Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Commission On Elections, Rommel Arnado y Cagoco, Linog G. Balua
Commission On Elections, Rommel Arnado y Cagoco, Linog G. Balua
G.R. No. 195649 / April 16, 2013 / SERENO, C.J. / Qualifications / EFHDy Continuation of DQ case – Arnado only filed his answer after winning. He
NATURE PETITION for certiorari submitted the following documents to show he was qualified: (a) Affidavit of
PETITIONERS Casan Macode Maquiling Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance; (b) a Join-Affidavit of City Engineer and other
RESPONDENTS Commission on Elections, Rommel Arnado y Cagoco, Linog G. neighbors of Arnado, attesting that he was a long-time resident of Kauswagan; (c)
Balua certification from Punong Barangay of Kauswagan stating he was a bona-fide
resident; (d) certification from Municipal Local Gov’t that Arnado’s father was also a
SUMMARY. Arnado was a natural born Filipino who subsequently gained US resident, and even served as Mayor; (e) Voter Certification showing that Arnado
citizenship through naturalization, losing his PH citizenship in the process. However, had been a registered voter in Kauswagan since April 3, 2009
in order to be qualified to run for the position of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del COMELEC First Division – Ruled against Arnado. It treated the case as one for
Norte, he gained back his PH citizenship through repatriation, taking 2 oaths of disqualification, not as one of cancellation of CoC. First ruled that Arnado was not a
allegiance to the country and renouncing his US citizenship. He won the election, US resident because Balua was not able to present sufficient evidence. However,
prompting his opponents to file a case of disqualification against him, arguing that he in terms of citizenship, the COMELEC ruled that Arnado was not Filipino because
was still a foreigner as evidenced by his continuous use of his US passport even after of his act of consistently using his US passport (used it six times) after renouncing
his Oath of Allegiance to the PH. The SC ruled that Arnado was indeed disqualified. his US citizenship. Thus, they annulled his proclamation as Mayor and ruled that
The use of a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive the winner of Vice-Mayor should succeed in his place pursuant to Sec. 44 of the
and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality. Arnado did not lose his LGC.
Filipino citizenship, but regained his US citizenship and became a dual citizen. Under Intervention by petitioner Maquiling – Petitioner was another candidate for
sec. 40(d) of the LGC, those with dual citizenships are expressly disqualified from Mayor and garnered the second highest number of votes. He intervened and
running for local gov’t positions. The effect of this is that Maquiling, the losing argued that while COMELEC was correct in DQing Arnado, they were wrong in
candidate with the highest number of votes, should be declared Mayor. As ruled in ruling that Vice-Mayor should succeed as Mayor under Sec. 44 LGC. He argues
Jalosjos v. COMELEC, when there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their that he should be proclaimed winner for being the qualified candidate who garnered
victory is voided and the next qualified candidate with the most votes wins the the most votes.
election. In cases like this, the winner is not considered a second-placer, but the “first- COMELEC En Banc – Reversed the First Division’s ruling and stated that Arnado
placer” amongst the qualified candidates. was qualified. Ruled that the use of a US passport does not operate to revert back
DOCTRINE. The use of a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship his status as a US/dual citizen since no law provides such.
is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality. Under sec. The principle of continuity of citizenship, which provides that once a
40(d) of the LGC, those with dual citizenships are expressly disqualified from running person becomes a citizen, it is assumed that he desired to continue to be
for local gov’t positions. one until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. In this case,
DISSENT, BRION, J.: Arnado’s use of a foreign passport was just an isolated act and Arnado should be presumed to have remained Filipino despite his use of
it cannot be considered as an express renunciation of his PH citizenship. the US passport absent any clear and unequivocal proof of expatriation.
Furthermore, Arnado’s claim that he had no choice but to use his US
FACTS. passport because he had not been given notice of the issuance of his PH
Background – Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. He passport yet was a valid excuse. He was only able to claim his PH
subsequently lost his PH citizenship when he underwent naturalization as a US passport 3 months after its issuance, and he used it ever since.
citizen. He then regained his PH citizenship under RA 9225 by taking two Oaths of
Allegiance to the RP (one on July 10, 2008 and one on April 3, 2009). These oaths ISSUES & RATIO.
were accepted, and an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re- 1. WON the intervention of a rival candidate in a DQ case is proper when there
acquisition was issued in his favor. He also executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of has been no proclamation of a winner yet. – YES.
his US citizenship. >>> All this made him qualified to file his Certificate of In this case, Maquiling intervened at the stage when Arnado filed an MR of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the 2010 local elections. the COMELEC First Division ruling before the COMELEC En Banc. The
Case for DQ – Another candidate for mayor, Balua, filed a petition to disqualify COMELEC decided to treat the case as one for Disqualification, so the
Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC. He contended that Arnado was not a resident of applicable law is Sec. 6 of RA 6646 (Electoral Reform Law of 1987), which
Kauswagan, and that he was still a foreigner based on the following: (a) allows interventions during DQ proceedings even after the election, as
certification by the Bureau of Immigration indicating that his nationality was “USA- long as there has been no final judgment on the eligibility of the candidate
American”; and (b) Arnado’s travel record indicating that he had been using his yet.
US Passport even after his Oath to the PH. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc had already ruled that Maquiling had
COMELEC ordered Arnado to file his answer >> Arnado failed to file ansser >> not shown the requisites for the exemption to the “second-placer rule” and
Balua filed motion to declare him in default therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case is of no
COMELEC did not act on the motions in time, so the elections pushed through moment, and does not deprive him the right to elevate the matter to the
before petition was decided. SC.
Arnado argues that the case has attained finality because the original Dual Citizenship: COMELEC was correct in ruling that Arnado did not lose
petitioner and respondents did not appeal the En Banc decision >>> SC = his PH citizenship. All that happened was a reversion to his status as a dual
no finality precisely because Maquiling elevated it to SC. It is only after SC citizen, which was fatal to his eligibility.
has ruled upon issues that DQ case originally filed by Balua will attain There are two classes of dual citizens: (a) those who acquired foreign
finality. citizenship through positive act of naturalization; (b) those who are
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth. >>> Those in the first class need
2. WON Arnado was qualified to run for local office. – NO. His use of a US to take both an Oath of Allegiance to PH and an Oath of Renunciation of
passport after renouncing US citizenship amounts to an undoing of such foreign citizenship. Those in the second class only need to take an Oath of
renunciation. Allegiance because the mere act of filing for a CoC carries with it an implied
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a renunciation of foreign citizenship.
positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s citizenship. It does >>> Arnado belongs to the first class. Basically, Arnado actually complied
not divest PH citizenship regained by repatriation, but recants the Oath of with the twin requirements under RA9225, but lost it subsequently. The
Renunciation of foreign citizenship, which is required to run for elective purpose of the LGC in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
position. elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has
Renunciation of foreign citizenship: Initially, Arnado complied with the earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents
twin requirements of Oath of Allegiance + Renunciation under RA9225 Sec. himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
5(2) to be eligible to run for an elective position. By renouncing his foreign Qualification Requirements are continuing in nature: In this case, the
citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a PH citizen. citizenship requirement must be possessed not just at the time of
However, this legal presumption of citizenship is not permanent, and may be renunciation of the foreign citizenship, but continuously. Therefore, Arnado’s
open to attack when, after such renunciation, the person performs positive act of using his US passport stopped this continuity.
acts showing his continued possession of foreign citizenship. The case of Yu v. Defensor-Santiago can be compared to this case: Yu
APPLIED: The important thing to determine is WoN Arnado was solely a PH was a Portugese dude who sought naturalization as a Filipino and later
citizen when he filed his CoC. In this case, between the date he renounced renewed his Portugal passport. In the case at hand, Arnado’s act of using his
his US citizenship and the date he filed his CoC, he used his US passport to US passport was also a positive act of representation as a US citizen.
travel six times. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and COMELEC En Banc, in ruling in favor of Arnado, stated that he had a
voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before justifiable excuse because he used his PH passport as soon as he got
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with it, which was 3 months after its issuance.
all attendant rights and privileges granted by the USA. >>> SC said this was erroneous. His PH Passport was issued on June.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be Three months from June is only September. If indeed Arnado used his PH
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an passport continuously once he got it, he would not have used his US
absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full passport on November 2009. Also, his subsequent use of a PH passport will
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which not cure the defect caused by the use of his US passport.
granted the citizenship.
Even if the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated 3. WON Maquiling should be proclaimed Mayor as the recipient of the 2 nd
in CA631 constituting loss of PH citizenship, it nevertheless is an act which highest number of votes. – YES.
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required by a dual citizen to be First of all, Topacio v. Paredes, the case that provided for the principle
qualified to run for a local elective position. He was therefore under the that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner in an election must
disqualification under Sec. 40 (d) of the LGC. be re-examined
This case involved the 1912 elections in the town of Imus, Cavite for the
position of municipal president between Abad and Topacio. Topacio
received the most votes while Abad was the second-placer. Abad then
1 Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship: contested the election on the ground that Topacio was ineligible because he
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country; (2) By express renunciation of citizenship; (3) By was running for a second time without observing the four-year interruption
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country rule under Act No. 2045.
upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more; (4) By accepting commission in the military, Said case contained the oft-quoted phrase of “the wreath of victory cannot
naval or air service of a foreign country; (5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: cast ballots.”
and (7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force >>> First, the SC said that this phrase was only obiter dictum because the
in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality. issue in that case was NOT WoN Abad can be proclaimed the winner as
second-placer because of Topacio’s disqualification. The issue that the court
actually ruled on was WoN the CFI has jurisdiction to try a DQ case based That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has
on the eligibility of the person who obtained the most votes. The ruling was assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based
that since a CFI’s jurisdiction is confined “to determine which of the on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of
contestants as been duly elected”, the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when candidacy voids not only the CoC but also the proclamation. Sec. 6 of RA
he “declared that no one had been legally elected president of the 66462 provides that when a candidate has not been declared DQ’d by final
municipality” where the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was judgment yet, but is subsequently proclaimed the winner, the COMELEC or
eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president. Court shall continue with the trial and may suspend the proclamation of such
Second, we have to look at the context upon which the phrase was used. candidate when evidence of guilt is strong. In this case, the only reason
The phrase was located in a paragraph that was comparing (a) the situation Arnado was able to continue with his candidacy without suspension was
where a candidate is not entitled to a position because of fraud in the because he only filed his answer to the DQ case against him when the
elections itself, and (b) the situation where a candidate is ineligible because elections were already conducted.
of his own qualifications. In the first situation, a winner can be proclaimed
because there was a contest in the strict sense of the word. For instance, if it DECISION.
is found that one candidate won because fraud in vote-counting, and that it is Petition GRANTED. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from
clear that another other candidate should have won, such rightful candidate running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby
can be proclaimed the winner. On the other hand, in the second situation, DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May
there is no actual contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from 2010 elections.
