Plotinus Agains The Gnostics, Paul Kalligas

Plotinus against the Gnostics
Author(s): Paul Kalligas

Source: Hermathena, No. 169, Essays on the Platonic Tradition: Joint Committee for
Mediterranean & Near Eastern Studies (Winter 2000), pp. 115-128
Published by: Trinity College Dublin
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Plotinus against the Gnostics
by Paul Kalligas
When, in the year AD 244 , Plotinus established himself in Rome

and started to teach, initially 'admitting people to study with him,
but writing nothing',1 it seems that he did not encounter any
serious competition. In the capital of the Empire, at least during
the second and the third centuries, there had not been any for
mally institutionalised philosophical schools with traditions and
organisation comparable with those in Athens and Alexandria.
Those of its inhabitants - usually coming from the wealthier
classes of society - who had some spiritual interests or needs
could satisfy them either in the amphitheatres, where famous ora
tors, like Maximus of Tyre2 and the Diophanes mentioned in
Porphyry's Life of Plotinus,3 would perform their epideictic decla
mations, or in the lecture rooms of diverse representatives or
exponents of 'wisdom' imported from the eastern provinces of the
Empire.4 Among these were some teachers whose prominence
and popularity had increased dramatically during this period and,
although they posed as being proper Christians,5 propounded in
a variety of versions a fusion made up of diverse complicated cos
mological myths, occult symbolisms, exotic magico-religious doc
1 See Porphyry, Life ofPlotinus (= VP) 3.35.

2 Whose Lectures (dialexeis) were delivered in Rome, during his first visit
to the city, in the reign of Commodus: see G.L. Koniaris, 'On Maximus of
Tyre: Zetemata I', ClAnt 1 (1982), 90-102.
3 See VP 15.6-12.
4 A more or less typical instance must have been one Alcibiades who,
according to Hippolytus, Ref IX 13.1, 'used to live in Apamea, in Syria, ... but
then came to Rome bringing with him a (sacred) book ... claiming that it had
been obtained from the Chinese of Parthia by a just man called Elchasai'.
5 The question whether Gnosticism was from the beginning a deviant
Judaeo-Christian trend, or developed independently, has not yet received a
definitive answer. There can be no doubt, however, that during the second cen
tury it had acquired a strongly Judaeo-Christian character, and that the
Gnostics known to Plotinus professed to be Christians. See R. McL. Wilson,
'Gnosis, Gnosticism and the New Testament', in U. Bianchi (ed.), Le origini
dello Gnosticismo, Leiden 1970, 276-8 and VP 16.1-2 with J. Igal, 'The
Gnostics and the "Ancient Philosophy" in Porphyry and Plotinus', in H.J.
Blumenthal & R.A. Markus (eds.), Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought:
Essays in honour of A.H. Armstrong, London 1981, 138-9.
116 Paul Kalligas
trines and some strongly anticosmic beliefs which, all together,

were supposed to lead, on the one hand, to a radically non-ration
al 'knowledge' [gnosis) or insight into the nature of an essentially
supra-rational, therefore inscrutable by our ordinary cognitive
powers, and so 'unknown', supreme God and, on the other, to the
realization and re-evaluation of the 'real' human condition, name
ly, of the fact that man is an offshoot of divine nature, an exile
from his supra-celestial homeland encaged in the material uni
verse by a malevolent or, at least, simply ignorant and stupid
Demiurge.
The arrival in Rome of the heresiarch Valentinus, around the
year 140, and his stay there for more than two decades, when he
was nearly appointed to the Episcopal see of the city, but was
eventually outvoted by a colleague with stronger credentials as a
martyr,6 symbolizes, one might say, the beginning of a process of
crystallization of this theosophical movement into a more or less
philosophically structured theological system, based on Platonic
and Pythagorean principles. Valentinus himself is commonly
described in our sources as a Platonist, and Hippolytus maintains,
not without some plausibility, that his system was based on a
famous passage from the Second pseudo-Platonic Epistle,7 which
we know had inspired several other Pythagorising Platonists of the
time, like for instance, Numenius. Within the following century,
the process continued and acquired considerable momentum
through the contribution of numerous disciples of Valentinus,
some of whom, like Heracleon and Ptolemaeus, were, according
to the testimony of Hippolytus, also active in Italy.8 A sure indi
cation of the amount of Gnostic material that was circulating in
Rome a few years before the arrival of Plotinus is given by the fact
that Hippolytus, while compiling his massive Attack Against the
6 See Tertullian, Adv. Valent. 4.1 and H. Leisegang, 'Valentinus,

