Professional Documents
Culture Documents
People v. CFI Rizal
People v. CFI Rizal
DECISION
GUERRERO, J : p
This original petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Order dated August 20,
1975 issued by District Judge Ulpiano Sarmiento in Criminal Case No. Q-3781 which
stalled the prosecution of respondents Sgt. Jessie C. Hope and Monina Medina for the
alleged violation of Section 3601 1 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The order declared
as inadmissible in evidence the allegedly smuggled articles obtained by apprehending
agents in the course of a warrantless search and seizure. Dispositively, the order
decreed:
The records disclose that one week before February 9, 1974, the Regional Anti-
Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was informed by an undisclosed Informer that a
shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles City on
a blue Dodge car. Spurred by such lead, RASAC Agents Arthur Manuel and Macario
Sabado, on the aforesaid date and upon order of the Chief of Intelligence and
Operations Branch, RASAC-MBA, Col. Antonio Abad, Jr., stationed themselves in the
vicinity of the toll gate of the North Diversion Road at Balintawak, Quezon City.
At about 6:45 A.M. of the same day, a light blue Dodge car with Plate No. 21-87-
73, driven by Sgt. Jessie Hope who was accompanied by Monina Medina approached
the exit gate and after giving the toll receipt sped away towards Manila. The RASAC
agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent Sabado blew his whistle and
signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter instead of heeding, made a U-turn back to the
North Diversion Road, but he could not go through because of the buses in front of his
car. At this point, the agents succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter
stopped. Manuel and Sabado who were in civilian clothes showed their identification
cards to respondents and introduced themselves as RASAC agents.
The Agents saw four (4) boxes on the back seat of the Dodge and upon inquiry
as to what those boxes were, Sgt. Hope answered "I do not know." Further,
respondents were asked where they were bringing the boxes, to which respondent
Medina replied that they were bringing them (boxes) to the Tropical Hut at Epifanio de
los Santos. Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car with respondents while Agent Manuel
took their own car and both cars drove towards Tropical Hut making a brief stop at the
Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by telephone.
Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who had joined
them waited for the man who according to Monina Medina was supposed to receive the
boxes. As the man did not appear, Col. Abad "called off the mission" and brought
respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo arriving there at about 9:00 A.M.
(Respondents' Memorandum, records, pp. 180-183).
An inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded eleven (11) sealed
boxes, four (4) on the rear seat and seven (7) more in the baggage compartment which
was opened on orders of Col. Abad. On the same order of the intelligence officer, the
boxes were opened before the presence of respondents Hope and Medina,
representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, P.C., COSAC
and photographers of the Department of National Defense. The contents of the bozes
revealed some "4,441 more or less wrist watches of assorted brands; 1,075 more or
less watch bracelets of assorted brands" (based on a later inventory), supposedly
untaxed.
As consequence, thereof, ASAC Chairman General Pelagio Cruz requested the
Bureau of Customs to issue a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against the articles
including the Dodge car. The Collector of Customs did issue the same on February 12,
1974. It was admitted, however, that when the apprehending agents arrested
respondents and brought them together with the seized articles to the ASAC Office in
Camp Aguinaldo, the former were not armed with a warrant of arrest and seizure. Cdpr
In conjunction with the Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Collector
of Customs, seizure proceedings were instituted and docketed as Seizure Identification
No. 14281 against the wrist watches and watch bracelets pursuant to Section 2530 (m)
— 1 of the Tariff and Customs Code, and Seizure Identification No. 14281-A against the
Dodge car pursuant to Section 2530(k) of the same Code. 2
During the hearing of the aforesaid cases, respondents disclaimed ownership of
the seized articles. Ownership was instead claimed by one Antonio del Rosario who
intervened in the proceedings. The claimant-intervenor testified that he bought the
watches and bracelets from Buenafe Trading as evidenced by a sales invoice certified
to be authentic by the BIR Revenue Regional Office No. 6 of Quezon City, which
transaction was entered in the book of accounts of aforesaid claimant; that the same
articles were brought to a buyer in Angeles City, but when the sale failed to materialize,
claimant contracted respondent Monina Medina to transport back the boxes to Manila
for a consideration of P1,000.00 without disclosing the contents thereof which claimant
simply represented as PX goods; that when he bought the watches from Buenafe, he
presumed that the corresponding duties have already been paid, only to be surprised
later on when he was informed that the same were seized for non-payment of taxes. LLjur
On the other hand, respondent Hope testified to the effect that at the time of
apprehension, he had no knowledge of the contents of the boxes, and granting that he
had such knowledge, he never knew that these are untaxed commodities; that he
consented to transport said boxes from Angeles City to Manila in his car upon request
of his girl friend Monina as a personal favor; that he was not present when the boxes
were loaded in his car nor was he ever told of their contents on the way. On the part of
respondent Monina Medina, she testified that what she did was only in compliance with
the agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to transport the boxes and deliver them to a certain
Mr. Peter at the Tropical Hut who will in turn give her the contracted price; that Mr. Del
Rosario did not reveal the contents of the boxes which she came to know of only when
the boxes were opened at Camp Aguinaldo.
As there was not enough evidence to controvert the testimonies of respondents
and the narration of claimant Antonio del Rosario, the Collector of Customs issued his
decision in the seizure cases on April 1, 1975 declaring that the seized articles including
the car are not subject of forfeiture. The dispositive portion of this decision reads:
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1974, after the requisite preliminary investigation, the
City Fiscal of Quezon City, finding the existence of a prima facie case against
respondents Hope and Medina, filed Criminal Case No. Q-3781 in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Quezon City). Upon arraignment on April 23, 1974, respondents
pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced on January 28, 1975 and while the prosecution
through its first witness, Agent Macario Sabado, was adducing as evidence the pictures
of the eleven (11) boxes containing the assorted watches and watch bracelets, counsel
for respondents objected to the presentation of the pictures and the subject articles on
the ground that they were seized without the benefit of warrant, and therefore
inadmissible in evidence under Section 4(2), Article IV of the New Constitution. After the
parties have argued their grounds in their respective memoranda, respondent trial court
issued the questioned order of August 20, 1975 as cited earlier. The prosecution's
motion for reconsideration was denied on September 30, 1975. Hence, this petition
which was treated as a special civil action in Our Resolution of May 5, 1976. llcd
The substantive issue as urged in the petition is whether or not the seizure of the
merchandise in a moving vehicle by authorized agents commissioned to enforce
customs laws without warrant of seizure breaches the constitutional immunity against
unreasonable search and seizure and therefore, such merchandise are inadmissible in
evidence. Corollary to the issue is, has the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
finding the affirmative?