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality. NOTES.
The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate: The DISSENT, BRION, J.
ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for Arnado’s use of US passport on November 24, 2009 was an isolated act and a
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When a person who is not matter of practicability, since he was returning to the PH, having used US
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, passport before. (Risky daw na gumamit siya ng US passport palabas ng PH
even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the tapos pagbalik niya PH passport na siya)
defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample Arnado’s Philippine passport was issued on June 18, 2009, but he was not
upon the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of immediately notified of the issuance so that and he only received his
candidates. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump passport three months after or sometime in September 2009. Clearly, when
mandatory provisions is not democracy nor republicanism, but electoral Arnado travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had
anarchy. This principle has been laid down by several cases such as no Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the United States
Frivaldo v. COMELEC, Quizon v. COMELEC, and Velasco v. COMELEC. to attend to the winding up of his business and other affairs in America.
Maquiling is not a second-placer, but the first-placer among the A travel document issued by the proper Philippine government agency (e.g.,
qualified candidates and should thus be proclaimed winner: As ruled in a Philippine consulate office in the US) would not suffice because travel
the cases of Jalosjos v. COMELEC and Aratea v. COMELEC, a void CoC documents could not be used; they are issued only in critical instances, as
cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, all the votes cast in favor of the determined by the consular officer, and allow the bearer only a direct, one-
ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determine the winner of an way trip to the Philippines.
election. Although Arnado received his Philippine passport by the time he returned to
However, this does not mean that the entire elections are rendered void. the Philippines on November 24, 2009, he could not use this without risk
Votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and of complications with the US immigration authorities for using a travel
total expression of sovereign voice, and the votes cast in favor of the other document different from what he used in his entry into the US on July
legitimate candidates should also be respected. When there are participants 29, 2009. Plain practicality then demanded that the travel document
who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded
to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that when 2 Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones. The
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
electorate’s awareness of a candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite
for the DQ to attach to the candidate. The very existence of disqualifying thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. of his guilt is strong.
that he used to enter the US on July 29, 2009 be the same travel
document he should use in leaving the country on November 24, 2009.
Given these circumstances, Arnado’s use of his US passport in travelling
back to the Philippines on November 24, 2009 was an isolated act that could
not, by itself, be an express renunciation of the Philippine citizenship he
adopted as his sole citizenship under RA 9225.
What the law requires in an express renunciation, not mere inference from
conduct
I loathe to rule that Arnado’s use of his US passport amounts to an express
renunciation of his Filipino citizenship, when its use was an isolated act that
he sufficiently explained and fully justified.
I emphasize that the law requires express renunciation in order to lose
Philippine citizenship. The term means a renunciation that is made distinctly
and explicitly and is not left to inference or implication; it is a renunciation
manifested by direct and appropriate language, as distinguished from that
which is inferred from conduct.
Other than the use of his US passport in two trips to and from the United
States, the record does not bear out any indication, supported by evidence,
of Arnado’s intention to reacquire US citizenship.
To my mind, in the absence of clear and affirmative acts of reacquiring US
citizenship either by naturalization or by express acts (such as the
reestablishment of permanent residency in the United States), Arnado’s use
of his US passport cannot but be considered an isolated act that did not
undo his renunciation of his US citizenship. What he might in fact have done
was to violate American law on the use of passports, but this is a matter
irrelevant to the present case.
Thus, Arnado remains to be a “pure” Filipino citizen and the loss of his
Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed or inferred from his isolated act of
using his US passport for travel purposes.
The People of Kauswagan have spoken and any doubt should be resolved in favor of
their verdict.
*Digester’s note: Hindi sakto yung argument’s ni J. Brion sa ponencia. Ang sabi ng
ponencia DQ si Arnado dahil dual citizen siya (fact of using foreign passport means
he represented himself as US citizen also.) Argument ni J. Brion ay he did not lose his
Filipino Citizenship, w/c is totoo naman in the case of dual citizenship.
Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by
former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it
Facts: could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore
former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the
the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former
President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-
C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
results. Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
Manila. all the Members of the Congress.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the xxxx
Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of
perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code favorable recommendation of the Commission.
(OEC). It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases;
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any
act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the President.
the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
of Manila.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows
Issue: that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to
convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41
disqualification to hold public office? of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were
Held: expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former pardon granted to him
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered
by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person
who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of
an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against
the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as
being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an
act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form
part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral
part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to
make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of
the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
1st case: PETS: USec. Austere Panadero and Regional Dir. Rene 4. While RD Burdeos sought clarification from Ombudsman Carpio-Morales on
applicability of the Aguinaldo doctrine, USec. Panadero issued a memorandum
Burdeos (DILG) RESPS: COMELEC directing him to proceed with the implementation of Ombudsman’s decision.
Limbona sought the Office of the President to revoke the DILG Memo against
2nd case: PETS: USec Austere Panadero and Regional Dir. Rene Burdeos him. It was dismissed on the ground that petitioners were justified in the
(DILG) RESPS: COMELEC and Mohammad Exchan Gabriel Limbona implementation of the Ombudsman’s decision. DILG served the dismissal order
of Limbona leading to his removal from office and assumption of Vice Mayor
3rd case: PET: Mangondaya Asum Tago RESPS: COMELEC and Mohammad Tago to his position.
Exchan Gabriel Limbona
5. Limbona filed with COMELEC a petition to cite petitioners for indirect
contempt. DILG now received endorsement from Ombudsman to implement
SUMMARY: Limbona was found guilty of administrative the order against Limbona. Petitioners argue:
misconduct by the Ombudsman when he was Brgy Chairman.
The latter ordered his dismissal from government service. a. COMELEC Resolution was not yet final because it remained
When Limbona ran for mayor, a disqualification case was filed pending with COMELEC En Banc thus petition of Limbona was
against him in the COMELEC which was resolved in his favor premature
saying the administrative case did not disqualify him from b. COMELEC had no jurisdiction over petitioner and the decision of
running for Mayor. Meanwhile, The DILG USec. tried Ombudsman
implementing their order through the Regional Dir but the camp
of Limbona presented them the COMELEC Resolution finding c. Petitioners not in bad faith as they merely implemented final and
him qualified to run. Through a petition by Limbona, the executory decision of Ombudsman
COMELEC cited petitioners in indirect contempt and imposed
penalties of fines and imprisonment. The Petitioners argue that 6. COMELEC En Banc said that the condonation was inapplicable to Limbona’s
they are beyond the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and cannot case as he was elected as Mayor (2010-2013), which was different from his
be cited in indirect contempt. SC limited the discussion on position of Brgy. Chairman (2007-2010) when the administrative case was
contempt power of COMELEC and ultimately sided with filed. Nonetheless, Limbona was qualified to run because he wasn’t removed
petitioners. from post of Brgy. Chairman and was able to finish the term prior to finality of
the Ombudsman decision. Sec 40(b) of LGC disqualified persons running for
DOCTRINE: Ratio a,b,c. any elective office when “removed from office as a result of an administrative
case” thus petitioners were cited in indirect contempt. Petitioners violated the
FACTS: final and executory decision of the COMELEC finding Limbona qualified to
1. In 2009, Office of Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and approved by run and ordering Tago to assume his post.
Ombudsman Gutierrez found Limbona guilty of grave misconduct,
oppression and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service 7. Petitioner’s arguments before the SC:
while he was Chairman of Brgy. Kalanganan Lower, Pantar, Lanao Del
Norte, in relation to the killing of former Municipal Vice Mayor Onos. He a. 1st case (Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64)
was dismissed from public service with accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual i. COMELEC has no jurisdiction over acts of Ombudsman
disqualification from re-employment in the government.
ii. No basis to hold them in contempt
2. In 2013, DILG Sec Panadero was ordered to implement it against Limbona.
Meanwhile, Limbona won as Municipal Mayor of Pantar. DILG Sec Panadero iii. Aguinaldo doctrine doesn’t apply
directed RD Burdeos of DILG Region X, to cause immediate implementation.
b. 2nd case (Petition for Certiorari with very urgent application for a
3. In 2014, RD Burdeos reported that he received from Limbona’s camp, a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO)
resolution from COMELEC First Division dismissing the petition for
disqualification filed by Malik Alingan against Limbona which discussed the i. COMELEC cannot motu proprio amend its decision by
eligibility to run after Ombudsman found him guilty in 2009. The resolution imposing fine and imprisonment
the DILG even seeking clarification from Ombudsman which later
ii. COMELEC had no jurisdiction reiterated instructions to implement the decision.
iii. NOTE: COURT issued TRO against issuance of arrest f. Limbona’s recourse to nullify the actions of DILG officials couldn’t be
warrants pending determination of merits on the petition allowed through a petition for contempt. His petition to revoke with OP
was dismissed in fact, as to revoke USec. Panadero’s memo would
c. 3rd case (Petition for Certiorari) encroach upon disciplining authority of the Ombudsman.
i. Petitioners did not commit acts constituting indirect 2. FALLO: Wherefore, the petitions are granted. The resolutions dated November
contempt as his assumption to office had legal bases 17, 2004 and January 5, 2015 of the COMELEC en banc are ANNULLED AND
(Ombudsman and DILG issuances, LGC provision on SET ASIDE.
succession)
1. YES. First off, the power of Contempt is given to Comelec by virtue of Art
VII, Sec 52(e) of the Omnibus Election Code. In defining indirect contempt,
we look at Sec 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. However,
petitioners are not guilty of such act.