Valentinianer', RE II 7 (1948), 2261-2.
7 See Tertullian, De praescr. haer. 7.3 and 30.1, De came Chr. 20,
Hippolytus, Ref VI 29.1 and 37.1-6. Anthimus of Nicomedia refers to a work
by Valentinus entitled On Three Natures (see Leisegang, above n. 6, 2262),
which sounds almost like a commentary on the crucial passage from the Second
Epistle (312el-4). J. Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context, Leiden 1992, 204-7,
seems to me to be over-skeptical here.
8 Ref. VI 35.5-6.
Plotinus against the Gnostics 117
Heresies, was able to collect there the immense material of Gnostic

provenance that is used in this work.9 Further fascinating testi
mony on the presence and the activities of Gnostic sects in Rome
during the first half of the third century is provided by the famous
hypogaeum of the Aurelii, with the imaginative depiction of
Gnostic allegorical scenes on its murals.10
At the same time, Valentinianism influenced some other,
related branches of the now rapidly expanding movement of
Gnosticism, such as the Sethians11 or Barbelognostics, who had
originally been a strictly Judaic heresy, but by now were incorpo
rating Christian and philosophical, i.e. Platonic, doctrines into
their teaching, and so developed a most intricately complex theo
logical system, expounded in the format of a somewhat melodra
matic narration of the origin of the Universe. Its main character
istics were the following:
1. A meticulously apophatic characterization of the incom
prehensible supreme Deity, sometimes described as a 'Monad' or
a 'Father', but which was thought to transcend any attempt of
determination or categorization.
2. This first principle is surrounded by a luminous emanation
from it, in which the divinity is reflected, so that a whole system
of divine beings, usually arranged in couples and called Aeons',
emerge, forming a kind of supra-celestial divine kingdom called
Pleroma.
3. One of the main figures in these mythical narratives is
Sophia, last born of the Aeons, who transgresses the divine order
and thus conceives and brings forth the imperfect and foolish
9 For Hippolytus' activities in Rome, see M. Marcovich's 'Introduction' to

his edition, pp. 10-2.
10 See J. Carcopino, De Pythagore aux Apotres, Paris 1956, 85-221 andChr.
Elsas, Neuplatonische und gnostische Weltablehnung in der Schule Plotins, (Berlin
/New York 1975) (RGW 34), 28-30.
11 So called because they considered themselves as descendants of the third
son of Adam (see infra). On Sethian Gnosticism, see H.-M. Schenke, 'Das
sethianische System nach Nag-Hammadi-Handschriften', in P. Nagel (ed.),
.Studio. Coptica, Berlin 1974, 165-74; 'The Phenomenon and Significance of
Gnostic Sethianism', in B. Layton (ed.), The Rediscovery of Gnosticism II, Leiden
1981, 588-616; and K. L. King, Revelation of the Unknowable God, (Santa Rosa
CA 1995) 34-40.
12 The etymology of this Aramaic name is given by G. Scholem,
'Jaldabaoth Reconsidered', in Melanges H.-Ch. Puech, (Paris 1974) 420-1, as
118 Paul Kalligas
Demiurge of the sensible world, sometimes named Ialdabaoth.12

