EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-18727. August 31, 1964.]

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-

appellant, ROMULO CUI, intervenor-appellant.

Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.

Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofileña for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS; "TITULO DE ABOGADO" MEANS MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR.

— The term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws but membership in the bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one
for the practice of law.
2. ID.; POSSESSION OF LAW DEGREE NOT INDISPENSABLE TO QUALIFY AS
LAWYER. — Possession of the law degree itself is not indispensable; completion of the
prescribed courses may be shown in some other way.
3. ID.; REINSTATEMENT TO THE ROLL WIPES OUT DISABILITIES. —
Reinstatement to the roll of attorneys wipes out the restrictions and disabilities
resulting from a previous disbarment.
4. QUO WARRANTO; LIMITATIONS; ONE YEAR AFTER RIGHT OF PLAINTIFF
TO HOLD OFFICE AROSE. — Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly Sec. 16 Rule 68,
taken from Section 215 of Act 190), an action of quo warranto must be led within one
(1) year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERIOD NOT TO BE COUNTED FROM DATE DEFENDANT
BEGAN TO DISCHARGE DUTIES OF OFFICE. — The basis of a quo warranto action being
the plaintiff's own right to o ce, it is from the time such right arose that the one-year
limitation must be counted and not from the date the incumbent defendant began to
discharge the duties of said office.

DECISION

MAKALINTAL , J : p

This is a proceeding in quo warranto originally led in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu. The o ce in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose
de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma.
Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor,
Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui
and Doña Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of
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 indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate
existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislative passed 27
November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a
series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly
and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or
designate, in the order prescribed by them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides
as follows:
"Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos
sustituyan nuestro legitimo sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o
incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la ciudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico
Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese
residiendo entonces en la ciudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro
sobrino legitimo Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos
administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara
a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui,
Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o
ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado
mayor impuesto o contribucion. En igualidad de circumstancias, sera preferido el
varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion
Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas cuali caciones, la
administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al señor Obispo de
Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignitario de la Iglesia Catolica, Apostolica, Romana,
que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al
Gobierno Provincial de Cebu."

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio
until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and
Dionisio Jakosalem. The rst died on 8 May 1931 and the second, on 1 July 1931. On 2
July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator.
Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued
concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the
present case, reference will be made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the
sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña
Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui,
resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between
them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui
took his oath of o ce. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the
"convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff
wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the o ce be turned over to him; and on
13 September 1960, the demand not having been complied with, the plaintiff led the
complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same
o ce, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the
founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective
quali cations to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and
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 therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred, pursuant to section 2 of the
deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be applied the deed gives
preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein
named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a
falta de estos titulos, el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion." cda

The speci c point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado."
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo
Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of
the Bar, and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case
No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two
weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase
"titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full- edged lawyer, but that "as used in
the deed of donation and considering the function of purpose of the administrator, it
should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law
degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the
defendant and by intervenor.
We are of the opinion that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de
abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but
membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of
law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is de ned as "testimonio o instrumento dado para
ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profession" (Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real
Academia Española, 1947 ed., p. 1224); and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en
el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los
derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictamen sobre las cuestiones o
puntos legales que se la consultan." (Id. p. 5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a
law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its
holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or
attorney- at-law. This term has a xed and general signi cation, and has reference to
that class of persons who are by license o cers of the courts, empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities
are developed by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the
authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires
passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certi cate from
the Clerk of Court, this certi cate being his license to practice the profession. The
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar,
except as evidence of compliance with the requirement that an applicant to the
examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, o cially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however,
possession of the law degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed
course may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under
the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any
formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to
qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary
quali cations of learning and ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that
such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic
degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
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 The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the
foregoing test advisedly, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the
administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or
failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise
quali ed. A lawyer, rst of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of
the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b);
shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute
persons may be admitted to the institute (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and
conditions promulgated for admission are not in con ict with the provisions of the Act;
and shall administer properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to
presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession
would be distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against
the defendant, to the o ce of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a
member of the Bar he is nevertheless disquali ed by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed
of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed, on the ground,
among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral
character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court
on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however,
that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the o ce of
administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof
no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
"Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in
the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally
speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and
impartial administration of Justice will be conserved by the applicant's
participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The
applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he
is a person of good moral character — a t and proper person to practice law. The
court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to
the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am.
Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
"Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to
reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his
conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same
as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater
degree of proof than in an original admission." (7 G.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec.
41, p. 815.)

"The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether

applicant is 'of good moral character' in the sense in which that phrase is used
when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a t and proper person to be entrusted
with the privileges of the o ce of an attorney, and whether his mental
quali cations are such as to enable him to discharge e ciently his duty to the
public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from
his mental qualifications." (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816)."

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking

reinstatement to the o ce of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in
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 paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the o ce which is disputed in
this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and
disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time
amounting to prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule
68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be led within one (1)
year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the o ce in question as long
ago as 1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr.
Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano
Cui, the plaintiff's father, and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case was
dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the
complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the
order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui vs. Cui, 60 Phil.
37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in the decision of
this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as
administrator Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui
accepted a position as assistant administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial
maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1
February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had "made clear" his "intention of
occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with another
letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1
January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of o ce before a notary public only
on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the
Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position
as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was
referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who in an opinion dated 3
April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect
ruled that the plaintiff, not being a lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the
Hospicio.
Meanwhile, the question again become the subject of a court controversy. On 14
March 1950 the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. Case No. R-1216) because the bank had frozen
the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then led a third-party complaint against
herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as
administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the opinion
of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the
ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of the
Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February
1954 he was able to take another oath of o ce as administrator before President
Magsaysay, and soon afterward led a second motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. R-
1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court,
stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the
court may disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted
nevertheless and the other parties in the case led their notice of appeal from the order
of dismissal. The plaintiff then led an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the
appeal and the trial court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954.
Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R.
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 No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui
should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was
dismissed upon motion of the parties, who agreed that "the o ce of administrator and
trustee of the Hospicio . . . should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be
initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the o ce but believes
he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July
1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in
quo warranto was led against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the
aforesaid motion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as
member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned as
administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the
same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court
decided the rst case of Cui vs. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial
court for further proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of assistant
administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator; and his failure to
file an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in
Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties
precisely so that the con icting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an
action — all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of
the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the
plaintiff to hold o ce arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not le an action against
Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the
running of the statutory period. And the fact that this action was led within one year of
the defendant's assumption of o ce in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's
position any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the o ce and it is
from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from
the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said o ce. Bautista vs.
Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a
lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio
mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is farther, in the line of succession, than
defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said
nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos
administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que
sera el varon, mayor de edad, que deacienda legitimante de cualquiera de nuestros
sobrinos legitimas Maiano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo
de abogado . . . En egualdad de circumtancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad
descendiente e quien tenia ultimamente la administracion." Besides being a nearer
descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred
when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention
of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to the
descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he
argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio
Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the
intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justi ed by the terms of the
deed of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is
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 reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are
dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala,
JJ., concur.

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