W/N PET. for disqualification is moot with re: 2013 grounds? No. He still liable
for it as the COMELEC explained that all candidates are required to file. (SEE
COMELEC decision above which is underlines and in bold)
b PET: invoking Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides: Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. x x x .
i. He contends that the failure to file the SOCE is an offense far
less grave than the serious crimes under the Revised Penal
Code and the grave offenses under the civil service laws.
c SC: We have always deferred to the wisdom of Congress in enacting a law.
We can only enforce a statute like R.A. No. 7166 unless there is a clear
showing that it contravenes the Constitution. The petitioner has not
demonstrated herein how R.A. No. 7166 could have transgressed the
Constitution. On the contrary, a review of R.A. No. 7166 convincingly
indicates that perpetual disqualification from public office has been
prescribed as a penalty for the repeated failure to file the SOCE and does
not constitute cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. Penalty is intended
to underscore the need to file the SOCE as another means of ensuring the
sanctity of the electoral process.
d We have already settled that the constitutional proscription under the Bill of
Rights extends only to situations of extreme corporeal or psychological
punishment that strips the individual of his humanity. NOT flagrantly and
plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense
as to shock the moral sense of the community
ALBANIA v. COMELEC e Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials… three years and no … more
G.R. No. 226792 / 6 Jun 2017 / Peralta, J. / MATConejero than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office … not considered
as interruption in continuity of service for the full elective term; Section 43. Term of
NATURE Rule 64 petition for certiorari Office. - (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
PETITIONERS Sofronio Albania terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation …
RESPONDENTS COMELEC, Edgardo Tallado f Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - … may
be filed … exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
SUMMARY. Edgardo Tallado served for the last three months of the 2007-2010 therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false… not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided … not
term after filing a petition for correction of manifest error against the proclaimed later than fifteen days before the election.
Governor of Camarines Norte, Jesus Typoco. Tallado then ran and won the
gubernatorial races in 2010 and 2013, after which he filed COC for the same
position in the 2016 election. Albania as a registered taxpayer filed a case for
disqualification against Tallado for violating the three-term limit and for having been
suspended by the Ombudsman. The COMELEC 2nd division dismissed the case as
the case was for denial/cancellation of COC and was filed out of time; moreover,
Tallado did not fully serve his first term which did not count as part of the three
terms, and was not disqualified by suspension. The COMELEC en banc’s
resolution affirmed this decision, and is herein assailed by Albania. SC affirmed the
en banc as the involuntary interruption of his service as Governor by Typoco’s
assumption of office meant no full term served and no violation of the three-term
limit rule when Tallado ran again.
DOCTRINE. An involuntarily interrupted term cannot be considered as one term for
purposes of counting the three-term limit rule that is embodied in Section 8 of
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 of the LGC.1
FACTS.
7. Edgardo Tallado’s petition for correction of a manifest error against co-candidate
Jesus
Typoco’s proclamation as Governor of Camarines Norte was granted 5 Mar 2010.
Tallado assumed his duly-elected gubernatorial office for the last three months of
the 2007-2010 term from 22 Mar to 30 June 2010.
8. Tallado ran and won as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2010 and 2013
elections after which he filed COC for the fourth time on 16 Oct 2015 for the 2016
race.
9. Sofronio Albania as registered voter of Poblacion Sta. Elena filed on 13 Nov 2015
a
petition to disqualify Tallado based on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resn. 9523 and on 2
grounds: o Violation of the three term limit rule under Section 43 LGC
o Tallado’s suspension by a 2 Oct 2015 Ombudsman order for one year without
pay, together with its accessory penalties, for oppression and grave abuse of
authority
10. Tallado in his verified Answer argued four points:
6. the petition should have been one to deny due course to or cancel COC
under Rule 23 of COMELEC Resn. 9523, in relation to Section 78 OEC on
eligibility, as it was
primarily based on alleged ineligibility through violation of the three-term limit
rule
10. this petition has prescribed based on Section 23 Rule 23 where the petition
should be filed 25 days after he filed COC or on 10 Nov 2015 and not 13
Nov
ii. he did not violate the three-term limit as he did not fully serve the 2007-2010 of the assailed COC, or later than 5
term o his suspension from office is not a ground for a petition for disqualification days if
as the COC is by a substitute candidate
Section 40(b) LGC refers to removal and not suspension by administrative
case
d. The COMELEC Second Division on 22 Apr 2016 dismissed the petition and agreed
f. Rule 25 - Disqualification of Candidates, Section 1. Grounds…. declared by
final decision of a competent court.. or Commission … disqualification
with all Tallado’s arguments. The COMELEC en banc in its assailed 24 Aug 2016 provided by law or the Constitution.
resolution dismissed Albania’s MR and echoed the Division’s findings, hence this g. Rule 23 - Petition to Deny Due Course to r Cancel COC, Section 1. Ground for
petition where Albania alleges GADALEJ on the four issues corresponding to Denial or Cancellation of COC - … any elective office … exclusive ground that any
Tallado’s arguments. material representation contained therein as required by law is false.
ISSUES & RATIO. 3. Whether Tallado violated the three-term limit rule on running for office—NO.
Since Tallado did not serve the full 2007-2010 term as governor, such cannot be
2. Whether the COMELEC erred in treating this disqualification petition as one considered as one term for purposes of assessing a violation of the three-term
for denial or cancellation of COC based on the grounds invoked—NO. The threshold.
COMELEC was correct in doing so as the two grounds invoked by Albania are
not found within the applicable provisions of Secs. 12 and 68 of BP 881 OEC or • The second of two conditions was missing for disqualification of a candidate based
in Sec. 40 LGC. on violation of the three-term limit rule
Suspension from office is not a ground for a petition for disqualification as o the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
Section 40 (b) clearly speaks of removal and not suspension as a result of same local government post
an administrative offense for disqualification from an elective local position. o he has fully served three consecutive terms
The alleged violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility which is a • The Court applied Abundo v. COMELEC, which has similar facts, in ruling that an
proper
ground for a petition to deny or cancel COC under Section 78 OEC. involuntary interrupted term is not considered as one term for the three-term limit. o
o Section 74 of the OEC provides that the candidate shall state his Abundo won an election protest and assumed the mayoralty post for
candidacy around a year and a month from 9 May 2006 until 30 June 2007.
and eligibility in his COC, “eligible” meaning having no ineligibilities
to run o A violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility which by Abundo was not considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term as his
false material representation is a proper ground for a petition to deny full term was substantially reduced.
due The almost two-year period during which Abundo 's opponent served as
course to or to cancel a COC under Section 78 OEC2. Mayor was considered an involuntary interruption of
The Constitution has vested in the COMELEC broad powers of enforcement
and administration of election laws, authority to promulgate rules of o Here, Tallado did not serve the full 2007-2010 term since he did not win as
procedure, and power to resolve controversies, including determine the true Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections, but served three months after a
nature of the cases filed before it based on its averments petition for correction of manifest error which cannot be considered as one term for
purposes of the three-term threshold.
3. Whether the petition was filed out of time—YES. A petition under Section 78 • Tallado did not hold the full term of three years to which he was supposedly entitled
to based on the definition of the term ”term”
of the OEC must comply with the period prescribed under Rule 23 and not Rule
25 as argued by Albania. Since Tallado filed COC on 16 Oct 2015, the petition o Aldovino Jr. v. COMELEC: Art. X, Sec. 8 refers to a "term" as a 3-year period of time
should have been filed not later than 25 days from that date or on 10 Nov 2015 during which a local official has title to office and can serve.
and not 28 days after or on 13 Nov.
o Appari v. CA (2007 resn): "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period
of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to
Petition for denial/cancellation of Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held.
Petition for disqualification COC
Upon term expiry, rights, duties and authority of a public officer must ipso
Under Rule 25, COMELEC Resn. Under Rule 23, COMELEC Resn. facto cease, unless authorized by law to holdover.
95233 95234 The most natural, frequent method by which a public officer
Filing period under Sec. 3 is any day Filing period under Sec. 2 is within five
ceases to be such is by expiration of elective/appointive term.
after 5
the last day for filing of COC, but not days from the last day for filing of o Gaminde v. COA: term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold
later COC; office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another.
but not later than 25 days from the
than the date of proclamation filing
4. Whether Tallado’s suspension disqualified him from office—NO. The penalty
of suspension cannot be a bar to his candidacy so long as he meets the qualifications
for the office as provided under Section 66(b) of R.A. No. 7160.
DECISION.
Petition denied. COMELEC en banc resolution affirmed.
TAN VS. CRISOLOGO ISSUE/HELD
November 8, 2017 | Martires, J W/N Tan can be considered a PH citizen at the time she registered as a voter – NO.
Basically, no legal basis for the retroactive application of RA 9225. Her inclusion in
PETITIONER: VIVIENNE TAN the voter’s list is highly irregular.
RESPONDENT: VINCENT “BINGBONG” CRISOLOGO
W/N when PH citizenship is reacquired after taking the Oath as required by RA 9225,
SUMMARY: Vivienne Tan was a naturalized US citizen who sought to run for QC 1 st the effect on citizenship status retroacts to period before taking said oath - NO
district representative. However, she only took her Oath of Allegiance to the PH, as
required by RA 9225, after she had applied to be a registered voter. Crisologo RATIO
challenged her inclusion in the voter’s list, saying she was not a citizen at the time of 1. The reacquisition of PH citizenship under RA 9225 requires only the taking
her registration, and that she failed to meet the residency requirement. SC held that of an oath of allegiance to the PH.
she was not a PH citizen at the time she registered. 2. RA 9225 makes a distinction between 1) those who lost PH citizenship
before RA 9225 and reacquired it under the same and 2) those who lost PH
DOCTRINE citizenship after RA 9225 and retained citizenship.
1. RA 9225 makes a distinction between 1) those who lost PH citizenship 3. Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the US on 19 Jan 2003, before the
before RA 9225 and reacquired it under the same and 2) those who lost PH enactment of RA 9225. If retroactive application is permitted, then the
citizenship after RA 9225 and retained citizenship. distinction is RA 9225 is rendered futile.
2. Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the US on 19 Jan 2003, before the 4. An interpretation giving RA 9225 retroactive effect as contemplated by Tan
enactment of RA 9225. If retroactive application is permitted, then the would cause confusion, especially with respect to Sec. 3, RA 9225. Verba
distinction is RA 9225 is rendered futile. legis.