The figure of Sophia is obviously based on that of Divine Wisdom
which appears in some of the books of the Old Testament,13 and
whose wanderings between heaven and earth were sometimes
thought to have far-reaching cosmogonical consequences,
described for example in Chapter 42 of the apocryphal Book of
Enoch. Her Judaic provenance is confirmed by the name
Achamoth, commonly ascribed to her, at least in her lower,
descended appearance. Such an hypostatization of divine wisdom
and its interpretation as the principle informing the world can be
traced at least as far back as Philo of Alexandria,14 but while being
a characteristic trait of the system of Valentinus, can also be found
in some of the Sethian tracts discovered in Nag Hammadi.
4. The 'conversion' and the 'repentance' of Sophia initiates a
huge cosmic enterprise on the part of the Aeons, to bring back the
divine 'power' which had outflowed and been dispersed on matter
during the creation of the world. The plan includes the liberation
of an elite part of humanity from the bonds of their fleshly captiv
ity, and the overcoming of Fate or heimarmene, which represents
the oppressive rule of the planetary Archons governing the
Universe.
The continuing tendency to formulate such speculations in
ever more theoretical terminology, their formidable complexity
and the effort to support or embellish them by employing philo
sophical concepts or even forms of argumentation led to the pro
duction of treatises where, under the guise of phantasmagoric alle
gories of a revelatory character and the intricacies of a complicat
ed symbolism, one can discern an effort to tackle theological
indicating 'the progenitor of (celestial) powers'. The figure of Sophia is usually

connected with Valentinian Gnosticism, although the Nag Hammadi find has
shown that she had a prominent role also in the Sethian systems.
'3 See Proverbs 8.22-31 and Wisdom of Solomon 7.12-29, 9.1 ff.; also, G.C.
Stead, 'The Valentinian Myth of Sophia', JThS 20 (1969), 75-104, G.W.
Macrae, 'The Jewish Background of the Gnostic Sophia Myth', NT 12 (1970),
86-101, J. Zandee, 'Die Person der Sophia in der vierten Schrift des Codex
Jung', in Bianchi (ed.), above n. 5, 203-12.
*4 Cf. Zandee, above n. 13, 208-9, and J. Dillon, 'Female Principles in
Platonism', Itaca 1 (1986), 117-8.
*5 See, e.g., J. Mansfeld, 'Bad World and Demiurge: a "Gnostic" Motif
from Parmenides and Empedocles to Lucretius and Philo', Studies presented to
G. Quispel, Leiden 1981, 261-314.
issues that had preoccupied Greek philosophy since the time of

the Presocratics.15 To this category seem to belong at least two of
the treatises mentioned by Porphyry in Chapter 16 of his Life of
Plotinus, which have miraculously emerged again among the
codices found buried in a jar, near the Egyptian village of Nag
Hammadi. These are the 'Revelations' of Zostrianus and
Allogenes, which contain some of the most theoretically preten
tious passages in the whole library Other Sethian texts included
in the collection are the ones under the titles Apocryphon of John,
The Hypostasis of the Archons, The Gospel of the Egyptians, The
Three Steles ofSeth, Marsanes and the treatise entitled Trimorphic
Protennoia. However, we have to note that although Porphyry
explicitly characterizes those who circulated these texts in Rome as
'Christians', the only one of them which bears any distinctively
Christian elements is the Apocryphon of John.16
It appears that, at first, Plotinus preferred not to engage
directly in any kind of polemic with this spiritual movement, with
some of the doctrines of which he might even feel a certain sym
pathy.17 One can hardly fail to notice some obvious similarities
between the theological structure outlined above and the
Plotinian system of the three so-called hypostases.
1. The distinctive and uncompromising transcendence of the
supreme principle in respect of the rest of the Pleroma leads to a
kind of 'negative theology' which reminds us of the negative
expressions Plotinus is employing, most of the time, in order to
refer to his own highest principle, the One. Furthermore, the
'<> On the other hand, scholars are now becoming more alert to the possi
bility that these works had undergone substantial changes in the period sepa
rating Plotinus' teaching in Rome from the time when the Nag Hammadi
library was deposited. See, e.g., H.W. Attridge, 'Gnostic Platonism', BACAP 7
(1991), 22-3, and R. Majercik, 'The Existence-Life-Intellect Triad in
Gnosticism and Neoplatonism', CQ 42 (1992), 475-6.
17 There are several instances in the early treatises of Plotinus, where he
seems to allude to Gnostic imagery: see, e.g., I 6.5.51-8, 8.9-16, 18-21, I 9.1
2 and Th. G. Sinnige, 'Gnostic Influences in the Early Works of Plotinus and
Augustine', in D.T. Runia (ed.), Plotinus amid Gnostics and Christians,
Amsterdam 1984, 81-9. H.-Ch. Puech formulated the hypothesis that
Plotinus' attitude towards Gnosticism underwent a serious change after 263,
during the discussion following the presentation of his paper in Vandoeuvres:
see Entretiens Hardt 1960, 183-4.
120 Paul Kalligas
terms God (theos) and Father (pater) are repeatedly employed by

