed. They
then hastily went home to Sagrada and told their father Jaime, Sr. of the incident.[33]

Jose Del Socorro corroborated the testimony of Ronald. He testified that on July 8, 1996, at about 5:00
p.m. he was on his way home when he met Diosdado whom he noticed to be inebriated and unruly
Diosdado was throwing dried mud at the farmhouse of the Castillanos and challenging the occupants of
the farmhouse to a fight. He advised Diosdado to stop what he was doing and warned him that he was
only inviting trouble. Diosdado told him to mind his own business and not to intervene. Jose thereafter
left Diosdado and went, home.[34] When Jose arrived home, Dominador Bria was waiting for him. He
and Dominador talked business for a while and subsequently had dinner. After some time, Jaime, Jr. and
Ronald arrived at Joses house.

Concepcion Castillano testified that on July 8, 1996 at around 5:00 a.m., her son Jaime, Jr. arrived home
and told her that Diosdado threw stones at their farmhouse and challenged everybody to a fight. She felt
nervous and reported the incident to the police and caused the same to be entered in the police blotter.
[35] Thereafter, she went home and told her sons Jaime, Jr. and Ronald to immediately fetch Gilda. She,
likewise, instructed her sons to first drop by the house of Jose so that the latter could accompany them
to the farmhouse.

Jaime, Sr. vehemently denied any participation in the killing of Diosdado. He claimed that at the time of
the alleged incident, he was at their house in Sagrada, bedridden due to his debilitating diabetes. He
narrated to the trial court his medical history and his confinement at the Mandaluyong Medical Center
sometime in 1994.[36] He presented documents and receipts showing that he had been and is still under
medication.[37] He declared that upon learning from his son Ronald that the latter killed Diosdado, he
advised his sons to look for a lawyer for legal representation. He told the trial court that at around 11:30
p.m., he and his two sons had decided to go to Andangnan in order to meet a cousin of his who knew of
a lawyer named Atty. Rotor. As they traversed the road to Andangan, they were stopped by some
policemen at a checkpoint and were invited to the police station where they were investigated and
eventually incarcerated.[38]

Gilda Abes, the last witness for the defense, affirmed that she was the girlfriend of Jaime, Jr. She told the
trial court that on July 8, 1996 she was at the farmhouse of the Castillanos. She corroborated the
testimony of Jose that Diosdado was combative and drunk. According to Gilda, Jaime, Jr. left the
farmhouse before sundown to go to his parents place at Sagrada. Jaime, Jr. never returned to the
farmhouse that night. Gilda learned of the incident the next morning when she went home.[39]

The Verdict of the Trial Court

On December 22, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting Jaime, Jr. and Ronald of murder
qualified by evident premeditation and treachery. The trial court exonerated Jaime, Sr. of the crime on
reasonable doubt. The trial court gave no credence to Ronalds claim that he acted in self-defense. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the two (2) accused
RONALD CASTILLANO and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
MURDER and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA
with all the accessory penalties imposed thereby. Further, as civil liability, the said two (2) accused are
hereby ordered to pay the legal heirs of the late Diosdado L. Volante, through his widow Luz R. Volante,
the total sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY ONE PESOS
(P177,421.00) Philippine Currency as actual and moral damages including death indemnity, with costs
against both accused.
The accused Jaime Castillano, Sr. is hereby acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.[40]

The accused, now appellants, interposed their appeal from the decision of the trial court contending that
it committed reversible errors:

(a) in rejecting appellant Ronalds plea of self-defense; and (b) in not acquitting appellant Jaime, Jr. of the
crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Anent the first issue, appellant Ronald posits that he adduced proof that he acted in self-defense when
he stabbed the victim.

The Court disagrees with appellant Ronald. The Court has consistently held that like alibi, self-defense is
inherently weak because it is easy to fabricate.[41] In a case where self-defense and defense of relatives
is invoked by the accused, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove with clear and convincing
evidence the essential requisites of self-defense, namely (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. There can be no complete or incomplete self-
defense or defense of relatives unless the accused proves unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
[42] The accused must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of
the prosecution for by pleading self-defense, the accused thereby admits having killed the victim and he
can no longer be exonerated of the crime charged if he fails to prove the confluence of the essential
requisites for self-defense and defense of a relative.[43]

Appellant Ronald failed to discharge his burden.

First. After shooting and stabbing Diosdado, appellant Ronald fled from the situs criminis. Flight from the
situs of the crime is a veritable badge of guilt and negates his plea of self-defense.[44]

Second. Appellant Ronald threw away his paltik .38 gun and the bolo he used in hacking Diosdado as he
fled from the scene of the crime instead of surrendering the same to the police authorities. Appellant
Ronald admitted that he had no license for the gun:
Q Where is that gun now that you use?

A I do not know, Your Honor, I think I was able to throw it away.

Q Where?

A At Danawan, Your Honor.

Q Danawan, is that a lake?

A No, Your Honor, it is a ricefarm.

Q What kind of gun is this?

A Paltik .38, Your Honor.[45]

ATTY. BALLEBAR:

q By the way, where is that bolo that you used in hacking and stabbing Diosdado Volante?

a I do not know anymore because I was able to throw it away also when I ran away.

q Where is that place where you throw it?

a It was by the NIA road.

q You mentioned also a while ago that this gun that you said is a paltik and you throw it away also, is it
not?
a Yes, Maam.

q And that gun had been in your possession the whole day that you are driving up to the time you shot
the victim, Diosdado Volante?

a Yes, Maam.

q Do you have license to possess that firearm?

a None, Maam.[46]

The failure of appellant Ronald to surrender the bolo and his gun to the police authorities belies his
claim of self-defense.

Third. Appellant Ronald failed to report the incident to the police authorities even when they arrested
him. Curiously, he failed to inform the police officers who arrested him that he acted in self-defense
when he shot and stabbed the victim The resounding silence of the appellant is another indicium of the
incredibility of his defense.[47] Moreover, the records show that the municipal trial court issued a
subpoena on July 9, 1996 requiring appellant Ronald to submit his counter-affidavit but he refused
and/or failed to submit the same despite service on him of the subpoena. It was only during the trial that
appellant Ronald, for the first time, invoked self-defense and defense of a relative.