The State holds on the proposition that the rules governing search and seizure
had been liberalized when a moving vehicle is the object of the search and the
necessity of a prior warrant has been relaxed on the ground of practicality, considering
that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched
must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which
borders on impossibility in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving
vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. Petitioner
vigorously contends that contraband may be seized without necessity of a search
warrant since the Constitution does not guaranty immunity to smugglers and that a
warrantless seizure of contraband in a moving vehicle is justified by the traditional
exception attached to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and such
exception must be adopted in interpreting the relevant provision in the new Philippine
Constitution.
As counter argument, respondents maintain that the decision of the Collector of
Customs in the seizure cases which has now become final and unappealable has made
no pronouncement that the subject articles are smuggled items. More so, the decision
has entirely cleared respondents of any liability or responsibility in the alleged
smuggling activity and as a consequence, the decision has the direct effect of deciding
finally that the watches and bracelets are not smuggled and that respondents have not
violated the customs and tariff laws as charged in the criminal complaint. Respondents
argue further that the interception of accused Jessie Hope's car by RASAC Agents
while in the course of a normal trip without any order of the court and without having
shown that the interception was necessary in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health, is an impairment of the liberty of travel under section 5, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution. Finally, they claim that the agents had one week's time before
the date of apprehension to secure the necessary warrant but since they failed to get
this court order, the search of Hope's car and the spontaneous seizure of the boxes
loaded therein and the contents thereof is a violation of the constitutional guarantee
against "unreasonable searches and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose"
under section 3, Article IV of the fundamental law.
We find for petitioner. The opposing counsel's attempt to draw an identity
between the seizure cases and the present criminal action to the ultimate end that the
decision in the former should be made decisive of the issue of criminal liability must be
overruled. It is not accurate to say that the Collector of Customs made no findings that
the articles were smuggled. In fact, what the Collector stated was that the prosecution
failed to present the quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant the forfeiture of the
subject articles (Pages 128 and 130 of Annex "E", Records, p. 109). In a general sense,
this does not necessarily exclude the possibility of smuggling. But if the aim of a
confirmation that the goods are indeed smuggled, is to draw an inference to tie up
respondents' criminal liability, the Collector is not duty bound, nor is there any need for
him to arrive at such a conclusion. It is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture
proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not
result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in
section 3601 of the Code. 3 As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure
proceedings, such as those instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in
character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture
incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in
seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed
against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed.
4
In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure
proceedings, concerns the res rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on
contraband or illegally imported goods. These merchandise violated the revenue law of
the country, and as such, have been prevented from being assimilated in lawful
commerce until corresponding duties are paid thereon and the penalties imposed and
satisfied either in the form of fines or of forfeiture in favor of the government who will
dispose of them in accordance with law. The importer or possessor is treated differently.
The fact that the administrative penalty befalls on him is an inconsequential incidence to
criminal liability. By the same token, the probable guilt cannot be negated simply
because he was not held administratively liable. The Collector's final declaration that the
articles are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his findings that untaxed goods
were transported in respondents' car and seized from their possession by agents of the
law. Whether criminal liability lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff and
Customs Code adduced in the information can only be determined in a separate
criminal action. Respondents' exoneration in the administrative cases cannot deprive
the State of its right to prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal responsibility, if
any, must be proven not by preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. LLjur
Considering now the critical area of the dispute, under the law, the authority of
persons duly commissioned to enforce tariff and customs laws is quite exceptional when
it pertains to the domain of searches and seizures of goods suspected to have been
introduced in the country in violation of the customs laws. This Court had occasion to
recognize this power granted to persons having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Code, who in order to discharge their official duties more effectively —
". . . may at anytime enter, pass through, or search any land or inclosure
of any warehouse, store or other building not being a dwelling house." (Section
2208, emphasis supplied)
". . . (to) go aboard any vessel or aircraft within the limits of any collection
district, and to inspect, search and examine said vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, box or envelope on board, and search any person on board the said
vessel or aircraft and to this end to hail and stop such vessel or aircraft if under
way, to use all necessary force to compel compliance; and if it shall appear that
any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws of the Philippines has been
committed, whereby or in consequence of which such vessels or aircrafts, or the
article, or any part thereof, on board of or imported by such vessel or aircrafts, is
liable to forfeiture to make seizure of the same or any part thereof.
"The power of search herein above given shall extend to the removal of
any false bottom, partition, bulkhead or other obstruction, so far as may be
necessary to enable the officer to discover whether any dutiable or forfeitable
articles may be concealed." (Section 2210)
or,
". . . (to) open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container
wherever found when he has reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein
of dutiable or prohibited article or articles introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid."
(Section 2211, emphasis supplied)
As enunciated in the leading case of Papa vs. Mago , 5 in the exercise of the
specific functions aforecited, the Code does not mention the need of a search warrant
unlike Section 2209 which explicitly provides that a "dwelling house may be entered and
searched only upon warrant issued by a judge (or justice of the peace), upon sworn
application showing probable cause and particularly describing the place to be searched
and person or thing to be seized." Aware of this delineation, the Court in that case
expressed the considered view that "except in the case of the search of a dwelling
house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search
and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws."