both Plotinus and the Gnostics as designators for this principle.
2. The Pleroma itself displays obvious similarities with the
Platonic and the Plotinian world of Ideal Forms.18
3. The most interesting case, though, is that of Sophia, whom
Plotinus himself considers as equivalent with his own World Soul.
She displays a similarly ambivalent attitude by being both fer
vently engaged in her contemplation of the Father, and also in
some way concerned with the vicissitudes of the material universe,
and her duplication in some Gnostic texts into a higher 'unfallen'
Sophia and a lower passionable' emanation, usually called
Achamoth, finds a parallel in the distinction sometimes drawn by
Plotinus between his World Soul and the lower and less obvious
ly impassible Pbysis.xc>
These and some other existing analogies, however, are of a
rather superficial and formal character, and should not blur the
fact that there are many deeper, although perhaps more subtle,
dissimilarities between the metaphysical structures of the two sys
tems. It would possibly be of some interest, although - in my view
- not of any particular importance, to try to describe these dis
crepancies in detail. It is - I believe - one of the merits of Plotinus'
treatment of the Gnostics that he does not indulge in disagreeing
with them at the theological level, as that would lead to a dog
matic dispute of little broader significance. He realizes that his dis
tance from Gnosticism is mainly due to their fundamentally dif
ferent world-views and, consequently, to their radically opposed
attitudes towards the world, society and history. But to this issue
I shall return in a moment.
Now, after the arrival at the school in Rome of Porphyry, who
is well-known for his strong anti-Christian feelings, it appears that
Plotinus' attitude against Gnosticism became much more outspo
ken. Porphyry reports that, in his lectures, his master would often
engage in severe criticism of certain Gnostic tenets while, around
18 This has been amply shown by J. Dillon in his 'Pleroma and Noetic
Cosmos: a Comparative Study', in R.T. Wallis (ed.), Neoplatonism and
Gnosticism (Albany 1992) 99-110.
19 See, e.g., Enn. II 3.17.15-25, IV 8.2.31-5 and F. Romano, 'Natura e
anima in Plotino', in M.-O. Goulet-Caze et al. (eds), Z<k|>lt]5 Mai^Topes.'
Hommage h J. Pepin (Paris 1992) 275-95.
the year 265, he composed a massive work, which is full of implic

it anti-Gnostic polemic, whereas in its last part it becomes much
more explicit and denounces the Gnostics with unprecedented
severity. This writing was subsequently divided20 into four parts of
approximately the same length, and these were dispersed in dif
ferent books of the Enneads, namely, as numbers III 8, V 8, V 5
and II 9 of the collection. In an influential article, R. Harder21 has
convincingly indicated not only the continuity of thought, but
also the coherent organic structure that underlies these pieces and
so reconstructed what has been known in recent years as Plotinus
'Great Book'.
The way Porphyry chooses to express himself in the Life gives
us the impression that the title which had already prevailed among
Plotinus' disciples while referring to this larger treatise was Against
the Gnostics.22 This, however, need not imply that its exclusive, or
even its main objective had been polemic. For its polemical aspect
is only a concomitant of the philosopher's radical dissent with
them on some really fundamental theoretical issues. The doctrines
of the Gnostics had obviously provided him with a motive to
rethink his whole philosophical system and to try to find out and
render more explicit those elements that contributed to its coher
ence. One such element is his doctrine of contemplation or theo
ria, which establishes a strong vertical connection between the dif
ferent layers of his metaphysical hierarchy and thus emerges as a
key concept in his philosophy. Other concepts with a similar func
tion are those of Beauty, which is the most powerful manifestation
of intelligible reality into the psychic and the corporeal level, and
cognition, which extends from the pure identification between
knower and known object — at the level of the Intellect — to the
more diversified and mediated sympathy which is required for the
perception of sensible objects. In this way, his polemic against the
Gnostics is focused, from the very beginning, in the direction of
20 Either by Porphyry, for his edition of the collected works of his teacher,
or possibly before him, by some other editor.
21 'Eine neue Schrift Plotins', Hermes 71 (1936), 1-10. Harder's theory has
been almost universally accepted. See, however, A.M. Wolters, 'Notes on the
Structure of 'Enneads II, 9', in Life is Religion: Essays in honour ofH.E. Runner,
(Ontario 1981) 83-7.
22 See Igal, above n. 5, 147, n. 18.
122 Paul Kalligas
the theoretical presuppositions of their doctrines, and thus is

transposed to the level of philosophical analysis.
Porphyry states that Plotinus' opponents, although known to
be Christians, were nevertheless different from the great mass of
ignorantly credulous believers, which he had denounced in his
extensive treatise against them, by the fact that they presented
their doctrines in a guise that was at least reminiscent of a philo
sophical hairesis, or school of thought.23 The fact that they pro
fessed to derive their doctrines from the 'ancient philosophy' - as
they called it -, even if they distanced themselves from it, caused
serious concern to Plotinus, who considered himself as an authen
tic exponent of the best tradition in ancient Greek philosophy.
Under this perspective, they appeared to him as a serious threat
for the tradition he represented, a threat of a purely doctrinal
nature. Moreover, if, as it has been recently suggested,24 the writ
ings by Alexander of Libya, Philocomus, Demostratus and Lydus
mentioned by Porphyry as being 'possessed' by the Gnostics and
used by them in order to produce their own 'Apocalypses', were
actually handbooks of a philosophical or doxographic character
and 'had nothing to do with either Christianity or Gnosticism',
then Plotinus' preoccupation to confront them on the philosoph
ical rather on the theological level is even better understood. He
was interested in the complexities of their theological construc
tions only to the extent that these had definite philosophical pre
tensions.
An interesting example of this is presented by his treatment of

the Gnostic doctrine of divine Reflection or epinoia. In some
Gnostic systems, like e.g. the one of the Valentinian Ptolemaeus,25
the Pleroma is produced by a couple of Aeons, Depth or Forefather
and his first offspring, Silence or Ennoia. Now, the latter was
thought to emanate from the Forefather as a reflection of him
upon himself. Plotinus takes issue with this doctrine26 by pointing
23 See VP 16.1-9 and cf. Contra Christianos fr. 49.15 and 89.5 Harnack.
24 By M. Tardieu, 'Les Gnostiques dans la Vie de Plotiri, in L. Brisson et
al. (eds.), Porphyre, La Vie de Plotin II, (Paris 1992) 516-7.
25 Described by Irenaeus at the very beginning of his Against the Heresies,
I 1.1. Cf„ e.g., NHC II 1, 4.27-5.5, VIII 1, 82.23-83.22, 87.14-20.
2<> See Enn. II 9.1.33-57.
out that, even if the Forefather is considered as an Intellect, his

self-thinking could never occur anywhere outside himself since,
according to his own considered view (defended at length in the
third part of his great anti-Gnostic tetralogy), the objects of the
intellect are not outside it. His use of the term epinoia, instead of
ennoia, probably indicates that he had in mind a system like the
one contained in the Simonian Apophasis, mentioned by
Hippolytus,27 but also helps to bring out the arbitrariness and the
redundancy that such a concept would, in his mind, involve.
Somewhat similar is the case of his treatment of the Gnostic
concept of logos. This is reported, for example, to have been an
important element in the system of the so-called Peratics,28 where
it denoted an entity mediating between the Intellect and the
Cosmic Soul, transferring noetic imprints from the former to the
latter. Plotinus' objection to this is that the World Soul, being by
its nature connate with the Intellect, needs no intermediaries in
order to come in contact with it.29 For him logos can only func
tion at a lower level, transferring the Soul's commands to the
material universe.
Another instance is his criticism of the well-known Gnostic
doctrine according to which mankind was, since its origin, divid
ed into three separate groups, descending respectively from the
three sons of Adam, namely, Cain, Abel and Seth. The first group,
called the 'sarcics' or 'fleshly' were forever doomed, beyond any
hope of salvation. The second, the 'psychics', had the chance to
elevate themselves to the 'middle' region of the universe, located
in the outermost part of the celestial sphere. Only the third group,
however, the 'pneumatics', were saved, as having in them the
divine spark of the Father.30 Plotinus is willing to relate these three
groups with his own classification of mankind into what he calls
'the vulgar crowd', 'those who remember virtue' and 'the wise'.
But for him these three categories of people are by no means rigid
ly separated from each other by some preordained divine will;
27 Ref. VI 18.3-7. Cf. NHC VIII 1, 82.1-22 and XIII 1, 35.12-36.25.