3. To consider that the reacquisition of the PH citizenship retroacts to the date 5. The Court also used the holistic approach, citing Mactan-Cebu Intl Airport
it was lost = absurd scenario where the person would still be considered a Authority vs. Urgello. The law must not be read in truncated parts; its
PH citizen when he had renounced his citizenship. provisions must be read in relation to the whole law.
6. RA 9225 contains to provision regarding the retroactivity of its effects as
FACTS regards natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign
1. 19 Jan 1993: Vivienne Tan became a naturalized US citizen. country before RA 9225.
2. 20 August 2003: RA 9225 was enacted. 7. To consider that the reacquisition of the PH citizenship retroacts to the date
3. 26 Oct 2009: Tan applied to be a registered voter in Quezon City. She it was lost = absurd scenario where the person would still be considered a
indicated that she was a Filipino by birth. The Election Registration Board PH citizen when he had renounced his citizenship.
approved her application on 16 Nov 2009. 8. Rule is also that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
4. 30 Nov 2009: Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the PH in Makati. operation, unless legislature intended to tive them a retroactive effect.
5. 1 Dec 2009: Tan filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration for the 9. Citing Maquiling vs COMELEC (penned by CJ Sereno): the renunciation of
reacquisition of her PH citizenship and executed a declaration renouncing foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
allegiance to the US. The BI confirmed her reacquisition. time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
6. 1 Dec 2009: Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy to run as QC 1st District renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
representative. political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
7. 28 Dec 2009: Bingbong Crisologo filed a petition before the MeTC seeking to 10. We cannot consider one a Filipino citizen unless and until his or her
exclude Tan from the voter’s list, alleging 1) she was not a PH citizen when allegiance to the Republic of the PH is reaffirmed.
she registered as a voter and 2) she failed to meet the residency NOTES
requirement.
8. MeTC ruled to exclude Tan from the voter’s list, holding that she was not a
PH citizen at the time she registered as a voter.
9. Tan appealed to the RTC. RTC reversed the MeTC and dismissed
Crisologo’s petition. RTC opined that the question of her citizenship was
cured by Tan’s subsequent Oath, Petition for Reacquisition, the BI’s Order
granting the said petition, and Sworn Declaration re: renouncing her
allegiance to the US.
10. The RTC decision became final and executory due to RA 8189. Hence,
Crisologo filed for certiorari before the CA.
11. The CA held that the RTC committed GADALEJ in reversing the MeTC
decision, hence this Petition.
probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the
GARCIA ET AL. VS COMELEC Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of
Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 AM confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in
G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993 [Initiative and Referendum; Recall proceeding] representation of their political parties but as representatives of the people. By
necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in
FACTS: political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of
mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for
municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.
Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall
No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous
election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan. influences. We held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a
condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in
injunction to annul the Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to session and in a public place. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements
comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given
R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the most fatal defect of due course by the COMELEC.
the proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure
to send notices of the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall
proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public
officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of the law.
RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people
have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall
proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode,
of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to
"enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this
constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective
mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one
or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally
granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating
recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the
people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this
alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a)
to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b)
to cut down on its expenses.
2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang
members of the municipalities and component cities are made members of the
preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned
to political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its members.
Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the
elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater
PARAS v. COMELEC to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. Petitioner
November 4, 1996 | Francisco, J. | Removal/Recall insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the
Digester: Sumagaysay, Rev Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the
first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof,
SUMMARY: Petitioner Paras is the Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan who won petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, where the Court
in 1994. A petition for recall was made and during the first recall election on considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that
November 13, 1995, more than 25% of the voters signed the petition. Petitioner as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can
opposed this so a second recall election was scheduled on December 16, 1995. be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall
Petitioner filed a TRO with the RTC which was initially granted but dismissed (he election.
misrepresented that the recall election was without COMELEC approval). Petitioner
now opposes this third recall election scheduled saying that the SK elections were RULING: Petition dismissed for having become moot and academic.
coming up on May 1996 and that the LGC states that no recall one year shall take
place preceding a local election. The Court rejected petitioner’s arguments invoking Whether petitioner’s interpretation is correct – NO. But recall couldn’t be made
LegMeth principles on harmonizing the laws and that if the SK election which is set by anyway cause next election is near.
R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must
then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
Local Government Code. Nevertheless, the petition is now moot and academic as it is intent of the whole enactment.
only 7 months from the next elections. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall
DOCTRINE: *from the book: “Regular local elction” refers to an election where the election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with
office held by the local official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official
the electorate. Hence, a recall for the punong barangay is not barred when a may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his
sangguniang kabataan election is scheduled within one year. term of office.
Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local election
The law prohibits recall election during the last year of the term of a local official to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the
because of the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by
official concerned. The electorate could choose the official’s replacement in the said initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is
election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be
recall election. deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously
insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile
FACTS: the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that
Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not
petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An
the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, COMELEC resolved to approve interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision
the petition, scheduled the petition signing and set the recall election on being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. inoperative or nugatory.
The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be
opposition. COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section
1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof,
Cabanatuan a petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a TRO. After should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of
conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the this, dismissed the Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall
petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
without COMELEC approval. of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
In a resolution, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which
on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following
for injunction. admonition:
Petitioner’s argument: Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 states that no o We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to
recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its
authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth
but in the spirit that vivifieth.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a
statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against
the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local
election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election
for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could
choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a
longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election.
It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the
Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where
the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election
involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the
same having been scheduled on May 1997.
NOTES:
LGC, SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the
subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence.
o (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election.
CLAUDIO v. COMELEC On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs,
and kagawads and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay, adopted Resolution No.
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF PASAY CITY v. COMELEC 01, S-1999 (Resolution to initiate the recall of Jovito Claudio as Mayor of Pasay
May 4, 2000 | Mendoza, J. | Removal for loss of confidence). Said resolution was formally submitted to the
Digester: Santos, Ihna As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999 at the Office of the
Election Officer. This was accompanied by an affidavit of service of the petition
SUMMARY: Claudio is the Mayor of Pasay City. Various barangay officials of Pasay on the Office of the City Mayor.
convened to create the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Pasay City. Claudio argued Pursuant to the rules of the Comelec, copies of the petition were posted on the
that preparations for his recall were laid down prior to the 1-year prohibition stated in bulletin boards of the local Comelec Office, the City Hall, the Police Department,
Sec. 74, LGC. He contends that “recall” as stated in said provision refers to all the the public market, and the church in Pasay. Subsequently, a verification of the
initiatory acts of recall to the filing to the election. SC otherwise and said that “recall” authenticity of the signatures on the resolution was conducted by the election
refers to the actual day of recall election. As long as the election is held outside the 1- officer of Pasay designated by the Comelec.
year period from assumption to office of the local official sought to be recalled, the Oppositions to the petition was filed by Claudio, Langub, and Angeles, alleging
preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the 1 st procedural and substantive defects:
year in office of said local official. 1. the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show
DOCTRINE: A recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory attendance at the PRA meeting
recall assembly (PRA) or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the 2. most of the signatories were only representatives of the parties
registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings
resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, 3. the convening of the PRA took place within the 1-year prohibited period
the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the 4. the election case filed by Trinidad in SC, seeking the annulment of the
scheduled date. As used in of Sec. 74(b) of the LGC, “recall” refers to the election proclamation of Claudio as mayor of Pasay, should first be decided
itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or before recall proceedings against Claudio could be filed
elect his replacement. 5. the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of
Sec. 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall while Sec. 69 provides that “the the PRA, considering that 10 were actually double entries, 14 were not
power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan
to which the local elective official belongs.” Since the power vested on the electorate officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed
is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into affidavits of retraction
office, the limitations in Sec. 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall In its Oct. 18, 1999 resolution, Comelec granted the petition for recall and
proceedings. In other words, the term “recall” in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall dismissed the oppositions against it.
election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with o On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its
the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25% of the voters for a members: COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who attended the May
petition for recall. 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA,
considering that its records showed the total membership of the PRA was
FACTS: 1,790, while the statistics of the DILG showed that the total membership of
This is a consolidated petition of: the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is required to
1. Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Claudio, seeking the constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of the
nullification of the resolution giving due course to the petition for his recall recall resolution. Based on the verification made by the election officer,
as Mayor of Pasay City COMELEC found the signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient.
2. Petition for mandamus filed by the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) of o On whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of
Pasay City to compel Comelec to set the date for the holding of recall Claudio was a prejudicial question which must first be decided before any
elections in Pasay pursuant to the resolution of the Comelec (In the matter recall election could be held: COMELEC ruled that it was not and that
of the preparatory recall assembly resolution no. 01, S-1999 adopted on Claudio was merely using the pendency of the case to delay the recall
May 29, 1999 for the recall of Mayor Jovito Claudio of Pasay City) proceedings.
Jovito Clausio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the 1998 elections. o On whether the petition for recall violated the bar on recall within 1 year
He assumed office on July 1, 1998. from the elective official’s assumption of office: COMELEC ruled in the
Sometime during May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay gathered negative, holding that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the
to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Claudio for loss of petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one
confidence. year and a day after petitioner Claudio’s assumption of office, it was held
On May 19, 1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr., several that the petition was filed on time.
barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the
PRA. Richard Advincula was designated chair.
RULING: 1st petition dismissed for lack of merit; 2nd petition dismissed for being moot limitations in Sec. 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall
and academic proceedings. In other words, the term “recall” in Sec. 74(b) refers
only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and
Whether the petition for mandamus (2nd case) should prosper – NO, moot and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the
academic gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a
In its Resolution No. 3121, dated March 9, 2000, the COMELEC set the date of petition for recall.
the recall elections in Pasay City on April 15, 2000. Consequently, the petition for 2. The second reason why the term “recall” in Sec. 74(b) refers to recall
mandamus in to compel the COMELEC to fix a date for the recall elections in election is to be found in the purpose of the limitation itself. There are
Pasay City is no longer tenable. two limitations in Sec. 74(b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall
shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of
Whether the word “recall” in Sec. 74(b) of the LGC includes the convening of office of the official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take
the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the filing by it of a recall resolution – NO. place within 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election.