The rationale of the Mago ruling was nurtured by the traditional doctrine in Carroll
v . United States 6 wherein an imprimatur against, constitutional infirmity was stamped
in favor of a warrantless search and seizure of such nature as in the case at bar. On this
stable foundation We refute the constitutional charge of respondents that the
warrantless seizure violated Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which finds
origin in the Fourth Amendment of the American Constitution. 7
The Carroll doctrine arose from the indictment and conviction of George Carroll
and partner for transporting in an automobile intoxicating liquor in violation of the
National Prohibition Act. They assailed the conviction on the ground that the trial court
admitted in evidence two of the sixty-eight bottles found by searching the automobile
and eventual seizure of the same allegedly in violation of the 4th Amendment, and
therefore that the use of the liquor as evidence was improper. 8 To paraphrase the
significant views of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, the legislative history of the Act clearly
established the intent of Congress to make a distinction between the necessity for a
search warrant in the search of private dwellings and that of automobiles and other road
vehicles in the enforcement of the Act. This distinction is consistent with the 4th
Amendment since the latter does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such
as are unreasonable. Searches and seizures without warrant are valid if made upon
probable cause, that is, upon a belief reasonably arising, out of circumstances known to
the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction. 9 Similarly, other statutes of the Union such as the
Act of 1789, Act of August 4, 1790, and Act of March 3, 1815, among others, construed
in the light of the 4th Amendment had recognized the distinctive feature of a warrantless
search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 10 In such a situation, what
appears to be the measure of legality of the seizure was formulated in this sense: "that
the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the
automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being
illegally transported." Therein the guarantee of the 4th Amendment was
fulfilled. Where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts
unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court probable cause. 11
The counsel for the State is candid enough to admit that the Anti-Smuggling
Action Center tries its best to follow-up the more promising tips and information from
informers, but very often, the information proves false or the smugglers are forewarned.
12 It is quite true the ASAC received one such information several days or a week
before the encounter; but the fact that its agents failed to obtain a warrant in spite of the
time allowance is not a sign that they have been remiss in their duty. The records hardly
reveal anything certain and confirmatory of the report during the said period except the
general knowledge that some highly dutiable goods would be transported from Angeles
City to Manila in a blue Dodge automobile. Not even the trial court has made any
findings that ASAC has established with exactitude the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized. Lacking this essential determination, the agents could not
have possibly secured a valid warrant even if they had foreseen its compelling
necessity. For one thing, the information could have been just another false alarm.
Providentially, however, things turned out differently when in the morning of February 9,
1974, the undisclosed Informer himself went along with the agents to the rendezvous
point where at the appointed time he positively identified an approaching car as the one
described by him a week earlier to be the suspected carrier of untaxed merchandise.
Clearly therefore, the agents acted not on the basis of a mere hearsay but on a
confirmed information worthy of belief and probable cause enough for them to adopt
measures to freeze the fleeting event. LLphil
We need not argue that the subjective phase of the police action taken by the
ASAC Agents to effect the apprehension of the suspected violators can be anything less
than the ensuing interception and stoppage of respondents' vehicle after a short chase.
Neither can We sustain the argument that in doing so, the agents violated respondents'
constitutional "liberty of travel". To recall again Mr. Chief Justice Taft: "(B)ut those
lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free
passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official
authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying
contraband or illegal merchandise." 13 What followed next in the scene was a simple
inquiry as to the contents of the boxes seen inside the car. Respondents' baffled denial
of knowledge thereof could not but only heighten the suspicion of a reasonable and
inquisitive mind. Thus, the probable cause has not been any less mitigated.
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful
invasion of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. 14 The
right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace
and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and
correspondence. 15 The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against
unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is more
closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal
security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best of causes and reasons. We
draw from the context of the Constitution that an intended search or seizure attains a
high degree of propriety only when a probable cause duly determined is branded on a
warrant duly issued by a judge or other responsible person as may be authorized by
law. Not invariably, however, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the
interference is not wholly defendant on the presence of a warrant or the lack of it. In the
ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics described by
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. But
We need not argue that there are exceptions. Thus, in the extraordinary events where
warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness
of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. 16
The ultimate question then, if any, that should confront the actuations of the
ASAC Agents in this case is whether the warrantless search and seizure conducted by
them is lawful or not. We have already seen that what they did was a faithful
performance of a duly authorized under the Tariff and Customs Code directing them as
authorized agents to retrieve articles reasonably suspected of having been possessed,
issued or procured in violation of the tariff laws for which the government has a direct
interest. The official capacity of the agents has never been questioned by respondents.
Neither did respondents raise an issue on the constitutionality of the law giving the
agents the power to act as mandated. There is no question that the Agents have not
exceeded their authority nor have they acted so licentiously to bear upon respondents
moral embarrassment or substantial prejudice beyond what is necessary. The purpose
of the search and seizure is more than clear to Us, hence, We rule out the suspicion
that the intention is only to elicit evidence to be used against respondents. dctai
We do not see strong justification for the trial court's failure to recognize the
circumstances at bar as among the "rare cases" which it admittedly conceded to be
exempted from the requirement of a warrant. 17 The lapse lies on the dismal gap in the
trial court's developmental treatment of the law on arrest, search and seizure. It missed
the vital distinction emphatically laid down in Boyd v . United States . 18 which was cited
in Carroll with "particular significance and applicability." Thus, We quote Mr. Justice
Bradley in Boyd :
". . . The search and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to
duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof , are totally different things from
a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of
obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him.
The two things differ in toto coelo. In the one case, the government is entitled to
the possession of the property; in the other it is not. The seizure of stolen goods is
authorized by the common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of
the revenue laws or concealed to avoid the duties payable on them, has been
authorized by English statutes for at least two centuries past; and the like seizure
have been authorized by our revenue acts from the commencement of the
government. The first statute passed by Congress to regulate the collection of
duties, the Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. at L. 29, 43, chap. 5, contains provisions to
tins effect. As this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for
adoption the original Amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members
of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable'
and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the Amendment. So also the
supervision authorized to be exercised by officers of the revenue over the
manufacture of custody of excisable articles, and the entries thereof in books
required by law to be kept for their inspection, are necessarily excepted out of
the category of unreasonable searches and seizures. So also the laws which
provide for the search and seizure of articles and things which it is unlawful for
a person to have in his possession for the purpose of issue or disposition, such
as counterfeit coin, lottery tickets, implements of gambling, etc. are not within
this category. Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. 329. Many other things of this
character might be enumerated." (Emphasis supplied). LibLex
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is
ordered remanded for further trial and reception of evidence without excluding the
articles subject of the seizure or for such action as the prosecution may take after the
re-assessment and re-evaluation of its evidence as herein above directed.
This judgment is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro * and Melencio-Herrera, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J ., dissenting and concurring :
This dissent is based on two aspects of the case at bar: I. Firstly, as discussed in
Part I hereof, I believe that the case at hand does not fall, either pointedly or tangentially,
under any of the recognized exceptions to the constitutionally mandated warrant
requirement, for the circumstances surrounding the apprehension, search and seizure
conducted by the RASAC agents show that they had ample time and opportunity for a
week's time to secure the necessary search warrant conformably with the constitutional
requirement. The warrantless search and seizure violated respondents' fundamental
constitutional rights and rendered the goods so seized inadmissible in evidence; and II.
Secondly, I hold that the decision of the Customs authorities themselves, as cited in the
majority opinion itself (at page 4 to 9) wherein the seized articles (including the car of
respondent Hope) were declared not subject to forfeiture since said articles were found to
have been purchased in good faith by the claimant thereof Antonio del Rosario under a
genuine purchase invoice from a trading firm and hence, the goods were ordered released
to said Antonio del Rosario upon payment of the corresponding duties and taxes and
penalties "as the rightful owner thereof" and Hope's car was ordered released to him as the
registered owner in view of the finding that he had been merely asked to bring the boxes
back to Manila and had no hand in their importation nor purchase, rendered moot the
question of admissibility in evidence of the goods in question. The admission in evidence of
the said goods which have been determined by the Customs authorities themselves to
have been lawfully purchased in good faith by the claimant-intervenor would in no way
established any criminal liability for the importation or transitory possession by respondents,
who were found by said authorities to be merely bringing them back to Manila on behalf of
the owner.
Withal, I join and concur with the Court's directive in its judgment that in
consonance with the respondents-accused s right to speedy trial and justice that the
prosecution forthwith reassess and reevaluate the evidence at its disposal" and
thereafter "promptly take the necessary action in the premises for the protection of the
rights and interests of all parties concerned" which, to my mind, means that the
prosecution must as a simple matter of fairness and justice move for the dismissal of
the criminal case below as herein below explained. prcd
I
The opinion of the majority in effect stamps approval on the warrantless search
for and seizure of the eleven (11) sealed boxes, containing wrist watches and watch
bracelets of different trademarks, aboard the four- door blue Dodge sedan owned by
TSgt. Jessie C. Hope of the United States Air Force by the agents of the Regional Anti-
Smuggling Action Center (RASAC), such approval being accorded on the strength of
the Court's ruling in Papa v . Mago 1 following, as the majority states, "the traditional
doctrine in Carroll v . United States , 2 " as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court. An
analysis and appreciation of the facts of the case at bar and the fundamental principles
on the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizure, as laid
down by this Court and the precedents set by the United States Supreme Court in
resolving Fourth Amendment issues, make it clear to me that respondent judges'
challenged Orders (1) dated August 20, 1975 holding the warrantless "apprehension,
search and seizure" 3 in question violative of the provisions of Section 3, Article IV of the
Constitution and consequently declaring the boxes and their contents seized from Sgt.
Hope's car as well as the pictures taken of the said items inadmissible in evidence in the
prosecution of respondents Sgt. Hope and his companion in the car, Monina Medina, for
violation of the provisions of Section 3601 4 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines; and (2) dated September 30, 1975 denying the State's motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated August 20, 1975, should be upheld and the petition
at bar accordingly dismissed.
1. I cannot accede to the majority's casual approach to the case at bar which
in the main raises an issue of constitutional dimension. The majority opinion simply and
broadly applied judicial precedents, taking no heed of the injunction that "when the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure is invoked, there is a need to
scrutinize the facts rigorously to preclude any infringement thereof." 5 This injunction
should be given due regard with greater reason where, as in the case at bar, the Court
invokes the applicability of a judicially established exception to a constitutionally
protective rule. Indeed, "[t]he constitutional validity of a warrantless search [and seizure]
is pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual
context of the individual case." 6
2. The majority validates the warrantless search and seizure in the case at
bar as an exception to the warrant requirement (spelled out by the second clause of
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution) pursuant to the ruling in Papa, supra, which in
turn relied on the doctrinal pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in
Carroll supra . Carroll set the ruling that "if the search and seizure without a warrant are
made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains
that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are
valid." 7 The "necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or
other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and
search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought" 8 supplied the underlying
rationale for the Carroll rule. Put simply, Carroll declared "a search warrant unnecessary
where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car
is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again
if a warrant must be obtained." 9 thereby laying down the probable cause plus exigent
circumstances standard. LLjur
The following ultimate facts provided the basis for the aforementioned rule in
Carroll : Three federal prohibition agents and a state officer, while patrolling, on their
regular tour of duty, the highway leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids, Michigan, met
and passed an Oldsmobile roadster in which rode Carroll and John Kiro, whom the said
agents recognized, from recent personal contact and observation, as having been lately
engaged in illegal liquor dealings (bootlegging). The government agents turned their car
and pursued Carroll and Kiro to a point about nineteen miles east of Grand Rapids
"where they stopped them and searched the car." The agents found, stashed inside the
upholstered seats, sixty-eight bottles of whiskey and gin. Thereafter, the state officer
and an, other took Carroll and Kiro, the liquor and the car to Grand Rapids.
