Professional Documents
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Second Division: Republic of The Philippines Supreme Court Manila
Second Division: Republic of The Philippines Supreme Court Manila
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
Promulgated:
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this appeal the challenge to the May 31, 2006 decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01251. The CA affirmed the May
14, 2004 decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 231, Pasay City,
finding appellant Jhon-Jhon Alejandro y dela Cruz (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165
(the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and imposing on him the penalty
of life imprisonment.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 before the RTC, under an Information that states:
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[4] During the pre-trial, the prosecution
and the defense stipulated on the following:
PRE-TRIAL ORDER
xxxx
A. Testimonial (witnesses) -
xxxx
B. Documentary
C. Real Evidence x x x
xxxx
This pre-trial order shall control the course of the trial in this case,
unless modified by the Court to prevent manifest injustice. The trial
prosecutor as well as the accused and counsel have signed this pre-trial
order to attest to the correctness thereof and their conformity thereto which
may accordingly be used in evidence in this case.[5] [emphases ours]
The evidence for the prosecution established that in the afternoon of September 1,
2002, SPO1 Tan was in the office of the District Drug Enforcement Group, Southern
Police District, Taguig, Metro Manila, when a confidential informant called and told
him about the illegal drug activities of the appellant, alias Nog-nog. Police
Superintendent (P/Supt.) Mariano Fegarido conducted a briefing, and then
dispatched Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Nilo Banzuela, Senior Police Officer 1
(SPO1)Alberto Sangalang, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Carlos Cachapero, SPO1 Tan,
and PO1 Mengote, to meet with the informant.[6]
At around 5:00 p.m., the police met with the informant at the Pio Del Pilar
Elementary School. Thereafter, SPO1 Tan, PO1 Mengote and the informant went
to M. Dela Cruz Street in Pasay City to conduct a surveillance.[7] There, the
informant pointed to a person standing at the corner of Mary Luz Street and M. Dela
Cruz Street, and identified him as the appellant.[8] They observed the appellant for
about half an hour, and saw that there were people approaching him. They also
observed that there was an exchange of goods between the appellant and the people
who approached him.[9] The police thereafter returned to the station where they
underwent another briefing and planned an entrapment operation. Under the plan,
PO1 Mengote was designated as the poseur-buyer.[10]
SPO2 Banzuela, SPO1 Tan, SPO1 Sangalang, PO1 Mengote, PO3 Cachapero
and the informant returned to M. Dela Cruz Street to conduct the buy-bust operation.
When they arrived at the place at around 6:00 p.m., they saw the appellant sitting in
front of a sari-sari store. The informant introduced PO1 Mengote to the appellant as
a buyer (i.e., a shabu scorer). The appellant asked, Magkano ba? PO1 Mengote
answered, Halagang piso. PO1 Mengote then gave the one hundred peso marked
money to the appellant. The appellant, in turn, pulled out a plastic sachet from his
right pocket and handed it to PO1 Mengote. Upon receiving the plastic sachet, PO1
Mengote made the pre-arranged signal (i.e., wiped his face with a towel) to his
companions. Immediately, the other members of the buy-bust team approached the
appellant. They introduced themselves as police officers, recovered the buy-bust
money from the appellant, and arrested him. They then brought him and the
confiscated items to the police station.[11] At the police station, they forwarded the
seized items to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory where they
were examined by P/Insp. Gural.[12]
xxxx
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
xxxx
FINDINGS:
CONCLUSION:
In his defense, the appellant submitted a different version of events. He testified that
at around 6:00 p.m. of September 1, 2002, he was in front of his grandmothers store
on Mary Luz Street, Pasay City, when eight (8) policemen arrived. PO1 Mengote
and SPO1 Tan approached and asked him about the whereabouts of a certain Terio.