Sec. 74 – Limitations on Recall. The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for
(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once judging the performance of an elective local official.
during his term of office for loss of confidence. In the Bower case cited by SC in Angobung v. COMELEC, it
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s was held that “The only logical reason which we can
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before
election. petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature
Claudio: Contends that the term “recall” in Sec. 74(b) refers to a process, in action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected
contrast to the term “recall election” found in Sec. 74(a), which obviously refers to official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the
an election. He claims that when several barangay chairmen met and convened soundness of his policies and decisions.”
on May 19, 1999 and unanimously resolved to initiate the recall, followed by the The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a
taking of votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for the purpose of adopting a petition for recall because the Municipal Code involved in that
resolution to initiate his recall as Mayor of Pasay for loss of confidence, the case expressly provided that “no removal petition shall be
process of recall began and, since May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he filed against any officer or until he has actually held office
had assumed office, the PRA was illegally convened and all proceedings held for at least twelve months.” But however the period of
thereafter, including the filing of the recall petition on July 2, 1999, were null and prohibition is determined, the principle announced is that the
void. purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis
Comelec: The process of recall starts with the filing of the petition for recall and for evaluating the performance of an elective local official.
ends with the conduct of the recall election. Since the petition for recall in this Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside
case was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly 1 year and a day after Claudio’s the 1-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a
assumption of office, the recall was validly initiated outside the 1-year prohibited recall can be held even before the end of the first year in
period. office of a local official.
Both Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term “recall” as used in Sec. As already stated, it is not the holding of PRA nor the adoption
74 refers to a process. They disagree only as to when the process starts for of recall resolutions that produces a judgment on the
purposes of the 1-year limitation in paragraph (b) of Sec. 74. performance of the official concerned; it is the vote of the
SC: Recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory electorate in the election that does. Therefore, as long as the
recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the recall election is not held before the official concerned has
registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing completed one year in office, he will not be judged on his
of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such performance prematurely.
resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the 3. To construe the term “recall” in Sec. 74(b) as including the
holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in Sec. convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the
74(b), “recall” refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly
whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement. restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its
Reasons in support of this conclusion: members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the
1. Sec.74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled election to decide on the performance of their officials. The
“Limitations on Recall.” On the other hand, Sec. 69 provides that “the crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To
power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the
government unit to which the local elective official belongs.” Since the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among
power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free
proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always
eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the
expression of confidence in the incumbent. Whether the recall resolution was signed by majority of the PRA and duly
SUMMARY: The term “recall” in Sec. 74(b) refers to the recall election and not to verified – YES.
the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall – Claudio: Contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA
1. Because Sec. 74 speaks of limitations on “recall” which, according to was not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution.
Sec. 69, is a power which shall be exercised by the registered voters of The 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify
a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right their attendance and not their concurrence. Claudio claims that this is shown by
except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is the word “Attendance” written by hand at the top of the page on which the
not prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b); signatures of the 74 begin.
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide SC: Contention has no basis. This claim is being raised for the first time in this
voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final case. It was not raised before the COMELEC, in which the claim made by
judging is not done until the day of the election;
Claudio was that some of the names in the petition were double entries, that
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the some members had withdrawn their support for the petition, and that Trinida’d
initiation of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech pending election protest was a prejudicial question which must first be resolved
and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.
before the petition for recall could be given due course. The order of the
In this case, as the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more COMELEC embodying the stipulations of the parties and defining the issues to
than 1 year after Claudio assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that there be resolved does not include the issue now being raised by Claudio.
is no bar to its holding on that date. Although the word “Attendance” appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that
it was written by mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn
Whether the phrase “regular local election” in Sec. 74(b) of the LGC includes across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a
the election period for that regular election or simply the date of such election – separate document. It is absurd to believe that the 74 members of the PRA who
simply the date of such election; election/campaign period of 45 days prior to signed the recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is
election day not included more probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their
Claudio: Contends that the date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is concurrence in the recall resolution of which the pages in question are part.
within the second period of prohibition in Sec. 74(b). He argues that the phrase As to the issue of verification: This issue was not raised before the COMELEC
“regular local elections” in Sec. 74(b) does not only mean “the day of the regular itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now.
local election” which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election period as well,
which is normally at least forty five (45) days immediately before the day of the Dissenting Opinion, J. Puno:
election. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election The right of recall is a double-edged sword· rightly used, it can promote the
may be held. greater good, but when wrongly used, it can result in greater evil.
SC: The law is unambiguous in providing that “no recall shall take place 2 kinds of recall:
within 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election.” Had 1. recall initiated directly by the people
Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period, which 2. recall initiated by the people thru the Preparatory Recall Assembly
period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly There are recalls as pointed out in the case of Angobung that should be avoided:
said so. (1) recalls borne by the ill motive of a few; (2) recalls that disrupt the smooth
Moreover, Claudio’s interpretation would severely limit the period during which a running of government; and (3) recalls that destabilize the local government unit.
recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until The standard mechanisms in recall statutes to avoid these evils are: (1) the
1 year after the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on setting of a waiting period before a petition for recall can be initiated, and (2) the
June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the fixing of a minimum percentage of voters’ signatures to kick-start a petition for
following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period recall.
of only 9 months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation
in Sec. 74(b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to 1-year waiting period:
8 months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize As clearly explained in the case of Bowers, the reason for fixing a waiting period
the right of recall which is designed to make local government units “more is “to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected
responsive and accountable.” official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his political
Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. policies and decisions.” On the other hand, the reason for requiring a minimum
Under the Omnibus Election Code, unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the number of voters’ signatures is “to insure that an official will not have to defend
election period commences 90 days before the day of the election and ends thirty his policies against frivolous attacks launched by a small percentage of
(30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow Claudio’s interpretation that the second disenchanted electors.” It will further avoid expenditure of public funds for
limitation in Sec. 74(b) includes the “election period” would emasculate even frivolous elections.
more a vital right of the people.
Beyond debate, the ideal interpretation of the waiting period must bring about this o By holding that recall initiatives can be done at any one’s caprice, the
pristine purpose – to give the voters a sound basis for their decision to recall or majority has cast a blind eye on the expenses that accompany such
not to recall an official whom they have elected just a year ago. That sound basis exercise. These expenses have to be repaid later, an undeniable cause of
cannot exist in a vacuum. “Sound basis” requires affording the official concerned cronyism and corruption in government.
a fair and reasonable opportunity to accomplish his program for the people. By The bottomline is that our law intends recall as a mechanism of good
no means will there be a reasonable opportunity if from Day One after government. It can never fulfill that intent if we allow its use to foment too much
assumption of office, the process of recall can already be initiated against said politics. We need not be adepts in the alleyways of politics to say that too much
official. To allow early recall initiative is to encourage divisive, expensive, politics is the root of a lot of evils in our country. Our 1987 Constitution sought to
wasteful politics. It will also put a premium on the politics of compromise – the check this bad political cholesterol plaguing our government. Any attempt to
politics where public interest always comes out second best. restore this fiat should draw more than a phlegmatic posture.
On why why J. Puno do not share the majority ruling that the one-year waiting
period is a limitation on the right of the people to judge an incumbent on election Majority’s reaction to J. Puno’s dissent:
day itself but not a limitation on their right to initiate the recall process: The J. Puno: The purpose of the one-year period in Sec. 74(b) is to provide the
rationale for fixing the election day one year after the assumption of office is local official concerned a “period of repose” during which “his attention
different from the rationale for prohibiting premature recall initiative. The rationale should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by disturbance due
of the first is for the benefit of the people, to give them sufficient time to assess to political partisanship.”
intelligently the performance of the incumbent, while the rationale of the second Majority: Unfortunately, the law cannot really provide for a period of
is for the benefit of the incumbent, to give him a fair chance to govern well, to honeymoon or moratorium in politics. From the day an elective official
serve the people minus the unnecessary distractions from the itch of too much assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and criticism, and it is
politics. not always easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically
The ruling of the majority recognizes the rationale of the first but not the motivated and when it is not. The only safeguard against the baneful and
rationale of the second. Its ruling that sanctions too early a recall initiative, and enervating effects of partisan politics is the good sense and self-restraint of the
worse, that allows endless recall initiatives will deprive an incumbent a fair people and its leaders against such shortcomings of our political system. A
opportunity to prove himself thru the politics of performance. respite from partisan politics may have the incidental effect of providing respite
Recall is a powerful weapon given to our people but, like any power, it can be from partisanship, but that is not really the purpose of the limitation on recall
abused. For this reason, the legislature carefully defined its limitations for its under the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient basis for
misuse can bring about the disuse of a valuable means to terminate the misrule evaluating and judging the performance of an elected local official.
of misfits in government. Our lawmakers know that the paradox of power is that o J. Puno’s comment: The ruling of the majority that the law cannot
to be effective it must be restrained from running riot. Section 74 of the LGC really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in politics
spelled out these restraints. Section 74(a) limits the number of times an official betrays historical amnesia. This legal mechanism has long been
can be subjected to recall during his term of office to only one time. Section 74(b) installed to regulate our labor-management relations, a volatile
limits the periods when the power can be exercised. It sets two periods: the first, relationship, then and now.
sets the beginning, i.e., one year after an officials’ assumption of office; the o Remember: Certification year rule pursuant to which no petition for
second, sets the end, i.e., one year immediately preceding a regular election. certification election can be ordered in the same bargaining unit
These limitations should be strictly followed considering the short 3-year term of more often than once in twelve months. Hence, for one year, the
office of local officials. employee representative is shielded from any initiative calling for a
certification election to change representative. This progressive
Majority ruling’s failures: mechanism is still contained in Article 231 of our Labor Code. To
o By holding that recall initiatives can start right after day one of an official’s jog our memory, this legal mechanism was taken from the Wagner
assumption to office, the majority failed to recognize the need for stability Act of the United States which had a provision that no election can
of a public office. be directed in any bargaining unit or in any subdivision, where in
o By holding that these initiatives can be undertaken not once, not twice but the preceding 12-months period, a valid election has been held.
endlessly within one year after an official’s assumption to office, the This 12- month ban on certification election of the Wagner Act has
majority exposed our people to an overdose of politics. never been challenged as violative of freedom of speech and of
o By holding that recall initiatives can be done prematurely, the majority assembly of members of minority unions who wish to be elected as
forgot that such initiatives are meaningful only if they are used to adjudge employee bargaining representative.
an official’s performance in office. J. Puno: The judgments of PRAs are not “as politically unassailable as
o By holding that recall initiatives can be done even without giving an official recalls initiated directly by the people.”
a fair chance to serve the people, the majority has induced incumbents to o Cited the “embarrassing repudiation by the people of Caloocan
play the politics of compromise instead of the politics of performance. City’s Preparatory Recall Assembly” when, instead of ousting
Mayor Rey Malonzo, they reelected him.