As could readily be seen, the "exigent circumstances" 10 which exist in
connection with the ambulatory character of the automobile provided the basic factor in
the justification for the warrantless search and seizure in Carroll . Absent, thus, these
"exigent circumstances, " notwithstanding the presence of probable cause, a warrant
must be secured and used .
The U.S. Supreme Court took this jurisprudential direction in the much later case
of United States v . Joseph V . Chadwick, et al . , 11 decided on June 21, 1977. The
facts of the case were summarized as follows: LLpr
"When respondents arrived by train in Boston from San Diego, they were
arrested at their waiting automobile by federal narcotics agents, who had been
alerted that respondents were possible drug traffickers. A double-locked
footlocker, which respondents had transported on the train and which the
agents had probable cause to believe contained narcotics, had been loaded in
the trunk of the automobile. Respondents, together with the automobile and
footlocker, which was admittedly under the agents' exclusive control, were then
taken to the Federal Building in Boston. An hour and a half after the arrests the
agents opened the footlocker without respondents' consent or a search warrant
and found large amounts of marihuana in it. Respondents were subsequently
indicted for possession of marihuana with intent to distribute it. The District
Court granted their pretrial motion to suppress the marihuana obtained from the
footlocker, holding that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment unless they fall within some established exception to the
warrant requirement, and that the footlocker search was not justified under
either the 'automobile exception' or as a search incident to a lawful arrest ; the
12
Court of Appeals affirmed."
The U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger,
responding to the Government's argument that the rationale of the Court's automobile
search cases applied as well to Chadwick, ruled that the footlocker's mobility does not
"justify dispensing with the added protections of the Warrant Clause" for, "[o]nce the
federal agents had seized it at the rail road station and had safely transferred it to the
Boston Federal Building under their exclusive control, there was not the slightest danger
that the footlocker or its contents could have been removed before a valid search
warrant could be obtained." 13
As to the contention of the Government that the search fell within the search-
incident-to-a-lawful-arrest exception, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "warrantless
searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified
as incident to that arrest either if the 'search is remote in time or place from the arrest,'
. . . or no exigency exists . Once lawful enforcement officers have reduced luggage or
other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to
their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain
access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property
is no longer an incident of the arrest." 14 It was emphasized that "the search was
conducted more than an hour after federal agents had gained exclusive control of the
footlocker and long after respondents were securely in custody; the search therefore
cannot be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any other exigency." 15
I perceive no reason why the rationale in Chadwick should not find application to
the case at bar. The record shows the following undisputed facts: (1) A week before the
actual interception of Sgt. Hope and Medina in the former's Dodge sedan, the RASAC
agents already knew, from an informer, that "a shipment of highly dutiable goods would
be transported to Manila from Angeles City in a blue Dodge car" 16 and that the goods,
in "sealed boxes with yellow tie," 17 would consist of "watches"; 18 (2) After the
interception, "Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car with respondents while Agent
Manuel took [his] own car and both cars drove towards Tropical Hut making a brief stop
at the Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by telephone"; 19 and (3)
"Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who had joined them
waited for the man who according to Monina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the
man did not appear, Col. Abad 'called off the mission' and brought respondents and
their car to Camp Aguinaldo arriving there at about 9:00 A.M." 20
In the case at bar, granting that the RASAC agents had probable cause to effect
the search and seizure, nonetheless, no exigent circumstances justified their
proceeding to do so without the requisite warrant . The RASAC agents, having known a
week before they actually undertook the operation that they would be intercepting a
"blue Dodge car" transporting "watches" in "sealed boxes," had ample opportunity within
the one-week period to secure the necessary warrant for the search and seizure
contemplated. Moreover, the RASAC agents had another opportunity to obtain the
search and seizure warrant on the day of the operation itself. The actual interception
took place "around 7:00 o'clock in the morning" 21 at the Balintawak approach to the
North Diversion Road and the actual search and seizure occurred past 9:00 o'clock the
same morning at Camp Aguinaldo. 22 During the intervening period, Agent Manuel even
had time to telephone Colonel Abad to ask for instructions and could have taken up
then with him the matter of securing the necessary search and seizure warrant. Colonel
Abad, as well, after learning from Agent Sabado that interception and apprehension had
already been effected, could himself, as RASAC Chief of Intelligence and Operations,
have secured the necessary search and seizure warrant. 23
As stressed by respondent judge in his questioned order, "there was ample time
and opportunity to secure the necessary warrant" 24 and "[j]ust because the RASAC-
MBA agents have information to make them believe that a certain person has
contraband goods in his possession, does not give them the right to search him and
seize whatever contraband may be found in his possession. ASAC Agents are not by
law empowered to determine whether there exists a 'probable cause', and even if they
have such power, assuming it to be so, the determination of the probable cause should
be made by examining the complainant and his witnesses under oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the thing or person to be seized,
and not simply on bare information given by an unnamed informer, as in the instant
case." 25
Respondent judge aptly added that. LibLex
"We cannot accept 'good faith' here, as an excuse to justify violation of the
Constitution in making the warrantless apprehension, search and seizure in
question when there was sufficient time — one week — within which they could
have procured a warrant of arrest and a search warrant in accordance with the
proscriptions of the present Constitution, had the ASAC Agents wanted to. Agent
Sabado simply said 'it is not necessary.' Furthermore, if subjective good faith alone
was the test, the protection afforded the Filipino people by our present Constitution
against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure would evaporate
and rendered its provision nugatory, and our people 'would be secured in their
persons, houses, papers and effects only in the discretion of the police'. And
besides, what would they have lost if they secured a warrant first? Would it have
frustrated their efforts in enforcing the provisions of the Customs and Tariff Code if
they secured the necessary warrant before making the apprehension and search?
Would it have thwarted the purposes of the Customs and Tariff Code and would
the results have been different if they had taken the trouble of securing the
necessary warrants, and made the apprehension and search in accordance with
the Constitution? It would have hardly made any difference. These over
earnestness and zealousness on the part of the officers in the discharge of their
function, is what we should guard against. We might impress on them the
importance to our well ordered society of the 'rule of law' — which necessarily
imply respect for and obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the land. This
we can do by making it clear to them that the fruits of such unreasonable searches
26
and seizures, are 'forbidden fruits' — inadmissible in evidence."
Granting arguendo that the RASAC agents had no opportunity after the
apprehended respondents to secure the necessary search and seizure warrant during
the period prior to their arrival at Camp Aguinaldo, they certainly could have delayed the
actual search and seizure until the necessary warrant had been obtained, which would
not have taken them beyond mid-afternoon of the same day. The inconvenience which
could be caused by the delay to respondents Hope and Medina would at least be
tolerable, for such inconvenience could be quantifiable only in terms of hours spent
while waiting, rather than the transgression of their rights through the warrantless
search and seizure which could be measured only in terms of fundamental
constitutional values violated.
The case at bar offers no situation "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought." As previously stated, after the interception, "Agent Sabado
boarded the Dodge car with the respondents" and directed Sgt. Hope the route he should
take. 27 Agent Sabado had, in effect, taken custody or control of Sgt. Hope's Dodge sedan,
for, being in there, on hand at all times from the moment he boarded it through the trip to
Bonanza Restaurant, Tropical Hut Foodmart and, finally, Camp Aguinaldo to guard against
any deviation by Sgt. Hope from the route he had been directed to take or against any
attempt to run off with the car and its contents, his presence had neutralized, if not
eliminated, the said car's mobility. Moreover, the RASAC agents, by directing the Dodge
sedan to Camp Aguinaldo and retaining it within the premises of the said Camp, had
effected its complete immobilization as well as of its contents. Definitely, under all these
circumstances, there could not have been the slightest possibility that Sgt. Hope and
Medina could have either moved the car or removed its contents — all securely within the
custody of the RASAC agents and the premises of Camp Aguinaldo — before the
necessary search and seizure warrant could be secured.
Neither can the warrantless search in the case at bar be viewed as a search
incident to a valid arrest so as to fall within another recognized exception from the
warrant requirement. In Preston v . United States , 28 the U.S. Supreme Court, in
spelling out the rule regarding this exception and the rationale therefor, stated that:
3. The majority opinion also cites Boyd v . United States , 31 with particular
reference to the dissertation therein on the distinction between the search and seizure
of "stolen or forfeited goods or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the
payment thereof" and the search and seizure of "a man's private books and papers for
the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence
against him" as well as on an historic and statutory account of instances "excepted out
of the category of unreasonable searches and seizures."
Boyd raised the matter of distinction aforementioned in connection with the
resolution of whether or not "a search and seizure or, what is equivalent thereto, a
compulsory production of a man's private papers, to be used in evidence against him in
a proceeding to forfeit property for alleged fraud against the revenue laws" 32 partook of
"an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution?" 33 Mr. Justice Joseph P. Bradley, who delivered the opinion of the
Court, "sought to determine the meaning of the fourth amendment reasonableness
clause by looking to those principles of the common law which defined the limits of the
state's power to search and seize the belongings of its citizens. Although it could seize
stolen goods and contraband, at common law the government could not search for and
seize a citizen's belongings in which it could not assert superior property rights." 34 He
"concluded that the owner's 'indefeasible' natural law property rights, enshrined in the
common law and protected by the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment,
placed his private papers and other property absolutely beyond the reach of
government agents seeking evidence of crime. No matter how compelling the showing
of probable cause or with what particularly the places to be search and the things to be
might be described, no warrant or subpoena could issue except for those items already
owned by or forfeited to the state." 35 In other words, the Court, in Boyd , 36 ruled, inter
alia , that the Constitution permitted searches and seizures only of property in which the
government could claim superior property rights at common law like "goods liable to
duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof." LLpr
The distinction excerpted in the opinion of the majority in the case at bar served,
in Boyd, to underscore its property -oriented rationale. However, this distinction — the
very basis of the property-focused rationale — had already been explicitly abandoned
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Warden, Maryland and Penitentiary v . Bennie Joe
Hayden, 37 wherein it was stated that:
"The premise that property interest control the right of the Government to
search and seize has been discredited. Searches and seizures may be
'unreasonable' within the Fourth Amendment even though the Government asserts
a superior property interest at common law . We have recognized that the principal
object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property ,
and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on
property concepts. . . . This shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come
about through a subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform. . . .
"We must remember that the extent of any privilege of search and seizure
without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret and apply themselves and
will push to the limit. We must remember, too, that freedom from unreasonable
search differs from some of the other rights of the Constitution in that there is no
way in which the innocent citizen can invoke advance protection. For example, any
effective interference with freedom of the press, or free speech, or religion, usually
requires a course of suppressions against which the citizen can and often does go
to the court and obtain an injunction Other rights, such as that to . . . the aid of
counsel, are within the supervisory power of the courts themselves. Such a right as
just compensation for the taking of private property may be vindicated after the act
in terms of money. dctai
The majority opinion itself recites these established facts on pages 4-5, as
follows:
"On the other hand, respondent Hope testified to the effect that at the
time of apprehension, he had no knowledge of the contents of the boxes, and
granting that he had such knowledge, he never knew that these are untaxed
commodities; that he consented to transport said boxes from Angeles City to
Manila in his car upon request of his girl friend Monina Medina as a personal
favor; that he was not present when the boxes were loaded in his car nor was
he ever told of their contents on the way. On the part of respondent Monina
Medina, she testified that what she did was only in compliance with the
agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to transport the boxes and deliver them to a
certain Mr. Peter at the Tropical Hut who will in turn give her the contracted
price; that Mr. Del Rosario did not reveal the contents of the boxes which she
came to know of only when the boxes were opened at Camp Aguinaldo.
"From the evidence thus adduced, it was established that the 11 boxes
found inside the subject car are 4,606 pcs. of assorted brands of wrist watches,
1,399 pcs. of wrist bracelets likewise of assorted brands and 100 pcs. tools, as
evidenced by the inventory list dated Feb. 22, 1974. (Exhs. '3' — '3-L' Hope) It
is the prosecutions's contention that these articles were imported without going
through a customhouse in violation of Sec. 2530 m)-1 of the TCCP. As a
consequence thereof, the vehicle which was used in transporting the subject
articles was likewise seized for alleged violation of Section 2530 (k) of the same
code.
"With respect to the charge against the subject car, the claimant thereof,
T/Sgt. Jessie C. Hope asserted that he merely accommodated Monina Medina, his
girl friend, who requested him to help her bring her cargo to Manila by driving the
car from Angeles City to Manila; that he was not present when the 11 boxes were
loaded in his car which was then parked on its usual parking place which is a
vacant lot adjacent to the house where he lives. He further stated that Monina
Medina has an access to the key of his car which he usually put on a table in his
house and that she did not tell him of the contents of the 11 boxes. Moreover he
asserted that he came to know of the contents of the 11 boxes when they were
opened at the RASAC office at Camp Aguinaldo. Upon being asked by this Office
why it never occurred to him to inquire from Monina Medina about the contents of
the 11 boxes, claimant categorically stated . . . 'because of the girl's honesty to
me.' In a similar vein, claimant stated in his sworn statement given to the RASAC
that he had known Monina Medina for quite a time so that . . . 'he did not suspect
her to carry anything against the law of the Philippines and for that reason I did not
bother to ask her.' (Exh. '5-A Hope') These assertions find support in the direct
testimony of Col. Antonio Abad, Chief, Intelligence and Operations, RASAC, who
testified thus: (t.s.n., p. 104)
"A. . . . I asked him again, how come your car was loaded with foreign
items? And he said 'that is my lady companion's.' I told him, don't you
know these are hot items?
A. He was surprised.
Both Col. Antonio Abad and Agent Macario Sabado, one of the
apprehending agents admitted in open hearing that during their initial interrogation
of T/Sgt. Hope, he maintained and professed that he did not know of the contents
of the 11 boxes. Monina Medina, on the other hand, stated on direct examination
that T/Sgt. Hope was not present when the subject 11 boxes were delivered to her
at the vacant lot in Angeles City by Antonio del Rosario. (tsn p.
169) Moreover, in her sworn statement given to the RASAC, Monina Medina
stated thus: (Exh. '4-A' Hope)
"Q. When you told T/Sgt. Hope that you will load something in his car,
did he ask you what you were going to load?
A. No, sir."
"It is a well settled rule that bad faith cannot be presumed, it must be
proven. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, which in this case none
whatsoever was presented, the claimant-intervenor herein is presumed to be a
buyer in good faith. However, it is incumbent upon the claimant-intervenor
herein to prove that the subject articles are tax-paid. Aside from the covering
sales invoice, not a scintilla of evidence was adduced to prove that the duties
and taxes due on the said items were satisfied. In this connection, this Office
does not share the view of the herein claimant-intervenor that it is not the
practice in business circles to inquire whether or not the subject matter of a
business transaction are tax-paid. Considering the quantity of the articles in
question and the big volume of the amount involved, Mr. Antonio del Rosario
was quite negligent in failing to inquire from the seller herein whether the duties
and taxes of the items he purchased were satisfied or not.
The point is that the customs authorities, the Commissioner of Customs and the
Manila Collector of Customs are bound by their own above stated decision and findings
in the seizure and detention proceedings that the goods in question were lawfully owned
by the claimant-intervenor Antonio del Rosario who had purchased them in good faith in
the regular course of business and that respondent Hope was completely innocent of
any complicity in their importation and purchase, having agreed merely to his girlfriend
Monina Medina's request to bring the goods back to Manila, without any knowledge of
their contents, and they should accordingly direct the prosecution to move for dismissal
of the case below.
As the majority opinion itself states:
"The collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to
forfeiture does not detract his findings that untaxed goods were transported in
respondent's car and seized from then possession by agents of the law.
Whether criminal liability lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff and
Customs Code adduced in the information can only be determined in a
separate criminal action. Respondents' exoneration in the administrative cases
cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our penal laws,
criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven not by preponderance of evidence
but by proof beyond reasonable doubt." 51
The majority opinion penned by Mr. Justice Guerrero, however, reaches the
conclusion that despite respondents' exoneration in the administrative cases, the
criminal responsibility can be determined only in the separate criminal action while
conceding that such criminal responsibility "must be proven not by preponderance of
evidence but by proof beyond reasonable doubt ." 52
This posture of the majority that any dismissal of the criminal case should not be
ordered outright by this Court but by the court a quo, whether motu proprio or at the
prosecution's instance, is nonetheless understandable.
I join the Court's directive in its judgment that in consonance with the
respondents-accused's right to speedy trial and justice that the prosecution forthwith
"reassess and reevaluate the evidence at its disposal" and thereafter promptly take the
necessary action in the premises for the protection of the rights and interests of all
concerned.
This means, as indicated above, that if the prosecution's evidence (as supplied by
the customs authorities) is totally devoid of "any evidence circumstantial or otherwise"
that would establish any complicity on the part of respondents "to a reasonable degree
of certainty", as determined in the very Collector's decision of April 1, 1975 itself as
affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs, then the prosecution must as a simple
matter of fairness and justice move for the dismissal of the criminal case below. The
judgment has been made immediately executory, so that the prosecution may comply
with the Court's directive without further delay. cdasia
Footnotes
1. Section 3601. Unlawful Importation. — Any person who shall fraudulently import or
bring into the Philippines, or assist in so doing, any articles, contrary to law, or shall
receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment,
or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to have been imported
contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling and shall be punished with:
In applying the above scale of penalties, if the offender is an alien and the
prescribed penalty is not death, he shall be deported after serving the sentence
without further proceedings for deportation. If the offender is a government official or
employee, the penalty shall be the maximum as herein above prescribed and the
offender shall suffer an additional penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
office, to vote and to participate in any public election.
When, upon trial for violation of the section, the defendant is shown to have
had possession of the article in question, possession shall be deemed sufficient
evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant shall explain the possession
to the satisfaction of the court; Provided, however, That payment of the tax due after
apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution under this
action. (As amended by R.A. No. 4712, approved on June 18, 1966).
2. Section 2530. Property Subject to Forfeiture Under Tariff and Customs Laws . —
Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, cargo, articles and other objects shall, under the
following conditions be subjected to forfeiture:
k. Any conveyance actually being used for the transport of articles subject to
forfeiture under the tariff and customs laws, with its equipage or trappings, and any
vehicle similarly used, together with its equipage and appurtenances including the
beast, steam or other motive power drawing or propelling the same. The mere
conveyance of contraband or smuggled articles by such beast or vehicle shall be
sufficient cause for the outright seizure and confiscation of such beast or vehicle, but
the forfeiture shall not be effected if it is established that the owner of the means of
conveyance used as aforesaid, is engaged as common carrier and not chartered or
leased, or his agent in charge thereof at the time, has no knowledge of the unlawful
act;
3. See Lazatin v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-19753, July 30, 1969, 28
SCRA 1016.
4. Pascual v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-12219, April 15, 1962, 4 SCRA 1020.
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall be issued, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized."
9. Id., at 549.
14. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 (1946).
15. Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 (1962).
19. G.R. No. L-29218, October 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 553, 562.
* Mr. Justice de Castro was designated to sit with the First Division.
3. Although the Order dated August 20, 1975 rather amply discusses the arrest-aspect
of the case at bar (vide Order, pp. 23-25, and Rollo. pp. 82-84), the majority opinion
prescinds from passing upon the matter.
4. Section 3601 declares "any person who shall fraudulently import or bring into the
Philippines, or assist in so doing, any article, contrary to law, or shall receive,
conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale
of such article after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to
law" guilty of smuggling and prescribes a scale of penalties for the violation thereof.
6. Nelson Sibron v. State of New York, 29 L. Ed. 2d 917, 932; 392 U. S. 40, 59. Vide
also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall with whom Messrs.
Justices William O. Douglas and William J. Brennan, Jr., join, in United States v .
Willie Robinson, Jr . (33 L. Ed. 2d 427; 414 U.S. 218). In his dissent, Mr. Justice
Marshall takes exception to the majority's approach for, he reasons, it "represents a
clear and marked departure from [the Court's] long tradition of case-by-case
adjudication of the reasonableness of searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment." He also states that "[t]he majority's attempt to avoid case-by-case
adjudication of Fourth Amendment issues is not only misguided as a matter of
principle, but is also doomed to fail as a matter of practical application."
9. Frank Chambers v. James F. Maroney, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 428; 399 U.S. 42, 51.
10. Ibid.
16. Decision, p. 2.
17. Rollo, p. 87, corresponding to page 28 of the Memorandum for the Respondents
wherein appear quoted excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes taken during
the hearing of Criminal Case Q3881 involved herein.
18. Rollo, pp. 186-187, corresponding to pages 27-28 of the Memorandum for
the Respondents.
19. Decision, p. 3.
20. Ibid.
21. Rollo, p. 62, corresponding to page 3 of the Order dated August 20, 1975.
22. Ibid.
23. Vide Delfin Lim, et al. v. Francisco Ponce de Leon, L-22554, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA
299, wherein the Court, regarding the claim of "lack of time to procure a search warrant
as an excuse for the seizure of the motor launch [involved therein] without one," held that
"[T]he claim cannot be sustained. The records show that on June 15, 1962 Fiscal Ponce
de Leon made the first request to the Provincial Commander for the impounding of the
motor launch; and on June 26, 1962 another request was made. The seizure was not
effected until July 6, 1962. In short, Fiscal Ponce de Leon had all the time to procure a
search warrant had he wanted to and which he could have taken in less than a day, but
he did not. Besides, there is no basis for the apprehension that the motor launch might be
moved out of Balabac because even prior to its seizure the motor launch was already
without its engine. In sum, the fact that there was no time to secure a search warrant
would not legally justify a search without one."
27. Rollo, p. 186, corresponding to page 27 of the Memorandum for the Respondents.
33. Ibid.
34. Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 Harvard Law Review 945, 952-953.
36. Boyd, decided on February 1, 1886, predated Fremont Weeks v . United States (58
L. Ed. 652, 232 U.S. 383), decided on February 24, 1914, wherein the Court,
indictum, recognized the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest exception, and Carroll,
supra, decided on March 2, 1925, wherein the Court first categorically established the
search-of-automobile exception.
39. Beck v. Ohio, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 379 U.S. 89; McDonald v. United States, 93 L. Ed.
153, 335 U.S. 451.
40. Trupiano v. United States, 92 L. Ed. 1663, 334 U.S. 699; Aguilar v. Texas, 12 L. Ed.
2d 723, 378 U.S. 108.
42. Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines enumerates
the persons authorized "to effect searches, seizures and arrests," to wit:
"b. Officers of the Philippine Navy and other members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and national law enforcement agencies when authorized by the
commissioner;
"c. Officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue on all cases falling within the
regular performance of their duties, when the payment of internal revenue taxes are
involved;" and