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On The Problem of The External World in The Ch'eng Wei Shih Lun
On The Problem of The External World in The Ch'eng Wei Shih Lun
Lambert Schmithausen
Tokyo
The International Institute for Buddhist Studies
of
The International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies
2015
On the Problem of the External World in the
Lambert Schmithausen
Tokyo
The International Institute for Buddhist Studies
of
The International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies
2015
Published by the International Institute for Buddhist Studies of the ICPBS:
2-8-9 Kasuga, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 112-0003, Japan
Correspondence regarding all editorial matters should be sent to the Director of the
International Institute for Buddhist Studies in Tokyo.
Contents
Preface …………………………………………………… 7
IV. Appendix:
Discussion of four Ch'eng wei shih lun passages … 57
V. Abbreviations .................................................................65
Preface
An earlier version of this paper was presented at a sympo-
sium on Yogācāra Buddhism in China, organized by Prof.
Chen-kuo Lin in June 2000 at the International Institute for
Asian Studies, Leiden. I take the opportunity to express my
gratitude to the participants of the symposium, as well as to Dr.
Anne MacDonald and Prof.s Florin Deleanu, Tilmann Vetter
and Nobuyoshi Yamabe who were so kind as to read revised
versions of this paper, for corrections and stimulating critical
remarks which have led to a number of modifications and addi-
tions in the present version, which on account of my own (tem-
poral as well as other) limitations is nevertheless still prelimi-
nary. To Japanese scholars working in the field, the result may
not come as a surprise, but the motive for taking up the issue
again will become clear from the following introductory re-
marks.1
1
From a somewhat different angle (focussing on the problem of
the plurality of sentient beings as purely mental continua and their
mutual interaction) but with similar results, the issue has also been
dealt with in an excellent paper by Nobuyoshi YAMABE (“Self and
Other in the Yogācāra Tradition”, in: 北畠典生博士古稀記念論文集
(Kitabatake Tensei hakushi koki-kinen rombunshū), Kyoto 1998: 15–41).
Japanese readers may miss references to secondary literature in Japa-
nese. It is, however, not only because of the constraints of time but
also on account of the special purpose of this paper (as delineated in
ch. I) that I shall base my argument on primary sources only.
I. A Recent Trend in Interpreting the Ch'eng
wei shih lun
Yogācāra thought has traditionally been understood as advo-
cating the epistemological position that mind, or consciousness,2
does not — at least not directly — perceive or cognize anything
outside itself, but rather cognizes only its own image3 of an ob-
ject, and as propounding the ontological position that there are
no entities, especially no material entities, apart from conscious-
ness, or, more precisely, apart from the various kinds of mind
(citta) and mental factors or mind-associates (caitta) (see § II.2).
This understanding was not invented by modern scholars but is
in line with the works of medieval Indian (and Tibetan) authors,
both non-Buddhist4 and [p.10]Buddhist5. In recent times, some
2
In the present paper, I mechanically use “mind” for 心 (citta) and,
after considerable hesitation (in view of the subliminal character of
the ālayavijñāna), “consciousness” for 識 (vijñāna, vijñapti), although
at least citta and vijñāna are substantially interchangeable. The term
vijñapti is, more specifically, used for the function of vijñāna, i.e. in
the sense of “making known”, “cognizing”, and is then rendered by 了
or 了別); it may, however, also qualify the object of consciousness as
being nothing but an image in consciousness. For jñāna (智) I have
chosen “knowledge” in the case of the Buddha, but “insight” in the
context of the Path. I beg the reader's pardon if my choice is not the
most felicitous one, but after all English is not my mother tongue.
3
The use of the word “image” to render Ch. 相 (when it is equi-
valent to 相分, i.e. the object part or aspect of a consciousness, proba-
bly corresponding to Skt. nimitta) is for want of something better. It is
not intended to imply, necessarily, the existence of an original of
which the “image” is a reflection (as would often, though perhaps not
always, seem to hold good when the more specific term 影像 is used).
4
Cf., e.g., Śaṅkara's commentary on Brahmasūtra 2.2.18: vijñānâ-
stitva-mātra-vādinaḥ and 2.2.28: vijñānaîka-skandha-vādaḥ (the latter
term being, of course, hardly justified); or Yuktidīpikā (ed. A. WEZLER
and Sh. MOTEGI, Stuttgart 1998) p. 219,5-6: asattvaṁ bhāvānām (in a
10 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
7
Dan LUSTHAUS, Buddhist Phenomenology. A Philosophical Inves-
tigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih lun. London:
RoutledgeCurzon 2002 (henceforward: L). The original version of the
present paper had referred to LUSTHAUS's PhD dissertation which is
stated by him to be the “distant ancestor” of this book (see L p. xi).
8
E.g. L 537. Cf. also YAMABE 1998 (s. fn. 1): 35–37.
12 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
9
Two more are adduced at L 512. For a discussion of these pas-
sages, see appendix, §§ 1–2.
10
This is one of the supra-normal knowledges or powers (abhijñā),
accessible only to Buddhas and advanced yogis or Bodhisattvas.
11
CWSL 39c9-16 / P 430; C 239; S 320.
12
The Sanskrit term at the basis of 變 is pariṇāma, which means
“change, alteration, transformation; development; ripeness, maturity”
(MONIER WILLIAMS). In Vasubandhu's works (cf. my article “Sautrā-
ntika-Voraussetzungen in Viṁśatikā und Triṁśikā”, Wiener Zeitschrift
für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 11/1967: 109–136) it is used as an
action noun describing a process taking place in the continuum
(saṁtāna, saṁtati) of a person or in the consciousness continuum or its
latent stratum. It may also refer to the culmination of this process or
to its result (the actual kinds of vijñāna). In the CWSL, however, it re-
fers to a de-temporalized ‘transformation’ or ‘development’ within a
single moment of a vijñāna or mental factor, i.e. to the fact that each
moment arises in such a way that it has ‘changed’ or ‘developed’,
from the outset, into an image (相) of an object cognized (or into a
duality of image 相 and vision 見; cf. SNSṬ vol. Thi 122b8: lta ba dang
rgyu mtshan gyi rnam par yongs su gyur pa). This image (or duality of
image and vision) is called 識所變 (“what vijñāna has changed, or de-
14 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
[1.2] But is this small passage really strong enough and suffi-
ciently unambiguous to carry the burden of a radical reinter-
pretation of the system of the CWSL? Does it really presuppose
an existence of matter that is independent of the cognizing mind?
And if it does, is DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN's interpretation20, ac-
17
“[This knowlege] is called ‘knowledge of another [person]’s
mind’ (paracittajñāna) only because the latter, like [an image in] a
mirror, etc., appears as an external object (viz. as the mind of another
person), but [this knowledge] is not capable of cognizing [another's
mind] directly. What is cognized directly, is [only the image of the
other person's mind] developed by [the paracittajñāna] itself.”(CWSL
39c13–14: 但如鏡等 似外境現 名了他心。 非親能了。 親所了者 謂自所
變。 / P 430; C 239; S 320; cf. L 491)
18
I suppose “etc.” refers to the other kinds of material sense-
objects (viz. sound, etc.), as at CWSL 39a26, b27 or c2 (cf. fn. 81), and
not to the viprayukta-saṁskāras and the asaṁskṛtas, as at CWSL 4a7,
7a19 or, perhaps but not necessarily, 39c25.
19
In YAMABE 1998 (s. fn. 1): 31, whose rendering ( “Cognizing
other people’s minds or matter is also [effected] in the same way.”)
slighly differs from mine, the sentence has, probably by misprint,
been included in the Saṁdhinirmocana quotation.
20
P 430: “Le Rūpa qui est le nimittabhāga de la pensée d'autrui (le
corps d'autrui, développement du Vijñāna d'autrui), et aussi le Rūpa
qui est le développement d'un autre Vijñāna de la même personne.
[C'est-à-dire: le cakṣurvijñāna (darśanabhāga) a pour ālambana immé-
Discussion of the Basic Evidence 17
diat son propre nimitta, qui est une reproduction du Rūpa développé
de l'Ālayavijñāna].”
21
I use the “traditional name” (cf. HôbFA p. 264, also for other
names). As Prof. N. YAMABE kindly pointed out to me, the problems
about this name are discussed in FUKAURA Seibun 深浦正文,『唯識
学研究, 上巻 : 教史論』, 東京 : 永田文昌堂 [1954]1972: 256, n. 2,
and in Stanley WEINSTEIN, “A Biographical Study of Tz’u-en”, in:
Monumenta Nipponica 15.1–2 (1959): 119–149 (esp. 129 ff).
22
HôbFA p. 284 (s.v. Tonrin). The problem of his name is dis-
cussed in YŪKI Reimon 結城令聞,『唯識学典籍史』, Tokyo 1962:
264 ff, and, as Prof. N. YAMABE kindly informed me, also in YŪKI
Reimon,「『瑜伽論記』の著者名に対する疑義」, repr. in:『結城令
聞著作撰集, 第一巻: 唯識思想』東京, 春秋社 1999: 145–155, and in:
YANG Pai-i 楊白衣,「新羅の学僧道(遁)倫の『瑜伽師地論記』の研
究」, in: 東洋学術研究 23.1 (1984): 292–305.
18 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
23
Unfortunately, I have no access to the Chinese original (as far
as it is preserved) but have to rely on the Tibetan translation by Chos
grub.
24
SNSṬ Ti 286a5(ff): bstan bcos rNam par rig pa tsam du grub pa'i
nang nas slob dpon Chos skyong gi bshad pas ni …
25
SNSṬ Ti 290a6–b1: kha cig na re rnam par shes pa brgyad dang
sems las byung ba zag pa dang bcas pas bsdus pa ni … zhes zer te / 'di ni
Blo brtan gyi bshad pa'i don to // yang kha cig ni rnam par shes pa drug
<pa?> dang bdun pa'i sems kyi rnam pa (text: pas) bdag dang chos su
'dzin pa ni ... zhes zer te / 'di ni slob dpon Chos skyong gi bshad pa'i
gzhung ngo // In this case, the position ascribed to Sthiramati is in
agreement with his Triṁśikābhāṣya (TrBh 35,14-17).
Discussion of the Basic Evidence 19
26
L 490 gives the passage a strange twist which forces him to take
實無 in a concessive sense, which in view of the absence of a conces-
sive conjunction is improbable.
27
Cf. Madhyamakāvatāra (see fn. 5) 166,14-16.
20 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
28
As for the tathatā, I disagree with LUSTHAUS's (L 530f; cf. also
359 and 535) statement that it is merely a prajñapti. This statement is
based on CWSL 6c10-20 where the unconditioned (asaṁskṛta) entities
like space (ākāśa) are interpreted as denominations (prajñapti) of the
transconceptual, ineffable true ultimate nature (dharmatā) of every-
thing, viewed under certain aspects. In this context, it is then added
that even [the term] ‘tathatā’ and the qualifications of tathatā as exis-
tent, empty, etc., are mere designations [of this dharmatā], used with
the purport of removing wrong conceptualizations of the transcon-
ceptual ultimate nature. tathatā, the text adds, must not be conceived
of as an unconditioned entity apart from the dharmas (matter, mind,
etc.), as other Buddhist schools do. But at the same time this implies
that tathatā as the transconceptual, ineffable true ultimate nature
(dharmatā) of everything, which becomes manifest in transconceptual
insight (nirvikalpaṁ jñānam : cf. CWSL 49c20(ff)), is not rejected.
Tathatā constitutes the primordial nirvāṇa of natural purity (55b7-8)
and is the basis of all forms of actualized nirvāṇa (55b12-17). In its
non-conceptualized, true nature, it can by no means be a mere pra-
jñapti. In fact, elsewhere the CWSL explicitly states that the Perfect
Nature (圓成實性 = pariniṣpannaḥ svabh āvaḥ), which is expressly
equated with tathatā at CWSL 46b15-16, is exclusively truly existent
Discussion of the Basic Evidence 21
34
Cf. also TrBh 15, 25–16,1: “Dharmas and a Self do not exist
outside a transformation of consciousness” ( dharmāṇām ātmanaś ca
vijñāna-pariṇāmād bahir abhāvāt ); 17, 2: bāhyārthābhāvāt; 16, 22-23:
vinaîva bāhyenârthena (cf. also 16, 6-7 and 18). There seems to be a
tendency to read more into the term artha than what may have been
intended by the Indian writers. According to Sanskrit lexicographers
(e.g. Amarakośa 3.3.86; Śrīdharasena, Abhidhānaviśvalocana, ed. L.
JAMSPAL, Naritasan 1992: 942–943), it may not only mean, among
other things, “purpose” (prayojana), “meaning” (abhidheya), or “ob-
ject” (viṣaya, not in Amara), but may also simply mean “thing” (vastu).
This suggests that it was felt to cover both the epistemological and the
ontological aspect. Cf. also Sthiramati, comm. on Mahāyānasūtrālaṅ-
kāra XI.47: gzugs la sogs pa phyi’i dngos po ni med kyi ... (Tanjur, Pe-
king vol. Mi 213a1; Derge vol. Mi 192a7-8; O. HAYASHIMA,
“Dharmaparyeṣṭi”, in: Bulletin of Faculty of Education, Nagasaki Uni-
versity 27/1978: 116).
Discussion of the Basic Evidence 25
35
This is, of course, the same argumentation as in Vasubandhu's
Viṁśatikā (ed. S. LÉVI) p. 6,22 ff.
36
Similarly, at CWSL 39c24-25 what is stated to be excluded by the
element mātra in vijñaptimātra is (visible) matter, etc., insofar as it is
regarded as really existing apart from mind (唯言 但遮 愚夫所執 定離
諸識 實有色等). According to other passages it is real entities (實物)
apart from mind (but not entities not separate from mind like the
mind-associates) (CWSL 38c24-25: 唯言 為遮 離識實物, 非不離識心所
法等。), or just the external (外, or extra-mental, cf. 59a16: 除識性),
which is entirely non-existent (都無), in contrast to the “internal ob-
ject” (內境) (59a8-9: 唯言遣外, 不遮內境; 59a14: 非謂 內境 如外都無).
37
I.e. CWSL 6c26–7a12.
26 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
activity are not only dharmas inside one’s own mind (自心內法)
but, in certain cases, also dharmas outside one’s own mind (自
心外法; my translation of 自心 is preliminary and will be re-
vised in § 4.3):
“As for all [these different forms of] ‘clinging to entities’
(dharma-grāha) that have been described thus (i.e. in the
preceding lines of the text), dharmas outside [one’s] own
mind are partly present, partly absent, whereas dharmas
inside [one’s] own mind are invariably present.” (如是所
說 一切法執, 自心外法 或有或無。 自心內法 一切皆有。)
38
K’uei-chi does not specify what, precisely, these ‘external’ con-
ditions are, but perhaps the expression refers to the wrong teachings
and wrong reflections mentioned subsequently; cf. also YoBhū 162,11-
12.
39
CWSL 7a5; cf. 2a17.
40
CWSL 6c27-28; cf. 2a10-11.
Discussion of the Basic Evidence 27
自心內蘊 一切皆有。
42
Saṁyuttanikāya III 46 (no. 22.47; cf. Tilmann VETTER, The
‘Khandha Passages’ in the Vinayapiṭaka and the four main Nikāyas,
Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
2000: 193–194) T vol. 2 no. 99: 16b15-16. Cf. also T vol. 27 no. 1545:
38a14-15 (quotation) and T vol. 30 no. 1579: 788a6 ff (commentary on
the Sūtra). In the Saṁyuttanikāya passage, the fact that the upādāna-
kkhandhas are the object of the conception of a Self is expressed by
their being the direct object of the verb samanupassanti (cf. also
YoBhū 162,12-13). In the Saṁyuktāgama parallel, they are marked by
the preposition 於. Hsüan-tsang uses 緣 instead, which may have been
chosen in order to explicitly point out their functioning as the objec-
tive support.
43
Implicitly confirmed by Shu-chi 250c9-10 and c20.
44
Cf. Shu-chi 292c22-23: “如是所說”下 (i.e. CWSL 7a12-13), 顯執
所緣或無或有。
45
CWSL 7a14 (似法相). Cf. 2a25-26 (五取蘊相) and 2a26 (諸蘊相).
46
CWSL 7a13-14 (P 81–82): “Therefore, the [various forms of]
clinging to entities (dharma-grāha) invariably take as their objective
support (緣 x = x-ālambana) an [image] appearing like dharmas [that
is] manifested within one’s own mind (cf., however, § 4.3!) [but]
falsely apprehend it as really existing [apart].” (是故法執, 皆緣自心所
現似法, 執為實有。) In the case of ātmagrāha (CWSL 2a25-26), only the
term 相 = nimitta is used (see fn. 45).
28 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
47
CWSL 4b24-25:自識所變 似色等相 為所緣緣。 Cf. also 4b3-4
(P 42; C 25; S 31): “Since in the case of these [sense-consciousnesses,
i.e.] visual consciousness etc.[,] an external objective support (here
clearly referring to matter existing outside any form of mind),
[can]not reasonably [be taken to] exist, one must necessarily admit
that [an image] developed by one’s own consciousness functions as
[their] objective support.” (此眼等識, 外所緣緣 理非有故, 決定應許
自識所變 為所緣緣。)
Cf. Shu-chi 250c16-17 (cf. also c18-19) and 293c25-26.
48
57
I.e. the respective mind (心, citta) together with its mind-
associates (心所, caitta).
58
CWSL 21c17 ff (cf. fn. 52), especially 22a13 (P 252; C 130;
S 173): “As long as it has not yet been fundamentally restructured [by
the Bodhisattva path], [the ‘seventh consciousness'] exclusively takes
the ‘eighth consciousness’ as its objective support.” (未轉依位 唯緣藏
識。) Cf. also 42c11-14.
59
Shu-chi 501c8-10 (ad CWSL 40c28): “As for the cluster of the
‘seventh consciousness' ..., [my] commentary says that this mind ...
necessarily relies on the ‘eighth consciousness' as its external ‘origi-
nal’.” (第七心品 ...。 述曰。此識 ... 必仗第八識 以為外質。)
32 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
60
Cf. Shu-chi 501a15-17, where the “condition consisting in the
remote objective support” (疎所緣緣), characterized as being “outside
the [respective] mind” (心外: 501a28-29), is stated to comprise both
“[images, or appearances] developed by consciousnesses of others
and [images, or appearances,] developed by separate [forms of] con-
sciousness in one’s own continuum” (疎所緣緣, 與能緣心相離法, 是。
謂 即他識所變, 及自身中別識所變。 杖為質者, 是。). Similarly, Shu-
chi 250c14-15.
61
Or could one understand: “outside the [respective] mind itself”
and, analogously, in the next line: “inside the [respective] mind itself”?
62
As far as I can see, the passages under discussion do not distin-
guish the ātma- or dharmagrāha as a caitta from the citta itself but
rather seem to take it as the function of the citta itself. If such a dis-
tinction is made, the rendering “a mental image of its own” would
definitely be preferable. For even though the image-parts of all mental
factors (citta and caittas) of a given ‘cluster’ (品) are alike, each factor
develops an image-part of its own.
Discussion of the Basic Evidence 33
63
In the case of the inborn clinging to a Self of the ‘sixth con-
sciousness’ (i.e. manovijñāna) it is the sub-commentator Chih-chou 智
周 who makes clear that the expression “image in the [cognizing]
mind itself (or: in [one’s] own mind)” in the CWSL refers to “what is
developed by the sixth consciousness [and is hence its] own, immedi-
ate image-part” (Yen-pi 825a23-24: 第六所變自親相分, 下文別說: 起自
心相 ...。).
34 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
64
Yen-pi 825a25–b1; T vol. 67 no. 2266 (by Tan-e 湛慧, 1675–
1747): 117b10-22 (quoting the I-yün; see fn. 65).
65
Cf. T vol. 67 no. 2266: 117b9-10 and b14-15 (quoting the I-yün 義
蘊), where it is first stated in connection with the inborn conception of
Self of the ‘sixth consciousness’ that in this case the ‘sixth conscious-
ness’ apprehends the nimitta (相) of the five upādāna-skandhas deve-
loped by the ‘eighth consciousness’ but that this expression is unprob-
lematic only with regard to matter, whereas the four immaterial skan-
dhas (i.e. mind and mind associates), not being part of the objective
support of the ‘eighth consciousness’, cannot be called ‘developed [by
mind]’ in the usual sense, and, if they are called so in another sense
(cf. Shu-chi 317a18–b7), cannot be called 相, at least not in the sense of
‘image’ (... 第六意識, 緣第八識所變五取蘊相也。 問。 若爾, 第八所變
色可爾。 餘之四蘊, 第八不緣, 如何稱變。 ... 問。 變義可爾。 四蘊既非
第八影像, 何名蘊相。 ...).
Discussion of the Basic Evidence 35
66
Cf., for ātmagrāha, Yen-pi 825a22-24; I-yen 24a6-12; for dharma-
grāha, Yen-pi 854a1-10.
67
Cf., e.g., CWSL 4b3-4 (see fn. 47).
68
That the bodies of others belong, properly speaking, to the sur-
rounding world is explicitly stated in Tun- (/Tao-) lun’s commentary
on the Yogācārabhūmi (T vol. 42 no. 1828: 602b23: 然變為他身, 是即
外器所攝。).
69
According to T vol. 67 no. 2266: 117b10 (see fn. 65), it is this
image of corporeal matter in the ālayavijñāna that is the ‘original’, i.e.
the ‘external’ objective support, of the image in the natural conception
of Self of the ‘sixth consciousness’.
70
I.e., according to Shu-chi 317a9-10, the direct seeds as hetu(pra-
tyaya) (親因種) and the karmic seeds as (adhipati)pratyaya (業緣種).
71
There is a Tibetan translation of this passage at SNSṬ Ti 269a3-4
in which 變為 X (“develops or changes into”) is translated by X lta
bur snang (“appears as X”).
36 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
72
Another designation of the ‘eighth consciousness’ with a wider
range of application than ‘ālayavijñāna’ (cf. CWSL 13c13-19).
73
Each sentient being has its own ālayavijñāna (or at least its own
‘eighth consciousness’): see CWSL 2b5-6; YAMABE (s. fn. 1): 21.
74
Cf. also CWSL 20a25-26 (P 235; C 119; S 162): “The ālayavijñāna
develops into what appears as the material sense-faculties, the support
of the sense-faculties, the surrounding world, etc.” (阿賴耶識 變似色
根 及根依處 器世間等); 41a10-11 (P 449; C 248; S 328): “The first five
[i.e. the] material [sense-]faculties consist in (…為性 = -svabhāva) the
clear matter (rūpaprasāda) of [the faculty of] sight (cakṣus), etc., [this
clear matter being an image] developed by the `root consciousness’
(mūlavijñāna, i.e. the ‘eighth consciousness’), etc.” (前五色根 以本識
等所變眼等淨色為性). I am sure that LUSTHAUS's (L 495 n. 25) inter-
pretation of the passage is untenable. He renders the sentence as fol-
Discussion of the Basic Evidence 37
lows: “The five rūpa organs, which alterations (so-pien) in the mūla-
vijñāna, etc., take in through the eyes, etc. Pure rūpa [(]淨色 ching-se)
is regarded as their nature.” According to LUSTHAUS, the purport of
the passage is that “visible experience of ‘pure rūpa’ is registered as
‘alterations in the mūla-vijñāna, etc.’” and that “far from implying a
causative idealist theory, the ālayavijñāna … and other conscious-
nesses are passive recorders (so-pien) of the activities of the visual or-
gan and its corresponding object.” Apart from contradicting the more
explicit passages adduced above, LUSTHAUS's translation (somewhat
odd even in English; should one perhaps read the passage as one sen-
tence by introducing a colon: “… etc.: Pure …”?) is, as far as I can
see, entirely incompatible with the rules of Chinese syntax since he
seems to take 以 as the main verb (“take in”), followed by 本識等所
變 (“alterations in the mūla-vijñāna, etc.”) as the subject, which in its
turn would be followed by an unmarked instrumental element 眼等
(“through the eyes”). The initial expression 五色根 (not “rūpa organs”
but the subtle material sense-faculties, rūpīndriya = rūpin + indriya)
which is, at least ad sensum, (rightly) connected with the final portion
of the passage, is at the same time also construed as the object of the
verb 以 (“take in”), which leads to the consequence that organs or
sense-faculties are both the object and the means of the taking-in or
registering. Actually, there can be little doubt that the passage is con-
strued on the common pattern A 以 B 為性 (“A, taking B, makes it its
nature”, “A takes/has B as its nature”, “A consists in B”). Hence, 本識
等所變眼等淨色 must be the definiens (B), constituted by the tradi-
tional 眼等淨色 (= cakṣurādi-rūpaprasāda) qualified by the attribute
本識等所變 (“into which the ‘root consciousness’, etc., develops, or:
has developed”, i.e., “developed by the ‘root consciousness’, etc.”; cf.
also CWSL 56b26) which is specifically Yogācāra. I admit that the 等
(“etc.”) in this expression requires explanation; one may think of the
mind-associates of the eighth consciousness or of the sixth conscious-
ness (cf. T vol. 67 no. 2266: 160a18-20), but I am not sure whether this
is the right track.
75
I am not sure whether my understanding of 於 … 處 (disre-
garded by P and C) is correct. I presume Hsüan-tsang wants to say:
where the bodies of other sentient beings are located in the ‘image-
part’ of the vipākavijñānas of the beings whose bodies they are. A dif-
38 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
77
In the terminology of the CWSL (cf. fn. 12), 變, for 所變 (cf.
CWSL 40c24-25: 他所變) = pariṇāma, is an abbreviation for 識所變
(vijñāna-pariṇāma) and inevitably suggests mental images (or at least
mental aspects, if we take the ‘aspect of vision’, the 見分, into ac-
count). Thus, 他(所)變 is a shorthand for 他識所變. Actually, in his
commentary on the definition of the ‘remote objective support’ (see
fn. 60) K'uei-chi expressly states that it consists not only in [images,
or appearances,] into which other consciousnesses of the same person
have developed, but also in [images] into which the consciousnesses
of other persons have developed (他識所變). No further kind of ‘re-
mote objective support’, existing independently of any form of mind,
is mentioned.
78
LUSTHAUS (L 502) translates: “... since it is the influence of
others' changes (他變 …) that is the hyle directing one's own changes
(自方變 ...)”. Does this mean that he takes 方 as a verb (“to direct”)
and 變 as its object (together with 自, which seems odd)? Actually,方
is rather a conjunction here (“then only”), as is supported by K'uei-
chi's paraphrase of the sentence: “This eighth consciousness must rely
on [images] developed by others[' consciousnesses] as its ‘original’,
then only (方) it is able to develop [one] itself” (Shu-chi 501b9-10: 此
第八識 要杖他變為本質 方能自變).
40 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
[5.3] Since even the image of the material world in the ālaya-
vijñāna is not based on an independent material world but on
other mental images (viz. those in other beings' ālayavijñānas),
it is highly improbable that the situation is essentially different
in the [p.41]case of the sense consciousnesses: In view of the
fact that in their case an external object (in the strict sense) is
categorically rejected,80 their remote objective support, too, can
79
See fn. 22.
80
CWSL 4b3-4 (see fn. 47). Cf. Shu-chi 269b22-23 and 270a8-9: “An
objective support [completely] outside mind, however, is definitely
non-existent. ... If we do not rule out dharmas outside [the respective
cognizing] mind as functioning as a remote objective support, this is
just [in the sense] that the eighth [consciousness] functions as the
‘original’, resting on which the remaining consciousnesses develop
Discussion of the Basic Evidence 41
83
Tshultrim KELSANG and Nobuchiyo ODANI, Tsonkapa-cho
Araya-shiki to mana-shiki no kenkyū, Kyoto 1986: 151, fol. 7b5. —
Tsong-kha-pa was acquainted with the Tibetan version of Wŏn-ch'ŭk's
commentary on the Saṁdhinirmocana-sūtra (cf. POWERS, op.cit. [see
fn. 16]: 96), but not with K'uei-chi’s writings. Unfortunately, I had no
time for more than a very superficial glance at Wŏn-ch'ŭk's commen-
tary, but one can find at least the distinction between rūpa as devel-
oped (*-pariṇāma) from the ālayavijñāna (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa
las gyur pa'i gzugs) and rūpa as an objective image (nimitta) developed
from visual consciousness (mig gi rnam par shes pa las gyur pa'i rgyu
mtshan gyi rnam pa) (SNSṬ Thi 122a6-7).
44 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
84
Date according to Erich FRAUWALLNER, Kleine Schriften (ed. G.
OBERHAMMER and E. STEINKELLNER, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner
1982): 859; cf. also Yuichi KAJIYAMA, Studies in Buddhist Philosophy
(ed. K. MIMAKI et al., Kyoto: Rinsen 1989): 200.
85
Madhyāntavibhāga-ṭīkā (ed. S. YAMAGUCHI) 146,5-9: <ya ālaya-
vijñānasya sādhāraṇârtha-prati>bhāso ..., so 'pi grāhya-...pratibhāsasya
pravṛtti-vijñānasyôtpattāv adhipati-pratyayatvād bāhyam āyatanam
ucyate, na tu tad-viṣayatvād iti. See also ibid. 17,13-14 and 16-17: tatrâ-
rtha-sattva-pratibhāsam ālayavijñānaṁ. ... vijñapti-pratibhāsaṁ ...
cakṣur-vijñānâdi-ṣaṭkam. Cf. L. SCHMITHAUSEN, Ālayavijñāna, Tokyo:
The International Institute for Buddhist Studies 1987, II: 414 and 416
(ns. 763 and 769).
Discussion of the Basic Evidence 45
86
Peking Tanjur, Sems-tsam, vol. Li: 395b5-7 (Derge vol. Ri:
329b3-4): ... mngon sum du dmigs pa dang brgyud pa'i sgo nas gzhan du
rnam pa gnyis te / de la mngon sum gyi dmigs pa ni gzung ba'i rnam pa
gang [6] yin pa'o // brgyud pa'i dmigs pa ni kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa
ste / de'i dbang gis gzung (P: bzung) ba'i rnam par snang ba'i phyir ro //
87
Ibid. 395a7: sems dang sems las byung ba la ma gtogs pa'i dngos
po med pa'i phyir .../. According to Susumu ŌTAKE, the Vivṛta-
gūḍārthapiṇḍavyākhyā might, however, have been produced in sixth
century Central Asia (ŌTAKE in: Imre HAMAR [ed.], Reflecting Mir-
rors, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 2007: 95).
46 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
88
Cf. also YAMABE 1998 (s. fn. 1): 31.
I-yen 243c7-10 ⋲Shu-ch’ao 330b9-12 explains: “One’s own
89
90
It is by no means my intention to deny the legitimacy of creative
philosophical interpretation, but if such an interpretation claims to be
in tune with what the old texts themselves wanted to communicate, it
has to put up with being checked against the actual wording of the
sources in its intratextual as well as wider historical context.
50 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
91
Cf., e.g., the Abhidharmasamuccaya, but much of the Yogācāra-
bhūmi, too, is more or less Abhidharmic.
92
E.g. Abhidharmasamuccaya (see fn. 14) 53,3 (reconstructed);
AKBh 192,10; even intentional bodily and vocal karma reduced to in-
tention: ib. 195,18-21.
The Spiritual Context of vijñaptimātratā 51
93
Cf. L. SCHMITHAUSEN, (see fn. 85): 57–62.
94
YoBhū 30,21–31,1; 36,19-20; 184,6-9; Abhidharmasamuccaya (T
vol. 31 no. 1605: 679b26-27; Tanjur (Peking) vol. Li: 102b6-7: las thun
mong ba … gang snod kyi 'jig rten rnam par 'byed pa'o. Cf. also AKBh
94,22; 95,15; 158,1-2 (vāyumaṇḍalam abhinirvṛttaṁ sarvasattv ānāṁ
karmādhipatyena); 158,6-11; 192,3-5.
95
Tanjur (Peking) vol. Zi: 8a6 and 4b1; T vol. 30 no. 1579:
581a28-29 and 580a2-4; cf. L. SCHMITHAUSEN, Ālayavijñāna (see
fn. 85): 64; 90; 203.
96
On the rôle of vijñaptimātratā in Vasubandhu’s solution of the
problem of karma and its fruition see J. BRONKHORST, Karma and
Teleology, Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies
2000: 67–75. According to BRONKHORST (op.cit. 77–93), reflections
on this problem were even the decisive stimulus for the original into-
duction of vijñaptimātratā. This is, however, not my concern in the
present paper.
52 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
97
Cf. the reduction of the cittaviprayukta-saṁskāras to mere de-
nominations (Abhidharmasamuccaya [see fn. 14] 10,15–11,24), or of
many traditional mind-associates to specific forms or combinations of
a few basic ones (ibid. 8,13–9,19; 10,5-12).
98
This is rightly emphasized by LUSTHAUS (L 486–487). On this
problem, see YAMABE 1998 (s. fn. 1): 15–41, and Yūichi KAJIYAMA,
“Do Other People's Minds Exist?”, in: Annual Report of the Interna-
tional Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University 3
(1999): 3–35 (in Japanese; dealing especially with Vasubandhu’s Viṁ-
śatikā, Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi and Ratnakīrti’s Santānā-
ntaradūṣaṇa); see also Y. KAJIYAMA, “Buddhist Solipsism. A free
translation of Ratnakīrti's Saṁtānāntaradūṣaṇa”, in: Y. KAJIYAMA,
Studies in Buddhist Philosophy (see fn. 84): 401–416.
99
I.e. experienced as not being created at will by one's own per-
ceptions.
The Spiritual Context of vijñaptimātratā 53
100
E.g. Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra (ed. S. LÉVI, Paris 1907) XIV.23–
24 (samāhitaḥ!). Cf., in this connection, also YAMABE 1998 (s. fn. 1):
35–38, suggesting spiritual practice as the basic motif behind the
Yogācāra system. This was also the result of my own previous inves-
tigation of the matter in my articles “Spirituelle Praxis …” and “On
the Problem of the Relation …” (see fn. 6).
101
E.g. Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra (see fn. 100) VI.6–8; XIV.23–28;
Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (ed. Klaus-Dieter MATHES, Unterscheidung
der Gegebenheiten von ihrem Wesen, Swisttal-Odendorf 1996): 64,98-
100 and 66,140-147; (Vṛtti:) 84,416-427 = 102,82-103,94 (Sanskrit) and
91,582-92,608; Mahāyānasaṁgraha (ed. E. LAMOTTE ) II.14b.c and f =
Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya (ed. N. TATIA ) 42, 8-9 and 14-15. Cf.
L 539, quoting Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya and Trisvabhāvanirdeśa.
102
CWSL 38c8-9 (P 414; C 231; S 314); cf. also 37a9.
103
CWSL 38c9; cf. 6c11, and also 6c23-26, 37a9-11 and 55b11.
54 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
104
TrBh 40,29–41,1: nirvikalpena jñānenâkāśasamatalān sarvadha -
rmān paśyati. The reading °samatalān (LÉVI: °samatāyāṁ; ms. °sama-
tayā tāṁ) is taken from Kamalaśīla's 3rd Bhāvanākrama (ed. G. TUCCI,
Rome 1971, p. 11,7-8) and the Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇī (ed. K. MA-
TSUDA), in: Bulletin of the Research Institute of Bukkyo University
3/1996: 96,7 and 109, fol. 2a8). My rendering of the compound fol-
lows the Tibetan (nam mkha'i dkyil dang mtshungs par); the Sanskrit
compound may mean “forming a [blank] surface like the empty sky”.
Cf. also TrBh 40,29: pariniṣpannaś câkāśavad ekarasaḥ (with ms.), jñā-
naṁ ca.
105
CWSL 46b28–c6; TrBh 40,26-28 (quotation from the Nirvikalpa-
praveśadhāraṇī): tatpṛṣṭhalabdhena jñānena māyā-marīci-svapna-prati-
śrutkôdakacandra-nirmita-samān sarvadharm ān pratyeti ; Sthiramati,
The Spiritual Context of vijñaptimātratā 55
more than the ordinary, sullied surrounding world and bodies do.
Especially in the case of the surrounding world, it is precisely
on account of its being only an image in mind that its transfor-
mation from a impure world into a pure, sublime one through
individual spiritual practise becomes plausible. This would be
much more difficult with an adamant, unwieldy material world
independent of mind.
[p.57]
IV. Appendix:
112
“And because of the arising of ‘knowledge-images’, it is
[called] the [mirror-like knowledge]” (jñānapratibimbodayāc ca tat; cf.
Bhāṣya: jñānapratibimbodayāc ca tad ‘ādarśajñānam’ ity ucyate).
58 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
113
Kyoo NISHIO (ed.), The Buddhabhūmi-sūtra and the Buddha-
bhūmi-vyākhyāna of Çīlabhadra, [reprint] Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai
1982, p. 9,10, etc.
114
Cf. Sthiramati, comm. on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, Tanjur
(Peking) vol. Mi: 157a3-5.
115
One of K'uei-chi's explanations (viz. Shu-chi 598c28–599a1) is
similar.
116
Cf. also BBhU 302c24-25: 現身土等一切影像, 312c23: 能變現身
and CWSL 58c1-3: 圓鏡智相應淨識 … 變為純淨佛土, showing that
現 X, 變現 X and 變為 X are interchangeable.
117
This refers to the Buddha's own continuum (cf. also BBhU
312c21-22). Moreover, as adhipati-pratyaya, the mind-cluster associ-
ated with the ‘mirror-like knowledge’ generates ‘images’ consisting
in knowledge, etc., (智等影) in the continua of other sentient beings
(BBhU 312c22-24). Cf. also BBhU 317c18-21: the pratyavekṣā-jñāna of a
Buddha, either by means of arousing an image of the teaching of the
Dharma (教法影像) in the mind associated with his ‘mirror-like
Appendix: Discussion of Four CWSL Passages 59
121
影 may belong to both sets of objects.
122
Cf. BBhU 317a3-9, stating that the other buddha-jñānas function
as an adhipati-pratyaya which impels the consciousness associated
with the ‘mirror-like knowledge’ (cf. also BBhU 317c18-19 (see
fn. 117)) to develop (現, 現變) into [an image of] a saṁbhoga- or nir-
māṇa-kāya. As far as I can see, the CWSL (57a1-4; 57c28–58a4) relates
these bodies to the other jñānas only.
123
I.e. if the text refers, in particular, to the peculiar material body
and Buddha-field of the svasaṁbhoga-kāya level (CWSL 57a1-2; c26-27
and 58c1-4).
124
Cf., e.g., CWSL 4a27: “Although it is not the case that matter
does not exist, it is after all [only] a development of mind (vijñāna-
pariṇāma)” (雖非無色 而是識變); 4b1-2: “Since resistent matter [ex-
isting] outside is unproved (asiddha, or: logically impossible, ayukta),
it can therefore only be [something] developed and manifested by
Appendix: Discussion of Four CWSL Passages 61
126
As already indicated by DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN (P 718; cf.
also T vol. 67, no. 2266: 915b2-6), this objection resembles an argu-
ment advanced, likewise from the point of view of a position accord-
ing to which the ‘image-part’ in consciousness is unreal, at BBhU
317c6-9 (cf. KEENAN, op. cit. [see fn. 118]: 169, differring, however,
considerably from my translation of the passage): “Although the im-
age [of an object] developed by the mind looks as if it were existent,
in reality it has no substance. Otherwise, visible matter, etc., would
exist just like mind and mental factors, [and thus your position would]
not come up to [the principle of] ‘nothing but consciousness’. If [you
think that one can] speak of ‘nothing but consciousness’ because the
[object] is really existent but not separate from consciousness, one
should as well speak of ‘nothing but object’ because mind and mental
factors, [in their turn,] are not separate from those images of visible
matter, etc., either. [This, however,] would amount to a serious flaw
[of your position].” (心所變相 雖相似有 而實無體。 若不爾者, 應有色
等 如心心法 不成唯識。 若彼實有 但不離識 名唯識者, 心及心法 亦不
離彼色等諸相 應名唯境, 便成大過。)
127
Cf. Shu-chi 606a11; 27; 28 and BBhU 317c9 (see fn. 126): 唯境.
64 On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL
Chinese texts have mostly been copied from the CBETA Chinese
Electronic Tripitaka Collection (April 2004, obtained through the
kindness of the Ven. Anālayo), but punctuation is mine.