Fourth. The cadaver of the victim was found inside his house when the police investigators arrived.[48]
This belies appellant Ronalds claim that he shot the victim in the rice paddies, near his house and that he
(appellant Ronald) took the bolo of appellant Jaime, Jr. and used it to stab the victim. Appellant Ronald
failed to prove his claim that when the police investigators arrived in the victims house, they carried his
(the victims) body from the rice paddies to the house. The only evidence adduced by appellant Ronald
was his testimony which is hearsay, and besides being hearsay, it is speculative and mere conjecture.

Fifth. Appellant Ronald hacked the victim no less than five times. Two of the stab wounds sustained by
the victim were at his back and posterior portion of his left ankle. The number and nature of the wounds
of the victim negate the appellants claim that he shot the victim in self-defense. On the contrary, they
prove that appellant Ronald was determined to kill the victim.[49]
Appellant Jaime, Jr. avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. He asserts that the testimony of Luz Volante, the widow of Diosdado, was inconsistent
with her testimony during the preliminary examination in the municipal trial court and her sworn
statement before the police investigators as well as the testimonies of SPO1 Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime
Favier, and the physical evidence on record. The appellant catalogued said inconsistencies, thus:

1. He was lying on the bench inside just upon entering. (Tsn p. 9, 2/17/97).

-I was lying down with my husband inside our house but we were still awake (9th Answer, Prel. Exam.
MTC, 7/9/96).

2. JCS fired towards our house hitting the wall (Tsn p. 11, 2/17/96).

JCS fired twice (16th answer, Prel. Exam. MTC, 7/9/96).

JCS kept on firing the gun pointing towards the body of my husband (9th Answer, Sworn Statement, PNP,
7/9/96).

JCS shot my husband three (3) times (Tsn p. 16, 2/17/97)

3. My husband was shot and hit on the right thigh (Tsn p. 14, 2/17/97). He was hit on the left lap (23rd
Answer, Prel. Exam. MTC, 7/9/96). He was hit on his side (Tsn p. 43, 2/17/97).

4. RC struck my husband with a 1-meter long Pipe (Tsn p. 13, 2/17/97). RC & JCJ smashed my husband
with a hard object (5th Answer, Sworn Statement, 7/9/96).

RC smashed my husband (22nd Answer, Prel. Exam. MTC, 7/9/96).

5. He was not able to fight back (Tsn p. 43, 2/17/97). He was standing and was trying to parry the attack
of the accused (26th Answer, Prel. Exam. 7/9/96).
6. When I went back to the house, he was still alive (Tsn p. 19, 2/17/97). - LV Yes, the victim could have
died instantly (Tsn p. 35, 2/3/97) With wounds sustained, he could have died instantly (p. 8,
Complainants Memorandum).

7. It was bright inside our house with a kerosene and a bottle lamp (Tsn pp. 33-34, 2/17/97). Only one
kerosene lamp - bottle of gin with wick and light (Tsn p. 10, 4/1/97 - SPO1 Pornillos

Surrounding house, dark, total darkness (Tsn pp. 12-13, 4/1/97).

8. Scene Photography by Jaime Jornales (Tsn, p. 21, 2/17/97).

-do- by Mr. Lozano (Tsn., p. 12, 3/7/97).

9. SPO1 Nilo Pornillos learned of the incident at 8:00 oclock of July 8, 1996 (page 5 of Complainants
Memorandum.

SPO4 Jaime Javier received report at 9:00 oclock P.M. of July 8, 1996 of Complainants Memorandum.

SPO4 Jaime Javier received report at 8:00 P.M. (page 7 of Complainants Memorandum).[50]

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony of Luz,
the prosecutions principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary
examination before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police investigators
for the reason that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by
the appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz
with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police
investigators. Luz was not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies, as
mandated by Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:

How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement. - Before a witness can be impeached
by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the
statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If
the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them.

The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. Before the credibility of a witness and the
truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements which are
inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for
impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness must
be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements
and state the circumstances under which they were made.[51] This Court held in People v. Escosura[52]
that the statements of a witness prior to her present testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching her
credibility unless her attention was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given an
opportunity to explain said inconsistencies. In a case where the cross-examiner tries to impeach the
credibility and truthfulness of a witness via her testimony during a preliminary examination, this Court
outlined the procedure in United States vs. Baluyot,[53] thus:

...For instance, if the attorney for the accused had information that a certain witness, say Pedro
Gonzales, had made and signed a sworn statement before the fiscal materially different from that given
in his testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon the attorney when cross-examining said
witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not make such and such
statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement different from that delivered in court.
If the witness admits the making of such contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of the
admission, while the witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the other
hand, if the witness denies making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove
that the witness did make such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the
document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. This process of cross-
examining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of the
American courts laying a predicate for the introduction of contradictory statements. It is almost
universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid upon cross-examination, evidence of contradictory
statements are not admissible to impeach a witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent
in the discretion of the court.

In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination
and her sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any discrepancies between her
present testimony and her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. The
appellants did not even mark and offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for the
specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her present testimony. Unless so marked and offered
in evidence and accepted by the trial court, said transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered
by the court.[54]
On the purported inconsistencies or discrepancies catalogued by the appellants relating to the testimony
of Luz during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement, the Office of the Solicitor General
posits that:

Sixth, Volante indeed testified that when she returned to their house from the ricefield, after the three
accused had left the premises, her husband was still alive (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 19) as he was still
able to ask for her assistance (Ibid, p. 20). But it is not inconsistent with the expert opinion of Dr.
Consolacion that by the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim, the latter could have died thereof
instantaneously (TSN, February 3, 1997, p. 35). It is clear that the said physician was merely stating a
possibility and not what happened in the instant case because in the first place, she was not present at
the scene right after the incident.

Seventh, Volante was insistent in her testimony that at the time of the commission of the subject crime,
it was bright inside their house because they had a kerosene lamp and a bottle lamp both lighted up, one
placed on the wall and the other on the ceiling (Ibid, pp. 33, 52-53). While it may appear contradictory to
SPO1 Pornillos testimony that there was only a kerosene lamp at the time, he could not have been
expected to notice all the things found inside the house, including the bottle lamp, because he might not
have been familiar with its interiors. Or, he could have focused his attention primarily on the body of the
fallen victim and the objects that may be used later as evidence against the perpetrators of the crime.

Eight, it is admitted that the testimonies of Volante and SPO1 Pornillos as to who took pictures of the
crime scene including the lifeless body of the victim are contradictory. But again, such contradiction,
being only minor and irrelevant, does not affect the credibility of their testimonies.

And ninth, the apparently inconsistent statements of the prosecution witnesses (SPO1 Pornillos and
SPO4 Javier) as to the exact time the subject incident was reported to the police authorities are similarly
irrelevant to the matters in issue. Of consequence here is the fact that on the night the crime was
committed, it was reported to the authorities who later effected the arrest of the perpetrators thereof.
[55]

The Court fully agrees with the foregoing ruminations of the Office of the Solicitor General. The
inconsistencies adverted to by the appellants pertained only to minor and collateral matters and not to
the elements of the crime charged; hence, they do not dilute the probative weight of the testimony. It
bears stressing that even the most truthful witness can make mistakes but such innocent lapses do not
necessarily affect his credibility. The testimonies of witnesses must be considered and calibrated in their
entirety and not by their truncated portions or isolated passages.[56] And then again, minor
contradictions among several witnesses of a particular incident and aspect thereof which do not relate
to the gravamen of the crime charged are to be expected in view of their differences in impressions,
memory, vantage points and other related factors.[57]
Contrary to appellant Jaime, Jr.s claim, the prosecution adduced proof that he and appellant Ronald
conspired to kill and did kill Diosdado by their simultaneous acts of stabbing the victim. As narrated by
Luz:

ATTY. BALLEBAR:

Q Now after Jaime Castillano Sr. fired at your house, what happened next if any?

A They entered our house.

Q Now, when you say they to whom are you referring to?

A Jaime Castillano Sr., Jaime Castillano, Jr., and Ronald Castillano.

Q Now, where did they enter?

A In the other door.

Q Now at the time they entered your house was the door of your house closed or opened?

A It was closed.

Q Now, after the accused entered your house what happened next, if any?

A Jaime Castillano Jr. stabbed my husband and also Ronal Castillano stabbed my husband.

Q Now, was your husband hit by the stabbing of Ronald Castillano, Jr. (sic)?
A Yes, sir.

Q Will you tell us on what part of his body was he hit?

A My husband was still struck by Ronald Castillano hitting him on his right side of his body including on
his right thigh and also on his back..

ATTY. BALLEBAR:

Q Now, you said Ronald Castillano struck your husband, now with what instrument did he use in
strucking (sic) your husband?

ATTY. BERNALES:

We object, misleading, your Honor.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

WITNESS:

A A pipe.

ATTY. BALLEBAR:

Q Now, will you tell us more or less how long was that pipe that was used by Ronald Castillano?

A About one (1) meter, Maam.[58]

Luz was merely five meters away from where Diosado was attacked and stabbed by the appellants.
Appellant Jaime, Jr. even tried to cut the ankle of the victim:

ATTY. BALLEBAR:

Q Now during this incident, how far were you from the accused and your husband?

A From where I am sitting up to that window which is about five (5) meters.

Q Now after the accused strucked (sic) and shot your husband, what else happened if any?

A Jaime Castillano Jr. stabbed my husband on his breast (Witness is pointing to her breast).

ATTY. BERNALES:

We will move that the answer be striken off from the records because it is not responsive to the
question. The question is after your husband has been stabbed strucked (sic) and shot.

COURT:

Q Your are being asked what happened after the accused was already stabbed, strucked (sic) and shot,
what happened next?

WITNESS:

Q Jaime Castillano Junior still stabbed my husband and try to cut his ankle, Your Honor.

COURT:
Strike our (sic) the previous answer of the witness.

ATTY. BALLEBAR:

Q By the way, will you tell us how many times did Ronald Castillano stab your husband?

A I cannot determine how many times he even stabbed my husband on his left eye.

Q How about Jaime Castillano Jr., how many times did he stab your husband?

A I cannot determine exactly how many times but he repeatedly stabbed my husband.[59]

The mere denial appellant Jaime, Jr. of the crime charged is but a negative self-serving which cannot
prevail over the positive and straightforward testimony of Luz and the physical evidence on record.[60]

The Crime Committed by Appellants

The trial court correctly convicted the appellants of murder, qualified by treachery, under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Court, however, does not agree with the trial courts finding that evident
premeditation attended the commission of the crime.

Case law has it that the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt qualifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime. For evident premeditation to qualify a crime, the
prosecution must prove the confluence of the essential requites thereof: (a) the time when the offender
has determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender has clung to his
determination; (c) an interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime enough
to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[61] There must be proof beyond cavil when
and how the offender planned to kill the victim and that sufficient time had elapsed between the time
he had decided to kill the victim and the actual killing of the victim, and that in the interim, the offender
performed overt acts positively and conclusively showing his determination to commit the said crime.
[62] In this case, the only evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove evident premeditation is the
testimony of Levy Avila that between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on July 8, 1996, he heard the appellants
planning to go to the house of Diosdado and that he heard them say: Ayaw namin kasing inaasar, and
that at 8:00 p.m., the appellants arrived in the house of the victim and stabbed him to death. There is no
evidence of any overt acts of the appellants when they decided to kill Diosdado and how they would
consummate the crime. There is no evidence of any overt acts perpetrated by the appellants between
5:00 and 8:00 p.m. that they clung to their determination to kill Diosdado.

There is treachery in the commission of a crime when (a) at the time of attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; (b) the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods and forms of attack employed by him.[63] Even a frontal attack may be treacherous when
unexpected on an unarmed victim who would not be in a position to repel the attack or avoid it.[64] In
this case, the victim was unarmed and was supinely resting before sleeping after a hard days work.
Although Luz warned the victim that the appellants were already approaching their house, however, the
victim remained unperturbed when the appellants barged into the victims house. They stabbed him
repeatedly with diverse deadly weapons. The victim had nary a chance to defend himself and avoid the
fatal thrusts of the appellants.

The crime was committed in the house of the victim. There was no provocation on the part of the victim.
Dwelling thus aggravated the crime. However, dwelling was not alleged in the information, as mandated
by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

The use by appellant Ronald of an unlicensed firearm to shoot Diosdado on the thigh is not an
aggravating circumstance because (1) there is no allegation in the information that said appellant had no
license to possess the firearm. That appellant lacked the license to possess the firearm is an essential
element of the crime and must be alleged in the information.[65] Although the crime was committed
before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2002, the rule should, however, be applied retroactively
as it is favorable to the appellants.[66]

The appellants are not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The evidence
shows that the appellants were arrested when the police officers manning the checkpoint stopped the
passenger jeepney driven by appellant Ronald and arrested the appellants. The fact that the appellants
did not resist but went peacefully with the peace officers does not mean that they surrendered
voluntarily.[67]
There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the appellants
should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The Civil Liabilities of the Appellants

The trial court awarded the total amount of P177,421 as civil indemnity, actual and moral damages in
favor of the heirs of the victim Diosdado. The Court has to modify the awards.

Appellants Ronald and Jaime, Jr. are obliged to pay jointly and severally the amount of P50,000 as civil
indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; P25,000 as exemplary damages in view of the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling;[68] and the amount of P18,300 for funeral and religious services. The heirs of
the victim failed to adduce in evidence any receipts or documentary evidence to prove their claim for
food and other expenses during the wake. However, they are entitled to temperate damages in the
amount of P5,000, conformably with the ruling of the Court in People v. dela Tongga.[69] His wife Luzs
testimony that the victim had an annual income of more than P65,000 is not sufficient as basis for an
award for unearned income for being self-serving. There was no proof of the average expense of the
victim and his family and his net income. In People v. Ereo,[70] this Court held that:

It bears stress that compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and as such requires due
proof of the damage suffered; there must be unbiased proof of the deceaseds average income. In the
instant case, the victims mother, Lita Honrubia, gave only a self-serving hence unreliable statement of
her deceased daughters income. Moreover, the award for lost income refers to the net income of the
deceased, that is, her total income less her average expenses. No proof of the victims average expenses
was presented. Hence, there can be no reliable estimate of the deceaseds lost income.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur, Branch 31 in
Criminal Case No. P-2542 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Ronald Castillano alias Nono and
Jaime Castillano, Jr. alias Junjun are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by
treachery, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, the appellants are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. They
are, likewise, ordered to pay jointly and severally to the heirs of the victim, Diosdado Volante, the
amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; P18,300 as actual damages; P25,000
as exemplary damages; and P5,000 as temperate damages. Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.
People vs. Nestor Bajada y Bautista, Victor Calisay y Lozaga and John Doe, G.R. No. 180507, November
20, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus -

NESTOR BAJADA y BAUTISTA, VICTOR CALISAY y LOYAGA, and JOHN DOE,

Accused-Appellants.

G.R. No. 180507

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

November 20, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the February 7, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01043 which affirmed the conviction of and death penalty for accused-appellants for the crime of
robbery with homicide. Said judgment was originally handed down on October 30, 2001[2] by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28 in Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. SC-8076.

The Facts

An information dated January 21, 2000 was filed against accused-appellants Nestor Bajada y Bautista,
Victor Calisay y Loyaga, and John Doe which accused them of committing robbery with homicide and
serious physical injuries, as follows:

That on or about 11:30 oclock in the evening of December 22, 1999, at Brgy. Calumpang, Municipality of
Liliw, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, and by means of violence
and intimidation upon person, enter the house of one ANTONIO C. VILLAMAYOR, and once inside, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away the following valuables, to
wit:

Cash Money -PhP 20,000.00;

Assorted jewelry - 80,000.00;

$500.00 (current rate $1.00=40.00)- 20,000.00; and

some pertinent documents

with the total amount of HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND (PhP 120,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
for their own personal use and benefit, owned and belonging to said Antonio C. Villamayor, and in the
course of the said occasion, above-named accused while conveniently armed with a handgun and bladed
weapon, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, kick, attack, assault and stab ANTONIO C. VILLAMAYOR,
resulting [in] his instantaneous death, and also inflicted upon ANABELLE ASAYTONO, stab wound on her
left chest, thus, accused had commenced all the acts of execution which could have produced the crime
of Homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason/cause independent of the
will of the accused, which prevented her death, to the damage and prejudice of the herein surviving
heirs of Antonio Villamayor and offended party, Anabelle Asaytono.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Bajada and Calisay pleaded not guilty to the charge.

During trial, the prosecution sought to establish the following facts: Bajada and Calisay were overseers at
Antonio C. Villamayors farm in Bayate, Laguna. As overseers, they visited Villamayors house in Liliw,
Laguna at least four times a week to deliver vegetables from the farm.[4]

On December 22, 1999, around 11:30 p.m., while 81-year old Villamayor was at home with his 24 year-
old live-in partner, Anabelle Asaytono, they heard someone call for Villamayor asking for coffee. The
caller introduced himself as Hector, Villamayors grandson, but Asaytono recognized the voice as Bajadas.
As Villamayor opened the door, the caller, Hector, pushed the door open with the barrel of a two-foot
long gun. Asaytono recognized Hector as Bajada because of his average physique, repulsive smell, the
black bonnet which he often wore at work, the deep-set eyes, mouth, a lump on his cheek, and the
green shirt which was given to him by Villamayor. Asaytono likewise recognized one of the men as
Calisay, noting his hair cut, eye bags, and voice. Calisay wore a red handkerchief across his face and
carried a 14-inch knife in his right hand. The third unidentified man, John Doe, wore a bonnet and
carried a 2 foot long gun with a magazine.[5]

Upon entering the house, John Doe said, There are many people in Calumpang who are angry at you
because you are a usurer engaged in 5-6, so give me PhP 100,000 right now. John Doe made Villamayor
sit down but when the latter refused, John Doe made him lie face down on the floor and kicked his back
several times. Meanwhile, Bajada pointed his gun at Asaytono and demanded for money. Asaytono
denied having any money. She was then made to lie face down on the ground and was kicked. John Doe
asked from Villamayor the key to the cabinet which was a meter away from the latter. Villamayor
brought out a key from his pocket and handed it to Bajada. Asaytono, who was able to stand up, saw the
three accused unlock Villamayors cabinet and took out its contents which consisted of documents and
clothes. Accused-appellants also opened the drawer and took jewelry valued at PhP 80,000 and the PhP
20,000 and USD 500 cash.[6]
Thereafter, Bajada pushed Asaytono towards Villamayor, laying her head sideways on Villamayors head.
In this position, Asaytono was able to see Calisay repeatedly stab Villamayor on the back. Calisay then
stabbed Asaytono on her left breast. Asaytono pretended to be dead as she lied on Villamayor who was
still moving. The three men then hurriedly left the house. Asaytono stood up and saw through the three
men move towards the rice field. She noticed that Villamayors dog wagged its tail as it followed the
three men, the way it did when accused-appellants would visit Villamayor.[7]

Assured that the men had left the area, Asaytono ran to the house of her neighbor, Cristy Samparada, for
help. After telling about incident to her neighbor, Asaytono lost consciousness and regained the same
after two days at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) in Manila. Dr. Michael Baccay, the attending
physician, testified that Asaytono suffered pneumochemo thorax, or the presence of air and blood in the
thoracic cavity of the left lung, which could cause death in six to eight hours if left untreated. Dr. Marilou
Cordon, the medico-legal officer, testified that Villamayors death was caused by hypovolemic shock
secondary to stab wounds. She opined that the stab wounds may have been caused by a single bladed
knife inflicted by one person. She added that the stab which pierced the right lung may have caused his
instantaneous death due to blood loss.[8]

The incident was reported to the police of Liliw, Laguna on December 22, 1999. Based on the
information given by Villamayors daughter, Perlita, PO2 Ronald Pana invited Bajada for questioning on
December 26. The following day, the police also invited Calisay for questioning. Thereafter, PO2 Pana and
his team went to PGH to interview Asaytono. On December 28, 1999, Asaytono gave her sworn
statement to the police officers of Liliw, Laguna and identified Bajada and Calisay as the perpetrators of
the crime. The following day, she reiterated her statement during the preliminary investigation
conducted by Judge Renato Bercales of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) in Magdalena, Laguna.

The defense presented Bajada, Calisay, and Editha Loyaga Calisay as witnesses. Bajada is Calisays
stepfather, while Editha is Bajadas live-in partner and Calisays mother. Bajada and Calisay denied
committing the crime and offered an alibi. They said they were husking coconuts until around 11:00 p.m.
on December 22, 1999. They went to sleep afterwards in view of the work they had to do at Villamayors
farm on the following day. Editha corroborated this alibi alleging that she helped accused-appellants in
gathering young coconuts on the night in question. Calisay testified that he learned about the death of
Villamayor from Villamayors nephew when he and Editha chanced upon him in town. Calisay and his
mother thereafter went to the funeral parlor to see the body of Villamayor. When they got home, they
informed Bajada of the news. Bajada went to see the remains of Villamayor to know the circumstances
surrounding the latters death. Bajada was arrested in the wake, questioned by the police, and eventually
charged with the crime.[9]

Bajada testified that he had known Villamayor for two years and had a good relationship with the latter
and Asaytono. He believed that Asaytono accused him as the perpetrator because he dissuaded
Villamayor from visiting Asaytonos relatives in Bicol since Villamayor was too old and frail to travel. This
was allegedly overheard by Asaytono. Bajada added that Villamayor fully trusted him with the secret
that Asaytono will not inherit any land from Villamayor. Bajada also alleged that Asaytono accused him
of the crime because he warned Villamayor not to leave money in the house because Bajada suspected
Asaytonos motives. Calisay added that Asaytono used to get angry whenever Bajada would get money
from Villamayor. Calisay, however, testified that he did not see any ill motive on the part of Asaytono
when she testified against accused-appellants.

On October 30, 2001, the RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds both the accused
NESTOR BAJADA and VICTOR CALISAY as GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as co-principals of the
offense of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE as defined and punished under paragraph No. (1) of Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by the Death Penalty Law (RA 7659) and as charged in the
Information and taking into consideration the two (2) aggravating circumstances enumerated
hereinbefore without any mitigating circumstance that would offset the same, hereby sentences both
the said accused to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH and to pay the heirs of the deceased
Antonio Villamayor the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and the sum of P78,620.00 as reasonable
expenses incurred by reasons of said death and to pay the cost of the instant suit.[10]
Accused-appellants filed their brief before this Court on April 3, 2003, docketed as G.R. No. 153218. On
September 21, 2004, we transferred the case to the CA in accordance with People v. Mateo.[11]

The Ruling of the CA

In their appeal before the CA, accused-appellants reiterated their defenses of denial and alibi. They
claimed that Asaytonos testimonies in court on March 30, 2000 and April 4 and 6, 2000 were
inconsistent to the statements she gave to the police on December 28, 1999, and with the statements
given to MCTC Judge Bercales on December 29, 1999. These alleged inconsistencies referred to the
identity of the caller, the state of intoxication of accused-appellants, and the manner of identification of
accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.

The CA held that Asaytonos testimony was categorical and straightforward, and her identification of
accused-appellants was consistent. Having worked with accused-appellants in the farm for a year, she
can readily identify their facial features, voices, physique, and smell. According to the CA, the details
which were lacking in her sworn statement but which she supplied in open court only served to
strengthen her testimony. The CA did not lend credence to accused-appellants defense of alibi since it
was possible for them to be at the crime scenethey claimed that they slept at 11:00 p.m. while the
incident happened at 11:30 p.m.; and the victims house was only 15 minutes away by jeep from the
farm.
The CA, however, disagreed with the trial courts finding of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
additional serious physical injury. It said that the information failed to specifically allege the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling; hence, it cannot be appreciated even if proved during trial. Also, applying
People v. Abdul, the appellate court held that the homicides or murders and physical injuries committed
on occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged in the composite crime of robbery with homicide.
[12] It concluded that absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be reduced
to reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the CAs judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision, dated 30 October 2001, of the Regional Trial
Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. Considering that there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance which attended the commission of the crime, accused-
appellants are, hereby, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.[13]

Bajadas motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated July 24, 2007. The Public Attorneys
Office filed a Notice of Appeal; however, per verification, there was neither a motion for reconsideration
nor appeal on behalf of Calisay. Thus, on August 24, 2007, the CA granted Bajadas notice of appeal and
entered judgment insofar as Calisay was concerned.[14]

Assignment of Error

In the instant appeal, accused-appellant Bajada reiterates his defenses and assigns the following error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE WITHOUT THEIR GUILT HAVING BEEN PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

Bajada asserts that the lower court erred in convicting him and his co-accused based on the testimony in
open court of the prosecution witness, Asaytono. Such testimony is allegedly inconsistent with the
December 28, 1999 sworn statement given to the police and the December 29, 1999 statement given
before MCTC Judge Bercales during the preliminary investigation. In her December 28, 1999 sworn
statement, Asaytono mentioned that she recognized Bajada as the caller though the latter
misrepresented himself as Hector. Asaytono also said that while the three accused were inside the
house, they smelled like they had lambanog, a native wine. These facts, Bajada alleges, were never
mentioned in the preliminary investigation and in court. Moreover, while Asaytono told the police that
she was able to identify the two accused because of the fluorescent lamp at the kitchen, she failed to
mention what parts of accused-appellants faces were covered by the bonnet and kerchief. She supplied
these details only during the preliminary investigation and examination in open court. Furthermore,
when Asaytono sought the help of her neighbor, Samparada, she only told the latter that three persons
robbed their house and stabbed her and Villamayor, without identifying Bajada and Calisay as the
perpetrators. Bajada believes that the manner of identification is suspicious since he and his co-accused
were identified only after their arrest and detention based on the statements of random witnesses and
not by Asaytono.[15] Lastly, Bajada tries to discredit Asaytono by pointing out that as a paramour of
Villamayor, she had no compunction about seducing an 81-year-old man to meet her financial needs.
Her alleged interest in inheriting from Villamayor led her to cause the latters death and find a fall guy for
it; hence, she accused Bajada and Calisay.[16] Bajada and Calisay also sent a letter entitled Petition
addressed to former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban. Said letter alleged that an eyewitness who was
afraid to testify revealed to Bajada that it was Asaytonos live-in partner and the children of Villamayor
who were responsible for the crime. Two handwritten letters from the said eyewitness were attached to
the Petition.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

The inconsistencies in the sworn statements and testimony of the prosecution witness, Asaytono,
referred to by accused-appellant Bajada do not affect her credibility. The details which she supplied to
the police and to the investigating judge are trivial compared to the testimony she gave in open court.
What is important is that in all three statements, i.e., sworn statement before the police, sworn
statement before Judge Bercales, and testimony in open court, Asaytono consistently and clearly
identified accused-appellants as the perpetrators. The essential facts do not differ: three men entered
and robbed the house of Villamayor and stabbed him and Asaytono, and Asaytono witnessed the
stabbing and recognized two of the accused because she was familiar with the latters physical attributes.

Also, the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that the defense counsel did not confront Asaytono with
these alleged inconsistencies. In People v. Castillano, Sr., we held that:

Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence
consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner
must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the
witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the
apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were
made. This Court held in People v. Escosura that the statements of a witness prior to her present
testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching her credibility unless her attention was directed to the
inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given an opportunity to explain said inconsistencies.[17]

This is in line with Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which states:
Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements.Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and
the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to
explain them. If the statements be in writing, they must be shown to the witness before any question is
put to him concerning them.

More controlling is our ruling in People v. Alegado where we held that inconsistencies between the
sworn statement and the testimony in court do not militate against the witness credibility since sworn
statements are generally considered inferior to the testimony in open court.[18]

In any case, Asaytono was able to sufficiently identify Bajada as one of the perpetrators to the
satisfaction of the trial court. Asaytonos familiarity with Bajada cannot be denied; she has known Bajada
and Calisay for more than a year prior to the incident. The two accused were also frequent visitors at the
victims house. Hence, Asaytono was acquainted with Bajadas physical features. The trial court found her
testimony to be credible, frank, straightforward, and consistent throughout the trial. We see no reason
to disturb this finding since trial courts are in a unique position to observe the demeanor of witnesses.
[19] The trial courts findings regarding the witness credibility are accorded the highest degree of respect.

Furthermore, Bajada could not ascribe any plausible ill motive against the witness. His accusation against
Asaytono that the latter was interested in inheriting from Villamayor is self-serving and uncorroborated.
Even Bajadas own stepson, Calisay, stated that there was no prior misunderstanding between him and
Asaytono and that he did not know any reason why Asaytono would accuse them of a crime. The letters
allegedly written by an eyewitness who was afraid to testify in trial cannot be given probative value. The
letters accused Asaytono as one of the culpritsa defense which was already dismissed by the courts a
quo. There was no evidence to support such allegation. The said letters were belatedly submitted,
uncorroborated, and cannot be admitted in evidence.
Bajadas alibi likewise deserves no merit. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that the accused was
somewhere else at the time of the commission of the offense and that it was physically impossible for
the accused to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[20] Bajada himself
admitted, however, that the travel time from Bayate, Liliw, Laguna to the crime scene is only 15 minutes
by jeep. Hence, it was possible for him to be at the crime scene at or around the time the offense was
committed.

The appellate court correctly reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The aggravating circumstance
of dwelling was not specifically alleged in the information. As regards the additional charge of serious
physical injuries, we held in Abdul[21] that this is merged in the crime of robbery with homicide.

WHEREFORE, the February 7, 2006 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01043 is AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

14. Evidence of good character of witness

15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses

16. When witness may refer to memorandum

17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder, the remainder
admissible

18. Right to respect writing shown to witness

Catacutan v. People, G.R. No. 175991, August 31, 2011;

[G.R. No. 175991 : August 31, 2011]

JOSE R. CATACUTAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

It is well within the Court's discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes
irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Jose R. Catacutan seeking to set aside
and reverse the Decision[1] dated December 7, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan which affirmed the
Decision[2] dated July 25, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Surigao City convicting him
of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.

Factual Antecedents

The antecedent facts are clear and undisputed.

Private complainant Georgito Posesano was an Instructor II with Salary Grade 13 while private
complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was an Education Program Specialist II with Salary Grade 16, both
at the Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT).[3]

On June 2, 1997, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Caraga Administrative Region, appointed
and promoted private complainants as Vocational Instruction Supervisor III with Salary Grade 18 at
SNSAT.[4] These promotional appointments were duly approved and attested as permanent by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) on June 3, 1997.[5] Being then the Officer-In-Charge of SNSAT, the approved
appointments were formally transmitted to the petitioner on June 6, 1997,[6] copy furnished the
concerned appointees. Despite receipt of the appointment letter, the private complainants were not
able to assume their new position since petitioner made known that he strongly opposed their
appointments and that he would not implement them despite written orders from CHED[7] and the CSC,
Caraga Regional Office.[8] Thus, on August 2, 1997, private complainants lodged a formal complaint
against petitioner for grave abuse of authority and disrespect of lawful orders before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao.[9]
In an Information dated February 27, 1998, petitioner was charged before the RTC of Surigao City with
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as amended, committed in the following manner, to wit:

That in June 1997 or sometime thereafter, in Surigao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN, OIC Principal of Surigao del Norte School of Arts and
Trades (SNSAT), Surigao City, with salary grade below 27, while in the performance of his official duties,
thus committing the act in relation to his office, willfully, feloniously and unlawfully did then and there,
with grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith, refuse to implement the promotion/appointments
of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Supervisors III notwithstanding the
issuance of the valid appointments by the appointing authority and despite the directive of the Regional
Director of the Commission on Higher Education and the Civil Service Commission in the region, thereby
causing undue injury to complainants who were supposed to receive a higher compensation for their
promotion, as well as [to] the school and the students who were deprived of the better services which
could have been rendered by Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational
Instruction Supervisors [III].

CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]

During arraignment on September 22, 1998, petitioner pleaded "not guilty."

For his defense, petitioner admitted that he did not implement the promotional appointments of the
private complainants because of some procedural lapses or infirmities attending the preparation of the
appointment papers. According to him, the appointment papers were prepared by SNSAT Administrative
Officer, Crispin Noguera, using blank forms bearing the letterhead of SNSAT and not of the CHED
Regional Office who made the appointments. He also averred that the appointment papers cited the
entire plantilla[11] (1996 Plantilla-OSEC-DECSB-VOCIS3-19, Pages 1-16) instead of only the particular
page on which the vacant item occurs. He likewise claimed that he received only the duplicate copies of
the appointments contrary to the usual procedure where the original appointment papers and other
supporting documents are returned to his office. Finally, he asserted that the transmittal letter from the
CHED did not specify the date of effectivity of the appointments. These alleged infirmities, he
contended, were formally brought to the attention of the CHED Regional Director on June 20, 1997[12]
who, however, informed him that the subject appointments were regular and valid and directed him to
implement the same. Still not satisfied, petitioner sought the intercession of CHED Chairman Angel C.
Alcala in the settlement of this administrative problem[13] but the latter did not respond. Petitioner
alleged that his refusal to implement the appointments of the private complainants was not motivated
by bad faith but he just wanted to protect the interest of the government by following strict compliance
in the preparation of appointment papers.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 25, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision[14] holding that the act of the petitioner in defying the
orders of the CHED and the CSC to implement the subject promotional appointments despite the
rejection of his opposition, demonstrates his palpable and patent fraudulent and dishonest purpose to
do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. The trial court ruled
that petitioner's refusal to implement the appointments of the private complainants had caused undue
injury to them. Thus, it held petitioner guilty of the crime charged and accordingly sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month and perpetual disqualification from
public office.

The RTC disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt [of] VIOLATION
OF SECTION 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, this Court
hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment [of] SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH and
PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE, and to pay the costs.

The aforementioned accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainants Georgito Posesano and
Magdalena Divinagracia the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each, for moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration[16] but it was denied in an Order[17] dated October 13, 2005.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On appeal, petitioner's conviction was affirmed in toto by the Sandiganbayan.[18] The appellate court
ruled that the Decision of the trial court, being supported by evidence and firmly anchored in law and
jurisprudence, is correct. It held that petitioner failed to show that the trial court committed any
reversible error in judgment.

Hence, this petition.

In the Court's Resolution[19] dated February 26, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was
required to file its Comment. The OSG filed its Comment[20] on June 5, 2007 while the Office of the
Special Prosecutor filed the Comment[21] for respondent People of the Philippines on February 22,
2008.

Issue

The sole issue for consideration in this present petition is:

Whether the [petitioner's] constitutional right[s] to due process x x x and x x x equal protection of [the]
law x x x were violated x x x [when he was denied] the opportunity to present [in] evidence [the Court of
Appeals'] Decision dated April 18, 2001 x x x in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 entitled "Jose R. Catacutan,
petitioner, versus Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, et al., respondents."[22]

Invoking the constitutional provision on due process,[23] petitioner argues that the Decision rendered by
the trial court is flawed and is grossly violative of his right to be heard and to present evidence. He
contends that he was not able to controvert the findings of the trial court since he was not able to
present the Court of Appeals' (CA's) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 which denied the administrative
case filed against him and declared that his intention in refusing to implement the promotions of the
private complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent.

Our Ruling

The petition lacks of merit.

Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process.

"Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard."[24] "Due process is satisfied when the
parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy."[25] "Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process."[26]

Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim denial of his
fundamental right to due process. Records show that petitioner was able to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him, argue his case vigorously, and explain the merits of his defense. To reiterate,
as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to
have been denied due process of law for the opportunity to be heard is the better accepted norm of
procedural due process.

There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to introduce as
evidence the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795. It is well within the court's discretion to reject the
presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on
hand. This is specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding as in this
case, concerns an administrative matter. As the Sandiganbayan aptly remarked:

The RTC committed no error in judgment when it did not allow the Accused-appellant to present the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 (Jose R. Catacutan vs. Office of the
Ombudsman). The findings in administrative cases are not binding upon the court trying a criminal case,
even if the criminal proceedings are based on the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the
administrative matter. The dismissal of a criminal case does not foreclose administrative action or
necessarily gives the accused a clean bill of health in all respects. In the same way, the dismissal of an
administrative case does not operate to terminate a criminal proceeding with the same subject matter. x
x x[27]

This action undertaken by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court was not without legal
precedent. In Paredes v. Court of Appeals,[28] this Court ruled:

It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from
criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to
an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is
the criminal liability for the same act.

xxxx

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the
sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one
should not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative
case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases. x x x

In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,[29] the Court reiterated:

This Court is not unmindful of its rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the
filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint and
that the disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the resolution of the other case/s and vice
versa. x x x

On the basis of the afore-mentioned precedents, the Court has no option but to declare that the courts
below correctly disallowed the introduction in evidence of the CA Decision. "Due process of law is not
denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an
incompetent witness. It is not an error to refuse evidence which although admissible for certain
purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it."[30]

At any rate, even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence of the
CA Decision, petitioner is not left without legal recourse. Petitioner could have availed of the remedy
provided in Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. - If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by
the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence
excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the
witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.

As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on having the RTC admit the CA's Decision
for whatever it may be worth, he could have included the same in his offer of exhibits. If an exhibit
sought to be presented in evidence is rejected, the party producing it should ask the court's permission
to have the exhibit attached to the record.

As things stand, the CA Decision does not form part of the records of the case, thus it has no probative
weight. Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must be formally
offered by him otherwise it is excluded and rejected and cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal.
The rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value to evidence
which was not formally offered.

Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful.

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

Under said provision of law, three essential elements must thus be satisfied, viz:

The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and

His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[31]

All the above enumerated elements of the offense charged have been successfully proven by the
prosecution.

First, petitioner could not have committed the acts imputed against him during the time material to this
case were it not for his being a public officer, that is, as the Officer-In-Charge (Principal) of SNSAT. As
such public officer, he exercised official duties and functions, which include the exercise of administrative
supervision over the school such as taking charge of personnel management and finances, as well as
implementing instruction as far as appointment of teachers.[32]

Second, petitioner acted with evident bad faith in refusing to implement the appointments of private
complainants. As the Sandiganbayan aptly remarked:
The records clearly indicate that the refusal of Catacutan to implement the subject promotion was no
longer anchored on any law or civil service rule as early [as] the July 14, 1997 letter of the CHED Regional
Director addressing the four issues raised by the Accused-appellant in the latter's protest letter. x x x In
light of the undisputed evidence presented to the trial court that Catacutan's reason for not
implementing the appointments was a personal dislike or ill feelings towards Posesano, this Court
believes that Catacutan's refusal was impelled by an ill motive or dishonest purpose characteristic of bad
faith. x x x

xxxx

In the August 1, 1997 [m]emorandum issued by the CHED Regional Director, Catacutan was once again
directed, in strong words, to cease and desist from further questioning what has been lawfully acted
upon by competent authorities. Catacutan deliberately ignored the memorandum and even challenged
the private complainants to file a case against him. Such arrogance is indicative of the bad faith of the
accused-appellant.

Yet again, the [CSC] Regional Director wrote the Accused-appellant on September 5, 1997, clarifying with
finality the validity of the appointment. Still, Accused-appellant failed to implement the subject
promotions. This stubborn refusal to implement the clear and repeated directive of competent
authorities established the evident bad faith of Catacutan and belies any of his claims to the contrary.
[33]

While petitioner may have laudable objectives in refusing the implementation of private complainants'
valid appointments, the Court fails to see how he can still claim good faith when no less than the higher
authorities have already sustained the validity of the subject appointments and have ordered him to
proceed with the implementation. "It is well to remember that good intentions do not win cases,
evidence does."[34]

Third, undue injury to the private complainants was duly proven to the point of moral certainty. Here,
the private complainants suffered undue injury when they were not able to assume their official duties
as Vocational Supervisors III despite the issuance of their valid appointments. As borne out by the
records, they were able to assume their new positions only on November 19, 1997. So in the
interregnum from June to November 1997, private complainants failed to enjoy the benefits of an
increased salary corresponding to their newly appointed positions. Likewise established is that as a
result of petitioner's unjustified and inordinate refusal to implement their valid appointments
notwithstanding clear and mandatory directives from his superiors, the private complainants suffered
mental anguish, sleepless nights, serious anxiety warranting the award of moral damages under Article
2217 of the New Civil Code.
At this point, the Court just needs to stress that the foregoing are factual matters that were threshed out
and decided upon by the trial court which were subsequently affirmed by the Sandiganbayan. Where
the factual findings of both the trial court and the appellate court coincide, the same are binding on this
Court. In any event, apart from these factual findings of the lower courts, this Court in its own
assessment and review of the records considers the findings in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on
December 7, 2006 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.