When he replied that he did not know where Terio was, the police brought him to
the Pio Del Pilar Elementary School in Makati City[14] from where the police
apparently received a text message informing them that Terio was in Pasay City. The
police and the appellant returned to Mary Luz Street, and entered a house owned by
Terio. Inside, they saw its occupant, Enrico Yatco. The police searched the house
for about half an hour. Afterwards, they brought the appellant and Enrico to the
Sothern Police District.[15] At the police station, PO1 Mengote and SPO1 Tan
showed six (6) pieces of plastic sachets to the appellant and forced him to admit
ownership.[16]
The RTC, in its decision of May 14, 2004, found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment. The RTC also ordered the appellant to pay a P500,000.00 fine.[18]
The records of this case were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal. Pursuant
to our ruling in People v. Efren Mateo y Garcia,[19] we endorsed the case and its
records to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.[20] The CA held that the appellant and his
counsel entered into a stipulation of facts whereby they agreed on the admissibility
of the request for laboratory examination of the submitted specimen and on the
findings of P/Insp. Gural. Hence, they cannot be allowed to question, on appeal, the
identity and integrity of the plastic sachet of shabu seized from the appellant by
members of the entrapment team. The CA added that the prosecution witnesses
positively identified the appellant as the person who handed the plastic sachet
of shabu to the poseur-buyer.[21]
The CA further held that the police officers are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner, in the absence of any evidence of improper motive on
their part. It, likewise, disregarded the appellants defense of denial, as it was
unsupported by reliable corroborative evidence.[22]
In his brief, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in convicting him of
the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He claims that the integrity of the seized item had been
compromised due to the failure of the apprehending police to mark it.[23]
The Office of the Solicitor General counters with the argument that the appellant
cannot now question the identity and integrity of the specimen confiscated from him
as he already entered into a stipulation regarding the admissibility of the request for
laboratory examination and on the result of this examination. In addition, the
appellant failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely
testify against him.[24]
We resolve to ACQUIT the appellant, for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs under
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is material in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes
that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the
illegal transaction.[26] In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance
itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and proof of its existence is vital
to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[27] To remove any
doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, the evidence
must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the very same illicit
drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for drug
pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.[28]
Thus, crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs
or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking
means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials
and signature on the items seized.[31] Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165,
this Court has consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark
the seized drugs casts reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus
delicti.[32] Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it
is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar
or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence.[33]
In the present case, the records do not show that the apprehending team
marked the seized items with their initials immediately upon confiscation.
In Sanchez,[34] we explained that consistency with the chain of custody rule requires
that the marking of the seized items be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation. We clarified in People v. Manuel
Resurreccion[35] that [m]arking upon immediate confiscation does not exclude the
possibility that marking can be at the police station or office of the apprehending
team. In the present case, the testimonies of the apprehending officers do not indicate
that they ever marked the seized items, either at the place of seizure or at the police
station. How the police could have omitted such a basic and vital procedure in the
initial handling of the seized drugs truly baffles us. Going back to what we earlier
discussed, succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the markings as reference.
If at the first instance or opportunity, the apprehending team did not mark the seized
item/s, then there is nothing to identify it later on as it passes from one hand to
another.
Curiously, the seized item already bore the markings TM-1-010902 when it
was examined by the forensic chemist. In the absence, however, of specifics on how,
when and where this marking was done, and who witnessed the marking procedure,
we cannot accept this marking as compliance with the chain of custody requirement
required by the law. In People v. Ranilo Dela Cruz y Lizing,[36] the Court reversed
the accuseds conviction for the failure of the police to mark the plastic sachet in the
presence of the accused or his representatives. People v. Zaida Kamad y
Ambing,[37] likewise, resulted in an acquittal for the failure of the prosecution to
provide specific details on how the seized shabu was marked.
The second link in the chain of custody is the turnover of the confiscated drug
from PO1 Mengote to the police station. To recall, after PO1 Mengote allegedly
received the plastic sachet from the appellant, he made the pre-arranged signal to his
companions. The other members of the buy-bust team approached the appellant,
introduced themselves as police officers, and arrested him. Thereafter, they brought
him and the confiscated item to the police station.
For the succeeding links in the chain of custody, the evidence shows that the
confiscated item was forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory by one SPO2 Pepano,
and then received by a certain Relos. P/Insp. Gural examined the submitted
specimen, and found it positive for the presence of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride. As previously discussed, there was a missing link in the custody of
the confiscated item after it left the possession of PO1 Mengote. The police did not
only fail to mark the specimen immediately upon seizure; it likewise failed to
identify the police officer to whose custody the confiscated item was given at the
police station. Thus, we cannot conclude with certainty that the item seized from the
appellant was the same as that presented for laboratory examination and, later on,
presented in court.
