Cleveland (Aldridge) Arbitration Awars
Cleveland (Aldridge) Arbitration Awars
City of Cleveland )
) Case No. 01-18-0002-0634
and ) Scott Aldridge, Grievant
)
Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s Association )
APPEARANCES
Arbitrator:
Nels E. Nelson
BACKGROUND
The instant dispute involves the City of Cleveland and the Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s
Association. The city maintains a Division of Police in the Public Safety Department. The
Division of Police consists of the ranks from patrol officer through chief. The union represents
The grievant is Scott Aldridge. He completed the 124th Cleveland Police Academy and
has been a Police Officer in the City of Cleveland for over 10 years. In April 2014, the grievant
completed a training program for Field Training Officers offered by the Academy. In addition,
he took numerous other training courses, including the Cleveland Division of Police Crisis
Intervention Training, which is a 40-hour course focusing on dealing with persons in crisis using
tools such as de-escalation. The grievant also has an Associate’s Degree in Law Enforcement
The events leading to the grievant’s suspension occurred on November 12, 2014. At 8:13
p.m. that day, a call came from Ansel Road where the caller, Joell Anderson, complained that his
sister, TA, who had a history of psychiatric problems, was acting belligerent and the family was
concerned. 1 Officers Antonio Muniz and Stephen McGrath responded at 9:31 p.m. 2 Muniz and
S. McGrath interviewed TA and her family members. They asked Joell Anderson, who was
upsetting TA, to leave the area. The officers found that TA was compliant, had taken her
medicine, and was not a threat to harm herself or others. Muniz and S. McGrath left the scene at
9:59 p.m.
1
TA was involuntarily admitted to Widener Laurelwood Center for Behavioral Medicine from July 30, 2014, to
September 3, 2014, and from September 10, 2014, to October 31, 2014. She was 37 years old, 5'6" tall, and weighed
251 pounds.
2
Muniz was a field training officer and S. McGrath was a probationary officer.
1
At 10:46 p.m., Theresa Overton, Joell Anderson’s fiancé, called the police and
complained that TA was acting combative. At 10:51 p.m. the grievant, serving as a FTO, and
Bryan Myers, a probationary officer, arrived at the scene. The grievant spoke to TA and other
family members. The parties agree that the grievant and Myers did an excellent job de-escalating
the situation and convincing TA to go to the hospital in accordance with the Division’s policies
The grievant and Myers attempted to place TA in the back seat of their cruiser for
transportation to the hospital. However, when Joell Anderson yelled at TA that she was going to
jail, TA began to struggle and rolled out of the cruiser onto the ground. Eventually, the grievant
and Myers were able to handcuff TA as she lay face down on the ground. Because of the use of
less than lethal force, the grievant and Myers called Sergeant Rachell Bottone, a District 3,
At some point, while TA lay on the ground face down in handcuffs, she stopped
struggling and closed her eyes and starting making snoring or grunting noises. The grievant
testified that he checked TA’s breathing and pulse and found them to be normal. Joell Anderson
told the two officers that TA may be “fake sleeping” and that such was not uncommon when she
Bottone arrived at the scene at approximately 11:34 p.m. She found that TA was
unconscious but breathing. Bottone turned TA on her back to ease her breathing and immediately
ordered the grievant to call EMS. EMS arrived at 11:44 p.m. and transported TA to the
Cleveland Clinic Emergency Department where she was pronounced dead at 12:30 a.m. on
2
As required in the case of a death in custody, the Homicide Unit conducted a criminal
investigation and Internal Affairs conducted an Administrative Investigation. The Homicide Unit
conducted interviews, took statements, and filed reports. On January 26, 2015, the Internal
Affairs Unit issued its report recommending disciplinary charges against the grievant and Myers
The grievant’s Garrity interview took place on November 28, 2014. During the interview,
the grievant acknowledged that TA suddenly stopped being active, closed her eyes, and started
making snoring sounds. He stated that when he asked Joell Anderson about TA’s sudden change,
Joell Anderson told him that she sometimes plays “possum.” (Joint Exhibit 30 at 34:00 minutes)
At that point, the grievant started checking TA’s pulse and breathing. He indicated that he then
called Bottone regarding the use of nonlethal force and that as soon as she arrived, she turned TA
on her back to ease her breathing and ordered the grievant to call EMS.
The Cuyahoga County Coroner issued his report on January 8, 2015. He determined that
TA’s death was a homicide caused in part by being physically restrained in a prone position. As
a result of potential criminal charges against the grievant, the criminal investigation was
On February 9, 2015, the city issued disciplinary charges against the grievant.
On November 12, 2014, it was determined that you … failed to notify EMS in a
timely fashion when it became apparent the respondent that you were in contact with
was in need of medical assistance. (Joint Exhibit 7, page 2)
The charging letter alleged numerous violations of the Manual of Rules, the General Police
3
On February 15, 2015, Safety Director Michael McGrath conducted a pre-disciplinary
hearing. 3 At the hearing, the witnesses included Bottone and the grievant. Bottone testified that
when she arrived at the scene, TA was unconscious but breathing and she ordered the grievant to
call EMS. The grievant stated that Joell Anderson was the instigator and taunted TA about going
to jail. He also reported that after a few minutes, TA, who was laying prone on the ground in
handcuffs, closed her eyes and became quiet. The grievant testified that Joell Anderson told him
that TA was playing “possum” and that it was not unusual for her to “crash” because of the
medications she was taking. The grievant said he had taken TA’s pulse and checked her
breathing. 4
At the conclusion of the hearing, the union asked the city to hold any disciplinary
decision in abeyance until after the criminal investigation was completed. On May 4, 2015, the
city agreed to delay the release of its disciplinary decision with the proviso that the city would
release the decision not later than seven business days after the County Prosecutor released the
When the investigation was transferred to Cuyahoga County for further investigation, the
County Sheriff interviewed many of the same witnesses to the November 12, 2014, incident. As
part of the investigation, the grievant and Myers provided written statements. The city
complained that the grievant’s statement “omits the most critical fact that the Grievant
previously reported in his Garrity statement and at his pre-disciplinary hearing -- that he checked
[TA’s] pulse and breathing prior to Sgt. Bottone’s arrival” and that the grievant “reports for the
3
On January 26, 2015, Lieutenant Robert Tucker submitted the administrative review to Lieutenant Monroe Goins
who reviewed it and forwarded it to Brian Heffernan, the Commander of the Bureau of Integrity Control, who
signed the report and forwarded it to the Deputy Chief Joellen O’Neill. She reviewed the report and recommended
retraining for the grievant. O’Neill then forwarded the report to Chief Calvin Williams who forwarded it to M.
McGrath, who hears all cases involving potential penalties from a ten-day suspension to termination.
4
There is conflicting testimony about when and how many times the grievant checked TA’s pulse and breathing.
4
first time that [TA] was sitting up after Sergeant Bottone arrived.” (City Post-Hearing Brief, page
18) The union responded that the grievant’s statements have remained consistent and truthful
On February 16, 2016, the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office recused itself from the
case. It did so because it concluded that despite at least two internal reviews to ensure that no
Garrity material was in the case file, the Prosecutor’s Office received and reviewed Garrity
material. The Prosecutor’s Office asked the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to
appoint the Special Prosecutions Section of the Ohio Attorney General’s Office to the case.
Since furnishing the Cuyahoga County Coroner’s report to the Attorney General’s Office
would violate the grievant’s Garrity rights, the Special Prosecutor had to determine the cause and
manner of TA’s death. He selected Dr. Kent Harshbarger, the Monroe County Coroner, to
conduct the examination. Harshbarger found that TA’s death was the result of arteriosclerotic
cardiovascular disease, including a 70% to 80% narrowing of the left anterior descending
coronary artery and 30% narrowing of the left circumflex artery. Harshbarger also noted that the
grievant was taking Resperidol/risperidone that increased the risk of a cardiac event. He
concluded that “it would appear that [TA] suffered no significant chest compression and that
[TA’s] sudden collapse was more consistent with a cardiac event.” (City Exhibit 13 and Union
Exhibit B, page 2)
In September 2017, the Special Prosecutions Section of the Attorney General’s Office
began presenting the facts to a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury. On February 2, 2018, the Grand
5
At the conclusion of the county’s criminal investigation, the union asked the city to
The supplemental pre-disciplinary hearing was held on February 26, 2018. The union
presented the first coroner’s report, which identified TA’s death as a homicide; Harshbarger’s
report, which stated that TA’s death was the result of arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease; a
February 2, 2018, report from the Special Prosecutor, including a copy of the Cuyahoga County
Sheriff’s investigation as well as typewritten statements from the grievant and Myers; a
screenshot of a Facebook page for Theresa Overton, which indicated she was a registered nurse;
and a Chief’s Commendation to the grievant dated April 8, 2008, for immediately notifying EMS
of a non-fatal accident. The city claims that none of the “new” evidence was relevant because
none of it was known to the grievant on November 12, 2014, when he failed to timely contact
EMS.
Upon review of the evidence presented by the Division, the memorialized record, as
well as the arguments of you and your representatives, I find you “Guilty” of the
administrative charges. Specifically, you failed to timely notify EMS, in violation of
the General Police Orders, Manual of Rules and Civil Service Rules.
Therefore, I am issuing you a ten (10) work day suspension without pay (Group III
offenses, first offense). This suspension shall be served on consecutive working days.
(Joint Exhibit 17, page 2)
On March 14, 2018, the union filed a grievance on behalf of the grievant. It charged that
the grievant was suspended without just cause in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement. The union asked the city to rescind the discipline, remove it from the grievant’s
record, pay him for any time missed, and otherwise make him whole for any losses he may have
suffered.
6
When the grievance was not resolved, the union appealed the case to arbitration. The
Arbitrator was informed of his appointment on June 13, 2018. The hearing took place on
September 18, 2018, and October 2, 2018. Post-hearing briefs were received on January 4, 2019.
ISSUE
Was there just cause for the grievant’s ten-day suspension? If not, what is the proper
remedy?
Article IV
Management Rights
(4) Except as expressly limited by the terms of this Contract, any and all rights
concerned with the management of the Division of Police are the exclusive and sole
responsibility of the employer. It is further recognized that the City has the right to:
***
(e) Suspend, discipline, demote or discharge for just cause, lay off, transfer,
assign, schedule, promote, or retain employees;
***
Article VII
Listing of New Employees, Rules and Orders, Personal Service Records
***
***
Article XXIX
Suspension from Duty
(71) The Chief of Police may suspend an officer for ten (10) days or less for
disciplinary reasons. If the Chief recommends a greater penalty, then the Director of
7
Public Safety will hear the disciplinary charge filed against the officer and render
judgment on such charge and set the disciplinary penalty, if any. The Director of
Public Safety is responsible for more severe disciplinary penalties and he shall hear
such matters as soon as practicable following their filing. All decisions of the Director
of Public Safety shall be subject to the Grievance Procedure beginning at Step 3-A.
In addition to the chief, a deputy chief can conduct a pre-disciplinary hearing and
make recommendations to the Chief regarding discipline up to and including a ten
(10) day suspension.
(72) In the event that administrative charges are brought against an officer by the
Chief of Police and such charges arise out of the same facts and circumstances which
are also the subject of a criminal indictment or criminal complaint pending against the
officer, then the following procedures shall apply:
(73) Nothing in this article shall be construed as precluding the preference and
hearing administrative charges alleging violations of the Civil Service rules or the
manual of rules and regulations of the Division of Police even though such
administrative charges may arise out of the same facts and circumstances which are
the subject of a criminal proceeding. No arbitrator or other party shall substitute his
judgment for the judgment of the Chief of Police or Director of Public Safety in
applying the provisions of this article.
***
CITY POSITION
The city argues that it had just cause to discipline the grievant. It charges that “the
Grievant did not timely contact EMS for TA on November 12, 2014, despite the fact he knew
8
that she was on some unknown medications, suddenly stopped her activity, closed her eyes,
started making snoring sounds, and Grievant felt the need to check her pulse and breathing ...”
(City Post-Hearing Brief, page 26) It adds that “the Grievant’s failure to timely contact EMS
contradicts the Division’s policies and expectations, all of the Grievant’s training as well as his
The city suggests that the standards for just cause are clear. It points out that in Clean
There are two proof issues in the arbitration of discipline and discharge cases. The
first involves proof of wrongdoing; the second, assuming that guilt of wrongdoing is
established and that the arbitrator is empowered to modify penalties, concerns a
question of whether the punishment assessed by management should be upheld or
modified.
The city notes that in Sysco Indianapolis, 133 LA 705, 713-714 (2014), Arbitrator Kininmonth
reported that “Arbitrators regularly hold employers to a preponderance of the evidence standard
The city contends that its policy and expectations are that police officers will
immediately notify EMS when a medical situation arises. It states that the grievant knew this
through his training, a commendation he received, and his experience. The city indicates that
“the Grievant … admits that he questioned [TA’s] physical state and went so far as to check her
vitals for approximately seven (7) minutes while she was still in a prone position with eyes
closed and making a snoring/grunting sound.” (City Post-Hearing Brief, page 27)
The city maintains that the grievant failed to call EMS in a timely manner. It observes
that he knew that TA was in distress for 7 to 11 minutes while he took her pulse and monitored
9
her breathing but he failed to contact EMS. The city reports that the grievant failed to call EMS
until Bottone arrived and ordered him to do so. The city claims that this establishes that it
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that it had just cause to suspend the grievant
The city argues that the facts known to the grievant should have prompted him to call
EMS. It points out that the grievant knew that the city’s expectation was that he would call EMS
in a timely manner and that Rule 4.14 of the Manual of Rules states that “personnel shall give
assistance to injured and sick persons and obtain proper transportation to the nearest hospital.”
The city contends that the grievant knew that TA suffered from a medical or mental
condition. It acknowledges that the grievant did not have precise or accurate knowledge of her
medical or mental condition and relied on what family members told him, i.e., TA suffered from
schizophrenia and bipolar disease. The city acknowledges that a police officer would rarely
know a person’s medical history but emphasizes that “officers are trained to react to the
observations and facts before him or her.” (City Post-Hearing Brief, page 28)
The city maintains that the grievant knew that TA had taken some unknown medications.
It points out that he had no accurate information about the drugs she had taken but relied on what
her family members told him. The city notes that “even if he did have accurate information about
[TA’s] medications, as a police officer, he is not trained to assess the effects and side effects of
medications and whether they are appropriately safe or unsafe.” (City Post-Hearing Brief, page
29) It adds, however, that “the grievant was aware of some medical conditions and the use of
medications combined with the physical state of TA warranted a prompt call to EMS.” (Ibid.)
The city argues that the grievant knew that TA’s physical state declined. It observes that
the grievant reported in his Garrity statement that she was initially “active, kicking and yelling
10
and suddenly stopped, her eyes closed and that she began snoring or making another odd
The city contends that TA’s medical condition prompted the grievant to monitor TA’s
breathing and take her pulse. It states that the grievant’s Garrity statement and his statements at
his pre-disciplinary hearing confirm that he took TA’s pulse several times before Bottone
arrived. The city indicates that the grievant admitted that police officers are not trained to take a
person’s pulse but despite this fact, he “decided to rely on his ‘untrained skills’ to take [TA’s]
pulse to determine whether or not EMS should be called.” (City Post-Hearing Brief, page 30)
The city maintains that the grievant relied heavily on Joell Anderson’s statements. It
points out that he told the grievant that his sister “fakes sleeping when she is on her medication.”
(Ibid.) The city notes, however, that while the grievant relied on this statement, the grievant
testified that Joell Anderson instigated the situation by yelling and taunting his sister. It adds that
he also attacked Joell Anderson’s credibility based on his criminal record. The city asks, “how
Grievant can reconcile the confusing conflict that he raises pertaining to the credibility of Joell
Anderson -- he cannot be believable only when it is convenient for the Grievant.” (City Post-
The city argues that Bottone’s testimony and statement are entitled to minimal weight as
to what was within the grievant’s knowledge and observation at the time he should have called
EMS. It observes that she does not know the situation before she arrived but when she arrived on
the scene, “she immediately addressed [TA’s] medical condition by getting her out of the prone
position and ordering the Grievant to contact EMS.” (City Post-Hearing Brief, page 30) The city
reports that Bottone’s written statement from November 14, 2014, confirms that when she
11
The city contends that the testimony of S. McGrath should be ignored. It states that he
testified that he never spoke to the grievant about his observations on the morning of November
12, 2014. The city indicates that he also testified that he was unaware of what the grievant
observed or encountered when the grievant went to the Anderson residence later that day.
The city maintains that the fact that TA’s family members did not prompt the grievant to
call EMS is irrelevant. It points out that it is not necessary for someone to tell an officer that
EMS is needed. The city notes that a police officer is required to use his training, experience, and
observations to determine whether to call EMS. It claims that the fact that the grievant found it
necessary to take TA’s pulse and monitor her breathing undermines his position that there was
no medical situation.
The city argues that at the arbitration hearing, virtually every officer who testified stated
that they had never checked a person’s pulse and then did not call EMS. It observes that M.
McGrath and Calvin Williams, the Chief of Police, testified they had never checked a person’s
pulse and not called EMS and David Medina, the union’s vice president and an instructor at the
Police Academy for 21 years, testified that he did not recall checking anyone’s pulse while on
duty. The union reports that Jeffrey Follmer, the union president, testified that he checked a
person’s pulse but did not call EMS because he was able to wake up the intoxicated person.
The city contends that the evidence regarding Overton being a registered nurse is not
probative of the circumstances and information the grievant had on November 12, 2014. It states
that the grievant admitted that he did not know that she was a registered nurse or a teacher at
Remington College until after the incident. The city indicates that in any event, the fact that she
did not demand that the grievant call EMS “does not change Grievant’s obligations to protect
and preserve the safety and health of someone.” (City Post-Hearing Brief, page 32)
12
The city maintains that the union’s arguments require the Arbitrator to look at the
incident with 20/20 hindsight. It observes that the union “picks apart every aspect of the
subsequent investigation, details the special prosecutor’s report, asks the Arbitrator to consider
the toxicology report and the subsequent coroner’s report, and questions the credibility of
witnesses.” (City Post-Hearing Brief, page 33) The city claims that the union is asking the
Arbitrator to look beyond what the grievant knew on November 12, 2014, when he made the
The city argues that the courts avoid using hindsight when reviewing the conduct of a
police officer. It cites Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1985), which deals
with the use of force. The city points out that the court stated that “the ‘reasonableness’ of a
particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” (Ibid.) It notes that the court also stated that “the
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments -- in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving -- about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” (Ibid.)
The city contends that while the instant case does not involve the split-second decisions
regarding the use of force, the Arbitrator should consider only the facts known to the grievant
when he decided not to call EMS. It states that “when reviewed in that light and the significant
unknowns to the Grievant about [TA’s] physical state, he did not exercise appropriate judgment
or his training.” (Ibid.) The city indicates that as a result the grievant “delayed in timely
The city maintains that the union’s attempt to expand the scope of the grievance to
include the grievant’s restricted duty assignment is inappropriate. It observes that the language of
13
the grievance is based on a claim that there was not just cause for the grievant’s ten-day
suspension. It adds:
There is no just cause requirement for the Chief to assign someone to restricted duty.
Rather, the CBA and Article IV provide the management rights to transfer or assign
personnel and Article XXIX more specifically permits the Chief to assign someone to
restricted duty under the circumstances. (City Post-Hearing Brief, page 34)
The city cites the decisions of Arbitrators Alan Miles Ruben in City of Cleveland and
Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s Association; AAA Case No. 01-16-0000-8181; July 3, 2017, and
Hyman Cohen in City of Cleveland and Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s Association; AAA Case
Nos. 01-0002-8370, 01-0002-8369, and 01-0002-8371; February 5, 2006. It reports that they
held that an assignment to restricted duty and a refusal to allow overtime assignments and
secondary employment were not a violation of the contract and were well within its management
The city charges that the Kopchak and Yasenchack cases summarized in the June 26,
2016, Division of Police, Police Discipline Notice, are not comparable to the instant case. (Union
Exhibit H) It states that the union could not present any evidence about the facts in the Kopchak
or Yasenchack cases, which involve failures to request EMS in a timely manner. The city
acknowledges that Follmer confirmed that in both of the cases, the Chief dismissed the charges
The city dismisses the union’s argument that the subsequent investigation of the incident
should have received more consideration. It acknowledges that “while the cause of death
changed and witnesses may have turned on the Grievant and Myers, none of those facts change
the underlying basis for the discipline with respect to the Grievant.” (City Post-Hearing Brief,
page 33) The city reports that Lieutenant Robert Tucker, who is in charge of the Inspection Unit,
testified as follows:
14
Q. Did the [Special Prosecutor’s] report change anything with respect to the
disciplinary charges issued against [the grievant]?
A. No.
Q. Why is that?
A. The change of the cause of death does not change the behavior of the officer as it
relates to his actions at the time of the incident. It’s in some ways irrelevant.
(Transcript, page 41)
The city contends that this is not a case where the penalty should be reduced. It points out
that the grievant was well aware of the Division’s stance regarding immediately contacting EMS.
The city notes that the grievant’s “failure to abide by the policies [and his] enhanced training …
are not grounds for a lesser penalty, but rather aggravating factors supporting his ten (10)-day
The city concludes that the grievant’s inaction was irresponsible, contrary to
departmental practice and policy, and his training. It asks the Arbitrator to deny the grievance
UNION POSITION
The union argues that there is not just cause for the grievant’s discipline. It points out that
Lieutenant David Medina, who has been and an instructor on subject control at the Cleveland
Police Academy for the last 21 years, testified that the grievant’s actions were consistent with his
training for de-escalation, including breathing techniques and crisis intervention. The union notes
that training is constantly updated, including EMS response. It adds that a new Divisional Notice
on this subject was released the same day as [the grievant’s] Arbitration Hearing.” (Union Post-
15
The union contends that the grievant and other officers are trained and instructed to call
EMS when they are aware of a medical condition or medical situation. It states that Medina
testified that it is a judgment call that an officer makes based on his observations, training, and
experience. The union indicates that Medina added that “the policy and training on this subject
matter is pretty broad, and takes a common-sense approach [and that] there is no written policy
or written training documents that state when a Cleveland Police Officer is required to call
EMS.” (Ibid.)
The union maintains that the grievant properly called EMS. It reports that the grievant
and Myers were dispatched on a mental health call and officers are trained not to call EMS on a
mental health call unless a medical condition arises. The union observes that “once the grievant
and Myers were aware of the change in [TA’s] mental health condition to a medical concern,
The union argues that Follmer’s testimony supports its position. It points out that as the
union’s president, he was called to the scene as in any death-in-custody case. The union notes,
however, that Follmer and Bottone agree that TA did not die in police custody.
The union contends that past practice supports its position. It states that Divisional Notice
12-273, dated June 26, 2012, reported that Donald Kopchak and Jeffrey Yasenchack committed a
number of offenses, including failing to timely call EMS. (Union Exhibit H, pages 2-3) The
union indicates that despite these facts, neither officer was suspended but they received only
The union maintains that proper discipline requires consistency in the enforcement of the
rules. It points out that this means that the penalty for a rule violation must be consistent with the
penalties imposed for similar offenses. The union notes that where enforcement is not consistent,
16
Arbitrators find there is not just cause for discipline. It adds that the change in department policy
and training demonstrates that the discipline imposed on the grievant was excessive.
The union argues that Myer’s decision not to grieve his written warning he received
should have no impact on the instant case. It observes that Myers “was ready to move on with his
career, get off Probationary status and be a full-fledged Police Officer.” (Union Post-Hearing
Brief, page 33) It reports that when Myers opted not to grieve, he was sworn in as a regular
The union contends that the grievant complied with GPO 3.2.06 in his interaction with
TA. It states that based on his interaction with her and her family, it became clear that pursuant
to department policy, TA needed to be taken to a hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. The union
A psychiatric emergency exists when an officer learns of, or has custody of a person
who is mentally ill and is likely to injure themselves or another. Under Section
5122.10 of the Ohio Revised Code, a police officer has the authority to take such a
person into custody involuntarily, and immediately transport the person to a hospital
for psychiatric evaluation.
The union maintains that the grievant and Myers were following policy when they used
handcuffs to take TA into custody when she became combative. It points out that they “tried to
use talking and other de-escalating methods throughout their lengthy interaction with [TA] and
her family in an attempt to make every reasonable effort to get her to cooperate.” (Union Post-
Hearing Brief, page 35) The union notes that the grievant explained to TA that she was not under
arrest but they were taking her to the hospital for help.
The union argues that GPO 2.1.01 is not relevant because there was no allegation that the
grievant or Myers used excessive force. It asserts that this fact is supported by Harshbarger’s
report and Tucker’s testimony that there was no use of force violations in the case. The union
17
adds that the grievant and Myers complied with GPO 2.1.01 when they called Bottone to the
The union contends that the Arbitrator must consider the grievant’s personal and financial
hardship in determining what, if any, discipline is appropriate. It reports that on December 18,
2014, the grievant and Myers were placed on restricted duty so they could not work non-
subpoenaed overtime or engage in secondary employment until they were cleared of any
The union maintains that the grievance filed by the grievant and Myers over being placed
on restricted duty provided little relief. It states that the grievant lost more than $20,000 in
overtime during his first two years of restricted duty but the true hardship must take into account
the fact that the grievant was on restricted duty for 3½ years. The union charges that the grievant
was improperly placed on restricted duty for an undetermined and unreasonably long period of
time.
The union argues that in City of Cleveland and Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s Association
(CPPA); AAA Case No. 01-16-0000-818; July 3, 2017, Arbitrator Alan Miles Ruben offered
The grievance filed on November 12, 2015 by [the grievant] and Bryan Myers over
the continuation of their "restricted duty" status is allowed in part.
The City is directed to make prompt and diligent inquiry of the Ohio Attorney
General, or other prosecutorial agency, as may be appropriate, as to whether the
investigation into the possible criminal conduct of Officers Aldridge and Myers in
connection with the death of [TA] has been concluded, and, if not, the estimated date
by which it is expected that the investigation will be completed.
The City is privileged to retain both Grievants on restricted duty until the conclusion
of the investigation and the exoneration of one or both Grievants. Should either or
both Grievants be made the subject to criminal prosecution, their duty status shall be
18
determined in accordance with Article XXIX, Paragraph 72 of the Contract and
G.P.O. 1.3.26.
If the investigation remains ongoing, and the City was not informed of the date by
which the investigation is expected to be completed, the Grievants are to be
immediately removed from restricted duty status and restored to regular duty status.
The City has no responsibility to make the Grievants whole for the loss of income
resulting from their disqualification from engaging in secondary employment or for
the loss of overtime opportunities.
The Arbitrator will retain remedial jurisdiction to respond to any issues or questions
which may arise over the interpretation, administration or implementation of this
Award. (City Exhibit 2, pages 32-33)
The union contends that the grievant’s April 10, 2013, discipline is not relevant. (City
Exhibit 28) It points out that on April 10, 2013, the grievant was suspended for three days with
one day held in abeyance. It notes, however, that Article VII of the collective bargaining
agreement states:
The union indicates that as a result of this language, the discipline was removed from the
grievant’s record on April 10, 2015, -- years prior to the imposition of the discipline at issue in
this case and should be stricken from the record. It adds that in any event, M. McGrath did not
refer to the prior discipline when he imposed the grievant’s ten-day suspension. 5
The union maintains that the grievant’s actions must be viewed as he experienced them
on November 12, 2014, and not with 20/20 hindsight. It states that one of the most glaring
statements was M. McGrath’s statement that the grievant should have called EMS when TA’s
breathing or pulse changed because neither M. McGrath nor Calvin Williams, the Chief of
5
The Arbitrator did not consider the grievant’s April 10, 2013, suspension.
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Police, were present on the scene. The union indicates that the city must rely on the testimony of
The union argues that the city should give great deference to the testimony of an officer
who is testifying under oath. It observes that the grievant testified that “he did not believe, based
on the totality of circumstances that were available to him at that exact moment, that [TA]
required medical attention [but that] … his evaluation given all the facts known to him was that
she was battling mental health issues, which does not require EMS.” (Union Post-Hearing Brief,
page 40) The union stresses that if the grievant knew TA was having a heart attack or required
The union cites Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 186. It points out that in
that case the court supported the principle that events must be presented as they occurred rather
than through 20/20 hindsight. The union notes that in Smith v. Freeland, 954 F.2d 443, 347, the
We must avoid substituting our personal notions of proper police procedure for the
instantaneous decision of the officer at the scene. We must never allow the
theoretical, sanitized world of our imagination to replace the dangerous and complex
world that policemen face every day. What constitutes “reasonable” action may seem
quite different to someone facing a possible assailant then to someone analyzing the
question at leisure.
The union contends that “some leeway must be given the officer for on-scene judgments
made during the uncertainty of a confrontational encounter.” (Union Post-Hearing Brief, page
40) It complains that instead, the city tried to pick apart the statements of the grievant over the
last four years in order to evaluate his on-the-scene judgments and decisions. The union adds that
the Special Prosecutor and the Grand Jury determined that “[the grievant’s] actions were
objectively reasonable [and that his] … potential inactions were objectively reasonable.” (Union
20
The union maintains that the city improperly found the grievant committed a Group III
offense pursuant to the city’s Disciplinary Matrix found in GPO 1.1.11. (City Exhibit 21) It
states that Group III offenses are the most serious violations and include:
• Alcohol-related offenses
• Criminal law offenses
• Alcohol/Drug use on duty
• Drug related offenses
• Firearms violations, careless handling resulting in an injury
• Firearms violations, (e.g. Unreported discharges)
• Gross immorality
• Neglect of Duty
• Operating a motor vehicle while privilege revoked or suspended
• Police vehicle, operating after consuming alcohol and/or drugs
• Reports, false
• Statements, false
• Engaging in sexual activities while on duty
• Other similar violations
The union claims that the specification against the grievant in no way compares to these
egregious policy violations. It indicates that the disciplinary actions for Group III offenses range
from a ten-day suspension to termination. It adds, however, that “the just cause standard and the
past practice between the parties does not impose any ‘mandatory minimums’ for certain
The union argues that the Disciplinary Matrix is not incorporated in the collective
bargaining agreement and therefore cannot be used in the consideration of just cause. It reports
that prior to January 1, 2014, there was no Disciplinary Matrix in the Division of Police. The
union observes that the matrix has been upheld only as a guideline or tool to assist the city in
The union contends that the just cause standard must still be followed and is the standard
for review at arbitration. It points out that Article IV(4)(c), expressly allows the city to discipline
or terminate an employee for just cause but expressly restricts an Arbitrator to the interpretation
21
and application of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, which does not include the
terms of GPO 1.1.11 or provide for the use of the matrix in determining just cause. The union
notes:
If an Arbitrator were to rely on a source outside the CBA, which was not permitted,
the Arbitrator’s decision regarding the dispute “could not be rationally derived from
the terms of the agreement” as required by law. There would be no “rational nexus”
between the agreement and the award, therefore, the essence of the arbitrator’s
decision could not be drawn from the CBA. (Union Post-Hearing Brief, page 44)
The union maintains that the discipline imposed on the grievant is punitive and politically
motivated. It states that there was extensive pressure on the city and the department to impose
discipline on the grievant and Myers due to the $2,250,000 settlement the city made with TA’s
family long before the administrative and criminal investigations were completed. It indicates
that the grievant asks the Arbitrator to consider the testimony and evidence that was presented at
the arbitration hearing regarding the political pressure faced by the city.
The union argues that the city has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the grievant was guilty of failing to timely call EMS. It points out that it is difficult
to claim that the grievant failed to call EMS in a timely fashion when no one at the scene felt TA
needed medical assistance prior to the officers calling EMS. The union notes that the grievant
testified that TA’s breathing and pulse were normal. It adds that Joell Anderson indicated that
The union contends that the city must also prove that a ten-day suspension is in
accordance with the just cause provision of the contract. It states that the grievant’s discipline
should be overturned in its entirety because not one witness or officer at the scene testified that a
medical emergency existed prior to the grievant contacting EMS. The union adds that TA’s
family commended the officers for their work and patience with TA.
22
The union maintains that the role of the Arbitrator is to determine whether the discipline
imposed on an employee comports with the concept of just cause. It cites CPPA and City of
Cleveland, AAA Case No. 53-39-000-1601 (Johnson, 2001), in support of its claim that where
the grievant is charged with morally reprehensible conduct, a high standard of proof is required.
The union observes that the city failed to introduce any written rule or policy regarding exactly
when an officer is required to call EMS, rather, they are trained to use common sense.
The union argues that in contrast to the city, it provided expert testimony in support of its
position. It points out that former Academy Instructor Medina testified “that [the grievant] acted
within departmental policy and training [and] … the tactics used by [the grievant] … were
proper and pursuant to his training and the CPD policy on training.” (Union Post-Hearing Brief,
pages 46-47)
The union contends that the grievant’s discipline was unfair and unreasonable. It
observes that in City of Cleveland and Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 8, AAA Case No.
53-390-00565-89 (1989), Arbitrator Dworkin held that based on the facts and circumstances, the
discharge of an employee was not warranted and was amended. The union reports that he held:
The standard of “just cause” requires that the action taken by management is
supported by the evidence, and consistent with the applicable terms of the agreement.
In essence, the discharge action must be deemed fair and reasonable, based on all the
relevant and material facts and circumstances. According to this standard, the
decision to discipline and the penalty imposed must take into consideration the
grievant’s service and background as a member of the Cleveland Police Department,
and whether the measure of discipline appears to be punitive in purpose and effect or
corrective in its application.
It claims that in the instant case, “the city failed to ever prove that [the grievant’s] honest
testimony under oath that he did not know a medical emergency was occurring until he called
23
The union maintains that the grievant’s suspension must be reversed or modified based
on the just cause standard. It points out that the grievant has over 10 years of service with a
“proud service record” and that all of the investigating agencies determined that his actions on
November 12, 2014, were lawful and legally justified. It cites CPPA and City of Cleveland,
***
In other words, the issue is not whether the City has the “authority,” but rather
whether it exercised its legitimate authority in a proper manner. Just cause requires
the city after its fair analysis of all the facts, determine for itself, using proper
standards, the appropriate discipline under the Contract.
The union argues that in a case where the grievant is charged with morally reprehensible
conduct, a high standard of proof is required. It states that in the instant case, the evidence does
not support the city’s contention of extreme wrongdoing. The union offers in support of its
contention Arvin Industries, 96 LA 1185 (1991), where an employee was discharged for
possessing alcohol on company property. It indicates that Arbitrator Volz listed four mitigating
factors and reinstated the grievant. The union claims that the grievant in the instant case, “has an
admirable employment history with the City, filled with awards, commendations, extensive
education and training as well as positive performance evaluations.” (Union Post-Hearing Brief,
page 49)
The union contends that the degree of the penalty must reflect the seriousness of the
offense. It reports that under Article IV of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, the
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Arbitrator has the authority to modify penalties that are improper or too severe. The union
(1) the facts and circumstances surrounding the Officer’s conduct, (2) the service and
background as a member of the Cleveland Police Department, and (3) whether the
measure of discipline appears to be punitive in purpose and effect, or corrective in its
application. (Union Post-Hearing Brief, page 49)
The union maintains that there are numerous other cases that support the principle that
the nature and degree of discipline must meet the just cause standard. It cites City of Louisville,
94 LA 43 (Volz, 1989); State of Ohio, 97 LA 1206 (Rivera, 1991); City of El Paso, 95 LA 201;
miscreant employee, to the restore him to acceptable levels of production and/or behavior.”
(Union Post-Hearing Brief, page 50) It states, however, that in the instant case, the grievant is not
a miscreant employee who needs to be restored to acceptable levels of production and behavior.
The union indicates that despite this fact ”the grievant had minutes of his life dissected and
analyzed for over four (4) years in an effort to try to come up with something that maybe he
The union concludes that the city did not have just cause to impose any discipline on the
grievant and in any event, it did not have just cause to impose a ten-day suspension. It asks the
Arbitrator to completely overturn the grievant’s ten-day suspension, to reinstate him to full-duty,
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ANALYSIS
The instant case involves two issues. The first issue is whether there is just cause to
discipline the grievant. The second issue is if there is just cause for discipline, is a ten-day
With respect to the first issue, the record establishes that there is just cause for discipline.
The grievant knew that the Division of Police requires an officer to call EMS whenever a
medical situation arises. He completed the 124th Police Academy training, took FTO training and
served as an FTO, and had ten years of experience as a patrol office. In addition, in 2008 he
received a Chief’s Commendation for assisting at the scene of a serious motor vehicle accident,
including “notifying dispatch to have EMS responded to the scene.” (Union Exhibit G, page 1)
The record also indicates that the grievant should have known that TA developed a
serious medical condition requiring a prompt call to EMS. The testimony and evidence establish
that the grievant and Myers had convinced TA that she needed to go to the hospital for an
assessment and treatment of a mental problem. However, before they could secure her in their
cruiser, she became resistant and had to be taken to the ground and her arms handcuffed behind
her back.
Initially, TA continued to yell and kick but then suddenly she became still while making
snoring or grunting sounds. The grievant was apparently concerned and took TA’s pulse and
checked on her breathing even though Medina testified that police officers are not trained to do
so.
Prior to TA’s becoming silent, the grievant and Myers had called Bottone, a District 3
Section Sergeant, to her ask her to come to the scene because of their use of nonlethal force in
26
securing TA. Bottone arrived shortly after TA had stopped yelling and kicking and lay still
As soon as Bottone arrived, she discovered that TA was unconscious but breathing. She
then rolled TA on her back to facilitate her breathing and immediately ordered the grievant to
call EMS. EMS arrived at 11:44 P. M. and TA was transported to the Cleveland Clinic where,
despite the efforts of the Emergency Room staff, she was pronounced dead at 12:30 AM.
Based on the testimony and evidence, the Arbitrator must conclude that the grievant’s
failure to recognize that TA had developed a serious medical problem and to promptly call EMS
Proper Penalty
The second issue for the Arbitrator is whether the ten-day suspension imposed by the city
was the proper penalty. The Arbitrator believes that the record indicates that the discipline
imposed by the city is too severe and that the proper penalty is a three-day suspension. First, the
position of the city with respect to the grievant’s ten-day suspension is undermined by Medina’s
testimony that the Division of Police has no written policy or written training documents that
indicate when an officer is required to call EMS. The city’s unwritten policy, which Medina
described as based on “common sense,” is not likely to provide sufficient guidance to the police
officers who face complex and difficult situations such as that the grievant faced.
Second, the grievant’s ten-day suspension appears to be inconsistent with the lack of
disciplinary penalties in an incident involving Police Officers Kopchak and Yasenchack. The
Division of Police, Divisional Notice for pre-disciplinary hearings held by the Director of Public
Safety on May 1, 2012, reports that they were charged with failure to request EMS in a timely
27
manner, exceeding the Taser cycle, and failure to terminate a pursuit. (Union Exhibit H, pages 2-
3) The Hearing Officer recommended that the disciplinary action be dismissed and the matter be
adopted the recommendation of the Hearing Officer and dismissed the disciplinary actions
The Arbitrator discounts the city’s complaint that the union did not provide the details of
the case. The city had the opportunity to attempt to distinguish this case from the grievant’s case
but did not do so. The disparate treatment received by the grievant is not consistent with the
Third, the Arbitrator believes that Joell Anderson’s comment to the grievant, as TA lay
motionless on the ground, that TA sometimes “fakes sleeping” cannot be ignored. While he has
no medical training, he lives with TA and should be familiar with her behavior. Thus, Joell
Anderson’s statement was one of the factors the grievant had to consider in deciding whether to
call EMS. The city’s decision to dismiss Joell Anderson’s comment suggests that the grievant’s
Fourth, the Arbitrator rejects the city’s argument that he should ignore the fact that
Overton was an RN because the grievant was unaware of it at the time of the incident. However,
whether or not the grievant knew Overton was an RN, Overton would have taken a more active
role if she felt that TA was experiencing a serious medical problem. As it was, Overton’s only
action was bringing a blanket from the house to cover TA, who was lying on the ground by the
police cruiser.
Fifth, while the Arbitrator agrees with Arbitrator Alan Miles Ruben that Article XXIX
gave the city the right to place the grievant on restricted duty and that the grievant is not entitled
28
to reimbursement for the overtime and extra duty assignments he could have worked, still the
loss experienced by the grievant cannot be ignored in considering the appropriate penalty in the
instant case. The grievant estimated that in the first two years of his 3½ years on restricted duty,
he lost approximately $20,000. The loss due to being placed on restricted duty is a function of
the time it took to resolve the criminal and administrative cases and it far exceeded the cost of
Sixth, the Arbitrator rejects the union’s argument that the grievant’s suspension must be
set aside because it is punitive and politically motivated. It claims that the $2.25 million
settlement the city made with TA’s family created pressure on the city to impose harsh discipline
on the grievant. While the Arbitrator understands that the case may have resulted in political
pressure on the city, especially given the initial coroner’s report that the grievant died of
positional asphyxiation rather than the finding of the coroner selected by the Special Prosecutor
from the Special Investigations Office of the State Attorney General’s Office that TA’s death
was the result of arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease. In any event, the Arbitrator found that
there was just cause to discipline the grievant but concluded that under the circumstances, a ten-
Finally, the grievant has a good employment record. He has been a police officer for ten
years and has no active discipline in his file. The grievant has an Associate’s Degree in Law
Enforcement from Cuyahoga Community College and has completed a number of courses in the
Academy, including the Crisis Intervention Training and Field Training Officer courses.
Based on the above analysis, the Arbitrator will direct the city to convert the grievant’s
ten-day suspension to a three-day suspension, to make the grievant whole for the loss of wages
29
and benefits due to a ten-day suspension rather than a three-day suspension, and to modify the
grievant’s personnel file to reflect a three-day suspension rather than a ten-day suspension.
AWARD
2) The city is ordered to make the grievant whole for any loss of wages and benefits
due to a ten-day suspension rather than a three-day suspension.
3) The city is ordered to modify the grievant’s personnel file to reflect a three-day
suspension rather than a ten-day suspension.
4) The Arbitrator will retain jurisdiction to resolve any dispute over the interpretation
and application of his award.
_____________________________
Nels E. Nelson
Arbitrator
February 18, 2019
Russell Township
Geauga County, Ohio
30