28 See Hippol., Ref V 17.1-2 and cf. NHC VII 5, 123.6-11.
29 See, e.g., £««. IV 4.2.27-9, V 1.3.12-23.
30 See Erin. II 9.9.6-11 and cf. Clem. Alex., Exc. ex Theod. 54, Irenaeus,
Adv. haer. I 7.5, Hippol., Ref. V 6.6-7, X 9.1-3, NHC I 5, 118.14-119.24, II
5, 117.28-118.5, 122.5-16.
124 Paul Kallig as
they rather represent different stages in one continuous process,

which leads from the ordinary preoccupation with bodily exis
tence to the attainment of perfection through philosophical life.
These stages are represented in his treatise On Dialectic by the
musician, the lover and the philosopher.31
Otherwise, Plotinus refrains from examining Gnostic mytho
logical narrations in detail, and disregards any discrepancies
between them. He even refuses to name his opponents, being con
tent to refer to them by more or less vague descriptive expressions
like, for example, 'those who know' or, even more ironically, as
'the listeners of cultivated and melodious knowledge'.32 He shows
little interest in the specific forms they gave to their visionary cos
mological scenarios or to the ritual processes through which they
hoped to achieve their liberation from the bonds of the cosmos.
This is the reason why it is so difficult for us today to identify pre
cisely the exact variety of Gnosticism to which his opponents
belonged. But, as it becomes obvious from a powerful passage in
which he addresses his audience directly, his main concern was
with members of his own circle - 'friends', as he calls them - who
presumably gave signs of being corrupted by those aberrant teach
ings.33 Then, by displaying remarkable insight, he proceeds to
identify at the core of their extravagant doctrines about the world,
its history and the moral constitution of man three corresponding
forms of alienation:
1. Alienation from the world. Anticosmism, the disparagement
of the world and its creator, was - as we already said - one of the
main characteristics of Gnosticism,34 which regarded the whole
visible universe as a temporary lodging, as a place of exile, or even
as a prison for the 'pneumatic' man, who is by his nature and his
provenance a complete stranger in it. The Gnostics believed that
the creation of the world is the work of a foolish, blind and arro
gant god, who governs it like a tyrant through the power of
heimarmene, exercised by his associates, the planetary Archons. By
contrast, the supreme God is completely transcendent, unknow
31 See Enn. I 3.1.9 ff.

32 Enn. II 9.15.23 and 13.10.
33 See Enn. II 9.10.3-14.
34 See H. Jonas, Gnosis und spatantiker Geist I, Gottingen 1954, 148-56.
able, unnamable and hidden, and he does not participate in any