That the defense admitted the existence of the Booking and Information Sheet
(Exh. C), the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exh. D) and Physical Science
Report No. D-1331-02 (Exh. E) during the pre-trial did not amount to an admission
of the identity of the seized specimen. What the admissions proved were merely the
existence and authenticity of the request for laboratory examination and the result of
this examination, not the required chain of custody from the time of seizure of
evidence. Simply put, the admission regarding the existence of Exhibits C, D and E
has no bearing on the question of whether the specimen submitted for chemical
analysis was the same as that seized from the appellant.[38] To interpret the
stipulations as an admission that the appellant was the source of the specimen would
be contrary to the pre-trial order (stating that Exhibits C, D and E were admitted as
to their existence only and not as to the source); it would also bind the appellant to
an unceremonious withdrawal of his plea of not guilty.
In like manner, the stipulation during the pre-trial regarding the non-
presentation of the forensic chemist, P/Insp. Gural, merely covers the handling of
the specimen at the forensic laboratory and the result of the examination,
but not the manner the specimen was handled before it came to the possession of the
forensic chemist and after it left his possession.[39]
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and Section 21(a), Article
II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165 give us the
procedures that the apprehending team should observe in the handling of seized
illegal drugs in order to preserve their identity and integrity as evidence. As
indicated by their mandatory terms, strict compliance with the prescribed procedure
is essential and the prosecution must show compliance in every case.[40]
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
This provision is further elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A.
No. 9165, which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
of and custody over said items[.]
The records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing that the
apprehending or buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. PO1 Mengote narrated the police operation as follows:
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
xxxx
A: When I had given him the buy bust money, he pulled x x x the
shabu out of his right pocket pants, sir.
xxxx
Q: What did he do with the shabu which he pulled out of his right
pocket?
xxxx
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
From these exchanges, clearly it appears that the apprehending team did not
photograph or conduct a physical inventory of the item seized, whether at the place
of seizure or at the police station. The non-compliance by the apprehending team
with the photograph and physical inventory requirements under R.A. No. 9165 and
its IRR was also evident in the testimony of another member of the buy-bust teams,
PO1 Tan, who corroborated PO1 Mengotes testimony on material points. Notably,
even the Joint Affidavit of Arrest[42] of the members of the entrapment team made no
mention of any inventory or photograph.
Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9165, the Court applied the procedure
required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending
Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974.[43] Section 1 of this Regulation requires the
apprehending team, having initial custody and control of the seized drugs, to
immediately inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
and/or his representatives, who shall be required to sign and be given copies of the
inventory.
After the passage of R.A. No. 9165, the Court did not waver in ensuring that
the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized drugs were observed.
In People v. Rosemarie R. Salonga,[44] we acquitted the accused for the failure of the
police to inventory and photograph the confiscated items. We also reversed the
accuseds conviction in Gutierrez,[45] for the failure of the buy-bust team to
inventory and photograph the seized items without justifiable grounds. People v.
Cantalejo[46] also resulted in an acquittal because no inventory or photograph was
ever made by the police.
No Presumption of Regularity in
the Performance of Official Duties
In convicting the appellant of the crime charged, both the RTC and the CA relied on
the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed.
However, this presumption is not conclusive and cannot, by itself, overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. The presumption of regularity, it must be
emphasized, obtains only when there is no deviation from the regular performance
of duty. Where the official act in question is irregular on its face, no presumption of
regularity can arise.[51] Our declaration in People v. Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta[52] is
particularly instructive:
In the present case, the procedural lapses by the apprehending team in the handling
of the seized items from their failure to mark it immediately upon confiscation, to
their failure to inventory and photograph it in the presence of the accused, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official, without offering any justifiable ground effectively negated
the presumption of regularity.
Conclusion
In fine, the totality of evidence presented in the present case does not support
the appellant's conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
of the offense. The prosecutions failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act compromised the
identity of the item seized, leading to the failure to adequately prove the corpus
delicti of the crime charged. In accordance with the constitutional mandate that the
guilt of the appellant must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, we hold for failure
to establish the required quantum of evidence that the presumption of innocence
must prevail and acquittal should follow as a matter of right.[54]
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice