ARTICLE 172- FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE

INDIVIDUALSAND USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS

K. PEOPLE VS. PACANA

47 PHIL 48
DEC. 19, 1924

FACTS:
These are five related criminal cases for the crimes of falsification of public documents
and estafa committed by means of falsification of public documents, in which the accused are Pedro A.
Pacana, secretary of the provincial board of Misamis, Isidro Adorable, member of the provincial board
of Misamis, and Vicente P. Castro, member of the provincial board of Misamis.

The charge in the first numbered case against Pedro A. Pacana relates to the falsification by the
accused of minutes of the meeting of the provincial board on June 9, 1923, for the alleged purpose of
permitting the district engineer to incur illegal expenses in the reconstruction of a provincial road.

The charge in the second case against the same accused relates to the falsification of minutes
of the provincial board on June 16, 1923.

The charge in the third case against the same accused relates to the falsification of an excerpt
from the minutes of the provincial board of June 9, 1923.

And the last two cases, one against provincial board member Isidro Adorable and Pedro A.
Pacana, and the other against provincial board member Vicente P. Castro and Pedro A. Pacana, relate
to the crimes of estafa committed by means of falsification of public documents, whereby it is alleged
Adorable and Castro were each able to collect the sum of P25 as per diems for two fictitious meetings
of the provincial board.

It is the theory of the prosecution that exhibit documents were prepared by the provincial
secretary with the connivance of the members of the provincial board for illegal purposes. To
substantiate this theory, attention is concentrated on the following prominent facts:

1. Exhibits C and D were seen by the chief clerk of the district auditor, Juan Callante, in the office
of Pacana on the afternoon of June 18, 1923. Copies of Exhibits C and D were made by a clerk
in the office of the district auditor, Juan Borja, on the morning of June 19, 1923.

2. An excerpt from Exhibit C containing resolution No. 224 was received in the office of the
provincial treasurer of Misamis before 5:50 o'clock on the afternoon of June 19, 1923.

3. Another excerpt from Exhibit C containing resolution No. 225, Exhibit Q-3, the basis of the third
prosecution, was received in the office of the district engineer on June 27, 1923, and when the
chief clerk of this office noted the date June 9, 1923, on the minutes and brought it to the attention
of the provincial secretary, the date was changed to June 16, 1923.

The mistake of the secretary was attempted to be rectified by the provincial board on September
20, 1923, by changing the dates of the excerpts to June 16, 1923, and thus another error was
perpetrated. The originals of Exhibits C and D have disappeared, possibly through the machinations of
the provincial secretary. The provincial board of Misamis could not have celebrated a session at
Cagayan before June 18, 1923, because of its absence on an inspection trip, and could not have
celebrated a session on the afternoon of June 19, 1923, as claimed by the defense, because of
a velada held on the same afternoon in the intermediate school of Cagayan at which the provincial
governor and member Castro were present. And finally, before the district auditor, the three accused
re-affirmed the fact that sessions of the provincial board were held on June 9 and 16, 1923.

The theory of the defense is diametrically opposed to that of the prosecution. Defendants thesis
is simple and is to the effect that on account of the carelessness of the provincial secretary and the
amount of work thrown on his inexperienced shoulders, error was committed, and that, instead of
meetings of the provincial board being held on June 9 and 16, 1923, meetings were in reality held on
June 19 and June 21, 1923.

ISSUE: WON there was an international and deliberate falsification of public documents on the part of
the accused, or whether there was merely a human error committed, in which criminal intent was wholly
lacking.

HELD:
YES. (in favor of the accused)

Oral testimony I this case is mostly circumstantial in nature, thus, that which presented by the
prosecution, is hard to say, unless there was exaggeration on the part of some of the witnesses.

Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be crime. Actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. Ignorance or mistake as to
particular facts, honest and real, will as a general rule, exempt the doer from criminal responsibility.
The exception, of course, is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference to consequences, which
is equivalent to a criminal intent. The element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of
negligence and imprudence.

Citing the decision of Supreme Court of Spain on February 25, 1885

(U.S. vs. Mateo [1913], 25 Phil., 324, 334; U.S. vs. Reyes [1902], 1 Phil., 341; U.S. vs. Ah Chong
[1910], 15 Phil., 488; U.S. vs. Catolico [1911], 18 Phil., 504; and Guevara's Penal Code, 2nd edition,
pp. 1-3, 401-406)

Considering that even though in the falsification of public or official documents,

whether by public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present
the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction
to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and
the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, it must, nevertheless, be
borne in mind that the change in the public document must be such as to affect the
integrity of the same or to change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for, unless
that happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the
crime which is required by article 1 of the Penal Code; considering that the fact that Don
Augustin Montes Moreno set out the proceedings as of a date prior to that on which they
actually occurred, and therefore incorrectly, the remaining part of the document being
true, ... neither affected the integrity or truth of said proceedings not affected in any
essential way their results or effects, it is necessary to conclude that the criminal intent
mentioned in the previous observation was absent; considering that, even though the
accused consciously attached incorrect dates to the proceedings, nevertheless that act
does not take on the character of a crime, and for that reason the Audiencia de Huelva
erred in convicting the accused …
 It is a serious matter to be responsible for sending the accused to prison for long terms. All
reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in to the benefit of
the prisoners at bar. The Government has suffered no loss. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
of the crime charged and the other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test
of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. We cannot bring ourselves to find these
accused guilty on the facts of record.

It results, therefore, that we must, as we hereby do, reverse the judgments appealed from and
acquit the accused of the charges laid against them, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

PEOPLE VS. SERGIO MENDOZA

93 PHIL 581
JULY 31, 1953

FACTS:
Sergio Mendoza was charged with falsification of a public or official document.

On July 27, 1949, Mendoza, being then employed as inspector of the Division of Sanitary
Engineering, of the Office of the City Health Officer in Manila, commit various acts of falsification on a
public and official document, to wit:

1. Official Receipt No. 188903-V, issued by the City Treasurer's Office, City of Manila, by erasing
the name "Elena Manansala" and the figure "P1.00" therein and

2. Afterwards, writing, inserting and intercalating, or, causing it to be written, inserted and
intercalated thereon in such a way as to change its import and meaning, the words "Roberto B.
Almaden," "forty-six only" and the figure "46" thereby making it appear that said receipt was
issued to the said Roberto B. Almaden and that the latter paid the sum of P46 to the City
Treasurer's Office, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, Official Receipt No.
188903-V was in the name of Elena Manansala as aforesaid and said receipt was issued to her
when she paid the amount of P1 to the Department of Engineering and Public Works, in said
City, for the issuance of a duplicate copy of a building fee.

Upon arraignment he entered a plea of not guilty, but on 18 February 1952, the date set for the
trial of the case, with the consent of the trial court and the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, assisted
by counsel, entered a plea of guilty for the crime of falsification described and punished in the last
paragraph of article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court sentenced him to suffer 4 months
and 1 day of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of P50, or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and costs. From this sentence the defendant has appealed.

On 14 June 1952, Vicente T. Velasco, Jr., the attorney de oficio appointed by the court, filed a
motion stating that he could not find a way to question the legality of the penalty imposed, which is the
only question raised by the appeal.

In the Solicitor General’s brief, he recommends that the penalty be not less than 1 month and 1
day nor more than 4 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and not less than 1 year and 1 day nor
more than 1 year and 8 months of prision correccional, as maximum, because the penalty imposed by
the lower court is below the range provided by law.
ISSUE: WON the penalty imposed for the crime of Falsification of Public Document by public officer
was proper.

HELD:
NO. Neither the penalty imposed by the trial court nor that recommended by the Solicitor General
is in accordance with law. The penalty should be not less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, and not less than 3 years, 6 months and 21 days and not more than 4 years, 9 months and
10 days of prision correccional, as maximum, the accessories of the law and a fine of P50, or subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and costs.

Falsification of a public document by a public officer or employee or by a private person is a very

serious crime punished with prision mayor to its full extent and with prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, respectively, and in both with a fine not to exceed P5,000.

Being an employee or inspector of the Division of Sanitary Engineering of the Office of the City
Health Officer the defendant was not a private person. He could be considered as such if
notwithstanding his government employment he took no advantage thereof in committing the
falsification. The crime of falsification described and punished in article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
is committed by a private individual who does any of the falsifications described in the next preceding
article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document;
and by a person who, to the damage of a third party, or with intent to cause such damage, shall in any
private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

The last paragraph of article 172 punishes a private person who introduces in evidence in any
judicial proceeding and uses any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article or in
any of the subdivisions of the article. For that reason the crime of falsification defined and punished in
the last paragraph of article 172 is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the information
for falsification of a public document by a public officer or employee or by a private individual.

The crime punished in the last paragraph of article 172 of the Revised Penal Code may be a
lesser offense but it certainly cannot be deemed necessarily included in the crime of falsification of a
public document by a public officer or employee or by a private person. Hence section 4, Rule 114,
was misapplied.

The trial court allowed the defendant to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense for that of not
guilty, to a more serious crime previously entered under and pursuant to section 4, Rule 114. The
substitution of plea could not lawfully be made taking into consideration the fact that the crime charged
in the information is falsification of a public document.

ARTICLE 173
FALSIFICATION OF WIRELESS CABLE x x x

U.S. VS. ROMERO

17 PHIL 76

FACTS:
ARTICLE 174
FALSE MEDICAL CERTIFICATES, FALSE CERTIFICATE O MERIT OR SERVICE

U.S. VS. MICHELENA

4 PHIL 492
APRIL 29, 1905

FACTS:
In an application to the Civil Service Board for examination, a document printed in accordance
with the form prescribed by said Board, and in that part thereof which contains recommendations of the
applicant, certificate No. 3 appears to be subscribed by Frank N. West, the latter having neither
subscribed it nor written the contents thereof, the same not being correct in some respects, viz, as
regards the age of the party certifying and the length of time which he knew the candidate
recommended. The crime was fully proven. The candidate, now the defendant, failed to present himself
for examination, notwithstanding having in his possession the ticket of admission.

The judge in his judgment qualifies this fact as an attempt at falsification of a public document.
It is an attempt because the examination did not take place, and not having taken place the document
was not put on record, for which reason it never became a public document. Therefore, the court
sentenced the defendant to six months’ arresto mayor and a fine of 1,000 pesetas, or the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment.

ISSUE: WON the crime is falsification of a public instrument.

HELD:
NO.

The fact that the defendant did, in one of the certificates in an application for an examination to
the Civil Service Board, and, in that part thereof containing recommendations of the applicant, subscribe
the name of a person, the latter neither having subscribed nor written the contents thereof, same not
being true in some respects, is neither falsification nor attempt of falsification of a public instrument, but
merely a falsification of a certificate of merit, provided for and punished in article 311 of the Penal Code.

U.S. VS. DELOSO

11 PHIL 180
AUGUST 13, 1908

FACTS:
Rufino Deloso stated under oath that he was a resident of the said town, and that at the date of
the next municipal election he would have resided therein for a period of six months; and that he was
in every way entitled to vote.

At the municipal elections held in the town of Oroquieta, in the same province, on the 5th of
December, 1905, Ruflno Deloso was elected by a majority vote to the office of municipal president. The
election was protested by several residents of the town on the ground that the successful candidate
had no legal residence therein. In his defense Deloso stated under oath on the 4th of January, 1906,
before Vicente Fortich, notary public of Oroquieta, that he had been, and was at the time, a resident
of the said town, and that he had resided therein from the month of April, 1902, until the above-
mentioned date.

A complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal charging Rufino Deloso with the crime of falsification
of official documents, and the court below, in view of the evidence adduced at the trial, found him guilty
of the crime defined and punished by Article 311, in connection with article 310, of the Penal Code, and
sentenced him to the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, to suffer the accessory penalties and to
pay costs. From this judgment the accused has appealed.

ISSUE: WON Deloso is guilty of Falsification.

HELD:
YES. (Trial court is affirmed, against the accused)

From the above stated facts, fully established in the case, it appears that the crime of falsifying
a certificate issued by a public officer was committed by a private person, who used it, perverting the
truth in the narration of facts, when exercising the right of suffrage at the municipal elections held in
December, 1904, in the pueblo of Jimenez, Province of Misamis.

Article 310 of the Penal Code provides that

"A public official who shall issue a false certificate of merit or service, of, good conduct, of property
or of other similar circumstances, shall be punished with the penalties of suspension in its medium
and maximum degrees and a line of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas."

Article 311 of the said code prescribes that

"An individual who shall falsify a certificate of the kinds mentioned in the preceding articles shall
be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor.

This provision is applicable to the person who shall knowingly make use of such false certificate."

The document offered in evidence, issued by the municipal secretary of Jimenez, is not,
strictly speaking, a public document, but it belongs to the class of documents the falsification of
which is specially punished by articles 306 to 311 of the Penal Code; therefore, the provisions
of articles 301 and 302, in connection with article 300 of said code, are not applicable to the
present case.

The said document or certificate was used with a knowledge that its contents were false,
in that Deloso was not a resident of Jimenez. The falsity of the statement, made by him to the
municipal secretary of said pueblo, was proven by another notarial document executed by the
same Deloso who also stated under oath, that he was a resident of Oroquieta both before and
after the year 1904; it is therefore unquestionable that the accused has incurred the penalty
imposed by article 311 of the Penal Code, above quoted.

The defendant pleaded not guilty and alleged that he signed the document marked Exhibit
B, without having read it, and that he was not acquainted with the provisions of the Municipal
Code as to the residence required of an elector. These allegations cannot be sustained, nor do
they constitute an exemption of the accused, inasmuch as, according to article 2 of the Civil
Code, ignorance of the law does not excuse a person from compliance therewith.

Furthermore, in view of the degree of education and intelligence of the accused who, as
appears in the proceedings, assisted a resident of the pueblo of Jimenez in his complaint
against the municipal president for violation of the Municipal Code, there can be no doubt but
that he was acquainted with the said code, and that he maliciously and knowingly made use of
the certificate issued by the municipal secretary of Jimenez, containing the false declarations
made by himself, in order to exercise the right of suffrage at the elections in that town, although
he was well aware that he was neither a resident of Jimenez nor entitled to participate in such
elections.

ARTICLE 175
USING FALSE CERTIFICATES

NEGROS MERCHANTS ENTERPRISES, INC.

VS. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 150918

CIVIL CASE

RULES OF COURT, Rule 7, Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in
the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of
court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

ARTICLE 176
MANUFACTURING AND POSSESSION OF INSTRUMENTS OR IMPLEMENTS FOR
FALSIFICATION

U.S. VS. ANGELES

6 PHIL 435

CASE NOT FOUND

 PEOPL VS. FELIPE MAGPALE
70 PHIL 177

FACTS:
A criminal complaint was lodged against Felipe Magpale charging him with a violation of Article
176 of the Revised Penal Code.

On 25th day of March, 1938, Magpale knowingly and without lawful purpose, have in his
possession, custody and control one brand of the municipal government of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, with
the intent of using it for falsifying the official brand of the said municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, in
public documents, to wit: Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle. All contrary to law.

Convinced, from the evidence and that there was reasonable ground to believe that the
defendant committed the crime complained of, the justice of the peace remanded the records of the
case to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for further proceedings. In CFI, Magple was informed
with the information charging him an offense, to wit:

That on about the 25th day of March, 1938, Magpale did then and there voluntarily, maliciously,
illegal and criminally make an iron brand purported to be of the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija,
with the intention of using it knowingly in the falsification of certificates of ownership of large cattle, said
manufactured brand having been found in the possession of said accused, which is contrary to law.

CFI finds the defendant Felipe Magpale guilty of a violation of article 176 of the Revised Penal
Code.

ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in finding the acts imputed to the defendant punishable, as coming
within the purview of article 176 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:
NO.

Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

ART. 176. Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for

falsification. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and a fine not to exceed 10,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall make
or introduce into the Philippine Islands any stamps, dies, marks, or other instruments or
implemented intended to be used in the commission of the offenses of counterfeiting or
falsification mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter.

Appellant himself admits that the ordered the questioned iron brand to be made, wherefore, he
is criminally liable for the making thereof. (Article 17, Revised Penal Code.) It also appears that the said
brand is an exact imitation of that owned and used by the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, to
brand its own large cattle and to counterbrand large cattle belonging to its inhabitants.
ARTICLE 177
USURPATION OF AUTHORITY AND OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS

PEOPL VS. FELIPE HILVANO

99 PHIL 655
JULY 31, 1956

FACTS:
When Mayor Fidencio Latorre of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila on official business
early in the morning of September 22, 1952, he designated the herein defendant Francisco
Hilvano, councilor, to discharge the duties of his office.

Later, during office hours on that same day, Vice-Mayor Juan Latorre went to the
municipal building. And having found Hilvano acting in the place of the Mayor, he served written
notices to the corresponding municipal officers, including Hilvano, that he (Juan Latorre) as Vice-
Mayor was assuming the duties of the absent mayor. However, Hilvano refused to yield, arguing
that he had been designated by the Mayor. Whereupon the Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the
Executive Secretary informing the latter of the controversy. And the said Secretary replied by
letter, that under sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code it was the Vice-Mayor who
should discharge the duties of the Mayor during the latter's temporary absence. Shown this
official pronouncement, Hilvano still refused to surrender the position. Again the Vice-Mayor
sought the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, who by letter, replied that the Vice-Mayor had the
right to the office. Notwithstanding such opinion which was exhibited to him Hilvano declined
to vacate the post, which he held for about a month, appointing some policemen, solemnizing
marriages and collecting the corresponding salary for mayor.

ISSUE: WON Francisco Hilvano is guilty of usurpation of public authority.

HELD:
YES. Republic Act No. 379 which amended, Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, reads:

"Usurpation of authority or official functions. Any person who shall knowingly and falsely
represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the
Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position,
shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or of any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled
to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correctional in its minimum and medium periods.”

It is contended however for the appellant that he committed no usurpation of authority because
he was a councilor, an official of the Government, and that such crime may only be committed by private
individuals. He cited a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of 1880 interpreting the
corresponding article of the Spanish Penal Code, which is the origin of our own Penal Code/ But it
appears that in subsequent decisions the same court convicted of the offense of usurpation certain
officials who without proper authority discharged the functions of other officials, e.g., a municipal judge
(Jan. 22, 1890) and a vice-mayor (teniente de alcalde) who discharged the functions of the alcalde.

There is actually no reason to restrict the operation of Article 177 to private individuals. For one
thing it applies to "any person"; and where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
 Furthermore, contrary to appellant's assumption that Articles 238-241 of the Revised Penal
Code penalize all kinds of usurption of official functions by public officers, said articles merely punish
interference by officers of one of the three departments of government (legislative, executive and
judicial) with the functions of officials of another department. Said articles do not cover usurption of
one officer or employee of a given department of the powers of another officer in the
same department. For instance, the exercise by a bureau employee of the powers of his director.

There is no excuse for defendant-appellant. In the beginning he might have pleaded good
faith, invoking the designation by the Mayor; but after he had been shown the letter of the Executive
Secretary and the opinion of the provincial fiscal, he had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to the
position. He was rightfully convicted.

PEOPLE VS. LIDRES

G.R. No. L-12495
July 26, 1960
FACTS:
Dionisio Lidres was charged in CFI o Cebu with the crime of usurpation of official functions as
defined and penalized in Republic Act No. 10.

On 22nd day of February, 1954, Lidres, with deliberate intent and without pretense of official
position perform acts pertaining to the position of the second grade class of the Biasong Elementary
School of the aforementioned municipality, a position assigned to and occupied by Miss Joseta Diutay
who had been duly appointed to said position. The records disclose that Magdalena P. Echavez is a
public school teacher who was granted maternity leave beginning the first school day of January, 1954
and ending on March of the same year. To fill up the vacancy expected to be created by said leave of
Echavez, Josita Diotay and defendant Lidres filed their respective applications as substitute teachers.

On December 30, 1953, Diotay was recommended by the supervising teacher of the
aforementioned school Hilario Laspiñas, to fill up the position of Echavez. Laspiñas, however,
requested Diotay to sign agreement take over Echavez' position on a "50-50" basis, that is, the period
from January, 1954 would be equally divided between them. Thereafter, Diotay received her
appointment (Exh. B) as substitute teacher, vice Echavez, effective January 4, 1954. Diotay then took
over the job of Echavez and began teaching the second grade class in said school.

On February 12, 1954, apparently on the strength of the agreement, defendant appeared at
Biasong Elementary School, armed with a prepared letter of resignation for the signature of Diotay.
When the defendant asked Diotay to sign said letter of resignation, the latter refused. Subsequently,
defendant made known to Diotay that whether she liked it or not, he would take over her class on
Monday, (date February 22), went to the classroom where Diotay was conducting her classes, and
insisted to take over the same, but Diotay tried to hold on. As a consequence, both held classes, Diotay
on 2 rows of pupils and defendant, on the remaining 2 rows. In order to assert his authority, defendant
also erased Diotay's named from the attendance chart, and placed his own. Annoyed by defendant's
actuation, Diotay, left the classroom, and reported the matter to the principal teacher, Exequiel Tecson,
at Balamban. The latter advised her to return to her post, which she did. When she arrived at her
classroom in the afternoon of the same day (February 22), defendant was still there, holding the class
until 4:00 o'clock. In view of this, Diotay went back to inform said principal about defendant's insistence
in taking over her class.

On the following day, February 23, 1954, both Diotay and defendant were summoned by the
supervising teacher (Laspiñas) for a conference in Cebu City. At said conference, said supervising
teacher told Diotay to continue teaching, while defendant was advised not to go back to school. Without
heeding said instruction, defendant, on February 24, 1954, without any authority whatsoever, again
took over Diotay's class, against the latter's will.

ISSUE: WON Lidres is guilty of usurpation of official functions.

HELD:
YES.

the law, as originally appearing in Article 177 of Act No. 3815 (Revised Penal Code), provides:

ART. 177. Usurpation of official functions. — Any person who, under pretense of official
position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer, without
being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis supplied.)

Granting, arguendo, that Republic Act No. 10 is an amendment to Article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code and not merely an implementation thereof (2 Padilla, Revised Penal Code Annotated [1958
Ed.] 267), or an emergency measure as stated, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 379
effective June 14, 1949, would constitute an amendment thereof by restoring the element of pretense
of official position in the offense of usurpation of official functions, originally required by Article 177 prior
to its amendment by the latter Act.

Under Republic Act No. 379 then, the law in force at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense by defendant, pretense of official position is an essential element of the crime of usurpation of
official functions. But the information specifically charges that defendant committed the offense "without
pretense of official position". Under circumstances, the facts alleged in the information fail to constitute
an offense. Neither can defendant be convicted of usurpation of authority, as distinguished from
usurpation of official functions, under the first paragraph of Article 177, as amended by said Republic
Act No. 379, namely, that of representing to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department
or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, inasmuch as the information
does not charge the same.

ARTICLE 178
USING FICTITIOUS NAME AND CONCEALING TRUE NAME

U.S. VS. TO LEE PIU

35 PHIL 4
FACTS:
The appellant was charged with using a false name. The evidence is to the effect that he came
to the Philippine Islands in 1911 and presented a section six certificate, which is attached to the record
as Exhibit A, wherein his name appears as To Lee Piu. Thereafter, he attached to an application for a
passport the name Toribio Jalijali. Said application was accompanied by the affidavits of two witnesses
and by a baptismal certificate showing that a person by that name was born in the Philippine Islands in
1878.

On the trial there was no denial of the fact that appellant signed the name Toribio Jalijali to the
application for a passport. And the only evidence which may be regarded as having been contradicted
in the case is that given by the defendant himself when he testified that he was born in the Philippine
Islands, that his name is Toribio Jalijali, that he went to China at an early age, and, feeling doubtful as
to his ability to prove his right to reenter, applied to the American consul at Canton for a section six
certificate; that, on such application, he stated to the consul that his name was Toribio Jalijali, and that,
upon being told by the clerk of the consulate that it was not necessary to put his surname in such
application, wrote therein the Christian name Toribio alone.