way with the governing of the universe, nor does he attempt to
make it better. His only interest in the world concerns the libera
tion of the particles of divine light which have been trapped in it.
Such a world-view appeared, of course, completely preposterous
to a Platonist like Plotinus, who believed that the very idea of a
world (cosmos) is intimately connected with harmonious order
and beauty, and that such a structure must be governed by a
divine Providence continuously aspiring at its best possible
arrangement. According to him, the world is everlasting and cre
ated only in the sense of being causally dependent on higher real
ities. Therefore, corporeal existence is not something inherently
pernicious, to be condemned or escaped from, but rather the
result of an outflow from the Good, that calls for a re-orientation
of the soul and the rectification of its attitude towards the body,
without involving any real rejection of the material universe as a
whole.
2. Alienation from history. Gnostic soteriology was based on an
apocalyptic view about time and history. These were considered as
resulting from the activity of the cosmic Demiurge, and therefore
as symptoms of degradation and fall, as no more than a procession
of lies and disgrace. The salutary 'knowledge' that was supposed
to bring about the salvation of man, his liberation from the bonds
of his earthly existence and, finally, his return to his supra-celestial
Father, is by its nature non-temporal; however, because of the fall
en state and the ignorance of the human race as a whole, it is
always revealed as something radically new.35 Even the Gnostics,
of course, were ready to accept that, in the course of human his
tory, there had been exceptionally insightful and 'prophetic' fig
ures, who in fact had preached the liberating truth, but their
appearance was not conceived as part of a consistent, organized
and acknowledged tradition; it was in no way embedded in the
historical process, but rather constituted a reaction or rebellion
against it. On the other hand, the cosmic 'wisdom' that is being
transmitted in the course of history as culture is no more than
35 Novum, as in Tertullian, Adv. Marc. I 8.1. See the important analysis of

H.-Ch. Puech, 'Gnosis and Time', in Man and Time: Papers from the Eranos
Yearbooks (Princeton 1957) 56-84.
126 Paul Kallig as
foolishness, obscuring the truth revealed to them alone. This is

why even those exponents of traditional philosophy considered by
them as having some value - for example Plato - were thought to
have achieved only a partial and, anyway, insufficient approach to
the truth, and not to have 'penetrated to the depths of intelligible
reality'.36 In the eyes of Plotinus, such a view was just a further
indication of the selfishness of the Gnostics, of their arrogance,
their megalomania and their vain wish to present themselves as an
independent and novel school of thought. It came into sharp con
trast with his own attitude towards philosophical tradition. He
believed that the 'blissful men of older times'37 - as he called the
philosophers of the classical period - had indeed endowed
mankind with crucial and revealing insights into the nature of
things and man's position in the world, but their teachings had to
be continuously examined and evaluated on the basis of one's own
experience and reasoning, in order to be correctly interpreted.
They provided clues and inspiration that had to be understood
within the context of a historical tradition of exegesis, not as god
sent revelations of an otherwise inscrutable hidden 'truth'.38
3. Alienation from society. For at least some of the Gnostics, the
realization of the fundamental distance which separates man's real
nature from the material world he lives in signified also that he
should feel free from all social and moral obligations or restric
tions. If the only presupposition for his salvation is his individual
conversion towards the supreme deity and the adherence to that
reality alone, then all the rest, not only material goods and pleas
ures, but also the practical way of properly living one's life as a
whole, would appear as totally insignificant and indifferent (adi
aphord), in the Stoic sense of the term. Irenaeus, for example,
reports the view of Simon Magus according to which 'men are
saved by the grace of God, not according to their just actions.
Therefore, the just character of human actions is not determined
by nature, but by convention'.39 If the only reasonable attitude
36 VP 16.8-9.
37 See Enn. II 9.6.27-8 and III 7.1.13-4.
38 See A. Eon, 'La notion plotinienne d'exegese', RIPh 24 (1970), 277-82.
39 See Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I 23.3 and 25.5, with SVFIII 117 and 118. Cf.
also R.M. Grant, 'Charges of "Immorality" against various religious groups in
Antiquity', in Studies presented to G. Quispel, Leiden 1981, 164-8, and H. Jonas,
The Gnostic Religion, ed.2 (Boston 1963) 267-72.
towards the world is total detestation and repulsion, then any sort
of care and involvement in morally righteous conduct within its
framework could only result in disorientating and enmeshing one
further in his fallen state. Finally, if salvation is preordained only
for an elite group of naturally endowed 'pneumatics', then, as
Irenaeus was quick to point out,40 'it is impossible for the rest to
overcome their miserable state, even if they engage in activities of
the most noble kind', while, on the other hand, the members of
the elite would lack any motive to adhere to virtuous conduct or
to make themselves any better. Now, Plotinus might perhaps have
agreed that virtuous conduct should in fact not be among the
main concerns of the wise man. But that would by no means
imply that virtue itself is meaningless or indifferent. On the con
trary, he believed that virtuous actions were a necessary concomi
tant, a sort of inadvertent by-product, of philosophical contem
plation focused on eternal reality.41 This is because the intelligible
beings are archetypes determining the basic theoretical attitude of
the contemplating soul in such a way as to induce virtuous behav
iour, as a kind of expression or image of them on the level of prac
tical living. For Plotinus, the anomian views of his opponents pro
vided the best proof of their hypocrisy. He believed that their
extreme individualism, their disparagement of the beauty and the
orderliness of the universe, their disregard for virtue and any kind
of moral value could only lead people astray from the true goal of
every human being, and that they undermined the very founda
tions of the culture to which he felt to belong. This, of course, is
not to deny that - as Hans Jonas has perceptively remarked42 -
they perhaps represent an attitude still entangled in the roots of
our own culture.
Let me sum up. Plotinus' stance towards Gnosticism is one of
deep concern not for the doctrinal differences it presented in
respect with his own philosophical system, but for the effects its
world-view could have on people who might possibly lose their
4° Adv. haer. I 6.2. Cf. Clem. Alex., Strom. Ill 4, 30.1-32.1.

41 See Enn. I 2.7.1-13 and cf. VP 9.5-22. See further my article 'Living
Body, Soul, and Virtue in the Philosophy of Plotinus' Dionysius 18 (2000),
35-7.
42 Gnosis und spdtantiker Geistl, 172.
128 Paul Kalligas
confidence in the unlimited and uncompromised goodness of the

origin of all. The derivation of the whole of reality from a single
source, identified as the Good itself, necessitates the emergence of
deficiencies and imperfections as the complexity of the total struc
ture and the distance from its source increase. But for him this
should not blind us to the fact that the unlimited power of this
ultimate source of Being encompasses even the remotest reflec
tions of it and provides them with an, ever dimmer perhaps, but
nevertheless redeeming aspiration towards itself.43
Paul Kalligas
Athens
43 A version of this paper was presented at a seminar, sponsored by th

Dublin Centre for the Study of the Platonic Tradition, in November 1998.
it I have used some material from my Introduction and Commentary on En
II 9, published in M. Greek (Plotinus: Second Ennead, Athens 1997, 327 ff.
but I have expanded considerably its conclusions. I wish to thank Prof. Jo
Dillon, for inviting me there, as well as all the participants for a stimulating
cussion.

Plotinus Agains The Gnostics, Paul Kalligas

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Plotinus against the Gnostics

Author(s): Paul Kalligas

When, in the year AD 244 , Plotinus established himself in Rome

1 See Porphyry, Life ofPlotinus (= VP) 3.35.

trines and some strongly anticosmic beliefs which, all together,

6 See Tertullian, Adv. Valent. 4.1 and H. Leisegang, 'Valentinus,

Heresies, was able to collect there the immense material of Gnostic

9 For Hippolytus' activities in Rome, see M. Marcovich's 'Introduction' to

Demiurge of the sensible world, sometimes named Ialdabaoth.12

indicating 'the progenitor of (celestial) powers'. The figure of Sophia is usually

issues that had preoccupied Greek philosophy since the time of

terms God (theos) and Father (pater) are repeatedly employed by

the year 265, he composed a massive work, which is full of implic

the theoretical presuppositions of their doctrines, and thus is

An interesting example of this is presented by his treatment of

out that, even if the Forefather is considered as an Intellect, his

27 Ref. VI 18.3-7. Cf. NHC VIII 1, 82.1-22 and XIII 1, 35.12-36.25.

they rather represent different stages in one continuous process,

31 See Enn. I 3.1.9 ff.

able, unnamable and hidden, and he does not participate in any

35 Novum, as in Tertullian, Adv. Marc. I 8.1. See the important analysis of

foolishness, obscuring the truth revealed to them alone. This is

4° Adv. haer. I 6.2. Cf. Clem. Alex., Strom. Ill 4, 30.1-32.1.

confidence in the unlimited and uncompromised goodness of the

43 A version of this paper was presented at a seminar, sponsored by th

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