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Petitioner, vs. vs. Respondents Richard W. Sison & Associates The Solicitor General
Petitioner, vs. vs. Respondents Richard W. Sison & Associates The Solicitor General
SYNOPSIS
On September 7, 1997, petitioner Agbay and a certain Jugalbot were arrested and
detained for the alleged violation of RA 7610. The next day, a case was led against them
in the MCTC. Petitioner, however, led a complaint against private respondents before the
O ce of the Ombudsman for failure to deliver the detained petitioner to the proper judicial
authority within 36 hours from arrest. Said complaint was transferred to the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military who recommended the dismissal of the complaints.
Petitioner questioned the authority of the O ce of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military to investigate civilian personnel of the government. The issue had already been
resolved in the affirmative in the case of Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.
On the alleged violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner contended
that the proper judicial authority is the Regional Trial Court, not the MCTC. The Court,
however, ruled that upon the filing of the complaint with the MTC, the intent behind Art. 125
is satis ed considering that the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against
him. Hence, such filing interrupted the period prescribed in Art. 125.SCEDaT
SYLLABUS
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES , J : p
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military dated 19 January 1998 1 which recommended the dismissal of the criminal
complaint led by petitioner against herein private respondents for violation of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code for delay in the delivery of detained persons, and the Order of
April 13, 1998 2 which denied his motion for reconsideration. LLjur
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are as follows:
On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with a certain Sherwin Jugalbot, was
arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of
R.A. 7610, the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act." 3 The following day, or on September 8, 1997, a Complaint for violation
of R.A. 7610 was led against petitioner and Jugalbot before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu by one Joan Gicaraya for and in behalf of her daughter Gayle. 4
The complaint, insofar as pertinent, reads as follows:
"That on the 7th day of September 1997 at Sitio Bonbon, Brgy. Catarman,
Liloan, Metro Cebu, Philippines and within the Preliminary Jurisdiction of this
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Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully,
feloniously and unlawfully, conspiring, confederating, helping with one another,
while accused JASPER AGBAY manipulating to nger the vagina of GAYLE
FATIMA AMIGABLE GICAYARA, his companion block the sight of the Private
Complainant, Mrs. JOAN A. GICAYARA, while on board a tricycle going their
destinations. Upon initial investigation of the Bgy, Captain of Bgy. Catarman,
accused SHERWIN JUGALBOT was released and accused JASPER AGBAY is
presently detain Liloan Police Station Jail. Medical Certi cate issued from Don
Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, Cebu City is hereto attached."
On September 10, 1997, counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan
demanding the immediate release of petitioner considering that the latter had "failed to
deliver the detained Jasper Agbay to the proper judicial authority within thirty-six (36)
hours from September 7, 1997." 5 Private respondents did not act on this letter and
continued to detain petitioner. 6
On September 12, 1997, the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu
issued an order, denominated as "Detention During the Pendency of the Case", committing
petitioner to the jail warden of Cebu City. 7 Five (5) days later, or on September 17, 1997,
petitioner was ordered released by the said court after he had posted bond. 8
On September 26, 1997, petitioner led a complaint for delay in the delivery of
detained persons against herein private respondents SPO4 Nemesio Natividad, Jr., SPO2
Eleazar M. Salomon and other unidenti ed police o cers stationed at the Liloan Police
Substation, before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. 9
Regarding the complaint for violation of R.A. 7610, it is alleged by petitioner that on
November 10, 1997, the 7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued a resolution containing the
following dispositive portion: LLjur
By virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1995, dated 10 October 1995 of
the O ce of the Ombudsman, 1 1 the case for delay in delivery led by petitioner against
herein private respondents before the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas was transferred
to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military for its proper disposition. Thus, it was this
o ce which acted on the complaint, now denominated as OMB-VIS-CRIM-97-0786, and
which issued the questioned Resolution dated January 19, 1998 recommending its
dismissal against herein private respondents. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this
Resolution but this motion was denied in an Order dated April 13, 1998.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The grounds relied upon in the present petition 12 are as follows:
I.
IV.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING
THAT THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDER OF DETENTION IS
IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FOR DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS.
V.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING
THAT THE DUTY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO FILE THE NECESSARY
COMPLAINT IN COURT WAS FULFILLED WHEN THEY FILED A FORMAL
COMPLAINT ON 8 SEPTEMBER 1997 WITH THE 7TH MCTC OF LILOAN-
COMPOSTELA.
On the rst issue, petitioner argues that due to the civilian character of the Philippine
National Police, the O ce of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, by virtue of the
description of the O ce, has no competence or jurisdiction to act on his complaint
against private respondents who are members of the PNP. Petitioner also questions the
constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 14 insofar as it purports to vest the O ce
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs with jurisdiction to investigate all cases
against personnel of the Philippine National Police. cdll
There is no dispute as to the civilian character of our police force. The 1987
Constitution, in Section 6, Article XVI, has mandated the establishment of "one police force,
which shall be national in scope and civilian in character (underscoring supplied)."
Likewise, R.A. 6975 1 3 is categorical in describing the civilian character of the police force.
1 4 The only question now is whether Memorandum Circular No. 14, in vesting the O ce of
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military with jurisdiction to investigate complaints against
members of the PNP, violates the latter's civilian character.