The charge is prosecuted on the theory that To Lee Piu appellant's correct name and that the
name Toribio Jalijali is false. Counsel for appellant maintains that the Government, in order to maintain
the action, must prove
(a) that the two names in question were different, and
(b) that the name alleged to be false was in fact false;

and that the failure of the Government to meet these, or either these, requirements must result in an
acquittal. It is contended on this appeal that the Government did not meet either of these requirements.

ISSUE: WON To Lee Piu used fisctitious name/ concealed his true name.

HELD:
YES.

It is undoubted that To Lee Piu was the name by which the appellant was known in China. It is
the name he gave to the American consul and it is the only name he gave. He alleged that he was born
in China in October, 1878, and applied for a certificate which is required of Chinese persons only. Upon
his own statements and the statement of his government he was given a section six certificate. It would
seem to us that these facts are sufficient to establish, prima facie at least, that the appellant is a
Chinese person and a Chinese subject; that he was born in China in October, 1878; and that his name
is To Lee Piu.

These facts being established it is incumbent on the appellant to relieve himself of the charge
that, when he stated under oath in his application for a passport that his name was Toribio Jalijali and
that he was born in Santa Cruz, Manila, on the 27th of April, 1878, he did not tell the truth; or to give
such proof with reference thereto as would raise in the mind of the trial court a reasonable doubt as to
his true name. The only evidence offered by the appellant in this connection was a certificate of baptism
of an infant named Toribio Jalijali, born in Santa Cruz, Manila, in April, 1878. The names of several
witnesses appear in this certificate. None of them were produced on the trial; nor was it shown that
these witnesses, or any of them, were dead, or that the appellant was unable to procure their presence
at the trial. No effort was made to find or offer as a witness his alleged father or mother.

HOCK LIAN VS. REPUBLIC

17 SCRA 188

FACTS:
Appellant contends that the lower court erred:
(1) in holding that the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation;
(2) in not holding that appellee uses an alias without court authority and in violation of the Anti-
Alias Law;
(3) in not holding that appellee had failed to report his true income; and (4) in not holding that
appellee has no lucrative occupation.
 Appellee, a citizen of the Republic of China, arrived in the Philippines on April 30, 1927. He used
to reside in Zamboanga City but since March 1, 1940 he has been living in Dumaguete City. He is
married to Tan Ko Kiem, also known as Alice Tan, a Chinese national, by whom he has three children,
two of whom are school age and are enrolled at the St. Paul's College, Dumaguete City, an educational
institution recognized by the government, not limited to any particular race or nationality and where
subjects on Philippine history, government and civics are part of the curriculum. Appellee himself
finished his first year high school education at the Zamboanga Chinese High School, Zamboanga City.

He speaks the English, language and the Cebuano-Visayan dialect. A merchant by occupation,
he has a store in Colon Street, Dumaguete City where he sells rice, corn and general merchandise. He
has two cargo trucks worth P17,000 and office equipment worth about P200. His net income was
P5,939.36 in 1958; P4,114.49 in 1959, and P5,659.30 in 1960. To prove that he has none of the
disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law, he presented tax and police clearances;
clearances from the Philippine Constabulary, the City Fiscal, the Provincial Fiscal, the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental and the Municipal Court of Dumaguete City; and a medical certificate of
the City Health Officer.

ISSUE: WON appellant Hock Lian has committed the crime of using fictitious name:

HELD:
YES.

For the purposes of this appeal only the second, third and fourth errors assigned by appellant
need be considered. The first of them refers to appellee's use of alias. Under the law, except as a
pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he
was christened or by which he has been known since childhood, or such substitute name as may have
been authorized by a competent court (Section 1, Commonwealth Act 142). Aside from the name "Ong
Hock Lian," appellee is using the alias "Julian Ong." There is no evidence that appellee has been
baptized with the latter name or that he has been known by it since childhood, or that the court has
authorized the use thereof. Appellee has therefore committed a violation of the Anti-Alias Law.