Majority: It is no disparagement of the PRA that in the ensuing election the local initiation of a recall process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or reason
official whose recall is sought is actually reelected. Laws converting why it cannot be entrusted to and exercised by the elected representatives
municipalities into cities and providing for the holding of plebiscites during which of the people.
the question of cityhood is submitted to the people for their approval are not The recall process may be considered as composed of 2 distinct but continuous
always approved by the people. Yet, no one can say that Congress is not a good phases: (1) the initiatory phase and (2) the election phase. As such, for purposes
judge of the will of the voters in the locality. of determining whether the recall was instituted within the allowable period under
o In the case of recall elections in Caloocan City, had it been shown Sec. 74(b), the reckoning point should be the initiatory phase which is the time of
that the PRA was resorted to only because those behind the move convening and passing of the recall resolution. This should be so since it is from
to oust the incumbent mayor failed to obtain the signatures of 25% this moment that the process of recall comes into being. It is at this precise
of the voters of that city to a petition for his recall, there may be moment when the PRA, as representatives of the electorate, concretizes its
some plausibility for the claim that PRAs are not as good a gauge stand and makes an affirmative act of its intent to recall the elected local official.
of the people’s will as are the 25% of the voters. Nonetheless, it is still up to the people to affirm or reject the move to recall the
o Indeed, recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of a incumbent official during the election called for the purpose.
local government unit cannot be more representative of the It can readily be observed that Senator Pimentel used the phrase “move to recall”
sentiments of the people than those initiated by PRAs whose in describing the activity which can only be undertaken during the freedom
members represent the entire electorate in the local government period. This is significant because the use of the phrase “move to recall” is
unit. Voters who directly initiate recalls are just as vulnerable instructive of the concept envisioned by the primary author of the law in providing
to political maneuverings or manipulations as are those for the limitations on recall. It connotes a progressive course of action or a step-
composing PRAs. by-step process. As such, the word “move,” when used in conjunction with the
The other point regarding J. Puno’s claim is that the question here is not whether word “recall,” can pertain to no other than the entire recall process which begins
recalls initiated by 25% of the voters are better. The issue is whether the one- with the convening of the PRA and the passing of the recall resolution and ending
year period of limitation in paragraph (b) includes the convening of the PRA. with the recall election. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be construed as
referring to the election alone.
Separate and Dissenting Opinion, J. Kapunan: J. Kapunan also disagrees to the observation of the majority that to construe the
Disagrees with the main opinion that the term “recall” under Sec. 74(b) of LGC limitation in Sec. 74(b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would
refers to the recall election alone. unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed by the
“Recall” under Sec. 74(b) is not limited to the election itself, but, rather, it is a Constitution. - Reason: The people can assemble and discuss their opinions
process which begins once the PRA makes its first affirmative acts towards the and grievances against the incumbent official, at any time during his term and as
recall of the elective local official concerned, i.e. the convening of the PRA and often as they would like, because it is their right to do so. An exercise of their
the passing by the PRA of a recall resolution during a session called for the said right to peaceably assemble and exchange views about the governance of the
purpose, and culminates with the holding of the recall election. local official would not be violative of the limitations set forth in Sec. 74(b).
o Majority: The power of recall can be exercised solely by the electorate and However, once notice is sent, during the prohibited period, stating that the
not by the PRA through the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, purpose of the meeting is to convene the PRA and to pass a recall resolution,
or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25% of the voters for a petition and the same is actually approved, then Sec. 74(b) is transgressed. In this
for recall. instance, the limitation of the electorate’s freedom of speech and assembly is not
This is so since the majority equates the power of recall with the violated since the time bar provision is imposed by the legislature in the exercise
electorate’s power to replace or retain the local official concerned during of its police power. The limitation in Sec. 74(b) is analogous to the prohibition
the recall elections. In furtherance of this premise, the majority concludes under Sec. 80 of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code), which prohibits a person from
that since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate the engaging in any election campaign or partisan political activity except during the
recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the campaign period. The limitation on the freedom of speech and assembly imposed
limitations in Sec. 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall by Sec. 80 has never been questioned as being unconstitutional.
proceedings. There is no logical reason to support the view that the recall process should be
o Why J. Kapunan disagrees: Since our form of government is a counted only from the time of the filing of the recall resolution or petition with the
representative democracy, it cannot be claimed that the initiation of the COMELEC. Although the filing of the petition for recall with the COMELEC is,
recall process by the PRA is not an initiation by the people. admittedly, an important component in the recall process, it, however, cannot be
o Garcia v. Comelec: Initiation by the PRA is also initiation by the people, considered as the starting point of the same. The filing of the petition being
albeit done indirectly through their representatives. It is not constitutionally merely a consequential mechanical act, is just a next step in the process of recall
impermissible for the people to act through their elected representatives. after PRA’s acts of convening the recall assembly and passing the recall
Nothing less than the paramount task of drafting our Constitution is resolution. Once a petition for recall is filed, the only role of the Comelec is the
delegated by the people to their representatives, elected either to act as a verification of its authenticity and genuineness. After such verification the
constitutional convention or as a congressional constituent assembly. The Comelec is mandated by law to set the date of the recall election. Clearly, the
role of the Comelec in the recall process under Sec. 70 of LGC is merely
ministerial in nature. Such being the case, it cannot be correctly argued that the
crucial moment in the recall process is the actual filing of the petition with the
Comelec.
Adormeo v. COMELEC 1.157That the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in
GR No. 147927, 4 February 2002, Quisumbing, J. the same local government post; and
Digested by Paula Filart • Law 154 – Local Government 2. That he has fully served 3 consecutive terms.
Topic: Recall (Lonzanida v COMELEC)
In this case, RESP was not elected for 3 consecutive terms.
Tagala was elected Mayor in the ’92-’95 elections and re- elected in ’95-’98 elections. o For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his
He lost in 1998 election however was elected into the office of Mayor in the recall mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
election and served unexpired term of the former mayor. He now runs as a candidate His victory in the recall election cannot be deemed a violation of Sec. 8
for Mayor of Lucena. His rival contends that he is disqualified because he has already Art. X as “voluntary renunciation”6 for clearly it is not.
served 3 consecutive terms. SC holds that he has not. o Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
FACTS involuntary severance from office for any length of time short
RESP Ramon Talaga Jr. was elected mayor of Lucena City in May 2002 for of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
which he served the full term (1st term). He was re-elected in 1995, and continuity of service.
served the full term again (2nd term). o Purpose of the provision is to bar any attempt to circumvent the 3-
o In the 1998 elections, he lost to Bernard Tagarao. term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office.
o May 2000 – A recall election was held in and RESP won. He served PET’s invocation of Fr. Bernas’ comment that “if one is elected
the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term,
In the May 2001 elections, PET Adormeo and RESP ran for the position of no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of
mayor of Lucena City. computing the number of successive terms allowed” is untenable.
PET filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of o Fr. Bernas’ comment is pertinent only to members of the House of
Candidacy and/or Disqualification of RESP. Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is not
o He alleged that RESP was elected and had served as city mayor recall election provided for members of Congress.
for 3 consecutive terms, the 3rd term being the unexpired term of
Tagarao after winning the recall elections in 2000. Serving the
unexpired term of office is considered 1 term.
o Art. VIII of the Constitution speaks of “term” and does not mention DISPOSITIVE
“tenure” Petition DISMISSED.
o PET’s candidacy constituted a violation of Sec. 8, Art. X of the 1987
Constitution.
RESP argues that he was not elected for 3 consecutive terms but only for 2.
o His defeat in the 1998 elections interrupted the consecutiveness of
his years as mayor, and thus his mayorship was not for 3
consecutive terms of 3 years each.
o “3 consecutive terms” means continuous service for 9 years and
that the 2 years from 1998-2000 by Tagarao prevented him from
having 3 consevutive years of service.
CEMELEC 1st division disqualified RESP. COMELEC en banc reversed and
ruled in favor of RESP.
RESP was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor.
RATIO
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to service in the same elective position. (Borja Jr. v
COMELEC) 6
“Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as
Two conditions for the application of the disqualification:
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected.”
Socrates v COMELEC 1. WON the 129/158
COMELEC Resolution giving due course to the PRA Recall Resolution
G.R. No. 154512, 12 Nov 1992, Carpio, J. is valid? YES. COMELEC findings showed compliance with notice and
Digested by Janelle Gomendoza • Law 154 – Local Government majority required were obtained.
Topic: Term of Office/3 Term Limit Rule; Recall
2. [Relevant] WON COMELEC committed GAD in upholding Hagedorn’s
qualification to run for mayor in the recall election despite the constitutional and
Hagedorn ran in the recall election during the interim of his prohibitive period (aka
statutory prohibitions against a 4th consecutive term? NO. The period before the
supposed 4th term). Court held that the limitation in the Constitution and LGC is not a
recall election is an interruption
strict 3 yr limit or entire term, but only that there is a certain interruption. He became
RATIO
qualified when Socrates was recalled as incumbent.
1. COMELEC findings of fact are accorded finality by the SC in absence of
patently erroneous findings.
FACTS
Proponents for the recall sent notices of convening of the PRA to the
In 2002, 312 of 528 members of the incumbent barangay officers of Puerto
members as shown by the Proof of Notice attached to each notice sent
Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) from
Notices were also posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Brgy. Hall.
9am to 12nn
The proponents also utilized broadcast mass media in the dissemination.
o It was convened to initiate a recall of incumbent Mayor Socrates who
City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City certified that majority of PRA
assumed office on June 30, 2011.
members approved the Recall Resolution.
o The members of the PRA designated Mark Hagedorn, president of the
o Not a single member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected
Association of Brgy. Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
as to the veracity and authenticity of the signatures
On the same date, PRA passed a recall resolution which declared its loss of
Provincial Election Supervisor found everything to be in order.
confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. PRA requested COMELEC to
Acting Director IV of Region IV recommended that the “PRA was validly
conduct the recall election
constituted and that majority of all members approved the Recall Resolution
While Socrates filed a petition to deny the recall, the COMELEC gave due course
against Mayor Socrates.”
and scheduled it.
SC: we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC’s findings of
Aug. 23, 2002: Edward Hagedorn (Hagedorn) filed his certificate of candidacy
fact are patently erroneous
(CoC) for mayor in the recall election
Socrates’s constitutional right to information was not violated since he was
o Subsequently, Adovo and Gilo (and others) filed a petition before the
notified through notice of the PRA meeting. He even sent his representative
COMELEC to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election
and counsel who were present during the entire PRA proceedings
and to cancel his CoC
This case is a consolidation of several petitions:
2. Hagedorn was qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Sept. 24,
o Socrates sought to nullify the COMELEC Resolution which gave due
2002
course to the recall because not all members of the PRA were allegedly
Legal Basis of 3 term limit: Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution7 and Sec. 43
notified
of 1991 LGC
o Sandoval sought an extension of the recall campaign period since the
COMELEC resolution only gave 10 days. He prayed for at least 15
days. (SC granted additional 15 days on top of the 10 days, thus this
has become moot)
7
o Adovo and Gilo assailed the COMELEC Resolution which declared Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
Hagedorn qualified to run. They prayed for a TRO to enjoin the which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
proclamation serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
election as against Socrates and Sandoval. his service for the full term for which he was elected.
o Hagedorn filed a motion to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from
proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to assume office. “Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
ISSUES & HOLDING the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
These provisions have 2 parts: o This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of service not
o 1st: elective local official cannot serve for more than 3 consecutive because of voluntary renunciation but because of a legal
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count. prohibition.
o 2nd: voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does NOT o Hagedorn’s new recall term from Sept. 24, 2002 to Jun. 30, 2004 is
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary NOT a seamless continuation of his previous 3 consecutive terms.
severance for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and o One cannot stitch it together as to make the recall a 4 th consecutive
prevents the service before and after the interruption from being term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption broke
joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. the continuity.
After 3 consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate “Voluntary renunciation rule” in the Constitution is to bar any attempt to
re-election for a 4th term. circumvent the limit by voluntarily renouncing the office and at the same time
o The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a
same office following the end of the 3rd consecutive term term.
o Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered o Voluntary renunciation does not cancel the renounced term.
by the prohibition for 2 reasons: Conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time
A subsequent election, like a recall election is no longer an short of full term amounts to an interruption of continuity.
immediate re-election after 3 consecutive terms CAB: Hagedorn was out of office for 15 months. Although short of the full 3
The intervening period constitutes an involuntary years, the Constitution did not intend the hiatus to be the full 3 years (a
interruption term).
Intention of the framers is only to prohibit an immediate re-election for a 4th o The clear intent is that the interruption “for any length of time” as
term following 3 consecutive terms. long as the cause is involuntary is sufficient to break an elective
o The Constitution does NOT prohibit a subsequent re-election for a local official’s continuity of service.
4th term as long as it is not immediately after the end of the 3 rd o Citing Adormeo v COMELEC, SC held that Hagedorn’s recall term
consecutive term. does not retroact to include Socrates’s tenure.
o A recall election, midway in the term following the 3rd consecutive The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the people
term, is a subsequent election but NOT an immediate re-election to elect leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly
after the 3rd term to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re- HOWEVER, an official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of
election to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of
office counting the 3 term limit although less than 3 years.
o What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive 4th term In summary:
Hagedorn’s candidacy in the recall on Sept. 24, 2002 is not an immediate re- 1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three
election after his 3rd consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001;
o The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn 2. Hagedorn’s continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily
referred to the regular elections in 2001 interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which
o Hagedorn was elected consecutively in ’92, ’95, ’98 and served his time he was a private citizen;
full 3 consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Thus under 3. Hagedorn’s recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004
the law, he could no longer run in 2001. cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on Sept. 24, 2002, the mayor consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth
was Socrates. During the same period Hagedorn was a private citizen. consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible
effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders
DISPOSITIVE
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for WHERERFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
which the elective official was elected.”
C.J. Davide Concurring & Dissenting
Concurs on the COMELEC giving due course to the Recall election but dissents
in allowing Hagedorn to run as Mayor
The term of office covered by the recall is from May 2001 to June 2004 which is
his prohibited 4th term
For one to be able to run again after three consecutive terms, he has to rest for
the entire immediately succeeding fourth term.
Hagedorn cannot have suffered involuntary severance from office because there
was nothing to be severed. Disqualification is not synonymous with involuntary
severance.
Involuntary severance should be one that took place during any of his 3 terms to
be excluded in the computation. In Hagedorn’s case, no such took place during
his 3 terms.
Voluntary renunciation is also one that should take place at any time during any
of the 3 consecutive terms.
A declaration allowing Hagedorn to be re-elected in a special election (also
considered a term) is to subvert the rationale of the limit.
An elective official who is qualified to seek a 4th term because of the limit but
obsessed to hold on to power would spend the first part of the 4 th term
campaigning for the recall of the incumbent especially if he has a solid following
and strong political machinery.
Note that the President of the Association of Brgy. Captains is one Mark
Hagedorn who was also designated by PRA as interim Chairman.
8
The grounds of the petition for recall was loss of trust and confidence
brought about by gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Code of Conduct inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and emotional
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence, and other related gross immaturity
o Atty. Maria Lea R. Alarkon, Acting Director III of the COMELEC’s FSD, Despite Resolution No. 9882’s statement about the alleged failure of the
during the 3 September 2013 budget hearing before the Senate’s 2014 GAA to provide for a line item appropriation for the conduct of recall
Subcommittee A of the Committee on Finance, elections, we hold that the 2014 GAA actually expressly provides for a line
for the specifics of our MFO [Major Final Output] budget, x x x item appropriation for the conduct and supervision of recall elections.
conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall and o This is found in the Programs category of its 2014 budget, which
plebiscites, 1,527,815,000; the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 is a line item for
o Online news article which quoted COMELEC spokesperson James the “Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes
Jimenez and plebiscites.”
saying that “lack of budget (should) not (be) an issue. x x x We In addition, one of the specific constitutional functions of the COMELEC is
always have a ‘standby’ budget for recall, plebiscite, etc.” to conduct recall elections. When the COMELEC receives a budgetary
o Letter dated 28 May 2014 from Rep. Isidro T. Ungab, Chairman of the appropriation for its “Current Operating Expenditures” such appropriation
House of Representative’ Committee on Appropriations, addressed to includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including
Hon. Douglas S. Hagedorn, Representative of the Third District of the conduct of recall elections.
Palawan o Thus, in Socrates v. COMELEC, recall elections were conducted even
“[t]he FY 2014 budget of the COMELEC as authorized in the without a specific appropriation for recall elections in the 2002 GAA.
FY 2014 General Appropriations Act amounts to More importantly, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the
P2,735,321,000, of which P1,401,501,000 is appropriated for COMELEC has a line item for the “Conduct and supervision of elections,
the conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall referenda, recall votes and plebiscites”
votes and plebiscites
II. On issue of authority of COMELEC Chairperson to augment the project of “recall
COMELEC elections” from their savings
There is a lack of appropriation or line item for a contingency fund for the conduct COMELEC
of recall elections in the 2014 GAA Despite the Php2 billion to Php10.7 billion savings existing in the COMELEC’s
The amount of Php1,483,087,000 referred to by [Goh] allegedly for the conduct coffers, the COMELEC asserts that it cannot legally fund the exercise of recall
and supervision of election, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites, actually refers elections.
to operating expenditures for “Personnel Services” under the program COMELEC is authorized to augment only for deficiency in operating expenses,
“Regulation of Elections.” but in recall elections capital outlay is needed, thus the situation cannot permit
The amount of Php1,401,501,000, on the other hand, is the total amount allotted the COMELEC to augment the approproation
for “Personnel Services” (Php1,360,975,000) and “Maintenance and Other SC
Operating Expenses”(Php40,526,000) for Regional Allocation. The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law.
I think what COMELEC means here is that the appropriations were not Flexibility in the use of public funds operates only upon legislative fiat.
specifically for recall elections As applied
SC The 2014 GAA provides a line item appropriation for the COMELEC’s conduct of
I. On issue of absence of specific appropriation recall elections. Since the COMELEC now admits that it does not have sufficient
Rule on appropriations funds from its current line item appropriation for the “Conduct and supervision of
To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific recall votes” to conduct an actual recall election (see last roman numeral), then
purpose. there is therefore an actual deficiency in its operating funds for the current year.
o However, the purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into This (an actual deficiency in its operating funds for the current year) is a
different related sub-categories of the same nature. situation that allows for the exercise of the COMELEC Chairman’ss power
For example, the purpose can be to “conduct elections,” which to augment actual deficiencies in the item for the “Conduct and supervision
even if not expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or of recall votes” in its budget appropriation.
recall elections.
The purpose of the appropriation is still specific - to Debunking COMELEC’s arguments
fund elections, which naturally and logically include, The conduct of recall elections requires only operating expenses, not capital
even if not expressly stated, not only regular but also outlays.
special or recall elections. o The COMELEC’s existing personnel in Puerto Princesa are the same
The Constitution only requires a corresponding personnel who will evaluate the sufficiency of the recall petitions and
appropriation for a specific purpose or program, not conduct the recall elections.
for the sub-set of projects or activities There is no constitutional requirement that the budgetary appropriation must
As applied be loaded in “contingent funds”
o The Congress has plenary power to lodge such appropriation in current
operating expenditures
Summary-Conclusion
Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the conduct of
recall elections in the 2014 GAA, we see no reason why the COMELEC is unable
to perform its constitutional mandate to “enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of recall.”
Should the funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed insufficient, then the
COMELEC Chairman may exercise his authority to augment such line item
appropriation from the COMELEC’s existing savings, as this augmentation is
expressly authorized in the 2014 GAA.
MARMETO v. COMELEC re-file his initiative petition, since the then newly-elected members of
G.R. No. 213953 / SEP. 26, 2017 / DEL CASTILLO, J. / RECALL / ZEDY the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Muntinlupa might be more sympathetic to
Marmeto' s propositions.
NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari and Mandamus ● Marmeto filed a second proposed ordinance with the SP. Again, no favorable
PETITIONERS Engr. Oscar A. Marmeto action was done by the Sanggunian within 30 days from the filing of the proposal,
RESPONDENTS COMELEC prompting Marmeto file a second initiative petition with the Office of the City
SUMMARY. Marmeto filed in behalf of the Muntinlupa People Power (MPP) a Election Officer. (Second Petition)
proposed ordinance with the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Muntinlupa. The ● On April 1, 2014, Marmeto filed a Supplemental Petition to comply with the
proposal sought the creation of a sectoral council and the appropriation of the requirements of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, which provided the Rules and
amount of ₱200 million for the livelihood programs and projects that would benefit Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative
the people of Muntinlupa City. SP failed to act so Marmeto filed a petition to invoke and Referendum on National and Local Laws.
initiative power under LGC. Comelec denied petition for lack of SP’s authority to ● On July 22, 2014, the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 14- 0509
enact such ordinance. Marmeto refiled proposed ordinance with the newly (Second Resolution) which effectively dismissed Marmeto's second initiative
constituted SP, which again remain unacted. Marmeto filed another petition with petition for lack of budgetary allocation, considering the absence of any provision
Comelec. Comelec denied petition for alleged lack of appropriation to conduct in Comelec’s FY 2014 budget for the expenses for local initiative or any other
initiatives. SC ruled that the 2014 GAA appropriated funds to Comelec for the election activity, that the power of local initiative cannot be invoked by Engr.
“conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites,” Marmeto will entail expenses on the part of the Comelec.
which include the conduct of initiatives. Hence, funds were allocated for the ● Marmeto filed the present certiorari and mandamus petition.
purpose of conducting initiatives. However, SC affirmed Comelec’s dismissal of the
first petition for lack of SP’s authority to enact the proposed ordinance. SC ruled ISSUES & RATIO.
that:
(A) The creation of a separate local legislative body is ultra vires
(B) The sectoral council's proposed function overlaps with the Local Development 1. WON COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer the laws on local
Council initiative and referendum – YES
(C) The LGC requires local government funds and monies to be spent solely for ● (See notes for the discussion on the concept of initiative)
public purposes, and provides transparency and accountability measures to ● The Constitution mandated the Congress to "provide for a system of initiative and
ensure this end referendum, x x x whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof by the Congress or local
DOCTRINE. The term "election" in the GAA appropriation is comprehensive legislative body x x x."9 In compliance, the Congress enacted RA No. 6735 on
enough to include other kinds of electoral exercises, including initiative August 4, 1989 which provided for a system of initiative and referendum on
elections. national and local laws.
● Since the LGC codified all laws pertaining to local governments, the provisions
on local initiative and referendum found in RA No. 6735 were reiterated, with
FACTS.
slight modifications, in Sections 120 to 127 of the LGC; all other provisions in RA
● Marmeto filed in behalf of the Muntinlupa People Power (MPP) a proposed
No. 6735 not inconsistent within the Sections 120 and 127 of the LGC remained
ordinance with the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Muntinlupa. The proposal
valid and in effect.
sought the creation of a sectoral council and the appropriation of the amount of
● RA No. 6735 and the LGC are thus the pertinent laws on local initiative and
₱200 million for the livelihood programs and projects that would benefit the
referendum which the COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer
people of Muntinlupa City. under Article IX-C, Section 2(1) of the Constitution.
● For failure of the SP to act on the proposition within 30 days from its filing,
Marmeto filed a petition for initiative with the same body to invoke the power of
2. WON COMELEC committed GAD for dismissing the second petition for
initiative under the LGC. (First Petition)
alleged lack of budgetary allocation for its conduct – YES
● (Here’s how the petition ended up with the Comelec) The secretary of SP of
● SC discussed Goh v. Bayron and applied it to this case. (Dinelete ko na yung
Muntinlupa wrote a letter to the COMELEC stating that the proposal could not be
extensive discussion ng Goh kasi may digest naman na tayo nung case)
acted upon by the Sanggunian because the City's budget for FY 2013 had
● There is no reason not to extend the Goh ruling to the present case. In fact,
already been enacted. Thus, a new appropriation ordinance was needed to
Marmeto's second initiative petition was also filed in 2014; in dismissing
provide funds for the conduct of the initiative.
Marmeto' s petition for lack of funds, the COMELEC was referring to its budget
● COMELEC issued Resolution No. 13-0904 (First Resolution) setting aside
under the FY 2014 GAA.
Marmeto's initiative petition because the propositions therein were beyond the
● Although Goh involved the conduct of recall elections, the ₱1.4 billion
powers of the Sanggunian Panglunsod to enact and were not in accordance with
the provisions of existing laws and rules.
● Comelec denied Marmeto’s MR. Nonetheless, it noted that Marmeto might opt to 9 Article VI, Sec. 32.
appropriation under the FY 2014 GAA was for the "conduct and supervision 127 of the LGC gives the courts authority to declare "null and void any
of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites." proposition approved pursuant to this Chapter36 for violation of the Constitution
● The term "election" is comprehensive enough to include other kinds of or want of capacity of the Sanggunian concerned to enact the said
electoral exercises, including initiative elections. As earlier mentioned, the measure." Significantly, the power of the courts to nullify propositions for being
COMELEC's constitutional mandate is to enforce and administer all laws relative ultra vires extends only to those already approved, i.e. those which have been
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. The approved by a majority of the votes cast in the initiative election called for the
Constitution further states that the "[f]unds certified by the [COMELEC] as purpose. In other words, the courts can review the terms only of
necessary to defray the expenses for holding regular and special elections, an approved ordinance. It will be premature for the courts to review the
plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in the regular or propositions contained in an initiative petition that has yet to be voted for by the
special appropriations and, once approved shall be released people because at that point, there is no actual controversy that the courts may
automatically."10 Thus, the budgetary allocation for the "regulation of elections" adjudicate.
identified as the COMELEC's MFO 1 should necessarily also cover expenses for ● This begs the question of which tribunal can review the sufficiency of an
the conduct of initiative elections. initiative petition?
● The Court also notes that, aside from the ₱1.4 billion appropriation for the ● Inasmuch as the COMELEC also has quasi-judicial and administrative
"conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and functions, it is the COMELEC which has the power to determine whether the
plebiscites," the COMELEC was also given ₱1.6 billion in the FY 2014 GAA propositions in an initiative petition are within the powers of a
for the "management and supervision of elections and other electoral concerned Sanggunian to enact.
exercises." ● In SBMA v. Comelec, the Court ruled that -while regular courts may take
● Thus, as in Goh , the COMELEC was provided with budgetary allocation for the jurisdiction over 'approved propositions' per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the
conduct of initiative elections. The COMELEC, therefore, committed grave abuse Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may
of discretion in dismissing Marmeto' s second initiative petition on the ground that adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and
there were no funds allocated for the purpose. language are concerned x x x and it may be added, even as to content,
where the proposals or parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the
3. WON COMELEC has the power to review whether the propositions in an 'capacity of the local legislative body to enact.' x x x”
initiative petition are within the power of the concerned Sanggunian to ● The COMELEC's power to review the substance of the propositions is also
enact - YES implied in Section 12 of RA No. 6735, which gives this Court appellate power to
● (SC first discussed why it may rule upon this issue) review the COMELEC's "findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition
● COMELEC: the propositions raised in Marmeto’s second petition were matters for initiative or referendum x x x."
that were not within the powers of the SP to enact.
● Marmeto: The arguments the COMELEC now raises were not the grounds which 4. Marmeto 's propositions in his initiative petition are beyond the powers of
the COMELEC cited in the Second Resolution that is assailed in the the Sanggunian Panlungsod ng Muntinlupa to enact – YES
present petition. He points that the second petition dismissed his second initiative ● Marmeto's initiative petitions propose the following:
petition solely for lack of specific budgetary allocation. There was no mention in (1) The creation of a sectoral council composed of 12 members from various
the assailed resolution that the propositions in his second initiative petition were sectors who will serve as the people's representatives for the implementation
not within the powers of the Sanggunian to enact. This ground was instead cited and management of livelihood programs and projects;
by the COMELEC in its First Resolution which dismissed Marmeto's first (2) The sectoral council will also stand as the people's representatives that will
initiative petition. Hence, he opines that the propriety of the propositions directly propose, enact, approve, or reject ordinances through initiative or
contained in his second initiative petition, not being covered by the assailed referendum;
COMELEC resolution, cannot be reviewed in the present petition. (3) An appropriation of ₱200 million to be allocated for livelihood projects of the
● SC: In several cases, this Court considered issues which were not raised people and other purposes. The net income from the projects will then be
by either party when these issues are necessary for the complete used for the delivery of basic services and facility for Muntinlupa residents;
resolution of the cases. If the Court can review unassigned errors which are (4) The MPP will create the implementing guidelines and procedure for the
necessary to arrive at a just resolution of the case, with all the more reason can it utilization of the appropriated funds, and conduct programs and project
review a matter raised as a defense by a party to uphold the validity of a feasibility studies. It shall comply with the prescribed accounting and auditing
resolution assailed in the case. rules of, and submit monthly accomplishment report to the local government
unit (LGU). It shall also observe transparency and accountability in fund
● (SC now discussed the issue itself) management.
● Section 124(b) of the LGC provides that "[i]nitiatives shall extend only to subjects ● These propositions, however, are either sufficiently covered by or violative of the
or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunian to enact." Section LGC for reasons explained below.
iThere are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an
electoral race. One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due course
to or to cancel his certificate of candidacy.
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Section 40. Disqualifications.—The following persons are disqualified from running for any
iii
ivSection 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and