As opined by the O ce of the Solicitor General in its Comment dated 7 December
1998, 1 5 the issue as to whether the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military has the authority
to investigate civilian personnel of the government was resolved in the a rmative in the
case of Acop v. O ce of the Ombudsman . 1 6 In that case, the petitioners, who were
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members of the Philippine National Police questioned the jurisdiction of the Deputy
Ombudsman to investigate the alleged shootout of certain suspected members of the
"Kuratong Baleleng" robbery gang; this Court held that:
"The deliberations on the Deputy for the military establishment do not yield
conclusive evidence that such deputy is prohibited from performing other
functions or duties affecting non-military personnel. On the contrary, a review of
the relevant Constitutional provisions reveal otherwise.
As previously established, the Ombudsman 'may exercise such other
powers or perform such functions or duties' as Congress may prescribe through
legislation. Therefore, nothing can prevent Congress from giving the Ombudsman
supervision and control over the Ombudsman's deputies, one being the deputy for
the military establishment. In this light, Section 11 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:
SECTION 11. Structural Organization. — The authority and
responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the O ce of the
Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be
vested in the Ombudsman, who shall have supervision and control of the
said Office.LLjur
The cited case is determinative of the issue. However, petitioner, in his Reply to
Comment dated February 1, 1999, argues that the ruling in the Acop case is not on all fours
with the case at bar. 1 8 Petitioner states that the doctrine laid down in the said case is
simply that "the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for
investigation by the Deputy for Military Affairs. This doctrine, petitioner argues, "applies
only to isolated or individual cases involving non-military personnel referred by the
Ombudsman to the Deputy for Military Affairs" and does not apply when, as in this case,
there is a wholesale or indiscriminate referral of such cases to the Deputy Ombudsman for
Military Affairs in the form of an Office Memorandum Circular.
Petitioner's arguments do not convince as there is no basis for the distinction.
There is no basis in the above-cited decision to limit the referral of cases involving
non-military personnel to the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs to isolated or
individual cases. The O ce of the Ombudsman, in issuing Memorandum Circular No. 15, is
simply exercising the power vested in the Ombudsman "to utilize the personnel of his
o ce and/or designate or deputize any scal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of certain cases." This Court, absent any grave abuse of
discretion, may not interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his power of
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supervision and control over the said Office.
Petitioner further argues that Memorandum Circular No. 14 violates the clear intent
and policy of the Constitution and of R.A. 6975 to maintain the civilian character of the
police force and "would render nugatory and meaningless the distinction between cases
involving civilian and military personnel and the creation of separate divisions of the
Ombudsman." 19
Said contentions are misplaced. llcd
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, despite his designation as such, is by no
means a member of the military establishment. The said O ce was established "to extend
the O ce of the Ombudsman to the military establishment just as it champions the
common people against bureaucratic indifference". The O ce was intended to help the
"ordinary foot soldiers" to obtain redress for their grievances against higher authorities
and the drafters of the Constitution were aware that the creation of the O ce, which is
seemingly independent of the President, to perform functions which constitutionally
should be performed by the President, might be in derogation of the powers of the
President as Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces. 2 0
It must be borne in mind that the O ce of the Ombudsman was envisioned by the
framers of the 1987 Constitution as the "eyes and ears of the people" 2 1 and "a champion
of the citizen." 2 2 Sec. 12, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution describes the Ombudsman and
his deputies as "protectors of the people." Thus, rst and foremost, the Ombudsman and
his deputies, including the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military owe their allegiance to the
people and ordinary citizens; it is clearly not a part of the military. We fail to see how the
assumption of jurisdiction by the said o ce over the investigation of cases involving the
PNP would detract from or violate the civilian character of the police force when precisely
the Office of the Ombudsman is a civilian office.
The other issues raised by petitioner concerns the application of Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides as follows:
"ARTICLE 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public o cer or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six
(36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by a ictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at
any time with his attorney or counsel."
In the case at bar, petitioner was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station
on 7 September 1997 for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610, speci cally section 5(b)
thereof. 2 3 This crime carries a penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua, an a ictive penalty. Under these circumstances, a criminal complaint
or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within thirty six (36) hours
of his arrest. Cdpr
Footnotes
6. Rollo, p. 7.
7. Annex "D" of Petition: Rollo, p. 39.
8. Annex "E" of Petition; Rollo, p. 40.
9. Annex "F" of Petition; Rollo, p. 41.
10. Rollo, p. 8.
11. Which reads, in part, as follows:
"In pursuance of the Office’s mandate to promote efficient service to the people and
conformably with the powers vested in the Ombudsman under Section 15, par. 10 and
Section 31 of RA 6770, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military shall continue to
investigate all cases against personnel of the PNP, BFP, and BJMP."
12. Rollo, pp. 9-10.
13. Entitled, "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized
Department of the Interior and Local Government and For Other Purposes," otherwise
known as the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990.
14. R.A. 6975, Section 2. Declaration of Policy . — It is hereby declared that the policy of the
State to promote peace and order, ensure public safety and further strengthen local
government capability aimed towards the effective delivery of the basic services to the
citizenry through the establishment of a highly efficient and competent police force that
is national in scope and civilian in character. . . .
The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the
performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian character shall be
paramount . . .
15. Rollo, pp. 79-81.
16. 248 SCRA 566.
17. Id. pp. 587-588.
18. Rollo, p. 92.
19. Reply; Rollo, pp. 95-96.
20. Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 2, p. 318-320 (hereinafter 2 Record)
21. 2 Record, p. 267.
22. 2 Record, p. 268.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: . . .
"Rule 114, Section 4, Rules of Court. Bail, a matter of right. — All persons in custody
shall: (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court; and (b) before conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule."